They have very little oil or gas inside their borders. Mongolia has lots of petroleum, so does Siberia. China invading either one would make sense in terms of removing that vulnerability
No it doesn't. Not in current situation, when China could essentially dictate prices to Russia due to loss of Russia European customers. Its order of magnitude safer, than trying to invade domestic territory of nuclear power with largest nuclear stockpile in the world and rather bad logistic.

Middle East restricts oil exports, or war with the US means interdicting the SCS.
Could you please stop inventing magical solutions to real problems? Your and Kat Tsun whole logic in this thread is a house made of cards, wth wild assumptions placed on top of even wilder assumptions. "The B-2 would knock down Chinese ICBM's because China would not detect them because Iran did not detect them because they would be coming through Mongolia because Russia would not detect them because Russia would be worried about China invading Siberia because China need petroleum because Middle East might stop export to China".

It's magical thinking - to assume that all those convoluted things would seamlessly fit into some grandiose plan JUST BECAUSE IT WOULD GRANT YOU WHAT YOU WISH (i.e. quick defeat of China by America).
 
Of course, if there is Revolution in Russia, and the new Russian elite is allied with the United States, then all bets are off.
The problem with this model is that US can't exactly suggest much to Russia for siding with them. What could US put on their end of bargain? Russia dealt with US long enough to be extremely skeptical of empty promises like "do what we want, and we would find excuses to not do whatever we promised".
 
Mongolia has lots of petroleum, so does Siberia.
Mongolia is not rich in oil resources.

They have very little oil or gas inside their borders.
China has substantial oil resources and is the world's fifth-largest oil producer, slightly behind Canada but ahead of Iraq and Iran. The problem is its consumption.

China invading either one would make sense in terms of removing that vulnerability.
There's something called trade.

You don't need the Iraq War to get Iraq's oil.
 
Could you please stop inventing magical solutions to real problems? Your and Kat Tsun whole logic in this thread is a house made of cards, wth wild assumptions placed on top of even wilder assumptions. "The B-2 would knock down Chinese ICBM's because China would not detect them because Iran did not detect them because they would be coming through Mongolia because Russia would not detect them because Russia would be worried about China invading Siberia because China need petroleum because Middle East might stop export to China".
You think that in the event of war, the USN would not destroy every single ship flying the PRC flag? Would not start destroying any ships pulling into or out of Chinese ports, regardless of flag?

I think the logic you're applying here is the house of cards.




There's something called trade.

You don't need the Iraq War to get Iraq's oil.
But a war in the Middle East completely FUBARs oil prices.
 
You think that in the event of war, the USN would not destroy every single ship flying the PRC flag? Would not start destroying any ships pulling into or out of Chinese ports, regardless of flag?
If I recall correctly neither I nor you said anything about that, so this is utterly irrelevant to the matter. But even speaking about this:

* No, USN could not do that. The absolute majority of this cargo ships are flagged not in China but in other countries (like the majority of world merchant marine). Attacking them - especially over something as dubious as Taiwan - would be too much for even American influence to handle;

*The USN is hardly in position to maintain any kind of tight blockade interdiction of Chinese shipping would require. There are rules for blockade; it must be enforced, not merely declared;

* Such action would represent MASSIVE escalation, which could be hard to push for even considering usual American warmongering;

I answered your question, now could you please answer mine? :)
 
But a war in the Middle East completely FUBARs oil prices.
The price of conquest is higher than oil prices.

You think that in the event of war, the USN would not destroy every single ship flying the PRC flag?
Maybe.

Would not start destroying any ships pulling into or out of Chinese ports, regardless of flag?
The U.S. does not possess such capability—U.S. Navy vessels have no survivability within the First Island Chain. I believe this is sufficient to protect ships entering and exiting Chinese ports.

Yes, perhaps Europe and North America don’t need China (they’re fools), but other countries do. The Middle East and Africa need China’s market and goods, as does Southeast Asia (and South Asia)—they also reap huge benefits from re-export trade.

Oil or minerals are shipped by Southeast Asian (or South Asian) vessels, departing from India, the Middle East, or Africa, (possibly transiting through India), arriving in the vast waters spanning from Hainan to Java, where they are unloaded at ports or even at sea before being transported to China by Chinese ships.

