overscan said:
Contenders
  • Aerospatiale ASLP
  • Boeing SRAM-T (SRAM-2 derivative)
  • Martin Marietta/BAeD/Hunting TASM-UK
Source:

John Fricker "RAF Operational Requirements" Air International May 1993

The ASLP was cancelled, but I simply can't remember how it differed from ASMP.

The second generation SRAM was cancelled as well.


......And I don't have a clue as to what the "Martin Marietta/BAeD/Hunting TASM-UK" was meant to be?
 
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Does anyone have any more information on the Aerospatiale ASLP?
Pictures seem to be hard to find. I only found one drawing of it in an Aerospatiale ad and i cant make much sense of it. I became interested after reading this mention of its air-intake configuration optimized for stealth:
Using a fuselage like this and placing the air intakes on the
leeward surface, we can get a vehicle that is discreet for on-
ground radar (ALCM, F117, B2). Of course, this location
contradicts the aerodynamic constraints. It can always be
said that, if the vehicle is very discreet, it will not be
detected and therefore will not have to manoeuvre.
Aerospatiale's ASLP concept is based on this principle with
an leeward surface air intake combined with a radar
detector. If acquisition is made anyway, the missile no
longer has to be discreet but its performance must be
increased. It turns over and the air intake is then on the
windward surface where it can be efficient
Source
 

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I found some info and a better image in IDR Vol 24 Iss 8 1991
Aerospatiale unveiled a mock-up of one of the many ASLP (air-sol longue’ portée: long-range air-to- surface) missile designs it has studied in association with the Direction des engins (French missile directorate). This missile, currently at the pre-development stage, is mainly intended to replace the ASMP which has been in French service since 1986 as the airborne component of the French strategic nuclear force and could be adopted by the UK, depending on the result of current negotiations.
The ASLP could also be used as a long-range conventional cruise missile. Current plans envisage the ASLP equipping the ACT and ACM versions of the Rafale, each aircraft being capable of carrying one missile on the centreline hard point or one under each wing. The ASLP uses a ramjet plus solid-propellant motor which enables it to travel at speeds close to Mach 3.5 over distances of 1,000 to 1,500km. The missile is completely autonomous, with a terminal phase programmable to any threat defenses. The ASLP flies at very low altitude and is expected to be accurate to within a few metres, due to its ability to navigate to its target by autonomous course correction in free flight. The radar-absorbent configuration and materials are designed to give the ASLP the greatest possible stealth capability. The navigation and guidance systems must also be hardened against possible countermeasures. Its speed, manoeuvrability, low-altitude flight, stealth and resistance to countermeasures will enable the missile to penetrate even the densest defenses.
Another approach being considered is to develop a derivative of the ASLP capable of flying at very-high altitude to prevent it being detected by early-warning aircraft.
 

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Far and away the best writeup of the TASM project seems to be here:
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/politi...3 Ritchie & Walker Denuclearising the RAF.pdf

The principal options were:
  • Boeing's SRAM-T, lowest technical risk but felt to be lacking range (at 250km), accuracy and penetrability.
  • Martin Marietta's Tactical Integrated Rocket Ramjet Missile (TIRRM), a derivative of ASALM by way of SLAT, with 520 to 700km range and an estimated in-service date of 2001-2002. Considered high risk for cost and timescale, and would be a UK-only sysstem.
  • The 'French' ASLP-D2, with range estimated at 760 to 900km, but very high risk and a joint development programme was proving difficult to agree. In addition, the UK's preferred warhead wasn't compatible with the missile.
SRAM-T and ASLP-D2 would also require an 'offset launcher' for carriage on Tornado, introducing additional risk and potential performance degradation.

The cancellation of SRAM-T in 1991 introduced considerable uncertainty, as it was the preferred option on grounds of cost and technical risk. The incompatibility between the warhead and the ASLP-D2 missile made TIRRM the only remaining viable option.

With concerns about cost and difficulty rising, increased uncertainty about the need for a theatre nuclear weapon, and the Royal Navy withdrawing from the programme entirely, the project was cancelled in 1993.
 
From the Twitter account of historian (who's name I've now forgotten) back when Twitter allowed people without accounts to browse.

Not all relevant to this topic,but Future Theatre Nuclear Weapons would have had a PAL, Anti-Tamper System, and Command Disable.

FBvJSb6XIBgiL2G.jpeg
FBvJSfCX0AIgWM5.jpeg
FBvJSh8XICYYNtn.jpeg
FBvJSk1XIAEdqp7.jpeg
 
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It's worth clarifying that 'Command Disable' is the ability to render a nuclear weapon incapable of producing a nuclear yield on the authority of a field commander. This is quicker and safer than the alternative of physically destroying the weapons, which would otherwise be required if control of the weapons were to be lost. AFAIK it was introduced in the US on the B61, which is a slightly more modern weapon than WE.177.

