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BAC/Sud Aviation Concorde - Development, Variants, Projects
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As a teenager I could see (and hear) it fly over my house every day.Richard N said:
Yeah beautiful… remember seeing it takeoff and landing at CdG when I was a kid and took plane from there.
Was hypnotic...
Was hypnotic...
The arguments over Concorde are well rehearsed. Everyone agrees that it was a beautiful aircraft and an outstanding engineering achievement. Everyone knows that it was a commercial failure and cost the British and French taxpayer a LOT of money. What seems harder to get an authoritative view on is whether Concorde ever could have been a commercial success. There are articles in the Flight archive from the early to mid 1960s, explaining how a supersonic airliner could do two transatlantic flights a day, so a 144-seat Concorde was equivalent to a 300-seater subsonic airliner. The designers seem to have hoped that, like jet airliners a few years earlier, supersonic flight would start off as a premium service for the elite, and then become the norm for the masses.
What happened in reality of course, is that the programme slipped, and in the highly inflationary environment of the 1960s, delay meant spiralling costs. The understandable concerns of environmentalists and those who would be living under the flightpath restricted the routes open to Concorde. Then the oil price exploded, the economics of the aircraft went from dubious to hopeless, Pan Am cancelled their options, and everyone else followed suit. The Concorde B model, with better range, noise and economics, never got off the drawing board. But could it have been different? Might it even have worked out better for Britain or France to develop a SST as a one-nation programme, since the mechanics of collaboration seem to have added to the delays? If Concorde had been ready for service in 1972, as originally hoped, would the airlines have decided that they needed a couple for reasons of prestige?
Can anyone imagine a scenario where Concorde might have at least broken even?
What happened in reality of course, is that the programme slipped, and in the highly inflationary environment of the 1960s, delay meant spiralling costs. The understandable concerns of environmentalists and those who would be living under the flightpath restricted the routes open to Concorde. Then the oil price exploded, the economics of the aircraft went from dubious to hopeless, Pan Am cancelled their options, and everyone else followed suit. The Concorde B model, with better range, noise and economics, never got off the drawing board. But could it have been different? Might it even have worked out better for Britain or France to develop a SST as a one-nation programme, since the mechanics of collaboration seem to have added to the delays? If Concorde had been ready for service in 1972, as originally hoped, would the airlines have decided that they needed a couple for reasons of prestige?
Can anyone imagine a scenario where Concorde might have at least broken even?
MaxLegroom
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One scenario I might imagine involves the 747 not existing. Part of the reason that airlines didn't buy the Concorde was that many had bought 747s that were too large for even their densest routes at the time, and thus were not economical to operate at the time. This is why NASA, in the end, used a modified 747 to transport the Space Shuttle. Aircraft were available, and waiting.
The decisions to produce our wide body jetliners did none of America's airframe manufacturers any good. The 747 proved nearly as much trouble, and nearly as big a threat to the company, as the 2707, there were substantial problems with the JT9D engines, and the battle between Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas did damage to both.
Another, and perhaps as far fetched, scenario would involve there being no oil crises brought on by OPEC. It's unlikely, as your typical American of the time was driving a car that got about 12 mpg in normal use.
The best scenario would have involved both of these, and protests over noise and the sonic boom being stifled. Then the airlines would be able to use SSTs over land as well. This scenario might also have helped the US SST, which also would have needed a few more votes in the Senate to continue. It's not impossible that there would have been a place for both aircraft.
The decisions to produce our wide body jetliners did none of America's airframe manufacturers any good. The 747 proved nearly as much trouble, and nearly as big a threat to the company, as the 2707, there were substantial problems with the JT9D engines, and the battle between Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas did damage to both.
Another, and perhaps as far fetched, scenario would involve there being no oil crises brought on by OPEC. It's unlikely, as your typical American of the time was driving a car that got about 12 mpg in normal use.
The best scenario would have involved both of these, and protests over noise and the sonic boom being stifled. Then the airlines would be able to use SSTs over land as well. This scenario might also have helped the US SST, which also would have needed a few more votes in the Senate to continue. It's not impossible that there would have been a place for both aircraft.
That Hawker Siddeley SST is a cool-looking machine...
