Queen Elizabeth Class (CVF) development

[Thorvic]

I'm not sure how you think that ships are built that such a significant deviation from the agreed plans could go unnoticed for years on end.

Quite simple really. The oversight that was traditionally exercised by the Royal Navy and by the Ministry of Defence over major naval projects and programs was practically all transferred to the DPA (and later inherited by the DE&S). The idea was that using commercial practices rather than military or Civil Service ones would make defence procurement faster and cheaper (needless to say it was a total disaster from the outset). When it came to the CVF program some of that oversight was delegated to the Aircraft Carrier Alliance. Since the design changes were initiated by the DPA in the first place however, no alarms were raised.

The NAO report into the abortive conversion makes no such claim, either. In fact, the NAO is very clear that the initial assumption was steam catapults, that changing to EMALS added 60% to the cost, and that further errors meant a further 150% increase. Of that, only £106 million was due to installation costs – unexpected ship impact was one component of this, but not the only component. That's not the kind of cost you'd see for a sudden realisation that the ship hadn't been built according to the plans.

Forgive me, but are you sure of that interpretation of the report?

Because Gordon Brown quietly told them to drop the space for the CTOL gear as he was desperate to get the cost of two ships down after wasting the design and build time for 5 years forcing the Warship builders into an unwanted merger by cancelling all other ships and offering the CVF as big carrots but dropped a clanger as still tried to use the 2003 price without 5 years of accumulated costs, more expensive steel taken into account.
The Carrier when ordered for construction were still 'Officially' interchangeable as the Final F-35 type selection wasn't due till 2011 as the F-35B had failed to prove itself at that point. That why the 2010 Defence review switched to F-35C and CATOBAR, the official stance was they Carriers were designed and were supposed built to be changeable, it was ony after that was announced did the ACA reveal what they had been instructed to do to focus ony on STOVL and that the switch would take a lot longer and cost a lot more (Plus any delays would be at the Govt expense and they would need compensation for the lack of work during the redesign thanks to the contract they agreed after the enforced merger !!)

 

[zen]

Certainly Brown's behaviour in No.11 and No.10 caused awesome levels of disruption to the military and their efforts to plan and procure.
The sheer unwillingness to accept the arguments for CVF were obvious and their repetition only made for delay after delay to avoid any real financial commitment.

Long term budgets for Typhoon would disappear for months or years. Pretend wrangling used to cover the obvious reality of current shortfalls even at the ultimate increase in costs!

This was going on across the board.

 

[aonestudio]

Navy launches probe after leak on board aircraft carrier

Water was ankle-deep in an accommodation area following an incident on board HMS Prince of Wales.

www.swindonadvertiser.co.uk

 

[phil gollin]

Because Gordon Brown quietly told them to drop the space for the CTOL gear as he was desperate to get the cost of two ships down after wasting the design and build time for 5 years forcing the Warship builders into an unwanted merger by cancelling all other ships and offering the CVF as big carrots but dropped a clanger as still tried to use the 2003 price without 5 years of accumulated costs, more expensive steel taken into account.
The Carrier when ordered for construction were still 'Officially' interchangeable as the Final F-35 type selection wasn't due till 2011 as the F-35B had failed to prove itself at that point. That why the 2010 Defence review switched to F-35C and CATOBAR, the official stance was they Carriers were designed and were supposed built to be changeable, it was ony after that was announced did the ACA reveal what they had been instructed to do to focus ony on STOVL and that the switch would take a lot longer and cost a lot more (Plus any delays would be at the Govt expense and they would need compensation for the lack of work during the redesign thanks to the contract they agreed after the enforced merger !!)

.

And has ANYONE admitted to actually giving the order to drop convertibility ? Or, has anyone admitted to not telling the RN ?

.

 

[Foo Fighter]

A very good question, perhaps the thumb screws should come out of retirement.

 

[kaiserd]

I’d like to see some (any?) actual evidence for many of the claims being made.
Sounds like desperate retrospective justification of the debacle around trying to shift to CTOL.

