The Minotaur and Tiger classes

[starviking]

That does make me think about how something like the Fairey Sea Skimmer in a SSM mode could be fitted..

Most likely by dismounting one or both rear turrets & installing missile hangar and turnable launcher instead. On the other hand, Sweden managed to install the rather massive Robot 08 missiles on their destroyers just by putting launch rail over torpedo tubes:

View attachment 676370

Two Robot 08 missiles on launch rails. Launch rails placed on the top of centerline torpedo mount of Halland-class destroyer.

I suppose, it is possible to actually put missile rails on the top of main gun turret of 6-inch cruiser also. The reload, of course, would be problematic...

They do look very exposed to the weather though. Would they last in the North Atlantic, as opposed to the Baltic Sea?

 

[Yellow Palace]

My IMHO, the most probable situation would be that Royal Navy would make a move against V-bomber program - arguing that strategic bombers would be inadequate detterence for Britain, since they are too vulnerable to enemy pre-emptive strikes - and promoting instead the idea of nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, launched from patrolling warships. This would be a good start to switch from carrier-centered to missile-centered fleet.

Which is of course exactly what happened in OTL, except that the nuclear-armed missiles were carried on submarines instead....

 

[Dilandu]

Which is of course exactly what happened in OTL, except that the nuclear-armed missiles were carried on submarines instead...

Yes, and it happened in 1960s, not in 50s. Which is my point.

 

[Dilandu]

They do look very exposed to the weather though. Would they last in the North Atlantic, as opposed to the Baltic Sea?

They aren't stored on rails. There are missile hangar in superstructure behind them. Missiles are normally stored inside, and sent on rails only in preparation for combat. Here, they are on museum ship, so they are presented as "visible" as possible.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Which is of course exactly what happened in OTL, except that the nuclear-armed missiles were carried on submarines instead...

Yes, and it happened in 1960s, not in 50s. Which is my point.

The missiles to do it weren't available in the 1950s, since the USSR inconsiderately placed its major cities a thousand miles or more from the open sea. Very unsporting.

 

[Hood]

Yes, and it happened in 1960s, not in 50s. Which is my point.

If you ignore SSM-N-8 Regulus and SSM-N-9 Regulus II.. Mountbatten circa 1956-58 did like the idea of building a cruise-missile submarine similar to the Greybacks but the funds were not there given early work on nuclear submarines was beginning and spending dollars to get reactor secrets was a much better investment and the Regulus programme, as we now know, was a dead-end.

 

[PMN1]

This is what I have on the OTL Sea Skimmer, from a post on this board I think

OTL Sea Skimmer Rolls-Royce Soar engine
Warhead - 1900lb Launch weight - 3500lb
Range - 15 nautical miles (by fitting a 1700lb warhead and increasing fuel by 200lb, range could be increased to 50nm)
Span – 9ft (3ft 4in folded) Length – 16ft
Flush, NACA-style intakes on each side.

So an Sea Skimmer type missile with the 50nm range could be quite useful, assuming you have the right guidance.

 

[Dilandu]

So an Sea Skimmer type missile with the 50nm range could be quite useful, assuming you have the right guidance.

What kind of guidance was on Sea Skimmer?

 

[PMN1]

So an Sea Skimmer type missile with the 50nm range could be quite useful, assuming you have the right guidance.

What kind of guidance was on Sea Skimmer?

Semi active I think, also IIRC, those ranges are air launched.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/fairey-sea-skimmer.6951/

 

[Dilandu]

Semi active I think, also IIRC, those ranges are air launched.

Hm, semi is not ideal for surface-to-surface missile of any long range... but if radar high enough, it would suffice. Maybe a dual beam-riding/semi-active guidance, as on Soviet KS-1 Kometa missile would be more efficient, though.

 

[zen]

Curious....
Blue Slug used I think ARH based on the Red Dean seeker.
I thought Fairey would do the same.....
Then again Fairey with ECKO had experience with radar guided missiles and likely felt this was more achievable....

 

[pathology_doc]

One thing USSR truly never ever planned to do is to launch any kind of surface commerce raiders against British communications.

We know that NOW. Could the West have been certain about it THEN?

If not for commerce raiding, for what were the Sverdlovs built?

 

[Dilandu]

We know that NOW. Could the West have been certain about it THEN?

