Canada's naval strategy?

[Rainbow1910]

And yet there don't seem to have been any issues reported with integrating CAMM into COMBATSS-21 (which uses the Aegis software library) on the Saudi MMSCs.

We also haven't heard much at all regarding the Saudi MMSC's in general given the development and construction hell that the vessels seemingly have been stuck in. I'm not sure I'd point to them as some kind of baseline or goal to hold up.

Type 26 is a dedicated ASW frigate, arguing it's somehow lesser by not being an area AAW platform is missing the point. We have Type 45 for that. And Type 31 for GP, as opposed to requiring the Rivers to be a jack-of-all trades. And if Aegis/CTI can't handle a missile designed for simple integration, is it really a superior CMS?

I am comparing the two variants in a reply to a previous comment which was comparing them, obviously Canada and the UK have different fleet composition and use cases for their vessels. That does not change the fact that the baseline Type 26 has a much reduced capability to defend itself and other units in its vicinity compared to the River and Hunter class design variants.

I don't think anybody is saying that AEGIS/CTI cannot handle CAMM, more so that the integration was viewed as not worth the effort when the RCN didn't want the system in the first place. It is far easier to jettison systems that need integration and replace them with already integrated systems into the CMS when the current goal is to maximize the speed of design finalization and production, which is where the RCN currently stands.

The T26 for RN and Norway is an ASW specialist, with secondary ASuW and LmdmAttack capabilities. 48 CAMM capable of local area dnd point defence are thus fine.

The River is a “multirole” design that had been specifically equipped with an SPY radar and AEGIS. Thus it is far more AAW centric (inc. BMD) than the baseline design. Removing the RAM PDMS from the equation, and relying on NSM for both anti-ship and land attack, this gives us the least cells of any allied or threat equivalent:

• USN Arleigh Burke - 96 mk41
• RN T45 - 48 Sylver for Aster 30 (plus 24 CAMM to be fitted)
• French and Italian Horizon - 48 Sylver
• Spain F100 - 48 mk41
• Australia F100 / Hobart - 48 mk41
• Japan - Kongo 90 mk41, Atago 96 mk41
• ROK - Sejong the Great - total 88 cells of mk41 and K-VLS
• PLAN Type 055 - 112 main VLS, 24 VLS for PDMS

So yes, 24 cells on an air defence ship is bizarre penny pinching. Yes, we can quad pack ESSM, which absolutely improves the magazine depth to a max of 96 missiles, but if that’s the load out, we don’t need the expense of SPY/AEGIS suite. To max out the capabilities of the sensors and CMS requires SM2-ER block III or IV, SM3 or SM6, very expensive missiles, but as recent experience against Houthis, and USN BMD over Israel has shown, magazines depth is an issue.

I do not think it is particularly fair to compare the River class to any of the vessels you mention, when all of them are dedicated AAW destroyers while the River is a multi-role frigate (regardless of what the RCN calls it). The River is far more comparable to the US Constellation class as far as role goes, as the RCN is not interested in a dedicated AAW vessel and wants a homogenous design that can undertake high level ASW work while also being able to provide AAW capabilities to protect itself and other units they are operating alongside. AEGIS and its CEC are the primary drivers for this, as all River class vessels can easily loop themselves into the larger USN ecosystem and function seamlessly in USN taskforces.

The RCN took an ASW focused design and gave it to sensors + weaponry to dabble in AAW, I would not call it an AAW vessel, nor would I compare it to purpose built AAW platforms. They wanted a homogenous fleet to avoid the problems of having a split ASW/AAW fleet, where your lesser numbers of AAW vessels inherently have poor operational readiness compared to the more numerous ASW element. Every River is interchangeable and can do both roles, as much as is possible within the constrains of the Type 26 design. 24 cells is basically the bare minimum for a viable combatant of this size in my eyes, and I do hope they can up the count to 32 or even past 40 as the Commander of the RCN hopes to do in later batches.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Type 26 is a dedicated ASW frigate, arguing it's somehow lesser by not being an area AAW platform is missing the point. We have Type 45 for that. And Type 31 for GP, as opposed to requiring the Rivers to be a jack-of-all trades. And if Aegis/CTI can't handle a missile designed for simple integration, is it really a superior CMS?

The modern ASW threat of various types of AShMs implies the need for a pretty capable AA defense on the ASW ship.

And, as the Red Sea mess shows, you also need magazine depth or after a week there you're out of weapons and the Houthis win by default.

So yes, 24 cells on an air defence ship is bizarre penny pinching. Yes, we can quad pack ESSM, which absolutely improves the magazine depth to a max of 96 missiles, but if that’s the load out, we don’t need the expense of SPY/AEGIS suite. To max out the capabilities of the sensors and CMS requires SM2-ER block III or IV, SM3 or SM6, very expensive missiles, but as recent experience against Houthis, and USN BMD over Israel has shown, magazines depth is an issue.

For a GP escort it's marginal. I'd hope that later flights of the class get more cells.

But let's do a hypothetical loadout of those 24 cells. 6 cells get ASROC. 3-4 cells get ESSM (12 missiles). That leaves us 14-15 cells for SM2s.

Any cells you add above that base 24 are purely for SM2s, effectively.

Once you exceed 48 cells you can consider adding Tomahawks or other land-attack missiles.

 

[DWG]

The modern ASW threat of various types of AShMs implies the need for a pretty capable AA defense on the ASW ship.

And, as the Red Sea mess shows, you also need magazine depth or after a week there you're out of weapons and the Houthis win by default.