 

[uk 75]

I was opposed to ordering aircraft carriers back in 1998 on the grounds that the RN had been barely able to keep one Invincible in commission and that SSNs were a more useful tool for the RN. A Commando ASW carrier like Ocean able to operate VSTOL aircraft if needed was a much more useful ship.
Now over 20 years later we have a very expensive version of that ship (as only one can be in commission). Was it worth the sacrifices made by the RN. Probably not. But we have the ship and its there and F35B might not be as duff (Dave as it got called) as I feared.
As for a 21st Century CVA01 it was and is never going to happen (unless you count my Triang model lookalike)

 

[phil gollin]

I’d like to see some (any?) actual evidence for many of the claims being made.
Sounds like desperate retrospective justification of the debacle around trying to shift to CTOL.

.

"Retrospective" as in written before the decisions ? That's not bad arse-covering even for a Tory government !

.

 

[Volkodav]

The facts are there - it says retain ability. It says buy a larger CTOL hull.

It retains the ability now. The larger hull is what we have.

It is still convertible.

It was just considered too expensive to action in detail for the benefits. What is difficult to understand about this?

There is no trick, no scheme, no dastardly devil. Just the reality of a complex and expensive project.

And I was there too, but not writing blogs - part of it!

I’m not sure how anything Cameron ever said has much value to this forum? The bloke was PR in it’s purest form of all style and zero substance.

Exactly, the concept was that the ships would initially operate Harrier, transition to F-35B and then at mid life, decide whether to convert them to CTOL, i.e. depending on whether there was a viable STO/VL replacement for F-35B available among other things. Undertaking such a radical change to the configuration of a ship with the intent of completing the work during what is already an extensive MLU is far less daunting than trying to redesign one that is already under construction. Ideally the decision would be made a decade or more out, design completed, materials ordered, equipment assembled and tested, all prior to the ship beginning the upgrade.

Redesigning a ship already under construction is idiocy.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Harrier disappeared as a requirement prior to 2006. The Order was in 2007.

I don’t think anyone has thought beyond F35B.

Again, the requirement was that the ship could be adapted, not that doing it was specified to a level of difficulty or cost.
There were “CTOL” spaces marked all over the design, but these were very rough and indicative and as above predated EMALS. There was also lots of unused accomodation areas similarly for the expected higher crewing requirement of CV ops.

 

[timmymagic]

Again, the requirement was that the ship could be adapted, not that doing it was specified to a level of difficulty or cost.
There were “CTOL” spaces marked all over the design, but these were very rough and indicative and as above predated EMALS. There was also lots of unused accomodation areas similarly for the expected higher crewing requirement of CV ops.

On the Navweaps forum there was a poster (who might still be active) called 'Hindpool' who was involved in the design and build of the QE Class. He detailed the series of events around the CATOBAR/STOVL angle. IIRC the requirement was ditched incredibly early on. Dr Liam Fox's re-examination of the F-35C was incompetence on the MoD's part and an easy £100m for the ACA, a phone call to the designers would have given them ballpark costs within an hour and knocked the idea on the head straightaway. Instead we wasted a year because of an incompetent Defence Ministers idea.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Fox was certainly an idiot in his ideas and execution. The Dept soon got rid and reimposed what it wanted to do.

But CTOL was never really more than “set aside” which did get eaten into but again this whole “convert to CTOL” wasn’t what people have made it out to be, and very far from a “thing” that got deleted. Those CTOL spaces were still there in 2009 btw.

The 100M for ACA is small beer to the money it cost from delaying the program so much. “Prudent” Brown wasted billions.

 

[zen]

Brown is the reason for the delay in Main Gate, at least 5 years and frankly more wasted causing costs escalation.
All while cutting defense spending while fighting two wars.

 

[timmymagic]

But CTOL was never really more than “set aside” which did get eaten into but again this whole “convert to CTOL” wasn’t what people have made it out to be, and very far from a “thing” that got deleted. Those CTOL spaces were still there in 2009 btw.

The 100M for ACA is small beer to the money it cost from delaying the program so much. “Prudent” Brown wasted billions.

I agree, that was the point that the Navweaps poster made, it was never a firm thing. The £100m is indeed small beer compared to the Treasury's ridiculous cost escalation of c£1.5bn to save in year costs. I guess the only upside was the £50-100m we got from the French for accessing the design. Incredibly even with the c£1.5bn of avoidable costs (that would have more than paid for the original Alpha design in hindsight..) they're still very good value for money in warship cost terms.

