HMS Hood 1942 Large Repair

[Flying Sorcerer]

How long would the reconstructions have taken?

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I would say, depending on the extent of the rebuild, anywhere from 12 to 24 months.

 

[fishpond]

You might want to know that the Admiralty did plan to build more Vanguards, using twin 15s from the R class, which were to have been scrapped, having been subject to only the most minimal improvements in the 1930s. In 1939-40 the Admiralty was much concerned over the possibility that the Japanese were building new battleships (but hadn't the slightest idea of what was involved), and it saw the Vanguards as the least painful way of augmenting the fleet in the East. For a time, for example, there was hope (in the Admiralty) that Australia would pay for or operate Vanguard herself. This was 1940-41, and you can find a hint of Australian interest in a battleship in the Australian official history. Of course nothing came of either the Australian fantasy or of junking Rs to get more Vanguards, because by the time that might have happened there were rather more urgent concerns.

On Hood, she was considered the first true fast battleship, and as such revolutionary, although some might see much the same thing in the German battlecruisers. What happened to her was extraordinary, as it appears that the fatal shell hit roughly lengthwise, where she -- and the QEs and Rs -- was poorly protected. It also seems to have had a rather long fuze delay, which was why it exploded in just the wrong place. After the action, there was an emergency analysis of the vulnerability of existing British ships, pointing up the transverse vulnerability of the QEs and Rs -- I do not remember for sure whether that also applied to the Nelsons.

On Australia, I doubt anyone in 1921-22 would have accepted that the Commonwealth was not integral with the British. I think there was even a legal link which made that clear. Nor were the Australians likely to have paid up to operate something that expensive. They found it difficult to finance their post-WW I navy for quite some time, despite their fear of the Japanese.

It surprises me that no one pointed out that, had work continued on the three other Hoods, they would have been in much the same position as the Lexingtons in 1921 -- incomplete, expensive, proceeding slowly. Wouldn't the RN have tried converting two of them into carriers, given the carrier clause of the Washington Treaty? And wouldn't that have afforded the RN the experience of running really large carriers like those the USN and the IJN used to learn what big carriers could do? They would have been a whole lot more survivable than Courageous and Glorious.

 

[Dilandu]

Of course nothing came of either the Australian fantasy or of junking Rs to get more Vanguards, because by the time that might have happened there were rather more urgent concerns.

Mostly because Vanguard didn't work well as proof of concept. The whole idea was, that by using guns, turrets and (partially, at least) armor from old R-class, Vanguards could be build much faster than from scratches.

Unfortunately, RN officials failed to anticipate labor shortages, resource drain on more immediate needs and inability to free the R-class battleships from Indian Ocean. Also, the revisions of the design to accomodate wartime experience severly affected her construction.

So essentially, while AS WARSHIP, Vanguard was a sucsess, as a CONCEPT of "wartime mobilization battleship" she was a total failure.

 

[Tzoli]

Also note that the Admirality thought in replacement classes since Pre WW1. The KGV's were considered as replacements to the QE's Lions as the Revenges and a new class might had been the Nelson replacements but not the Vanguard as stated it was a mobilization BB. I do not know how the Renowns and Hood were to be replaced.

 

[EwenS]

I would say, depending on the extent of the rebuild, anywhere from 12 to 24 months.

In 1939 the full up reconstruction (new machinery) was expected by the Admiralty to take 3 years starting around the beginning of 1942. The reduced version probably 18 months.

 

[EwenS]

Also note that the Admirality thought in replacement classes since Pre WW1. The KGV's were considered as replacements to the QE's Lions as the Revenges and a new class might had been the Nelson replacements but not the Vanguard as stated it was a mobilization BB. I do not know how the Renowns and Hood were to be replaced.

From as early as 1931 the Admiralty planned to replace the R class before the QEs. The initial plan was as follows in terms of scrapping the old ships:-
1940 - 2 R
1941 - 2 R
1942 - 1 R & 1 QE
1943 - 2 QE
1944 - 1 QE & Repulse
1945 - 1 QE & Renown
1946 - Hood
1947 - Rodney
1948 - Nelson

An alternative plan had one ship scrapped each year from 1940 starting with the Rs, with the last QE in 1949. Then Renown & Repulse in 1950/51, Hood in 1952 and the Nelrods in 1953/54.

