Why was US Army procurement/R&D so dysfunctional in the 1950's and 60's?

[Elan Vital]

Hi everyone,

This subject has been partially discussed in the context of "US Army without McNamara or Vietnam" discussions, but I wanted to get deeper.

It is no surprise that many US Army programs, especially in the 1960's, ended in abject failure or failed to yield a durable, massively used weapon system even if it entered service. From what I have been able to gather on said programs, there were some very major management/technical errors made that shouldn't have been this horrible.

E.g:

- M551 Sheridan AFVs and M60A1E2 turrets were both ordered in significant number well before testing ended, leading to major issues needing to be fixed after production even though people already pointed out the risks of doing so. It seems that program managers let them go into production for fear of losing funding.

- Re the 152mm gun, the backup steel case program was started too late to actually do its backup job and was cancelled as a result, when it should have been available from the start. Significant problems were experienced with combustible cases in spite of the tech being declared mature in the late 50s when the 152mm gun program started.

- Similarly the Shillelagh missile program went on for over a year in spite of the fundamental science behind its guidance method not being sufficiently figured out at the start of development.

- The entire MBT-70 ordeal...

- M114 entering production with terrain crossing issues

But what caused these problems to go so poorly in spite of the US having already years of failures to draw lessons from in the 1950-1955 period?

 

[uk 75]

One thought on this was that in the late 50s and early 60s (after Korea and before Vietnam) the USA was awash with money coupled with a flood of emerging technologies.
The menu of weapons systems developed in this period was staggering. Nuclear powered ships and submarines. Missiles for every role you could imagine.
Aircraft of every size and shape.
There were a lot of duds, many of which feature on this site more than elsewhere. But there were far more successes.

 

[Elan Vital]

One thought on this was that in the late 50s and early 60s (after Korea and before Vietnam) the USA was awash with money coupled with a flood of emerging technologies.
The menu of weapons systems developed in this period was staggering. Nuclear powered ships and submarines. Missiles for every role you could imagine.
Aircraft of every size and shape.
There were a lot of duds, many of which feature on this site more than elsewhere. But there were far more successes.

To be fair, post-Korea US Army wasn't that massively funded compared to the USAF, USN and SAC (I am talking only about the Army, the other branches at least fielded the major systems they wanted even if it was later/not as capable as intended).

Meanwhile, the only systems Army systems introduced in the period that worked well enough to stay in service for a long time were the very conservative ones like the M60/60A1, the M113 family and the SPG family (and TOW even if it was delayed by several years du eto funding issues.
But basically the entire group of AFVs intended for the late 60's and 70's failed, and the Army didn't even capitalize on the more conventionnal stuff to meet its needs (like the M60A1* barely representing 50% of the active force over 13 years after introduction, with even basic M48A1s still being in service in significant numbers). I wouldn't call that very successful.

*and even it retained some reliability issues for far longer than it should have

 

[uk 75]

I accept that the US Army had problems with new weapons systems like MBT 70 M551 and M60 A2 Starship. You can add the Mauler missile system and the various efforts before the M2/3 family to develop an IFV.

What all these systems have in common was an unrealistic faith in new ideas and technology. Too much included in new systems.

West Germany as the second biggest developer of new army equipment may offer some clues as to how the US could have done it better.

The Germans like the US had the M47 and the M48 (this like the National Guard ones served in the Territorial units with 105mm guns). Leopard 1 was a thorough piece of German engineering and unlike M60 and Chieftain served in many other NATO armies.

Germany had an equal role in the MBT 70 fiasco but had Leopard developments to fall back on. Leopard 2 was a much less radical design than the XM1 but provided the 120mm gun.


Germany wisely bought huge quantities of M109s. The ill fated SP70 repeated many of the mistakes of MBT 70. The eventual PZH2000 emerged as NATO's best SPH but at staggering cost and complexity.


Unlike the US West Germany got its anti aircraft vehicles right. Gepard mated 35mm guns with a Leopard hull. Roland fitted a good SAM to Marder.

