P1154 scenario

[uk 75]

Although the 50s are not my area it seems to me that the UK fails to produce its own Sabre equivalent and is rescued by Canadair.
Fine aircraft though the Hunter is, it is pretty basic.
Lightning is a clever upgrade of a typical 50s research test plane.
By 1970 the only modern fighter the RAF has flown is the Phantom. Tornado owes a lot to the Phantom. It has a similar weapons configuration and all weather capability.
I am sorry but the UK does not compare well with Sweden or France in developing combat aircraft.

 

[Scott Kenny]

This is why I'm an advocate for the early adoption of the Lightning as a fighter-bomber, as the Hunter-P1154-Phantom-Jaguar path was the path to foreign policy dependence on other countries. Ideally in my mind the RAF and RN-FAA should have had 5 combat types in the late 60s and the only foreign type would be the F4K as it would be cheaper to go that way instead of an all British type to equip the handful of RN-FAA sqns.

No, EE Lightning is a terrible choice for a fighter-bomber!

 

[Rule of cool]

I am sorry but the UK does not compare well with Sweden or France in developing combat aircraft.

I agree, it's the whole point of this thread and several others. However this poor comparison isn't because the UK lacked the skills, technology and expertise, it's almost entirely a political problem.

 

[Rule of cool]

No, EE Lightning is a terrible choice for a fighter-bomber!

In the 1957-59 time-frame when the decision needed to be made to get an aircraft into service by 1961 to replace the Venom FBs and Meteor FRs the only other Mach 2 option was the F104C. That's hardly a stellar fighter-bomber option and it comes with a lot of baggage, although I suspect you're comparing the Lightning to the F4E which entered service 8 years later.

 

[Scott Kenny]

In the 1957-59 time-frame when the decision needed to be made to get an aircraft into service by 1961 to replace the Venom FBs and Meteor FRs the only other Mach 2 option was the F104C. That's hardly a stellar fighter-bomber option and it comes with a lot of baggage, although I suspect you're comparing the Lightning to the F4E which entered service 8 years later.

F-105. Mach 2.1 top speed, 675nmi combat range, 14,000lb bomb load. Little marginal as a fighter, but highly capable as an attacker or interdictor.

 

[Rule of cool]

F-105. Mach 2.1 top speed, 675nmi combat range, 14,000lb bomb load. Little marginal as a fighter, but highly capable as an attacker or interdictor.

Its pretty fast too, and big enough to mount 4 x Firestreaks so probably decent enough in the 60s as a fighter, far better than the Hunter FGA9.

However, the flyaway cost of an F105D was US$2.1 million, and that's ever scarce US currency, when a Lightning was about USD$1.7-1.8 million but paid for in Sterling. Then there's the entire supporting infrastructure, again bought from the US in scarce dollar reserves, whereas the Lightning fighter-bomber will share Fighter Command's supporting facilities, conversion trainers and the like.

I'm aware that other aircraft exist and have advantages over the Lightning, but these advantages come with disadvantages which are often not directly related to the aircraft but are extremely important to Governments and Air Forces.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Its pretty fast too, and big enough to mount 4 x Firestreaks so probably decent enough in the 60s as a fighter, far better than the Hunter FGA9.

Not going to go for SARH missiles? Not that the UK seemed to have any till Skyflash, but still.

However, the flyaway cost of an F105D was US$2.1 million, and that's ever scarce US currency, when a Lightning was about USD$1.7-1.8 million but paid for in Sterling. Then there's the entire supporting infrastructure, again bought from the US in scarce dollar reserves, whereas the Lightning fighter-bomber will share Fighter Command's supporting facilities, conversion trainers and the like.

Definitely an issue, not gonna lie.

One option would be to build under license, like the helicopters were. So instead of paying $2.1mil in dollars, you're only paying a license fee in dollars and everything else in Sterling. It probably would be a per-plane fee not a one-time cost, but still better than buying outright in scarce dollars.

But it saves you a lot of dollars and it gives you a work force that can build modern fighters.

Maybe go big and stick an Olympus 593 in there instead of the J75. 5" larger in diameter but over 6000lbs more thrust before afterburner. 12,000lbs more thrust in full burner. You'd need to design new inlets to handle the much greater mass flow, 410lbs/sec versus 256lbs/sec. 2000lbs heavier, but that's fine. Add more electronics up front to balance.

