On the 'Esprit de Corps Canadian Military Magazine' on YouTube, a new video presents a Spanish shipyard's bid for the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, their (somewhat troubled so far) S-80 class sub, which recently entered service with the Armada española. After a selection is made, Canada's subs are planned to begin service roughly a decade from now. Is Spain's design the best for the Royal Canadian Navy, as opposed to sub designs from other countries? See:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=epW8sLOjYTw
The video immediately starts by calling the S-80+ class "one of the most, if not the most technologically advanced submarines currently in production" which I find very questionable. Spain is very much a second rate submarine designer and builder, especially given that the S-80 design and construction process has stretched long past its initial project deadlines of the mid-2010's. Alongside the Swedish with their A-26, I would say that the Spanish offering is actually at the bottom of the list of ideal candidates for the CPSP due to its troublesome development and production. Navantia has been known for some shoddy work on designing and building warships, Australia has been dealing with issues on their Spanish build vessels like the resupply and amphibious vessels that have negatively affected their ability to operate. Personally, I want little to do with anything Navantia has to offer, but especially not anything related to the seemingly cursed S-80+.
 
Too true. And the RCN (Maritime Command, as once was) have/will always make Halifax the priority ...
On a related note:
Naval News comment:

For now the yet-unamed system selected remains unknown, however the Royal Canadian Navy Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) UAS project requirements are described as follow:

The RCN requires a shipborne vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) that can launch and recover from a Halifax-class frigate with an embarked maritime helicopter, by day and night, in challenging weather conditions globally. The minimum requirement will be to operate at least 50nm from the ship while fitted with a dynamically responsive, open architecture, maritime ISTAR sensor suite (to include at a minimum EO/IR, maritime radar, AIS, and an IFF Transponder).
 
The RCN has officially down selected the Canadian Patrol Submarine Program down to the Type 212CD (Germany) and the KSS-III (South Korea), this seems to point towards the program progressing rapidly and likely a contract award in the coming months.

 
The RCN has officially down selected the Canadian Patrol Submarine Program down to the Type 212CD (Germany) and the KSS-III (South Korea), this seems to point towards the program progressing rapidly and likely a contract award in the coming months.

Yes, I saw this recent CBC news clip on YouTube <
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ONWFJIZxYTY
>, confirming that Spain's and Sweden's bids have been dropped, leaving Germany (ThyssenKrupp) and Korea (Hanwha Ocean) as the two contenders to build up to twelve new patrol submarines for the Royal Canadian Navy, to replace the four aging ex-British Victoria-class subs which (I've heard) have not been fully satisfactory in RCN service. Both Germany and Korea seem to be a worthy choice. From the news, it appears none of the subs will be built in Canada.

Any rumor about when the final selection is scheduled to be made?

...Spain is very much a second rate submarine designer and builder, especially given that the S-80 design and construction process has stretched long past its initial project deadlines of the mid-2010's. Alongside the Swedish with their A-26, I would say that the Spanish offering is actually at the bottom of the list of ideal candidates... Personally, I want little to do with anything Navantia has to offer, but especially not anything related to the seemingly cursed S-80+.

Ottawa has come to agree with you, Rainbow1910. Do you have a preference between the German bid and Korea's?
 
Yes, I saw this recent CBC news clip on YouTube

Any rumor about when the final selection is scheduled to be made?

Ottawa has come to agree with you, Rainbow1910. Do you have a preference between the German bid and Korea's?
A Naval News article posted recently had an interview with a Canadian Naval Officer who claimed the down select and contract negotiation within the next two years, although the down select happening now automatically speeds this timeline up. It very much seems that speed is of the essence here, and some rumours I've heard point towards the RFP being skipped and the Navy entering into direct negotiations with one of the two parties in 2026 potentially.

I will preface my opinion with the fact that both the German and Korean designs are very competently designed and constructed vessels by experienced partners, and I think either design will ultimately suit Canada's goals. All of the "bad" or "unsuitable" options have been eliminated and it comes down to tradeoffs between the remaining bids.

South Korea: KSS-III Batch II

South Korea has recently said that if the contract is awarded to them in 2026, they promise delivery of the first submarine to Canada by 2032. They specify three more submarines by 2035 and the entire hypothetical twelve submarine order by 2043. To say this is quick would be an understatement, it is frankly lightening fast and blows the German offering out of the water. The Korean offer would allow the RCN to retire the Victoria class by 2035, allowing us to scrap those ships and saving us potentially billions in operational/modernization costs. They have also signed countless memorandums with high profile Canadian companies for various bits of cooperation, and have pledged/discussed things like lithium battery production/maintenance, domestic production of Korean weapon systems with IP rights, access to Korean owned American shipyards for upkeep alongside Canadian yards and many more things.

The KSS-III design itself is pretty modern, tracing its legacy back to the German Type 209 and 214 class submarines which were licensed to Korea for further domestic design/construction. It has its German lineage, but the Korean's have done significant work to make the follow on KSS designs their own. Various domestic systems are integrated, alongside importing many top of the line sensor, CMS, etc systems into the design as well. The boats are large, featuring some of the most advanced lithium ion batteries in the world while also retaining AIP as well. Range is not an issue, with the boats designed for long range patrols throughout the Pacific Ocean. There is a substantial amount of Korean sourced equipment aboard, something like 80% it seems. 10 large VLS tubes aboard currently only house the Hyunmoo 4-4 conventional SLBM, but it is theorized they can retrofit anti-ship, land attack and even potentially unmanned systems into these in the future. VLS permits additional weaponry to be carried while keeping the torpedo magazine uncluttered for its primary purpose. They are stealthy, advanced and have a good standard of modern amenities for western crews.

Questions can be raised if these vessels are truly suited to Arctic/near Arctic operations though. There is also concerns about NATO/NORAD interoperability for sensor suites, CMS and other systems, although the Korean's apparently do build much of their equipment to meet or exceed NATO standards. Korean weapon systems would take us out of our comfort zone of American and European weapons, alongside the fact that Korea can be a bit politically unstable/will be ground zero for a conflict with China if it breaks out. The KSS-III Batch II boat is not entirely proven and still under construction, and deviates a fair bit from the Batch I which is in service currently. It is also questionable if the Korean K-VLS can accommodate foreign/other missile types besides the Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBM, which is a bit of a dubious purchase for Canada/sale from Korea.

Germany: Type 212CD (E?)