Actually they could; there was literally zero interest from USSR to any kind of surface raiding operations since 1930s. There were never any indication that USSR have any interest toward surface raiding. And as far as I know, USN never ever considered Soviet raiding operations at all. So, it was particular UK feat.

If not for commerce raiding, for what were the Sverdlovs built?

As mass-produced artillery units to complement Soviet destroyers in protecting the USSR coastlines against amphibious attacks and naval bombardment, achieving superiority over coastal seas (like Baltic and Black Sea) and supporting coastal flanks of Soviet Army in Europe. Commerce raiding was never ever considered for them. The closest thing to raiding that was contemplated, was combined force strikes against NATO convoys and amphibious assault groups - not the "free hunt", but the coordinated sortie against designated targets.

 

[pathology_doc]

So, it was particular UK feat.

Given the threat the UK had faced in BOTH world wars, from both surface and submerged commerce raiders, one can hardly blame the British for fixating on this potential.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

Indeed. Given that the UK has suffered interdiction of her SLOCs for centuries and in the timeframe in question, quite recently and to great effect, I don't think it unreasonable for the RN to honour the threat of commerce raiders.

I'm also somewhat incredulous that the Soviet Navy had no interest in commerce raiding. Taking no account of a potential enemy's logistics seems an incredible oversight. A Sverdlov is a bit big and fleet of foot for coastal patrol. I'm quite certain no-one intended to stand in particularly close to the Soviet coast anyway (on the surface at least).

I'll buy limited interest but none?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

To reinforce what @pathology_doc and @Opportunistic Minnow wrote in Posts 54 and 55.

There's a British proverb which says "Once bitten. Twice shy" and the Royal Navy had been bitten twice in living memory.

And even if the British admirals had known that the Soviet Navy had had zero interest in commerce raiding since the 1930s they were sensible enough to know that while it might have been what the Soviet admirals had though for decades they could change their minds.

Another British proverb is that "The best form of defence is attack." For all the British admirals knew the Soviet admirals could have had what's scientifically known as an "Eureka Moment" and though that if they sent their cruisers out to attack the Atlantic trade routes the NATO navies would be too busy dealing with them to attack the USSR's coastlines.

However, looking at it from the Soviet point of view they might have seen how difficult it had been for the Germans to get their surface raiders into (or should it be onto) the trade routes and also noted that their geographic position was even worse than Germany's. Therefore, they might have concluded that the results weren't worth the effort and that after the cruisers were sunk their coastlines would have been open to attack.

So maybe their strategy was to make the NATO navies think that the cruisers were for commerce raiding instead of coast defence, which was their real purpose. The intention being to make the NATO navies divert resources from attacks on the Soviet coasts to protecting its SLOCs so that said attacks on the Soviet coasts would be weaker and therefore require weaker forces to repel them.

 

[Dilandu]

I'm also somewhat incredulous that the Soviet Navy had no interest in commerce raiding. Taking no account of a potential enemy's logistics seems an incredible oversight. A Sverdlov is a bit big and fleet of foot for coastal patrol. I'm quite certain no-one intended to stand in particularly close to the Soviet coast anyway (on the surface at least).

The facts are facts; USSR never planned for raider warfare, it was not anywhere in Soviet doctrine, and Soviet analysis of German WW2 raiding efforts were universally negative. And you could hardly disagree with that: in radar & patrol planes era, commerce raiding was just plainly inefficient.

. A Sverdlov is a bit big and fleet of foot for coastal patrol.

It was build not exactly for coastal defense, but for fighfing on coastal seas - like Black Sea, Baltic, ect. - ensuring Soviet naval superiority here.

 

[pathology_doc]

The facts are facts; USSR never planned for raider warfare

We're not arguing with that any more.

The conversation has shifted to why we think the Admiralty continued to believe it WAS planning for it, and as a corollary why the RN should be prepared to fight that battle.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

The facts are facts

Are they indeed? Thank you for that. I'm glad we sorted that out. Would we have a citation floating about somewhere?

We're not arguing with that any more.

I am. That there was no planning whatsoever between 1945 and 1991 for the interdiction of western European SLOCs by Soviet naval command authorities seems simply unknowable unless you are quite old and have attended an awful lot of meetings or have read through an awful lot of minutes subsequently to be so definitive.