The alternative plan would only have worked if more ships had been given major reconstructions. For example Repulse’s engines were expected to last until 1943/4. They were not replaced in her 1934/36 “large repair”.

After modernisation the lives of the various ships were expected to be

Warspite - 9 years (to 1946)
Valiant - 6 years (to 1945/46)
QE - 7 years (to 1946/47)
Renown - 8 years (1948)

A full reconstruction of Hood between 1942 and 1945 was expected to see her life extended by about 10 years, otherwise she would only last until 1948-50.

The Admiralty plan in 1935 (never formally approved but generally worked to as far as possible in the late 1930s) called for the following BB to be part of the Buliding Programmes each year from 1936-1944:- 2,3,2,3,2,2,2,1,1. The long term aim was to achieve a strength of 20 capital ships.

The actual orders and plans were:
1936 2xKGV
1937 3xKGV
1938 2xLion
1939 2xLion
1940 2xLion (“firm proposals”) + 1x new 15” gunned battleship (which became Vanguard)

Then war broke out and everything changes so we have no idea what might have happened beyond the Lions.

Any 15” BB beyond Vanguard were pure speculation, and certainly didn’t have the support of Sir Stanley Goodall, the Director of Naval Construction, who considered them extravagant for the armament carried. The estimated time saving in 1939 from recycling the 15” turrets was also not that great- 36 months for a Vanguard v 42 for a 16” gunned Lion.

 

[Archibald]

"Battleship (turrets) recycling" - only the British could invent such things. Turning R-class into Vanguards to get more, good battleships faster.

5 R-class with 4 turrets each is 20 turrets.
While it would be logical to build 5 Vanguards with 4 turrets each;
- one should note that, had the RN been desperate to get one more battleship hull in the water, they could also build 6 ships:
- 4*3-turrets, 12 turrets (= Renown BC, 6 guns)
- 2*4-turrets, 8 turrets (= Vanguard, 8 guns)

Hell of an idea, on paper at least. In practice... didn't worked well, as brilliantly explained above.

Imagine if the USN had done that with the Colorado class !

 

[Dilandu]

The estimated time saving in 1939 from recycling the 15” turrets was also not that great- 36 months for a Vanguard v 42 for a 16” gunned Lion.

It should be noted, that while turrets taken from light battlecruisers required extensive rebuilds - like replacing their relatively thin armor plates - turrets, taken from R-class battleships required only limited refit (like increasing the max angle).

 

[Hood]

Recycling old turrets still had the drawback of the magazine layout with the cordite propellants above the shell rooms and the turrets in 'B' and 'X' position needed extensive work to extend the trunks.
The faces were thickened to 13in and 6in NC on the roof, elevation increased to 30 degrees and remote power control fitted. Stiffer supports to allow the use of super-charge charges were also included (though these were never actually issued to Vanguard).
So it wasn't a case of just bunging in the turrets, they needed quite extensive work. But the results for Vanguard saw her obtain a theoretical max engagement range of 36,500yds.

 

[JFC Fuller]

As previously discussed, Vanguard was a means of getting round a specific industrial bottleneck in the form of a limited number of available turret erecting pits in the UK in the late 1930s. She is interesting from a Hood perspective as she would have been an ideal partner for that ship once she had been reconstructed, Director of Tactical Division pointed this out, similar speeds and virtually identical armament.

Whether any more Vanguards would have been built is, as @EwenS points out, pure speculation. She was controversial, but on the other hand the potential was there as other ships were decommissioned. The debates from the time about her are interesting as there was serious cost benefit analysis against various heavy cruisers designs and her design process shows a desire for greater speed than had thus far been pursued in the KGVs and Lions. "RN battleship development if war hadn't broken out in 1939" might be an interesting thread for the alternative history section of the forum.

As for Hood's reconstruction, it was obviously seriously considered and I suspect it would have happened but with the way RN new construction was going, especially if they had sustained 2-3 ships per year as (the 1940 programme suggests this), the impetus for further reconstructions would have declined. The 1940 programme would have taken new-generation RN construction (inc. in various stages of construction and planning) to 12 battleships, a number that could have increased to 16 or even 18 through 1941 and 1942 programmes. The decider would have been perceptions of how many battleships the RN needed available.

