NJ's like Iowa's observers spotting was indeed 'optimistic' I wager. I tend to trust this observer pilot as he indeed was just few thousand feet from target vs 35000 yards for battleships. Can't say were from NJ got 'spotter report' of them straddles - but there were none observed on his report.
The smoke observed - most likely it is Nowaki's CE cranking max power as they realized that huge shells are coming at them. Same thing happened when Yamato was shooting at White Plains - Yamato observed smoke on target after 4th salvo - and assumed a hit and burn on target - however this smoke was just White Plain getting smoke screen generator on at the same moment when salvo landed. The hit was though observed by Haruna (or Kong, can't recall now).
Many a poster are telling about 'Nowaki was damaged by these salvoes' - report. But - for whatever reason none have presented this 'report' yet. Should it some day turn up and show the details of damage - we might call NJ's gunfire a bit more accurate....
A couple things worth noting here. I personally have not seen the actual AAR from CAG 17 but there is a transcription of it that apparently emanated from Dan Bailey’s
WW II Wrecks of the Truk Lagoon. Assuming that there are no transcription errors CAG 17 does not explicitly state that he only observed just one hit rather
The first observed hit came about 1530 from a black splash. It was at the waterline under the bridge. Black got on the target the second salvo. The black pattern had good density, as did the orange.
Note the use of the word "first" here which would of course imply other hits but none were explicitly stated or assigned to splash colors. It is also worth noting that his narrative of events was somewhat confused in that he stated the cruisers came in, apparently because he observed larger splashes and assumed they were from them:
Shortly thereafter larger splashes appeared around Cruiser "K". These were apparently from the heavy cruisers. Some were close but no definite hits were observed
He then states the battleships came in and fired and stated the colored dyes that he identified: blue, red, orange and black. Problem is that there were only two ships firing dyed projectiles,
Minneapolis and
New Orleans. I can not recall which is which as I am not at home to look at those AARs however one was shooting blue and the other was shooting orange as I recall. He probably saw some orange splashes, and from his vantage point thought they looked red. In any case, no other ship present was shooting dyed projectiles. Black was certainly
Iowa as high capacity rounds tend to have a blackish base and this seen in the later narrative when describing the gunnery portion against
Nowaki where those splashes are described as black.
It is also worth noting that even as experienced as he may be presumed to have been, it is highly unlikely he was able to concentrate fully on observation on the fall of shot as he had to split his attention with flying and observation.
Iowa and the cruisers were not in communication with the spotter so he would not have been alerted to a "rain drop" call when a salvo was about to land. On top of all of this, as was illustrated before in this discussion,
Katori was burning nearly stem to stern, barely a quarter of it visible from the heavy smoke prior to the arrival of TG 50.9. His position and distance relative to
Katori, are also considerations as I can guarantee you that there was a healthy distance from CAG 17 and
Katori to clear the line of fire. Another relevant point is that and had to orbit and would not have had visual on her the entire time when he was wing up in a turn. The fact that he observed a hit, assuming that is indeed what he saw, is quite frankly remarkable.
Action reports, even they are official, are better sources of information but are far from infallible, and I would strongly suggest taking them as with any human observation with a grain of salt. We've seen many times when the pilot/unit/ship/commander are over exuberant in their observations (fighter kill claims are a notorious example, but also
South Dakota at Santa Cruz) but we have also seen the opposite such as Adm. Lee thought
Washington hit
Kirishima 8 times yet recent research from Mr. Lundgren now shows that
Washington probably hit
Kirishima around 20 times.
The point isn't that CAG 17 was wrong—he may well have seen exactly what he reported, but that doesn't mean that he saw everything that actually transpired. This is also true from the ships themselves. The point is that action reports reflect what observers believed they saw under difficult conditions, and we have ample evidence that such observations can err substantially in either direction.
Washington's experience at Guadalcanal shows us that even good observers can significantly undercount. Fighter kill claims show us overcounting is equally common. CAG 17's report should be treated as one data point among several, not as definitive confirmation.
And it bears repeating, again, that
Iowa's crew felt that the main battery effectiveness was "considerable". That is not a term that one would have used had they believed they did not hit anything.
For full disclosure, this is the narrative that I have from the Bailey book, I do not have the second half against
Nowaki:
Dan Bailey’s “WW II Wrecks of the Truk Lagoon’ quotes the Action Report of Carrier Air Group 17. It says in part:
“At about 1515, the screen destroyers opened up on Cruiser "K" (KATORI). We took position at 1,000 feet altitude and about one mile to the southeast in order to observe results. The cruiser was lying helpless in the trough of the waves, bow to northwest (Tokyo). She had a slight list to port and a red flame could be seen amidships. Her after twin turret was trained amidships and she did not at any time fire her main battery or AA guns.
The shooting of the destroyers was poor. Not until the 5th or 6th salvo did any shots land within 25 yards of the target. About ninety percent were well over. I did not see any hits from the destroyer gunfire. The pattern had good density - at least one splash every 25 yards. There were a few wild shorts.
Shortly thereafter larger splashes appeared around Cruiser "K". These were apparently from the heavy cruisers. Some were close but no definite hits were observed….
The battleships then opened fire on cruiser "K", which now had a marked list to port. The red and blue colored splashes were not close. The blue straddled, but the pattern was about 100 yards between each splash. The red did not straddle. The first observed hit came about 1530 from a black splash. It was at the waterline under the bridge. Black got on the target the second salvo. The black pattern had good density, as did the orange.
The cruiser quickly listed to her port beam and lay for a few moments on her beams ends. I obtained a good sketch of her profile as she lay this way free from smoke. From this I am positive she was a CL of the KATORI class. She had two large shell holes about six feet in diameter in her starboard side, one under the bridge about six feet below the waterline and the other amidships about at the waterline, plus about six small holes.
In a few moments she rolled over on her back, exposed her red bottom, then sank stern first…..”