Max, thanks for your perspective on the impact of the 747 on Concorde (and, by implication, on the US SST programme too.) I'd always understood that the 747 killed off Concorde by dramatically bringing down costs per passenger mile, so that supersonic flight no longer made economic sense. But I suppose it's always more complicated.
Max, thanks for your perspective on the impact of the 747 on Concorde (and, by implication, on the US SST programme too.) I'd always understood that the 747 killed off Concorde by dramatically bringing down costs per passenger mile, so that supersonic flight no longer made economic sense. But I suppose it's always more complicated.
MaxLegroom
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Actually, one way the 747 brought down the Concorde wasn't superior seat mile costs, it was, and perhaps I've posted this elsewhere, that when it came time to buy Concorde, airlines were strapped for cash from flying half empty 747s. Seat/mile costs are a matter of filling the seats. If you're flying 160 people in a plane configured to carry 350, the extra fuel burned and added aircraft expense mean higher, not lower seat mile costs.
If I recall correctly, the first energy crisis came shortly after these decisions had been made, ensuring that Concorde was a topic that they wouldn't return to.
Still, it's lovely to see these images. These concepts are quite interesting.
If I recall correctly, the first energy crisis came shortly after these decisions had been made, ensuring that Concorde was a topic that they wouldn't return to.
Still, it's lovely to see these images. These concepts are quite interesting.
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While cataloging part of a large donation to the Museum - the one Mark Nankivil has been sharing those goodies from these last few days - I came across two 1968 BAC/SUD reports for United Airlines as part of their sales effort to sell the Concorde, and those reports might be relevant to your question. The first one, titled "United Air Lines Discounted Cash Flow Variations C.12" works with "...the associated 'Market Survey and D.C.F. Analysis' document C.4..." and gives "computer results & plots" of Boeing 747 Operations, Boeing 2707 operations, Concorde operations, and mixed fleet operations. The other is titled "United Air Lines Route Analysis C.6" which gives cost assumptions for United Air Lines for summer and winter season operations. I'm not much of a numbers cruncher, but something did catch my attention in the introduction. Fuel Price - 11 cents per U.S. Gallon, and Oil Price $7.50 per U.S. Gallon.andy_d said:
To the non-number cruncher these documents are quite dry, and the C.12 one has some has some fading in the pages toward the end of the report. If anyone here is interested in seeing these, I'll place them on the pile of things for Mark to scan for the Museum then he can either post the PDFs here or make them available on request.
National Research Institutions explored high payload/range supersonics for military application. There were funds nowhere for solely-commercial applications. Engine longevity and structures-in-heat improved to permit USAF 8/52 to fund (to be) Convair B-58. In UK, RAE settled on the (Meteor-esque) layout funded 1953 as Bristol T.188 proof vehicle for 1954-funded Avro 730 recce/bomber, off metallurgy-industry novel tools for stainless steel. USSR and Dassault settled on alloy/M.2.2 for M-50 Bounder (flew 1957) and Mirage IV (flew 6/59).
RAE's Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee sat languidly 1957-61 as just one among many such Advisory talk-shops (Swept Wing, Boundary Layer Control, Gas Turbine Collaboration...) It did not concern itself with what was to be transported - ASMs, recce pallets, other military loads, people.
By 10/8/61: UK had changed its mind on "Europe" and knocked on the door of the Club of Rome; France wanted a longer range Super-Mirage IV; USSR wanted a practical Bounder; US funded (to be) B-70, 10/61. So, off we all went - military, not civil.
UK 11/64 tried to chop (to be) Concorde, but 29/11/62 Memorandum of Understanding (Govts., as sovereigns, do not enter mundane "contracts") had included no break clause - a UK inspiration to prevent CDG lifting all precious UK lifeblood Intellectual Property (?!!?) in Project Week One, then decamping over the hills. So, onwards, now solely-civil as UK and France had chosen to replace/supplement deep penetration Air with FBMs.