Commerce raiding is a fundamental aspect of naval warfare. You would at least war game it. You would have contingencies regarding it. Any decent Captain would brief on targets of opportunity before sortieing. What did the Soviet naval planners do for 4 decades? It is such a glaring oversight, I wonder, did the Soviets do without anchors too?

 

[zen]

It doesn't matter what the Soviets thought or what their doctrines state.

The UK ceased to be able to feed itself from it's own agricultural land by 1900 if not earlier.

From thence, external supply was no longer a matter of relative trade performance, but survival.

This was not something to risk on the assumption, no matter how well founded. That an enemy would never seek to interdict that supply and force a starving UK to capitulate to them. The risk could not be accepted.

This is at heart why the German naval buildup could not be ignored.
This is why the French Navy was destroyed at Mers-El-Khabir.
And this is why ANY potential threat to it by any possible force of Soviet power had to be countered.

This is also why, if today the USN withdraws from the world, the UK will have to expand it's navy.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

Having done some light reading, I'm putting this one to bed. SLOC interdiction was “among the main tasks” according to Marshal Sokolovskiy and “a most important integral part of naval efforts aimed at undermining the military-economic potential of the enemy” according to the writings of Admiral Gorshkov (Sea Power of the State). Admiral Chernavin apparently wrote a book on the subject, “The Struggle on Sea Lines of Communications”. So it would appear to have been given at least some some high-level consideration.

It does appear to diminish in importance by the late-60s somewhat with the emphasis onto nuclear warfare and away from more protracted warfare. SLOC interdiction is described in the 70s as “secondary” to the battle against the shore – and no doubt to the bastions too - but a secondary mission is still a mission.

I must say I enjoyed an apparent assertion from an Admiral Pushkin quasi-related to SLOC warfare, that: “bourgeois falsifiers of history wrongly assign enormous importance to the Battle of the Atlantic, considering it one of the main factors that determined the outcome of World War II” and goes on to state that it was the Eastern Front that secured victory in the Atlantic. Sure, mate, you did it all by yourself. In splendid isolation. No other factors or participants. I must have missed the bit where T34s could do 30kts in sea state 4! Suffice to say, I won't consider this Pushkin fella (other f-words available) to be authoritative on much at all.

I digress.

Some links that may or may not be of any value to anybody. The references may be of use, if nothing else:

https://archive.org/details/CIA-RDP85T01058R000507440002-5/page/n2/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA149481/page/n3/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/impactofgorbache00tsyp/page/n4/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/sovietantislocde00whetpdf/page/n8/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA003071/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA140490/page/n6/mode/1up
https://archive.org/details/newsovietmilitar00walkpdf/page/n4/mode/1up

The above isn't necessarily completely off-topic. Trade protection is a cruiser mission, after-all.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I must say I enjoyed an apparent assertion from an Admiral Pushkin quasi-related to SLOC warfare, that: “bourgeois falsifiers of history wrongly assign enormous importance to the Battle of the Atlantic, considering it one of the main factors that determined the outcome of World War II” and goes on to state that it was the Eastern Front that secured victory in the Atlantic. Sure, mate, you did it all by yourself. In splendid isolation. No other factors or participants. I must have missed the bit where T34s could do 30kts in sea state 4! Suffice to say, I won't consider this Pushkin fella (other f-words available) to be authoritative on much at all.

There are quite a few modern commentators who will claim not only that the defeat of Germany was entirely due to the actions of the USSR, without any meaningful contribution from the United Kingdom or United States, but also that the surrender of Japan was entirely due to the Soviet declaration of war against them. That's partly a backlash against Anglo-American portrayals of WW2 as exclusively their affair, with the USSR's involvement a sideshow, which come from Cold War imperatives and which are of course completely incorrect.

It stands to reason, of course, that a combatant power which viewed the war at sea as an existential struggle would present victory at sea as the determining factor of the war. And it equally stands to reason that a combatant power which viewed the war on land as an existential struggle would present victory on land as the determining factor of the war. The truth, of course, is that neither extreme view is accurate.

With that perspective in mind, of course the Royal Navy looked at Soviet cruisers and saw a threat to the sea lanes. They knew cruiser warfare and the problems it could cause. A couple of dozen big, powerful cruisers would be a real problem for them if they got loose.

