The Minotaur and Tiger classes

[pathology_doc]

This link takes you through to a google books page that may shed light on why the Royal Navy went with DC in the first place, and why it stayed there as long as it did.
I googled "DC vs AC current in the Royal Navy".

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

especially when they turned out to be incredibly hungry for alternating-current electricity in a navy which had hitherto been wedded to DC.

That's one of these details I never quite understood about these RN warship rebuilds. How did the Royal Navy ended with a Tesla vs Edison war of currents? Some carriers started with DC and had to be rebuild with AC, some ended mixed... Sweet Jesus. Did such things happened to the USN or other navies ?
I'm at lost over this.

Some of the ships ended up AC/DC because a full conversion to AC was too expensive. I'm thinking of Eagle's 1959-64 refit/rebuild in particular.

For what it's worth it wasn't just the aircraft carriers.

The first 4 Darings were completed with DC and the second 4 had AC. I thought that the DC ships were converted to AC later but when I checked my sources I discovered that I was wrong. E.g. Jane's 1967-68 says 4 had DC and 4 had AC.

As far as I know AC was standard on American warships and auxiliaries by the middle of the 1930s. I have no idea about the other navies.

Going back to when I first read Norman Friedman's Post War Naval Revolution (several decades ago) I think he said that the RN gun mountings were usually hydraulically powered and American gun mountings were electrically powered. The result was that American warships were usually built with much greater electricity generating capacities than their British equivalents which proved to be an important advantage when the ships were studied for modernisation/conversion.

E.g. in the case of the American guided missile cruiser conversions removing turrets released considerable amounts of electric power that could be used to power the new equipment that replaced them. Not just the guided missiles and other new weapons, but also the new sensors like the 3D radar and electronic systems like the NTDS.

Meanwhile, the British had to find the space, weight and (last but by no means least) money for the extra electricity generating capacity for the power hungry systems that they wanted to fit. This is one of the reasons why I think that for the British in the 1950s building new ships was usually better than modernising existing ones.

The US Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers also had the advantage of being larger than the British Colony, Swiftsure and Tiger classes. This produced better results when some of them were converted to guided missile cruisers. In spite of that the USN still came to the conclusion that new ships were more cost effective.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

 

[Archibald]

I love the last US cruisers classes - Worcesters, Baltimore & Oregon, and the Des Moines monsters.

The WWII USN buildup, even if not fully completed (unfortunately) was pretty awesome.

52 CL & CA, 17 BB & BC, plus 32 Essexs and 6 Midways, 9 Independances and 2 Saipans.

Worcester, Baltimore & Oregon, Des Moines, Alaska, North Carolina, South Dakota, Iowa, Montana.

49 fast carriers with 69 AAA escorts, total 118 ships. Plus countless destroyers - Wikipedia says 343, no less.

 

[PMN1]

Going back to when I first read Norman Friedman's Post War Naval Revolution (several decades ago) I think he said that the RN gun mountings were usually hydraulically powered and American gun mountings were electrically powered. The result was that American warships were usually built with much greater electricity generating capacities than their British equivalents which proved to be an important advantage when the ships were studied for modernisation/conversion.

What are the pros and cons of the two different systems.....assuming it remains guns and no missiles.

Did combat prove a winner?

 

[Hood]

The plan was to rebuild the four DC Darings in the early 1960s and they would have had their DC systems stripped out.
But this was expensive and it was felt building new Leanders offered the same capability for less effort and so they were decommissioned early and scrapped.
Certainly having DC hampered their longevity but those are the breaks.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Going back to when I first read Norman Friedman's Post War Naval Revolution (several decades ago) I think he said that the RN gun mountings were usually hydraulically powered and American gun mountings were electrically powered. The result was that American warships were usually built with much greater electricity generating capacities than their British equivalents which proved to be an important advantage when the ships were studied for modernisation/conversion.

What are the pros and cons of the two different systems.....assuming it remains guns and no missiles.

Did combat prove a winner?

If you're referring to the the pros and cons of hydraulically powered and electrically powered gun mountings I simply don't know. Sorry.

 

[pathology_doc]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

A seasoned Cleveland crew with WW2 experience would probably tear a Sverdlov apart, and the Worcester's firepower was such that barring lucky Bismarck-vs-Hood hits, it's probably guaranteed the win. DM's along the lines of "Burp, what's next?" Baltimore depends on how soon it can start hitting (DM has the rate of fire to adjust fall of shot much more quickly, and probably good enough fire control to get very close on the first salvo), but that 8-inch is going to make a mess when it does.