With regard to a potential wartime refit/modernisation of Hood, had she survived the Denmark straight and any subsequent actions: Friedman notes that an Admiralty Fire Control Table (AFCT) Mk.VII was ordered for Hood and installation of an AFCT would take six months. This particular section of his British Battleships book is a little confusing but my interpretation is that an AFTC for her would not have been available until at least March 1943 and would take six months to install but it provides a potential window for additional modifications, though I suspect they would have been limited to light AA and radars with compensating weight reduction, e.g. removal of the armoured con, as in Nelson.

 

[EwenS]

The estimated time saving in 1939 from recycling the 15” turrets was also not that great- 36 months for a Vanguard v 42 for a 16” gunned Lion.

It should be noted, that while turrets taken from light battlecruisers required extensive rebuilds - like replacing their relatively thin armor plates - turrets, taken from R-class battleships required only limited refit (like increasing the max angle).

"Battleship (turrets) recycling" - only the British could invent such things. Turning R-class into Vanguards to get more, good battleships faster.

5 R-class with 4 turrets each is 20 turrets.
While it would be logical to build 5 Vanguards with 4 turrets each;
- one should note that, had the RN been desperate to get one more battleship hull in the water, they could also build 6 ships:
- 4*3-turrets, 12 turrets (= Renown BC, 6 guns)
- 2*4-turrets, 8 turrets (= Vanguard, 8 guns)

Hell of an idea, on paper at least. In practice... didn't worked well, as brilliantly explained above.

Imagine if the USN had done that with the Colorado class !

In 1939 there are another 4 15” turrets around. From WW1 era monitors Terror & Erebus. Also the turret training ship Marshall Soult (turret went to the new monitor Roberts in 1941). The final turret was in storage, having been built as one of the pair for Furious as an alternative to the 18” mounts (it went to the new monitor Abercrombie in 1942).

 

[fishpond]

Turret recycling was because the British had dismantled too much industrial infrastructure due to the combination of the Washington Treaty and drastic cuts in defense spending in the 1920s. When you read the DNC 'private office' papers (ADM 229) you are struck by the consequences of the elimination of several turret-building pits. Hence the perceived impossibility of building LIONs fast enough, and the VANGUARD project. The USN had no such problems because its turrets were built at a government facility, the Washington Navy Yard; facilities had not been destroyed interwar. I have always suspected that the existence of the Navy Yards, which did not suffer too badly between wars, explains how quickly the USN was able to rebuild. Remember that it, too, lost a lot of yard capacity when naval shipbuilding was cut dramatically. Before that Cramps was the biggest US warship yard; it shut down in, I think, 1928 (a major liner renovation project helped kill it).

In a few cases judgements by DNC have been cited. You have to remember who made decisions; he was an advisor to the Board of Admiralty, which ultimately had decision-making power. Also feeding into the Board was the Naval Staff, which set requirements. A major weakness of the system was that the staff officers who fed in seem not to have had much technical expertise, hence could advocate what in retrospect were totally unrealistic choices. Because D.K. Brown was in the Royal Naval Construction Corps, and because he much admired Goodall, he cites Goodall's opinions (he used Goodall's diary, which is in the British Library, extensively). But he had little interest in staff discussions; you don't get references to PRO material in Kew. I wouldn't bet on Goodall when it comes to weapon choices. That was someone else's field. From a research point of view, you get a skewed view unless you go to both the DNC material (Covers, mainly) and the PRO (Board and naval staff). Even then there are blanks because papers are missing, either not yet surfaced or gone permanently.

This thread brings up something else, which is quite sad. British documents often refer to sketches produced by DNC, e.g. for Board review. For example, papers about rebuilding HOOD mention alternatives and drawings, generally by number. It appears that very nearly NONE of these sketches have survived, which is why all the discussions of how HOOD might have been rebuilt are inherently conjectural. That also applies to a lot of other designs of considerable interest, such as several wartime cruiser designs. In a good world perhaps a collection of such sketches will surface one day, but one has to fear that they have all been destroyed.