Germany has stated recently that they can promise delivery of the first submarine to Canada by 2034, with a second in 2036 and a third in 2037. The Germans are unable to deliver boats on anything approaching the same schedule as the Korean's due to the ongoing orders in their yards for their own Navy and that of Norway for the same Type 212CD design. Germany and Norway have 10 boats currently ordered, with an expected additional 5 boat order coming in the future. There is other multiple high profile nations who are looking at German submarines in the future like Poland, this will further affect Canadian order rate speed if they get ahead of us in line. Germany has been rather tight lipped about cooperation with Canada for domestic offsets, and has offered little to match what the South Korean's have done thus far.

As far as the Type 212CD design, we are unsure if the German's are offering the 212CD design or the enlarged 212CDE which was previously offered to Norway. The E variant is an extended with a 10m~ hull plug, providing an additional 500t~ to the design and is used to additional range and space within the design. The base and extended variants of the Type 212CD are smaller than their Korean counterpart, largely due to the inclusion of a 10 large diameter VLS cells. The German design is reported to be one of the most advanced conventional submarines in the world, and Germany has a substantial pedigree as cutting edge submarine designers and producers. A novel diamond shaped outer hull apparently provides a greater degree of stealth against active sonar use, and some other sensor packages. The sensor package on this design is also apparently the best in class, even considering SSN's of the UK, Russia and the US. Germany also has access to advanced weapon systems like the relatively new DM2A4 Hake torpedo, with a new advanced torpedo actively being designed jointly by Norway and themselves. A torpedo tube launched variant of the NSM is under consideration, which provides commonality with the RCN surface fleet.

Germany has some of the most advanced AIP in the world seemingly, although their lithium battery tech is behind the Korean's apparently. The range provided for the size of the boat and its crew is very impressive, to the point Norway and Germany expects to use them in the North as well. The Type 212CD design is also fully NATO compliant and having an agreement inked with Norway & Germany would provide Canada an easier avenue to cross train submariners in the future. There is also the political considerations with the current Liberals, who seem very excited to push Canada closer to Europe and especially with their defence industry. Going alongside multiple major NATO allies and European partners is a powerful message.

The German delivery timeline is very sub-par, to the point that it will force Canada to wait around in line and potentially fight with Germany/Norway to get priority in the production line. We will be forced to operate the Victoria class for longer, or be required to scrap them early and accept a capability gap within the RCN's submarine force. If there are any slipups or delays in the German production line, the effects will be much harsher on Canada than the Korean's. The German design lacks a VLS system, which concentrates any land attack or anti-ship weapons into the torpedo magazine. This takes up valuable space and can limit combat endurance/loadout variety. The Type 212CD and CDE are both unproven designs, heavily modified from the base Type 212 design. Similar to Korea in a way, Germany will be a major target of Russia in an escalation of a European conflict in the future. Even in peacetime, sabotage of NATO infrastructure including ships as been more and more common as of late.

My Opinion:

After everything I've seen and heard, I'm personally putting my favor behind the South Koreans. The German's have a seemingly awesome submarine itself, but their delivery timeline and crowded shipyards really fly in the face of the urgent need to replace our current submarines. The Korean design is very capable itself, to the point it seems entirely able to meet our requirements. With the proposed delivery timeline, the Korean option is very difficult to beat. Items like VLS on the design is a further sweetener, if they can be properly utilized.

Korea is also a potential major economic and military partner for Canada in the future, although the pivot to Europe might override any concerns had over the Germans with a political decision from upon high. It would not be the first time such things have happened.
 
Thanks very much for your extended thoughts about the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, Rainbow1910. I've been an armchair observer of submarine matters for the past 45 years or so, and am basically in agreement with your info and opinions here. I concur with you that either German or Korean yards would be a fine choice for Canada. Germany's longtime expertise in U-boats, and their experience in two world wars, needs no comment. Korea's shipbuilding industry is massive and of reportedly high quality. While submarine building is a very specialized area, by all accounts the Korean Navy's subs (with tech of German origin) have been satisfactory. Yes, real Arctic ability will be a stretch for both countries. Let's see whether anybody else would like to weigh in here.

As you touched on, in big pricey warship deals like this, the final decision may come down as much on what side offset deals (having nothing to do with ships or defense) are offered by the parties as on what specs the two sub designs have.

It very much seems that speed is of the essence here...

Germany and (especially) Korea are capable of timely manufacture after at least a down payment is received. But given the facts of what Ottawa has spent since 2011 to actually meet its agreed goal of a minimum of 2.0% of GDP for defense, I regrettably suspect that your and the TV commentators' view about a speedy contract with the chosen shipyard about this very expensive program, and speedy entry into RCN service, is optimistic, to say the least. We will see.

the pivot to Europe...

I chuckled when I read this. Perhaps this is a polite way to hint at Ontarian fear of allegedly imminent US invasion, but Canada had "pivoted to Europe" back in 1917 at Vimy Ridge, and was one of the founding members of NATO in 1949.
 
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A Naval News article posted recently had an interview with a Canadian Naval Officer who claimed the down select and contract negotiation within the next two years, although the down select happening now automatically speeds this timeline up. It very much seems that speed is of the essence here, and some rumours I've heard point towards the RFP being skipped and the Navy entering into direct negotiations with one of the two parties in 2026 potentially.

I will preface my opinion with the fact that both the German and Korean designs are very competently designed and constructed vessels by experienced partners, and I think either design will ultimately suit Canada's goals. All of the "bad" or "unsuitable" options have been eliminated and it comes down to tradeoffs between the remaining bids.

South Korea: KSS-III Batch II

South Korea has recently said that if the contract is awarded to them in 2026, they promise delivery of the first submarine to Canada by 2032. They specify three more submarines by 2035 and the entire hypothetical twelve submarine order by 2043. To say this is quick would be an understatement, it is frankly lightening fast and blows the German offering out of the water. The Korean offer would allow the RCN to retire the Victoria class by 2035, allowing us to scrap those ships and saving us potentially billions in operational/modernization costs. They have also signed countless memorandums with high profile Canadian companies for various bits of cooperation, and have pledged/discussed things like lithium battery production/maintenance, domestic production of Korean weapon systems with IP rights, access to Korean owned American shipyards for upkeep alongside Canadian yards and many more things.
All those offsets alone would make one hell of an attractive package.

Then there's the delivery timeline that we all know that the Koreans can actually meet.

Hard to argue with those two points. In fact, "almost impossible to argue with" is probably the better description.