There's a difference between a capable AA defence and area-AAW capability. 48 Sea Ceptor (plus 2 Phalanx) is significantly better than Type 23 had, and while the Mk 41 VLS is primarily there for FC/ASW and potentially a VL ASW stand-off weapon, it does offer another 24 potentially quad-packable cells, for anything up to a further 96 Sea Ceptor in a max self-defence configuration.

WRT magazine depth, if you don't take out the problem at source, you will ultimately shoot yourself dry, or need to hand off to other vessels, however many cells you have.

 

[DWG]

We also haven't heard much at all regarding the Saudi MMSC's in general given the development and construction hell that the vessels seemingly have been stuck in. I'm not sure I'd point to them as some kind of baseline or goal to hold up.

To quote an old, but true, line: absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.

I don't think anybody is saying that AEGIS/CTI cannot handle CAMM, more so that the integration was viewed as not worth the effort

The impression I got at the time was that NavSea pretty much refused to do it, but I can't find the news item or forum post that gave me that impression (if anyone knows what it was, pointers gratefully received).

 

[Scott Kenny]

There's a difference between a capable AA defence and area-AAW capability.

If your ship is intended as an "ASW convoy escort" you need enough range in your capable AA defense to cover a pretty good length of convoy.

WRT magazine depth, if you don't take out the problem at source, you will ultimately shoot yourself dry, or need to hand off to other vessels, however many cells you have.

True, but you do still need ~2 weeks worth of "Houthi Skeet" between reloadings.

 

[whatismoo]

For a GP escort it's marginal. I'd hope that later flights of the class get more cells.

But let's do a hypothetical loadout of those 24 cells. 6 cells get ASROC. 3-4 cells get ESSM (12 missiles). That leaves us 14-15 cells for SM2s.

Any cells you add above that base 24 are purely for SM2s, effectively.

Once you exceed 48 cells you can consider adding Tomahawks or other land-attack missiles.

The RN doesn't use an ASROC type weapon and hasn't since the retirement of Ikara, though

 

[Rainbow1910]

The RN doesn't use an ASROC type weapon and hasn't since the retirement of Ikara, though

The RCN also does not use any ASROC type systems and has no plans on procuring one.

 

[DWG]

The RN doesn't use an ASROC type weapon and hasn't since the retirement of Ikara, though

The RN issued a request for information for a Mk41 compatible Long Range ASW Weapon last year.

One moment, please...

Edited to add: A standoff ASW weapon is pretty much essential for the unmanned Type 92 ASW sloop.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Canada’s new head of Defence Investment Agency starts today

It’s Doug Guzman’s first day as CEO of Canada’s new Defence Investment Agency.

www.ctvnews.ca

The DIA has sent the request for proposals for building and manufacturing the submarines to the two finalists: South Korea company, Hanwha Ocean and German defence company TKMS .

The deadline for RFP submission is March 2, 2026.

RFP has been privately sent to the remaining competitors for the CPSP, deadline of March 2, 2026.

 

[Jedpc]

Interview with head of Royal Canadian Navy:

Lets Talk with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy

Noah grapples with his internal struggle (and external anxiety) as he speaks with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy about:

open.substack.com

Noah Gaim does it again with a fantastic hour long chat with Vice Admiral Topshee.

Spoilers - Some of the interesting comments from the Admiral:

• River Class Flight 1 Batch 1 is the first 3 ships
• River Batch 2 would be the next 6 and he mentions extra cells and the 32 of the RAN Hunter class - so 9 Flight 1 give the minimum required to replace Halifax class as fast as we can
• Flight 2 - the last 6 could see other improvements / modifications as they are so much further out
• The Continental Defence Corvette is in the “examine the options” phase, but it’s pretty much a light frigate, ideally 105m but up to,120m if needs be, with an ice rating he characterizes as “PC6 minus”
• CDC to be smaller than a Halifax, but with the same capabilities to hunt subs, sink ships and defend itself from air attack
• Interesting comments on Naval Reserve, coastal and Great Lakes communities and the replacement for the Orcas being bigger and more “multirole” - almost like the Orca replacement will really also be the Kingston replacement
• Navy heavy ice breakers - the direction he seems to think make sense is logistics / amphib ships - my comment, G-LAAM anyone…?

 

[Scott Kenny]

• The Continental Defence Corvette is in the “examine the options” phase, but it’s pretty much a light frigate, ideally 105m but up to,120m if needs be, with an ice rating he characterizes as “PC6 minus”
• CDC to be smaller than a Halifax, but with the same capabilities to hunt subs, sink ships and defend itself from air attack

I don't think you can pack all that into a smaller package than a Halifax. Not with modern sensors. Look at how big the US Constellation-class is!

 

[Rainbow1910]

I don't think you can pack all that into a smaller package than a Halifax. Not with modern sensors. Look at how big the US Constellation-class is!

You certainly can fit the modern equivalent of a Halifax class frigate into a smaller platform, the Halifax class is a dated design originating from the early 1980's and thus can be shrunk down in a lot of aspects. CMS-330 is modular and can easily be carried over, comparable sensor suites can be mounted on smaller vessels, you can fit basically the same armament alongside the ASW suite. The only issue is a full flight deck and hanger for an ASW helo like a Cyclone isn't exactly easy to fit, but it kind of sounds like CDC will have a hanger/deck only suited to drones anyway.