There may be another source for some designs. During World War II many ships were subject to wind tunnel experiments to find out, for example, whether their bridges would be habitable. Some of the reports survive, e.g. one on the abortive plan to rebuild HMS NELSON in the United States. There is also a report on alternative bridge arrangements for VANGUARD. The photos from these reports ought to be in the file of the National Physical Laboratory (which is huge, and probably nearly impossible to search). I don't know when this practice started, and it may have begun only in 1944, but one can certainly hope... Postwar there are a few sketches in Covers, but not many.

 

[David Chessum]

Also note that the Admirality thought in replacement classes since Pre WW1. The KGV's were considered as replacements to the QE's Lions as the Revenges and a new class might had been the Nelson replacements but not the Vanguard as stated it was a mobilization BB. I do not know how the Renowns and Hood were to be replaced.

From as early as 1931 the Admiralty planned to replace the R class before the QEs. The initial plan was as follows in terms of scrapping the old ships:-
1940 - 2 R
1941 - 2 R
1942 - 1 R & 1 QE
1943 - 2 QE
1944 - 1 QE & Repulse
1945 - 1 QE & Renown
1946 - Hood
1947 - Rodney
1948 - Nelson

An alternative plan had one ship scrapped each year from 1940 starting with the Rs, with the last QE in 1949. Then Renown & Repulse in 1950/51, Hood in 1952 and the Nelrods in 1953/54.

The alternative plan would only have worked if more ships had been given major reconstructions. For example Repulse’s engines were expected to last until 1943/4. They were not replaced in her 1934/36 “large repair”.

After modernisation the lives of the various ships were expected to be

Warspite - 9 years (to 1946)
Valiant - 6 years (to 1945/46)
QE - 7 years (to 1946/47)
Renown - 8 years (1948)

A full reconstruction of Hood between 1942 and 1945 was expected to see her life extended by about 10 years, otherwise she would only last until 1948-50.

The Admiralty plan in 1935 (never formally approved but generally worked to as far as possible in the late 1930s) called for the following BB to be part of the Buliding Programmes each year from 1936-1944:- 2,3,2,3,2,2,2,1,1. The long term aim was to achieve a strength of 20 capital ships.

The actual orders and plans were:
1936 2xKGV
1937 3xKGV
1938 2xLion
1939 2xLion
1940 2xLion (“firm proposals”) + 1x new 15” gunned battleship (which became Vanguard)

Then war broke out and everything changes so we have no idea what might have happened beyond the Lions.

Any 15” BB beyond Vanguard were pure speculation, and certainly didn’t have the support of Sir Stanley Goodall, the Director of Naval Construction, who considered them extravagant for the armament carried. The estimated time saving in 1939 from recycling the 15” turrets was also not that great- 36 months for a Vanguard v 42 for a 16” gunned Lion.

Their plans seemed to shift around a bit in the years before WW2.
After AGNA35 was signed, this influenced numbers because the number of ships the Germans could build was based on the British forecasts of strength- so that in late 38/early 39 they came up with a scrapping schedule for the R's to maintain a strength of 19 ships, because if they had kept a 20th ship, the workings of the ratio would have given the Germans enough capital ship tonnage to build an additional battleship. (i.e. the number of ships the Germans could build was exactly the same if the British had 17, 18 or 19 capital ships, and the Germans could build one more if the British had 20, 21 or 22 ships etc - therefore the optimum solution was for Britain to have 16, 19, 22 or 25 ships etc.)

Regards

David

 

[Jemiba]

The discussion, if HMAS Australia could have been retained by the Australian Navy and been
still in service during WW II was split and moved, and can now be found here:
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/could-hmas-australia-have-been-saved-from-scrapping.36789/
Please, continue that discussion there.
When there still are posts, that rather belong to this new thread, please tell me.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I know it is based on a ‘fictional world’, but our own Nick Summers Drakes Drum website appendices has some details of a refit for Hood based on official notes and records Which includes some weights.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Meant to put this here ages ago:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vqnk2-noeUY


Note that Drachinifel subscribes to the underwater penetration theory rather than the plunging fire theory for the cause of Hood's destruction.

