Canada's naval strategy?

[Scott Kenny]

There are no joint ships with "USCG painted on one side and CCG on the other". And as discussed above, Canadian Coast Guard personnel have never had police powers, unlike the US Coast Guard and most other coast guards. Your college friends were pulling your leg, Scott Kenny.

That was literally a USCG officer giving the presentation.

 

[Rainbow1910]

That was literally a USCG officer giving the presentation.

I have similarly never heard or seen this being a thing, and the logistics of such a setup would be.....interesting to say the least.

 

[Grey Havoc]

I have similarly never heard or seen this being a thing, and the logistics of such a setup would be.....interesting to say the least.

Bureaucrats have their own logic that us poor mortals can scarcely even begin to comprehend at the best of times.

 

[Owens Z]

I suspect Scott's mis-remembered who was involved...

That was literally a USCG officer giving the presentation.

I have similarly never heard or seen this being a thing, and the logistics of such a setup would be.....interesting to say the least.

Or perhaps he misremembered USCG + USN, DWG. Unlike personnel of the US Navy (restricted by the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act), US Coast Guard officers, warrant officers, and petty officers have police powers (on the high seas or anywhere in the USA), and a detachment is sometimes aboard a USN warship for law enforcement, e.g. for boarding suspected drug runners.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Or perhaps he misremembered USCG + USN, DWG. Unlike personnel of the US Navy (restricted by the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act), US Coast Guard officers, warrant officers, and petty officers have police powers (on the high seas or anywhere in the USA), and a detachment is sometimes aboard a USN warship for law enforcement, e.g. for boarding suspected drug runners.

No, this was explicitly USCG + CCG, with a USCG officer giving the presentation.

 

[Owens Z]

SH 60/ S 70 had tested and failed almost spectacularly. Insufficient range, insufficient endurance. And it failed a safety test involving ditching it at sea.

Canadian Forces have historically favored the bigger helicopter models for naval use (such as the old Sea King and the current Merlin). So far as I've heard, the US Navy has been happy with its SH-60 Seahawks over the past forty years, as has the US Coast Guard with its similar Jayhawks. More than, for example, the operators of the troubled NH90 have been. But to each his own.

 

[Apophenia]

Canadian Forces have historically favored the bigger helicopter models for naval use (such as the old Sea King and the current Merlin). So far as I've heard, the US Navy has been happy with its SH-60 Seahawks over the past forty years, as has the US Coast Guard with its similar Jayhawks. More than, for example, the operators of the troubled NH90 have been. But to each his own.

I've been reading over this thread, going back 6 months or so. I'm hoping that members will indulge me in a few notes on Canadian helicopter procurement ...

#114 GK Dundas: "The Merlin order was cancelled because of a spur of the moment decision in order to gain a couple of points in polling. As to saving money the they didn't save a penny. Between cancellation fees and the lawsuits plus the cost of running two different competitions for replacement aircraft."

There was nothing 'spur of the moment' about cancelling the New Shipboard Aircraft order. Chrétien had turned NSA cancellation into a fairly major campaign issue - "Zéro hélicoptère!". Having paid the kill fees, the Liberals then had to pay AgustaWestland even more to buy utility-model EH101s to replace the CH-113 SAR fleet. Daft but true.

#122 Owens Z: "...if the Royal Canadian Air Force had dropped its "assembled in Canada" demand (which it later did anyway), then the original 48-helicopter order could have been cheaper."

The original RCN Sea Kings were put together by UAC at Longueuil. But there was no 'assembled in Canada' demand as part of the NSA programme.

#124 Scott Kenny: "the expensive operating costs are from buying too few aircraft to cover the duties"

Like anything else, operating costs depend upon a lot of factors. The CH-149s' reputation sprang for a 2014 article by Michael Coyle claiming an absurdly high $30k (2015 CAD 838k) per hour operating costs. In 2015, Danish EW101 figures were released saying DKK 70-to-80k (CAD 10.4-to-13k) for Flyvevåbnet hourly operating costs. For the same year (well, actually FY 2015) the Public Accounts of Canada annual report put CH-149 costs at CAD 6,650 (2025 CAD 8,614) per flight hour.

Any twin-engined equivalent will, obviously, be less expensive to operate than the 3-engined EH101. That was factored in for the original decision (3-engine reliability being seen as desirable - especially for the long-range SAR role). Some of that is in fuel burn but also in increased mtx and parts. And there is the rub. The 1998 order for the Cormorants was very light in spares.

#133 Owens Z: "does not say whether the similar Bell helicopters of the Canadian Coast Guard will also be replaced."

The CCG Bell 412EPIs are much newer than CAF/RCAF CH-146 Griffons. DFO started receiving B412s (as B212 replacements) in 2016. Those 7 x airframes were then supplemented by 15 x Bell 429s (as MBB Bo 105 replacements).

#206 Owens Z: "Canadian Forces have historically favored the bigger helicopter models for naval use (such as the old Sea King and the current Merlin). So far as I've heard, the US Navy has been happy with its SH-60 Seahawks..."

For 'Merlin', I assume that you mean Cyclones for naval use. The CH-149 Cormorant is, of course, an SAR platform.

On size, generally, the ability to stand upright within the cabin was a requirement of the New Shipboard Aircraft programme and its inheritor - the Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP). When Sikorsky saw that elimination from the NSA contest was inevitable, they withdrew the Seahawk from consideration.

 

[Scott Kenny]

#124 Scott Kenny: "the expensive operating costs are from buying too few aircraft to cover the duties"

Like anything else, operating costs depend upon a lot of factors. The CH-149s' reputation sprang for a 2014 article by Michael Coyle claiming an absurdly high $30k (2015 CAD 838k) per hour operating costs. In 2015, Danish EW101 figures were released saying DKK 70-to-80k (CAD 10.4-to-13k) for Flyvevåbnet hourly operating costs. For the same year (well, actually FY 2015) the Public Accounts of Canada annual report put CH-149 costs at CAD 6,650 (2025 CAD 8,614) per flight hour.

Any twin-engined equivalent will, obviously, be less expensive to operate than the 3-engined EH101. That was factored in for the original decision (3-engine reliability being seen as desirable - especially for the long-range SAR role). Some of that is in fuel burn but also in increased mtx and parts. And there is the rub. The 1998 order for the Cormorants was very light in spares.

My point was that due to the small number of aircraft in the fleet, each bird must fly more to cover the missions. So the flight-hours based major checks have to happen more often per year. Cost per flight hour doesn't change, annual maintenance costs do.

 

[Apophenia]

My point was that due to the small number of aircraft in the fleet, each bird must fly more to cover the missions. So the flight-hours based major checks have to happen more often per year. Cost per flight hour doesn't change, annual maintenance costs do.

Understood. Annual hours for individual CH-149 airframes are far higher than for any other EH101/AW101 operator. And, as you say, there is an inevitable knock-on effect for MRO. Then, suddenly, it really matters that you tried to save some procurement costs by cheaping out on the spares package.

Canada's approach to In-Service Support hasn't helped either. It is a gift for industry to get a 20- or 25-year ISS contract (even if, sometimes, they get unfairly blamed for inadequate spares). I suspect that many of DND's problems would be eased with faster airframe turnovers. And I do wonder how multi-decade service for individual airframes ever became the accepted norm.

 

[Owens Z]

FWIW, the CCG vessels involved:
...The CCG response to this grounding is about maritime and environmental safety and SAR. As noted above, under Canadian law, ultimate responsibility for repair, recovery, and remediation rest with Royal Wagenborg - the owners of the MV Thamesborg.

Thanks, Apophenia. A Dutch former merchant marine officer has an update on YouTube about the stranding of Thamesborg in the Northwest Passage. The cargo of the run-aground Dutch freighter is being offloaded onto smaller ships (with less draft), to lighten her for eventual refloating. No casualties or pollution release, fortunately. A 6400-ton Pierre Radisson-class icebreaker of the Canadian Coast Guard, Des Groseilliers, is standing by, and a similar-sized icebreaking salvage ship, Botnica, has been hired from Estonia. Both have helipads if needed. There is a race to beat the incoming cold. Canada's "Franklin Strait is only passable in August and September. Conditions deteriorate considerably from mid-October".