 

[Owens Z]

...As I have stated before, I do not think it is a battle worth fighting for DND. There is a substantial number of very important CCG staff members in positions of power and throughout the fleet that are diametrically opposed to being an armed service, to the point you are looking at potentially a major disruption of service from either a work refusal or a widescale quitting trend. The CCG being civilian vessels and not engaging in work against non-state actors abroad largely means that counter drone systems are not especially important to them, and this trend seems unlikely to change going forward. For what DND may gain from this entire process, they'll have to step through an absolute minefield and attempt to change the engrained culture of an organization that they recently brought under their wing.
If you think that the CCG staff would be unhappy with being armed for constabulary work, handing them drones and sensors before telling them to go do MCM work would be nothing short of apocalyptic. About the only way to get away with such a thing would be wartime conditions, which is its own separate can of worms...

I saw this recent YouTube video about a prospective plan of the female general who is Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff, the professional head of Canadian Forces, to add circa 300,000 civilian government employees to the nation's Supplementary Reserve, with one week per year of drill at a rifle range. This sounds neither useful to Canada's defense nor practical, and indeed the general seems to have backed off her plan after news reports. If few of the 6,500 members of the Canadian Coast Guard are interested in becoming militarized (absent a world war), then would there be 300,000+ office clerks who are? See:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5hVTwyM5A8w

 

[Apophenia]

... would there be 300,000+ office clerks who are?

SuppRes is made up of inactive or retired CAF members. Its numbers are low because, historically, NDHQ didn't want to bear the expense. A military entirely composed of top-performers with multiple degrees was an ambitious goal. But, if DND's recruiting approach worked at all, we would not now be discussing emergency call-ups for random office clerk volunteers.

As for the video, I would take anything from Esprit de Corps with a large grain of salt. After all, not so long ago, editor Scott Taylor was calling for a 'Canadian Foreign Legion' to solve recruiting issues (with citizenship promises). And that was supposed to make more sense than getting inactive members onto the SuppRes list?

Esprit de Corps is preaching to their choir (retired Cold Warriors and the incels from the comment section). Much was made of reducing SuppRes fitness and age restrictions. Our Baltic allies have ramped up defensive cybersec forces through expanded supplementary reserves - you don't need 00010-level fitness to help defeat RU cyber attacks.

If Scott kept up-to-date, he would be aware that the world has changed out from under him. Buy your buddies another round at the Legion, Scott, and leave recruiting reservists to the CDS.

 

[Owens Z]

...However, I don't like the lack of helo capability (both flight deck and hangar), as there's no telling how big future VTUAVs will become and no ability to act as a lilypad for land-based or ship-based helicopters...

...There's plenty of room for arguing the must-haves versus nice-options for the future corvettes. But, if you can ignore the Biz-Admin-speak approach often taken by the Vice Admiral, Angus Topshee is usually making sense. The trick for future RCN corvettes will be avoiding mission/design creep in one direction (which has already begun) whilst avoiding CDC programme slashings to paper-over the inevitable cost overruns of the River class destroyers.

Interview with head of Royal Canadian Navy: Noah Gaim does it again with a fantastic hour long chat with Vice Admiral Topshee.
Spoilers - Some of the interesting comments from the Admiral:

• The Continental Defence Corvette is in the “examine the options” phase, but it’s pretty much a light frigate, ideally 105m but up to,120m if needs be, with an ice rating he characterizes as “PC6 minus”
• CDC to be smaller than a Halifax, but with the same capabilities to hunt subs, sink ships and defend itself from air attack

I don't think you can pack all that into a smaller package than a Halifax. Not with modern sensors. Look at how big the US Constellation-class is!

You certainly can fit the modern equivalent of a Halifax class frigate into a smaller platform, the Halifax class is a dated design originating from the early 1980's and thus can be shrunk down in a lot of aspects. CMS-330 is modular and can easily be carried over, comparable sensor suites can be mounted on smaller vessels, you can fit basically the same armament alongside the ASW suite. The only issue is a full flight deck and hanger for an ASW helo like a Cyclone isn't exactly easy to fit, but it kind of sounds like CDC will have a hanger/deck only suited to drones anyway.

This interview with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, the highest-ranking officer in the Royal Canadian Navy since mid-2022, is interesting and relevant for our thread; thanks Jedpc. Host Noah Gairn, the self-styled "sharpest voice on defence and national security" in Canada, doesn't sound impressive (he tends to giggle), but the admiral speaks forthrightly and touches on several RCN matters. No mention of a timeline for having the planned Canadian corvettes in service other than to say those are "needed now", but Admiral Topshee confirms that the corvette will be "a warfighter", be the size of a light frigate (but retain the corvette name for WW2 heritage reasons) and be armed "close to a Halifax-class frigate", have real Arctic capability of perhaps Polar Class 6, and have range enough to transit from Canada's Atlantic to Pacific coast (via Panama Canal, or Northwest Passage during summer) without refueling. All these seem wise. These are far above what the Kingston class vessels can do, and although the admiral doesn't say so, his wishlist plainly blows the limit of 1000 tons at light displacement out of the water. Rainbow1910 had told us (posts #43,51,57,69 above) that there exists "a hard tonnage ceiling on this general type of warship for the RCN, as any vessels above 1,000t would require renegotiation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy or some funky bit of rejigging between the shipyards".

An overall length of 105m for the corvette would be "easy to accommodate" in existing docks, but he could live with up to 120m, Admiral Topshee says. In the presentation he did eleven months ago (post #35) Andrew Graham gave the length as between 75 and 100m, necessary (as he said) to fit Halifax berths.

Nothing herein about the RCN's new corvette being able to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles and hostile satellites as Captain Graham had mentioned, a cause of some disbelief in this thread. Does Captain Graham remain Director of the corvette program?