At the same time, Chinese ships deliver semi-finished goods (perhaps just missing a brand label) to Southeast Asia, where they undergo further processing before being shipped to India, the Middle East, and Africa by Southeast Asian (or South Asian) vessels.

What, are you going to restrict how much oil Saudi Arabia can export or how much Malaysia can import?

What, are you going to cap how many TVs Vietnam can export or how many South Africa can import?

Can you attach a tracker to every lump of iron ore exported from South Africa? Can you monitor the final destination of every single item on Southeast Asian (or South Asian) cargo ships?

Can you capture or destroy every Southeast Asian (or South Asian) vessels that could potentially facilitate China's imports and exports?

People often talk about the "carrot and stick"— if you offer no carrot, only the stick, then a lot of people are going to get angry!
 
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You think that in the event of war, the USN would not destroy every single ship flying the PRC flag? Would not start destroying any ships pulling into or out of Chinese ports, regardless of flag?

I think the logic you're applying here is the house of cards.





But a war in the Middle East completely FUBARs oil prices.
I don’t think we could do that if we wanted to.

We don’t have the ships to escort our own MSC, so we don’t have the ships to task with commerce raiding.

Ships that do run across Chinese flagged or bound vessels don’t have the magazine depth to sink too many, and on the fleet level I don’t think the USN has enough of any type of munition to do so for very long.

The other option is boarding and scuttling charges. Which unless something has changed, USN VBSS teams are not trained in the use of scuttling charges or any other serious explosives.
 
This is not just a reply to JPJ, it's addressed to everyone saying the USN can't do it.

We don’t have the ships to escort our own MSC, so we don’t have the ships to task with commerce raiding.

Ships that do run across Chinese flagged or bound vessels don’t have the magazine depth to sink too many, and on the fleet level I don’t think the USN has enough of any type of munition to do so for very long.
Have yall not heard of submarines? The pre-eminent commerce raiders for the last 125 years? The commerce raiders that strangled Great Britain twice, and Japan once? That hunted merchant ships in the SCS, Philippine Sea, Sea of Japan, ECS, and Yellow Sea, to the point that a map showing their kills has barely any visible land or water in the SCS and PS?

No skimmer targets need apply for commerce raiding. SUBFLT has that covered.

Magazine depth?

How many merchant ships will still be afloat after taking a single Mk48 amidships? That's ~20 merchant ships per submarine, still allowing them to keep a few torpedoes for self-protection on their way back to re-arm. Not counting any Tomahawks used as AShMs (12x per, which may-or-may-not cause critical damage to a merchant ship). 24 merchies if the sub Captains exhaust all their torpedoes before returning. But sure, let's assume that the average container ship is sufficiently watertight that it ends up averaging to 2 torpedoes per ship to sink them. That's still 10-12 merchant ships per submarine per patrol.

WW2 subs usually needed to fire 4x fish to get 2 hits and sink a merchant ship, and they still only carried about 24-34 torpedoes (depending on whether they went to sea with tubes loaded or just in the racks). IIRC the single most successful patrol in WW2 saw 8 sunk merchant ships via torpedo (the other sunk ships were via deck gun).

Plus, merchant ships have gotten a lot bigger. Order of magnitude bigger in terms of tonnage. This means fewer ships needed to haul the same total cargo tonnage. USS Tang, the US sub with the highest tonnage sunk in WW2, only had 116,000 tons across 33 ships (most recent revision to numbers) over 5 patrols. A single ULCC or container ship will equal or exceed that today.
 
This is not just a reply to JPJ, it's addressed to everyone saying the USN can't do it.


Have yall not heard of submarines? The pre-eminent commerce raiders for the last 125 years? The commerce raiders that strangled Great Britain twice, and Japan once? That hunted merchant ships in the SCS, Philippine Sea, Sea of Japan, ECS, and Yellow Sea, to the point that a map showing their kills has barely any visible land or water in the SCS and PS?

No skimmer targets need apply for commerce raiding. SUBFLT has that covered.

Magazine depth?