The KSS-III design itself is pretty modern, tracing its legacy back to the German Type 209 and 214 class submarines which were licensed to Korea for further domestic design/construction. It has its German lineage, but the Korean's have done significant work to make the follow on KSS designs their own. Various domestic systems are integrated, alongside importing many top of the line sensor, CMS, etc systems into the design as well. The boats are large, featuring some of the most advanced lithium ion batteries in the world while also retaining AIP as well. Range is not an issue, with the boats designed for long range patrols throughout the Pacific Ocean. There is a substantial amount of Korean sourced equipment aboard, something like 80% it seems. 10 large VLS tubes aboard currently only house the Hyunmoo 4-4 conventional SLBM, but it is theorized they can retrofit anti-ship, land attack and even potentially unmanned systems into these in the future. VLS permits additional weaponry to be carried while keeping the torpedo magazine uncluttered for its primary purpose. They are stealthy, advanced and have a good standard of modern amenities for western crews.

Questions can be raised if these vessels are truly suited to Arctic/near Arctic operations though. There is also concerns about NATO/NORAD interoperability for sensor suites, CMS and other systems, although the Korean's apparently do build much of their equipment to meet or exceed NATO standards. Korean weapon systems would take us out of our comfort zone of American and European weapons, alongside the fact that Korea can be a bit politically unstable/will be ground zero for a conflict with China if it breaks out. The KSS-III Batch II boat is not entirely proven and still under construction, and deviates a fair bit from the Batch I which is in service currently. It is also questionable if the Korean K-VLS can accommodate foreign/other missile types besides the Hyunmoo 4-4 SLBM, which is a bit of a dubious purchase for Canada/sale from Korea.
The VLS is definitely an attractive option, though in Arctic ops you'd need to find a hole in the ice to shoot through.

The real question is what exactly the tube diameter is, as right now it sounds like Hyunmoo 4-4s are ~80cm diameter or so. Which means you're only sticking one 53cm tube in there for "lesser" missiles like Tomahawks or Exocets. If you could stuff 3x 53cm tubes into each VLS in a smaller version of the Trident/VPM setup, that would be a wicked setup for an SSGP.


Now, if Canada's government doesn't like the VLS or it's a diameter that limits you to 1x 21" weapon per tube, I'm sure the Koreans could design out the VLS and replace it with additional fuel tanks and batteries for the same total weight. And more hydrogen tankage under the turtleback. Though in this case I'd strongly recommend including one large diver lock-out chamber in there, space for 8+ dudes plus all their equipment.




Questions can be raised if these vessels are truly suited to Arctic/near Arctic operations though.
As far as I understand things in general, if the KSS-3s aren't already designed for Arctic operations there would be a bit of a weight increase to reinforce the sail framework and maybe the turtleback, plus installing fairwater planes that can go dead vertical like the old 637 boats did. Annoyingly, all that weight would be up high in the sub, so it may require lead ballast to get the CG/metacentric height back where it belongs. (I'm not sure which term of art is correct here, can someone help me out?) I'm guessing about 100 tons of metal in the sail and turtleback, probably with a corresponding 100 tons in the keel. Of course, if there's physically space for an additional 100 tons of batteries in the keel, you should install the extra batteries instead of simple lead.

The only other modification you'd need is an upwards-looking under-ice sonar, but these days I think that's standard equipment.



Germany: Type 212CD (E?)

Germany has stated recently that they can promise delivery of the first submarine to Canada by 2034, with a second in 2036 and a third in 2037. The Germans are unable to deliver boats on anything approaching the same schedule as the Korean's due to the ongoing orders in their yards for their own Navy and that of Norway for the same Type 212CD design. Germany and Norway have 10 boats currently ordered, with an expected additional 5 boat order coming in the future. There is other multiple high profile nations who are looking at German submarines in the future like Poland, this will further affect Canadian order rate speed if they get ahead of us in line. Germany has been rather tight lipped about cooperation with Canada for domestic offsets, and has offered little to match what the South Korean's have done thus far.

As far as the Type 212CD design, we are unsure if the German's are offering the 212CD design or the enlarged 212CDE which was previously offered to Norway. The E variant is an extended with a 10m~ hull plug, providing an additional 500t~ to the design and is used to additional range and space within the design. The base and extended variants of the Type 212CD are smaller than their Korean counterpart, largely due to the inclusion of a 10 large diameter VLS cells. The German design is reported to be one of the most advanced conventional submarines in the world, and Germany has a substantial pedigree as cutting edge submarine designers and producers. A novel diamond shaped outer hull apparently provides a greater degree of stealth against active sonar use, and some other sensor packages. The sensor package on this design is also apparently the best in class, even considering SSN's of the UK, Russia and the US. Germany also has access to advanced weapon systems like the relatively new DM2A4 Hake torpedo, with a new advanced torpedo actively being designed jointly by Norway and themselves. A torpedo tube launched variant of the NSM is under consideration, which provides commonality with the RCN surface fleet.
Hopefully it's the 212CDE, the extra range and space is critical for under-ice operations.



Germany has some of the most advanced AIP in the world seemingly, although their lithium battery tech is behind the Korean's apparently. The range provided for the size of the boat and its crew is very impressive, to the point Norway and Germany expects to use them in the North as well. The Type 212CD design is also fully NATO compliant and having an agreement inked with Norway & Germany would provide Canada an easier avenue to cross train submariners in the future. There is also the political considerations with the current Liberals, who seem very excited to push Canada closer to Europe and especially with their defence industry. Going alongside multiple major NATO allies and European partners is a powerful message.
I'm not sure that's really an advantage, as the RCN currently shares training (at least for COs) with IIRC the Dutch Perisher.



The German delivery timeline is very sub-par, to the point that it will force Canada to wait around in line and potentially fight with Germany/Norway to get priority in the production line. We will be forced to operate the Victoria class for longer, or be required to scrap them early and accept a capability gap within the RCN's submarine force. If there are any slipups or delays in the German production line, the effects will be much harsher on Canada than the Korean's. The German design lacks a VLS system, which concentrates any land attack or anti-ship weapons into the torpedo magazine. This takes up valuable space and can limit combat endurance/loadout variety. The Type 212CD and CDE are both unproven designs, heavily modified from the base Type 212 design. Similar to Korea in a way, Germany will be a major target of Russia in an escalation of a European conflict in the future. Even in peacetime, sabotage of NATO infrastructure including ships as been more and more common as of late.
And yes, the delivery time is likely to see the German bid lose, IMO.
 
The VLS is definitely an attractive option, though in Arctic ops you'd need to find a hole in the ice to shoot through.