 

[uk 75]

We do tend to forget that the UK is trying to do more than most second tier economic powers (ie everyone apart from US and China).
We now have a carrier and immediate task group better than any non US navy (CVF, 2 T45, some T23 and an SSN around). Unlike France we have a second such group as a swing.
The RAF's Typhoons have really experienced crews and F35B is coming along.
The Army has a lot of Apaches and pretty good European armoured battlegroups.
And we havr a Trident submarine at sea.
For all the bungling of politicians, bureaucrats and senior officers the people who operate them are pretty damn good.
No I am not being complacent. There is a lot wrong and huge mistakes continue. But in thes gloomy days I want a glass half full.

 

[Purpletrouble]

But CTOL was never really more than “set aside” which did get eaten into but again this whole “convert to CTOL” wasn’t what people have made it out to be, and very far from a “thing” that got deleted. Those CTOL spaces were still there in 2009 btw.

The 100M for ACA is small beer to the money it cost from delaying the program so much. “Prudent” Brown wasted billions.

I agree, that was the point that the Navweaps poster made, it was never a firm thing. The £100m is indeed small beer compared to the Treasury's ridiculous cost escalation of c£1.5bn to save in year costs. I guess the only upside was the £50-100m we got from the French for accessing the design. Incredibly even with the c£1.5bn of avoidable costs (that would have more than paid for the original Alpha design in hindsight..) they're still very good value for money in warship cost terms.

yes wasnt trying to disagree!

The cost management of CVF was absurd, but usual business for defence procurement. The system has been overhauled near continuously for decades but never gets any better.
I used to be impressed with the civil engineering industry (thinking railways) in terms of budgeting, particularly their approach to risk and reserve. But However that has also spectacularly fallen apart over the last decade. The common denominator being the public sector control...

 

[sferrin]

Would the carriers be retrofitted to use EMALS at some point in the future once the system has been fully tested on the US Navy's Ford class super carriers? And return to CTOL carrier operations. I have heard rumours that this is now not going to happen.

Even if the USN were to ever get EMALS to a truly satisfactory state (I'm doubtful),

Why? It's not controlled nuclear fusion or antigravity.

 

[Purpletrouble]

It’ll work at some point probably, but the time and cost to get there...

 

[Ron5]

It’ll work at some point probably, but the time and cost to get there...

It works:

New record

 

[Purpletrouble]

A one-off 167 vs target of 160 sustained for 30 days with actual one-off target of 270...

How much prep was needed for this? Were they trying for 270? How often have Nimitzs hit/exceeded their target?

It’s 2 years since it last tried to hit it’s target (when it achieved 50%) and has raised that to just over 60%. Sorry but the article reeks of PR over substance.

And look at the cost and time!

I still remember muppets screaming in 2010 the RN should be getting this kit and Super Hornet to get the capability done and dusted before 2015.

 

[Grey Havoc]

It’ll work at some point probably, but the time and cost to get there...

It works:

New record

Mostly recoveries rather than launches though.

 

[Pirate Pete]

I know it is the 'Official' Report, but hopefully he attached will help shed some light on the CATOBAR/VSTOL carrier discussions:

 

[Grey Havoc]

Here’s why Britain is struggling to form a fully effective carrier strike group

Britain’s Royal Navy took delivery of two new aircraft carriers, but a government report on the ships achieving operational capability has laid bare some obstacles toward making a fully effective carrier strike group.

www.defensenews.com

 

[Grey Havoc]

Via the SNAFU blog:

Is the Carrier Strike Concept Worth It? Thoughts on the NAO Report.

A blog about UK defence issues which tries to put a positive and fresh look at many current matters impacting UK and wider defence.

thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com

 

[Volkodav]

The biggest single factor in schedule slip and cost growth has been politics and not just for the carriers but for every single program, defence or otherwise, government has a hand in.

The only reason there are two carriers and that they are the size they are is because that is the bare minimum that could be justified, had it been a frigate, submarine, fighter or armoured vehicle program, numbers would have been slashed in addition to the project being delayed.

The argument that the RN should have acquired a larger number of smaller carriers is great in theory but fails in practice, because, although it is true a given capability can be divvied into smaller packets, this increases overheads costs and it also attracts cost cutting in the form of reducing numbers incrementally. There were meant to be five Escort Cruisers and three strike carriers, this became six through deck cruisers (I believe up to eight were first proposed) and no strike carriers, only three eventually being ordered. The three was cut to two and would have stayed there but for the Falklands War, the capability being retired altogether but for the constant demonstrated need meaning at least two had to be retained.

