Battle of France and RAF light bomber choices.

[T. A. Gardner]

The French were on the right path with planes like the Potez 630 and Breguet 693. These had the potential to make good ground attack planes. They carried a reasonable bombload, and both could be fitted with a mix of 20mm and 7.5mm guns. Coming in at very low level, they could use time delay fuzed bombs and be effective against a defended target.

The Potez was terribly underpowered (it had the wrong, old brand of radials 14 cylinders with only 700 hp each) slow, and as such a death trap for its crews in any role - fighter, bomber, or reconnaissance.

There were kind of three generations of 14 cylinder radials (from G&R but also from Hispano Suiza) - 700 hp, 1100 hp, and 1600 hp. Unfortunately the oldest generation was by far the most available.

Hispano-Suiza 14AB - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Gnome-Rhône 14M - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

----

Gnome-Rhône 14N - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Hispano-Suiza 14AA - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

----

SNECMA 14R - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

----

The Breguet was much better but still too fragile, and still with those wrong engines.

The bomber variant of the MB-174 (the MB-175) had powerful enough 14N with 1080 hp each. They flew 60 miles faster than the Potez for the same mission of reconnaissance - with 800 hp + is it hardly surprising.

The seventh Breguet 691 finally got those more powerful engines and become the 697, and then the 700.
Now THAT could have been interesting: a mix of Breguet 700 and MB.175. Unfortunately both flew in the winter of 1939... way, way too late. A rather large number of MB.175s were near completion at the end of June 1940.

Potez never put 14N on their 630 or 670 series AFAIK.

The next step would be the 14R with nearly 1600 hp... if it can made work, of course
(hint: it couldn't: neither in 1939 nor in 1942 nor in 1946. Gnome&Rhone was marred by severe issues including greed and corruption - guess why SNECMA was created in 1946 and publically owned ? some big bosses of French aviation before the world were corrupt pigs and morons)

Bre 697 Intended as a pre-prototype for the Bréguet 700 C2 heavy fighter. Powered by Gnome-Rhône 14N-48/Gnome-Rhône 14N-49 engines which offered 50% more power than the 14M, the Bre 697 prototype displayed a sensational rate of climb, and was as fast as a Bf 109E. The Bre 700 was expected to offer even higher speed and would have been very heavily armed.

My point is that these aircraft were on the right path to being successful, even if as designed they had drawbacks. A single engine light bomber like the Battle was the wrong way to go.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The Skua was more of a glide bomber than a true dive bomber. That is, it entered a relatively shallow dive to approach the target and then deliver its payload. It would be the worse of two worlds. In the attack, it would be in a shallow dive making it a perfect target for defending flak

How do you define “a true dive bomber”? Anything over 45 degrees is generally considered dive bombing.

Eric Brown tested the Skua during WW2 in 70 degree dives which was considered normal for the aircraft. Other tests pre war recorded something like an average 78 degrees. It was equipped with dive flaps and a bomb crutch to ensure its 500lb underfuselage bomb cleared the prop.

For the USN the SBD Dauntless dived at 70-75 degrees and the SB2C Helldiver at 75-80 degrees.

For the Japanese the tactics with the D3A Val called for 70 degree final dives.

It was only aircraft like the Stuka and Vultee Vengeance that were designed for 90 degree dives.

So please explain why the Skua doesn’t qualify if all these others do?

Edit:- now found what I was looking for. From Peter Smith’s “Skua! The Royal Navy’s Dive Bomber” on the Konigsberg sinking:-

“While Church’s second attack was the shallowest approach [40 degrees is noted in the previous paragraph] , and most of the Skuas went in at a 60 degree angle, several attacked at 70 degrees and a few aircraft dived at a 50 degree angle.”

Okay. Then it was a dive bomber, but not a fighter. The SBD in the early days of the Pacific war was used sometimes as a CAP fighter at low level--as at Coral Sea-- but quickly found to be completely useless in that role.

 

[EwenS]

That’s what happens when you have a limited number of aircraft as on a carrier and try to combine roles.

The Skua entered service in late 1938 by which time its fighter replacement, the Fulmar, had been designed and was flying in prototype form with production scheduled to start in Jan 1940. And the designs of the next generation were beginning.

Maybe if the RN had been able to fully control procurement for the FAA interwar, instead of from May 1939, things might have been very different.

 

[Avimimus]

Bombs would be carried in the wings (consistent with late 1930s British design practice).