I'm aware that other aircraft exist and have advantages over the Lightning, but these advantages come with disadvantages which are often not directly related to the aircraft but are extremely important to Governments and Air Forces.

Oh, absolutely.

But the EE Lightning is a terrible attacker. Frankly, it's a marginal fighter and a tolerable interceptor. It really needed SARH missiles which didn't arrive until the Phantom did.

 

[red admiral]

There was no British equivalent of Saab or Dassault evolving families of combat aircraft (Lansen, Draken, Viggen or Ouragan, Mystere, Mirage). Hawker had the non supersonic Hunter while English Electric had lurched from a subsonic 40s jet bomber to a test pilot machine (Lightning).

I don't think this is true

Hawkers was very much a similar "evolutionary" philosophy as per Dassault, with progression from Sea Fury to Sea Hawk to P.1052 to P.1081 to Hunter to P.1083 to P.1100 and then arguably into P.1103/1121. (Arguably similar for the dH jets)

Its simply that not all these steps were funded and resulted in production orders. The main difference compared to say Sweden or France is that there were many more design teams and hence competition in the UK, so the chance of winning every single competition was low - rather than guaranteed.

And then couple this with going from supersonic research aircraft directly to the only supersonic fighter programme without competition and you see that UK was fixed on Warton dominance way back around the early 50s rather than any of the existing experienced manufacturers. If you wanted to choose monopoly supplier then you'd never pick EE, but the illusion of competition went on for a few more years until 1960ish, but we were locked in from a simple decision around research aircraft in 1949, and arguably the decision to power the Fairey FD.2 with Avons rather than Sapphires which significantly delayed its test flying.

In the US of course the customer was spoilt for choice though McDD seemed to punch through

I think the US provides a good illustration of a more competitive environment and how short lifespanned some companies were. e.g. North American Aviation produce two stand out performers in a row with P-51 and F-86, and then rapidly disappear because they didn't win any big contracts around 1960. Similar story with Republic and others.

 

[Rule of cool]

Not going to go for SARH missiles? Not that the UK seemed to have any till Skyflash, but still.

No, despite in my minds scenario Sandys not being so stupid declaring manned fighters obsolescent he still had to save 100 million pounds per annum. In any case Firestreak and particularly Red Top are impressive missiles with wide engagement envelopes that are fire and forget and not susceptible to ECM. Apparently even after rejecting the Red Top in favour of Sparrow and Sidewinder for the Phantom the RAF had another look at the Red Top as a high performing missile for ECM environments.

Definitely an issue, not gonna lie.

One option would be to build under license, like the helicopters were. So instead of paying $2.1mil in dollars, you're only paying a license fee in dollars and everything else in Sterling. It probably would be a per-plane fee not a one-time cost, but still better than buying outright in scarce dollars.

But it saves you a lot of dollars and it gives you a work force that can build modern fighters.

Maybe go big and stick an Olympus 593 in there instead of the J75. 5" larger in diameter but over 6000lbs more thrust before afterburner. 12,000lbs more thrust in full burner. You'd need to design new inlets to handle the much greater mass flow, 410lbs/sec versus 256lbs/sec. 2000lbs heavier, but that's fine. Add more electronics up front to balance.

That's ratcheting up the complexity, risk and likely cost of this procurement to get a fighter-bomber that will threaten the GOR339/OR343 development. And for what, because the Lightning doesn't meet specs that politicians and the Treasury don't care about?

Oh, absolutely.

But the EE Lightning is a terrible attacker. Frankly, it's a marginal fighter and a tolerable interceptor. It really needed SARH missiles which didn't arrive until the Phantom did.

The British looked at a 'radar Red Top' both with CW guidance and the Matra 530 seeker as a weapon for the P1154. They liked the CW guidance because of it's resistance to jamming but couldn't get a CW emitter to fit into an AI23 until the 200th unit. In a scenario where the Lightning isn't the perpetual 'interim' a couple of years from retirement for 3 decades it would be worth the effort to develop the radar Red Top.

As for how bad it is, with swings and roundabouts it was no worse than it's contemporaries other than the Phantom.