Green crews just worked up? Sverdlov probably has a much better chance.

The US Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers also had the advantage of being larger than the British Colony, Swiftsure and Tiger classes. This produced better results when some of them were converted to guided missile cruisers. In spite of that the USN still came to the conclusion that new ships were more cost effective.

If I read Friedman right, after the Long Beach they never built a true cruiser again. Subsequent ships were to destroyer standards, and the name "frigate" was resurrected, in the age-of-sail sense rather than the junior-destroyer one. The later reuse of the "cruiser" term was functional and political rather than reflecting build standards.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The US Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers also had the advantage of being larger than the British Colony, Swiftsure and Tiger classes. This produced better results when some of them were converted to guided missile cruisers. In spite of that the USN still came to the conclusion that new ships were more cost effective.

If I read Friedman right, after the Long Beach they never built a true cruiser again. Subsequent ships were to destroyer standards, and the name "frigate" was resurrected, in the age-of-sail sense rather than the junior-destroyer one. The later reuse of the "cruiser" term was functional and political rather than reflecting build standards.

I'm having a blond moment. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing with me?

If you're disagreeing with me... I meant that the USN came to the conclusion that the new large guided missile destroyers (that the USN called frigates) were more cost effective than the gun cruisers that had been converted to guided missile cruisers. That's why I wrote new ships instead of new cruisers.

I have always assumed (because I didn't read it anywhere) that the USN's 1975 reclassification was to make its warship designations conform to the rest of NATO. That's why most of the frigates became cruisers (and the rest became destroyers) and the destroyer escorts became frigates. Do you know if my assumption is correct?

 

[pathology_doc]

The US Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers also had the advantage of being larger than the British Colony, Swiftsure and Tiger classes. This produced better results when some of them were converted to guided missile cruisers. In spite of that the USN still came to the conclusion that new ships were more cost effective.

If I read Friedman right, after the Long Beach they never built a true cruiser again. Subsequent ships were to destroyer standards, and the name "frigate" was resurrected, in the age-of-sail sense rather than the junior-destroyer one. The later reuse of the "cruiser" term was functional and political rather than reflecting build standards.

I'm having a blond moment. Are you agreeing with me or disagreeing with me?

If you're disagreeing with me... I meant that the USN came to the conclusion that the new large guided missile destroyers (that the USN called frigates) were more cost effective than the gun cruisers that had been converted to guided missile cruisers. That's why I wrote new ships instead of new cruisers.

I have always assumed (because I didn't read it anywhere) that the USN's 1975 reclassification was to make its warship designations conform to the rest of NATO. That's why most of the frigates became cruisers (and the rest became destroyers) and the destroyer escorts became frigates. Do you know if my assumption is correct?

We're in agreement.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

A seasoned Cleveland crew with WW2 experience would probably tear a Sverdlov apart, and the Worcester's firepower was such that barring lucky Bismarck-vs-Hood hits, it's probably guaranteed the win. DM's along the lines of "Burp, what's next?" Baltimore depends on how soon it can start hitting (DM has the rate of fire to adjust fall of shot much more quickly, and probably good enough fire control to get very close on the first salvo), but that 8-inch is going to make a mess when it does.

Green crews just worked up? Sverdlov probably has a much better chance.

For what it's worth the USN had a grand total of 71 cruisers at 30th June 1957 of which 16 were Active, 51 were in Reserve and 4 that were being converted to Guided Missile Cruisers. In alphabetical order:

• 9 Atlanta class. All of them were in Reserve.
• 15 Baltimore class. 9 of them were Active and 6 were in Reserve.
• 2 Baltimore class (Boston & Canberra) that had been converted to Guided Missile Heavy Cruisers (CAG). Both ships were Active. More Baltimore class cruisers would be converted to Guided Missile Cruisers (CG). However, this did not begin until 2nd January 1959 when the conversion of USS Albany commenced.
• 2 Brooklyn class. Both of them were in Reserve.
• 29 Cleveland & Fargo classes. None of them were Active. However, 4 were being converted to Guided Missile Light Cruisers (CLG) and the conversion of 2 more would begin August 1957. The other 23 were in Reserve.
• 3 Des Moines class. All of them were Active.
• 4 New Orleans class. All of them were in Reserve.
• 3 Northampton class. All of them were in Reserve.
• 1 Portland class. This ship was in Reserve.
• 2 Worcester class. Both of them were Active.
• 1 Wichita class. This ship was in Reserve.