The point I was really driving at is that the gondola framing appears to carry the entire load of the aircraft on landing.

Hmm... well, in my head I actually had vertically mounted landing gear coming down from the wings (but the reinforcement struts for those would interfere with the bomb cellules - so it probably for the best). That said, at these low speeds (projected to be even lower than the Battle) fixed landing gear would make sense.

 

[Archibald]

No problem. I tend to digress the lengthy way when discussing interbellum French combat aircraft, because they were plagued by so many lethal issues, it is kind of... morbidly fascinating. And very despairing, too. It was an extremely rotten house which collapse - with perfect hindsight - was quite unsurprising and also well deserved. Dear God. Never, ever start me on this.

 

[uk 75]

The Battle and Blenheim squadrons of the RAF that were sent to France did have Hurricane squadrons attached and could have been used more sensibly together with them. But the Germans have a lot of AA fire.

 

[Archibald]

The Battle and Blenheim squadrons of the RAF that were sent to France did have Hurricane squadrons attached and could have been used more sensibly together with them. But the Germans have a lot of AA fire.

As I said earlier, the British (unlike the French) had plenty enough light bombers to try mass attacks - only to be slaughtered in larger numbers.

Can't remember where, early in the campaign they send no less than 71 Battles to try and blow bridges, and took 40% or 50% losses to the flak.

One has to realize the Advanced Striking Force send by the British was a potent force in regard to the Armée de l'Air misery. They had tons of Hurricanes (as good as the D-520) and a crapton of light bombers (more than a hundred).

So through this force we have a glimpse at what could a better equiped Armée de l'Air could have accomplished
- Hurricanes are kind of D-520
- Battles and Blenheims are no worse than, say, Potez 63, Breguet 693 or MB-175
And there are many of them.
Alas, end result ? Massive losses for little. 135 bombers on May 10: 72 left three days later !

 

[tomo pauk]

Battles and Blenheims were the AA gunner's and fighter pilot's dream come true - big, slow and without protection for either crews or fuel tanks. Eg. Battle was bigger than the huge P-47; the area of the wing of the Battle was 2.5 times greater than of the Bf 109 that Germans were starting to bomb-up by the Summer of 1940.
So my suggestion is to make the light bombers as small as possible. 1-engined - certainly not bigger than Spitfire, 2-engined not bigger than Fw 187. Small size = lower drag = greater speed = profit; small size also means that engines chosen can be what ever is in mass production.
Attack profiles will also need re-hash. Either go tree-top, or go at 17-18 thousand of feet of altitude. Germans were using mostly 20mm, some 37mm, while mobile 88mm batteries were few and far between - the high altitude removes the 20 and 37mm from the equation. Dive bombing is a requirement in this case (Battle, for all its faults, was rated for dive bombing beyond 80 deg), just make sure to end the dive early enough, like the P-47s were doing in 1944, so the light Flak can't get you.
Conversely, going tree-top makes aiming at you a tricky business.
RAF and FAF will also need to re-invent fighter escort.

 

[Archibald]

Breget 693 with some twist
- 1100 hp G&R radials from MB-174 rather than Potez 63 700 hp
- 1000 ft to 2000 ft high, NOT tree tops
(as done in June 1940 after the slaughter)
- HS-404 guns but band-feeded: not 60 shell 25 kg drum.
In a few words: Breguet 700. Or MB-175.
Otherwise: Hawker Henley.

 

[Justo Miranda]

In my opinion, no Allied bomber would have managed to stop the Wehrmacht's advance in the circumstances in which it occurred. The problem was the slow reaction of the Allies that gave the Flak units enough time to firmly establish themselves and make a carnage among the attacking planes that were arriving in small numbers spaced in time.

 

[Archibald]

The Soviets had no choice and paid the price in blood: 36000 Shturmovik build, 11000 shot down: a 30% loss rate. Not that Stalin gave a rat about human losses.

 

[tomo pauk]

A 'proper' light bomber for the RAF migth've looked a lot like the Yokosuka D4Y Judy: a V12 engine in the nose, bomb bay behind the cooling system, and a small wing - three ingredients of a high cruising and max speed even when bombed-up. (wing area was size of Spitfire's)
On the modest power made by the Aichi copy of DB 601A, it went 330 mph, ie. faster than Hurricane I. Yes, no self-sealing tanks there, just like most of the aircraft in service in 1940. Dive-bombing capable.
RAF will not need the carrier-vessel particularities, obviously. Merlin in the nose. 80 mph faster than the Battle. Much smaller target for gunners trying to train their guns on it.