How many merchant ships will still be afloat after taking a single Mk48 amidships? That's ~20 merchant ships per submarine, still allowing them to keep a few torpedoes for self-protection on their way back to re-arm. Not counting any Tomahawks used as AShMs (12x per, which may-or-may-not cause critical damage to a merchant ship). 24 merchies if the sub Captains exhaust all their torpedoes before returning. But sure, let's assume that the average container ship is sufficiently watertight that it ends up averaging to 2 torpedoes per ship to sink them. That's still 10-12 merchant ships per submarine per patrol.

WW2 subs usually needed to fire 4x fish to get 2 hits and sink a merchant ship, and they still only carried about 24-34 torpedoes (depending on whether they went to sea with tubes loaded or just in the racks). IIRC the single most successful patrol in WW2 saw 8 sunk merchant ships via torpedo (the other sunk ships were via deck gun).

Plus, merchant ships have gotten a lot bigger. Order of magnitude bigger in terms of tonnage. This means fewer ships needed to haul the same total cargo tonnage. USS Tang, the US sub with the highest tonnage sunk in WW2, only had 116,000 tons across 33 ships (most recent revision to numbers) over 5 patrols. A single ULCC or container ship will equal or exceed that today.
John is right, the USN does not have the magazine depth or mission ready vessels to take on China's vast merchant fleet while simultaneously handling the PLAN.

They would need to lean on the USAF and their anti-ship munitions, though I'd imagine they'd have their hands full too.
 
This is not just a reply to JPJ, it's addressed to everyone saying the USN can't do it.


Have yall not heard of submarines? The pre-eminent commerce raiders for the last 125 years? The commerce raiders that strangled Great Britain twice, and Japan once? That hunted merchant ships in the SCS, Philippine Sea, Sea of Japan, ECS, and Yellow Sea, to the point that a map showing their kills has barely any visible land or water in the SCS and PS?

No skimmer targets need apply for commerce raiding. SUBFLT has that covered.

Magazine depth?

How many merchant ships will still be afloat after taking a single Mk48 amidships? That's ~20 merchant ships per submarine, still allowing them to keep a few torpedoes for self-protection on their way back to re-arm. Not counting any Tomahawks used as AShMs (12x per, which may-or-may-not cause critical damage to a merchant ship). 24 merchies if the sub Captains exhaust all their torpedoes before returning. But sure, let's assume that the average container ship is sufficiently watertight that it ends up averaging to 2 torpedoes per ship to sink them. That's still 10-12 merchant ships per submarine per patrol.

WW2 subs usually needed to fire 4x fish to get 2 hits and sink a merchant ship, and they still only carried about 24-34 torpedoes (depending on whether they went to sea with tubes loaded or just in the racks). IIRC the single most successful patrol in WW2 saw 8 sunk merchant ships via torpedo (the other sunk ships were via deck gun).

Plus, merchant ships have gotten a lot bigger. Order of magnitude bigger in terms of tonnage. This means fewer ships needed to haul the same total cargo tonnage. USS Tang, the US sub with the highest tonnage sunk in WW2, only had 116,000 tons across 33 ships (most recent revision to numbers) over 5 patrols. A single ULCC or container ship will equal or exceed that today.
We don’t have the subs for that. We’re going to send our subs after PLAN’s high value targets both at sea and ashore.

We have 71 submarines. Only 1/3 are ever in a deployable status. That’s 23-24 subs.

Some of those subs will be kept in the gulf, Baltic area, likely the med.
24/3 leaves 8 for each area/region.

Do you think 8 subs is enough to target both PLAN’s high end combatants including other subs, as well as commerce raiding?

You cite WWII and the uboats how many uboats do you think Germany had in WWII?
In 1940 Germany lost 24 subs. That’s more than 1/3 of our entire sub fleet currently.
By 1942 Germany had lost 155 subs.
 
We don’t have the subs for that. We’re going to send our subs after PLAN’s high value targets both at sea and ashore.

We have 71 submarines. Only 1/3 are ever in a deployable status. That’s 23-24 subs.

Some of those subs will be kept in the gulf, Baltic area, likely the med.
24/3 leaves 8 for each area/region.