The government has demonstrated that no more than two carriers will survive the electoral and financial cycles, but no less than two will always be required. All the political penny pinching and changing direction does is drive up costs through stop start stupidity. The need for the capability exists, it is affordable and sustainable, the issue is the political games that drive up the lifecycle costs. Every short term cut increases life cycle cost, every cost cutting change in direction or support, drives up lifecycle costs, every early retirement or layup, results in a capability gap that is more expensive and time consuming to fill.

The worst part of the situation is multiple, large, long term sacrifices have been made to pay for the capability, i.e. combatant numbers, submarine numbers, the LPH, Largs Bay, Sea Harrier and then Harrier, manpower, RFA numbers. All these things were sacrificed, over twenty years, to pay for the required smaller (but more capable fleet), built around two carriers, but those sacrifices have been ignored with politicians, civil servants, media and interest groups now pretending that the RN has somehow foisted this unrealistic, unachievable "white elephant" on the UK without factoring in the cost. Wrong, they have already paid for it through sharply reduced fleet size and painful capability gaps, they have taken hit after hit, economy measure after economy measure and now the powers that be are trying to justify not delivering on their part.

 

[Purpletrouble]

The biggest single factor in schedule slip and cost growth has been politics and not just for the carriers but for every single program, defence or otherwise, government has a hand in.

The only reason there are two carriers and that they are the size they are is because that is the bare minimum that could be justified, had it been a frigate, submarine, fighter or armoured vehicle program, numbers would have been slashed in addition to the project being delayed.

The argument that the RN should have acquired a larger number of smaller carriers is great in theory but fails in practice, because, although it is true a given capability can be divvied into smaller packets, this increases overheads costs and it also attracts cost cutting in the form of reducing numbers incrementally. There were meant to be five Escort Cruisers and three strike carriers, this became six through deck cruisers (I believe up to eight were first proposed) and no strike carriers, only three eventually being ordered. The three was cut to two and would have stayed there but for the Falklands War, the capability being retired altogether but for the constant demonstrated need meaning at least two had to be retained.

The government has demonstrated that no more than two carriers will survive the electoral and financial cycles, but no less than two will always be required. All the political penny pinching and changing direction does is drive up costs through stop start stupidity. The need for the capability exists, it is affordable and sustainable, the issue is the political games that drive up the lifecycle costs. Every short term cut increases life cycle cost, every cost cutting change in direction or support, drives up lifecycle costs, every early retirement or layup, results in a capability gap that is more expensive and time consuming to fill.

The worst part of the situation is multiple, large, long term sacrifices have been made to pay for the capability, i.e. combatant numbers, submarine numbers, the LPH, Largs Bay, Sea Harrier and then Harrier, manpower, RFA numbers. All these things were sacrificed, over twenty years, to pay for the required smaller (but more capable fleet), built around two carriers, but those sacrifices have been ignored with politicians, civil servants, media and interest groups now pretending that the RN has somehow foisted this unrealistic, unachievable "white elephant" on the UK without factoring in the cost. Wrong, they have already paid for it through sharply reduced fleet size and painful capability gaps, they have taken hit after hit, economy measure after economy measure and now the powers that be are trying to justify not delivering on their part.

I think the issue is that they presented that they could have these ships without those cuts.
And now they still havent completed the capability but have kind of run out of cuts to make.
That is the core of the “white elephant” argument, and it sticks because largely it is correct.

 

[Volkodav]

The biggest single factor in schedule slip and cost growth has been politics and not just for the carriers but for every single program, defence or otherwise, government has a hand in.

The only reason there are two carriers and that they are the size they are is because that is the bare minimum that could be justified, had it been a frigate, submarine, fighter or armoured vehicle program, numbers would have been slashed in addition to the project being delayed.

The argument that the RN should have acquired a larger number of smaller carriers is great in theory but fails in practice, because, although it is true a given capability can be divvied into smaller packets, this increases overheads costs and it also attracts cost cutting in the form of reducing numbers incrementally. There were meant to be five Escort Cruisers and three strike carriers, this became six through deck cruisers (I believe up to eight were first proposed) and no strike carriers, only three eventually being ordered. The three was cut to two and would have stayed there but for the Falklands War, the capability being retired altogether but for the constant demonstrated need meaning at least two had to be retained.