For clarity the 16 Active ships were:

9 Baltimore class CA​

2 Baltimore class CG​

3 Des Moines class CA​

2 Worcester class CL​

I chose 1957 because it's what the British designated the "Year of Maximum Danger". It's at 30th June because the Official Lists of Active warships and auxiliaries were at 30th June from 1946 to 1977 which at the time was the end of the American Fiscal Year. From 1978 onwards the strength was at 30th September because from FY1978 onwards the Fiscal Year ended on 30th September.

There was also USS Northampton (CLC 1). This is the first half of her General Notes in Jane's 1960-61.

This vessel was originally designed as a heavy cruiser of the modified "Oregon City" class numbered CA 125. She was 57 per cent constructed as such when she was cancelled on 11 August 1945. She was re-ordered I July 1948, and re-designed as a Task Force (now Tactical) Command Ship with the new rating of CLC 1, for the exclusive use of Task Force commanders in conducting either operations of fast moving carrier task forces or an amphibious assault. Accommodation and equipment were modified accordingly. She is fully air conditioned with an installation at least as extensive as that of the largest heavy cruiser Salem to which she now approximates in displacement. She was commissioned on 7 Mar. 1953, to fulfil the same functions as an AGC., i.e. as Operations-Communications-Headquarters Ship, but has more speed, manoeuvrability armament and anti-aircraft fire than an AGC.
Reported to have been designed to resist atomic attack. Has large installation of newly developed electronic equipment, a vast communications network, an imposing array of electronic antennae, and features one of the largest seaborne radar aerials in the world. She is one deck higher than a normal cruiser to provide for additional office space, and has the tallest unsupported mast afloat (125 feet) . Seven months trials to Nov. 1954. First operational assignment was to Atlantic Fleet Amphibious Force as temporary flagship in Nov. 1954. Now serves as Second Fleet flagship.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Post Scripts to Post 93

• The Americans discarded the Omaha & Pensacola classes soon after the end of World War II.
• 6 of the 8 Brooklyn class that survived the war were transferred to Argentina, Brazil and Chile in 1951. Each nation received 2 ships.
• However, that was it until 1st March 1959 when all of the remaining the pre-war cruisers were "Stricken" along with 4 of the Atlanta class and 6 of the Cleveland class.
• All but one of the 9 Altanta class that survived the war went into Reserve by 30th June 1949. The survivor was Juneau (CL 119) which didn't De-commission until 23rd July 1956. Note that this wasn't the Juneau sunk on 13th November 1942. That was Juneau (CL 52). Atlanta (CL 51) was also sunk on 13th November 1942.
• All but one of the Cleveland-Fargo class was in Reserve by 30th June 1950. However, Manchester (CL 83) remained in Commission until 27th June 1956. The first of the Guided Missile conversions to re-enter service was Galveston (CLG 3) which was Re-commissioned on 28th May 1958. Although Jane's 1960-61 says her conversion wasn't completed until 5th September 1958.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

A seasoned Cleveland crew with WW2 experience would probably tear a Sverdlov apart, and the Worcester's firepower was such that barring lucky Bismarck-vs-Hood hits, it's probably guaranteed the win. DM's along the lines of "Burp, what's next?" Baltimore depends on how soon it can start hitting (DM has the rate of fire to adjust fall of shot much more quickly, and probably good enough fire control to get very close on the first salvo), but that 8-inch is going to make a mess when it does.

Green crews just worked up? Sverdlov probably has a much better chance.

How do you think the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and De Zeven Provinciën would have performed in a one-to-one duel with a Servdlov?

According to their entry on Naval Weapons their rates of fire of their eight 6in guns were 10 (AP) and 15 (AA) that is rounds-per-gun per-minute.

According to the same source the rates of fire for the twelve 6" guns fitted to the Chapaev and Sverdlov classes were:

7.5 rounds per minute (MK-4 and MK-5)​

6.5 rounds per minute (MK-5bis)​

​

So that's a theoretical rate of fire of 80 rounds-per-minute from the Dutch ships and 78 to 90 rounds per minute from the Soviet cruisers. I appreciate that there's more to it than firepower... the quality of the crew, weather conditions, visibility, the ship's state of repair, the fire control systems, and the quality of the crew to name but a few.

 

[TomS]

I have always assumed (because I didn't read it anywhere) that the USN's 1975 reclassification was to make its warship designations conform to the rest of NATO. That's why most of the frigates became cruisers (and the rest became destroyers) and the destroyer escorts became frigates. Do you know if my assumption is correct?

