Stretched Type 82

That's quite interesting, probably makes a good argument that warship costs don't follow the retail price index. Which is fair, I can't remember the last time I saw corvettes on BOGOF at Tesco.
 
uk 75 said:
Gentlemen,

I must admit to being puzzled as to why you both are getting so worked up. The question that I posed remains on the table.

Somewhere there must be someone who knows what a stretched Type 82 with helo deck might have looked like. I accept that
no drawings may have been done, and that it may have just been a series of numbers and stats.

Furthermore, let us get some perspective, we are talking about a possible project fifty years after it was looked at. I cannot really
see why we need to get worked up. I for one just see it as a bit of harmless historical interest.

I would not be surprised if the hanger, flight deck arrangement, with the launcher super firing over the hanger, was somewhat like a Tromp, or perhaps even the Australian DDL, especially if the mod 1 launcher was used. Limbo would probably almost definitely go and I am not sure about the Ikara though depending on timing an improved launcher based on the more compact Australian configuration, or even the canister launched Super Ikara could have been used instead. It all comes down to what influences had precedence at the time of the sketch or sketches. All pure speculation as none of my sources go back that far, although I have seen some very interesting RN Horizon profiles from one of them.

As for the worked up, it all comes down to how recently I've had my pain killers and how distracted I am by other things I'm working on.
 
RLBH said:
That's quite interesting, probably makes a good argument that warship costs don't follow the retail price index. Which is fair, I can't remember the last time I saw corvettes on BOGOF at Tesco.

The way I look at it is ships are more like buildings and even similar, or supposedly identical ones are all different. Even built at the same yards, with the same subcontractors and supply chain each one is unique. Its not unusual for experienced individuals to be able to tell which yard a particular ship has been built at, even when the vessels are meant to have all been ordered and built to a common baseline. You could pretty much tell which yard built which blocks on one project I was on, things like weld quality, the way the pipes were fitted, especially small diameter piping that traditionally is not as tightly controlled as the main pipe runs.

You can have situations such as a severe weather event slowing work, a subcontractor being late on block or major equipment delivery, throwing out the schedule for everything waiting on that delivery. Austal dropped and bent a block on the JHSV project, BAE stuffed up the keel blocks on the first RAN AWD, Litton Shipyard literally ended up under water following a Hurricane.

A big factor has always been continuity of work, even the best workforce losses its edge if not gainfully employed in such a way as to maintain their skills. The worst performing yard on AWD had been the best in the country only five or six years before they derailed the entire schedule through amateur mistakes and poor workmanship. This is why you see governments ordering OPVs that the services don't really want or need, it can actually work out cheaper than having to rebuild skills while you really need to be concentrating on de-risking a complex new project. That said, proper planning should have ensured the work force was gainfully employed on something the RN / RAN etc. actually needed.

Then there is the classic government fiddling. Money is tight in a particular year to they reduce the amount they pay that year on a multi year project, on aircraft or armoured vehicles it just means fewer are bought that year, on ships it means the build rate is slowed, often resulting in redundancies within the workforce. This then requires experienced people to be replaced once the money is available but the good ones are long gone so new people need to be hired, trained and certified for marine work, not cheap and not quick. End result, it usually costs more, much more, to rebuild than it would have done just to keep the original workers in the first place.
 
Hmmm... we're getting well away from history here.

So yes, it is possible to conceive of a 'multirole' warship that could have been a 'successful' design (for a given interpretation of 'successful') but was that ever going to be the Type 82?

Unlikely.

Type 42 did contain a degree of multirole-ism, in the addition of the 4.5" mk8 gun and the helicopter facilities. Arguably the helicopter conferred a degree of multirole-ism far in excess of Ikara on the Type 82 and it's arguable that the removal of Ikara from the design and the addition of helicopter facilities would produce a far more multirole warship.

However the costs and margins needed for the 988/Broomstick 3D radar and ADAWS capable to handling it is arguably not necessary for such a multirole warship.

But it is also clear to the RN by the 70's that the Type 42 design is too tightly filled with equipment to be easily upgradable, hence the process that lead to first the Type 43 and then the Type 44.

So how could you square the circle?
Well either you abandon true multirole as the RN did, or to be affordable something significantly different has to be developed.
In this the Type 82 might still exist as a designation, but it's differences to the real world design would be so great as to leave only the designation the same.
But for that one needs to either engage in theoretical and hypothetical speculation or dig deep into alternative history.
 
Since the temperature rise on this thread I have been progressively reading through relevant topics on the site and found this one that appears to be discussing the stretched Type 82 we are discussing here.

http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,4143.msg275745.html#msg275745

Going through it again, I was quite astounded when I reread some of the comments in light of the content of some of the posts on this topic in the last few days. If I were a member of the aluminium foil hat brigade I would suspect some sort of mind control or body snatching.