 

[uk 75]

P1154 with two kinds of Red Top would have been a useful aircraft if it had been flying in some form by 1964 and in service by 1968.
Short rolling take offs and landings would have been much more useful to actual RAF operations than the elusive pure VTOL.
The delays caused by Thorneycroft's mimicking of Mac's joint service opened the door to a genuine joint service jet-Phantom.
The same is true of AW681 which even with non deflecting jets would have offered advantages of speed and domestic production over the C130. Effort should have gone into this rather than the Belfast. Stretching the fuselage and fitting with RB211s in the 70s and adding a few C5s would have given the RAF much better airlift.

 

[Hood]

Airbases are the best place for sortie generation, which is the only place combat aircraft have any value. Further, airbases can be fortified to protect the personnel, aircraft and logistics from attack, which historically has been just as likely to come from ground forces as air attack. What's more airfields have proven notoriously difficult to put out of action for any prolonged period of time. Port Stanley was constantly bombed, rocketed, strafed and shelled from ships yet undertook supply flights almost every night to the point of flying in the ground based Exocet launcher less than a week before surrender that hit HMS Glamorgan.

There has been an argument put forward, in a PhD thesis I think which may have become a book, that Stanley was something of a 'magnet' for the British planners and it absorbed far more ordnance and effort from Black Buck, Harriers, naval gunfire and later the British forces on the ground - they were fixated with destroying Stanley. Arguably they didn't have the proper means to do it.

At that time the RAF was developing JP.233 and of course munitions such as Durandal existed, 4 years later the French would use the rocket-propelled BAP-100 in Chad. Efforts to use Paveway with Harrier GR.3 LRMTS flopped too. There were effective means to destroy runways, the Task Force just didn't have any of them (well unless they really did have some WE.177A aboard...).

The RAF made quite intensive studies for AST.396 in particular in relation to offsite sortie generation and basing options based on the Harrier experience. As Red Admiral says, that experience has some mixed results. The conclusion was that for AST.396 dispersed site operations would result in lower level of battlefield support being generated over 5 days than compared to main base operation, however there have been some benefit over much shorter periods of time. RAF Germany always considered that landing on patched runways was hazardous. Analysis seemed to show that runway attack had low long-term effectiveness, attacking HAS was always the better method.
The RAF didn't really seem to take dispersed operations too seriously, it only ever participated a couple of motorway trials for example (the famous Jaguar M55 trial was a BAC stunt, not the MoD's doing).

The security aspects of dispersed operations were worrying and its open to question how successful the Harriers would have been. Hopping from site to site sounded good on paper but if the ground crew couldn't move (refugees, blocked roads, enemy action) it may have been more like May 1940 levels of dislocation than anything else.

 

[Scott Kenny]

That's ratcheting up the complexity, risk and likely cost of this procurement to get a fighter-bomber that will threaten the GOR339/OR343 development. And for what, because the Lightning doesn't meet specs that politicians and the Treasury don't care about?

Stuffing an Olympus in place of the J75 was strictly optional.

Building F105s under license with J75s would be my preference.

 

[JFC Fuller]

The RAF showed the OR.345 requirement to the USAF, one of the responses they got was that the payload sacrifice to accommodate VTOL was so great that VTOL itself may not be worth it. Though another bit of feedback was that Mach 3 was essential.

One of the nav-attack solutions considered for the P.1154, as a cost saving measure, was the system from the F-105.

 

[Archibald]

The RAF showed the OR.345 requirement to USAF, one of the responses they got was that the payload sacrifice to accommodate VTOL was so great that VTOL itself may not be worth it. Though another bit of feedback was that Mach 3 was essential.

One of the nav-attack solutions considered for the P.1154, as a cost saving measure, was the system from the F-105.

The so-called thunderstick ? AN/ASG-19

 

[Rule of cool]

There has been an argument put forward, in a PhD thesis I think which may have become a book, that Stanley was something of a 'magnet' for the British planners and it absorbed far more ordnance and effort from Black Buck, Harriers, naval gunfire and later the British forces on the ground - they were fixated with destroying Stanley. Arguably they didn't have the proper means to do it.

At that time the RAF was developing JP.233 and of course munitions such as Durandal existed, 4 years later the French would use the rocket-propelled BAP-100 in Chad. Efforts to use Paveway with Harrier GR.3 LRMTS flopped too. There were effective means to destroy runways, the Task Force just didn't have any of them (well unless they really did have some WE.177A aboard...).