Do you think 8 subs is enough to target both PLAN’s high end combatants including other subs, as well as commerce raiding?
So surge the others, and pull a few from LANT/IO.

Now you have 16-24.
 
I edited my post but ill repeat it here.

In 1940 alone germnay lost 24 subs.
By 1942 they lost 155 subs.

Germany used a lot more subs than what we have available in order to ‘strangle’ the UK.
And the US lost fully 1/6 of what they sent to strangle Japan.

What's your point?

War has been declared.
 
And the US lost fully 1/6 of what they sent to strangle Japan.

What's your point?

War has been declared.
…we don’t have the numbers…it’s not about losing subs. It’s about the number of subs necessary.

England has 7700miles of coastline.
Much of that did not require subs to watch since it was in the channel and Germany controlled one side of it.

China has 9000miles of coastline with ports, all of which must be watched.

Let’s go with your best case scenario here.
24 subs on blockade duty. How many missiles and torpedoes does each carry?

Thousands of ships pull into and leave Chinese ports every day. 24 subs can only cover approximately 24 arrival/departure points for ships, and each one has limited munitions.
When a sub leaves station to rearm, that’s, days if not weeks with one or more holes in the net.

Let’s assume though those 24 subs are doubled up so not to leave holes while one is rearming…well now you just always have more holes.

We don’t have the hulls of any type of ship, nor do we have the munitions necessary to sink ‘all’ ships or ‘everything’ flying a Chinese flag or coming/going to/from Chinese ports. Not even in a rhetorical sense.

Edit
You used germany ‘almost’ or ‘nearly’ starving england, to justify your strategy, yet you conveniently ignore the fact that Germany failed to actually starve england…a small island nation with almost no natural resources including food to support them.
Same thing with the US and Japan. We did not starve the nation into giving up, and they were again an island nation with limited natural resources.

So what makes you think that 24 subs can strangle or starve China the fourth largest country on the planet into submission?
If Britain’s victory gardens in their very limited space kept the population fed, what do you think China will do if we try to starve them out?
Import over land, start their own ‘victory gardens’ which in many cases would likely just be whole new farms, rather than an actual garden.

To win against China we need to destroy their ability to make war as fast as possible. A prolonged blockade will not do that.
We are in a very similar position today as Japan was in WWII against us.

Today our capability to produce weapons and machines of war is limited. Meanwhile China is the most successful manufacturer in the world right now.

Edit #2
I guess it is also partly about losses. If we lose 3 or 4 subs in the first month, then any attempt to commerce raid with subs effectively is pretty much gone.
 
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(i.e. quick defeat of China by America)
It is important not to conflate quick defeat with easy defeat. As things stand, the nuclear balance is probably very much favorable to Blue, and even conventionally, a large Blue offensive with six flattops would be a serious problem; so there are slim paths to partial Blue victory through limited nuclear war, perfidious conventional counterforce, etc.

The problem with the whole idea is that it involves nuclear war, with all the attendant uncertainties and questions and megadeaths. What do you do after the mushroom clouds?

During the Cold War, the fear was that the Soviet Union would overrun all of Eurasia, from Manchuria to Iran to the Pyrenees, unless it were stopped by nuclear force; the Chinese have no ability to do any of this, not without a few years to build the relevant conventional ground forces. The strategic rationale is not there.

This is of course, not necessarily apparent to the American public or to American decision makers, they can potentially stay irrational longer than China can stay solvent, which is why Red must be prepared. The depth of irrational feeling in Blue against Red cannot be underestimated, as can be clearly seen across the interwebs. Of course, Blue has every incentive to project irrationality in the face of its own weaknesses.


The Chinese merchant fleet is 9,000 large vessels. There are only 1,000 heavyweight torpedoes in inventory, so they are working on smaller torpedoes. Submarine commerce raiding is not how China is going to be blockaded, China is going to be blockaded at source and by boarding and seizure of all the various ships, which will subsequently be used against Red.

Why build your own ships when you can just steal from Red?

You don't need submarines when you have air power and command of the sea past Malacca. Shipping cannot be protected past Malacca.

American strength in theaters beyond the second island chain should not be underestimated, the oceans still mostly belong to the USA.
 