The real question is what exactly the tube diameter is, as right now it sounds like Hyunmoo 4-4s are ~80cm diameter or so. Which means you're only sticking one 53cm tube in there for "lesser" missiles like Tomahawks or Exocets. If you could stuff 3x 53cm tubes into each VLS in a smaller version of the Trident/VPM setup, that would be a wicked setup for an SSGP.


Now, if Canada's government doesn't like the VLS or it's a diameter that limits you to 1x 21" weapon per tube, I'm sure the Koreans could design out the VLS and replace it with additional fuel tanks and batteries for the same total weight. And more hydrogen tankage under the turtleback. Though in this case I'd strongly recommend including one large diver lock-out chamber in there, space for 8+ dudes plus all their equipment.
Information on the K-VLS submarine variant diameter is very difficult to come by however, I've heard rumours that it is more in the sub 2.0m diameter range, maybe somewhere around the 1.5m~ range? The Koreans have spoken about wanting to launch their Tomahawk equivalents from the cells, so it seems you would be able to multi-pack them with some kind of VPM type setup. Even if Canada has to take delivery of the boats with empty VLS and retrofit this capability later, I think it is likely worthwhile. The ability to have a substantial strike package within a stealthy and potent sensor package like a large SSK is very tempting.

Designing the VLS out of the design would fly in the face of the Canadian govt wanting to take an off the shelf design that is also operated by the home country, it would also potentially complicate the design and delay it to some degree. Missing out on the VLS seems like a major loss as well, KSS-III Batch II's range seems perfectly fine without more.
 
I saw a press release yesterday that the civilian Canadian Coast Guard is becoming part of the Department of National Defence (DND). The DND's 27k civilian employees oversee 64k active Canadian Forces (navy + army + air force). The Coast Guard's 6.5k personnel and their ships are unarmed—not even handguns—and I've seen no report of that changing, so little or no operational difference. But Ottawa will hereafter consider the Coast Guard's budget as defense spending, to (at least notionally) get closer to the 2.0% of GDP that Canada had agreed to in 2011. For comparison, Ottawa spent 1.37% on defense in 2024.

(NATO member Italy, also below 2.0% since 2011, has broached calling the 14-billion-euro budget of its planned record-span Messina Strait suspension bridge 'defense spending'.)
 
(NATO member Italy, also below 2.0% since 2011, has broached calling the 14-billion-euro budget of its planned record-span Messina Strait suspension bridge 'defense spending'.)
Consider US Federal support of the creation of the US interstate system (aka the Dwight D Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways) because of its military utility. Is this any different?

WRT the Canadian Coastguard, it's clear they do have a defence function, even if they aren't armed. For comparison, consider the RN's RFA with an even more obvious military role, but also civilian and not armed.
 
I saw a press release yesterday that the civilian Canadian Coast Guard is becoming part of the Department of National Defence (DND). The DND's 27k civilian employees oversee 64k active Canadian Forces (navy + army + air force). The Coast Guard's 6.5k personnel and their ships are unarmed—not even handguns—and I've seen no report of that changing, so little or no operational difference. But Ottawa will hereafter consider the Coast Guard's budget as defense spending, to (at least notionally) get closer to the 2.0% of GDP that Canada had agreed to in 2011. For comparison, Ottawa spent 1.37% on defense in 2024.

(NATO member Italy, also below 2.0% since 2011, has broached calling the 14-billion-euro budget of its planned record-span Messina Strait suspension bridge 'defense spending'.)
Doesn't the Canadian Coast Guard have a law/customs enforcement role like the USCG?
 
Doesn't the Canadian Coast Guard have a law/customs enforcement role like the USCG?
Not at all. Actual law enforcement is done by the RCMP and fishery officers. Fishery officers are part of Fisheries and Oceans, not coast guard. Both agencies utilize Coast Guard ships to carry out enforcement actions. Coast Guard personnel cannot legally make arrests or enforce any of the laws under the Criminal Code. They can issue tickets for certain maritime offences but that is not a mandated duty. Additionally guardsmen and ships are not armed, as Owens Z stated. There are a few Coast Guard ships that are more directly operated by fishery officers and they can be armed with M2 Brownings.
 
I wonder how long before that non-combatant / non-LEO status gets junked after this change though, attempts to game defence spending to try and preserve bread and circuses notwithstanding?
 
I saw a press release yesterday that the civilian Canadian Coast Guard is becoming part of the Department of National Defence (DND). The DND's 27k civilian employees oversee 64k active Canadian Forces (navy + army + air force). The Coast Guard's 6.5k personnel and their ships are unarmed—not even handguns—and I've seen no report of that changing, so little or no operational difference. But Ottawa will hereafter consider the Coast Guard's budget as defense spending, to (at least notionally) get closer to the 2.0% of GDP that Canada had agreed to in 2011. For comparison, Ottawa spent 1.37% on defense in 2024.

(NATO member Italy, also below 2.0% since 2011, has broached calling the 14-billion-euro budget of its planned record-span Messina Strait suspension bridge 'defense spending'.)
Ottawa can consider the CCG as defence spending however, NATO has strict guidelines on what can be classified as such and the CCG does not meet such guidelines.


Defence expenditure is defined by NATO as payments made by a national government (excluding regional, local and municipal authorities) specifically to meet the needs of its armed forces, those of Allies or of the Alliance. For the purposes of this definition, the needs of the Alliance are considered to consist of NATO common funding and NATO-managed trust funds. The list of eligible NATO trust funds is approved by all Allies.

A major component of defence expenditure is payments for Armed Forces financed from within the Ministry of Defence budget. Armed Forces include land, maritime and air forces as well as joint formations, such as Administration and Command, Special Operations Forces, Medical Service, Logistic Command, Space Command, Cyber Command. They might also include parts of other forces such as Ministry of Interior troops, national police forces, coast guards etc. In such cases, expenditure is included only in proportion to the forces that are trained in military tactics, are equipped as a military force, can operate under direct military authority in deployed operations, and can, realistically, be deployed outside national territory in support of a military force. Expenditure on other forces financed through the budgets of ministries other than the Ministry of Defence is also included in defence expenditure.

Retirement pensions made directly by the government to retired military and civilian employees of military departments and for active personnel is included in the NATO defence expenditure definition.

Expenditures for stockpiling of war reserves of finished military equipment or supplies for use directly by the armed forces are included.

The CCG doesn't really fall under this and thus NATO wouldn't really recognize us rolling it into our defence spending, as far as they are concerned at this point.