And nothing herein about fitting the corvette with a Bear Trap-equipped flight deck and hangar for a big helicopter like the CH-148 Cyclone, which Scott Kenny, H_K, Riggerrob, and others deem essential (although Rainbow1910 disagreed).

 

[Owens Z]

River class orders are still at 15 currently, and seem unlikely to change especially given the unfunded and bloating nature of the Continental Defence Corvette program. Cutting the River class program back to eight would be flat out disastrous, leaving us with fewer combatants than we currently have.

...River Class are the most under armed variant of T26 design, with ridiculously low number of VLS cells for an alleged “multi-role” version of an ASW centric design with added air defence role to have a single class - let’s hope more cells fitted later when defence budget actually increases?...

...The Rivers have, de facto become the Halifax replacements...

...I think saying the River class is "the most under armed Type 26 variant with ridiculously low number of VLS cells" is unfair and overly dismissive of the Canadian variant...

I'm not sure what you mean by 'current orders', Rainbow1910. In his recent interview, Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee states that so far only the first three River-class destroyers are contracted. Fifteen Rivers is certainly the RCN's desire, and in fact the admiral says Canada needs more than twenty surface combatants. But Ottawa has to pay for that, which is not a given, to say no more. Thus my rough guess of perhaps 8 to 15 of this class in future service.

Admiral Topshee confirms that the River class design has no special ice strengthening (i.e. no Polar Class rating).

 

[Owens Z]

Consider US Federal support of the creation of the US interstate system (aka the Dwight D Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways) because of its military utility. Is this any different?...

I wonder how long before that non-combatant / non-LEO status gets junked after this change though, attempts to game defence spending to try and preserve bread and circuses notwithstanding?

Ottawa can consider the CCG as defence spending however, NATO has strict guidelines on what can be classified as such and the CCG does not meet such guidelines. The CCG doesn't really fall under this and thus NATO wouldn't really recognize us rolling it into our defence spending, as far as they are concerned at this point...

...The 'accounting tricks' used by European allies to broaden their NATO-acceptable defence expenditures will not have been lost on Carney et al. But, of course, that doesn't automatically mean that Ottawa intends to follow this particular path...

...Coast Guard is not in any way contributing to military roles / missions, beyond perhaps a common surface picture, putting them under DND is [sleight] of hand to make NATO spending commitment targets only...

...Almost all of our European NATO allies pad out defence spending claims with constabulary work. One man's 'sleight of hand' is another's 'dexterity'. That said, there is no evidence yet that the GoC intends to claim CCG assets or operations as military expenses...

I did laugh at your point about dexterity versus sleight of hand. Good point well made, I presume that all of NATO does it, yes, but I think the move of CCG to DND absolutely proves we intend to the fiddle the books on that one. This is not necessarily a bad thing...

If anyone could swallow that expansive redefinition of 'defense spending', DWG, then as they say in my town, I have a bridge in Brooklyn to sell to him.

 

[Rainbow1910]

SuppRes is made up of inactive or retired CAF members. Its numbers are low because, historically, NDHQ didn't want to bear the expense. A military entirely composed of top-performers with multiple degrees was an ambitious goal. But, if DND's recruiting approach worked at all, we would not now be discussing emergency call-ups for random office clerk volunteers.

As for the video, I would take anything from Esprit de Corps with a large grain of salt. After all, not so long ago, editor Scott Taylor was calling for a 'Canadian Foreign Legion' to solve recruiting issues (with citizenship promises). And that was supposed to make more sense than getting inactive members onto the SuppRes list?

Esprit de Corps is preaching to their choir (retired Cold Warriors and the incels from the comment section). Much was made of reducing SuppRes fitness and age restrictions. Our Baltic allies have ramped up defensive cybersec forces through expanded supplementary reserves - you don't need 00010-level fitness to help defeat RU cyber attacks.

If Scott kept up-to-date, he would be aware that the world has changed out from under him. Buy your buddies another round at the Legion, Scott, and leave recruiting reservists to the CDS.

Entirely agree with all said above, I'd also add that Espirt de Corps pumps out a lot of low effort "AI slop" content alongside their clearly biased political content. Be very wary of what you see from them, they have a distinct objective of embarrassing and tearing down the current CAF as it doesn't serve their political leanings.

This interview with Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee, the highest-ranking officer in the Royal Canadian Navy since mid-2022, is interesting and relevant for our thread; thanks Jedpc. Host Noah Gairn, the self-styled "sharpest voice on defence and national security" in Canada, doesn't sound impressive (he tends to giggle), but the admiral speaks forthrightly and touches on several RCN matters. No mention of a timeline for having the planned Canadian corvettes in service other than to say those are "needed now", but Admiral Topshee confirms that the corvette will be "a warfighter", be the size of a light frigate (but retain the corvette name for WW2 heritage reasons) and be armed "close to a Halifax-class frigate", have real Arctic capability of perhaps Polar Class 6, and have range enough to transit from Canada's Atlantic to Pacific coast (via Panama Canal, or Northwest Passage during summer) without refueling. All these seem wise. These are far above what the Kingston class vessels can do, and although the admiral doesn't say so, his wishlist plainly blows the limit of 1000 tons at light displacement out of the water. Rainbow1910 had told us (posts #43,51,57,69 above) that there exists "a hard tonnage ceiling on this general type of warship for the RCN, as any vessels above 1,000t would require renegotiation of the National Shipbuilding Strategy or some funky bit of rejigging between the shipyards".