Anyway it seems to suggest that this 1967 vessel was significantly larger than simply a slightly stretched Type 82 with a helicopter hanger. Looking at it from the point of view of an alternative to the Escort Cruiser and as a Tiger replacement I then reread the Escort Cruiser and Invincible sections of Brown and it states that post the CVA-01 cancelation the RN with treasury support were looking to build six escort cruisers with the first entering service around 1975. These seem to marry up quite well Study 21 which is also mentioned in the above referenced topic, £30 million, 10,000 ton, six Sea Kings aft flight deck, Ikara deleted, cruiser based on the Type 82.

So what we actually appear to have is a much larger 10,000 ton ship, Study 21 (that is illustrated in Brown), which looks like a much larger Type 42 with an exceptionally long aft helideck. I could be wrong but that is how the 1967 stretched Type 82 appears to have panned out to me.
 
My own best guess is that the starting point was the Type 82 hull, as this was already designed.

By moving the Seadart launcher forward to replace the Ikara, space could be created for an Andrea
Doria style platform and hangar for 4 Sea Kings (similar to the Blakes, which this ship might have
replaced) aft.

I doubt that this option was very attractive to the RN, given all the studies that had been done and would
be done for more capable platforms. However, it may have been looked at as a fast way of using the
three spare hulls to get a good ASW force (12 Sea Kings) to the RN relatively quickly (early 70s instead
of late 70s with the Invincibles).

If you scrap Blake and Tiger, three helo Bristols would not have been a bad substitute. It would also have
been in line with the Government's wish to have no carrier-style vessels in service after 1972.
 
Crew numbers would less than the Tigers also.
 
uk 75 said:
My own best guess is that the starting point was the Type 82 hull, as this was already designed.

By moving the Seadart launcher forward to replace the Ikara, space could be created for an Andrea
Doria style platform and hangar for 4 Sea Kings (similar to the Blakes, which this ship might have
replaced) aft.

I doubt that this option was very attractive to the RN, given all the studies that had been done and would
be done for more capable platforms. However, it may have been looked at as a fast way of using the
three spare hulls to get a good ASW force (12 Sea Kings) to the RN relatively quickly (early 70s instead
of late 70s with the Invincibles).

If you scrap Blake and Tiger, three helo Bristols would not have been a bad substitute. It would also have
been in line with the Government's wish to have no carrier-style vessels in service after 1972.

If you have access to a copy of Rebuilding the Royal Navy the sketch is on pg. 67 and the relevant text on pg. 68 and it shows six Sea Kings in two rows of three, plus two spots aft. The tab data also says GT propulsion, not COSAG.

I could have it wrong but it definitely seem to indicate to me that the 1967 stretched Bristol was Study 21, I would be interested if anyone can show that there were two stretched Bristols at the time, otherwise I think we may have the answer to what it was and what it looked like.
 
zen said:
Crew numbers would less than the Tigers also.

Especially with a GT only propulsion and no hideously complicated RN Ikara.
 
Volkodav said:
I could have it wrong but it definitely seem to indicate to me that the 1967 stretched Bristol was Study 21, I would be interested if anyone can show that there were two stretched Bristols at the time, otherwise I think we may have the answer to what it was and what it looked like.

I think Hobbs' "British Carrier Strike Fleet" delves a bit deeper into the origins of the post-carrier command cruiser studies. I do not recall Bristol being a basepoint for any of them, though I am working from memory at present.
 
The section in Rebuilding the Royal Navy states that Study 21 was based on (or at least evolved from) Bristol while the much larger, through deck, Study 23, which was the one that evolved into Invincible, was not. I have British Carrier Strike Fleet on Kindle so will have a read of that as see if it clarifies things.
 
One of the puzzling things about the study 21 and 23 ships shown as part of the 1966 look at the future RN isvthat they retain the MACK funnel masts fashionable in the late50s but dropped by the RN in the 60s except for CVA01.
Invincible emerges with separate stacks. Bristol ended up with three funnels.
 
The escort cruiser story is told through multiple books, Friedman's cruiser book and Ed Hampshire's work are the best combination. Hobb's commentary on the concept is an unhinged rant.

The short story is this; the concept started out as a means of getting more ASW helicopters to sea by replacing the Ca (IIRC) class destroyers in the 1957 approved 88 fleet with helicopter ships built to destroyer standards. They then evolved into cruisers, became a mechanism for saving space on the carriers by putting their ASW helicopters on separate ships, then became units able to operate independently again when it was realised that the carriers could have their own on-board ASW helicopters. In the process the concept went from being a Sea Slug ship to being a Sea Dart ship and the RN seems to have drawn just about every conceivable configuration- though most of them without a formal staff target.
 
uk 75 said:
One of the puzzling things about the study 21 and 23 ships shown as part of the 1966 look at the future RN isvthat they retain the MACK funnel masts fashionable in the late50s but dropped by the RN in the 60s except for CVA01.
Invincible emerges with separate stacks. Bristol ended up with three funnels.