I wonder how long before that non-combatant / non-LEO status gets junked after this change though, attempts to game defence spending to try and preserve bread and circuses notwithstanding?
Incredibly unlikely, the Govt and all relevant organizations here have made it clear that the mandate of the CCG will not be changing much. The CCG is staying a civilian organization, with the changes seemingly being higher capability radar suites, interoperable information sharing networks with the Navy and allowing the Navy to utilize CCG infrastructure/vice versa to a point. The CCG is fiercely independent and proud of their culture and traditions, alongside the fact they are a heavily unionized civilian organization. A substantial amount of their staff do not want to be armed, nor undertake law enforcement/military matters and chose the job for that reason.

If the Govt attempted to change this, you would almost certainly see large scale work action, major union objections and people flat out leaving the organization to the point it will grind their operations to a halt.
 
Incredibly unlikely, the Govt and all relevant organizations here have made it clear that the mandate of the CCG will not be changing much. The CCG is staying a civilian organization, with the changes seemingly being higher capability radar suites, interoperable information sharing networks with the Navy and allowing the Navy to utilize CCG infrastructure/vice versa to a point. The CCG is fiercely independent and proud of their culture and traditions, alongside the fact they are a heavily unionized civilian organization. A substantial amount of their staff do not want to be armed, nor undertake law enforcement/military matters and chose the job for that reason.

If the Govt attempted to change this, you would almost certainly see large scale work action, major union objections and people flat out leaving the organization to the point it will grind their operations to a halt.
Ah, okay. Makes a little more sense now. So Canadian coast guard is pretty strictly a rescue service, then?

As opposed to USCG which started out as Customs/Revenue cutters and added rescue because they were already out at sea and there.
 
Information on the K-VLS submarine variant diameter is very difficult to come by however, I've heard rumours that it is more in the sub 2.0m diameter range, maybe somewhere around the 1.5m~ range? The Koreans have spoken about wanting to launch their Tomahawk equivalents from the cells, so it seems you would be able to multi-pack them with some kind of VPM type setup. Even if Canada has to take delivery of the boats with empty VLS and retrofit this capability later, I think it is likely worthwhile. The ability to have a substantial strike package within a stealthy and potent sensor package like a large SSK is very tempting.
And of course you could stuff bigger UUVs into the tube than the 21" variety.

Hopefully the sub KVLS is big enough for at least a triple-21" insert (~25" actual inside diameter, probably 30" outside diameter). My brain is not processing the math to figure out what that outer tube diameter needs to be in order to make 3x30" outside diameter pipes fit inside it right now. I'm guessing something about 6ft diameter would be needed.



Designing the VLS out of the design would fly in the face of the Canadian govt wanting to take an off the shelf design that is also operated by the home country, it would also potentially complicate the design and delay it to some degree. Missing out on the VLS seems like a major loss as well, KSS-III Batch II's range seems perfectly fine without more.
Yes, if they want to take a completely MOTS sub they'll keep the VLS.
 
Ottawa can consider the CCG as defence spending however, NATO has strict guidelines on what can be classified as such and the CCG does not meet such guidelines...

True. Of course, civilian agencies like coast guards can be included under military expenditures if they receive training in military tactics and are armed (or can be armed in wartime). That's how Italy's Guardia di Finanza sneaks under the wire - they qualify as a paramilitary police force.*

However, as you said, there seems to be no current plan to change the CCG mandate.

It may be that moving the Canadian Coast Guard from DFO to DND is a first step in qualifying the CCG as a paramilitary. On the other hand, it may just be a change in bookkeeping - after all, the CCG was under Transport Canada before it became a DFO SOA. There already are standalone agencies which are titularly under DND - the Communications Security Establishment comes to mind.
_______________________________________

* The RCMP also qualify as a paramilitary police force ... although Canada doesn't claim even ERTs under defence spending.
 
If the Govt attempted to change this, you would almost certainly see large scale work action, major union objections and people flat out leaving the organization to the point it will grind their operations to a halt.
In other words, if the Canadian government wants the CCG to be an armed law enforcement organisation like most major coast guards these days, they will probably have to pretty much start from scratch. Our own coast guard (which is a privatised, primarily helicopter based, SAR organisation) will likely have to be dealt with in the same way in the near future if our own government is any bit serious about their promises to secure Irish airspace and waters.
 
Ah, okay. Makes a little more sense now. So Canadian coast guard is pretty strictly a rescue service, then?

As opposed to USCG which started out as Customs/Revenue cutters and added rescue because they were already out at sea and there.
Yes, the CCG follows the British model of organization. Unlike the American model where both the Navy and the Coast Guard are armed and have various duties, the Canadian Coast Guard is unarmed while most of its enforcement roles fall either to the Navy, or to various law enforcement organizations which CCG transports around. Wikipedia explains it best;

Unlike armed coast guards of some other nations, the CCG is a government marine organization without naval or law enforcement responsibilities. Naval operations in Canada's maritime environment are exclusively the responsibility of the Royal Canadian Navy. Enforcement of Canada's maritime-related federal statutes may be carried out by peace officers serving with various federal, provincial or even municipal law enforcement agencies.

Although CCG personnel are neither a naval nor law enforcement force, they may operate CCG vessels in support of naval operations, or they may serve an operational role in the delivery of maritime law enforcement and security services in Canadian federal waters by providing a platform for personnel serving with one or more law enforcement agencies. The CCG's responsibility encompasses Canada's 202,080-kilometre-long (109,110 nmi; 125,570 mi) coastline. Its vessels and aircraft operate over an area of ocean and inland waters covering approximately 2.3 million square nautical miles (7.9 million square kilometres).


The Oceans Act gives the CCG responsibility for providing:

aids to navigation;
marine communications and traffic management services;
icebreaking and ice-management services;
channel maintenance;
marine search and rescue;
marine pollution response; and
support of other government departments, boards and agencies by providing ships, aircraft and other services.
The Canada Shipping Act gives the minister powers, responsibilities and obligations concerning:

aids to navigation;
Sable Island;
search and rescue;
pollution response; and
vessel traffic services.

True. Of course, civilian agencies like coast guards can be included under military expenditures if they receive training in military tactics and are armed (or can be armed in wartime). That's how Italy's Guardia di Finanza sneaks under the wire - they qualify as a paramilitary police force.*

However, as you said, there seems to be no current plan to change the CCG mandate.