Talking of Marder. It was the only vehicle if its kind in a NATO army for much of the 70s. M2/3 and Warrior in the UK were better when they arrived in the 80s. But replacing Marder has not proved easy for Germany.

 

[Elan Vital]

Yeah, I was just curious as to why US program managers and procurement officers took so many risks and did little to keep conventionnal backups to the riskier features while the Europeans managed to get more done with less ambitions.

Especially when less than 2 decades prior the Americans were cautious enough (maybe too cautious) to keep conservative backups and avoid mass production/use of the risky weapons when an alternative was available. The US did build a couple dozen M1 heavy tanks and 250 T23 medium tanks, but never deployed them unlike the Cold War Americans who were willing to deploy the "few" M60A2s and the M551s even when they still had major issues.

 

[uk 75]

M551 is a victim of combining too many roles and capabilities in one vehicle.
The UK used three different variants of its light tracked combat vehicle to do the same job.
West Germany used the M41 in its recce units and then replaced them with Leopards in the anti tank role and the enormous Luchs wheeled vehicle.
The UK Scorpion family was perhaps our best armoured vehicle after the Centurion. A unit with Scorpions (76mm) Scimitars (30mm canon) and Strikers (Swingfire ATGW) was fast and easily deployed by air or helicopter.
But the Brits never tried to use them as a tank. Substituting Scorpions for Chieftains in a British operation would have been as daft as replacing M48s with Sheridans in Vietnam.
M60 has been the subject of lengthy debate in another thread. I am not sure that a US built Leopard 1 would have been much better.

 

[Elan Vital]

M60 has been the subject of lengthy debate in another thread. I am not sure that a US built Leopard 1 would have been much better.

Well they're kinda apples and oranges as to the design philosophy, but in terms of individual components Leopard was much better and a M60 built with the same component design, and with a size/crew volume closer to the M1 would have been much better from a mobility, reliability, fire control and survivability standpoint.

 

[GeorgeA]

I would think the Sylvania SAM-A-19 Plato and its successor, the GE FABMDS, would fall into this category. Ambitious and pressing the technical state of the art at the time.

 

[Dilandu]

To be fair, post-Korea US Army wasn't that massively funded compared to the USAF, USN and SAC (I am talking only about the Army, the other branches at least fielded the major systems they wanted even if it was later/not as capable as intended).

And significant part of Army funding went to air/missile defense programs.

 

[Dilandu]

I would think the Sylvania SAM-A-19 Plato and its successor, the GE FABMDS, would fall into this category. Ambitious and pressing the technical state of the art at the time.

Mauler also. Great on paper, but basically fell apart as hardware to the point when NOTHING worked as planned.

 

[Dilandu]

But what caused these problems to go so poorly in spite of the US having already years of failures to draw lessons from in the 1950-1955 period?

I think one major problem is poor bureaucratic organization of R&D. I read the history of "Chaparral" SAM - Army basically bundled together the development of "Chaparral" SAM and "Vulcan" SPAAG (under premise that they were supposed to be used together), and dropped it all on small and understaffed office in Washington, that was forced to handle two significantly different projects without having expertise on either ("Chaparral" was based on Navy missiles, and "Vulcan" was an USAF gun).

 

[Archibald]

To be fair, post-Korea US Army wasn't that massively funded compared to the USAF, USN and SAC (I am talking only about the Army, the other branches at least fielded the major systems they wanted even if it was later/not as capable as intended).

And significant part of Army funding went to air/missile defense programs.

Yes. And as usual, the 1950's Air Force pissed everyone there. Redstone vs Thor vs Jupiter. BOMARC vs Hawk. In the next decade they fought over ABM. Sweet geez.

 

[Dilandu]

BOMARC vs Hawk.

Correction: BOMARC vs Nike-Hercules.