The dropping of MACKS was more to do with the adoption of GT. The volume of air drawn into and passing through the system is much greater than in a steam plant and could not be intergrated into a mack
 
JFC Fuller said:
The escort cruiser story is told through multiple books, Friedman's cruiser book and Ed Hampshire's work are the best combination. Hobb's commentary on the concept is an unhinged rant.

There is a lot of railling against the other services and political and design initiatives in Hobbs' book - but there is also some good details that I have never come across before. I would ignore the rants, and take what facts there are.
 
One very interesting article on Type 82 is Innovation and Surface Ships: The Type 82 Destroyer and the Future Fleet Working Part, published in the academic journal 'The Mariner's Mirror in 2013.

Since this is probably closed to most non-academic people, I'll post a liberal quote from the most relevant section that refers to the arugemnts and ideas on this thread in relation to a stretched Type 82 and the mix of systems and the single vs. two hull argument.


In August 1966 the FFWP had concluded that it would ‘be essential to build, as quickly as possible, not more than four Type 82 destroyers: these will provide the only means of getting SEA DART, Type 988 radar and Ikara – on which large sums have been committed – to sea in the early 1970’s [sic]’. Yet by October the enthusiasm had waned. In his October letter to the Secretary of State, the Minister (RN) stated that the Navy recommended keeping the Type 82 procurement to one ship, instead of the six projected in the Long-Term Costings; that a cruiser be developed from an enlarged Type 82 design, which would replace the Tiger class by 1976 and ‘provide command facilities, the control of R.A.F. aircraft and [carry] A.S.W. and reconnaissance helicopters’; and that Sea Dart be deployed on a new destroyer design ‘to come into service in 1973’.39 The Navy believed that in an age of missiles which can be fired from ships and submarines as well as from aircraft, it should be our aim to keep our own surface ships as small in size as is consistent with the capability required of them. It is with these thoughts in mind that we have recommended…that the Type 82 programme should be curtailed, and the design developed on the one hand into a smaller destroyer, and, on the other, into a cruiser whose size should be kept to a minimum.

The fleet now required command and control capabilities in one class, but the Type 82 was too small to meet this requirement. The Navy therefore proposed to enlarge the Type 82 design quickly, to retain the air defence system and replace Ikara with a helicopter ‘to provide a substantial ASW capability and surface tactical reconnaissance’.The operational and technological merits of the Type 82 were dissipating across various classes. What is more, the operational reasoning applied now should also have been applied by the FFWP, which nevertheless seemed to have valued the Type 82 precisely because all its systems were integrated, combined significant and unique technological and operational capabilities in one major surface unit, and would thus allow implementing the FFPW’s declared rationale for redesigning the fleet for single or small group deployments.

By January 1967 the Navy’s argument on the future building policy had gained further shape. In order to put the new justifications in context, it should be recalled that the role described for the Type 82 in 1965 has not been restricted to the support of carrier task forces, that the FFWP had been tasked with designing the post-carrier fleet, and that the concept of operations it applied, when urging that four of the class should be built speedily in August 1966, had already accounted for the shift away from task force operations and towards peace-keeping with single units or small groups. Now the Navy Board emphasized exactly the same shift as the FFWP had declared, but the Board argued that this had ‘changed the required weapon “mix” for the 1970s’; that is the loss of carriers made it necessary to deploy command and control facilities, direction for ‘[RAF] fixed-wing maritime aircraft’ and ‘large ASW helicopters’ in other hulls, and the deployment of helicopters in all major warships being paramount. As the Type 82 could not be adapted without a major redesign effort, it was necessary to design new types of ship and to meet their cost by economizing on the Type 82.

In what the Board described as ‘this new situation’ and in contradiction to the previous rationale of the economies of deploying all the Type 82 systems in one hull, it suggested that the most economical way of ‘deploying the new “mix” of Type 82 weapon systems’ whilst simultaneously ‘providing for the “cruiser” functions described above’ would be not to design an escort cruiser, to complete the first Type 82, to ‘develop the ships of the follow-on Type 82 programme into cruisers by the addition of command and helicopter operating facilities’, and to advance a Sea Dart medium destroyer programme of no more than 3,500 tons, rather than the previously planned 4,500 tons. The first Type 82 should be retained because she had already been ordered, she would be a useful addition to the County class, her weapon systems, which she would share with the new cruisers and destroyers, would make her an important ‘lead in’, and the Navy could gain useful experience with the design and iron out teething troubles with the new weapon systems before they were fitted to
the new ships. Her design had at any rate been necessary as at the time no other available hull would have been able to deploy Sea Dart and, if she were not completed, she would have to be replaced at a later date with an additional Sea Dart destroyer.