No and yes. The redesignation of frigates into cruisers was largely a political thing. In the early 1970s, the US Congress looked at the number of Soviet ships called cruisers -- Raketnyi Kreiser (RKR/missile cruisers), Protivolodochnyi kreiser (PKR/helicopter cruisers), and Bolʹshoy Protivolodochnyy Korablʹ (BPK/large antisubmarine ships, which US intelligence weirdly referred to as ASW cruisers). These greatly outnumbered the USN ships designated as missile cruisers (the converted CAGs and CLGs plus Long Beach) so Congress decided the USN was dangerously outclassed. This despite the fact that the USN had a large force of frigates (DLGs) that were broadly similar in size and AAW firepower to the Soviet RKRs, and was buying new DDs (the Spruance class) that were comparable in size and functionality to the BPKs.

So, to appease Congress, the USN did a mass redesignation in 1975. Most of the DLGs became CGs (the oldest, smallest class became DDGs). Then, with the term "frigate" now unused, they redesignated the "ocean escorts" (not technically destroyer escorts, despite the DE hull numbers) as frigates, in theory to line up with European/NATO practice.

Of course, European practice was far from uniform anyway. The French had sort of followed USN style, with the Suffren large AAW ships being called frigates and smaller ships being escorts or corvettes (or also frigates, sometimes with D pendant numbers, sometimes with F numbers -- it was a confusing time for the French Navy). And the RN did it's own role-based thing with destroyer=AAW and frigate=ASW. A bit later, most of the European navies decided that going forward pretty much everything was going to be a frigate, regardless of size or role.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

A seasoned Cleveland crew with WW2 experience would probably tear a Sverdlov apart, and the Worcester's firepower was such that barring lucky Bismarck-vs-Hood hits, it's probably guaranteed the win. DM's along the lines of "Burp, what's next?" Baltimore depends on how soon it can start hitting (DM has the rate of fire to adjust fall of shot much more quickly, and probably good enough fire control to get very close on the first salvo), but that 8-inch is going to make a mess when it does.

Green crews just worked up? Sverdlov probably has a much better chance.

And finally.

1) How do you think the French cruisers De Grasse and Colbert would have performed in a one-to-one against a Servdlov?

They were only armed with 5" guns, but they did have 16 of them and they had a designed rate of fire of 15 RPG/Min according to Naval Weapons. Although it looks line they could only fire 12 as a broadside and Naval Weapons also said that their rate of fire was somewhat less than 15 RPG/Min in practice. On the other hand it looks like 8 of the 5" guns could be fired forward and 8 could be fired aft so they might be at less of a disadvantage if it's "T" was crossed.

2) Many US cruisers (Baltimore, Cleveland-Fargo and Des Moines classes) had a secondary armament of twelve 5" guns in six twin turrets. Meanwhile, the Servdlovs had twelve 3.9" guns in six twin turrets. How much of an advantage was that?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Not finally after all...

I have always assumed (because I didn't read it anywhere) that the USN's 1975 reclassification was to make its warship designations conform to the rest of NATO. That's why most of the frigates became cruisers (and the rest became destroyers) and the destroyer escorts became frigates. Do you know if my assumption is correct?

No and yes. The redesignation of frigates into cruisers was largely a political thing. In the early 1970s, the US Congress looked at the number of Soviet ships called cruisers -- Raketnyi Kreiser (RKR/missile cruisers), Protivolodochnyi kreiser (PKR/helicopter cruisers), and Bolʹshoy Protivolodochnyy Korablʹ (BPK/large antisubmarine ships, which US intelligence weirdly referred to as ASW cruisers). These greatly outnumbered the USN ships designated as missile cruisers (the converted CAGs and CLGs plus Long Beach) so Congress decided the USN was dangerously outclassed. This despite the fact that the USN had a large force of frigates (DLGs) that were broadly similar in size and AAW firepower to the Soviet RKRs, and was buying new DDs (the Spruance class) that were comparable in size and functionality to the BPKs.

So, to appease Congress, the USN did a mass redesignation in 1975. Most of the DLGs became CGs (the oldest, smallest class became DDGs). Then, with the term "frigate" now unused, they redesignated the "ocean escorts" (not technically destroyer escorts, despite the DE hull numbers) as frigates, in theory to line up with European/NATO practice.

Of course, European practice was far from uniform anyway. The French had sort of followed USN style, with the Suffren large AAW ships being called frigates and smaller ships being escorts or corvettes (or also frigates, sometimes with D pendant numbers, sometimes with F numbers -- it was a confusing time for the French Navy). And the RN did it's own role-based thing with destroyer=AAW and frigate=ASW. A bit later, most of the European navies decided that going forward pretty much everything was going to be a frigate, regardless of size or role.