It may be that moving the Canadian Coast Guard from DFO to DND is a first step in qualifying the CCG as a paramilitary. On the other hand, it may just be a change in bookkeeping - after all, the CCG was under Transport Canada before it became a DFO SOA. There already are standalone agencies which are titularly under DND - the Communications Security Establishment comes to mind.
_______________________________________

* The RCMP also qualify as a paramilitary police force ... although Canada doesn't claim even ERTs under defence spending.
I have my doubts that the CCG will ever change from its current form for the reasons I described above, the organization is fundamentally opposed to being a paramilitary force and attempting to transform it into one would effectively require you to tear it all down and start again. This consolidation seems to largely be a way to allow better cooperation and coordination between the forces, specifically allowing them to use each others naval infrastructure and better share sensor data through datalinks.
 
...
I have my doubts that the CCG will ever change from its current form for the reasons I described above, the organization is fundamentally opposed to being a paramilitary force and attempting to transform it into one would effectively require you to tear it all down and start again. This consolidation seems to largely be a way to allow better cooperation and coordination between the forces, specifically allowing them to use each others naval infrastructure and better share sensor data through datalinks.

Agreed ... for now. At present, we lack clarity as to Ottawa's motivation for this move. The simplest explanation is that being an SOA of DFO proved too narrow for whatever it is that the GoC wants the Canadian Coast Guard to be capable of doing.

The 'accounting tricks' used by European allies to broaden their NATO-acceptable defence expenditures will not have been lost on Carney et al. But, of course, that doesn't automatically mean that Ottawa intends to follow this particular path.

Agreed too that a forced militarisation of the Canadian Coast Guard would result in job action as well as some exits or early retirements. I mention the latter because of the average age of CCG employees - I've seen 45 for ships' personnel and 47 for 'landsmen' (slightly above the PSAC average). The point here is that cultures do change - especially as a workforce ages out. I'm not trying to be predictive here, just considering potential options should Ottawa intend a future change in the CCG mandate.

Going out on a limb, one extreme option for the GoC would be to re-establish the Marine Service (under TC) to cover obviously civilian roles - general maritime safety, navaids/buoy tending, Inshore Rescue Boats, etc. Then a somewhat militarised CCG (under DND) could focus on security and sovereignty roles - especially in the Arctic - and dedicated SAR. Obviously, there would still be overlaps between the Marine Service and a paramilitary CCG - in icebreaking, environment protection, more general SAR, etc.

The Marine Service/CCG split scenario above may be improbable. But it could provide a gentler 'out' for older employees and other dedicated to the existing non-military culture of the Canadian Coast Guard.

OT but a lower-hanging fruit for GoC accountants would be the National Aerial Surveillance Program. At present, NASP is still under Transport Canada (AFAIK). However, 'surveillance' is about sovereignty and NASP patrol aircraft have sensors of readily-apparent use to DND. The trick (as with a revised CCG) would be creating a mandate that focused a paramilitary NASP on tasks that the military doesn't already perform.
 
Yes, the CCG follows the British model of organization.
That's a good point, the UK considers HM Coast Guard an emergency service in the same category as police/fire/ambulance and pretty much everything they do is rescue or safety related - most of their personnel are civilian volunteers.

OTOH the nature of operations in the far North means CCG has a de facto sea surveillance role as Johhny-on-the-spot that doesn't really have a parallel for HMCG.
 
Going out on a limb, one extreme option for the GoC would be to re-establish the Marine Service (under TC) to cover obviously civilian roles - general maritime safety, navaids/buoy tending, Inshore Rescue Boats, etc. Then a somewhat militarised CCG (under DND) could focus on security and sovereignty roles - especially in the Arctic - and dedicated SAR. Obviously, there would still be overlaps between the Marine Service and a paramilitary CCG - in icebreaking, environment protection, more general SAR, etc.
I dunno, Canada has not done a good job historically with creating new organizations and identifying the people with the right personality types to have working there.
Witness the multiple versions of Special Ops they've gone through, each ending in some scandal regarding personnel doing nasty things. Which all come down to a gross failure in the selection process.
Also witness the problems in the US with "militarized police" and how a former US Marine was fired for using his military counter-insurgency training to talk down an attempted suicide-by-cop. Department policy was to just shoot the dude and not risk personnel. When a freaking Marine is less trigger-happy than your local police department, you have issues.
 
I was speculating about one possible re-organisation model available to Ottawa. And, of course, success in such ventures can never be guaranteed. However, the chances of success are greatly increased in the case of well though-through mandates which are then reinforced and enforced. As Rainbow 1910 pointed out, a key issue is the underlying organisational culture (which can/does change over time).

I'm not sure about the relevance of CANSOFCOM. If you are talking about JTF2, then you need to examine both motives and execution. In the case of JTF2, the GoC took 'militarisation' of ERTs too literally - shuttering the politically-awkward RCMP SERT in favour of a CAF-manned replacement. Then, they kept lumping on additional roles while allowing DND to cloaking everything in 'OpSec' ... not the most promising of recipes.

That said, Federal police paramilitaries are not the same thing as 'militarised police'. Under NATO rules, the former need to be capable of performing practiced military tasks in wartime. Your American 'militarised police' are just over-armed cops making enemies out of their own population - even when equipped with MRAPs and AR15s, such police have no actual military value.
 
I was speculating about one possible re-organisation model available to Ottawa. And, of course, success in such ventures can never be guaranteed. However, the chances of success are greatly increased in the case of well though-through mandates which are then reinforced and enforced. As Rainbow 1910 pointed out, a key issue is the underlying organisational culture (which can/does change over time).

I'm not sure about the relevance of CANSOFCOM. If you are talking about JTF2, then you need to examine both motives and execution. In the case of JTF2, the GoC took 'militarisation' of ERTs too literally - shuttering the politically-awkward RCMP SERT in favour of a CAF-manned replacement. Then, they kept lumping on additional roles while allowing DND to cloaking everything in 'OpSec' ... not the most promising of recipes.
Exactly. The wrong personality types will start doing things like abusing underlings or other things that the politicians will really scream about, because there's no internal discipline to avoid those things.



That said, Federal police paramilitaries are not the same thing as 'militarised police'. Under NATO rules, the former need to be capable of performing practiced military tasks in wartime. Your American 'militarised police' are just over-armed cops making enemies out of their own population - even when equipped with MRAPs and AR15s, such police have no actual military value.
Correct.

"Over-armed cops making enemies out of their own population" is exactly the kinds of bad decisions the wrong kinds of personalities make, that a proper selection program would weed out.
 