Finally, as the costs of the ship had been rising and ‘in view of the changed background’ it would be necessary to economize on both the class as well as the follow-on designs. Of the Type 82 systems the cruiser was to receive Sea Dart and the Type 988 radar. Although the Board conceded that this piece of equipment was very expensive and highly complex, it decided against alternatives because the development was already advanced, alternatives would entail time and cost penalties, and the programme had been revised to ensure greater financial control. It would also receive ADA, but in a lighter version because there was no need to integrate the operation of Ikara into the software. The destroyer would also be equipped with Sea Dart and ADA, but the choice of radar remained open. Given the money already spent on the Type 82 systems, the Board recommended that the programmes were continued, but proposed a slow down of the Type 988 radar programme in the expectation that this would ensure a more reliable fit, and the deployment of Ikara in HMS Bristol, whilst leaving open the option to build an Ikara version of the destroyer. On 13 February 1967 the Secretary of State for Defence, Denis Healey generally consented to limiting the procurement of Type 82s to one ship, although he did raise a warning that the decision to order a major weapon system at the time of a significant defence review had been somewhat unwise. The Navy’s desire to cancel all further orders after the FFWP had elevated the Type 82 to such a core position in the new fleet is puzzling even if one accounts for the coincidence of the unit cost rising significantly with the renewed pressure to cut the defence budget.45 It raises the question of whether the Type 82 was too innovative and capable as an individual unit for the type of fleet the FFWP had designed, and whether that fleet was perhaps not quite as novel as was previously announced.
 
My understanding is approximately five Escort Cruisers were seen as necessary from the early 60s (perhaps even the late 50s), irrespective of what happened with the strike carriers to meet NATO obligations. Based on my understanding of evolutions the number five usually supports two ships on deployment, for ships such as these that actually means two task groups, perhaps North Sea and North Atlantic.

The numbers of helicopters per cruiser was pretty much always six, but a preferred nine, which fits pretty well with the aspirations of Japan and Australia at the same time periods. Japan in particular initially planned for a pair of DDH per task group for six of the required helicopter with the remaining aircraft to be embarked individually on other destroyers in the group. The total number of helicopters required being modelled on how many were needed to prosecute a single submarine, initially a fast battery boat, then later SSNs. Again, as I understand it this number increased as the threat became faster, meaning that either the size of the helicopter carrier has to increase, or each of the escorting destroyers has to be larger to accommodate a Seaking size helicopter.

I wonder if the change in tack from a high low mix of large multi role vessels and smaller less capable but fast ships to the AD / ASW mix of medium sized ones related to the sinking of the Israeli Destroyer Eliat in October 1967 (even if it was only as a validation of their fears). At the period a number of navies moved to smaller ships with distributed capabilities, or even away from destroyers and frigates altogether.
 
Your understanding is wrong. From 1960 until 1963/4 the escort cruiser concept and numbers were directly tied to the strike carrier force as they were intended as integral parts of the carrier escort group in that they were to be responsible for carrying the groups ASW helicopters. Only once it was decided that those helicopters could and would be carried on the carriers themselves did the escort cruiser become an independently acting ship.

Helicopter numbers were determined by studies (some performed at NATO level) that established how many helicopters were required for a ship to maintain certain patrol levels. Numbers varied based on the type of helicopter.

As the piece posted by Hood points out the prevalence of AShMs was one factor in RN thinking but the main driver had always been the high unit cost of the Type 82.
 
Hood
Thank you for sharing this article with us.
I think now that therr may in fact be no such thing as a stretched Type 82 helicopter ship.
The design for a helicopter cruiser srmed with Seadart had been completed by 1963. The ship remains pretty much the same in 1966.
As has been pointed out, the only major change is to the funnels to cope with gas turbines.
Unless anyone comes up with notes or a sketch of revised Type 82 our search is over.
 
JFC Fuller said:
Your understanding is wrong. From 1960 until 1963/4 the escort cruiser concept and numbers were directly tied to the strike carrier force as they were intended as integral parts of the carrier escort group in that they were to be responsible for carrying the groups ASW helicopters. Only once it was decided that those helicopters could and would be carried on the carriers themselves did the escort cruiser become an independently acting ship.

Helicopter numbers were determined by studies (some performed at NATO level) that established how many helicopters were required for a ship to maintain certain patrol levels. Numbers varied based on the type of helicopter.

As the piece posted by Hood points out the prevalence of AShMs was one factor in RN thinking but the main driver had always been the high unit cost of the Type 82.