Or - something that is size & shape of Fw 187. Workable already with the pair of Kestrels (745 HP at 14500 ft, compared with Jumo 210G that gave 670 PS PS at 12000 ft). French version can be even better with HS 12Ys.
Or, the Whirlwind-equivalent with Kestrels. Minus the cannon, plus the space for extra crew member if needed.
Gloster F./37 with Merlins.
British equivalent of the IMAM Ro.57 (Mecury instead of A.74) and then of the Ro.58 (Merlin instead of DB-601A).

In my opinion, no Allied bomber would have managed to stop the Wehrmacht's advance in the circumstances in which it occurred. The problem was the slow reaction of the Allies that gave the Flak units enough time to firmly establish themselves and make a carnage among the attacking planes that were arriving in small numbers spaced in time.

Very true.
Allied poor showing in 1940 was a result of deeply-rooted flaws & faults. Plus, leaving the best part of RAF in the UK proper meant that air units that were present in the West (FAF, what was send by the RAF, plus Belgians and the Dutch) were badly outnumbered. Very high density of the Flak guns in May of 1940 was a bane to the Allied aerial counter-attack. In the same time, LW had far fewer Allied AAA to worry about.
Lack of performance and protection on the light bombers (not just on them) meant that flying into the wall of AA fire was the death sentence to the crews and aircraft, without much of return to the sacrifice.

 

[H_K]

So my suggestion is to make the light bombers as small as possible. 1-engined - certainly not bigger than Spitfire

As Archibald said, that sounds like the Hawker Henley. That's a popular "what-if" as an alternative to the hapless Battle!

Was capable of almost 300mph with 2x 250lb bombs in a small internal bomb bay, but could also carry 2x 500lb bombs underwing.

Hawker Henley target tug and dive-bomber.

www.dingeraviation.net

The Hawker Henley ; the Missed British Stuka? - Forgotten Aircraft - Military Matters

The Hawker Henley is an interesting “what if” aircraft. Used as a target tug, it was designed to be a dive bomber. Did the RAF miss out?

militarymatters.online

 

[tomo pauk]

As Archibald said, that sounds like the Hawker Henley. That's a popular "what-if" as an alternative to the hapless Battle!

Was capable of almost 300mph with 2x 250lb bombs in a small internal bomb bay, but could also carry 2x 500lb bombs underwing.

Battle was indeed hapless.
Henley would've been better - it was a smaller and probably lighter aircraft, thus it performed better on same engine. Wing area was 342 sq ft vs. 422 sq ft on the Battle. On the big P-47, wing area was 300 sq ft.

Thing with the Henley is that it tried to one-up the Hurricane in wing thickness - 20% vs. 19% thickness-to-chord i the root. No wonder, since it used the Hurricane's wing (257 sq ft) as base, with the thicker & bigger inner part. Increased area and T-t-C of the wing increases drag, that in return kills speed: Henley was ~20 mph slower than Hurricane I, that was already slower than Bf 110 and much slower than Bf 109.

Spitfire and Judy, with wing being both smaller and thinner, were the opposite of the two Hawkers. Less drag = greater speed. So I'd reiterate that aircraft going in the harm's way in 1940 need to be of modest size and well streamlined, in order to increase it's chances of both competing the mission and return to tell about it, despite the airspace contested by enemy fighters and AAA.

 

[Archibald]

Everybody tried to stop panzers (or their ennemies) with a "miracle plane".

This result in such different aircraft as

- Breguet 693 and MB-175 for the Armée de l'Air
- Battles and Blenheim for the RAF, early on
- Typhoon with rockets, later
- Il-2 for the Soviets
- P-47s for the Americans. A-26s. A-20s.
- and dive bombers, too: Stuka, V-156F...
- HS-129
None of these solution was optimal.

Light bombers were chopped to bits: attack bombers (MB-175, A-20s) remained vulnerable and too large targets; dive bombers were vulnerable targets; Il-2 while strongly armored, lost thousands; ground attack fighters were at least not too vulnerable but lacked punch and it wasn't their primary role.

There was no clear solution to the flak problem. Frack, even B-17s at 30 000 feet still fell to it.