See:

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ODEksjYmiZ4

 

[Apophenia]

For some, it will have gone 'under the radar' that most of the RCN's Kingston class MCDV have now been paid off without replacement. These were:

29 Sept 2025: MM 705 Whitehorse, MM 709 Saskatoon, and MM 710 Brandon

03 Oct 2025: MM 700 Kingston, MM 701 Glace Bay, MM 704 Shawinigan, MM 707 Goose Bay, and MM 711 Summerside

Those 8 x Kingston class hulls are to be followed by ...

2026: MM 706 Yellowknife

2027: MM 703 Edmonton

2020: MM 702 Nanaimo and MM 708 Moncton

No replacement type has been chosen for training, MCM, or coastal patrol. The latter role will be filled temporarily by the 5 x KingstonHarry DeWolf class AOPS.

In the Canadian Defence Review, Richard Nghiem wrote on MCDV replacement options. [1] But, as is common with him, the CDR article just turned into just another apologia for buying more US weapons systems. The author also seems to think that a hull-for-hull replacement with AI-controlled crewless vessels is a near-term option for Canadian coastal patrol!

But Nghiem's main argument was that the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette was the obvious replacement for the MCDVs. For coastal patrol? Sure, why not. But MCM and the Kingstons' training role seems to have been completely lost in all of this.
_______________________________

[1] Coastal Shift: The Next Wave in Maritime Coastal Defence; CDR, Aug 2025, Vol 31, Issue 4, pp 85-92

 

[Rainbow1910]

For some, it will have gone 'under the radar' that most of the RCN's Kingston class MCDV have now been paid off without replacement. These were:

29 Sept 2025: MM 705 Whitehorse, MM 709 Saskatoon, and MM 710 Brandon

03 Oct 2025: MM 700 Kingston, MM 701 Glace Bay, MM 704 Shawinigan, MM 707 Goose Bay, and MM 711 Summerside

Those 8 x Kingston class hulls are to be followed by ...

2026: MM 706 Yellowknife

2027: MM 703 Edmonton

2020: MM 702 Nanaimo and MM 708 Moncton

No replacement type has been chosen for training, MCM, or coastal patrol. The latter role will be filled temporarily by the 5 x KingstonHarry DeWolf class AOPS.

In the Canadian Defence Review, Richard Nghiem wrote on MCDV replacement options. [1] But, as is common with him, the CDR article just turned into just another apologia for buying more US weapons systems. The author also seems to think that a hull-for-hull replacement with AI-controlled crewless vessels is a near-term option for Canadian coastal patrol!

But Nghiem's main argument was that the Canadian Multi-mission Corvette was the obvious replacement for the MCDVs. For coastal patrol? Sure, why not. But MCM and the Kingstons' training role seems to have been completely lost in all of this.
_______________________________

[1] Coastal Shift: The Next Wave in Maritime Coastal Defence; CDR, Aug 2025, Vol 31, Issue 4, pp 85-92

Interestingly from what I have heard, all of the Kingston fleet had what amounted to another decade of service life remaining on their hulls if the Navy put them into dock for the requisite refits. The decision to pay off the fleet over a relatively short period was made due to the fact that the Kingston class shares the same overall maintenance budget with the Halifax class frigates, which are viewed as more important and also requiring increasingly obscene amounts of time/money to keep operational. It seems the choice was made to discard the Kingston class and take the crew/cost savings for use elsewhere in the fleet.

The Harry DeWolf class will act as "replacements" in the short term however, they are much larger and resource intensive vessels that don't enjoy the light operational footprint of the Kingston class for many duties. The CMMC program is many, many years away and only seems to be getting increasingly complex, large and costly every time it is mentioned by the Navy. Vice Admiral Topshee was quoted saying the following relatively recently:

CDR: The Navy has announced it is starting to pay off the MCDV fleet. What do you want to see as a replacement of the MCDV?

VAdm Topshee: The Kingston class has been fantastic since its introduction into service in the 1990s. They’ve deployed to places no one ever thought they would go. The name gives it away: Maritime Coastal Defence Vessel. They were not supposed to ever go to Hawaii or repeatedly cross the Atlantic. They’ve proven to be remarkably flexible in what they’ve done.

The problem I face as we look at building the River Class Destroyers to take over the response capability of the main surface combatant from the Halifax class, and we recognize that we’ve got the Harry DeWolf class that can go up in the north, is there’s a gap between those two. We need something that can deal with most threats that isn’t going to provide air defence or protection to anyone else, but can defend itself in a fight, and is not afraid of ice. So not an icebreaker, but can go to the ice edge and can rip about at speed near ice. That should be consistent with a hull form that still allows it to have a sonar and still allows it to move with enough speed to be relevant as a combatant. It’s basically the same capability set that’s currently in the Halifax class, shrunk down to a smaller package with an ice edge capability, roughly a Polar Class 6. So that’s what we’re talking about as a Continental Defence Corvette, and we’re working to develop the high-level mandatory requirements for what exactly that would look like. We deliberately chose the name Corvette because we’re trying to indicate that it’s a tier of combatant — it definitely can fight, but it’s not the thing that’s the heart of the fleet.

Also:

"Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee tells The Canadian Press he’s looking for ships with a long range that pack a punch in combat and can also deal with Arctic ice.

That likely will result in a set of requirements unique to Canada’s military.

Topshee says the navy wants the ships to be “Canadian from the core” and “absolutely built in Canada,” wherever possible.

The navy is still in the early stages of its search for a dozen or more corvette warships that would be smaller than frigates - one of the next major procurement projects the military is expected to pursue after it settles on a new fleet of submarines.

The current Kingston-class coastal defence vessels are approaching the end of their lifespans, with eight of the twelve ships leaving service this fall and the rest expected to retire by 2029."

So instead of a relatively cheap and cheerful 1:1 replacement of the Kingston class with another OPV/MCM vessel, we've feature crept the program into a literal miniature Halifax class frigate which will be rated for Polar Class 6 while also "built in Canada" and "Canadian from the core." At a minimum, we won't see a 12 ship class procured anymore and should expect something like 6 on the low end and maybe 8 on the high end due to the increased cost and complexity inherent with this design. The Navy needs to be careful it doesn't fly too close to the sun as well, as too capable of a CMMC could spell disaster for the River class order numbers. It also sounds like there will be no off the shelf designs here and Canada will want its own bespoke design to fit our exacting requirements, alongside owning the design entirely ourselves. There will almost certainly be US weapon systems, decoys, equipment, sensors, etc on this new platform to provide some semblance of interoperability/cost savings with the largely US furnished River class destroyers, but it sounds like there is a major push for Canadian systems like CMS-330 to be integrated as well.

I don't have access to the CDR article in question, but anybody seriously suggesting we replace major surface vessels with unmanned or minimally ships is not in touch with reality. This technology is unproven and has many inherent security/operational risks, it will not be a viable concept for many years from where I sit atleast. We have indeed lost a lot of MCM capability, although from what I understand, Kingston's have not been used for major training work for many years at this point. Training work can be hoisted off to the Harry DeWolf's if absolutely required.

 

[Apophenia]

On training, apologies, my wording was very muddy. The Orca class are now the primary training craft (an oddity there is, despite being and attached to the PCTU and not being commissioned, the 8x Orcas have also been assigned a surveillance role in Georgia Strait).

My reference to the Kingstons had more to do with operational training for the Naval Reserve component of their complement. Perhaps that too will become part of the new Corvette's growing job list?

Actually, that brings up the Canadian Defence Review writer's comments on uncrewed systems. If the Baltic is a model, it is probably time to get very serious about remote MCM. And that raises the question of suitable 'motherships'. Something like a 'NextGen Kingston' might suit but that's unlikely to happen.

Going back to that August issue of CDR, Richard Nghiem's mention of fully autonomous patrol vessels was probably an attempt to tie-in with another article on Vard's current work on future autonomous patrol ships. (I guess this is the magazine equivalent of what SEO types used to call 'link whoring'.)