Of course I'm wrong and you are right because in your own mind that is the way of the world, or more to the point that is how it goes when you consistently cherry pick for no other reason than to try and assert yourself.

You have started by saying I am wrong then basically then reworded the content of what I stated. Your posting style is unnecessarily negative and confrontational and detracts from most topics you participate in, a shame really as apart from continually derailing discussions when people bite back, it makes this otherwise excellent site far less enjoyable for all.

Seriously who do you think you are? Everyone took a deep breath, put aside their differences and brought the discussion back on topic, then out of the blue there you are again placing your opinion over the reading, analysis and understanding of just about every other poster. You are not even consistent as what you state changes depending on who you are arguing with, the obvious reason is the need to be seen as right and to have the last word. As I have said before this is infantile and pointless, it is not what the majority come here for.
 
Way off topic but made necessary by the unwelcome derailing, yet again, by Mr Mitty. A quick reference to Friedmans British Cruisers: WWII and After clearly states that while cruisers were seen as necessary to bolster carrier defences they were also seen as filling the need for ships capable of operating independently.

It also refers to the between the wars concept of cruiser and battleship aircraft being used to reinforce carrier aircraft (not mentioned but important is these cruiser aircraft were also seen as providing air cover when carriers were not available) and to the effect of removing helicopters enabling 2 or 3 Buccaneers to be added to a carriers air group, stating that while beneficial to a small carrier such as Centaur, it would not be so critical for a large carrier which would be better served by retaining some helicopters for last ditch defence. Mention was also made of V/STOL, embarking troops and providing NGS, in addition to air defence and ASW.

I could go on because Friedman doesn't cherry pick, he tends to layout as much as he possibly can, including the differences of opinion at the time. There it is, even in written records there are differences, at any given time, let alone from year to year, over requirements. This is the difference between an academic and a commentator, the academic researches and evolves their thinking with new information and further analysis, while the commentator states their position and shouts down anyone who disagrees, cherry picking facts rather than analysing a body of information.

I am not an expert but rather an interested student of history, I am particularly interested in technology and why certain paths were followed and not others. This involves reading discussing, analysing and then going back and doing it over and over again, learning all the time. One thing that does not work is reading something and thinking you know it all, at best you will be able to recite dates and tabulated data, but as to root cause, how things evolved, or why certain things happened, it is never black and white. Some people just don't get this and think because they can shout the loudest or others give up in disgust, that they have been proven right.

All I can say is read, read and read some more from as many different sources as possible and when the opportunity arises discuss what you have read, offer opinions and listen to those of others and then discuss the differences and maybe come away with more leads to follow and a different perspective. Coming here and doing precisely that is great, having one individual constantly arching up "YOU ARE WRONG.... IT HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED.... THERE ARE LOTS OF BOOKS ON THE TOPIC....I'M SO CLEVER DON'T ARGUE WITH ME JUST ADMIRE MY BRILLIENCE...) really doesn't contribute anything and sort of misses the point.
 
And none of that changes the fact that prior to 1963/64 the escort cruiser was directly related to the strike carrier programme up to 1963/4.
 
uk 75 said:
I think now that therr may in fact be no such thing as a stretched Type 82 helicopter ship.

I have always thought that to be the case. With the Escort Cruiser designs in being at that time it would make little sense to try and adapt Type 82 for a similar role. I think there was perhaps a temptation to see the non-through deck Escort Cruiser designs with aft-helideck and the bow section given over to Sea Dart and 4.5in Mk.8 as effectively Type 82 with helicopters, but in reality they had a very different linage even if the systems and armament were similar to Type 82.

In response to Volkodav's points, I think its right to make the distinction between the Escort Cruiser of the 1961-64 era which was wedded to the carrier programme but also capable of independent action, and the Command Cruiser of 1964-70 which is a very similar beast but one that in the smoke-and-mirrors world of MoD planning acquired the trooping role and the overall command aspects to give it life and political justification after CVA-01 was consigned to history. I don't think we should underestimate the impact of the Healey defence cuts and the greater role of the MoD in defence procurement at this time and the effect that had on the concept being put around Whitehall to sell these ships, when superficially the entire helicopter cruiser linage were very similar ships of similar capability (albeit modernised in weapons as the years rolled on).

I've looked at some of the later Command Cruiser files, I'll try and give you my thoughts about them later on.

Also, I would be weary of relying on Friedman's judgements, several times I've been caught out by things in his British Cruisers book (from across all eras covered in the book) which are either plain wrong or seriously garbled in transmission.
 
Hood and JC

Thank you for your comments. I am grateful for the continuing fruit of your researches at Kew.

I would be interested to know what, if anything, was done about the Escort Cruiser between 1963 and
1966. It still appeared in the long term costings, presumably as the design that had to be postponed
in 1962 because of Polaris work.