And of course the Soviets built cruisers because they saw Western naval power as a threat to the flanks of their land-based power. A large-scale amphibious landing in (say) Estonia or Crimea - or as the Cold War developed, even Poland - could be disastrous for them.

That said, Soviet disinterest in commerce raiding doesn't rule out coordinated attacks on NATO logistic convoys. @Dilandu notes that this would take the form of planned sorties against specific targets, rather than the traditional cruiser warfare approach of 'go forth and sink things'. Which makes perfect sense: for a land power, interdicting lines of communication is an important cavalry mission. And what are ships if not cavalry? Just ask Jan Willem de Winter!

 

[Hood]

Large cruisers historically were raiding weapons, that was their main rationale. A 12-gun 6in cruiser was better fitted to that than scouting for example. So its not strange the Admiralty would think that, especially when Stalin was equally keen to develop HTP-powered submarines as a U-Bootflotte 2.0.

There is of course a practical reason why the Soviets would not use the 'go forth and sink things' concept. Soviet naval officers were not encouraged to act alone or without orders. There was powerful central command and control, something that seen as a headache even as late as the Exercise Okean 70 which showed the limitations of shore-based control. Stalin would never have trusted his Captains with vague missions like "head into the Atlantic and sink what merchant ships you find" even with a Political Officer to watch over and approve every move.
So yes, commerce raiding would be set-piece coordinated battles, which in truth is what U-Boat wolfpacks and Axis efforts in the Med to prevent the resupply of Malta were and even the US blockade of Japan had strong central control to organise it. The grandstanding lone cruiser raider like Emden or Graf Spee might produce headlines but their material effort against merchant ships were low, only the military dislocation required to find them was a headache.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

It stands to reason, of course, that a combatant power which viewed the war at sea as an existential struggle would present victory at sea as the determining factor of the war. And it equally stands to reason that a combatant power which viewed the war on land as an existential struggle would present victory on land as the determining factor of the war. The truth, of course, is that neither extreme view is accurate.

For clarity, had it simply been another case of "we saved your asses in dubya-dubya-2" I would have simply rolled my eyes and moved on, leaving aside how multiple 20/30-something year old Americans travelled back in time to directly contribute without violating the Temporal Accords to become "we".

Two factors lead to my ire however. One: he's supposedly a professional Admiral who doesn't think one of the largest sustained maritime campaigns in history amounted to anything! Well if your own bread and butter is meaningless - you're in the wrong job. Two: how much blood did "we" (Canadians, Americans, British and more) spill to supply the Soviets so that they could stay in long enough for their steamroller routine to actually contribute to the end of the war, in said demeaned Atlantic Theatre? Sorry-not-sorry to use a vulgarity but: dick move, Admiral. I know there's an air of Cold War era revisionism-of-convenience at work here but nonetheless, I'm quite happy to point out my lack of respect for this Pushkin as a commentator.

WW2 was a group effort. A lot of folks under a lot of flags "won the war". Leave the grandstanding for the school yard. The Battle of the Atlantic didn't in fact win the war but it nearly lost it.

 

[Dilandu]

I am. That there was no planning whatsoever between 1945 and 1991 for the interdiction of western European SLOCs by Soviet naval command authorities seems simply unknowable unless you are quite old and have attended an awful lot of meetings or have read through an awful lot of minutes subsequently to be so definitive.

Seems we have a misunderstanding: I never said that USSR did not plan interdiction. I said that USSR never planned to use SURFACE warships for that. Submarines were supposed to do the job.

 

[starviking]

I am. That there was no planning whatsoever between 1945 and 1991 for the interdiction of western European SLOCs by Soviet naval command authorities seems simply unknowable unless you are quite old and have attended an awful lot of meetings or have read through an awful lot of minutes subsequently to be so definitive.

Seems we have a misunderstanding: I never said that USSR did not plan interdiction. I said that USSR never planned to use SURFACE warships for that. Submarines were supposed to do the job.

But that does not mean that surface raiders could not be used in a war: tactics and strategies are often at their most changeable in conflict.

 

[Dilandu]

But that does not mean that surface raiders could not be used in a war: tactics and strategies are often at their most changeable in conflict.