The RAF made quite intensive studies for AST.396 in particular in relation to offsite sortie generation and basing options based on the Harrier experience. As Red Admiral says, that experience has some mixed results. The conclusion was that for AST.396 dispersed site operations would result in lower level of battlefield support being generated over 5 days than compared to main base operation, however there have been some benefit over much shorter periods of time. RAF Germany always considered that landing on patched runways was hazardous. Analysis seemed to show that runway attack had low long-term effectiveness, attacking HAS was always the better method.
The RAF didn't really seem to take dispersed operations too seriously, it only ever participated a couple of motorway trials for example (the famous Jaguar M55 trial was a BAC stunt, not the MoD's doing).

The security aspects of dispersed operations were worrying and its open to question how successful the Harriers would have been. Hopping from site to site sounded good on paper but if the ground crew couldn't move (refugees, blocked roads, enemy action) it may have been more like May 1940 levels of dislocation than anything else.

Anti-airfield ops and all the stuff that goes with it is a fascinating topic. I recently learned that in 1973 the Israeli's shelled Damascus airport with M107 SP artillery pieces, the ones with the 32km range, for days in order to suppress it.

Even if the British had the best anti-runway equipment, it appears as a killer blow that knocks out an airfield for the duration is virtually impossible. To keep an airfield closed demands constant attention to hamper repair work and discourage makeshift operations. Maybe Port Stanley garnered too much attention for most of the war given that it was mostly used for resupply and evacuation. Then again it was used to fly in 4 x 155mm artillery pieces once RN shelling began and the 105mm pieces couldn't respond, as well as the trailer mounted Exocet launcher that hit Glamorgan and killed 13 sailors so it did give the defenders teeth.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The RAF showed the OR.345 requirement to USAF, one of the responses they got was that the payload sacrifice to accommodate VTOL was so great that VTOL itself may not be worth it.

I mean, for a fighter it's not all that severe a penalty, the F-4's full 4+4 missile load is under 3000lbs. And for short range nuclear strike it's not bad either, once your nukes get into the 1000lb or lighter category.

It's conventional bombing or early nukes (4000lb or so) that VTOL makes challenging. Even the USMC Harrier 2s usually only carried 2x1000lb bombs.

Though another bit of feedback was that Mach 3 was essential.

And that makes me question the whole analysis.

Though I'd still more likely want a plane that was ESTOL instead of VSTOL. ~1000ft takeoff runs. Crud, most Harrier and F-35B ops have them flying as ESTOL instead of STOVL.

 

[Hood]

And that makes me question the whole analysis.

I suspect most analysis in the late 50s-early 60s was heavily influenced by the personal preferences of the reviewers - out of the three main camps (VG wings, V/STOL, Mach 3+) you are likely to get at least one of these options being the favoured 'solution' depending on who you ask.

 

[H_K]

Stanley was something of a 'magnet' for the British planners and it absorbed far more ordnance and effort from Black Buck, Harriers, naval gunfire and later the British forces on the ground - they were fixated with destroying Stanley. Arguably they didn't have the proper means to do it.

Indeed there’s an argument that a simultaneous strike on Argentina’s air bases on the mainland would have been a better choice. Israeli Six Day war style - damage the runways first then destroy aircraft on the ground. Could have ended the Falklands air war on Day 1.

This was probably beyond the means of the RNs’ Harriers, but would have been an option with a conventional carrier with Buccaneers or Super Etendards, Durandals, buddy refueling, and good planning/training. The 4 main Argentinian airfields in the south were extremely vulnerable, with short runways (so easy to target) and ~60 aircraft crowded on aprons, there being only 16 hardened shelters and air defenses were almost non existent.

 

[uk 75]

I don't know about Etendards but the Buccaneer only carried standard free fall bombs in its naval version or the not very effective Martel ASM.
As far as I know RN Bucs were only trained for anti-shipping work by the late 70s. Happy to be corrected by those who flew them.

 

[Rule of cool]

In the textbook anti airfield strike, Op Focus in 1967, the attacks were large and sustained. The first wave was ~210 aircraft against 11 airfields, the second wave was of similar strength against 14 airfields about 20 minutes later and included some re-atracks, and there was a third wave before midday. This destroyed the Egyptian air Force, however its important to note that the Egyptian front only lasted for 3 days so there was little time to recover.