An overall length of 105m for the corvette would be "easy to accommodate" in existing docks, but he could live with up to 120m, Admiral Topshee says. In the presentation he did eleven months ago (post #35) Andrew Graham gave the length as between 75 and 100m, necessary (as he said) to fit Halifax berths.

Nothing herein about the RCN's new corvette being able to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles and hostile satellites as Captain Graham had mentioned, a cause of some disbelief in this thread. Does Captain Graham remain Director of the corvette program?

And nothing herein about fitting the corvette with a Bear Trap-equipped flight deck and hangar for a big helicopter like the CH-148 Cyclone, which Scott Kenny, H_K, Riggerrob, and others deem essential (although Rainbow1910 disagreed).

The "hard tonnage ceiling" I spoke about prior is a holdover from the National Shipbuilding Strategy and can be changed if desired, it very much seems like we have made it to the point where such a guide rail has been blown past or otherwise ignored. I will also point out that Topshee mentioned in that interview that they are in the process of looking at their options regarding the CDC, so it's not especially surprising that old information has no longer relevant as objectives change with a program in its early days. As I stated before as well, I'll bet we're looking at a smaller flight deck and hanger for drones as the Cyclone itself is overkill and rumoured to not be long for RCAF service.

I'm not sure what you mean by 'current orders', Rainbow1910. In his recent interview, Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee states that so far only the first three River-class destroyers are contracted. Fifteen Rivers is certainly the RCN's desire, and in fact the admiral says Canada needs more than twenty surface combatants. But Ottawa has to pay for that, which is not a given, to say no more. Thus my rough guess of perhaps 8 to 15 of this class in future service.

Admiral Topshee confirms that the River class design has no special ice strengthening (i.e. no Polar Class rating).

Three vessels are currently contracted however, the RCN and Topshee have been very clear for decades that 15 vessels is the desired total orderbook and what they are going for regardless of the circumstances. Given the extreme amount of sunk cost into Irving and the want to keep them active for decades to come, the RCN/Govt is effectively stuck keeping the River class production line open. Cutting such a class down to 8 vessels would seriously endanger the backbone of the Navy and result in a lot of program inefficiencies.

 

[Owens Z]

...The fools who leveled that term of 'slushbreaker' upon the AOPS deserve a slap across the face, given how much that unfair slander has stuck with the class. The class has a general rating of Polar Class 5 however, it's bow section is strengthened to Polar Class 4. In trials, ships of the class have been said to have broken in excess of 2m of ice, exceeding even her Polar Class 4 rated bow (1.2m+)...

...If Rainbow1910 is correct that the Harry DeWolf-class ships have demonstrated breaking 2m-thick ice at (the international standard of) 3 knots, then that is quite impressive.

...AOPS are barely “warships” and when used outside of the Arctic as GP OPV, could not defend themselves from UAV / USV launched by non-state actors...

...I'll see your under-armed AOPS and raise you a 'barely 2 knots faster than the MCDV'

...AOPS aren't combatants and trying to overly outfit them as such is a lost cause. I would not be against retrofitting some additional systems to help protect against UAV/USV threats however, this has to be balanced with the fact their primary purpose is Northern use. This complicates development as there is very few Arctic rated drone defence systems in existence. There has been some talks about fitting systems like this, but it is not a priority considering the risk levels of the areas AOPS sees deployment to at this time...

In his recent interview, Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee says that the Royal Canadian Navy's Harry DeWolf-class artic patrol ships, of which all five are now in service, have indeed succeeded in breaking thicker sea ice than had been planned. He praises the usefulness of the ships in peacetime, but admits the class is "not a combatant".

 

[Apophenia]

...
The "hard tonnage ceiling" I spoke about prior is a holdover from the National Shipbuilding Strategy and can be changed if desired, it very much seems like we have made it to the point where such a guide rail has been blown past or otherwise ignored. I will also point out that Topshee mentioned in that interview that they are in the process of looking at their options regarding the CDC, so it's not especially surprising that old information has no longer relevant as objectives change with a program in its early days. As I stated before as well, I'll bet we're looking at a smaller flight deck and hanger for drones as the Cyclone itself is overkill and rumoured to not be long for RCAF service.

Yes. Any serious changes proposed for the terms of the National Shipbuilding Strategy would have seemed ludicrous 10 months ago. Now, your "blown past or otherwise ignored" is not just plausible but highly likely. Keep what works in the NSS and draw a neat line through the bits that are in the way.

Agreed on the smaller flight deck and hangar. Ten years ago, those would have been essential components. For the CDC, adequate UAS stowage and launch/recovery space will likely be the priorities.

As for "the Cyclone [...] rumoured to not be long for RCAF service" ... may the rotary-winged deities be praised!

 

[Apophenia]

In his recent interview, Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee says that the Royal Canadian Navy's Harry DeWolf-class artic patrol ships, of which all five are now in service, have indeed succeeded in breaking thicker sea ice than had been planned. He praises the usefulness of the ships in peacetime, but admits the class is "not a combatant".

AOPS has always been about 'presence' in Canada's High Arctic, not about war-fighting. If VAdm Topshee's desire for well-armed CDCs with PC 6+ hulls is realised, then job done.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I cannot believe that anyone thought a 1000ton ship was viable for the arctic.

 

[Owens Z]

...The Orca class are now the primary training craft (an oddity there is, despite being and attached to the PCTU and not being commissioned, the 8x Orcas have also been assigned a surveillance role in Georgia Strait)...

...Interesting comments on Naval Reserve, coastal and Great Lakes communities and the replacement for the Orcas being bigger and more “multirole” - almost like the Orca replacement will really also be the Kingston replacement...