While it was not impossible, it was very improbable. USSR simply did not have much of access to ocean communication lines, to make sending big, easily to detect cruisers on the enemy communications a viable proposal. Submarines clearly were more cost-efficient here. While it was theoretically possible that some Soviet cruiser may found itself in far away neutral port exactly when hostilities would start, I could recall nothing about any idea to pre-position cruisers as commerce raiders deliberatedly.

And, I should point out, that we are talking about nuclear conflict. In which the strategic situation development took mere days, not months or weeks. With the exception of RN admirals with their nuclear denial thinking (i.e. they tried to pretend that nuclear weapon is not affecting warfare much), everybody else would probably view a cruiser breaking into open ocean not as commerce raider, but as nuclear delivery platform.

 

[starviking]

But that does not mean that surface raiders could not be used in a war: tactics and strategies are often at their most changeable in conflict.

And, I should point out, that we are talking about nuclear conflict. In which the strategic situation development took mere days, not months or weeks. With the exception of RN admirals with their nuclear denial thinking (i.e. they tried to pretend that nuclear weapon is not affecting warfare much), everybody else would probably view a cruiser breaking into open ocean not as commerce raider, but as nuclear delivery platform.

Royal Navy doctrine evolved with the changing strategic and tactical developments. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, H-bombs, and rocket delivery the RN moved from reserve forces and a focus on convoy escorts to higher-end equipment that could be sustained after a first exchange and support NATO combat at sea and from the sea.

As a cruiser breaking out into the open ocean being a nuclear delivery platform, perhaps - but deliver using what?

 

[Deleted member 2278]

As a cruiser breaking out into the open ocean being a nuclear delivery platform, perhaps - but deliver using what?

Good question. There is some serious conflation of time periods going on here. Less Able Archer, more Suez. The Minotaurs were extinct before the first Kynda was in service. In that context "everybody else" LOL would probably view a gun-only Sverdlov breaking out the same as the RN did - as an anti-ship asset, a shore-bombardment vessel and yes, a commerce raider - but only a nuclear delivery platform if on a suicide run.

I'm also not sure what is meant by "nuclear denial thinking". Which navy of the era had correct nuclear thinking? The implication here is of singular stupidity on the part of the RN. Think of it. Us poor benighted Blightians, too inept to go to sea. No doubt Soviet vessels of the era could shrug off any amount of kilotonnage with a hearty workers' anthem?

 

[Dilandu]

Royal Navy doctrine evolved with the changing strategic and tactical developments. With the proliferation of nuclear weapons, H-bombs, and rocket delivery the RN moved from reserve forces and a focus on convoy escorts to higher-end equipment that could be sustained after a first exchange and support NATO combat at sea and from the sea.

Yeah, but in mid-1950s the RN doctrine was basically "call us when you exaust all your bombs and we could fight an old-style naval war". It wasn't practical approach; more a political one, an attempt to preserve the traditional advantages of naval power (which are more valuable in prolonged war) by inventing the conditions for such war to be possible.

As a cruiser breaking out into the open ocean being a nuclear delivery platform, perhaps - but deliver using what?

Artillery shells, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles... All this seems a valid cause to worry in 1950s.

 

[Dilandu]

I'm also not sure what is meant by "nuclear denial thinking". Which navy of the era had correct nuclear thinking?

Well, lets start with American. They recognized the truth much earlier than anyone else: that the nuclear weapon allowed war to be very fast and decisive. So they concentrated on nuclear delivery roles for the navy quite early. Recall the "United States"-class supercarriers: they were initially designed as nothing more than mobile platforms for nuclear delivery bombers.

USSR have more moderate approach, but it recognized also the influence of nuclear weapons on naval strategy. While the main function of Soviet Navy remained "active defense" (i.e. naval dominance within the range of coastal aviation), the concept of nuclear defense (by knocking out USN supercarriers by missile-carrying bombers) and nuclear delivery (by submarines) took more and more importance.

And then we have Royal Navy, which... actually didn't want to do anything with nuclear weapons, have zero interest in nuclear weapon delivery, brushed aside nuclear defense as "its RAF job") and instead invented fantasy scenarios about hunting imaginary Soviet surface raiders in Atlantic and defeating Soviet cruisers by super-duper-aiming skills of RN gunners on destroyers. All this while paying little attention to available tech solutions:

* RN could develope subsonic/supersonic missile as nuclear delivery system in 50s: it never tried to.