I doubt that even CVA01 & 02 could duplicate that sort of effort against the 4 Argentine air bases within range of the Falklands if they were authorised to. They just lack the numbers, despite the Buccaneers and Phantoms being individually able to do far more than Mirages, Mysteres and Vautors. There would be no rapid turnaround for follow on sorties for starters, modern carriers don't really do that.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I doubt that even CVA01 & 02 could duplicate that sort of effort against the 4 Argentine air bases within range of the Falklands if they were authorised to. They just lack the numbers, despite the Buccaneers and Phantoms being individually able to do far more than Mirages, Mysteres and Vautors. There would be no rapid turnaround for follow on sorties for starters, modern carriers don't really do that.

The two carriers could probably take out two air bases each day, launching a single full strike at each and reserving 6-8 Phantoms for CAP.

In the textbook anti airfield strike, Op Focus in 1967, the attacks were large and sustained. The first wave was ~210 aircraft against 11 airfields, the second wave was of similar strength against 14 airfields about 20 minutes later and included some re-atracks, and there was a third wave before midday. This destroyed the Egyptian air Force, however its important to note that the Egyptian front only lasted for 3 days so there was little time to recover.

So about 15-20 aircraft per base. You could probably cut that in half due to the greater bomb loads of Phantoms and Bucs. But the CVA01 air wing was looking like 16x Phantoms and 16x Bucs, right?

Carriers keep 6-8x Phantoms each for CAP. So your available strike force is 8x Phantoms and 16x Bucs per carrier. Splitting that into two strike packages gives you 4x Phantoms with bombs and full AAMs and 8x Bucs per carrier per airfield. (12x aircraft per base, each carrying at least twice what the IAF planes did)

So depending on distances, two CVA01-class carriers probably could take down all 4 Argentine air bases in one attack(!).

 

[Rule of cool]

Yes, but only once, rather than 3 times in 5 hours with only short breaks in between waves. That's what it takes to  really put an Air Force out of action.

That's not to say 8 Buccaneers wouldn't do a lot of damage to Argentine air bases, they would, but a single strike won't be a knockout blow.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Yes, but only once, rather than 3 times in 5 hours with only short breaks in between waves. That's what it takes to  really put an Air Force out of action.

That's not to say 8 Buccaneers wouldn't do a lot of damage to Argentine air bases, they would, but a single strike won't be a knockout blow.

I'm reading Op Focus as really only two attacks per base.

Depending on the CVA01 ability to reload the air wing, they might have been able to generate a second attack per base.

Mission I am assuming is timed so that all 4 bases are struck at the same time, despite different travel times to the bases. This splits the 4 strike groups into smaller chunks, and if the time/distance equations are kind the deck crews may have had enough time to rearm and launch the closer strike before the farther strike gets back. The first returns get sent to the farther base for wave 2, and the second group gets sent to the closer airbase for the second strike.

This really depends on how many loader vehicles/trailers there are onboard, so there may be a stop at a US base to borrow more bomb trailers so they can have enough trailers to load the entire strike group at once.

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd say almost every base got 2 waves and important ones got 3. There was at least 1 base in upper Egypt that could only be reached by Vautors, so it likely only got hit once.

If it were me I'd want 2 waves, each with a bit of heft. So the first wave would be 6 Buccaneers and 2 phantom escorts for each base and the 2nd wave would be 4 Buccaneers with 2 phantom escorts but they also carry some air to ground ordnance like a couple of cluster bombs or rockets or a gun pod. That would use up the carrier's ~1 sortie per plane per day.

This is interesting, I feel myself being drawn into a rabbit hole. Wish me luck!

 

[H_K]

@Rule of cool @Scott Kenny I think you’re overestimating Argentinian strength. An attack of the 4 Argentinian airfields might be workable with as few as 15 strike aircraft.

The goal in most cases would be to achieve a single cut of the runways, thereby disabling them (2 cuts needed for Rio Gallegos which was ~3,500m long, the others were all short 2,000-2,200m runways).

Assuming a standard loadout of 3 Durandals on a triple pylon, I would expect 3 strike aircraft would have a high likelihood of getting at least 1 successful cut (Israeli experience showed very high success rates). So 6 aircraft for Rio Gallegos and 9 (3x3) for the other 3 airfields - total 15 strikers.