Although Hobbs is a bit chaotic, I do have some sympathy for his preference for a light carrier based
design rather than a cruiser. It would have been a much more versatile platform, but of course
the RN were keen to get as many CF299/Seadart platforms to sea as possible.
 
I might be somewhat 'late to the party' on this subject, but disagreements between members aside, I think one of the important things to remember about the Cruiser/Type 82/Helicopter Cruiser/Command Cruiser issue is that there seems to be a lack of consistent forward planning. You have to remember that the 1950's were a period of rapid technological change within the military, not so much keeping moving the goal posts, more rebuilding the entire stadium!
In the '50's there seems to have been an almost rearguard thinking by some Admiralty members, determined to keep the CRUISER alive. Even the completion of the Tiger class was ultimately seen, even by the most die-hard members, to have been a mistake.
The original concept of the Escort Cruiser was as an addition to the new Carrier fleet, to, as discussed, carry sufficient helicopters for A/S protection whilst enabling the Carriers to concentrate on fixed-wing aircraft. It was then realised that the Escort Cruiser could risk the Carrier programme itself, and so was put on the 'back burner'.
The Type 82 itself was a concept filled with good intentions, but unfortunately was then discovered to be expensive on a per-unit basis (this is well documented).
The later Command Cruiser (post Carrier demise) concept, along with the smaller Type 42 Destroyers were oft quoted in print as being stretched or reduced, respectively, versions of the Type 82. This to a certain extent has entered the realms of Urban Legend, and thus, unless PRIMARY source material is uncovered which clearly shows the various projects respective lineages, will unfortunately alway influence effective discussion of the subject.
 
JFC Fuller said:
And none of that changes the fact that prior to 1963/64 the escort cruiser was directly related to the strike carrier programme up to 1963/4.

Every source that covers the Escort Cruiser concepts in any depth mentions not just supporting the strike carriers, but also flag / command facilities, independent operations and even, in some cases, missions such as troop transport, air assault, air direction and naval gunfire support. Pretty much all of the concepts were multi-role ships intended to replace cruisers in the fleet in most, if not all of their roles because this is what cruisers did. Cruisers in WWII were superior anti aircraft platforms, capable anti surface platforms, NGS, some even embarked aircraft capable of ASW as well as spotting, missions not that different to those proposed for the various Escort Cruiser studies. As requirements evolved the concepts evolved, in particular as other projects changed, grew or were cancelled, the priority and mix of particular missions and capabilities also changed. Another factor was also who was wearing what hat at what time, with different "Senior Sirs" have different opinions and priorities based on their own experiences and outlooks.

As I see it the stretched Bristol was an attempt to meet the requirements of getting additional large ASW helicopters to sea, as well as to replace the flag facilities and independent operations capabilities of the aging and shrinking cruiser fleet at minimum cost. It is clear (stated) that when compared to the larger, more capable, though deck studies that the bigger ships were the preferred way to go, ending work on the Bristol evolution. This is hardly surprising as the early studies appear to have been almost the size of Colossus and Majestic Class carriers, a number of early missile cruiser studies looked at using incomplete or surplus carrier hulls retaining some deck and hanger space for helicopters. There was even the early post war concept of using light fleet carriers to replace station and trade protection cruisers as their aircraft would deliver greater capability and flexibility than traditional gun cruisers.

Its the old trade off of size verses numbers, with carriers size does matter because the bigger the ship the bigger the air group tends to be and the more personnel are required to support it. With surface combatants though the relationship is not necessarily so linear as extra physical size only affects crew size significantly if extra systems are added. Larger boilers need not require significantly larger crews while replacing separate cruise GTs, steam plant or diesels with additional main propulsion GTs could actually reduce the required size of the engineering department. Adding a separate point defence missile system would increase manning but increasing the size of the area defence missile magazine would not and adding a second launcher or additional directors may not. Integrating another missile type into an existing launcher probably wouldn't increase crew size but adding a separate system would.
 
As promised some information on the later Command Ships from the archives (DEFE 23/387 and DEFE 23/1385).