 

[njiiaf]

For the same reason that U.S. Army procurement (really should U.S. Military procurement in general) was so dysfunctional in the late 90s, 00s, and '10s. Senior leadership becomes too far removed from the realties of warfare and becomes obsessed with bolting on as many high-tech gizmos as they can onto every weapons system they procure. In contrast to designing practical weapons that actually perform well on the battlefield and can be bought without bankrupting the country. See the difference between mbt-70 and the xm1 that actually ended up being procured.

 

[Elan Vital]

For the same reason that U.S. Army procurement (really should U.S. Military procurement in general) was so dysfunctional in the late 90s, 00s, and '10s. Senior leadership becomes too far removed from the realties of warfare and becomes obsessed with bolting on as many high-tech gizmos as they can onto every weapons system they procure. In contrast to designing practical weapons that actually perform well on the battlefield and can be bought without bankrupting the country. See the difference between mbt-70 and the xm1 that actually ended up being procured.

Yeah, in fact M1 was austere enough and some components started development early enough that it could have been fielded by 1975/6 almost as is if done instead of MBT-70.

The turbine was not well-funded until 1969 so could have progressed faster, and if necessary NERA inserts for Burlington could have been fielded sooner as the British demonstrated with FV4211. Other than that, good torsion bars, spaced armor, blowout pannels, the FCS scheme and turbine could be ready by 75/76.

 

[riggerrob]

M-14 rifle and M-60 machinegun was two more R&D fiascos.
M-14 was originally intended to be a simple conversion of the .30 caliber, M-1 Garand rifle of WW2 ... converted to fire 7.62 x 51mm NATO ammo. The original plan was to use most of the M-1 tooling. But development dragged on for so long - and they made so many minor changes - that M-1 tooling was rendered useless.
M-14 was not fielded until 1957, then was replaced in 1964 by the much lighter M-16 rifle.

The M-60 machinegun was a similar fiasco not entering service until 1957. M-60 proved maintenance-intensive and was replaced by its leading competitor a mere two decades later. M-60 only served the US Army from 1957 to 1977, then being replaced by the Belgian-designed Fabricque Nationale MAG (aka. M240 in American service) in 1977. Ironically, the British Army had adopted the MAG-58 in 1957 or '58. FN MAG/M240 has become the NATO standard for light/medium (aka. general purpose) machineguns.

 

[riggerrob]

" ... - M114 entering production with terrain crossing issues ... "

M114 was a huge waste of time and money.
The US Army would have been wiser to purchase FMC "M113 and a half" Lynx tracked recce vehicles like the Canadians and Dutch.
In Canadian service, M113.5 replaced Ferret scout cars that were rapidly wearing out during the 1970s.
Ferrets had in turn replaced the de-frocked (turrets removed M3 and M5 Stuart light tanks that had served in the recce role since 1943 or 1944 (?). During the 1950s, the Canadian Army had bought additional stocks of M3s and M4 Shermans and de-frocked them to serve in recce and APC roles respectively.
By the 1960s, the Canadian Army finally bought a fleet of M113 APCs.
M113.5 had the advantage of being based upon the ubiquitous M113 APC chassis, so was well-understood by mechanics and drivers. The Canadian Army issued exactly the same drivers' license to M113 and M113.5 drivers.
I learned how to drive M113.5 at CFM Valcartier during the summer of 1974.
Later on, the Dutch converted their Lynxes by installing 20mm auto-cannons.

 

[Colonial-Marine]

Somehow the M114 won the competition over the vehicle that would become the M113½ so I've no clue how they misjudged so badly there.

The whole story of the initial fielding of the M16 rifle is another disaster that took awhile to correct and permanently damaged the rifle's reputation.

 

[Elan Vital]

Somehow the M114 won the competition over the vehicle that would become the M113½ so I've no clue how they misjudged so badly there.

The whole story of the initial fielding of the M16 rifle is another disaster that took awhile to correct and permanently damaged the rifle's reputation.