Ingress at low altitude / high speed would minimize warning time to under 5 minutes in most cases, making the strikers hard to intercept.

Disable the runway on the 1st pass then return for 1-2 passes straffing aircraft parked in the open with guns or rockets. I would want a mix of jammer pods to disrupt AAA radars and some Sidewinders for self-defense.

Fighter escort of 2 aircraft against Rio Gallegos. The other 3 fields might only rate 1 close-in fighter escort operating as a 4th aircraft in the same package.

That would be a total of 20 aircraft (15 strikers and 5 escorts). Adding some spares and enough for a defensive CAP around the carrier and I think 30 aircraft would be sufficient. This would obviously be the strict minimum and would be a high risk operation.

At least 1-2 follow-on strikes in the same day should be possible if the initial strike is successful. These could focus on any aircraft left in the open and on hardened shelters.

 

[Rule of cool]

These are the Argentine airbases used in 1982 from north to south. I've just looked on Google maps satellite view, so what I see might not have been there in 1982, however given Argentina's military and economic situation I'd think there wouldn't be huge changes to the military side.

• Trelew; No taxiway; turning loops each end of runway, 1 hardstand at AFB, 1 big hardstand at civilian airport. Canberra
• Comodoro Rivadavia: Parallel taxiway, 6 HAS in 2 locations, 1 dispersal area, 2.5 hardstand areas. Mirage III, C130, F28, Sqn Fenix
• San Julian. No taxiway, 8 HAS in 2 locations, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 1 hardstand area. Dagger, A4C
• Rio Gallegos: Parallel taxiway, 16 HAS in 3 locations, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 3 hardstand areas. Mirage III, A4P, Trackers
• Santa Cruz; No taxiway, 1 hardstand area. A4P
• Rio Grande; No taxiway, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 1.5 hardstand areas. Dagger, A4Q, Super E, Neptune

This is a real mixed bag and likely indicative of many countries around the world. Rio Gallegos will require a real hammering to damage the runway and taxiway, attack the HAS to get to the protected aircraft as well as 3 separate hardstands where aircraft will be parked. In contrast Santa Cruz might be wiped out by a handful of aircraft in a single attack on the runway and hardstand.

 

[Rule of cool]

@Rule of cool @Scott Kenny I think you’re overestimating Argentinian strength. An attack of the 4 Argentinian airfields might be workable with as few as 15 strike aircraft.

The goal in most cases would be to achieve a single cut of the runways, thereby disabling them (2 cuts needed for Rio Gallegos which was ~3,500m long, the others were all short 2,000-2,200m runways).

Assuming a standard loadout of 3 Durandals on a triple pylon, I would expect 3 strike aircraft would have a high likelihood of getting at least 1 successful cut (Israeli experience showed very high success rates). So 6 aircraft for Rio Gallegos and 9 (3x3) for the other 3 airfields - total 15 strikers.

Ingress at low altitude / high speed would minimize warning time to under 5 minutes in most cases, making the strikers hard to intercept.

Disable the runway on the 1st pass then return for 1-2 passes straffing aircraft parked in the open with guns or rockets. I would want a mix of jammer pods to disrupt AAA radars and some Sidewinders for self-defense.

Fighter escort of 2 aircraft against Rio Gallegos. The other 3 fields might only rate 1 close-in fighter escort operating as a 4th aircraft in the same package.

That would be a total of 20 aircraft (15 strikers and 5 escorts). Adding some spares and enough for a defensive CAP around the carrier and I think 30 aircraft would be sufficient. This would obviously be the strict minimum and would be a high risk operation.

At least 1-2 follow-on strikes in the same day should be possible if the initial strike is successful. These could focus on any aircraft left in the open and on hardened shelters.

Firstly, is my assessment in the above post reasonably accurate for what was around in 1982 in terms of HAS', hardstands etc?

Secondly, my recent reading has shown that airbases are very resilient, it wouldn't take too long to do a makeshift repair on a Durandal crater which is why the JP233 had a lot of delayed action and anti-personnel bomblets. This means that to really knock out an airbase major taxiways, hardstands, supply and repair infrastructure, personnel as well as the aircraft all need to be attacked. With so many targets in a major airbase it's not surprising that Israel really loaded aircraft into their attacks and then did 2nd a 3rd attacks.

Assuming this is true it appears the P1154 was quite unnecessary.