The government has demonstrated that no more than two carriers will survive the electoral and financial cycles, but no less than two will always be required. All the political penny pinching and changing direction does is drive up costs through stop start stupidity. The need for the capability exists, it is affordable and sustainable, the issue is the political games that drive up the lifecycle costs. Every short term cut increases life cycle cost, every cost cutting change in direction or support, drives up lifecycle costs, every early retirement or layup, results in a capability gap that is more expensive and time consuming to fill.

The worst part of the situation is multiple, large, long term sacrifices have been made to pay for the capability, i.e. combatant numbers, submarine numbers, the LPH, Largs Bay, Sea Harrier and then Harrier, manpower, RFA numbers. All these things were sacrificed, over twenty years, to pay for the required smaller (but more capable fleet), built around two carriers, but those sacrifices have been ignored with politicians, civil servants, media and interest groups now pretending that the RN has somehow foisted this unrealistic, unachievable "white elephant" on the UK without factoring in the cost. Wrong, they have already paid for it through sharply reduced fleet size and painful capability gaps, they have taken hit after hit, economy measure after economy measure and now the powers that be are trying to justify not delivering on their part.

I think the issue is that they presented that they could have these ships without those cuts.
And now they still havent completed the capability but have kind of run out of cuts to make.
That is the core of the “white elephant” argument, and it sticks because largely it is correct.

Would the cuts have been necessary if previous, supposedly unrelated cuts, i.e. cutting the numbers of Type 45s and Astutes while stretching their build programs, early retirements of Type 22 and early Type 23, plus RFAs, hadn't actually increased long term costs through creating capability gaps and forcing life extensions and expensive work arounds?

The attitude seemed to be, we have the new world order, there is a war on terror, and the carriers will transform national capability, therefore we can cut and delay projects now. Then when there were resulting, long term costs associated with those decisions, they were paid for by further cuts and delays, creating further cost pushed into the future. Now these things that should have already been paid for are falling due when big investment is required replacing SSBNs and the Type 23s.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Well capability gaps dont cost anything, life extensions do but still small vs cost of new stuff.

The reality is that none of the plans was costed properly and never had a chance of arriving. The Seniors knew this and hence it was all just about positioning and getting ones favoured stuff through at key crunch points - politics, especially until they got their ranks and peerages and revolving door consultancies. Those that didnt know this and believed the figures were just incompetent.

SDR98 was lovely on strategy, complete fiction on numbers. But that was what was wanted as it got the Govt looking good andas events showed it could spin the inevitable cuts even in a war using those things cut! As again in 2008-10 when cuts were mow very really needed.

Even today look at the absurd Type31 pretence and shenanigans to hide that true cost.

MoD has never been able to either understand or accept that things are expensive, largely because it is run by people who don’t ever really encounter the true value of money - they just move it around, ask for more, carry on if they dont get it all whilst on salaries protected from theirs and the Dept’s performance. Hence you had a generation who hated BAE Systems because they became robust (esp after Astute/Nimrod) in refusing to play the game and instead forced MoD to pay for what it wanted - eg way over the top for nominally OPVs but actually because MoD wanted the shipbuilding capability and minimum job losses.

Type 45 cost what it cost because that it what producing a large 1st rate AAW ship costs. Its the MoD who pretended it could get twice the number.

The other side is manpower - this dominates running costs and all services have cit and cut against a declining real terms budget to reduce that, well, still with some silly sacred cows, but where on earth would we crew 6 more T45 or LPHs?

 

[SteveO]

Development of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier – a design history

In this article, we review how the design of the Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers evolved. This is a broad subject, worthy of several books but this article provides an overview.

www.savetheroyalnavy.org

I've only just discovered the Save The Royal Navy website and I'm finding it an excellent resource for the latest on RN projects. If you miss Richard Beedall's Navy Matters then you should give it a look!

 

[sferrin]

It’ll work at some point probably, but the time and cost to get there...

Nothing is free.

 

[sferrin]

Well capability gaps dont cost anything,

Until there's a war. Then they cost dearly. Pay in dollars now or blood and lives later.