Thanks for the clarification.

For what it's worth (1) I think that the Soviet's designation system for its post-war warships was the only one that actually reflected what the functions of the ships were.

For what it's worth (2) the American's 1955-75 definition of a Frigate and the French definition of a Frigate are much closer to the age-of-sail Frigate than the common definition. I also think that Ocean Escort has more "fitness for purpose" than Destroyer Escort and Frigate.

For what it's worth (3) in recent months I've been looking through a lot of editions of Jane's as part of my research for these threads. How it's editors categorised warships was "all over the place". E.g. for a while the British County & Type 82 classes were Light Cruisers and the Type 22s were listed as Destroyers in some editions.

 

[TomS]

1) For the most part, I agree. I wish they had ditched Raketnyi Kreiser for something more parallel to the BPK (Bolʹshoy Raketnyi Korablʹ perhaps) But in general it was functional and descriptive in a way that few Western navies really managed.

2) Agreed. That was the explicit rationale for the USN's use of frigate in that era.

3) Yeah, Jane's was very idiosyncratic. It's worth remembering that there were actually separate editors/contributors for the larger national navy sections, so the classifications were usually internally consistent for a given navy but not always consistent across navies.

 

[Dilandu]

How do you think the Dutch cruisers De Ruyter and De Zeven Provinciën would have performed in a one-to-one duel with a Servdlov?

In theory, quite good. Their 6-inch autoloaders were - surprizingly! - considered quite reliable. Peruvian Navy used those guns till late 2010s, and seems to have little problems.

 

[Archibald]

I noticed a lot of WWII veteran ships seems to have gone to the breakers the same year - 1959. USN really made a large cleanup of the mothball fleet that year. Heck, they still had Standard type battleships in reserve !

Standard-type battleship - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

The treaty battleships were the next to go, in the early 1960's.

 

[uk 75]

Although we have US Naval War College Wargames published from the 1980s I have not seen anywhere wargames covering the period 1956 to 1966 when guns gave way to missiles in the major navies.
Early Soviet missile subs had to go quite close to targets in NATO and the Far East. It was much later that the bastions could be used by missile subs.
Polaris subs when they arrive are also deployed much closer to their targets than later Poseidon and Trident boats.
Sixth and Seventh Fleet carriers in the Med and Pacific were the principal Western naval nuclear delivery systems until Polaris. The USSR develops the Shaddock on Kyndas and subs as well as similar air launched cruise missiles.
But the wargames that generated and refined these systems do not seem to have been published.
The Royal Navy's prime NATO role in this period is to provide one of two Carrier groups in the NATO Striking Fleet.
Unlike in the well documented 80s (both official and unofficial) we don't really know what the Striking Fleet was supposed to do.
I am probably wrong about this and there may be books out there (or even in my own library) that I have missed.
The Sverdlovs would presumably have clashed with the Striking Fleet somewhere between Norfolk and Murmansk.

 

[Dilandu]

I noticed a lot of WWII veteran ships seems to have gone to the breakers the same year - 1959. USN really made a large cleanup of the mothball fleet that year. Heck, they still had Standard type battleships in reserve !

Well, in 1959 the first ICBM were put on alert by both USA and USSR. And after that it became kinda obvious, that large reserve fleet isn't exactly practical. By the time any of those old ships could be reactivated, the war would be long over.

Other consideration also played role, of course. The US tactical nuclear arsenal became so large, that heavy naval guns became redundant (I should remind, that non-nuclear local wars, like Korea and Suez, were viewed as exceptions, not the rule!). The Soviet anti-ship missiles were deployed in such large numbers on jet planes (Tu-16 and Tu-95 bombers), warships (Project 56EM and Project 57 destroyers) and coastal launchers ("Sopka") that the possibility of old-school gun cruiser or battleship closing into gun range became nearly moot. So... the big cleanup begun.

 

[Dilandu]

The USSR develops the Shaddock on Kyndas and subs as well as similar air launched cruise missiles.

While Western sources mostly mixed up all those low-supersonic cruise missiles as "Shaddock"'s (well, Shadoks are kinda cute ), I should point out that P-5 and P-6/P-35 are actually different missiles, not the different models of the one. The P-6/P-35 was developed using experience of P-5.

 

[Archibald]

Shadoks ?

Les Shadoks - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

It is kind of funny the Soviets named a missile the shadock, as in the cartoon the very stupid birds are unable to build a decent rocket...

 

[Dilandu]

Shadoks ?

Yeah) Love them)

It is kind of funny the Soviets named a missile the shadock, as in the cartoon the very stupid birds are unable to build a decent rocket...