* RN could develope subsonic anti-ship missile and thus solve the "Sverdlov scare" radically by just upgrading their existing fleet. They never bothered.

So yes, I think that RN in 50s make stupid decisions and was more interested in inventing comfortable reality to hide in, than in actual efficiency. And then came 1956, and RN found out that it have nothing to fight with.

 

[Deleted member 2278]

Aaaaah so because the RN didn't follow the Soviet suit and put big missile tubes on the bows of their ships, they were stupid. I see. Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery so is it's absence a mortal insult? I think this thread has already established that the British and Soviet naval arms had very different modus operandis. I wouldn't personally attach a value judgement to either Soviet dependence on big, big AShMs or a British lack thereof. The design drivers are far too disparate. Different requirements will yield different solutions.

@Dilandu too often you seem to revert to a nuclear war only mentality. It has it's place but I think you greatly miss-apply it to the 1950s when in fact it belongs to a later era. Yes, yes no doubt you could point out the Kennels and Scrubbers et al available but these were primitive and lacked the numbers the Soviets undoubtedly enjoyed in later decades. I reject them as the dominating panacea you assert, certainly for the Minotaur class's lifetime. A nuclear war in the 50s is eminently survivable for the widely-distributed RN (though not so for long thereafter, I fear).

The RN then (and now) do have a certain weakness in (surface-based) anti-ship capability but they did not have quite the considerable number of warships arrayed against them as the Soviets did, hence the difference in emphasis. They also have had the luxury of allies. Thus they do not need to be master of all roles and can concentrate on their strengths, in concert with allies (yes the US is prominent here). Caveats apply to the latter point, naturally but I think this is something miss-apprehended and underestimated by Russians due to their very different, more insular worldview.

Ultimately, I think having a different mindset and methodology can be questioned without being decried as stupidity. A modicum of respect goes a long way.

 

[Hood]

The 'broken-back' war scenario lasted for a limited period, 1949-55, a time before thermonuclear weapons and a time when the Soviets didn't have a massive arsenal and before Sputnik and the ICBM scare. The conceivable notion was that manned bombers were the main threat and that with limited stockpiles that while some cities would be devastated regional destruction would not be total. Reinforcements and supplies would still be needed and the RN would have to fight to get them their. Perhaps it was optimistic but not far-fetched (even Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not totally destroyed and indeed aid came and they both thrive today).

But the megaton H-Bomb changed all that, whole counties would be devastated by a single hit, 12 bombs detonated off the west coast would blanket the entire nation with radioactive fallout. Quite simply a megaton exchange meant Crispy Isles, not British Isles.
So in 1955 the Strath Report basically says no more civil defence, no more broken backed war. If war comes its over, the UK is finished and its people lost, as for arms its use it or lose it. This is signals the end of National Service, reserve fleets, mobilisation production plans etc.
Coincidently at the same time Mounbatten arrives as First Sea Lord and he immediately begins studies on a modified Porpoise with Regulus II as a nuclear strike platform. He backs nuclear and he backs modernisation.
As it was they couldn't fund a Strike Submarine and the Nuclear SSN so had to make a choice. And as we now know, Mountbatten kept Polaris from its inception in his hat ready for the right moment... which took a few years but came following the Skybolt saga.

In 1955 ship-launched KSSch and the air-launched KS-1 had only just entered service, of these only KSSch had a nuclear warhead option and the P-5 ('Shaddock') wouldn't enter service until 1959. The nuclear-arrmed air-launched Raduga K-10S and Kh-20 did not enter service until 1961 and 1960 respectively. The Sverdlov-class Admiral Nakhimov didn't receive its trial KSShch launchers until 1957 and the installation was not successful and the ship was decommissioned in 1961. None of the P-5 equipped conversions were ever carried out.
So for the 1950s the Soviets hard very little nuclear surface strike capability, yes it was in development but it wasn't operational until the early 1960s.

 

[Archibald]

Yup, the parallel advents of Atlas and H-bomb must have been terrifying. Not only a few megaton warheads could devastate large chunks of a country, but the vector to carry them was a) expendable b) cheap enough to be manufactured in large numbers and c) nearly invulnerable at Mach 20+.
B-29 with A-bomb
B-52 with H-bomb
Atlas with H-bomb
All this in merely 12 years...