Nghiem also contributed an advocacy piece for RCN amphibious assault ships (complete with reference to Rick Hillier's "Honkin' Big Ships" concept). In this article, Nghiem pushes for procurement of the America class complete with F-35Bs, MV-22Bs, MH-60s, V-247 Vigilant UAS, as well as LCAC hovercraft (to deliver CA Leo 2 MBTs ashore during contested landings).

I'm not sure what Mr. Nghiem has been smoking lately but it must be potent! Still, TBF, Nghiem and his editors may just have been caught off guard by the announcement of a new Defence Investment Agency. I find the details of this agency rather fuzzy thus far but Stephen Fuhr has been pretty clear that the days of 70-75% of DND procurement going the US are coming to an end.

_____________________________

If interested, the Aug 2025 issue of CDR can be accessed here:
-- https://canadiandefencereview.com/ or, if it work, here:
-- https://secure.viewer.zmags.com/publication/71501063#/71501063/1

 

[DWG]

anybody seriously suggesting we replace major surface vessels with unmanned or minimally ships is not in touch with reality. This technology is unproven and has many inherent security/operational risks, it will not be a viable concept for many years from where I sit atleast. We have indeed lost a lot of MCM capability

The RN, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are all busy replacing their MCM capabilities with unmanned small craft. Not much use for the substitute patrol boat side of being an MCM vessel, but the actual MCM bit they can apparently handle just fine. The Dutch-Belgian-(with France to come) City Class are an interesting design of motherships for ferrying the actual MCM capability around, and look like they'd be able to handle the patrol role easily. (The RN's trying to do it on the cheap without dedicated motherships)

 

[Rainbow1910]

Nghiem also contributed an advocacy piece for RCN amphibious assault ships (complete with reference to Rick Hillier's "Honkin' Big Ships" concept). In this article, Nghiem pushes for procurement of the America class complete with F-35Bs, MV-22Bs, MH-60s, V-247 Vigilant UAS, as well as LCAC hovercraft (to deliver CA Leo 2 MBTs ashore during contested landings).

I'm not sure what Mr. Nghiem has been smoking lately but it must be potent! Still, TBF, Nghiem and his editors may just have been caught off guard by the announcement of a new Defence Investment Agency. I find the details of this agency rather fuzzy thus far but Stephen Fuhr has been pretty clear that the days of 70-75% of DND procurement going the US are coming to an end.

_____________________________

If interested, the Aug 2025 issue of CDR can be accessed here:
-- https://canadiandefencereview.com/ or, if it work, here:
-- https://secure.viewer.zmags.com/publication/71501063#/71501063/1

I just went through and read that, although its nothing I haven't seen before relatively speaking. The amphibious warfare concept always circles back to one thing, we'd effectively need to focus a significant amount of our manpower, funds and effort from all three branches of the military into a project with dubious utility to the CAF. Disaster relief, sealift capability to Europe and Arctic sovereignty are all important to Canada however, some of these missions are dubious uses of tens of billions of dollars in funding. I see minimal purpose for the RCN being able to maintain its own contested amphibious landing capability, and sealift can be done more efficiently by for example copying the Royal Navy's Point-class sealift ships, where we have a class of RORO vessels basically on call when required but can be used by civilian agencies when not needed. To make an Arctic capable force you would also need specific training and equipment/ships to make this possible, which puts some major pressures on an already questionable idea.

We have a lot of other programs that need our funding and effort, far more important than this lark as well.

The RN, France, Belgium and the Netherlands are all busy replacing their MCM capabilities with unmanned small craft. Not much use for the substitute patrol boat side of being an MCM vessel, but the actual MCM bit they can apparently handle just fine. The Dutch-Belgian-(with France to come) City Class are an interesting design of motherships for ferrying the actual MCM capability around, and look like they'd be able to handle the patrol role easily. (The RN's trying to do it on the cheap without dedicated motherships)

Indeed there is valid use cases for unmanned smaller crafts in MCM roles, although I don't think this is what was being discussed overall with larger, independently operational ships earlier.

 

[Apophenia]

... City Class are an interesting design of motherships for ferrying the actual MCM capability around, and look like they'd be able to handle the patrol role easily...

I can't agree with such motherships being very capable in a patrol role. The Kingston class MCDVs have a top speed of 15 knots (and were originally armed with 1 x 40 mm Bofors). [1] The Kingstons' problem in the coastal patrol role was how many suspect craft could simply outrun the MCDVs.

The City class - topping out at 15.3 knots - has no speed advantage over the already inadequate Kingston class. In the past, patrol was tacked on to make better use of under-utilised MCM vessels. In our era of asymmetrical warfare, MCM has to be taken more seriously again. The roles are probably best separated back into mineclearing specialists and fast patrol vessels.

_____________________________________

[1] Admittedly, those guns were ancient L/60 40 mm Bofors on WW2 'Boffin' mounts. So, not at all comparable with the City class' modern L/70 Bofors 40 Mk4. Still, the Dutch/Belgian ships will only have an armaments advantage so long as the relatively pokey City class can keep its potential target within range.

 

[DWG]

The Kingston class MCDVs have a top speed of 15 knots [] The Kingstons' problem in the coastal patrol role was how many suspect craft could simply outrun the MCDVs.

The City class - topping out at 15.3 knots - has no speed advantage over the already inadequate Kingston class.

That's a fair point, but it's not significantly worse than the existing lack of capability, and as motherships the ships have the optionally-manned 25kt Inspector 125 USV by default, which they could presumably substitute for a 12m fast interceptor on patrol duties if they so desire, plus they can use their rotary wing drone capability, whether that be with the Skeldar, the Camcopter, or whatever.,

 

[Apophenia]

I just went through and read that, although its nothing I haven't seen before relatively speaking. The amphibious warfare concept always circles back to one thing, we'd effectively need to focus a significant amount of our manpower, funds and effort from all three branches of the military into a project with dubious utility to the CAF. Disaster relief, sealift capability to Europe and Arctic sovereignty are all important to Canada however, some of these missions are dubious uses of tens of billions of dollars in funding. I see minimal purpose for the RCN being able to maintain its own contested amphibious landing capability, and sealift can be done more efficiently by for example copying the Royal Navy's Point-class sealift ships, where we have a class of RORO vessels basically on call when required but can be used by civilian agencies when not needed. To make an Arctic capable force you would also need specific training and equipment/ships to make this possible, which puts some major pressures on an already questionable idea.

We have a lot of other programs that need our funding and effort, far more important than this lark as well.
.

I fully agree with your assessment of amphibious assault ships but have only now had a chance to read up on the Point class. This approach makes a great deal of sense to me.

I seem to recall the idea of an on-call RORO capability being discussed back in the pre-JSS days of the Afloat Logistics Support Capability project. IIRC, the model at the time was the Danish military's use of leased Mærsk RORO ships.

One of the 'problem' identified at the time was the need for the peacetime pre-positioning Canadian Army heavy equipment. (That just sounds like good planning to me.) Thinking of RORO ships brings to mind Operation Reassurance.

For 'OpRe', RORO 'on call' would allow stockpiling of vehicles and ordnance for MNB-LVA. Should some of that stockpile prove surplus to requirements, it still beats trying to transfer Canadian equipment and personnel to Latvia under fire - even if amphibious assault ships were available.

 

[Owens Z]

Good news—the ship Thamesborg stranded in the Franklin Strait has been successfully refloated (after its cargo was offloaded) and is moving under its own power out to the Atlantic and then to the Gulf of St Lawrence; see < https://gcaptain.com/cargoship-tham...refloat-concluding-six-week-rescue-operation/ >.

 

[Owens Z]

...Davie will be building her 'sistership' in concern with their newly purchased Helsinki Shipyard in Finland, using a modified former Russian civilian heavy icebreaker design...

In Finland, Helsinki Shipyard (which is owned by Davie Shipbuilding of Quebec) has begun building the second vessel of the Polar Icebreaker Project, Imnaryuaq, for the Canadian Coast Guard.

And the first River-class destroyer, HMCS Fraser, is now under construction at Irving Shipyard in Halifax. The Royal Canadian Navy's River class of perhaps eight to fifteen ships is based on the UK's latest Type 26 design being built in Glasgow.

 

[Owens Z]

The Kingstons are being paid off by 2029...

For some, it will have gone 'under the radar' that most of the RCN's Kingston class MCDV have now been paid off without replacement. These were...

