- Joined
- 19 July 2016
- Messages
- 3,958
- Reaction score
- 2,998
A very good question, perhaps the thumb screws should come out of retirement.
I’d like to see some (any?) actual evidence for many of the claims being made.
Sounds like desperate retrospective justification of the debacle around trying to shift to CTOL.
Exactly, the concept was that the ships would initially operate Harrier, transition to F-35B and then at mid life, decide whether to convert them to CTOL, i.e. depending on whether there was a viable STO/VL replacement for F-35B available among other things. Undertaking such a radical change to the configuration of a ship with the intent of completing the work during what is already an extensive MLU is far less daunting than trying to redesign one that is already under construction. Ideally the decision would be made a decade or more out, design completed, materials ordered, equipment assembled and tested, all prior to the ship beginning the upgrade.The facts are there - it says retain ability. It says buy a larger CTOL hull.
It retains the ability now. The larger hull is what we have.
It is still convertible.
It was just considered too expensive to action in detail for the benefits. What is difficult to understand about this?
There is no trick, no scheme, no dastardly devil. Just the reality of a complex and expensive project.
And I was there too, but not writing blogs - part of it!
I’m not sure how anything Cameron ever said has much value to this forum? The bloke was PR in it’s purest form of all style and zero substance.
Again, the requirement was that the ship could be adapted, not that doing it was specified to a level of difficulty or cost.
There were “CTOL” spaces marked all over the design, but these were very rough and indicative and as above predated EMALS. There was also lots of unused accomodation areas similarly for the expected higher crewing requirement of CV ops.
But CTOL was never really more than “set aside” which did get eaten into but again this whole “convert to CTOL” wasn’t what people have made it out to be, and very far from a “thing” that got deleted. Those CTOL spaces were still there in 2009 btw.
The 100M for ACA is small beer to the money it cost from delaying the program so much. “Prudent” Brown wasted billions.
yes wasnt trying to disagree!But CTOL was never really more than “set aside” which did get eaten into but again this whole “convert to CTOL” wasn’t what people have made it out to be, and very far from a “thing” that got deleted. Those CTOL spaces were still there in 2009 btw.
The 100M for ACA is small beer to the money it cost from delaying the program so much. “Prudent” Brown wasted billions.
I agree, that was the point that the Navweaps poster made, it was never a firm thing. The £100m is indeed small beer compared to the Treasury's ridiculous cost escalation of c£1.5bn to save in year costs. I guess the only upside was the £50-100m we got from the French for accessing the design. Incredibly even with the c£1.5bn of avoidable costs (that would have more than paid for the original Alpha design in hindsight..) they're still very good value for money in warship cost terms.
Would the carriers be retrofitted to use EMALS at some point in the future once the system has been fully tested on the US Navy's Ford class super carriers? And return to CTOL carrier operations. I have heard rumours that this is now not going to happen.
Even if the USN were to ever get EMALS to a truly satisfactory state (I'm doubtful),
Via the SNAFU blog:
Is the Carrier Strike Concept Worth It? Thoughts on the NAO Report.
Defence blog focusing on 21st century analysis of Cold War defence, security and continuity of government problems.thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com
I think the issue is that they presented that they could have these ships without those cuts.The biggest single factor in schedule slip and cost growth has been politics and not just for the carriers but for every single program, defence or otherwise, government has a hand in.
The only reason there are two carriers and that they are the size they are is because that is the bare minimum that could be justified, had it been a frigate, submarine, fighter or armoured vehicle program, numbers would have been slashed in addition to the project being delayed.
The argument that the RN should have acquired a larger number of smaller carriers is great in theory but fails in practice, because, although it is true a given capability can be divvied into smaller packets, this increases overheads costs and it also attracts cost cutting in the form of reducing numbers incrementally. There were meant to be five Escort Cruisers and three strike carriers, this became six through deck cruisers (I believe up to eight were first proposed) and no strike carriers, only three eventually being ordered. The three was cut to two and would have stayed there but for the Falklands War, the capability being retired altogether but for the constant demonstrated need meaning at least two had to be retained.
The government has demonstrated that no more than two carriers will survive the electoral and financial cycles, but no less than two will always be required. All the political penny pinching and changing direction does is drive up costs through stop start stupidity. The need for the capability exists, it is affordable and sustainable, the issue is the political games that drive up the lifecycle costs. Every short term cut increases life cycle cost, every cost cutting change in direction or support, drives up lifecycle costs, every early retirement or layup, results in a capability gap that is more expensive and time consuming to fill.
The worst part of the situation is multiple, large, long term sacrifices have been made to pay for the capability, i.e. combatant numbers, submarine numbers, the LPH, Largs Bay, Sea Harrier and then Harrier, manpower, RFA numbers. All these things were sacrificed, over twenty years, to pay for the required smaller (but more capable fleet), built around two carriers, but those sacrifices have been ignored with politicians, civil servants, media and interest groups now pretending that the RN has somehow foisted this unrealistic, unachievable "white elephant" on the UK without factoring in the cost. Wrong, they have already paid for it through sharply reduced fleet size and painful capability gaps, they have taken hit after hit, economy measure after economy measure and now the powers that be are trying to justify not delivering on their part.