I wonder if a single-engine, single-crew type with a huge powerful radial (to protect the crew) wouldn't be ideal.

But even R2800 wouldn't lift enough armor, P-47s still had too many losses.

R3350 maybe ? and there we get... the Skyraider, which did wonders in Korea and even in Vietnam. Also Algeria.

R4360 would result in the Mauler, but that one was a piece of junk.

I'm personally fond of the Douglas XB-42, hell of a flying machine. But off topic there.

 

[tomo pauk]

RAF and FAF were badly outnumbered by the LW. Add the numerous & capable light Flak arm (more than 9000 of 20 and 37mm AA pieces were at hand by early 1940 in LW hands, obviously not all were deployed near the frontline, but still) that was a complete surprise to them and result is there. Plus, aircraft per aircraft, LW have had the qualitative advantage above France and Low Countries. Add the strategical ... incapabilities of the Allied brass and result is what it was.

Panzers themselves were flimsy in 1940. Could've been taken out by 20mm cannons, let alone the 25 mm ATGs or 2pdr.

P-47 didn't have that many losses. They were used as dive bombers with success, dives starting above 15000 ft.

 

[Archibald]

France lacked the USSR depth and Il-2 numbers. 36000 vs...uh, some dozens Breguets... ugh.

Plus Generallissimo Maurice "advanced syphillis fried brains" Gamelin (I KID YOU NOT HERE) who made Caporetto's Cadorna looks like Clausewitz, as far as tactical intelligence is concerned (shudders).

But he had Daladier unabatted confiance.
"Weygand c'est un mur Gamelin un edredon."
"Weygand is a wall, Gamelin, a pillow"

ROTFL
PM Edouard Daladier ( also of Munich shame, what an inspired genius !) REALLY said that.

Poor 1939 France... and they say 2021 France is declining or doomed ??!!! try 1939 you morons. Now that was a truly doomed ships of fools- Crecy 1346, Azincourt 1415 : HERE WE GOOOO, AAAGAAAIN, right into the wall then into the abyss. Dear God. My poor grandparents that lived in that shithole...

Also 9th Army Charles Huntziger, standing right in the middle of Manstein Ardennes sickle cut... "rising star"among French HQ
( gaaasp !!) and an arrogant, complacent PRICK.

Who declared on MAY 7th 1940 "Meh, the Germans will never attack in my sector."

*May 7th, 1940*. Note the date. Such an inspired quote !!
For good measure he actually doubled down - from a similar quote in April. "Meh, the Germans will never attack there."
Frack.
That SOB ended as Petain's best friend in Vichy before his aircraft mercifully slammed into a mountain in November 1941. Good riddance.

 

[H_K]

P-47 didn't have that many losses. They were used as dive bombers with success, dives starting above 15000 ft.

So what was the best tactic for dive bombers to survive in 1940? Say if you were a Hawker Henley?

Would the following improve chances of survival? High altitude cruise at ~18,000+ft (Merlin engine’s critical altitude). Accelerate to 280-290+mph over enemy lines. If jumped from above by enemy fighters, steep dive to shake off pursuit. Otherwise stay above flak and steep dive on target. Then low altitude egress?

 

[tomo pauk]

P-47 didn't have that many losses. They were used as dive bombers with success, dives starting above 15000 ft.

So what was the best tactic for dive bombers to survive in 1940? Say if you were a Hawker Henley?

Would the following improve chances of survival? High altitude cruise at ~18,000+ft (Merlin engine’s critical altitude). Accelerate to 280-290+mph over enemy lines. If jumped from above by enemy fighters, steep dive to shake off pursuit. Otherwise stay above flak and steep dive on target. Then low altitude egress?

Agreed pretty much. Although I'd try to end the dive bombing run above 7000 ft, since the 20mm - predominant Flak in 1940 - can kill me under ~5000 ft.

 

[Tony Williams]

Everybody tried to stop panzers (or their ennemies) with a "miracle plane".

This result in such different aircraft as

- Breguet 693 and MB-175 for the Armée de l'Air
- Battles and Blenheim for the RAF, early on
- Typhoon with rockets, later
- Il-2 for the Soviets
- P-47s for the Americans. A-26s. A-20s.
- and dive bombers, too: Stuka, V-156F...
- HS-129
None of these solution was optimal.

My favourite for its sheer desperation - an emergency anti-invasion tank destroyer consisting of a Lysander with a pair of Hispanos braced by the undercarriage legs. At least one was made, and conversion kits sent to the Middle East IIRC, but I doubt that any saw combat.