...So Canadian coast guard is pretty strictly a rescue service, then?
Our own coast guard (which is a privatised, primarily helicopter based, SAR organisation)...
...the UK considers HM Coast Guard an emergency service in the same category as police/fire/ambulance and pretty much everything they do is rescue or safety related...

Well, not quite. The Royal Canadian Air Force's big Merlin helicopters, local name CH-149 Cormorant, are the nation's first responders for air/sea rescue. See post #112 above for an example. Two squadrons of (unarmed) CH-149s are on the east coast, and one on the west coast. Although operating from land bases in Canadian service, the Merlin was designed for shipboard use and can, and sometimes does, stage from RCN and CCG ships with appropriate pads.

If I'm remembering correctly, when I as a kid was briefly allowed aboard a red-hulled Canadian Coast Guard ship tied up at Québec City one summer in the early 1980s, I was told that these ships' primary task was keeping the vital shipping channel of the St Lawrence River and its estuary ice-free during winters, allowing year-round access through to the Great Lakes (which have their own CCG ships). Also tending buoys and other aids to navigation. Sounds to me like proper civilian jobs, for which police powers (much less antisubmarine weapons) would be superfluous.

While Vancouver on the west coast is at a higher latitude than Québec City, the Juan de Fuca Strait out to the Pacific that Vancouver and CFB Esquimalt share with Seattle and Bremerton doesn't ice up in wintertime. So maybe CCG vessels on the west coast have a different focus.
 
...WRT the Canadian Coastguard, it's clear they do have a defence function, even if they aren't armed. For comparison, consider the RN's RFA with an even more obvious military role, but also civilian and not armed.

I don't think so, DWG. If ever there is a serious naval war again (God forbid), then the unarmed Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships and unarmed United States Naval Ships (USNS) will become armed very quickly, for survival. Ships of the Canadian Coast Guard, by contrast, have no fleet support role (other than, as always, coastal icebreaking) and wouldn't be sent into harm's way.
 
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Right. The reason I assumed the CCG was like the USCG was their joint operations on the Great Lakes. They have ships painted USCG on one side and CCG on the other, and the topside crews are half USCG and half CCG. They'll pull up on ships on the US side of the border showing their USCG side and all personnel will be USCG, and start talking with people. Do the usual safety chats (everyone have a life jacket, etc), then start talking about what they're doing. People will admit to USCG that they're hauling cigarettes into canada to bypass the taxes/customs duties, and that's about the time that the USCG guys will say, "yeah, I can't do anything about it. But he can!" as the Canadian personnel pop up having heard everything. IIRC it's alcohol going the other direction, usually.

Rule #1: You do not talk about Fight Club.
Rule #2: You DO NOT talk about Fight Club.
 
I wonder how long before that non-combatant / non-LEO status gets junked after this change though...
...Incredibly unlikely, the Govt and all relevant organizations here have made it clear that the mandate of the CCG will not be changing much. The CCG is staying a civilian organization, with the changes seemingly being higher capability radar suites, interoperable information sharing networks with the Navy and allowing the Navy to utilize CCG infrastructure/vice versa to a point. The CCG is fiercely independent and proud of their culture and traditions, alongside the fact they are a heavily unionized civilian organization. A substantial amount of their staff do not want to be armed, nor undertake law enforcement/military matters and chose the job for that reason. If the Govt attempted to change this, you would almost certainly see large scale work action, major union objections and people flat out leaving the organization to the point it will grind their operations to a halt.
...It may be that moving the Canadian Coast Guard from DFO to DND is a first step in qualifying the CCG as a paramilitary. On the other hand, it may just be a change in bookkeeping...
...I have my doubts that the CCG will ever change from its current form for the reasons I described above, the organization is fundamentally opposed to being a paramilitary force and attempting to transform it into one would effectively require you to tear it all down and start again. This consolidation seems to largely be a way to allow better cooperation and coordination between the forces, specifically allowing them to use each others naval infrastructure and better share sensor data through datalinks.
...OTOH the nature of operations in the far North means CCG has a de facto sea surveillance role as Johhny-on-the-spot that doesn't really have a parallel for HMCG.

Canada's version is unusual among world coast guards in having zero police or paramilitary functions or training. To an outside observer like me, the Canadian Coast Guard seems to serve its restricted civilian roles well. If I understand correctly, the main point of cooperation between the CCG and the Royal Canadian Navy is for a sturdy icebreaker to precede a relatively flimsy warship in the Arctic when needed.

Of course, as DWG mentions, simply keeping one's eyes (and civilian radar) open in sparsely populated Arctic Canada can, assuming communications are not jammed, serve as a worthy auxiliary aid to policing and defense. But if Canada's waters become a war zone again, then defenseless CCG ships and aircraft will have to clear out: not their job.
 
... They have ships painted USCG on one side and CCG on the other, and the topside crews are half USCG and half CCG...

I have never heard of such a thing.

The USCG and CCG share icebreaking duties in the Great Lakes. So Canadian-manned CCG medium icebreakers may sometimes operate in US waters while their USCG opposites will return the favour in CA waters. AFAIK, the so-called 'one-fleet' approach has not been affected by the current US administration.

Within the Saint Lawrence Seaway, there is also the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement programme - aka 'Shiprider' - whereby law enforcement personnel from the US or Canada embarked upon CCG or USCG vessels, respectively.
 
Canada's version is unusual among world coast guards in having zero police or paramilitary functions or training...

(Sorry, HP keyboard glitch!) As mentioned, the CCG was originally a renaming of the Marine Service. Wherever non-maritime law enforcement is required, RCMP members are embarked - one advantages of having a Federal police force.
 
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I'm not sure about the relevance of CANSOFCOM. If you are talking about JTF2, then you need to examine both motives and execution. In the case of JTF2, the GoC took 'militarisation' of ERTs too literally - shuttering the politically-awkward RCMP SERT in favour of a CAF-manned replacement. Then, they kept lumping on additional roles while allowing DND to cloaking everything in 'OpSec' ... not the most promising of recipes.
Interestingly the CAF/DND reportedly tried to return the role to the Mounties back in 2020.

Ships of the Canadian Coast Guard, by contrast, have no fleet support role (other than, as always, coastal icebreaking) and wouldn't be sent into harm's way.
In theory. In practice, bureaucrats and politicians caught in a crack are liable to do anything.
 