Interestingly from what I have heard, all of the Kingston fleet had what amounted to another decade of service life remaining on their hulls if the Navy put them into dock for the requisite refits...

This deletion of the small, slow Kingstons is earlier than H_K's estimate of "by 2029", Apophenia. I'm sorry to learn that HMCS Glace Bay, which I had visited, is now gone. The resulting lack of hulls for at least the necessary constabulary role in Canadian waters, much less wartime roles, seems shortsighted.

What is the relationship between Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee and his 'Continental Defence Corvette' and Captain Andrew Graham, who in the January 2025 video in post #35 above was Director of the CMC (Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette) program?

 

[Owens Z]

These ships are supposed to be operating in the high Arctic. Where are the other BMD radars up there?

There are BMD radars facing the Artic in Thule, Greenland and Clear, Alaska. And in a scenario where they were sending BMD armed patrol ships up there, I'd also expect the Sea-Based X-band Radar and maybe a THAAD TPY-2 radar to be oriented that direction.

A recent editorial of interest is "Canada's Underutilized Advantage in the Arctic: Surface Wave Radar" in The Maritime Executive by a retired colonel of the Canadian Army. The Canadian-developed High Frequency Surface Wave Radar or HFSWR is intended to fill the surveillance gap between line-of-sight X-band radars and a very-long-range ionosphere-refraction skywave radar like the Australian Jindalee that Canada is interested in purchasing, which (according to the author) is optimized for detecting aircraft and ballistic missiles instead of ships. HFSWR emits only slightly longer wavelengths than Jindalee but as surface waves rather than skywaves, using evaporating seawater as a waveguide for over-the-horizon range even through clutter (i.e. sea ice or rough surf), to at least the 200-nautical-mile edge of Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone.

Raytheon Canada Ltd successfully put a demonstrator HFSWR on Cape Race to monitor the Grand Banks, and the author urges the Canadian government to now buy, install, and man further such radars in Arctic Canada, especially to cover the eastern and western outlets of the Northwest Passage. See the editorial at < https://maritime-executive.com/edit...antage-for-monitoring-strategic-arctic-waters >.

 

[Rainbow1910]

And the first River-class destroyer, HMCS Fraser, is now under construction at Irving Shipyard in Halifax. The Royal Canadian Navy's River class of perhaps eight to fifteen ships is based on the UK's latest Type 26 design being built in Glasgow.

River class orders are still at 15 currently, and seem unlikely to change especially given the unfunded and bloating nature of the Continental Defence Corvette program. Cutting the River class program back to eight would be flat out disastrous, leaving us with fewer combatants than we currently have.

 

[Apophenia]

...The resulting lack of hulls for at least the necessary constabulary role in Canadian waters, much less wartime roles, seems shortsighted...

I suspect that the "constabulary role" will become much more literal. With the CCG now being made a Special Operating Agency under DND, the RCN has a rare opportunity to dump its unwanted coastal patrol duties on the CCG. But there is also a bureaucratic ambition - control of the multi-agency Maritime Security Operations Centres.

The RCN wants to maintain direct control over the two oceanic MSOCs - MSOC East and MSOC West. CCG - now a DND SOA - already leads MSOC Great Lakes. So, NDHQ will now have complete operational control of all three MSOCs while Transport Canada - as Chair of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group - is left with nothing but the bureaucratic grunt work.

If I'm right, the coastal defence aspect of the Kingston class will be taken over, in part, by the CCG's Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels. (I say 'in part' because there are only 9 x MSPVs in service.) Compared to the MCDVs, the MSPVs are quite small - with a complement of 9 + any embarked RCMP, they will be cramped for sovereignty patrol. On the up side, MSPVs are 5 knots faster than an MCDV.

What is the relationship between Vice-Admiral Angus Topshee and his 'Continental Defence Corvette' and Captain Andrew Graham, who in the January 2025 video in post #35 above was Director of the CMC (Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette) program?

The Continental Defence Corvette is an evolution from the vaguer Canadian Multi-Purpose Corvette/Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Project. (Besides, without such multiple rebrandings, the CMC/CMPC/CDC would not be recognisable as a Canadian defence procurement project!) To some degree, VAdm Topshee is also putting a personal stamp on the CMC as was.

I seem to recall some mention of minimal 'ice tolerance' for the CMC (fitting in with Vard's design heritage) but the CDC hull is to be Polar Class 6. So, Summer/Autumn ops in 0.7 to 1.2 metre of first-year ice (with older ice inclusions). The goal, according to VAdm Topshee is for the corvettes to be able to "rip about at speed near ice". The CDC is also to be capable of ASuW, ASW, and LAAD. These corvettes are no direct MCDV replacement.

There's plenty of room for arguing the must-haves versus nice-options for the future corvettes. But, if you can ignore the Biz-Admin-speak approach often taken by the Vice Admiral, Angus Topshee is usually making sense. The trick for future RCN corvettes will be avoiding mission/design creep in one direction (which has already begun) whilst avoiding CDC programme slashings to paper-over the inevitable cost overruns of the River class destroyers.

 

[Rainbow1910]

I suspect that the "constabulary role" will become much more literal. With the CCG now being made a Special Operating Agency under DND, the RCN has a rare opportunity to dump its unwanted coastal patrol duties on the CCG. But there is also a bureaucratic ambition - control of the multi-agency Maritime Security Operations Centres.

The RCN wants to maintain direct control over the two oceanic MSOCs - MSOC East and MSOC West. CCG - now a DND SOA - already leads MSOC Great Lakes. So, NDHQ will now have complete operational control of all three MSOCs while Transport Canada - as Chair of the Interdepartmental Marine Security Working Group - is left with nothing but the bureaucratic grunt work.

If I'm right, the coastal defence aspect of the Kingston class will be taken over, in part, by the CCG's Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels. (I say 'in part' because there are only 9 x MSPVs in service.) Compared to the MCDVs, the MSPVs are quite small - with a complement of 9 + any embarked RCMP, they will be cramped for sovereignty patrol. On the up side, MSPVs are 5 knots faster than an MCDV.

I have supreme doubts that the CCG will take over coastal patrol duties given their union backed aversion to militarized duties, doubly so when the MSPV's are very poorly suited to these missions. The vessels of the class were not fitted with stabilizer fins and subsequently have shown seakeeping so poor that it constantly makes the RCMP, DFO and CCG personnel aboard very ill.

Some excerpts from here:

Canada's $227-million fleet of mid-shore coast guard vessels are rolling "like crazy" at sea, making crews seasick and keeping some ships in port during weather conditions where they should be able to operate, CBC News has learned.

Canadian Coast Guard records and correspondence obtained under federal access to information legislation raise questions about the patrol vessels' seagoing capability and reveal a two-year debate — still unresolved — on how to address the problem.

"It goes without saying that the crew [is] in favour of [stabilizers]," wrote supervisor Mike Crottey. "Seasickness is felt both by conservation and protection and coast guard personnel and has an impact on vessel operation."

Crottey said that in exposed water, the skipper of the CCGS M. Charles sets a weather course to "keep the ship from really rocking around," which can result in more fuel consumption and increased operating costs. "This course is based on the swell and the wind direction and is used [to] alleviate excessive ship motion and not based on the shortest distance to destination," Crottey wrote.

The coast guard denies there is any problem with the safety and stability of the fleet. However, in a March 2017 "configuration change request" to have stabilizers installed, coast guard project manager David Wyse described "an increased hazard of crew injuries and program failures.

"All vessel operators agree the Hero class vessels require stabilizers in all area of operation," Wyse wrote. "Program operations can suffer [due] to the fact that the vessels have extreme roll in high sea state conditions."

More than a year later, in May 2018, Wyse relayed an unidentified at-sea testimonial: "I'm rolling 15 degrees port and starboard (30 degrees total) out here today and the winds are less than 10 knots and seas are less than one metre. We need to make this platform more workable."

Those concerns were echoed by Sgt. Hector Chaisson of the RCMP Marine Security Enforcement Teams who, in September 2017, wrote "greater stability of the ship would be appreciated by the entire crew and would avoid repeated seasickness."