 

[Dilandu]

Aaaaah so because the RN didn't follow the Soviet suit and put big missile tubes on the bows of their ships, they were stupid

Please show me what exactly smart RN done in 1950s. Lenghty rebuilds of old carriers, neither of which was sucsessfull? Implementation of exactly zero new weapon systems, suitable for jet & missile era? Spending money on very strange projects like Zonal?

Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery so is it's absence a mortal insult?

Simpler, simpler. Guided weapons is my sphere of interest, so I suggest solutions from it.

too often you seem to revert to a nuclear war only mentality

Newsflash: because in 1950s it was kinda obvious mentality.

Yes, yes no doubt you could point out the Kennels and Scrubbers et al available but these were primitive and lacked the numbers the Soviets undoubtedly enjoyed in later decades

Five reigment of long-range missile carrying jet bombers by late 1950s is "lacking the numbers"? Oh, and even if we took just mid-1950s, there were at least two missile-carrying bomber regiments, equipped with Tu-4K planes. 24 machines per regiment, two KS-1 missiles each... please show me RN battlegroup of this era, capable of absorbing two dozens missile strikes (I would be generous and allow for half missiles to malfunction) without being wrecked? Oh, and bombers could reload and came back, you know.

reject them as the dominating panacea you assert, certainly for the Minotaur class's lifetime.

Please give logical reasons, not merely "maybe there weren't enough". As I mentioned above - there were.

A nuclear war in the 50s is eminently survivable for the widely-distributed RN (though not so for long thereafter, I fear).

Who cares, frankly? The question was, is a nuclear war survivable for UK? The British own calculations of mid-1950s rather clearly demonstrated, that just several megaton-scale blasts would cause national-scale devastation (mostly by fallout and infrastructure collapse). Britain isn't large country. So who would care about some RN ships surviving and bravely patrolling Atlantic seeking for nonexistent raiders, while British would die at rate of hundreds thousands per day?

The RN then (and now) do have a certain weakness in (surface-based) anti-ship capability but they did not have quite the considerable number of warships arrayed against them as the Soviets did, hence the difference in emphasis

Emphasis on what? Could you explain, what exactly role besides "kinda patrolling somewhere in Atlantic" royal navy of mid-1950 could - or planned to - perform?

Ultimately, I think having a different mindset and methodology can be questioned without being decried as stupidity.

Then please explain what was the strenght of Royal Navy at this period? They were somewhat good in submarine-hunting, but not exactly the best here either. Their air defense, surface combat and land attack capabilities were far below the top class. If you arguing that RN planning wasn't stupid - despite several arguments that support this notion - then please explain what exactly they were good in?

 

[Deleted member 2278]

Five regiment of long-range missile carrying jet bombers by late 1950s is "lacking the numbers"? Oh, and even if we took just mid-1950s, there were at least two missile-carrying bomber regiments, equipped with Tu-4K planes. 24 machines per regiment, two KS-1 missiles each... please show me RN battlegroup of this era, capable of absorbing two dozens missile strikes (I would be generous and allow for half missiles to malfunction) without being wrecked? Oh, and bombers could reload and came back, you know.

..and how are we targetting our KS-1s today? Clairvoyant Badgers that know precisely where to go and are somehow invulnerable to weapons fire from hundreds of F-86K or Javelin among other interceptors betwixt them and their targets? Fifth columnist bird-watchers, studying every cove, estuary, sea loch and fjord? Thousands of little red trawlers covering every inch of open ocean? RORSATs in 50s skies? The Atlantic Theatre is huge and just a teeny little bit contested by oh, a few good men. So yes, lacking in numbers for the task at hand. The glorious scouring of the RN from the seas will have to wait a few more years to see fruition.

Who cares, frankly? The question was, is a nuclear war survivable for UK? The British own calculations of mid-1950s rather clearly demonstrated, that just several megaton-scale blasts would cause national-scale devastation (mostly by fallout and infrastructure collapse). Britain isn't large country. So who would care about some RN ships surviving and bravely patrolling Atlantic seeking for non-existent raiders, while British would die at rate of hundreds thousands per day?

Today's word of the day is mutual. Mutual.

Emphasis on what? Could you explain, what exactly role besides "kinda patrolling somewhere in Atlantic" royal navy of mid-1950 could - or planned to - perform?