Erm... The "shaddock" is a NATO designation, and it means a fruit. In USSR, those missiles were called either by designation (P-35) or by alphanumerical code ("izdelie 4K44")

 

[Archibald]

I do know it was a coincidence, they aren't even written the same.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I do know it was a coincidence, they aren't even written the same.

It may not be, there was a general principle that ASCC reporting names should have a generally negative connotation.

 

[starviking]

Although we have US Naval War College Wargames published from the 1980s I have not seen anywhere wargames covering the period 1956 to 1966 when guns gave way to missiles in the major navies.
Early Soviet missile subs had to go quite close to targets in NATO and the Far East. It was much later that the bastions could be used by missile subs.
Polaris subs when they arrive are also deployed much closer to their targets than later Poseidon and Trident boats.
Sixth and Seventh Fleet carriers in the Med and Pacific were the principal Western naval nuclear delivery systems until Polaris. The USSR develops the Shaddock on Kyndas and subs as well as similar air launched cruise missiles.
But the wargames that generated and refined these systems do not seem to have been published.
The Royal Navy's prime NATO role in this period is to provide one of two Carrier groups in the NATO Striking Fleet.
Unlike in the well documented 80s (both official and unofficial) we don't really know what the Striking Fleet was supposed to do.
I am probably wrong about this and there may be books out there (or even in my own library) that I have missed.
The Sverdlovs would presumably have clashed with the Striking Fleet somewhere between Norfolk and Murmansk.

If my memory hasn’t failed me, Grove’s Battle for the Fiords has a lot on the Striking Fleet.

​

 

[uk 75]

Starviking, you are right. I knew I had read a book on the Striking Fleet and cannot find my copy. It is a slim volume but does have details of annual NATO exercises from the 50s to the 80s. Thank you.

 

[bobtdwarf]

I presume that the Baltimore and Des Moines classes were more than a match for the Sverdlovs.

How well would a Cleveland and a Worcester perform in a one-to-one encounter with a Sverdlov?

A seasoned Cleveland crew with WW2 experience would probably tear a Sverdlov apart, and the Worcester's firepower was such that barring lucky Bismarck-vs-Hood hits, it's probably guaranteed the win. DM's along the lines of "Burp, what's next?" Baltimore depends on how soon it can start hitting (DM has the rate of fire to adjust fall of shot much more quickly, and probably good enough fire control to get very close on the first salvo), but that 8-inch is going to make a mess when it does.

Green crews just worked up? Sverdlov probably has a much better chance.

The US Cleveland and Baltimore class cruisers also had the advantage of being larger than the British Colony, Swiftsure and Tiger classes. This produced better results when some of them were converted to guided missile cruisers. In spite of that the USN still came to the conclusion that new ships were more cost effective.

If I read Friedman right, after the Long Beach they never built a true cruiser again. Subsequent ships were to destroyer standards, and the name "frigate" was resurrected, in the age-of-sail sense rather than the junior-destroyer one. The later reuse of the "cruiser" term was functional and political rather than reflecting build standards.

The Worcester's had excellent rate of fire but had truly horrid anti surface performance with the FC they had: It was optimized for the anti air role to the point it would require new FC to be truly useful for shore bombardment. The Clevelands were better at putting rounds on surface targets. I have no clue why that is because to me it looked like they were fitted about the same; but I came across reference to this and the numbers listed were seriously bad for hitting a ground target.

 

[Archibald]

Yup, Wikipedia (for what it's worth) consider them half failures. The guns had serious reliability issues.

 

[EwenS]

You can find some detail on their problems here

United States of America 6"/47DP (15.2 cm) Mark 16 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

 

[Archibald]

Thank you. Looking at this, it makes the Worcesters looks like the Alaskas - a solution looking for a problem. In the Alaska case, they were build to counter imaginary Japanese big battlecruisers. In the case of the Worcesters, that gun described in your link above was not only flawed technically, the dual-purpose seems to have taxed it too much - and on top of that, the guns and their turrets weights turned the Worcesters into bloated monsters far larger than the Atlantas before them.

So, could a case could be make, the Worcesters were to CL, what the Alaskas were to CA / BB ? "intermediate big ships" but in the end, huge and expensive evolutionary dead ends ?

 

[EwenS]

When it comes to the Worcester class it is maybe better to consider the ship and the gun separately.

The gun has its origins pre-war in the various designs for a 1936 London Treaty compliant 8,000 ton vessel. These came to nothing. But it’s continued existence seems to have been due to BuOrd not giving up on it and continuing to look for a home for it.