Fred Emeneau, commanding officer of the CCGS G. Peddle, was more blunt in his assessment.

"All I know is something needs to be done," he said. "They want us to patrol through the nights whenever possible. The crews are getting fatigued trying to achieve this in North Atlantic conditions in the winter. Most 45-foot [13.7-metre] fishing boats we work around are wider than the [mid-shore patrol vessels]."

In the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Francois Lamoutee, commander of the CCGS Caporal Kaeble emailed on August 2018 with his opinion.

"By the way stabilizers should never have been removed from the original design. Please put them back ASAP. Losing a few cubic metres of fuel space will be a minor factor compared to the huge gain in stability, safety and comfort for the crew."

The issue of excessive rolling isn't limited to expeditions at sea.

Steve Arniel, commanding officer of the CCGS Constable Carrière on the Great Lakes, emailed in June 2018, saying, "This ship rocks like crazy tied to the dock!"

In the 2016-17 season, the Nova Scotia-based CCGS Corporal McLaren lost 44 per cent of ship time allotted to fisheries patrols — 112 of 252 days — because the vessel could not sail due to weather, according to its commanding officer.

Greg Naugle reported that "87 days of those weather days were in seas less than three metres, which is inside the TSOR [technical statement of operational requirements] operational envelope." The year before, 107 days were lost when seas were under three metres, he said.

It said the CCGS G. Peddle had 96 weather delay days out of a planned 302 operational days, while the Corporal McLaren had 97 weather delay days out of 309 planned operational days. It did not say how many weather delay days involved seas under three metres.

But Michael Grace, a DFO Maritimes offshore surveillance supervisor, wrote in that report there are "several examples" of a mid-shore patrol vessel staying in port due to weather "while significant on-water activity is taking place offshore."

All of the people forced to be aboard these vessels hate them and they are not fit for their purpose, besides being small and cramped as well as the issues expressed above. Forcing these vessels to do even more patrols in their current state is only going to burn out the fleet personnel and cause morale issues.

Fundamentally I feel like the premature retirement of the Kingston class is a mistake for the operational requirements of the RCN, as we have no real replacement to bridge the gap between whatever is procured next.

 

[Apophenia]

I have supreme doubts that the CCG will take over coastal patrol duties given their union backed aversion to militarized duties, doubly so when the MSPV's are very poorly suited to these missions. The vessels of the class were not fitted with stabilizer fins and subsequently have shown seakeeping so poor that it constantly makes the RCMP, DFO and CCG personnel aboard very ill...

Agreed. I put it out there are an "opportunity to dump" a largely unwanted role. I was in no way voicing support for any hypothetical move towards MSPVs. (Even without the CCG's cultural 'issues', the MSPVs' complement would be woefully undersized ... even without half of the crew puking over the gunnels at any given time.)

... Fundamentally I feel like the premature retirement of the Kingston class is a mistake for the operational requirements of the RCN, as we have no real replacement to bridge the gap between whatever is procured next.

Again, totally agree. And obviously, that "gap" includes both coastal patrol and MCM.

I see musings on the notion of sharing a hull between a new CDC and some form of MCM 'mothership'. I have my doubts about such a pairing but would be interested to hear your take on this shared hull concept.

 

[Jedpc]

Just discovered this very interesting forum / discussion. Unfortunately Canadian maritime strategy and the RCN appear to be an absolute mess.

1. Halifax well over due replacement, old and maintenance heavy
2. River Class are the most under armed variant of T26 design, with ridiculously low number of VLS cells for an alleged “multi-role” version of an ASW centric design with added air defence role to have a single class - let’s hope more cells fitted later when defence budget actually increases?
3. Retiring Kingston early all about saving money
4. AOPS are barely “warships” and when used outside of the Arctic as GP OPV, could not defend themselves from UAV / USV launched by non-state actors
5. Continental Defences Corvette seems as confused in its requirements as the Rivers, I can see how they can add mass to the ocean going ASW / ASuW capabilities with SAM’s for self defence, but then who / what is acting as MCM mothership for deploying the THALES MCM USV’s?
6. Coast Guard is not in any way contributing to military roles / missions, beyond perhaps a common surface picture, putting them under DND is slight of hand to make NATO spending commitment targets only
7. Cyclone is a disaster, Topshee agrees, but what to do about it?
8. Arctic basing / fuel depo options remain a disaster
9. If we don’t bite off Koreas hand on the KSS-III offer and all the industrial cooperation involved ….. then we are really doomed :-(
10. National ship building strategy - are the Canadian jobs worth the massive expensive to the Canadian tax payer?

 

[Rainbow1910]

Again, totally agree. And obviously, that "gap" includes both coastal patrol and MCM.

I see musings on the notion of sharing a hull between a new CDC and some form of MCM 'mothership'. I have my doubts about such a pairing but would be interested to hear your take on this shared hull concept.

The problem with this shared hull concept specifically regarding the CDC is that the more the aforementioned vessel turns into a flat out combatant, the less suitable its hull form is to being retrofitted into a MCM mothership or other vessel. Once you get to the point of making so many modifications to the design to make it work for that other role, you are approaching the point where you are better off sticking with a separate design which is designed from the start for such a role.

If the RCN wants an MCM mothership, they might be better off purchasing something like the City class mine warfare vessel or adapting an existing civilian hull like the RN did with HMS Stirling Castle.

 

[Owens Z]

I have supreme doubts that the CCG will take over coastal patrol duties given their union backed aversion to militarized duties, doubly so when the MSPV's are very poorly suited to these missions. The vessels of the class were not fitted with stabilizer fins and subsequently have shown seakeeping so poor that it constantly makes the RCMP, DFO and CCG personnel aboard very ill...
All of the people forced to be aboard these vessels hate them and they are not fit for their purpose, besides being small and cramped as well as the issues expressed above. Forcing these vessels to do even more patrols in their current state is only going to burn out the fleet personnel and cause morale issues...

Agreed. I put it out there are an "opportunity to dump" a largely unwanted role. I was in no way voicing support for any hypothetical move towards MSPVs. (Even without the CCG's cultural 'issues', the MSPVs' complement would be woefully undersized ... even without half of the crew puking over the gunnels at any given time.)

I too don't foresee Canadian Coast Guard personnel being given police powers and CCG ships becoming at least minimally armed, for what seem to an outsider like me to be good reasons. I find that the MSPVs (Mid-Shore Patrol Vessels) you refer to are the nine 'Hero'-class boats for the CCG, built in Halifax to a Dutch design. Adding a deck gun to the Heros, and training gun crews (as the US Coast Guard does for its similar-sized Sentinel-class cutters), would be a serious difference in kind from the CCG's customary practice of having a Mountie/fishery officer with a handgun aboard from time to time. Unlikely. And yet the maritime constabulary role is necessary to have a country at all.

Because of too-cramped size and being terrible rollers, the Heros are "hated" in service, eh?

 

[Owens Z]

...The Continental Defence Corvette is an evolution from the vaguer Canadian Multi-Purpose Corvette/Canadian Multi-mission Corvette Project. (Besides, without such multiple rebrandings, the CMC/CMPC/CDC would not be recognisable as a Canadian defence procurement project!) To some degree, VAdm Topshee is also putting a personal stamp on the CMC as was.
I seem to recall some mention of minimal 'ice tolerance' for the CMC (fitting in with Vard's design heritage) but the CDC hull is to be Polar Class 6. So, Summer/Autumn ops in 0.7 to 1.2 metre of first-year ice (with older ice inclusions). The goal, according to VAdm Topshee is for the corvettes to be able to "rip about at speed near ice". The CDC is also to be capable of ASuW, ASW, and LAAD. These corvettes are no direct MCDV replacement.
There's plenty of room for arguing the must-haves versus nice-options for the future corvettes. But, if you can ignore the Biz-Admin-speak approach often taken by the Vice Admiral, Angus Topshee is usually making sense. The trick for future RCN corvettes will be avoiding mission/design creep in one direction (which has already begun) whilst avoiding CDC programme slashings to paper-over the inevitable cost overruns of the River class destroyers.

...Fundamentally I feel like the premature retirement of the Kingston class is a mistake for the operational requirements of the RCN, as we have no real replacement to bridge the gap between whatever is procured next.