 

[Pirate Pete]

You might want to know that the Admiralty did plan to build more Vanguards, using twin 15s from the R class, which were to have been scrapped, having been subject to only the most minimal improvements in the 1930s. In 1939-40 the Admiralty was much concerned over the possibility that the Japanese were building new battleships (but hadn't the slightest idea of what was involved), and it saw the Vanguards as the least painful way of augmenting the fleet in the East. For a time, for example, there was hope (in the Admiralty) that Australia would pay for or operate Vanguard herself. This was 1940-41, and you can find a hint of Australian interest in a battleship in the Australian official history. Of course nothing came of either the Australian fantasy or of junking Rs to get more Vanguards, because by the time that might have happened there were rather more urgent concerns.

On Hood, she was considered the first true fast battleship, and as such revolutionary, although some might see much the same thing in the German battlecruisers. What happened to her was extraordinary, as it appears that the fatal shell hit roughly lengthwise, where she -- and the QEs and Rs -- was poorly protected. It also seems to have had a rather long fuze delay, which was why it exploded in just the wrong place. After the action, there was an emergency analysis of the vulnerability of existing British ships, pointing up the transverse vulnerability of the QEs and Rs -- I do not remember for sure whether that also applied to the Nelsons.

On Australia, I doubt anyone in 1921-22 would have accepted that the Commonwealth was not integral with the British. I think there was even a legal link which made that clear. Nor were the Australians likely to have paid up to operate something that expensive. They found it difficult to finance their post-WW I navy for quite some time, despite their fear of the Japanese.

It surprises me that no one pointed out that, had work continued on the three other Hoods, they would have been in much the same position as the Lexingtons in 1921 -- incomplete, expensive, proceeding slowly. Wouldn't the RN have tried converting two of them into carriers, given the carrier clause of the Washington Treaty? And wouldn't that have afforded the RN the experience of running really large carriers like those the USN and the IJN used to learn what big carriers could do? They would have been a whole lot more survivable than Courageous and Glorious.

I know that the notion of 'additional' Vanguards crops up from time-to-time, but do you have/know the source material for the Admiralties plans?
Tks

 

[Graham Strouse]

Bit late too the party. I recommend YouTuber’s Drachinifel’s excellent video “The of HMS Hood—But what if she had survived?” in Drach’s hypothetical Hood comes out of the Denmark Straights badly wounded & is sent off for repair & a large refit, possibly in the States. It’s quite good.

 

[Julio Garay Terrazas]

Here is the Hood refit video:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vqnk2-noeUY

 

[Nick Sumner]

I know it is based on a ‘fictional world’, but our own Nick Summers Drakes Drum website appendices has some details of a refit for Hood based on official notes and records Which includes some weights.

Did someone mention Drake's Drum?



(Oops, nearly forgot the disclaimer) This image is Photoshopped

 

[Firefinder]

possibly in the States

This is highly unlikely post mid 1940 for the repairs and rebuilds the Hood needed and the RN wanted. If it did happen the RN would have gotten the bare minimum, basically what the Hood need to fight and nothing fancy like the 5.25s.

Since it this time the USN was starting it crash program of ship building and was using up dock space as we built more.

The USN was willing to do minor upgrades, patch job repairs and maintenance, like they did on Warspite at this time, but nothing that took more the 6 months in dry dock.

And after Pearl Harbor?

Those docks became reserved for damage US Ships and any new builds happening. The US was to busy with its own ships let alone other countries.

Heh, the old hands around here in Bremerton Wa. Once told of a rumer that happenear after Pearl was hit. That the US Navy was going to commandeer the Warspite that was pier side under repairs there to replace the loses at Pearl. Likely nothing more then low level scuttle butt started by the usual idiots and nothing official, but an interesting look into a time long past...

 

[Archibald]

I never knew that a Prinz Eugen crew had filmed a little bit of the infamous battle of Denmark straits. Pretty chilling, even more the brief glimpse of the Hood blowing up, or at least the pillar of smoke from it.

 

[Tzoli]

To my knowledge only the Nelsons were considered for Modernization in the US after WW2 started and the USN declined becuse their 5" turret/gun production capacity and dockyards were already quite stretched.

 

[Dilandu]

To my knowledge only the Nelsons were considered for Modernization in the US after WW2 started and the USN declined becuse their 5" turret/gun production capacity and dockyards were already quite stretched.

According to "British battleships", US were mainly concerned about the time required for major refit. They saw no reason to even start the works on the ship, that would not be ready till long after the war. They agreed to receive "Nelson", because British presented its condition as being better than it actually was, but as soon as they inspected the ship, they realized, that it was in desperate need of major repair. And the full refit required would therefore last way past mid-1946. After that, USN flatly refused to do anything except small-scale repair.