So come May 1941 the USN believes it needs a cruiser capable of defending the fleet against heavy bombers. For that it needed an AA gun with a higher / longer reach than the 5”/25 & 5”/38. And the 6”/47 Mk16 was seen as the answer, being already in development. Initial designs also called for a 6-7” Armoured deck but no side armour, completely different from what had gone before.

That role however quickly disappeared when everyone realised, based on RN experience, that heavy bombers were not the threat imagined as they were unlikely to hit a manoeuvring warship and that the solution to the dive bomber was more light AA.

Friedman in US Cruisers notes that the 6” cruiser project remained alive 1941-43 because of the gun. But by the end of 1943 many were questioning whether the light cruiser had a role at all because of the coming of the 8”/55 RF Mk16 that ultimately went into the Des Moines class. And in addition the sheer size of the Worcester wasn’t that much less than a Des Moines which was much more effective in the surface role.

Then comes the wake up call from Salerno in Sept 1943 with the Germans deploying guided weapons like Fritz X and HS293. All of a sudden there is a new need to expand the AA coverage of the fleet. And the 6”/47 Mk16 suddenly has a new reason for existing.

Couple that with the apparent inability to supply enough 8”/55RF mounts in time for the build programme then planned so 4 Worcesters find their way into it (2 canx in Aug 1945).

The final 1945 War Programme that never saw the light of day saw the 6” cruiser dropped altogether in place of more 8” plus an entirely new class armed with 16x5”/54 DP guns (mounts developed for the cancelled Montana class and then also looking for a new home). The latter saw a return to more modest dimensions, basically a slightly enlarged Atlanta.

USA 8"/55 (20.3 cm) RF Mark 16 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

USA 5"/54 (12.7 cm) Mark 16 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

Also some experimental weapons of the period.

USA Experimental and Proposed 5.4" (13.7 cm) and 5" (12.7 cm) Guns 1940s - 1960s - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

3) Yeah, Jane's was very idiosyncratic. It's worth remembering that there were actually separate editors/contributors for the larger national navy sections, so the classifications were usually internally consistent for a given navy but not always consistent across navies.

Aye lad. The USN and USCG sections in particular.

E.g. I've got my copy of Jane's 1968-69 in front of me on my desk and the PDF of Jane's 1967-68 open on my laptop. The way it's arranged and how the ships are categorised are completely different. It may be significant that 1967-68 is the first that has "Compiled and Edited by Norman Polmar" (who succeed James Fahey as editor of Ships & Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet) immediately below the heading United States Navy.

This is actually from the PDF of Jane's 1962-63 because the equivalent in 1967-68 won't copy and paste into MS Paint.



And this is a transcript of the equivalent table in Jane's 1968-69.

**** **** ****

STRENGTH OF THE FLEET​

The following table provides a tabulation of the ship strength of the United States Navy and an index to the ship listings within the United States section of this edition. Ship arrangement is based on function and employment; the official arrangement of ship types is contained in the "List of classifications of naval ships and service craft" which appears on a later page of this section. Numbers of ships listed in the table are estimated as of 1 Nov 1968 based on official and unofficial sources. Active ships in categories through Fire Support Ships are indicated by an asterisk in the individual ship listings. The scheme of identifying active ships applies only to the United States section. Notes appear at the end of the table.

​

NOTES:

* Includes ships undergoing overhaul, modernisation, and refuelling in the case of nuclear-powered ships.​

** Includes ships authorised through Fiscal Year 1968 programmes.​

*** Includes:​

one ex-cruiser planned for conversion to sonar test ship;​

one ex-cruiser hulk;​

and one damaged technical research ship.​

​

Operational Naval Reserve Training Ships are included in the active category.​

**** **** ****​

 

[Archibald]

When it comes to the Worcester class it is maybe better to consider the ship and the gun separately.

The gun has its origins pre-war in the various designs for a 1936 London Treaty compliant 8,000 ton vessel. These came to nothing. But it’s continued existence seems to have been due to BuOrd not giving up on it and continuing to look for a home for it.

So come May 1941 the USN believes it needs a cruiser capable of defending the fleet against heavy bombers. For that it needed an AA gun with a higher / longer reach than the 5”/25 & 5”/38. And the 6”/47 Mk16 was seen as the answer, being already in development. Initial designs also called for a 6-7” Armoured deck but no side armour, completely different from what had gone before.

That role however quickly disappeared when everyone realised, based on RN experience, that heavy bombers were not the threat imagined as they were unlikely to hit a manoeuvring warship and that the solution to the dive bomber was more light AA.