Again, totally agree. And obviously, that "gap" includes both coastal patrol and MCM. I see musings on the notion of sharing a hull between a new CDC and some form of MCM 'mothership'. I have my doubts about such a pairing but would be interested to hear your take on this shared hull concept.

This is interesting; thank you. Any new illustrations or stats about the Royal Canadian Navy's future corvettes after Vice-Admiral Topshee put his personal stamp on this program? I understand avoiding design creep, but also important is to build a right-sized warship in the first place. As you both saw, there was wide disbelief earlier in this thread that Captain Graham could fit a worthwhile corvette, which he himself said must be "much more" than a Kingston, into Ottawa's political/technical limit of 1000-metric-ton light displacement. And if most of the Kingstons are already retired and the rest are on their way out, while the first new corvette won't be in service for another decade, then this opening gap does sound like bad news for Canada's naval power. Zodiacs can't do the job of the Kingstons—and the Kingstons were already considered by Canadians to be disappointingly limited.

That the new corvettes will indeed be designed to operate in Canada's extensive arctic waters (i.e. have at least a minimal Polar Class rating) seems very wise, as I had advocated earlier.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Adding a deck gun to the Heros, and training gun crews (as the US Coast Guard does for its similar-sized Sentinel-class cutters), would be a serious difference in kind from the CCG's customary practice of having a Mountie/fishery officer with a handgun aboard from time to time. Unlikely. And yet the maritime constabulary role is necessary to have a country at all.

And that is where my mind is breaking.

What I'm reading is that Canada doesn't have any maritime constabulary. Which means they have no way to prevent someone from coming into their waters and stealing fish or dumping waste and messing up the place.

 

[Rainbow1910]

And that is where my mind is breaking.

What I'm reading is that Canada doesn't have any maritime constabulary. Which means they have no way to prevent someone from coming into their waters and stealing fish or dumping waste and messing up the place.

Canada has maritime constabulary forces present across the country, RCMP and Fishery Officers act as the frontline staff with the RCN, RCAF, Transport Canada and CCG being utilized to find lawbreakers and deliver the aforementioned law enforcement units to them. Canada has plenty of mechanisms to prevent and punish the very things you are talking about, to the point we are partnering with nations like Japan to do fisheries enforcements abroad into the Pacific.

 

[Apophenia]

Just discovered this very interesting forum / discussion. Unfortunately Canadian maritime strategy and the RCN appear to be an absolute mess.
[...]

Welcome aboard @Jedpc. FWIW, my take on your comments ...

1. The Rivers have, de facto become the Halifax replacements.

2. Agreed. Less sure about hopes of "more cells fitted later". Sure, the baking process is on-going, but have there been any suggestion of 'fitted for but not with' more VLS? [1]

3. How much is really being saved by retiring the Kingston early?

4. I'll see your under-armed AOPS and raise you a 'barely 2 knots faster than the MCDV'

5. What little has been released (or even decided yet?) about the Continental Defence Corvettes suggests moves to clarify its requirement. Shedding MCM makes sense in helping to focus the CDC's core roles. But, as you say, what then become the mothership (in the absence of the albeit inadequate MCDVs).

6. Almost all of our European NATO allies pad out defence spending claims with constabulary work. One man's 'sleight of hand' is another's 'dexterity'. That said, there is no evidence yet that the GoC intends to claim CCG assets or operations as military expenses.

7. Nothing to do about it ... short of dumping Cyclone and replace them with smaller, better-proven helicopters. [1] A stupid move? Maybe but 'stupid' has been a big part of the MHP since when it was NSA and SKR before that.

8. Speaking of 'sleight of hand' ...

9. No comment.

10. On the National Shipbuilding Strategy, you pose a political question that was answered 15 years ago. You might argue that the original NSPS should have been opposed politically ... but it wasn't.

Going back to the Kingston class, I fully accept that these MCDVs have always been mediocre. And anyone who has owned a 30-year-old 'beater' already knows that they will nickel-and-dime you to death. So, how did we get here?

A decade ago, the executive plan was to retain (and prepare an extensive mid-life for) the Kingstons. The first 2 x components of the rationale was for NAVRES "to train and prepare reservist to supplement the Regular Force" at the strategic level. NAVRES was also to be fully integrated into RCN Force Generation processes at an operational level.

Does any of the above still hold? I would suggest not - @Rainbow1910 having said that the MCDVs have played no part in training for some time. In changeable times, there is always a danger of ceaselessly changing plans without achieving culmination on any of them.

______________________________

[1] To throw a cat amongst the pigeons, I would also ask how NDHQ staffers how they sees their River class armament (and supplier) choices in light of PMO announcements that CA will no longer spend 70-75% of its defence procurement budget in the US? Assuming that is not just rhetoric, perhaps we should be talking not just about "more cells" but also 'different cells'?

[2] As MND, Peter MacKay had the perfect opportunity to dump the CH-148 and probably sue Sikorsky for its repeated breaches of contract. He chose, instead, to avoid personal and party embarrassment by turning a blind eye.

 

[Jedpc]

Thanks for the welcome. Ex-RN, Canadian for 18 years



I did laugh at your point about dexterity versus sleight of hand Good point well made, I presume that all of NATO does it, yes, but I think the move of CCG to DND absolutely proves we intend to the fiddle the books on that one. This is not necessarily a bad thing - can we restart the debate about arming at least some classes of CCG vessels with something more appropriate than small arms? I know, its been done before, the world has changed, continues to change and the ability of non-state actors to deploy drones (air and surface) from an innocent looking merchant ship means "C-UAS / C-USV" makes its way to the CCG, whether they and their union likes it or not.



Meanwhile if we have given up both the MCM and reservist training roles of the Kingston class in order the that the notional CDC becomes a more "fighty" tier 2 surface combatant - then do CCG ships have a role in deploying remote MCM USV and UUV to where they are needed?



Now, as to your footnote 1. The overwhelming response seems to be "OMG we can do nothing to delay the Rivers, so suck it up". I think far to many senior people in the service chief's hierarchy, and DND have never read the Project 2025, and maybe think if Trump is replaced by elections, or dies of old age, everything goes back to the old normal. I think that is delusional and ignoring the geopolitical reality. Would changing the Rivers be expensive? Yep, sure. However, that does not unfortunately mean it is not the right and sensible thing to do. Is there a Euro equivalent to AEGIS? Hmmm not really, but Thales SeaFire with Aster 30 would be pretty good capability, including BMD. I think people are frightened of breaking existing contracts, which is fair, but sometime national security and the broader national interest, er ... trumps cost....?



On the actual VLS, that is more difficult. MBDA have said they will quad pack CAMM in the Sylver, if a customer asks (in other words if a customer pays for it). Meanwhile, all US missiles, a lot of Japanese and Korean, and most of MBDA's (Aster, CAMM family, new cruise missiles etc) all fit in the LM MK41. We do seem to be cosying up to S.Korea and Hanwha... KVLS and K-SAM family...????



Personally, I dont think my "fantasy fleet" is overly crazy - the first 9 Rivers dialed back to be identical ASW specialists to RN and RNoN T26, with BAE Artisan (or Artisan NG given our build times) but Canadian sonars etc, and the final 6 Rivers the AD variant with more VLS in the place of the multi-mission bay, Thales SeaFire, and Aster30 NT Block1. No AEGIS, but probably still MK41, but no US missiles.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Just discovered this very interesting forum / discussion. Unfortunately Canadian maritime strategy and the RCN appear to be an absolute mess.

1. Halifax well over due replacement, old and maintenance heavy
2. River Class are the most under armed variant of T26 design, with ridiculously low number of VLS cells for an alleged “multi-role” version of an ASW centric design with added air defence role to have a single class - let’s hope more cells fitted later when defence budget actually increases?
3. Retiring Kingston early all about saving money
4. AOPS are barely “warships” and when used outside of the Arctic as GP OPV, could not defend themselves from UAV / USV launched by non-state actors
5. Continental Defences Corvette seems as confused in its requirements as the Rivers, I can see how they can add mass to the ocean going ASW / ASuW capabilities with SAM’s for self defence, but then who / what is acting as MCM mothership for deploying the THALES MCM USV’s?
6. Coast Guard is not in any way contributing to military roles / missions, beyond perhaps a common surface picture, putting them under DND is slight of hand to make NATO spending commitment targets only
7. Cyclone is a disaster, Topshee agrees, but what to do about it?
8. Arctic basing / fuel depo options remain a disaster
9. If we don’t bite off Koreas hand on the KSS-III offer and all the industrial cooperation involved ….. then we are really doomed :-(
10. National ship building strategy - are the Canadian jobs worth the massive expensive to the Canadian tax payer?

