gollevainen said:Have checked Shipbucket yet? To my recal there were lots of variatios of the Bristol class. Some of those migth have been based on some real image
PMN1 said:In Rebuilding the RN Brown notes 'In 1967 consideration was given to a stretched Type 82 to replace the Tiger class as helicopter ships' (DEFE 16/617 (PRO))
Were any drawings made?
As one of the originators I actually agree, but it's getting everyone else aboard for the changes to the album that's the problem.TinWing said:gollevainen said:Have checked Shipbucket yet? To my recal there were lots of variatios of the Bristol class. Some of those migth have been based on some real image
Well, the only problem is that there are too many "Alternate Universe" drawings, many of which that are poorly differentiated from genuine proposals.
uk 75 said:This is another of those 60s projects which have not survived so far.
The impression quoted above was suggested as being a student's drawing
rather than something from Bath or the RN.
We have been very good here in ferreting out material from the NAO or
asking people who worked on projects to "spill the beans" (it is after all
half a century ago!).
The only real source we have on these designs are the ones looked at by the
Fleet Working Party and published in Brown/Moore. The Type 82 hulls were
on order, and it would have made sense to use them as helicopter ships after
the first ship was completed as a Seadart/Ikara trials ship.
The second 82 is mentioned as being "Exeter".
JohnR said:The problem with re-engining a T82 is that no GT provides the same output as the COSAG plant which provided 74,600shp. Using a Olympus/Tyne COGAG would provide around 65,000shp. The question would be how would the drop in SHP effect the ships performance overall and would the two Tyne provide on 11,400shp sufficient power for 18knots.
In Friedmans Nuclear Navy he states that there was a variant of the Olympus developed that was capable of 35,000shp which would give sufficient power to maintain performance; I have however never seen any reference to this engine anywhere else and do not believe it ever entered service.
As for the secondary power plant the obvious solution is the provision of Spey's, however the problem there is entry into service, the earliest service entry was 1988 with the Japanese Navy.
JFC Fuller said:This has been covered on this forum multiple times. Bristol was neither on time or budget, the Type 82 design was abandoned after her because she was too expensive to be Leander/GP frigate replacement. Thats why it was decided to put Sea Dart and Ikara on separate hulls- in order to keep the total number of hulls up.
JFC Fuller said:Its all already on this forum, its also in Friedman and multiple other books. Bristol was expensive so to get more hulls Ikara and Sea Dart were split between multiple platforms.
In 1967 Bristol was projected at £20 million (already considered impractical) and ended up at £25 million. Type 42s were estimated at £15 million, it was cheaper and thus got more hull numbers.
Your opinion is not based in fact. Type 42s were successfully upgraded, it would have been no easier to upgrade a Type 82.
All of this is well documented, the relevant files are open and I and many others have read them, Friedman and others have used them to produce excellent narratives of the period.
JFC Fuller said:I read your post, it was just a repeat of the previously incorrect content from your previous one. Bolding and underlining incorrect text does not make it correct. Type 42s were no more or less designed for upgrades and modifications than Bristol yet they were successfully upgraded and there was no particular cost associated with them being upgraded that would not also have been present with Bristol.
The history of the period is well documented with a wealth of excellently researched books having been produced by some outstanding authors. The basic reality remains the same, the RN needed hull numbers in order to meets its commitments, it could not do that with Type 82s (this was discovered even prior to CVA01 cancellation); there is an entire file in the national archives at Kew containing the documents that outline this and this is referenced by Friedman and Ed Hampshire, the data exists in archive form and has been published. It was an internal RN analysis that produced the T42 not some political/civil service conspiracy.
JFC Fuller said:1) This isn't the thread for this and you have laid waste to one that was perfectly serviceable until you got to it
2) Pointing out that you are wrong isn't arrogant ; Type 82 was un-affordable in the required numbers, thats why the RN only built one and then transitioned to the frigate destroyer force in the late 1960s then maintained that all the way through to today.
JFC Fuller said:Nope, the Earth is round, and the RN abandoned the Type 82 because its cost made it impossible to build it in sufficient numbers as outlined by surviving documents at Kew and referenced in works by both Ed Hampshire and Norman Friedman. It is also hinted at in Rebuilding the Royal Navy which gives useful cost numbers.
Still not the thread or the section for this.
If you have not the desire to start your own thread, then I suggest you look at existing ones in the correct section of this site.
I shall even recommend....
Thanks for that, great read! ;D
I will have a think on where this best belongs as it is really turning into a marine engineering / capability development discussion of the merits of large/capable/flexible but individually expensive, verses smaller/less capable/ less flexible but more numerous and individually cheaper, or even long service life with planned midlife modernisation, verses, short service life with no midlife modernisation.
I do wonder if Mr Mitty will let anyone discuss any of this anywhere though as he does seem to see himself as a bit of a thought policeman.
In fairness, part of Volkodav's argument is that the loss in hull numbers would be compensated for by an increase in capability of individual hulls. I'm not entirely sold on that argument - probably valid in wartime, but for the RN in peacetime and in that era, there were a lot of 'presence' missions where any hull, however limited the capability, was perceived as better than no hull at all.And again, Type 82 was too expensive and would have resulted in a dramatic reduction in available RN escorts, thats why it was abandoned, this is discussed by both Ed Hampshire and Norman Friedman.
It's actually quite illuminating to see just how expensive a Type 22 was - more than a Type 82! But then they were very advanced ships for their day.JFC Fuller said:Your numbers are not that far out; whenever same year cost numbers are seen for the Type 82 and Type 42 they show a Type 42 being roughly 60% the cost of a Type 82. (Figures in Friedman and Rebuilding the RN). For instance, the 1967 estimates have Type 82 at £17 million and Type 42 at £10.5 million. Type 42s were designed to (it varied as the specification shifted) between £10.5 and £12 million and were £13.5 by the end of 1968. HMS Cardiff seems to have been ordered on a tender price of £15 million (but ended up twice that, apparently due primarily to labour shortages). Ed Hampshire describes the Type 42 as being half the cost of a Type 82.
It's there implicitly; I think you could quite easily argue either way for Lynx or Ikara but at the end of the day Lynx could be had on a smaller and cheaper ship than the British interpretation of Ikara!Your capabilities list is quite comprehensive but there is one piece missing. All to often forgotten is that the Type 42 had the same sonar fit as HMS Bristol, it just used Lynx and onboard torpedo tubes for ASW weapons delivery so once you get past the headline of the Ikara system you actually find that you lose a significant amount of ASW capability too by having fewer Bristol's rather than more Type 42s.