 

[Justo Miranda]

The French had a better solution, but they lacked the imagination to develop it.

The Roussel R.30 was conceived as a private venture ‘Jockey Fighter’ in answer to the Programme technique A.23 (12 January 1937) that required a light fighter able to fly at 520 km/h. Construction of the prototype began at Courbevoie, flying for the first time equipped with a 690 hp Gnôme-Rhône 14 M7 engine in April 1939.

In August 1939 it was transferred to the Centre d’Essais du Matériel Aérien (C.E.M.A.) for official trials, as a result of which it was recommended to install a more powerful engine to better use its excellent flying performances. During the Battle of France, the airplane was armed with two 20 mm Oerlikon FFS cannons mounted in the wings and some tests were performed for the installation of a bomb rack under the fuselage.

In combat, the R.30 could have destroyed any Luftwaffe bomber thanks to its high fire power of 2 Kg/sec, 2.8 times that of the Bf 109 E-1. In ground attack mode it would have had more possibilities to survive the Flak than the unfortunate Breguet 693 of the GBA 54 due to its high speed and small size. The only prototype was destroyed in Bordeaux-Mérignac airbase during a He111 bomb raid.

Technical data

Engine: one 690 hp Gnôme-Rhône 14 M7 of fourteen-cylinder, air-cooled radial driving a Ratier 1527 airscrew with electrically adjusted pitch. Armament: two 20 mm Oerlikon FFS cannons and one 250 kg G.P. bomb. Wingspan: 7.75 m, length: 6.15 m, height: 2.10 m, wing surface: 10 sq.m, maximum weight: 1,766 kg, maximum speed: 520 kph at 6,000 m.

 

[Justo Miranda]

During the critical days of 1940 the 'Panic Effect' boosted numerous interim solutions to increase the number of British fighters available: A.A. Bage, the Percival chief designer, proposed to build a version of the Mew Gull armed with two 0.303 in Vickers Mk.II machine guns. The projected light fighter, called Percival P.32 AA, would have 7.62 m wingspan, 6.57 m overall length and 1,087 kg maximum weight. But it was rejected in favour of the Miles M.24, the single-seat version of the Miles Master, armed with eight Brownings, capable of flying at 370 kph and with handling characteristics similar to those of the Hurricane.

During the Battle of Britain some Tiger Moth training biplanes were equipped with bombs of up to 110 kg and the Percival Proctor prototype P5998 radio-trainer were also converted into anti-invasion light bomber with sixteen 20 lb bombs under the wings.

 

[Archibald]

The French had a better solution, but they lacked the imagination to develop it.

The Roussel R.30 was conceived as a private venture ‘Jockey Fighter’ in answer to the Programme technique A.23 (12 January 1937) that required a light fighter able to fly at 520 km/h. Construction of the prototype began at Courbevoie, flying for the first time equipped with a 690 hp Gnôme-Rhône 14 M7 engine in April 1939.

In August 1939 it was transferred to the Centre d’Essais du Matériel Aérien (C.E.M.A.) for official trials, as a result of which it was recommended to install a more powerful engine to better use its excellent flying performances. During the Battle of France, the airplane was armed with two 20 mm Oerlikon FFS cannons mounted in the wings and some tests were performed for the installation of a bomb rack under the fuselage.

In combat, the R.30 could have destroyed any Luftwaffe bomber thanks to its high fire power of 2 Kg/sec, 2.8 times that of the Bf 109 E-1. In ground attack mode it would have had more possibilities to survive the Flak than the unfortunate Breguet 693 of the GBA 54 due to its high speed and small size. The only prototype was destroyed in Bordeaux-Mérignac airbase during a He111 bomb raid.

Technical data

Engine: one 690 hp Gnôme-Rhône 14 M7 of fourteen-cylinder, air-cooled radial driving a Ratier 1527 airscrew with electrically adjusted pitch. Armament: two 20 mm Oerlikon FFS cannons and one 250 kg G.P. bomb. Wingspan: 7.75 m, length: 6.15 m, height: 2.10 m, wing surface: 10 sq.m, maximum weight: 1,766 kg, maximum speed: 520 kph at 6,000 m.