Interesting that Admiral Topshee believes further Orca-class (or similar) patrol boats should be built for Royal Canadian Navy service on the Great Lakes, armed with rifle-caliber machine guns. Canadian Forces has some 'stone frigates' (shore establishments for muster and drill) around the Lakes, as does the US Navy (e.g. Naval Station Great Lakes), but to my knowledge there hasn't been Canadian or British naval dockage there since the War of 1812. Considering the attitudes of the civilian Canadian Coast Guard discussed in this thread, hosting RCN vessels at one of the several CCG stations on the Great Lakes might not be entirely welcome, even though the RCN and CCG are now together under the Department of National Defence.

Such armed patrol boats for training and constabulary use would be allowed under the Rush-Bagot demilitarization treaty of 1817. The occasional 'Great Lakes Deployment' of a Canadian Fleet Atlantic warship transiting the St Lawrence Seaway for a port call at Kingston, Toronto, Thunder Bay, etc. to show civilians what they're paying for also doesn't violate the treaty, as both parties agree (given advance notice). Seawaymax dimensions can accommodate any of the RCN's surface combatants, including the forthcoming River-class destroyers.

Like Apophenia said, the existing Orca-class boats, fitted for but not with a machine gun, are based at CFB Esquimalt, near where they were built on Canada's Pacific coast.

 

[Jedpc]

Interesting that Admiral Topshee believes further Orca-class (or similar) patrol boats should be built for Royal Canadian Navy service on the Great Lakes, armed with rifle-caliber machine guns. Canadian Forces has some 'stone frigates' (shore establishments for muster and drill) around the Lakes, as does the US Navy (e.g. Naval Station Great Lakes), but to my knowledge there hasn't been Canadian or British naval dockage there since the War of 1812. Considering the attitudes of the civilian Canadian Coast Guard discussed in this thread, hosting RCN vessels at one of the several CCG stations on the Great Lakes might not be entirely welcome, even though the RCN and CCG are now together under the Department of National Defence.

Such armed patrol boats for training and constabulary use would be allowed under the Rush-Bagot demilitarization treaty of 1817. The occasional 'Great Lakes Deployment' of a Canadian Fleet Atlantic warship transiting the St Lawrence Seaway for a port call at Kingston, Toronto, Thunder Bay, etc. to show civilians what they're paying for also doesn't violate the treaty, as both parties agree (given advance notice). Seawaymax dimensions can accommodate any of the RCN's surface combatants, including the forthcoming River-class destroyers.

Like Apophenia said, the existing Orca-class boats, fitted for but not with a machine gun, are based at CFB Esquimalt, near where they were built on Canada's Pacific coast.

The Vice Admirals comments open up some interesting future “fantasy fleets” brainstorming.

• RCN has 8 x 33m Orcas, all west coast based and used for training
• RCN is retiring 12 x 55m Kingston class, which had a “sea time” training component to their role, as well as providing the “war time” MCM role for RCN Reserve
• CCG has 9 x 42.8m Hero class, a version of a popular Damen design built by Irving, but without active stabilizers, causing them in some peoples opinion to be a failure as they can’t patrol in even slightly bad weather.

9 Hero’s painted grey and given an HMG would seem to be ideal for Topshee’s “Great Lakes Flotilla” ? Border security and training for reservists.

Meanwhile there would seem to be operational cost benefits in replacing the Orcas with something more Kingston sized, and the Hero’s with something a little bigger and less bouncy (!) that use a common hull? I am going to use Vard’s 7055 as an illustrative example as it comes in Naval OPV and Coast Guard variants: https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/VARD-7-055.pdf

However I say “fantasy fleet” as;

1. The Great Lakes capability would be net new, and even taking used hulls from the CCG, this is additional cost. On the other hand it takes away some of Trump / Vance’s regimes whining about us not taking border security seriously, so might be funded…?
2. Replacing the Orcas with something Kingston sized, that can do training, inshore security patrols around naval bases and CNI, plus maybe a little ROV based MCM, and on both east and west coasts would potentially be a hard sell. Even slightly bigger boats come with higher running costs….
3. Number of projects… Rivers, CDC as Kingston replacement, Orca replacement, new subs, new helo’s to replace Cyclones (?), various new UAV’s ….. there is simply a lot going on, or desired, that needs a slice of a finite budget!

 

[Apophenia]

I cannot believe that anyone thought a 1000ton ship was viable for the arctic.

Then you failed to notice that the even lighter Kingston class MCDVs put in years of useful, summertime work in Arctic waters.

As for the CDC, VAdm Topshee does keep repeating "edge of ice". That hoped for PC 6+rating is not for breaking multi-year ice, it is about shrugging off growlers at speed.

 

[Apophenia]

... the existing Orca-class boats, fitted for but not with a machine gun, are based at CFB Esquimalt ...

And important there is that surveillance patrols are in the relatively protected waters of Georgia Strait (along the sea boundary between British Columbia and Washington State).

I would imagine that VAdm Topshee's mention of Orcas in the Great Lakes would follow a similar pattern to their West Coast kin - emphasis on training with an option for patrol.

 

[Rainbow1910]

The Vice Admirals comments open up some interesting future “fantasy fleets” brainstorming.

• RCN has 8 x 33m Orcas, all west coast based and used for training
• RCN is retiring 12 x 55m Kingston class, which had a “sea time” training component to their role, as well as providing the “war time” MCM role for RCN Reserve
• CCG has 9 x 42.8m Hero class, a version of a popular Damen design built by Irving, but without active stabilizers, causing them in some peoples opinion to be a failure as they can’t patrol in even slightly bad weather.