 

[Scott Kenny]

@Rule of cool @Scott Kenny I think you’re overestimating Argentinian strength. An attack of the 4 Argentinian airfields might be workable with as few as 15 strike aircraft.

I was assuming basic 1000lb bombs, not Durandals, so much higher numbers of planes needed.

The goal in most cases would be to achieve a single cut of the runways, thereby disabling them (2 cuts needed for Rio Gallegos which was ~3,500m long, the others were all short 2,000-2,200m runways).

Assuming a standard loadout of 3 Durandals on a triple pylon, I would expect 3 strike aircraft would have a high likelihood of getting at least 1 successful cut (Israeli experience showed very high success rates). So 6 aircraft for Rio Gallegos and 9 (3x3) for the other 3 airfields - total 15 strikers.

Were Durandals ever cleared for F-4s or Bucs?

If so, good, we can use a smaller attack flight per base.

Ingress at low altitude / high speed would minimize warning time to under 5 minutes in most cases, making the strikers hard to intercept.

Disable the runway on the 1st pass then return for 1-2 passes straffing aircraft parked in the open with guns or rockets. I would want a mix of jammer pods to disrupt AAA radars and some Sidewinders for self-defense.

Fighter escort of 2 aircraft against Rio Gallegos. The other 3 fields might only rate 1 close-in fighter escort operating as a 4th aircraft in the same package.

That would be a total of 20 aircraft (15 strikers and 5 escorts). Adding some spares and enough for a defensive CAP around the carrier and I think 30 aircraft would be sufficient. This would obviously be the strict minimum and would be a high risk operation.

I would not want to have any plane make a second pass over the airfield, use Rockeyes or the British cluster bomb to shred any aircraft on the ground.

One pass, over and gone.

What did the RN have for a usable recon pod to use for damage assessment?

At least 1-2 follow-on strikes in the same day should be possible if the initial strike is successful. These could focus on any aircraft left in the open and on hardened shelters.

This is where military strategy crosses over into politics. With the runways cut, is it necessary to destroy the rest of the ArgAF on the ground? Can we afford have the Ambassador deliver a message that "if those ArgAF planes stay on the ground, we won't blow them up" before follow on strikes go in?

 

[Rule of cool]

I was assuming basic 1000lb bombs, not Durandals, so much higher numbers of planes needed.



Were Durandals ever cleared for F-4s or Bucs?

If so, good, we can use a smaller attack flight per base.




I would not want to have any plane make a second pass over the airfield, use Rockeyes or the British cluster bomb to shred any aircraft on the ground.

One pass, over and gone.

What did the RN have for a usable recon pod to use for damage assessment?



This is where military strategy crosses over into politics. With the runways cut, is it necessary to destroy the rest of the ArgAF on the ground? Can we afford have the Ambassador deliver a message that "if those ArgAF planes stay on the ground, we won't blow them up" before follow on strikes go in?

I doubt Durandals were ever cleared for Buccaneer of Spey Phantoms, but in an emergency the British can do all sorts of amazing stuff, like put Laser Guided Bombs into the Vulcan bomb bay.

I doubt if attacks on the Argentine mainland were authorised they would be limited to just cratering the runways, they'd be general attacks on the airbases including the planes, fuel storages etc.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I doubt Durandals were ever cleared for Buccaneer of Spey Phantoms, but in an emergency the British can do all sorts of amazing stuff, like put Laser Guided Bombs into the Vulcan bomb bay.

Fair point.

I doubt if attacks on the Argentine mainland were authorised they would be limited to just cratering the runways, they'd be general attacks on the airbases including the planes, fuel storages etc.

I was mostly thinking in terms of "minimum sorties for the carriers" since they're already limited in capabilities.

I might go so far as to send two sorties to each airfield to break the runways and then a BDA recon flight, then we can clean up planes on the ground the next day or two.

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd be sending 1 whole carrier air group against Rio Gallegos alone, with it's 16 HAS, parallel taxiway and 3 hardstand to disperse aircraft around and 4 end-of-runway 'scramble' parking spots.

The other carrier I'd be sending 2 Buccaneer against Santa Cruz, 3 or 4 against Rio Grande and whatever's left on this carrier against San Julian with it's 8 HAS and 3 'scramble' parking spots.