Well the MB-152 / 155 could have done a similar job but as you said: lack of imagination...
In the FFO-verse (France fights on) I had
GC I/8 Bloch 152 /155s straffing the German invaders south of Bordeaux in July 1940... all the way to Bayonne. I wrote this in 2007, pretty interesting since it is the place where I grew up, so some familiar places made "cameos.

 

[tomo pauk]

During the critical days of 1940 the 'Panic Effect' boosted numerous interim solutions to increase the number of British fighters available: A.A. Bage, the Percival chief designer, proposed to build a version of the Mew Gull armed with two 0.303 in Vickers Mk.II machine guns. The projected light fighter, called Percival P.32 AA, would have 7.62 m wingspan, 6.57 m overall length and 1,087 kg maximum weight.

Having Percival-made fighters for the RAF from late 1930s on is a great food for what-if scenarios. Guess I'd start one right now

 

[Archibald]

(sorry for the rant but it important to realize how hopeless was 1939 France, Armée de l'Air included.)

The tragic reason why France got a Crecy / Azincourt collapse in 1940 relates to two men: Edouard Daladier and Maurice Gamelin.

Édouard Daladier - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Maurice Gamelin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In a few words (or trying !) : Daladier "Parti Radical" (center-left) despite being mostly inept, was an essential link into all the precarious political coalitions from 1933 to 1940. Lose Daladier and lose your parliamentary majority, government collapse, new election. Rinse, repeat - as simple as that. That was 1939 France political system, inherited from 1870 - another crushing defeat by the Germans, Sedan breakthrough included !

It happened that Daladier (who to his credit had bravely fought in WWI) was a die-hard supporter of Maurice Gamelin.

Who only got the Generallisimo job in 1935 because rival (and far more capable) Alphonse Georges was badly crippled in Marseille, October 9, 1934: the day the King of Yugoslavia died, along with Louis Barthou and his strong anti-Hitler stance and containement via Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia "La petite entente".

A true disaster that send France cartwheeling toward the 1940 disaster.

So Gamelin got his job in 1935 and, as long as Daladier and his PR would remain part of political coalitions, he couldn't be removed.

Case in point: March 21, 1940 saw PM Daladier kicked away (at least !) by Paul Reynaud.
Reynaud was lucid enough to realize the damage done by the Daladier - Gamelin axis.
Yet he couldn't do anything. Daladier instantly returned as Minister of Foreign policy (after Munich.. oh Gosh !) because Reynaud needed his Parti Radical in his coalition - here we go again. And of course Daladier made sure Gamelin wouldn't be removed ! (facepalm).

In fact Reynaud could only remove Gamelin after the Ardennes collapse... on May 19, 1940.
The day Rommel's panzers arrived in Abbeville on the Atlantic coast from Sedan, after a 250 km rush since May 13 (!): sealing what was not yet the "Dunkirk pocket" yet already "Northern France giant trap" and dooming France to collapse. His successor Weygand did his best in June, but he only had 1/3rd of the Army left: plus he was already rooting for Pétain and capitulation, the old fart.

So Daladier doomed France twice, first at Munich and also through his strong backing of Gamelin.

As for Gamelin, to his credit he had been a valuable "right arm" of Joffre a certain day of September 1914..."Miracle on the Marne".

So in a sense, Gamelin saved France in September 1914 by saving Paris - only to doom it to collapse 26 years later through his sheer ineptitude.

As Romans said "sic transit gloria mundi".

There are so many troubling parallels between 1870, 1914 and 1940, sometimes it is kind of surreal (lost Battles of frontiers, cough, cough, cough).

 

[Justo Miranda]

(sorry for the rant but it important to realize how hopeless was 1939 France, Armée de l'Air included.)

The tragic reason why France got a Crecy / Azincourt collapse in 1940 relates to two men: Edouard Daladier and Maurice Gamelin.

Édouard Daladier - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Maurice Gamelin - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

In a few words (or trying !) : Daladier "Parti Radical" (center-left) despite being mostly inept, was an essential link into all the precarious political coalitions from 1933 to 1940. Lose Daladier and lose your parliamentary majority, government collapse, new election. Rinse, repeat - as simple as that. That was 1939 France political system, inherited from 1870 - another crushing defeat by the Germans, Sedan breakthrough included !

It happened that Daladier (who to his credit had bravely fought in WWI) was a die-hard supporter of Maurice Gamelin.