 

[Purpletrouble]

Well capability gaps dont cost anything,

Until there's a war. Then they cost dearly. Pay in dollars now or blood and lives later.

Gapping Sea Harrier cost us lives?

Capability gaps can cost in blood, most dont however.

Spending billions on destroyers, subs and aircraft carriers whilst short of troops, armoured vehicles and helicopters in the actual war did cost actual lives.

 

[SteveO]

Capability gaps nearly always cost money in the long term. Whether they cost lives or not is down to luck or avoiding the fight.

Gapping Harrier's on carriers presumably cost the UK money if this quote from Navies in the 21st Century by Seaforth Publishing is correct about the 2011 Libya campaign is correct (page 35 notes)

10. The 3000 plus sorties by the land based RAF resulted in 600 targets being attacked. Meanwhile 1500 sorties by the French carrier Charles de Gaulle resulted in some 785 attacks. Similarily the Italian Navy's Harrier's represented just a seventh of their nations deployed combat strength, yet they flew a fifth of the Italian missions, dropped half of the total ordnance and did so for a tenth of the cost of Italy's land based Tornado's and Typhoon's.

Politicians are to blame

 

[zen]

It's never so simple as the Invincible class's use of fuel and consumables would be greater in cost than a airfield in the UK. Total cost really favours something a bit bigger than Tornado flying on internal fuel only from the UK to theatre and back.

This why I tended to favour something like Russia's JCB, able to tote a wide load over long range.

Militarily however a carrier is able to react and adapt more quickly and places less stress on flight crew.

It all has to be considered in any assessment of the costs and benefits of carriers.

 

[sferrin]

Well capability gaps dont cost anything,

Until there's a war. Then they cost dearly. Pay in dollars now or blood and lives later.

Gapping Sea Harrier cost us lives?

Capability gaps can cost in blood, most dont however.

Spending billions on destroyers, subs and aircraft carriers whilst short of troops, armoured vehicles and helicopters in the actual war did cost actual lives.

The UK barely had enough navy to handle the Falklands. Much less and the cost would have been territory lost for good. As for land war which are you referring to specifically?

 

[zen]

Hmmm someone seems to be arguing that the absence of a war to utilise certain sections of the military and their equipment is indication of no need for that equipment as no one would ever engage in a war that would require their use?

Perhaps one should consider that because such sections of the military exist with such equipment. That the potential threat of their use is a....deterrent to just such conflicts.

That the indication of the existence of a capability is ultimately the indication of the will to use it.

Whereas the indication of the lack of a capability is the certainty of the lack of ability, even should the will to use such be rediscovered.

 

[TomS]

something like Russia's JCB, able to tote a wide load over long range.

I searched for this but only found one other reference, also by you. Can I ask what aircraft or system you are talking about?

 

[Purpletrouble]

Hmmm someone seems to be arguing that the absence of a war to utilise certain sections of the military and their equipment is indication of no need for that equipment as no one would ever engage in a war that would require their use?

Perhaps one should consider that because such sections of the military exist with such equipment. That the potential threat of their use is a....deterrent to just such conflicts.

That the indication of the existence of a capability is ultimately the indication of the will to use it.

Whereas the indication of the lack of a capability is the certainty of the lack of ability, even should the will to use such be rediscovered.

I think its fairly obvious that when you are fighting a war, you need to focus on what is happening vs what might happen.

Not doing that cost us lives, including friends of mine. It isn’t so theoretical then.

 

[zen]

No this is a temptation to hijack the thread.

Strictly the bulk of CVF spending took hold after the wind down of operations.

Blaming the Navy or the RAF is playing right into the politicians hands. The very same politicians who are responsible for the delays on CVF and a myriad of irresponsible decisions over all services equipment plans and budgets.

 

[RLBH]

No this is a temptation to hijack the thread.

Strictly the bulk of CVF spending took hold after the wind down of operations.

Blaming the Navy or the RAF is playing right into the politicians hands. The very same politicians who are responsible for the delays on CVF and a myriad of irresponsible decisions over all services equipment plans and budgets.

There's blame enough to go around, provided one blames the right people for the right things. The armed forces have a definite tendency to act like children in a toy shop and spend far more money than they should on shiny things. But equally, trying to fight a war on a (declining!) peacetime budget was never going to go well.