9 Hero’s painted grey and given an HMG would seem to be ideal for Topshee’s “Great Lakes Flotilla” ? Border security and training for reservists.

Meanwhile there would seem to be operational cost benefits in replacing the Orcas with something more Kingston sized, and the Hero’s with something a little bigger and less bouncy (!) that use a common hull? I am going to use Vard’s 7055 as an illustrative example as it comes in Naval OPV and Coast Guard variants: https://vardmarine.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/VARD-7-055.pdf

However I say “fantasy fleet” as;

1. The Great Lakes capability would be net new, and even taking used hulls from the CCG, this is additional cost. On the other hand it takes away some of Trump / Vance’s regimes whining about us not taking border security seriously, so might be funded…?
2. Replacing the Orcas with something Kingston sized, that can do training, inshore security patrols around naval bases and CNI, plus maybe a little ROV based MCM, and on both east and west coasts would potentially be a hard sell. Even slightly bigger boats come with higher running costs….
3. Number of projects… Rivers, CDC as Kingston replacement, Orca replacement, new subs, new helo’s to replace Cyclones (?), various new UAV’s ….. there is simply a lot going on, or desired, that needs a slice of a finite budget!

The Hero class is going to be retired and scrapped entirely, them being unusable for the CCG in the Atlantic very much carries over to Great Lakes use by the RCN in that kind of hypothetical scenario. The Orca's are almost certainly going to be replaced with a larger and more seaworthy design, although they still have to be kept at a size where they are ease to handle and cheap/simple to produce. It would be a bit of a stretch and difficult however, I think it would be a very valuable capability for the CCG/RCN to do a joint procurement with the same base design to replace the Hero and Orca classes.

 

[Jedpc]

Then you failed to notice that the even lighter Kingston class MCDVs put in years of useful, summertime work in Arctic waters.

As for the CDC, VAdm Topshee does keep repeating "edge of ice". That hoped for PC 6+rating is not for breaking multi-year ice, it is about shrugging off growlers at speed.

Turns out the Finnish Pohjanmaa class Corvettes (117m, 4,200 tons, 73 crew) are built to Finnish-Swedish Class 1A which according to Wikipedia is approx Polar Class 6 equivalent. So it’s a lightly ice strengthened combatant already exists….

 

[Apophenia]

Turns out the Finnish Pohjanmaa class Corvettes (117m, 4,200 tons, 73 crew) are built to Finnish-Swedish Class 1A which according to Wikipedia is approx Polar Class 6 equivalent. So it’s a lightly ice strengthened combatant already exists….

Just a note, Finnish-Swedish Ice Class 1A is roughly comparable to Polar Class 7 - so, 0.7 m first year ice maximum. (The PC 6 analogue is ICE 1A+.)

 

[Rainbow1910]

Canada has requested the sale back in November of a bunch of US equipment relating to the River class destroyers, found here.

Of special note is the inclusion of the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System seems to definitively answer the question that Tomahawk missiles will be present and eventually procured for the River class destroyers.

The Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS) is the U.S. Navy's shipboard component for command and control, mission planning, and distribution of Tomahawk tactical and strike data for the Tomahawk missile.

 

[Owens Z]

Then you failed to notice that the even lighter Kingston class MCDVs put in years of useful, summertime work in Arctic waters. As for the CDC, VAdm Topshee does keep repeating "edge of ice". That hoped for PC 6+rating is not for breaking multi-year ice, it is about shrugging off growlers at speed.

Turns out the Finnish Pohjanmaa class Corvettes (117m, 4,200 tons, 73 crew) are built to Finnish-Swedish Class 1A which according to Wikipedia is approx Polar Class 6 equivalent. So it’s a lightly ice strengthened combatant already exists….

Just a note, Finnish-Swedish Ice Class 1A is roughly comparable to Polar Class 7 - so, 0.7 m first year ice maximum. (The PC 6 analogue is ICE 1A+.)

An interesting short article today on the influential StrategyPage website about the worthy Icebreaker Collaboration Effort or 'ICE Pact' among Canada, Finland, and the United States, including an overview of other icebreaker efforts, especially in recent years by Communist China, a self-styled "near-Arctic state". See < https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htproc/articles/2025121745853 >.

 

[Apophenia]

An interesting short article today on the influential StrategyPage website about the worthy Icebreaker Collaboration Effort or 'ICE Pact' among Canada, Finland, and the United States ...

I wouldn't put too much stock in on-going Canadian participation in ICE Pact. The policy people involved have all moved on and the political landscape has changed completely.

The big loser in ICE Pact will probably be Davie Shipbuilding ... unless Davie abandons Québec for those Gulf Copper yards in Texas. And the 'Davie Defense' dodge will only take Inocea Group so far. Eventually, those international owners will have to choose between the Arctic Security Cutter and retaining their Lauzon yard.

The New Year is going to be very interesting for the changes coming to Canadian shipbuilding. With all of the potential foreign (read: non-US) trade and procurement deals being juggled in Ottawa right now, I would expect some of those changes to be fairly radical.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The way I see it, Canada needs ice-rated patrol craft out there just to enforce claims. See also that island that Canada and Denmark were friendly-disputing ownership (planting a flag and a bottle of national-booze, then the other side took down the flag, replaced it with their side's flag and replaced the bottle of booze).

Russia and China will not play that nicely. And for that matter, the US may not play that nicely, either.

Because Canada's Coast Guard has no military powers, they need different ships than what the RCN needs. No point in them getting an unarmed version of the RCN patrol ship.