The Draft Sketch Requirement for a Command Cruiser (NSR 7097) (undated but must be 1967) listed the functions of the ship as:
Function (War): command and control naval and air forces, both maritime and fighter/strike in support of fleet, contribute to defence of convoy/force with ASW helicopters and by operating them in reconnaissance and anti-shipping strike role, supplement air defence of force, gun armament to engage light surface forces, NGS, illumination, ECM fire and AA fire, acting as Air Defence Ship or Joint Amphibious Force Commander, Command Communications ship for relaying traffic, Grade III Flagship.
Function (Peace): long-range self-contained patrol vessel to deal with wide range of internal security and disaster relief tasks.
Four ships were required initially.
Desired characteristics were; speed 28kts at max deep displacement 6 months out of dock in tropical waters, 20kts cruising speed; 5,000 miles endurance at 20kts; gas turbine power plant.
Armament: 1x GWS 30 twin launcher with 2x Type 909 (38x Sea Dart). 1x 4.5in Mk.8 (350 rounds). Was to be fitted with Type 988. Sonar was pretty basic with Type 184M and 182 and 185.
Airgroup: 6x SH3D helicopters (all in hangar, preferably 3 abreast). Flight deck 180ft long with two operating spots, width 70ft at hangar doors. Sufficient strength to carry a Chinook (30,000lb) for transit ferry purposes.

During 1967 nuclear propulsion was studied, partly to increase the airgroup but bizarrely also it was thought to "provide a measure of political insurance against cancellation and might improve public image of the Navy."
Things then get trimmed as £30 million per ship was deemed too expensive and a new target was within £20 million (£22mil max), makes an interesting comparison to the Type 82 costs and what was desired for in the Command Cruiser. To save the money Sea Dart was replaced by PX 430, 4.5in gun and other systems removed but helicopters carried increased to 9 Sea King, with 7 in the hangar, thereby maximising the aviation potential of the ship, a clear sign that with the carrier fleet being phased out a flight deck and an effective air group were now of more importance than traditional cruiser roles (air defence and NGS). As we've discussed before, whether the cruiser had any reasonable role post 1960 is very questionable. By 1968 the Command Cruiser was a carrier by political smokescreen

By October 1968 the Navy was looking to add a light anti-surface strike capability by fitting Sea King with an air-to-surface missile.
Possible air groups now looked like this:
6 Sea King for ASW and reconnaissance and strike
9 Sea King, 6 for ASW and reconnaissance and strike and 3 for AEW
12 Sea King, 9 for ASW and reconnaissance and strike and 3 for AEW

Naval Staff Requirement (NSR 7097) for a Command Cruiser, approved in February 1970 called for:
Function: to command a task force and control operation of land based aircraft, to operate large helicopters for area ASW defence, to deploy area SAGW, to deploy surface reconnaissance and light surface strike capability, to provide a quick reaction contribution to strike, problem and limited air defence capability with V/STOL aircraft.
Operational Concept: primarily operate as part of NATO Maritime Contingency Force, will be fitted to carry Commander. Up to three months non-firing operations and perhaps one month firing operations with intensive level in last week. Peacetime NATO exercises and flag showing, up to six months away. Expected life 20-25 years.
Emergency troop lift up to a Commando or Battalion Group.
28kts max speed and 5,000nm at 18kts endurance in tropical conditions at max deep displacement, 6 months out of dock.
Two Olympus TM3B on each of two shafts.
No limitations on dimensions.
Armament: 1x GWS 30 with 2x Type 909 (adapted from Type 42 System), 22x missiles including 2 in hoists
Airgroup: 9x ASW helicopters and 3x Harriers typical. Reasonable provision for successor to Sea King, provision for future V/STOL to be based on P.1179.
Flight Deck: Runway 550ft x 40ft (167.6m x 12.2m)
 
Hood,

Thank you for posting that. I don't particularly regard the outlined ship as a carrier with a political smokescreen. Rather more it is a carrier shorn of the baggage associated with the heavy strike role that had been associated with the role of NATO Carrier Striking Group 2 and the EoS role (CVA01 had the CVA designation for a reason). I would also add that the Air Defence Role of the cruiser had been central for years, the novelty was the addition of a small number of V/STOL aircraft to compliment the ship based systems.

There is clearly a host of things baked into the Cruiser Concept but they can be roughly segmented into three main components:

ASW Helicopter platform; essentially the same as the various helicopter ships schemed by NATO countries throughout the late 50s and 60s
Command vessel; answering the RN need for flagships- roles previously undertaken by carriers and cruisers
Air Defence; very much a cruiser role (it had been baked into the 1957 cruiser designs)

The small V/STOL component extends the air defence umbrella and adds a light strike component. It would be interesting to see the air weapons stowage requirements associated with NSR 7097.
 
The weapons stowage in NSR 7097 for the air group was:
Helicopter ammunition: 54x ASW torpedoes (may include 12 Practice torpedoes); 12x Bombs HE 600lb MC; up to 24x Mk.11 Depth Charges; 24x 5in and 12x 4.5in Reconnaissance Flares
V/STOL aircraft: 40x 68mm SNEB pods, 1527 30mm ADEN rounds, 18x 1,000lb bombs, plus provision for 12x Martel (replacing 1,000lb bombs) and 16x Sidewinder/Taildog for Harrier Successor only.