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Taiwan is 130~180 km from China, the USN would be the object of a Chinese turkey shoot if they were going to get involved.
Cuban Missile in reverse.

Which is deeper--the sea floor between Taiwan and the mainland...or between Cuba and the United States?

A feint might churn things up such that sub-sea assets extending from China to Formosa simply are not noticed.

China does like Kurita--pretends to turn back home. At night, special forces wade ashore.

Here, instead of immediately attacking to knock down radars--they lie dormant...until after the turnabout takes place as a distraction.
 
American strength in theaters beyond the second island chain should not be underestimated, the oceans still mostly belong to the USA.

That's what Russia thought a few years back, now they are hiding ships.

Taiwan Straight is around 60 meters, not a lot of wiggle room.

Regards,
 
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It is important not to conflate quick defeat with easy defeat. As things stand, the nuclear balance is probably very much favorable to Blue, and even conventionally, a large Blue offensive with six flattops would be a serious problem; so there are slim paths to partial Blue victory through limited nuclear war, perfidious conventional counterforce, etc.

The problem with the whole idea is that it involves nuclear war, with all the attendant uncertainties and questions and megadeaths. What do you do after the mushroom clouds?

During the Cold War, the fear was that the Soviet Union would overrun all of Eurasia, from Manchuria to Iran to the Pyrenees, unless it were stopped by nuclear force; the Chinese have no ability to do any of this, not without a few years to build the relevant conventional ground forces. The strategic rationale is not there.

This is of course, not necessarily apparent to the American public or to American decision makers, they can potentially stay irrational longer than China can stay solvent, which is why Red must be prepared. The depth of irrational feeling in Blue against Red cannot be underestimated, as can be clearly seen across the interwebs. Of course, Blue has every incentive to project irrationality in the face of its own weaknesses.


The Chinese merchant fleet is 9,000 large vessels. There are only 1,000 heavyweight torpedoes in inventory, so they are working on smaller torpedoes. Submarine commerce rating is not how China is going to be blockaded, China is going to be blockaded at source and by boarding and seizure of all the various ships, which will subsequently be used against Red.

Why build your own ships when you can just steal from Red?

You don't need submarines when you have air power and command of the sea past Malacca. Shipping cannot be protected past Malacca.

American strength in theaters beyond the second island chain should not be underestimated, the oceans still mostly belong to the USA.
We don’t have the ships necessary for large scale seizures of Chinese ships
 
The LCSes might shine in the commerce raider role, though we still don’t have nearly enough to realistically apply any major pressure.

But 2 berthing modules in the mission deck, provides space prisoners, and extra crew for prize crews/boarding teams.

Speed allows them to get around quickly

Would probably be more propaganda value than anything else.
 
Taiwan Straight is around 60 meters, not a lot of wiggle room.
That works to their advantage.

They might not build a pipeline for their men...but one great big sunken stob means they could go around it towing a submerged train of equipment.

Taiwan sees the ships moving away as a line of unseen pods gets nearer.

The invasion of Taiwan--even more than Normandy--will be more of a public works project than an invasion in a classical sense... that's my prediction.
 
When is an invasion not a public works project?

As noted, Normandy had the famous mulberries and the pipeline under the ocean, not to mention the vast fleets of invasion shipping and the assembly bases and the zillion runways.

The Pacific War, more remarkably, had an entire industrial complex afloat - machine shops, drydocks, barracks ships, ice-cream barges - all shipped to central pacific atolls, which were bulldozed and paved with giant airports with multiple runways, docks, and of course residential areas - entire cities rising from the sea where nothing once stood.

Even Vietnam saw massive investments in infrastructure, with huge floating bases repurposed from barracks barges, dockyards, and airfields across Southeast Asia.

Large conventional wars run on logistics that are often extensions of those from the civilian economy. It has only been since Vietnam that there has been increasing decoupling of such, as huge amounts of capital have been sunk into specialized weapons and capabilities and informatized (in no small part a lesson learned from Vietnam, where huge tonnages of bombs seemed to have little effect) - but even that was in line with the informatization of the wider economy and proliferation of electronics across society.
 