There was no competition, the M113 1/2 didn't even exist until 1963 by which time the M114 had already been approved for service and ordered in large numbers. Why they didn't even consider FMC as a contractor for a tracked recon vehicle when they were also designing the T113 and T117 APCs makes no sense, for sure

 

[Apophenia]

M114 was a huge waste of time and money.
The US Army would have been wiser to purchase FMC "M113 and a half" Lynx tracked recce vehicles like the Canadians and Dutch.
In Canadian service, M113.5 replaced Ferret scout cars ...

In Canadian service, the Ferrets replaced the Ford Windsor Lynx IIs (stealth) not the tracked Stuarts (sabre). When the M113 C&Rs were introduced, they served alongside Ferrets until 1981 (albeit in different armoured regiment recce squadrons).

Both the M114 and M113 C&R suffered from muddled arguments over that recce by stealth or sabre choice. Another issue was that both tracked vehicles were wider than their wheeled predecessors (eg: the Ferret measured 1.91 m compared with the M113 C&R's 2.41 m. That 20 inches isn't a lot ... until you're trying to squeeze down a tight Gasse somewhere in West Germany).

Despite those size issues, note that both the US Army and Canadian Army replaced these M113 derivatives in the recce role with much larger vehicles - the M551 Sheridan and Coyote, respectively. Some people really never do learn. If "What is it we are trying to achieve?" isn't the procurement people's first question, the following query will usually be "What the hell were they thinking?" ...

 

[Bruno Anthony]

As far as tactical SAMs, some armored vehicles, small arms, the USArmy in the period 1953-1969 didn’t do great.
But the posters here have “forgotten” the M107, M109, M110 self propelled artillery pieces. The world standard in air mobility both in concept & numbers. Helicopters that became global standards.

 

[Archibald]

Bell UH-1. How many were build ? 8000 ?

 

[Bruno Anthony]

I may add the best ABM system in the world at that time.

 

[riggerrob]

M114 was a huge waste of time and money.
The US Army would have been wiser to purchase FMC "M113 and a half" Lynx tracked recce vehicles like the Canadians and Dutch.
In Canadian service, M113.5 replaced Ferret scout cars ...

In Canadian service, the Ferrets replaced the Ford Windsor Lynx IIs (stealth) not the tracked Stuarts (sabre). When the M113 C&Rs were introduced, they served alongside Ferrets until 1981 (albeit in different armoured regiment recce squadrons).

Both the M114 and M113 C&R suffered from muddled arguments over that recce by stealth or sabre choice. Another issue was that both tracked vehicles were wider than their wheeled predecessors (eg: the Ferret measured 1.91 m compared with the M113 C&R's 2.41 m. That 20 inches isn't a lot ... until you're trying to squeeze down a tight Gasse somewhere in West Germany).

Despite those size issues, note that both the US Army and Canadian Army replaced these M113 derivatives in the recce role with much larger vehicles - the M551 Sheridan and Coyote, respectively. Some people really never do learn. If "What is it we are trying to achieve?" isn't the procurement people's first question, the following query will usually be "What the hell were they thinking?" ...

I suspect that it is more of a question of "how many men do you need to man an observation post for a few days?"
While stealthy, little scout cars (Dingo, Ferret, Commando Scout, etc.) are great for speedy route recces, they only contain 2 or 3 men. Those two or three men soon tire when manning OPs for 24 hours per day.
You really need 5 or 6 men for a long-term OP by the time you dig latrines, eat, sleep, re-supply, escort visitors, watch sophisticated sensors, etc. Larger recce vehicle (e.g. Coyote) are big enough to carry the two or three spare bodies that you need to man an OP for more than 48 hours.

Another debate questions whether recce should depend upon stealth (e.g. Ferret) or whether you might need to fight to gain intelligence. Fighting requires much bigger guns (e.g. Coyote with a 25mm auto-cannon). Big guns are also handy when doing boring secondary duties like convoy escort.