Would the cuts have been necessary if previous, supposedly unrelated cuts, i.e. cutting the numbers of Type 45s and Astutes while stretching their build programs, early retirements of Type 22 and early Type 23, plus RFAs, hadn't actually increased long term costs through creating capability gaps and forcing life extensions and expensive work arounds?I think the issue is that they presented that they could have these ships without those cuts.The biggest single factor in schedule slip and cost growth has been politics and not just for the carriers but for every single program, defence or otherwise, government has a hand in.
The only reason there are two carriers and that they are the size they are is because that is the bare minimum that could be justified, had it been a frigate, submarine, fighter or armoured vehicle program, numbers would have been slashed in addition to the project being delayed.
The argument that the RN should have acquired a larger number of smaller carriers is great in theory but fails in practice, because, although it is true a given capability can be divvied into smaller packets, this increases overheads costs and it also attracts cost cutting in the form of reducing numbers incrementally. There were meant to be five Escort Cruisers and three strike carriers, this became six through deck cruisers (I believe up to eight were first proposed) and no strike carriers, only three eventually being ordered. The three was cut to two and would have stayed there but for the Falklands War, the capability being retired altogether but for the constant demonstrated need meaning at least two had to be retained.
The government has demonstrated that no more than two carriers will survive the electoral and financial cycles, but no less than two will always be required. All the political penny pinching and changing direction does is drive up costs through stop start stupidity. The need for the capability exists, it is affordable and sustainable, the issue is the political games that drive up the lifecycle costs. Every short term cut increases life cycle cost, every cost cutting change in direction or support, drives up lifecycle costs, every early retirement or layup, results in a capability gap that is more expensive and time consuming to fill.
The worst part of the situation is multiple, large, long term sacrifices have been made to pay for the capability, i.e. combatant numbers, submarine numbers, the LPH, Largs Bay, Sea Harrier and then Harrier, manpower, RFA numbers. All these things were sacrificed, over twenty years, to pay for the required smaller (but more capable fleet), built around two carriers, but those sacrifices have been ignored with politicians, civil servants, media and interest groups now pretending that the RN has somehow foisted this unrealistic, unachievable "white elephant" on the UK without factoring in the cost. Wrong, they have already paid for it through sharply reduced fleet size and painful capability gaps, they have taken hit after hit, economy measure after economy measure and now the powers that be are trying to justify not delivering on their part.
And now they still havent completed the capability but have kind of run out of cuts to make.
That is the core of the “white elephant” argument, and it sticks because largely it is correct.
Nothing is free.It’ll work at some point probably, but the time and cost to get there...
Well capability gaps dont cost anything,
Gapping Sea Harrier cost us lives?Well capability gaps dont cost anything,
Until there's a war. Then they cost dearly. Pay in dollars now or blood and lives later.
10. The 3000 plus sorties by the land based RAF resulted in 600 targets being attacked. Meanwhile 1500 sorties by the French carrier Charles de Gaulle resulted in some 785 attacks. Similarily the Italian Navy's Harrier's represented just a seventh of their nations deployed combat strength, yet they flew a fifth of the Italian missions, dropped half of the total ordnance and did so for a tenth of the cost of Italy's land based Tornado's and Typhoon's.
The UK barely had enough navy to handle the Falklands. Much less and the cost would have been territory lost for good. As for land war which are you referring to specifically?Gapping Sea Harrier cost us lives?Well capability gaps dont cost anything,
Until there's a war. Then they cost dearly. Pay in dollars now or blood and lives later.
Capability gaps can cost in blood, most dont however.
Spending billions on destroyers, subs and aircraft carriers whilst short of troops, armoured vehicles and helicopters in the actual war did cost actual lives.
something like Russia's JCB, able to tote a wide load over long range.
I think its fairly obvious that when you are fighting a war, you need to focus on what is happening vs what might happen.Hmmm someone seems to be arguing that the absence of a war to utilise certain sections of the military and their equipment is indication of no need for that equipment as no one would ever engage in a war that would require their use?
Perhaps one should consider that because such sections of the military exist with such equipment. That the potential threat of their use is a....deterrent to just such conflicts.
That the indication of the existence of a capability is ultimately the indication of the will to use it.
Whereas the indication of the lack of a capability is the certainty of the lack of ability, even should the will to use such be rediscovered.
There's blame enough to go around, provided one blames the right people for the right things. The armed forces have a definite tendency to act like children in a toy shop and spend far more money than they should on shiny things. But equally, trying to fight a war on a (declining!) peacetime budget was never going to go well.No this is a temptation to hijack the thread.
Strictly the bulk of CVF spending took hold after the wind down of operations.
Blaming the Navy or the RAF is playing right into the politicians hands. The very same politicians who are responsible for the delays on CVF and a myriad of irresponsible decisions over all services equipment plans and budgets.
No this is a temptation to hijack the thread.
Strictly the bulk of CVF spending took hold after the wind down of operations.
Blaming the Navy or the RAF is playing right into the politicians hands. The very same politicians who are responsible for the delays on CVF and a myriad of irresponsible decisions over all services equipment plans and budgets.
I guess truth can be very inconvenient.No this is a temptation to hijack the thread.
Strictly the bulk of CVF spending took hold after the wind down of operations.
Blaming the Navy or the RAF is playing right into the politicians hands. The very same politicians who are responsible for the delays on CVF and a myriad of irresponsible decisions over all services equipment plans and budgets.