I feel that there is nothing to talk about on this topic at the moment, and now no one understands how far Chinese submarines have developed, and no one knows China's anti-submarine capabilities, and all that remains is speculation. But there is no doubt that if the United States intervenes in the Chinese civil war, it is likely to suffer heavy losses and will not change the outcome. This is not to question the military strength of the Americans, but because the Taiwan region is too close to the mainland.
 
I hope there are infrasound arrays and seismographs, just in case political prisoners are digging a tunnel.
 
Given the US failure to act in any meaningful way in the red sea against a less sophisticated adversary, I'd argue that's very much up for debate. But the US has ships and infrastructure around the world, yes.
I’d say more like given the US’s capitulation in the Red Sea and the examples of ineptitude we’ve seen the last 7 months or so, it’s a major stretch to say the seas belong to the USN
 
I think that's everything summed up. The US is happy to sell Taiwan equipment, but they won't deploy the sons and daughters of Americans to die in a war that in no way, shape or form threatens the US directly.
You all forget that Taiwan has the edge about semiconductors. It is just unthinkable to give up that asset to China, and let all the west deprived of such technologies.
USA will defend Taiwan, not to defend Taiwan, but to halt China. just my opinion.
 
You all forget that Taiwan has the edge about semiconductors. It is just unthinkable to give up that asset to China, and let all the west deprived of such technologies.
USA will defend Taiwan, not to defend Taiwan, but to halt China. just my opinion.
Perhaps...Inter likes help China to destroy TSMC and Samsung,so that they could monopolize the semiconductor industry worldwide,If they think so.
 
You all forget that Taiwan has the edge about semiconductors. It is just unthinkable to give up that asset to China, and let all the west deprived of such technologies.
USA will defend Taiwan, not to defend Taiwan, but to halt China. just my opinion.
It doesn't matter, Taiwan (TSMC) just produces what they're contracted to produce. To manufacture their products they use ASML machines, Machines that can be bought, installed and used by literally anyone anywhere. The only benefit about Taiwan is that labor and material is dirt cheap. Taiwan isn't worth defending over their semiconductor production, that can be set up anywhere.

The only reason for the US to intervene over Taiwan would be to simply mess with China as much as possible. But given the current trajectory of the PLA and US Military, and the PLAN and USN in particular, that would be suicidal for the USN as a branch and politcal suicide for any government as people would be rather unhappy when thousands of sailors perish once destroyers and carriers sink into the sea.
 
It doesn't matter, Taiwan (TSMC) just produces what they're contracted to produce. To manufacture their products they use ASML machines, Machines that can be bought, installed and used by literally anyone anywhere. The only benefit about Taiwan is that labor and material is dirt cheap. Taiwan isn't worth defending over their semiconductor production, that can be set up anywhere.

The only reason for the US to intervene over Taiwan would be to simply mess with China as much as possible. But given the current trajectory of the PLA and US Military, and the PLAN and USN in particular, that would be suicidal for the USN as a branch and politcal suicide for any government as people would be rather unhappy when thousands of sailors perish once destroyers and carriers sink into the sea.
Not if China shoots first. Then you get a Pearl Harbor/9-11 effect.
 
Not if China shoots first. Then you get a Pearl Harbor/9-11 effect.
P-H effects matters all that much only if you're stronger and/or can mobilize stronger.
Otherwise, it isn't Pearl Harbor effect, it's loss of key units which won't be replaced in wartime, against opponent who is ~guaranteed to outbuild US in most volume assets. Hope here is tied to (1)being able to protect key allies with significant manufacturing capabilities in same fields, and (2)control over resource flows. Both are reliant on units on the map, not sentiments at home.

Also, P-H effect wasn't endless historically - nor was 9-11.
It's often forgotten that USN survived through 1942 - and effectively won - fair and square, almost entirely before the effects of 2-ocean navy kicked in.
Mood in US around april 1942 was in fact grim - and notion that it wouldn't matter if Japan continued winning is highly, highly questionable and based on confirmism from later perspective.
 