 

[Apophenia]

Yes, you've pretty much nailed my point. There are decisions to be made about recce - stealth, sabre, or both (almost certainly in two distinct types of vehicle). More firepower might be combined on one 'stealth' hull - kind of what the Brits went for with their RARDEN-armed Fox.

If you need six crew members to man an OP, your PMO must choose between two scout cars or one big honkin' vehicle which won't physically fit in some of the places you may need to go. If the latter, the willing not to fit in those places should be arrived at by an intentional change in tactics and procedures ... not just accepted because the system demands more stuff/people jammed into one catch-all.

 

[Hood]

The Vixen was roomier for extra guys, but only had a puny GPMG for armament and was cancelled.
Scimitar and Fox always seem to overlap in my mind.

There are few MICs during this period that didn't have a fair share of cock-ups and "WTF were you thinking?" moments alongside some real successes and unexpected successes. Nobody can be right every time. And from the perspective of today, things are no better now - if not worse - in terms of goldplating, skimping in false economies etc. Plus back in the 1960s five or ten companies could have a crack at something and give you a series of options (even if you were biased in favour of a couple of fave companies). Today you have to take what two, or if you are lucky three, giant conglomerates throw at you.

 

[Ron2001]

I think one major problem is poor bureaucratic organization of R&D. I read the history of "Chaparral" SAM - Army basically bundled together the development of "Chaparral" SAM and "Vulcan" SPAAG (under premise that they were supposed to be used together), and dropped it all on small and understaffed office in Washington, that was forced to handle two significantly different projects without having expertise on either ("Chaparral" was based on Navy missiles, and "Vulcan" was an USAF gun).

1970 , Fort Bliss Texas, 2nd Lt Army Air Defense. Part of a newly formed unit to field deploy the Chaparral-Vulcan Army Air Defense system. My unit was the second to get trained on the system. In the era of McNamara he was looking to repurpose tried and try weapon systems for other missions and thus Chaparral - Vulcan were track mounted versions of a Sidewinder airborne-launched missle while the Vulcan was a gatling gun. To be included in each unit was an early-warning radar but that did not come along for many years. The reason for the system was the existence of the Warsaw Pact in Europe and the constant threat the "Pact", with thousands of tanks, would roll into Germany in the winter. Neither NATO or the US had enough of anything to stop a ground invasion but perhaps with air defense, there was some hope that the US could get air superiority. The first Chaparral-Vulcan unit was deployed to German. 1970, the Vietnam war was all consuming and "we" believed that perhaps the dictator of North Korea might use this time to invade South Korea. Thus, the new unit I was in was sent to South Korea up near the DMZ such that we could place our weapons along the main valley and air and tank route from the North to Seoul. Stationed in a newly constructed "camp", we had no immediate air support or infantry support and if all hell broke loose, we all would be dead, BUT that would bring the US into Korea again, big time and maybe Nato. At that time there were rumors circulating and picked up by G2 that the North had a handsome bounty on one of our missiles and when I deployed my unit up near the DMZ, had 24-7armed security. The Chaparral was not a bad weapon except it could only be fired once an aircraft was passed you. The Vulcan was more of less worthless against high speed jet aircraft but would have made a good defensive weapon in any invasion. Unfortunately, the 2 systems were not co-located and thus Chaparrals had no defense except the M16's of the crew. As for stores, each Chaparral track only carried 8 missiles and there was not a 2.5 ton truck full of missiles with us for our use. In battle, a crew would shoot what they had and then try to get away form the action but the valley was steep and little in the way of escape. Being an officer, I was trained by the Chaparral contractor to run the turret launcher and then train each crew on how to operate it. It was not a difficult launcher to operate but I eventually only had 2 trained operators per track while others loaded rails and provided M16 defense. Finally, the new unit was headed by a colonel how had been stationed in the Pentagon in assignments or ? and as the Korea unit was going to be so important and perhaps a star for him, so he handpicked each and every unit member. All officers from military schools or number 1 in their ROTC and sergeants where all long term SAM unit members. Finally, enlisted men where mostly new or had served in another SAM battery. To start, no Vietnam short-timers were sent to Korea but it did start happening and with them coming, so too opium. Well beyond what was already in Korea.