Friedman in US Cruisers notes that the 6” cruiser project remained alive 1941-43 because of the gun. But by the end of 1943 many were questioning whether the light cruiser had a role at all because of the coming of the 8”/55 RF Mk16 that ultimately went into the Des Moines class. And in addition the sheer size of the Worcester wasn’t that much less than a Des Moines which was much more effective in the surface role.

Then comes the wake up call from Salerno in Sept 1943 with the Germans deploying guided weapons like Fritz X and HS293. All of a sudden there is a new need to expand the AA coverage of the fleet. And the 6”/47 Mk16 suddenly has a new reason for existing.

Couple that with the apparent inability to supply enough 8”/55RF mounts in time for the build programme then planned so 4 Worcesters find their way into it (2 canx in Aug 1945).

The final 1945 War Programme that never saw the light of day saw the 6” cruiser dropped altogether in place of more 8” plus an entirely new class armed with 16x5”/54 DP guns (mounts developed for the cancelled Montana class and then also looking for a new home). The latter saw a return to more modest dimensions, basically a slightly enlarged Atlanta.

USA 8"/55 (20.3 cm) RF Mark 16 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

USA 5"/54 (12.7 cm) Mark 16 - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

Also some experimental weapons of the period.

USA Experimental and Proposed 5.4" (13.7 cm) and 5" (12.7 cm) Guns 1940s - 1960s - NavWeaps

www.navweaps.com

This. It amused me to no end, when I first checked Wikipedia entries for big USN WWII ship classes. So much for "light cruisers" versus "heavy cruisers" !

As you note indeed, the Worcester CLs ended heavier than freakkin' Baltimore / Oregon CAs ! Only the Des Moines were larger. At some point or another, 17 000 tons ships, whether they have 6-in or 8-in guns, are quite expensive.

Now I can understand that "dual purpose" trend blurred the lines. "Drats, the main guns must have enough rate of fire and elevation to shoot aircraft on top of naval and ground targets".

But at some point or another, large guns end firing too slowly to shoot down aircraft. From what you describes it seems there were some kind of "back and forth" between 5-inch, 6-inch, and 8-inch guns for that "dual purpose" mission.

Of course the totally absurd, illogical end of that DP thing was the Japanese having special shells for the Yamato 18-inch that, supposedly, had some kind of "magic trick" to try and shoot down aircraft. Guess what ? it didn't worked.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth (2) the American's 1955-75 definition of a Frigate and the French definition of a Frigate are much closer to the age-of-sail Frigate than the common definition. I also think that Ocean Escort has more "fitness for purpose" than Destroyer Escort and Frigate.

2) Agreed. That was the explicit rationale for the USN's use of frigate in that era.

Some background information on the evolution of the DL designation.

This is part of the entry on the Mitscher class in Jane's 1968-69.

CLASSIFICATION. These ships were originally classified as Destroyers (DD 927-930 respectively); reclassified as Destroyer Leaders (DL 2-5) on 9th Feb 1951 while under construction; the symbol DL was changed to Frigate on 1 Jan 1955. Mitscher and John S McCain were reclassified as the DDG 35 and DDG 36 on 15 Mar 1967.

These are parts of the entry on Norfolk DL 1 (ex-CLK 1) in Jane's 1968-69.

The Norfolk was one of two cruiser-size anti-submarine ("killer") ships authorised in 1948. Their size was to provide a rough-weather, long-range ASW capability. Construction of the CLK 2 was deferred on 2 Mar 1949 and cancelled on 9 Feb 1951; her keel was not laid down. She was to have been named New Haven.

CLASSIFICATION. The Norfolk was reclassified as a Destroyer Leader (DL 1) on 9 Feb 1951 while under construction; the symbol DL was changed to Frigate on 1 Jan 1955.

 

[bobtdwarf]

Thank you. Looking at this, it makes the Worcesters looks like the Alaskas - a solution looking for a problem. In the Alaska case, they were build to counter imaginary Japanese big battlecruisers. In the case of the Worcesters, that gun described in your link above was not only flawed technically, the dual-purpose seems to have taxed it too much - and on top of that, the guns and their turrets weights turned the Worcesters into bloated monsters far larger than the Atlantas before them.

So, could a case could be make, the Worcesters were to CL, what the Alaskas were to CA / BB ? "intermediate big ships" but in the end, huge and expensive evolutionary dead ends ?

The problems they had could be fixed with some cash, the USN just had no reason to spend it. No reason in an alternate that someone else might not.. they did have potential.