I'm detecting some [more] unjustified vitriol and denigration toward the RN here. This is straying away from the interesting thought exercise I thought it was and - being the cynic I am - an agenda suggests itself. So I will recuse myself. I suggest you go look at that pic of the Type 45 in the crosshairs again. Soothing.

Then please explain what was the strenght of Royal Navy at this period? - - then please explain what exactly they were good in?

Oh, nothing really. The RN doesn't have much of a record or anything. Nobody here but us chickens.......

 

[Dilandu]

and how are we targetting our KS-1s today? Clairvoyant Badgers that know precisely where to go and are somehow invulnerable to weapons fire from hundreds of F-86K or Javelin among other interceptors betwixt them and their targets

Nah, just very advanced Soviet radio pelengation stations... about which NATO became aware only in 1960s. USSR used a large array of coastal, shipborne and airborne pelengators, which located, analyzed and pinpointed radio sources. In late 1950s it was enormous advantage: NATO navies did not bothered much with EMCON yet, so battlegroups could be easily tracked (in fact, EMCON was an answer to Soviet radio recon...)

The Atlantic Theatre is huge and just a teeny little bit contested by oh, a few good men

Why bother, if RN ships are parading around shining radars and sending lots of communications? As I mentioned above: in 1950s, tracking the NATO forces was easy. They did not suspect yet, how good Soviet pelengators are.

Today's word of the day is mutual. Mutual.

Not unless USA get involved, since Britain did not have capability to mutual assured destruction with USSR. Britain could hope only for deterrence by threat of inacceptable losses.

I'm detecting some [more] unjustified vitriol and denigration toward the RN here. This is straying away from the interesting thought exercise I thought it was and - being the cynic I am - an agenda suggests itself. So I will recuse myself. I suggest you go look at that pic of the Type 45 in the crosshairs again. Soothing.

Well, you asked for arguments. I argumented my position, why I consider that RN was basically chasing illusions till 1956.

Oh, nothing really. The RN doesn't have much of a record or anything. Nobody here but us chickens.......

Past records means little, you know. If past records means everything, Russian Imperial Navy should annihilate the clumsy unexperienced Japanese in 1904. But "for some reason" the opppsite happens. Relatively good record of RN in WW1 also didn't help them much against Japanese in 1941-1944 (you recall that the only major RN naval victory against Japanese was sinking of damaged heavy cruiser by destroyers nighttime attack?)

 

[pathology_doc]

Relatively good record of RN in WW1 also didn't help them much against Japanese in 1941-1944 (you recall that the only major RN naval victory against Japanese was sinking of damaged heavy cruiser by destroyers nighttime attack?)

Probably because they never had the opportunity. The vast majority of the weight in the Pacific was shouldered by the Americans, for very good reasons.

Your agenda here seems to be to go out of your way to belittle the British at every turn. Please stop this.

 

[pathology_doc]

Getting back to the main thread of the discussion, I hit up Friedman's book on British cruisers in the world wars and after. As I came to understand from this re-reading, the problem with the Tigers is that they were designed and begun mid-war for weapon systems available off the shelf mid-war to meet a mid-war threat, but then left unfinished until after the war... by which time the threats they were to meet had changed, and the weapons and associated technology to meet those threats didn't fit well into their half-built mid-war hulls.

Once that point was reached, an erroneous decision seems to have been made regarding whether it was cheaper to start again or attempt to build what was needed into what they already had. As with combat aircraft moving forward, the critical element for the new technology was volume, not just weight - and in the right place with respect to everything else. Once you've got to the point where your bulkheads and half your superstructure are already built and your margins of stability already defined, it becomes very difficult to suddenly drop in newer, more modern, more volume-hungry (and more topweight-hungry!) weapon systems - especially when they turned out to be incredibly hungry for alternating-current electricity in a navy which had hitherto been wedded to DC.

 

[Archibald]

especially when they turned out to be incredibly hungry for alternating-current electricity in a navy which had hitherto been wedded to DC.

That's one of these details I never quite understood about these RN warship rebuilds. How did the Royal Navy ended with a Tesla vs Edison war of currents ? Some carriers started with DC and had to be rebuild with AC, some ended mixed... Sweet jesus. Did such things happened to the USN or other navies ?
I'm at lost over this.