1.) Not really much we can do at this point, previous governments have kicked the can down the road to such a degree that we have to basically take our medicine and try to deal with our situation the best we can.

2.) I think saying the River class is "the most under armed Type 26 variant with ridiculously low number of VLS cells" is unfair and overly dismissive of the Canadian variant. While the base model Type 26 has a large number of CAMM aboard, these missiles are relatively low capability with regard to range and threat envelopes compared to the RAM-ESSM-SM2 loadout planned for the River class. That isn't even considering the potential for SM-6 that can easily be backfitted onto the River class due to the presence of a far more capable radar and CMS in a full AEGIS suite. While it has less missiles in pure terms, the River variant more capable than the base model in many aspects and better balanced than the troublesome Hunter variant as well. There is plans to add more cells in later batches, but 24 is a more than workable baseline. If it had like 16, I think the comments would be warranted.

3.) Silly idea, I am in agreement.

4.) AOPS aren't combatants and trying to overly outfit them as such is a lost cause. I would not be against retrofitting some additional systems to help protect against UAV/USV threats however, this has to be balanced with the fact their primary purpose is Northern use. This complicates development as there is very few Arctic rated drone defence systems in existence. There has been some talks about fitting systems like this, but it is not a priority considering the risk levels of the areas AOPS sees deployment to at this time.

5.) Nobody knows, MCM work has seemingly been left on the wayside by the RCN leadership in exchange for a second line combatant.

6.) This is not a slight of hand as NATO requires very strict requirements for something like a Coast Guard to actually count towards defence spending, meaning we cannot play the system in NATO's eyes by doing this. We can do it for our own budget books, but our allies see right through that facade. The placement under DND is largely to permit the planned information sharing between CCG and Military through new CCG vessel radars, datalinks and data management systems alongside consolidating authority.

7.) Cyclone is a mess but the RCAF has its hands full elsewhere, likely no bandwidth in the procurement system to replace it at this point quickly or efficiently.

8.) No way to really get around this, any infrastructure projects in the Arctic are going to be incredibly expensive, time consuming and ultimately vulnerable to environmental changes as time goes on.

9.) Don't be surprised if the PM's influence pushes Canada towards Germany with the goal of further EU cooperation.

10.) The answer has been given decades ago, it is far more palatable to politicians and the public to spend substantial sums of money when citizens and the domestic economy reap the benefits largely. With so much time, effort and money sunk into building the industry to where it is now, it is nonsensical to talk about walking away from the whole endeavor right now.

Going back to the Kingston class, I fully accept that these MCDVs have always been mediocre. And anyone who has owned a 30-year-old 'beater' already knows that they will nickel-and-dime you to death. So, how did we get here?

A decade ago, the executive plan was to retain (and prepare an extensive mid-life for) the Kingstons. The first 2 x components of the rationale was for NAVRES "to train and prepare reservist to supplement the Regular Force" at the strategic level. NAVRES was also to be fully integrated into RCN Force Generation processes at an operational level.

Does any of the above still hold? I would suggest not - @Rainbow1910 having said that the MCDVs have played no part in training for some time. In changeable times, there is always a danger of ceaselessly changing plans without achieving culmination on any of them.

The Kingston's did do valuable training work, but my point was they were not dedicated training ships as per part of their original purpose. Basically every ship in the RCN has extra bunks aboard for training purposes, and the Kingston's were the most cost effective, ocean capable training platform the RCN has had in recent memory.

I did laugh at your point about dexterity versus sleight of hand Good point well made, I presume that all of NATO does it, yes, but I think the move of CCG to DND absolutely proves we intend to the fiddle the books on that one. This is not necessarily a bad thing - can we restart the debate about arming at least some classes of CCG vessels with something more appropriate than small arms? I know, its been done before, the world has changed, continues to change and the ability of non-state actors to deploy drones (air and surface) from an innocent looking merchant ship means "C-UAS / C-USV" makes its way to the CCG, whether they and their union likes it or not.

As I have stated before, I do not think it is a battle worth fighting for DND. There is a substantial number of very important CCG staff members in positions of power and throughout the fleet that are diametrically opposed to being an armed service, to the point you are looking at potentially a major disruption of service from either a work refusal or a widescale quitting trend. The CCG being civilian vessels and not engaging in work against non-state actors abroad largely means that counter drone systems are not especially important to them, and this trend seems unlikely to change going forward. For what DND may gain from this entire process, they'll have to step through an absolute minefield and attempt to change the engrained culture of an organization that they recently brought under their wing.

Meanwhile if we have given up both the MCM and reservist training roles of the Kingston class in order the that the notional CDC becomes a more "fighty" tier 2 surface combatant - then do CCG ships have a role in deploying remote MCM USV and UUV to where they are needed?

If you think that the CCG staff would be unhappy with being armed for constabulary work, handing them drones and sensors before telling them to go do MCM work would be nothing short of apocalyptic. About the only way to get away with such a thing would be wartime conditions, which is its own separate can of worms.

Now, as to your footnote 1. The overwhelming response seems to be "OMG we can do nothing to delay the Rivers, so suck it up". I think far to many senior people in the service chief's hierarchy, and DND have never read the Project 2025, and maybe think if Trump is replaced by elections, or dies of old age, everything goes back to the old normal. I think that is delusional and ignoring the geopolitical reality. Would changing the Rivers be expensive? Yep, sure. However, that does not unfortunately mean it is not the right and sensible thing to do. Is there a Euro equivalent to AEGIS? Hmmm not really, but Thales SeaFire with Aster 30 would be pretty good capability, including BMD. I think people are frightened of breaking existing contracts, which is fair, but sometime national security and the broader national interest, er ... trumps cost....?

I think changing the River class yet again at this point in the process would be a bad idea, hence why cooler heads within DND have prevailed and not fallen to political fears. We have existing contracts signed, suppliers set, sub-contractors tendered and even some equipment already procured, further delaying the entire process when the Halifax class are hanging on for dear life seems like a bad idea to me. For all of Trump's bluster, Canada will remain operating US systems and remaining interoperable with the US military for decades to come. Throwing this all away due to the current state of things is not smart policy and will likely only enrage the US further. European systems aren't going to help us be more interoperable with the US, which is one of the major goals for the program. Canada has had previous problems trying to integrate a jumble of European systems with American counterparts on prior vessels, and seems to want to avoid that this time around.

On the actual VLS, that is more difficult. MBDA have said they will quad pack CAMM in the Sylver, if a customer asks (in other words if a customer pays for it). Meanwhile, all US missiles, a lot of Japanese and Korean, and most of MBDA's (Aster, CAMM family, new cruise missiles etc) all fit in the LM MK41. We do seem to be cosying up to S.Korea and Hanwha... KVLS and K-SAM family...????

Personally, I dont think my "fantasy fleet" is overly crazy - the first 9 Rivers dialed back to be identical ASW specialists to RN and RNoN T26, with BAE Artisan (or Artisan NG given our build times) but Canadian sonars etc, and the final 6 Rivers the AD variant with more VLS in the place of the multi-mission bay, Thales SeaFire, and Aster30 NT Block1. No AEGIS, but probably still MK41, but no US missiles.

Nobody particularly wants Sylver outside of those who have a hand in producing it, as its footprint and missile availability is inferior to what Mark 41 offers across the board. The RCN does not want CAMM and was fighting against its inclusion previously, the return to RAM is what they wanted since effectively Day 1. Given that we are a major member of the ESSM consortium, not having those missiles aboard our modern combatant is a dealbreaker. While I like some Korean systems, I do not extend that to the various Korean missile and launch systems over the Mark 41 and its contemporaries.