The YouTube channel 'What's Going On With Shipping?' has an interesting video about a Dutch-flagged freighter, on course from China to a Quebec port on the St Lawrence River via the Northwest Passage, having run aground on 7 Sept 2025 on a shoal in Franklin Strait, named after the doomed Franklin Expedition that was lost in those waters in the 1840s. Three Canadian Coast Guard vessels are on scene today. No reported casualties, but the freighter remains stuck fast, and summer ends soon. Includes a helpful table of the various ice ratings used worldwide.

I had wondered whether the big container ship MSC Baltic III that lost power and smashed against a cliff in Newfoundland last February (see post #112 above) has since been salvaged, but the host mentions in passing that she is still there. Probably not in the best of shape, I would guess.

See:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mlf2ee-sU38
 
Right. The reason I assumed the CCG was like the USCG was their joint operations on the Great Lakes. They have ships painted USCG on one side and CCG on the other, and the topside crews are half USCG and half CCG. They'll pull up on ships on the US side of the border showing their USCG side and all personnel will be USCG, and start talking with people. Do the usual safety chats (everyone have a life jacket, etc), then start talking about what they're doing. People will admit to USCG that they're hauling cigarettes into canada to bypass the taxes/customs duties, and that's about the time that the USCG guys will say, "yeah, I can't do anything about it. But he can!" as the Canadian personnel pop up having heard everything. IIRC it's alcohol going the other direction, usually.
I have never heard of such a thing. The USCG and CCG share icebreaking duties in the Great Lakes. So Canadian-manned CCG medium icebreakers may sometimes operate in US waters while their USCG opposites will return the favour in CA waters. AFAIK, the so-called 'one-fleet' approach has not been affected by the current US administration. Within the Saint Lawrence Seaway, there is also the Integrated Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement programme - aka 'Shiprider' - whereby law enforcement personnel from the US or Canada embarked upon CCG or USCG vessels, respectively.
It exists. It's to address smuggling, as my example indicated.
Off the top of my head? No. That is how it was described by USCG folks when I was in college.

There are no joint ships with "USCG painted on one side and CCG on the other". And as discussed above, Canadian Coast Guard personnel have never had police powers, unlike the US Coast Guard and most other coast guards. Your college friends were pulling your leg, Scott Kenny.
 
There are no joint ships with "USCG painted on one side and CCG on the other". And as discussed above, Canadian Coast Guard personnel have never had police powers, unlike the US Coast Guard and most other coast guards. Your college friends were pulling your leg, Scott Kenny.
I suspect Scott's mis-remembered who was involved. Rather than USCG + CCG, try CCG without enforcement powers, and RCMP with.

"The Canadian Coast Guard and the RCMP work together to provide security enforcement on the Great Lakes and Gulf of St. Lawrence. Maritime security enforcement teams combine RCMP law enforcement powers with Canadian Coast Guard operational expertise. Teams are made up of RCMP officers working on mid-shore patrol vessels from the Canadian Coast Guard."
 
... a Dutch-flagged freighter, on course from China to a Quebec port on the St Lawrence River via the Northwest Passage, having run aground ...

FWIW, the CCG vessels involved:

CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier = High Endurance Multi-Tasked Vessel (Arctic Class 2)
- Canadian Shipbuilding, 1986; 83 m loa; 3,812 t gross
- Towing equipment: 22.4 tonnes bollard pull
- Western Region; home port: Victoria, BC
-- https://inter-j02.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fdat/vessels/100

CCGS Jean Goodwill = Medium Icebreaker (DNV ICE 10)
- Havyard Leirvik, 2000; 83.7 m loa; 3,382 t gross
- Towing equipment: winch; 200 tonnes bollard pull
- Atlantic Region; home port: Dartmouth, NS
-- https://inter-j02.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/fdat/vessels/2424

And from the CCG incidents page:

MV Thamesborg grounding in the Franklin Strait, Nunavut
First update – September 8, 2025

- On September 6, 2025, the Canadian Coast Guard was notified that Dutch-flagged vessel MV Thamesborg had run aground in the Franklin Strait, Nunavut.
- There are no injuries or pollution.
- The CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier is on scene with its Fast Rescue Craft and helicopter. It is in close contact with the MV Thamesborg.
- CCGS Jean Goodwill completed a hull inspection today (September 8, 2025) using a remotely operated vehicle. The results are currently being analyzed.
- The vessel MV Thamesborg has flooded in multiple ballast tanks. There is no flooding in any of its fuel tanks or its cargo hold. It is carrying a load of carbon anodes.
- Vessel owners are responsible for the cost of addressing their problem vessel. This includes any hazard-related costs like cleanup or repairs and any remediation action taken.

According to several sources, there is "no environmental damage". But multiple ballast tanks have been holed in the grounding. Assuming that those tanks were trimmed after leaving Lianyungang, officialdom must be assuming that any 'hitchhikers' from the Yellow Sea will be unable to survive in Arctic waters (even in the summertime). Let's hope that is true.

The CCG response to this grounding is about maritime and environmental safety and SAR. As noted above, under Canadian law, ultimate responsibility for repair, recovery, and remediation rest with Royal Wagenborg - the owners of the MV Thamesborg.
 

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I suspect Scott's mis-remembered who was involved. Rather than USCG + CCG, try CCG without enforcement powers, and RCMP with. "The Canadian Coast Guard and the RCMP work together to provide security enforcement on the Great Lakes and Gulf of St. Lawrence. Maritime security enforcement teams combine RCMP law enforcement powers with Canadian Coast Guard operational expertise. Teams are made up of RCMP officers working on mid-shore patrol vessels from the Canadian Coast Guard."

Yes, I understood that the Mounties (and, I'm told, armed officers from Fisheries and Oceans Canada) sometimes stage from Canadian Coast Guard vessels, and occasionally from Royal Canadian Navy warships, when needed for local law enforcement. While there are no joint ships on the Great Lakes, as Apophenia mentioned the USCG and CCG have for many years cooperated there as one fleet for strictly civilian tasks like icebreaking, rescue, and aids-to-navigation upkeep.

Naval battles were fought on the Great Lakes, but since the successful 1817 Rush-Bagot Treaty those (and Lake Champlain) are demilitarized. Warships have been built in lakeshore yards in both countries, but as long as after completion the warship transits to the open sea, the Treaty is considered unbroken. The famous paddle-wheel aircraft carriers Wolverine and Sable, used for pilot training on Lake Michigan, were commissioned USN warships but unarmed. In this 21st Century some law enforcement vessels on the Great Lakes carry rifle-caliber machine guns, to back up handguns if needed against a serious (esp. terrorist) threat, but as agreed, nothing heavier.
 

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