USAF 1964 funding for Very Heavy structure, Very Big Fans (to be C-5A/TF39) could have/should have caused UK/France to abandon Concorde, but: Dr. A.Russell (BAC Technical Director), A Span of Wings, Airlife, 1992, P.178: “In one respect Concorde bore straight comparison to (T.167 Brabazon) - no questions from anywhere had been asked on comparative airline operating costs.” "A good example of how a Govt. can find itself supporting a glamorous scientific break-through which does not make commercial sense.” Defence, and Treasury Minister D.Healey,The Time of My Life, Penguin, 1990, P328. Big fans permitted Singapore Airlines to schedule to Heathrow about the same but dramatically cheaper on 747/PW JT9D-7Q as on its brief Concorde experiment.
RAE's Supersonic Transport Aircraft Committee sat languidly 1957-61 as just one among many such Advisory talk-shops (Swept Wing, Boundary Layer Control, Gas Turbine Collaboration...) It did not concern itself with what was to be transported - ASMs, recce pallets, other military loads, people.
By 10/8/61: UK had changed its mind on "Europe" and knocked on the door of the Club of Rome; France wanted a longer range Super-Mirage IV; USSR wanted a practical Bounder; US funded (to be) B-70, 10/61. So, off we all went - military, not civil.
UK 11/64 tried to chop (to be) Concorde, but 29/11/62 Memorandum of Understanding (Govts., as sovereigns, do not enter mundane "contracts") had included no break clause - a UK inspiration to prevent CDG lifting all precious UK lifeblood Intellectual Property (?!!?) in Project Week One, then decamping over the hills. So, onwards, now solely-civil as UK and France had chosen to replace/supplement deep penetration Air with FBMs.
USAF 1964 funding for Very Heavy structure, Very Big Fans (to be C-5A/TF39) could have/should have caused UK/France to abandon Concorde, but: Dr. A.Russell (BAC Technical Director), A Span of Wings, Airlife, 1992, P.178: “In one respect Concorde bore straight comparison to (T.167 Brabazon) - no questions from anywhere had been asked on comparative airline operating costs.” "A good example of how a Govt. can find itself supporting a glamorous scientific break-through which does not make commercial sense.” Defence, and Treasury Minister D.Healey,The Time of My Life, Penguin, 1990, P328. Big fans permitted Singapore Airlines to schedule to Heathrow about the same but dramatically cheaper on 747/PW JT9D-7Q as on its brief Concorde experiment.
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Dear Boys & Girls, here is a vintage 10" x 5½" photograph that I bought earlier this month at the Heathrow Aviation Enthusiasts' Air Fair at Kempton Park showing an original Concorde publicity model in Pan American World Airways Inc. livery......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Dear Boys & Girls, here is a vintage 7" x 9½" photograph that I bought earlier this month at the Heathrow Aviation Enthusiasts' Air Fair at Kempton Park showing an original Concorde publicity model in Compagnie Nationale Air France livery......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Great posts, everyone! ;-)
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Dear Boys & Girls, here is another vintage 10" x 5½" photograph that I bought on 8th May 2016 at the Heathrow Aviation Enthusiasts' Air Fair at Kempton Park showing an original Concorde publicity model in Pan American World Airways Inc. livery......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Great! Wasn't this mere wishful thinking on the part of BAC and Sud-Aviation?? Surely there is no way Pan Am would have eyed towards the Concorde, when they were sold to Boeing's own SST from the very start, right?
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Hmm... Interesting. I'm not an airline expert and I figured Pan Am had picked Boeing because it was the American design. So it was actually Boeing's putting Pan Am all over their SST artwork that was a clever marketing ploy? :-\RLBH said:
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Pan American World Airways Inc. was one of the three launch "customers" for the Concorde and alongside BOAC & Air France, had the greatest customer airline input into the design......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Air India International had 2 Concordes on "order/option" from 15th JUly 1964 to February 1975 (a saved image from my computer)......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Continental Air Lines Inc. had 2 Concordes on "option/order" from 24th July 1963 to March 1973......
Terry (Caravellarella)
Terry (Caravellarella)
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Gosh... So many missed opportunities for the most amazing airliner ever produced... :-\
Thanks for fixing my highly defective airline culture!
Thanks for fixing my highly defective airline culture!
Wow seems this add image is a painting by Paul Lengellé . For those who remember , he did a lot of Le Fana old issues covers and was a renowned aviation painter.Caravellarella said:
Some examples :
http://www.galeriemarineenre.fr/oeuvre.php?artiste=74