 

[Sferrin]

Hi everyone,

This subject has been partially discussed in the context of "US Army without McNamara or Vietnam" discussions, but I wanted to get deeper.

It is no surprise that many US Army programs, especially in the 1960's, ended in abject failure or failed to yield a durable, massively used weapon system even if it entered service. From what I have been able to gather on said programs, there were some very major management/technical errors made that shouldn't have been this horrible.

E.g:

- M551 Sheridan AFVs and M60A1E2 turrets were both ordered in significant number well before testing ended, leading to major issues needing to be fixed after production even though people already pointed out the risks of doing so. It seems that program managers let them go into production for fear of losing funding.

- Re the 152mm gun, the backup steel case program was started too late to actually do its backup job and was cancelled as a result, when it should have been available from the start. Significant problems were experienced with combustible cases in spite of the tech being declared mature in the late 50s when the 152mm gun program started.

- Similarly the Shillelagh missile program went on for over a year in spite of the fundamental science behind its guidance method not being sufficiently figured out at the start of development.

- The entire MBT-70 ordeal...

- M114 entering production with terrain crossing issues

But what caused these problems to go so poorly in spite of the US having already years of failures to draw lessons from in the 1950-1955 period?

Was a well-oiled machine compared to today.

 

[sdmuleman]

Not sure that USA procurement was really any worse than any of the other services. See for instance the USN typhon radar system, USAF nuclear powered aircraft, etc.

Root issue was the rapidly increasing complexity of weapons systems combined with a mindset of trying to do everything regardless of cost or how complex the system would be. Probably also a degree of trying to move at the same speed and buy the same quantities as early 50's era systems.

 

[Scott Kenny]

M-14 rifle and M-60 machinegun was two more R&D fiascos.
M-14 was originally intended to be a simple conversion of the .30 caliber, M-1 Garand rifle of WW2 ... converted to fire 7.62 x 51mm NATO ammo. The original plan was to use most of the M-1 tooling. But development dragged on for so long - and they made so many minor changes - that M-1 tooling was rendered useless.
M-14 was not fielded until 1957, then was replaced in 1964 by the much lighter M-16 rifle.

Yes, the M-14 was a complete fustercluck of a rifle/procurement process.

LtCol Rene Studler needed to suffer a car crash and be retired from injuries suffered. Then maybe the US could have gotten the FAL. Or NATO goes with the .280 British, if that accident happens before Studler demands .30-06 power.

The M-60 machinegun was a similar fiasco not entering service until 1957. M-60 proved maintenance-intensive and was replaced by its leading competitor a mere two decades later. M-60 only served the US Army from 1957 to 1977, then being replaced by the Belgian-designed Fabricque Nationale MAG (aka. M240 in American service) in 1977. Ironically, the British Army had adopted the MAG-58 in 1957 or '58. FN MAG/M240 has become the NATO standard for light/medium (aka. general purpose) machineguns.

While it's true that the M60 was maintenance-intensive, the real issue was that it was an FG42 with the MG42 belt feed bolted on and designed for light weight, then forced to fire what amounts .30-06 ammunition. The result was a rounds-limited receiver. Over time, the receiver stretches because of how thin the metal is, and reliability goes down as it stretches. After 10-15k rounds fired, you're supposed to strip all the parts out of the old receiver and install them on a new receiver. (A stamped steel receiver is dirt cheap, we're talking ~$100 in today's dollars, ~$9 in 1957 dollars!)

But the US Army never replaced the old receivers when they should have. The Army was used to the old Browning MGs that never wore out.

Anyone who had a brand new M60 was a happy camper it ran great. Anyone who had an old M60 hated it. The Dutch recently bought a pile of M60E6s.