 

[Dilandu]

P.S. Also, as I found out, US shipyards have... negative experience with repairing RN warships. Due to different construction and maintenance methods, the repair often caused unexpected problems. When US received HMS "Royal Sovereign" for repair, they decided to shot-blast it to clean the rust - and were quite shocked, when after repair ship started to leak horribly.

 

[EwenS]

After war with Japan broke out only 3 British battleships were sent to the US for refit (I'll exclude Warspite which was already at Mare Island from Aug 1941 until Jan 1942).

Queen Elizabeth (already modernised) from Sept 1942 to June 1943, following the extensive damage she suffered at Alexandria in Dec 1941.

Royal Sovereign from Oct 1942 to Nov 1943. Following that she returned to the UK where it was found she still had defects in her main armament ammo supply system, which it was felt were not worth repairing. So she was laid up under Care and Maintenance at Rosyth before being transferred to the Soviet Union in May 1944 in lieu of one of the Italian battleships.

Nelson from July 1944 to Jan 1945. Friedman however, on my reading, notes that the completion date kept moving to the right but does not explicitly state it was because the ship was in worse condition than indicated. That may or may not be true but there was clearly more to it.

As early as July 1943 the Admiralty were noting that the USN was reluctant to undertake long term repairs on what they considered to be "old ships", very probably as a result of the experience with Royal Sov. The Admiralty put the case that the Nelson was younger and that it was a case of "outfitting a powerful and relatively modern battleship" that still had its original armament. Rodney was to be refitted at Devonport. A plan was then agreed to refit Nelson in the USA with 5"/38 guns and Mark 37 directors amongst other improvements. In July 1944 completion was estimated to be Dec 1945 which slipped to mid 1946 by the end of that month which Admiral King then stated as end of 1946 and offered a compromise of Sept 1946! King effectively killed the project in Oct 1944, by the use of a little considered provision in the Lend-Lease Act that required US approval for all finished equipment and materials for the refit. Britain lacked the resources to provide all the necessary paperwork which was normally the function of the Planning Dept of the Navy Yard (see note 60 on page 402 Friedman British Battleships quoting documents in Nelson's Ship's Cover). The cost was to be capped at $3m. As this was unacceptable to the Admiralty a new minimal scheme had to be worked out to get the ship back to sea around the end of 1944 (it slipped to Jan 1945) when she returned to Britain for further work before heading to the East Indies Fleet to replace Queen Elizabeth as flagship.

So regardless of the condition of Nelson in July 1944 there was a definite USN (or at least Admiral King) bias against refitting the ship in the first place. This was then compounded by events in the Pacific in Oct 1944 that saw the cruisers Canberra, Houstoun and Reno all torpedoed and sent to East Coast yards for repair, albeit that none arrived for several months and none ended up at Philadelphia NY where Nelson was refitting.

It should also be noted that the French tried to get Jean Bart refitted in the USA in 1943/44. In May 1943 the USN agreed to repir her sufficiently to allow her to travel to the US probably around Sept 1943. Plans were worked out for a one turret ship with 340mm guns from the Lorraine and a massive AA armament of US weapons. The French request was turned down in Aug and they made a direct approach to King in Dec. He took until March 1944 to inform them that the USN was unwilling to divert resources to the ship. Again given the extent of the work it would have had to go on until late 1945 or into 1946.

Rodney was in a far worse state than Nelson having missed out on a refit immediately prior to the war. When finally laid up in Nov 1945, the story goes that her pumps had to be kept running continuously to stop her filling with water such was the state of her hull!

It is also interesting to note that the USN continued to refit its old battleships in this period. West Virginia didn't complete her rebuild until July 1944. And Arkansas, New York and Texas were all sent to the Pacific in late 1944/early 1945 being given such repairs as necessary.

Edit - re the laying up of Royal Sov, it did occur when the RN was feeling a real manpower shortage which resulted in many older ships being laid up. That probably influenced things. Pity the US effort on the year long refit was wasted.