It does not imply an ability to disable weapons remotely by transmission of a command, which would pose obvious risks to nuclear surety.
 
It's worth clarifying that 'Command Disable' is the ability to render a nuclear weapon incapable of producing a nuclear yield on the authority of a field commander. This is quicker and safer than the alternative of physically destroying the weapons, which would otherwise be required if control of the weapons were to be lost. AFAIK it was introduced in the US on the B61, which is a slightly more modern weapon than WE.177.

It does not imply an ability to disable weapons remotely by transmission of a command, which would pose obvious risks to nuclear surety.
I was under the impression that the US version was integrated into the PAL. Enter an invalid code however many times and the thermal batteries fry the detonator circuits. [edit: or a specific code once]
 
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Dr James Jinks has written a research paper about the 1980s studies into the replacement of the WE.177 in British service, for the think tank Policy Exchange. The primary objective of the paper is to identify lessons for today but there is a huge amount of new (to me) material on the SR(A).1244 studies. I won't list it all but some of the considerations are particularly notable (e.g. the desire for an anti-ship capability) as are some of the proposed solutions. I have cut out two notional national concepts and posted as JPEGs. The article does not provide a huge amount of technical detail about the proposed solutions though.

The original file was released here (link) but I have uploaded it in case the site is ever removed.

I have always thought that, in the 1980s, the UK missed an opportunity to to use common, nationally developed, guidance and propulsion technology across different airframes to satisfy SR(A).1244 and AST.1236, and produce a submarine launched weapon.
 

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I should add that the two-person concept looks really funny when handling printed messages. Two junior officers each with a death grip on one side of a sheet of paper.
 
Dr James Jinks has written a research paper about the 1980s studies into the replacement of the WE.177 in British service, for the think tank Policy Exchange. The primary objective of the paper is to identify lessons for today but there is a huge amount of new (to me) material on the SR(A).1244 studies. I won't list it all but some of the considerations are particularly notable (e.g. the desire for an anti-ship capability) as are some of the proposed solutions.
The stated requirement for 230 weapons to replace WE.177s one-for-one, except for NDBs, is interesting as that must closely align with the number of WE.177s in RAF service. Which puts the lie to some of the claims from anti-nuclear groups that fewer than 100 WE.177s were deployed.
 
@JFC Fuller

I don't really understand the drawing of the cruise missile variant. How does the frontal view of that work? Unfortunately there doesn't seem to be more details in the paper.
 
@JFC Fuller

I don't really understand the drawing of the cruise missile variant. How does the frontal view of that work? Unfortunately there doesn't seem to be more details in the paper.
I'm not sure we aren't looking at two separate concepts. There's simply no way to have a wing with significant dihedral from ahead and a basically flat one from behind.
 
@JFC Fuller

I don't really understand the drawing of the cruise missile variant. How does the frontal view of that work? Unfortunately there doesn't seem to be more details in the paper.
As a policy history, rather than a technical history, I think it's understandable that Jinks doesn't replicate the technical details. But enough has been included to strongly exist that they're available in the archival material.
 
I'm not sure we aren't looking at two separate concepts. There's simply no way to have a wing with significant dihedral from ahead and a basically flat one from behind.
Morphing wings or something equally exotic, perhaps?
 
Oddly the side cutaway view shows a lot of similarities with the more conventional Tomahawk analogue design.
 
Morphing wings or something equally exotic, perhaps?
You could do that, but why? I think this is two separate concepts. I really wish they'd given us plan views so we could better understand the layout of each.
 
Additional note.

The article implies Prime Sunbeam, the warhead for this, wasn't a true W91 copy, but rather something different. AWE seem to be clear that this development can only proceed after Holbrook is finalised and that once PS is done the plan was for a new depth charge and possibly usable as a torpedo warhead. ....nuclear Spearfish?
 
The Richie & Walker paper linked up thread describes the warhead as
A UK design incorporating US SRAM-T electronics and sub-systems
That, and the testing programme, seem to support the view that the TASM warhead was more than just a W91 clone, but not a wholly independent design. Given that Holbrook was apparently a very close copy of W76, and that an NDB would be a simpler weapon than either, I can't help but wonder if there was a perceived pathway away from dependence on US designs.

It's also interesting in light of the early 1980s discussions around a UK GLCM force and the need to develop a warhead for that. It was to replace the Vulcans (and WE.177B?) in the long-range theatre role, but the decision to defer the Polaris replacement until Trident D5 was available meant that the Trident and GLCM warhead programmes clashed.s
 
Wait a minute.....is there a viable AH scenario in here?
That if Polaris had not been deferred, the GLCM (wasn't it supposed to be tri-service?) could have proceeded?

Flipside is maybe there was a tactical need for a different warhead than those the US had pledged to SACEUR and the UK was examining development of such?
Question is what might that be?

Rumour is enhanced radiation work a.k.a neutron bomb type concepts.
 

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