Who only got the Generallisimo job in 1935 because rival (and far more capable) Alphonse Georges was badly crippled in Marseille, October 9, 1934: the day the King of Yugoslavia died, along with Louis Barthou and his strong anti-Hitler stance and containement via Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia "La petite entente".

A true disaster that send France cartwheeling toward the 1940 disaster.

So Gamelin got his job in 1935 and, as long as Daladier and his PR would remain part of political coalitions, he couldn't be removed.

Case in point: March 21, 1940 saw PM Daladier kicked away (at least !) by Paul Reynaud.
Reynaud was lucid enough to realize the damage done by the Daladier - Gamelin axis.
Yet he couldn't do anything. Daladier instantly returned as Minister of Foreign policy (after Munich.. oh Gosh !) because Reynaud needed his Parti Radical in his coalition - here we go again. And of course Daladier made sure Gamelin wouldn't be removed ! (facepalm).

In fact Reynaud could only remove Gamelin after the Ardennes collapse... on May 19, 1940.
The day Rommel's panzers arrived in Abbeville on the Atlantic coast from Sedan, after a 250 km rush since May 13 (!): sealing what was not yet the "Dunkirk pocket" yet already "Northern France giant trap" and dooming France to collapse. His successor Weygand did his best in June, but he only had 1/3rd of the Army left: plus he was already rooting for Pétain and capitulation, the old fart.

So Daladier doomed France twice, first at Munich and also through his strong backing of Gamelin.

As for Gamelin, to his credit he had been a valuable "right arm" of Joffre a certain day of September 1914..."Miracle on the Marne".

So in a sense, Gamelin saved France in September 1914 by saving Paris - only to doom it to collapse 26 years later through his sheer ineptitude.

As Romans said "sic transit gloria mundi".

There are so many troubling parallels between 1870, 1914 and 1940, sometimes it is kind of surreal (lost Battles of frontiers, cough, cough, cough).

Gamelin, 78, only talked about philosophy and Italian painting, led a monastic existence surrounded only by a small group of chiefs and isolated from the outside world to the extent that in the Grand Quartier General (GQG), located in the castle of Vincennes, there was no radio communications center, the closest was 35 kilometers away at the Quartier Général de l’Etat-major. According to Reynaud, Gamelin would have been a good bishop, but he was unable to make a quick decision without first meditating on it "deeply."

 

[Archibald]

There is presently a raging controversy among French historians, related to Gamelin now declassified medical file.

Some argue he had advanced syphillis (grade 4, or whatever grade, you get the point: it wasn't pretty). And that the illness had fried his brains by 1939.

Others argued he lived without any dementia until 1958 - and by 1946 was able to write a book defending himself (yes, he did THAT).

Now, one of the FFO / France fights on three "2006 founding fathers" is a retired physician, so he knows a lot of about health and medecine.

He told me, verbatim that indeed, Gamelin had advanced syphillis by 1939.

Whether it affected his lucidity - hard to guess. Every person is unique.

In the words of the late and much regreted Boris Vian in "La java des bombes atomiques"

"A mesure que je deviens vieux / je m'en aperçois mieux / j'ai le cerveau qui flanche;
/ Soyons sérieux / disons le mot / c'est même plus un cerveau / mais comme de la sauce blanche"



Remember "The world at war" - that BBC magnus opus, 1973 British series ?

At some point there is the testimony of André Beaufre, one of the four best post-war French strategists (with Poirier, Gallois and Ailleret)

The young Beaufre was a staff member at Gamelin Vincennes HQ.. and later very ashamed of what he saw and couldn't change from his junior position.

Beaufre, in his unique delivery, relates Gamelin departure banquet (yes, he threw a very lavish banquet) on May 20, 1940 as Weygand came to replace him.
Beaufre testimony is... cruel, hilarious, and baffling - altogether. You can see the man is split between laughing and shame.

 

[tomo pauk]

Italians have designed a potentially interesting 1-engined bomber prototype, the Caproni Ca.335, that was supposed to be licence produced in Belgium. Not very powerful nor with a great bomb load, it was re-born as Ca.355 for the Italian AF. Neither the 335 nor 355 were proceeded beyond prototype.
The Ca.355 was to lug a 250 kg bomb, max speed (without the bomb?) was 300 mph; all on the indifferent I-F Delta engine, while the 335 was powered with HS 12Y of about the same power.

It is not hard to imagine the British take on the subject, Merlin in the nose, a 500 lb bomb, etc. Even the Dagger VII might've worked here.