The whatever's left after this big first wave I'd send later in the day to harass (in order of priority) Rio Gallegos, San Julian, Rio Grande then Santa Cruz.

 

[zen]

This is the P.1154 thread.
Not CVA-01 thread.
It's not really appropriate to hijack this thread to discuss CVA-01 airwing and Falklands War.

It would be appropriate to discuss P.1154 and Falklands War.

 

[uk 75]

That is easy. P1154RAF like the real world Jaguar squadrons would remain in the UK and W Germany as they could not operate off soft ground or tin sheets.
P1154RN is never going to happen in any of the forms drawn in real life.

 

[F.L.]

P1154RN is never going to happen in any of the forms drawn in real life.

What are the reasons for this ?

 

[Rule of cool]

Airbase vulnerability was the key reason behind NBMR3 and the RAF planned to build 1/4-1/3 of its combat force around this requirement.

Yet even a middle income country like Argentina can harden an airbase to the level where it requires a lot of heavy hitters in several waves. If Argentina can do ot then so too can Britain, which they did in Germany IIUC, therefore NBMR3 isn't a good spec to build a major part of the force structure around.

That said I still think there's a place for VTOL, the RAF GR3 Harriers showed that in the Falklands. However this should be a niche capability and money should be spent in proportion.

 

[Archibald]

It's a pity the mighty BS.100 went to waste. It was one heck of an awesome jet engine !

 

[zen]

For P.1154 in a Falklands War.
Path 1. Optimal path.
RN chooses a BS.100 powered solution to AW.406 with Minister not imposing common airframe.
Adoption of affordable CV programe based around 40,000ton to 42,000ton carriers for 24 fast jets.

Funded 'interim' STOVL system based on upgraded AI.23 and Red Top mkII (liquid motor) for ISD 1968.
Longer term AI.24 FMICW (not Foxhunter) for ISD 1972 to 1975 and new AAM.

Path 1a. Interrupted Optimal.
New CV cancelled '66, and make do approach, interim version only. Through-deck Cruiser program but scaled up for interim aircraft.

Path 2. Suboptimal path.
CVA-01 as is.
Adoption of navalised P.1154 post '66 cancellation of CVA-01.

Either way RN can choose to focus on Stanley or strike the mainland. But the latter risks the carrier more.

 

[zen]

Firstly, is my assessment in the above post reasonably accurate for what was around in 1982 in terms of HAS', hardstands etc?

Secondly, my recent reading has shown that airbases are very resilient, it wouldn't take too long to do a makeshift repair on a Durandal crater which is why the JP233 had a lot of delayed action and anti-personnel bomblets. This means that to really knock out an airbase major taxiways, hardstands, supply and repair infrastructure, personnel as well as the aircraft all need to be attacked. With so many targets in a major airbase it's not surprising that Israel really loaded aircraft into their attacks and then did 2nd a 3rd attacks.

Assuming this is true it appears the P1154 was quite unnecessary.

The Brough Solution. STOL instead.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/the-brough-solution.33831/

 

[red admiral]

Airbase vulnerability was the key reason behind NBMR3 and the RAF planned to build 1/4-1/3 of its combat force around this requirement.

Yet even a middle income country like Argentina can harden an airbase to the level where it requires a lot of heavy hitters in several waves.

NBMR.3 context was the airbase being hit by likely more than one tactical nuke... Hence "don't be there" makes sense. And only generating a single sortie to drop your own nukes also makes sense.

The change to conventional war fighting with Flexible Response was years away

 

[H_K]

These are the Argentine airbases used in 1982

• San Julian. No taxiway, 8 HAS in 2 locations, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 1 hardstand area. Dagger, A4C
• Rio Gallegos: Parallel taxiway, 16 HAS in 3 locations, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 3 hardstand areas. Mirage III, A4P, Trackers
• Santa Cruz; No taxiway, 1 hardstand area. A4P
• Rio Grande; No taxiway, end of runway parking for rapid scramble, 1.5 hardstand areas. Dagger, A4Q, Super E, Neptune

Good summary. These are the 4 bases that matter. (Ignoring Trelew and Comodoro Rivadavia to the north as they were too far for anything but Canberras)

Here is the CIA’s assessment of these airfields as of 1983. It notes only 8 HAS at Rio Gallegos and some improvements at Rio Grande which may have been post May/June 1982.

https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP84T00171R000201070001-2.pdf