 

[Firefinder]

It is also interesting to note that the USN continued to refit its old battleships in this period. West Virginia didn't complete her rebuild until July 1944. And Arkansas, New York and Texas were all sent to the Pacific in late 1944/early 1945 being given such repairs as necessary.

Not that interesting, more of a go figures there.

EVERYONE puts their own ships first. It just how it is.

Basically the old My Ships, My Yards, I going to do mine first and you is a fat maybe if I feel like it. *

It been repeat time and again before and after the war.

We all know if the roles were reverse the RN will do and have done the same thing.

 

[EwenS]

Just thinking about Nelson again, it occurs to me that it would be almost certain that her condition on arrival in Philadelphia was worse than the Americans had been led to believe.

The refit / modernisation had been planned with the Americans for at least 6-12 months. What could not have been planned for so easily was the damage suffered from the two mines she triggered on 18/6/44, a bare 4 days before she sailed for Philadelphia. According to McCart’s history of the Nelrods, she was inspected by divers and temporary repairs carried out but she was not docked in Britain. There was damage to her double bottom from A turret to the forward engine room and to her fuel tanks.

I can well envisage the divers having difficulties in carrying out a detailed inspection in the generally murky waters in the Solent where it was carried out. So how much information about that damage could be / was communicated to the USA before she arrived in Philadelphia on 4th July and before her dry docking on 1 Aug? I find it hard to blame the Admiralty for that.

Turning to the Rs again, even in 1939 the Admiralty recognised their generally poor condition. Revenge was rated the worst and Royal Oak the best, the latter because she had had the most extensive refit of the class between Jan 1933 and Aug 1934. As noted previously the various pre war RN replacement plans envisaged their replacement with the KGVs from around 1940.

 

[phil gollin]

The designs of the Nelson and Warspite were mostly done at BAD(W) - the paperwork of which were thrown away when BAD(W) had to be severely cut back post war due to lack of foreign currency.

From what little I can find in the BAD(W) files, the only reason for their refits being cut back was the USN's not wanting to "waste" resources of a foreign navy's ships (i.e. probably King's anglophobia), BAD(W) design team got on well with their USN liaison team and the dockyard. BAD(W) had learnt how to present the design and detail to the yards due to the USN/yards way of working to fixed bids.

 

[airman]

The refitting of Hood could have been remedied to armour flaws of Hood .

 

[Owens Z]

The refitting of Hood could have been remedied [the] armour flaws of Hood.

I think you are right, Airman. All accounts agree that HMS Hood was considered overdue for an overhaul in 1938-39, but the gathering war clouds made a protracted time off her feet infeasible. Yet be careful. Some on this Secret Projects Forum get surprisingly defensive and agitated when it's pointed out that British-made battlecruisers too often proved frail in service. If you state that Hood exploded, killing almost her entire crew, after just two 38cm hits (and one 20.3cm) while Bismarck by starkest contrast endured hundreds of 14- and 16-inch shells (and six torpedoes) before being scuttled, they will tell you that this demonstrates nothing about Hood's protection schema. It follows that she had no armor flaws to remedy.

 

[fishpond]

Would it be relevant that in the aftermath of the loss of HOOD, the Admiralty circulated an order to commanders of battleships concernign the transverse protection forward? The NELSONs were due to get bow (transverse) armor, but had not yet had it, so that only the KGVs were considered capable of facing BISMARK. If you take the modern view of why the battlecruisers blew up at Jutland (suicidal magazine practices), limited side and deck armor are not all that important. I would hold with Jurens' analysis. In effect capital ships were designed to fight in line ahead against similar capital ships. They were not really designed to handle end-on hits. The Admiralty seems to have reached this conclusion quite soon after hte HOOD disaster, presumably based on the fact that she had turned towards BISMARK when she was sunk. The relevant paper is in a Cover at the Brass Foundry, but I have not found it in recent years (I was lucky enough to have photographed it -- using analog film -- many years ago. I am not sure, incidentally, that had she survived HOOD could have handled much extra weight forward, given how badly her hull was already stressed.

 

[Foo Fighter]

My recollection is that Hood was turning parallel to Bismarck to unmask her rear turrets rather than towards Bismarck.

As with most catastrophic events there is a collection of contributory events/problems building into the final event.

Was Hood deficient in more ways than one? Certainly and failure to remedy those is a sign of the times and people involved in decision making. War does not kill people, PEOPLE kill people?