The V/STOL I think was very much intended to be 'pure' P.1127 as the ground-attack Harrier GR.1 than the Sea Harrier that became, indeed it seems they felt a viable future V/STOL fighter could only be a Harrier successor like P.1179. This document of course pre-dates the Sea Harrier.

When I say carrier with a political smokescreen I'm being a bit literal, but its interesting as the Type 82 weapons and radar were shorn to save money the air group came to the fore. This is probably how it should always have been. Politically though calling this a carrier in any form was more dangerous than calling it a cruiser, though of course in concept its closer to the cruiser roles as you've pointed out.
 
My reading of the Type 988 story is that it was shorn away for its own expense rather than the expense it imposed on ships. There are also hints of technical problems and the growing requirements for computing power to support it were piling on cost. I suppose what I am trying to say is that it was abandoned as an equipment project in its own right rather than being removed from a ship (though obviously that was the practical impact). NSR 7097 still mandates the same AAW fit as a Type 42 destroyer (essentially the same as Bristol sans 18 rounds). It still looks relatively intact compared to the original cruiser requirements (some of the Sea Dart escort cruiser designs are gunless too). The interesting piece for me is related to the P.1127 element, the air weapons stowage suggests a limited degree of light attack capability, it would be interesting to understand whether this was to enable a degree of support to RM units in Northern Norway (a legacy from the strike carriers)...?

I am sure you know this but the Bombs HE 600lb MC were WE.177; that they were listed under helicopter munitions suggests they were there as nuclear depth charges.
 
To me it feels as though V/STOL was wanted as an air defence asset but all that existed in 1970 was a ground-attack Harrier (only just entered RAF service the year before) so they gave provision for Harrier as a stop-gap until a supersonic V/STOL fighter could be acquired in the late 70s. Of course we know Sea Harrier was the eventual fighter version, probably not what the writers of NSR 7097 had in mind given the Martel-toting Harrier Successor they wanted provision for.

Supporting the RM in Norway would probably be one additional role, though a Harrier GR.1 with SNEB and/or 1,000lb bombs would qualify towards the required surface reconnaissance and light surface strike capability (the Sea Kings lacking ASM capability as planned back in 1968). As for Northern Norway, its worth noting NSR 7097 called for the ship to be winterised but not arcticised.
 
Thank you Hood again for sharing your research.
I recall that much was made in the late 1960s of using helicopters to provide platforms for anti-ship missiles, initially Wasps with AS12.
I think it was hoped to fit Sea Kings with MARTEL but this only happened when India got Sea Eagle.
P1179 would have been operated by the RAF as an alternate to MRCA Tornado but never happened.
Sea Harrier started under the Conservative 1970 government but was not ordered until the 1974 Labour Government. David Owen took credit for toning down Labour opposition to carriers.
 
TNA file image attached.

What we would today call 'breaking the targeting and kill chain' was a key role.
 

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Harrier said:
TNA file image attached.

What we would today call 'breaking the targeting and kill chain' was a key role.

The reference to "radar SIDEWINDER" is interesting. Were they looking to revisit AIM-9C?
 
I think it may be a typo, a missing ampersand.

It was meant to be minimum change/lowest cost from GR3/Seaspray radar.
 
TomS said:
Harrier said:
TNA file image attached.

What we would today call 'breaking the targeting and kill chain' was a key role.

The reference to "radar SIDEWINDER" is interesting. Were they looking to revisit AIM-9C?

Or do they mean slaving the IR seeker on the Sidewinder to the fighter radar i.e. SEAM?
 
Yeah, probably a typo, but it struck me that before AIM-9L brought in an all-aspect capability, they'd be maneuvering for a stern chase, which might take some effort to set up against the surprisingly fast Bear aircraft. Being able to shoot them from the front would really have sped up intercepts. But given how cheap they wanted SHAR to be, they would definitely not have been making a new missile and the 9C was thoroughly obsolete by that point.
 
TomS said:
Yeah, probably a typo, but it struck me that before AIM-9L brought in an all-aspect capability, they'd be maneuvering for a stern chase, which might take some effort to set up against the surprisingly fast Bear aircraft. Being able to shoot them from the front would really have sped up intercepts. But given how cheap they wanted SHAR to be, they would definitely not have been making a new missile and the 9C was thoroughly obsolete by that point.

AIM-9L started development in 1971 with a "planned" LRIP start year of 1974. Seems to be within the timeframe provided by the attached document.
 
Sea Harrier - I have NSR.6541 for Sea Harrier. I wonder if the '1' should be a '7'. Looks like it should be. Can't recall offhand where I saw the 6541
I also have NST.6455 as the Sea Harrier update (FA.2)

Chris
 
I think it's a typo. The spec that it is appended to calls it 6451.
 

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