The RCN specifically wished to avoid this "split fleet" from the very inception of the current program, to the point that the original River class program was referred to as the "Single Class Surface Combatant Project". There was a distinct want to have a single, homogenous class of warships to avoid the logistical, operational and training pitfalls which operating multiple variants or types of vessel inevitably lead to. Look at the Royal Navy for example and the availability of their air warfare Type 45 destroyers, that isn't a problem for the RCN when every single one of their combatants is interchangeable with one another.

The base model Type 26 is unfit for Canadian requirements and would not be acceptable, with regard to the radar suite and weapons present. The removal of the multi-mission bay for an air defence variant is also not acceptable to the Navy at this time, who views the space and overall system as a major hedge towards unmanned system operation in the future. Trading off AEGIS and the American missile suite for European counterparts is also a non-starter, as the RCN does not want these systems and they do not fit the use purposes we see for the class. The River class radar and CMS are potent but they are not suitable to base an AAW destroyer upon, it would be too many cells and not enough of a sensor system to make best use of them.

Allowing reactionary, knee-jerk decisions due to political issues to seriously delay and change such a long overdue and much needed combatant procurement is not something I want to see happen. We really do need to stay the course and not get sidetracked in even more destructive changes to such a vital program.

 

[Apophenia]

...
The Kingston's did do valuable training work, but my point was they were not dedicated training ships as per part of their original purpose. Basically every ship in the RCN has extra bunks aboard for training purposes, and the Kingston's were the most cost effective, ocean capable training platform the RCN has had in recent memory...

Agreed, the MCDVs were never intended to be "dedicated training ships". My point was that they were seen as an integral part of that 2013 executive plan as related to NAVRES. That was a rather different notion to "extra bunks aboard".

... cooler heads within DND have prevailed and not fallen to political fears... Canada will remain operating US systems and remaining interoperable with the US military for decades to come. Throwing this all away due to the current state of things is not smart policy...

I admire your confidence.

Policy can be defined as a statement of intent. That simple definition points towards the future, not to the past.

Politics is what happens to militaries which are ill-prepared for policy. In the past, Cabinets and Prime Ministers have been challenged by RCN/Maritime Staff sticking to their own, internal policy goals. Usually, that didn't end well for the funding of NDHQ's procurement preferences.

But refusing to accept current political realities is always an option for procurement. NDHQ and the RCN can stick to their US supplier preferences in defiance of PMO objectives. They might get lucky ...

 

[DWG]

2.) I think saying the River class is "the most under armed Type 26 variant with ridiculously low number of VLS cells" is unfair and overly dismissive of the Canadian variant. While the base model Type 26 has a large number of CAMM aboard, these missiles are relatively low capability with regard to range and threat envelopes compared to the RAM-ESSM-SM2 loadout planned for the River class.

Remember that the original proposal was SM2+ESSM+CAMM, the current configuration with RAM vice CAMM being a clear down-grade (CAMM being Mach 3 vs Mach 2 and having nearly triple the range vs RAM).

MBDA Confirms Sea Ceptor Order for Canadian Surface Combatant - Naval News

MBDA has been awarded a contract by Lockheed Martin Canada to equip the Royal Canadian Navy's new Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) with the Sea Ceptor air defence weapon system.

www.navalnews.com

Each navy clearly has their own preferred concept of operations, but at the end of the day Type 26 has 24 Mk 41 cells for non-self-defence use, while the Rivers probably have only 12.

 

[Rainbow1910]

Remember that the original proposal was SM2+ESSM+CAMM, the current configuration with RAM vice CAMM being a clear down-grade (CAMM being Mach 3 vs Mach 2 and having nearly triple the range vs RAM).

MBDA Confirms Sea Ceptor Order for Canadian Surface Combatant - Naval News

MBDA has been awarded a contract by Lockheed Martin Canada to equip the Royal Canadian Navy's new Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) with the Sea Ceptor air defence weapon system.

www.navalnews.com

Each navy clearly has their own preferred concept of operations, but at the end of the day Type 26 has 24 Mk 41 cells for non-self-defence use, while the Rivers probably have only 12.

The original, original proposal was actually ESSM + SM2 + RAM and you can see early models showing this. Sometime after the Type 26 won the CSC program bid, there was concerns in govt regarding too many design alterations from the base. Due to this, RAM was pushed out in order to move back to CAMM as that missile system was already integrated into the base design, although they are using ExLS cells instead of the British purpose built mushroom cells. Later again when the systems integration was ongoing, concerns were raised about integration of CAMM with AEGIS and the Canadian Tactical Interface. Since RAM is already integrated into AEGIS, CAMM was dropped and RAM was re-adopted in an known layout (21 or 42 missiles in 1 or 2 Mark 49 launchers). The RCN always wanted RAM over CAMM due to interoperability/development/logistics with the Americans and cost concerns with CAMM. RAM and CAMM were never both present in the design at the same time. They’ve been trading places back and forth as time has went on.

If the current design ends up with two Mark 49 launchers, I'd personally say its an advantage over CAMM with double the missile load for close in self defence that can also be easily reloaded at sea. If its only one launcher or say a pair of SeaRAM launchers, I think the 24 CAMM is superior.

The base model Type 26 relies entirely on its 48 CAMM alongside a much lesser radar and CMS compared to the River class, which brings a much more capable missile loadout to bear with ESSM, SM-2 and potentially more in the future. Type 26 is constrained inherently in what missiles it can effectively operate in the future due to Artisan holding the platform back, something which is not a problem with SPY-7 aboard the River class. There is no plans as far as I know to fit any other missiles for air defence aboard the base Type 26, with the Mark 41 being exclusively for strike.

 

[DWG]

Later again when the systems integration was ongoing, concerns were raised about integration of CAMM with AEGIS and the Canadian Tactical Interface.

And yet there don't seem to have been any issues reported with integrating CAMM into COMBATSS-21 (which uses the Aegis software library) on the Saudi MMSCs.

The base model Type 26 relies entirely on its 48 CAMM alongside a much lesser radar and CMS compared to the River class.

Type 26 is a dedicated ASW frigate, arguing it's somehow lesser by not being an area AAW platform is missing the point. We have Type 45 for that. And Type 31 for GP, as opposed to requiring the Rivers to be a jack-of-all trades. And if Aegis/CTI can't handle a missile designed for simple integration, is it really a superior CMS?

 

[Jedpc]

The base model Type 26 relies entirely on its 48 CAMM alongside a much lesser radar and CMS compared to the River class, which brings a much more capable missile loadout to bear with ESSM, SM-2 and potentially more in the future. Type 26 is constrained inherently in what missiles it can effectively operate in the future due to Artisan holding the platform back, something which is not a problem with SPY-7 aboard the River class. There is no plans as far as I know to fit any other missiles for air defence aboard the base Type 26, with the Mark 41 being exclusively for strike.

The T26 for RN and Norway is an ASW specialist, with secondary ASuW and LmdmAttack capabilities. 48 CAMM capable of local area dnd point defence are thus fine.

The River is a “multirole” design that had been specifically equipped with an SPY radar and AEGIS. Thus it is far more AAW centric (inc. BMD) than the baseline design. Removing the RAM PDMS from the equation, and relying on NSM for both anti-ship and land attack, this gives us the least cells of any allied or threat equivalent:

• USN Arleigh Burke - 96 mk41
• RN T45 - 48 Sylver for Aster 30 (plus 24 CAMM to be fitted)
• French and Italian Horizon - 48 Sylver
• Spain F100 - 48 mk41
• Australia F100 / Hobart - 48 mk41
• Japan - Kongo 90 mk41, Atago 96 mk41
• ROK - Sejong the Great - total 88 cells of mk41 and K-VLS
• PLAN Type 055 - 112 main VLS, 24 VLS for PDMS

So yes, 24 cells on an air defence ship is bizarre penny pinching. Yes, we can quad pack ESSM, which absolutely improves the magazine depth to a max of 96 missiles, but if that’s the load out, we don’t need the expense of SPY/AEGIS suite. To max out the capabilities of the sensors and CMS requires SM2-ER block III or IV, SM3 or SM6, very expensive missiles, but as recent experience against Houthis, and USN BMD over Israel has shown, magazines depth is an issue.