Bloody stupid either way.

 

[DWG]

Some on this Secret Projects Forum get surprisingly defensive and agitated when it's pointed out that British-made battlecruisers too often proved frail in service.

Possibly because "suicidal magazine practices" and "frail" are two unrelated concepts. Take out Jutland and the whole assessment changes. Hood was only marginally less armoured than the QEs and Rs, if you argue she was frail, you have to come up with some reason why they didn't have similar issues.

 

[EwenS]

Would it be relevant that in the aftermath of the loss of HOOD, the Admiralty circulated an order to commanders of battleships concernign the transverse protection forward? The NELSONs were due to get bow (transverse) armor, but had not yet had it, so that only the KGVs were considered capable of facing BISMARK. If you take the modern view of why the battlecruisers blew up at Jutland (suicidal magazine practices), limited side and deck armor are not all that important. I would hold with Jurens' analysis. In effect capital ships were designed to fight in line ahead against similar capital ships. They were not really designed to handle end-on hits. The Admiralty seems to have reached this conclusion quite soon after hte HOOD disaster, presumably based on the fact that she had turned towards BISMARK when she was sunk. The relevant paper is in a Cover at the Brass Foundry, but I have not found it in recent years (I was lucky enough to have photographed it -- using analog film -- many years ago. I am not sure, incidentally, that had she survived HOOD could have handled much extra weight forward, given how badly her hull was already stressed.

Not clear to me what you mean by this.

The Nelrods as built had the ends of their belt armour enclosed by armoured bulkheads 12/8in thick forward and 10/4in aft between the middle & lower decks.

As completed what they lacked was horizontal deck armour forward of that armoured bulkhead. Nelson had 2.5/3/4in of armour plate (forward to aft) added on the lower deck during her June 1937/Jan 38 refit. That was a modification that Rodney missed out on.

 

[DWG]

Would it be relevant that in the aftermath of the loss of HOOD, the Admiralty circulated an order to commanders of battleships concernign the transverse protection forward?

Am I interpreting this right as bulkhead armour?

The Admiralty seems to have reached this conclusion quite soon after hte HOOD disaster, presumably based on the fact that she had turned towards BISMARK when she was sunk.

Hood had just turned to port to unmask the stern turrets. Based on PoW's action plot, at the point of Hood's loss the Germans were steering roughly due south with the British steering roughly due west. With the Germans on the starboard bow, that's a turn away, not towards.

They were not really designed to handle end-on hits.

I'm not convinced the relative geometry at the point of Hood's loss allows for an end-on hit.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

As completed what they lacked was horizontal deck armour forward of that armoured bulkhead. Nelson had 2.5/3/4in of armour plate (forward to aft) added on the lower deck during her June 1937/Jan 38 refit. That was a modification that Rodney missed out on.

What was the concern that led to that addition of deck armor forward of the armored bulkhead? If the idea was to limit flooding in that area due to battle damage wouldn't some vertical armor along the waterline make more sense?

 

[Tzoli]

What was the concern that led to that addition of deck armor forward of the armored bulkhead? If the idea was to limit flooding in that area due to battle damage wouldn't some horizonal armor along the waterline make more sense?

To protect against bomb damage later this armour was suggested the installation of two twin 5,25" forward in two of the modernization proposals

 

[Owens Z]

Possibly because "suicidal magazine practices" and "frail" are two unrelated concepts. Take out Jutland and the whole assessment changes. Hood was only marginally less armoured than the QEs and Rs, if you argue she was frail, you have to come up with some reason why they didn't have similar issues.

I don't 'explain' Hood's loss. I avow that the long history of, um, bad luck which British-made battlecruisers suffered is noteworthy. And I avow that when there is a problem, to disregard every instance of that problem and then claim there is no problem is not analysis. Yes, if we leave out the Battle of Jutland, the Battle of Denmark Strait, and the fate of Force Z (and the torpedoing of carrier Courageous, the shelling of Glorious, and loss of Kongo), then no British-made battlecruiser sank with dreadful loss of life from a few hits. And not counting days of drought, it rains every day in the Sahel. And if we overlook sick time, then Airman and I have been in perfect health our entire lives. Sounds great. But better to live in the truth.