IMO both need helicopter capabilities. CCG may be able to get away with just a helo deck to lily-pad the rescue helos out, or may want a hangar just for VTOL drones. But I'd prefer a full helo hangar able to do some maintenance if I was writing the requirements. Which means a pretty big ship for "just a Coast Guard cutter," and more importantly it needs a good stabilizer system to allow for helo operations in worse weather.

RCN patrol ship should have an ASW helo that can also do SAR.

 

[Apophenia]

... And for that matter, the US may not play that nicely, either...

Yeah. That was kinda my point about the future of the ICE Pact.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Ah-ha! Found a decent map to use here:

(Map source is in the bottom left corner)

Look at all the territory Canada needs to patrol, and just how far North it gets. Some of that looks like 85degN or more, in the area NW of Greenland in the center of the map. Even the "Northwest Passage" up through Baffin Bay towards the Beaufort Sea is about 75degN.

Now, that said, if Canada keeps kicking their Helicopter purchase down the road, they may be able to buy MV-75s instead of S-92s or EH101s. And frankly the MV75 makes a lot more sense for Canada's needs.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I wouldn't put too much stock in on-going Canadian participation in ICE Pact. The policy people involved have all moved on and the political landscape has changed completely.

The big loser in ICE Pact will probably be Davie Shipbuilding ... unless Davie abandons Québec for those Gulf Copper yards in Texas. And the 'Davie Defense' dodge will only take Inocea Group so far. Eventually, those international owners will have to choose between the Arctic Security Cutter and retaining their Lauzon yard.

The New Year is going to be very interesting for the changes coming to Canadian shipbuilding. With all of the potential foreign (read: non-US) trade and procurement deals being juggled in Ottawa right now, I would expect some of those changes to be fairly radical.

I'm not sure what you mean by Davie being the biggest loser here for the ICE Pact, when they have purchased their American shipyard, now control an experienced Finnish shipyard and are preparing for major Canadian government contract work at their Quebec yard. Davie is building two MPPS-100 icebreakers for the USCG in its Helsinki shipyard, and an additional three vessels at that newly acquired Galveston shipyard following that. Davie has been contracted to build one Polar Icebreaker and six Program Icebreakers at their Quebec facility as well for the CCG, with some work on the Polar being done in Finland at Helsinki as well.

Given Canadian and American shipbuilding ramping up in the future and considering current orders, I don't see in the slightest how Davie will be in dire straits and somehow required to "choose between projects and retaining yards".

Because Canada's Coast Guard has no military powers, they need different ships than what the RCN needs. No point in them getting an unarmed version of the RCN patrol ship.

The CCG is getting their AOPS for Atlantic fisheries patrols and other largely non-Arctic work, going to be used for different roles compared to the RCN AOPS.

 

[Owens Z]

The way I see it, Canada needs ice-rated patrol craft out there just to enforce claims...

Scott Kenney, I was in Toronto for business about fifteen years ago and took the opportunity to visit the dojo of a friendly acquaintance there. He confronted me about the American invasions of Canada, and while I understood he was joshing, I was struck again by the Ontarian propensity to treat that fighting like it happened yesterday. I have better grasp of history than most, and when I acknowledged the American (mainly New Yorker) invasions of 1775 and 1813, and spoke of the two invasions of New York from Canada (until defeated at Saratoga and Plattsburgh, respectively), he sputtered, said "those had nothing to do with Canadians!", and changed the subject.

When I visited the country starting as a kid in 1982, meeting Canadians who did little to hide their disdain for Americans was routine. Back then a different US President, inferior in intelligence and wisdom and goodness to Canadians, was responsible for Canada's problems. So I have the experience to take the current "it's all Trump's fault", and the eventual blaming of a future President, for what those are. And yet, if a phony threat of US attack can help convince Canadian voters to at last invest in strengthening their long-neglected naval power, then it might be worth it, for everybody's sake. The Royal Canadian Navy fought to the death to push Canadian and American convoys past German U-boats to UK ports, while the pre-buildup US Navy had its hands full holding off the Japanese onslaught. In our world of scarcity and ruthless aggressors, such teamwork will someday be needed again.

While I no longer have the personal connections there that I did in the 1980s and 90s, I'm more traveled inside Canada and know more book learning about that nation than most Americans, and I see that resentment of American neglect has some justification. It pains me that our northern neighbor and key ally is mentioned here in NYC only to be blamed for the weather ("another cold front coming in from Canada...") or for the loathed Branta canadensis. But a situation between neighbors of benign neglect or bickering over tariffs could be far darker, which despite their vaunted superiority some Ontarians and Quebecois don't seem to fully understand. As you said Scott, for all our own shortcomings, there is worse out there in the world than Americans. Ask a Ukrainian, or a Tibetan.

To be clear, I very much enjoyed my sojourns in Canada in the 20th century. Many good memories, of a great people. I wish them the best.

 

[Apophenia]

... And yet, if a phony threat of US attack can help convince Canadian voters to at last invest in strengthening their long-neglected naval power, then it might be worth it, for everybody's sake...

Oh ... okay.

Perhaps this thread should be retitled as 'Canada's naval strategy and how that could best serve future US interests'?

 

[Scott Kenny]

I've been trying to look at the situation from the POV of what Canada needs for itself.

Not for how Canada slots into NATO or US/continental defense.

 

[Jemiba]

Folks, this is an interesting discussion indeed, and (Kudos !) lead very reasonably.
Nevertheless, it's touching current politics, so, please, be careful.
If you want to extend it the theme, I recommend doing this via PM and inviting the desired participants.