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P-H effects matters all that much only if you're stronger and/or can mobilize stronger.
Otherwise, it isn't Pearl Harbor effect, it's loss of key units which won't be replaced in wartime, against opponent who is ~guaranteed to outbuild US in most volume assets. Hope here is tied to (1)being able to protect key allies with significant manufacturing capabilities in same fields, and (2)control over resource flows. Both are reliant on units on the map, not sentiments at home.

Also, P-H effect wasn't endless historically - nor was 9-11.
I mean the entire US uniting into one "we are going to destroy you" attitude. It lasts maybe 4 years.



Mood in US around april 1942 was in fact grim - and notion that it wouldn't matter if Japan continued winning is highly, highly questionable and based on confirmism from later perspective.
Mood in the US around December 2001 was also quite grim.
 
I mean the entire US uniting into one "we are going to destroy you" attitude. It lasts maybe 4 years.
"We are going to destroy you" is sentiment which is troublesome if you can't absorb it.
Via China, it's past that point - irreplaceable units aren't worth rallying around the flag.
Mood in the US around December 2001 was also quite grim.
That's different kind of grim. I'm talking "we're going to be defeated this way", this kind of grim.
And frankly speaking, should USN have cleanly lost Midway and with now uncheckable cascade in Southern pacific, there would be liittle that could be done to even stop it. Doolitle raid was ultimately a single time opportunity.
Nations can morally lose wars(which they in principle still can continue), even when they were determined before. Perceived injustice (sudden attack, early loss shock and calls for revenge) is a barrier, but not an insulation against it.

As such, getting us sailors killed just to get a sentiment isn't quite worth it. Sentiment itself isn't absolute, and unlike via Japan, main problem isn't lack of determination - it's hard production in volume metrics. If anything, US is now in worsened Japanese position ca.1941, after the two ocean act. US navy is still stronger(and there's perception that "there's still time"), but the problem is exactly that it isn't China's growth anymore, we've already entered into actual change of balance between powers stage.

As such, forward presense operations, should they continue during hightened tensions period, are but a folly.
 
It doesn't matter, Taiwan (TSMC) just produces what they're contracted to produce. To manufacture their products they use ASML machines, Machines that can be bought, installed and used by literally anyone anywhere. The only benefit about Taiwan is that labor and material is dirt cheap. Taiwan isn't worth defending over their semiconductor production, that can be set up anywhere.
Not really. ASML latest machines are not selled to anyone. Specially to China....
 
TSMC is not going to be captured intact in any scenario. The chips are essentially a red herring. The physical location is not that important, given the reach of Chinese A2/AD and maturing blue-water capabilities.


The value of Taiwan is, I would argue, almost certainly in the psychological domain, as a political and strategic focus for the energies of the PRC that might otherwise be directed to more productive ends; a political "cork in the bottle". Once they take Taiwan, whether peacefully or in a warlike manner, other things happen around the world, and Chinese power is essentially unleashed to roll around the world like a loose cannon.

Now, the calculating current leadership of the PRC, the risk-averse strategic culture of the PRC, the overall strategy of peaceable economic development as the basis for power, the fairly reasonable balance of power on the Eurasian continent, as well as the continued existence of the US Navy and USA, give good reasons for optimism as to the likelihood of Chinese restraint in exercising that power even after reunification.

However, were the US Navy to be sunk, or were future Chinese leadership to be less restrained, the difficulty of managing that risk would be increased.

It thus behooves the USN not to be sunk in a war over Taiwan.
 
The whole PRC obsession over Taiwanw is really just bad blood stuff and there's no reason to expect them to get reasonable over it. The bottlecap needs a corkscrew over it for the liquor to unleash, eh yeah?

I wouldn't rule out a quick if violent Taiwan takeover as PRC funded politicians opened the floodgate for them and actively hamper ROC defense through bureaucracy or intel leaks. Essentially Venezuela with a phase 2, but historically the Chinese are exceptionally competent at beating the shit out of each other, so it won't be an Afghan.
 
You are forgetting at one point in time about decade or so ago Taiwan had one of the largest gold reserves in the world.
The other reason was more or less the official goal (2005 Anti-Secession Law) of reuniting before the 100 year celebration of the PRC's establishment. They would lose face if they don't get it done now.
 
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