Russian Strategic Weapon Modernization Plans

I’m curious whether the Russians are doing climate change research at their nuclear labs?
Yes, I believe they're looking at some sort of "nuclear winter" approach which aims to offset the current global warming trend.
 
 

Ridiculous article. Starting with a Felngenhaur quote should tell you all you need to know about this analysis.
 
I hope a very certain user that I argued with regards to this information before sees this.;)


Mozyr active defense complex (KAZ)

The Design Bureau of Mechanical Engineering (KBM), under the leadership of the legendary Sergei Pavlovich Nespobodimy, successfully developed a system for the protection of silo launchers of ICBMs and missile launchers of the Strategic Missile Forces, and not as a classical ABM system, but as a unique Russian know-how not surpassed so far.

This was told publicly for the first time by the Chief Designer of this system, now the General Designer of JSC "NPK KBM" »Doctor of Technical Sciences, Honored Designer of the Russian Federation V. M. Kashin. He also said that despite the huge costs incurred by the state to create a prototype of this system and extremely high test results (actual defeat of almost 90% of the targets delivered to the test site by actual launches of ICBMs).

Data for this project was not disclosed, and all the information is of a presumptive nature. But the idea of creation of a fundamentally new weapons gave impetus to the creation of other samples (complex "Arena", "Blackbird"), whose operation is based on the principle of self-defense and worked out in the development of Russia's first active protection.

The principle of KAZ operation is based on the defeat of air targets by metal balls with a diameter of up to 30 millimeters at an altitude of up to six thousand meters. In early December 2012, the source of the newspaper "Izvestia" in the military department said that charges with 40 thousand attacking elements will be fired at the target with an initial speed of up to 1800 meters per second and create after the blast at a certain height an "iron cloud" capable of destroying any air target. Prospective complexes are planned to be used primarily to cover strategic objects: launch silos, command posts and communication centers.

By the early 1970s, classical methods of protecting silo launchers (silo launchers) of intercontinental ballistic missiles from enemy attacks using high-precision weapons were becoming ineffective. Countering the technical means of reconnaissance of the enemy, masking the silo, creating a multitude of false, simulating start-up targets with the development of new technologies for satellite reconnaissance has become a difficult and sometimes impossible task. By 1970, thanks to advanced tracking facilities, the coordinates of all silos in the Strategic Missile Forces of the Strategic Missile Forces became known to the enemy.

Fortification method of protection, based on increasing the armor protection of the launcher, in connection with the rapid increase in the mid-1970s in the accuracy of the targeting of nuclear warheads and the appearance of new models of precision weapons, was also ineffective. If in the middle of the twentieth century the accuracy of the guidance was determined by tens of meters, by 1970 it was already a few centimeters. It became clear that missile silos could be put out of action by a sudden preemptive strike, not even of nuclear weapons, but of conventional weapons with high accuracy of guidance. Even if the exact hit of a warhead by an enemy guided missile does not lead to the destruction of the mine or to the penetration of the cover of the silo, at least it will lead to its jamming, which in the end will not allow launching the missile, that is, it will not allow the combat mission to be accomplished.

One of the first Russian projects aimed at creating KAZ (complex active protection) ICBM silos, was project KAZ "Mozyr" or "complex 171" (but there is a perception that this designation is incorrect), developed in the Kolomna Design Bureau. The possibility of creating an experimental complex for conducting tests in real conditions was set by the USSR Government Decree in 1984. Work on the project began in the middle of the 1970s, the main designer of the complex was N.I.Gushchin general administration produced a professional engineer and designer S.P.Nepobedimoy. Specifically, thanks to his initiative and assertiveness of Russian and later Russian army had adopted a new kind of weapon, such as MANPADS "Arrow", and intended for tanks complex active protection "Arena." The principle acts CAP "Arena" is the same as that of the CAP "Mozyr".

The chief designer of KAZ was N.I.Gushchin. Development of a complex of active protection of the silo of ICBMs from the attack of ballistic missiles (including ICBMs) was carried out by the Design Bureau of Machine Building (Kolomna) under the general supervision of S.P.Nespobodimy from the mid-1970s. It was thanks to his initiative and perseverance that the Soviet, and then the Russian army, received a new type of weapon, such as MANPADS "Strela", and a complex of active defense "Arena" created for the tanks. The principle of KAZ "Arena" is the same as that of KAZ "Mozyr". In total, more than 250 different enterprises of Soviet industry of almost all the ministries of the USSR worked on the KAZ "Mozyr" project.

The creation of an infrastructure for testing the complex was started in 1980-1981. The creation of the complex was directly supervised by the USSR Minister of Defense, D.F.Ustinov. The possibility of creating an experimental complex for conducting tests in real conditions was set by the USSR Government Decree in 1984. 250 enterprises of 22 ministries were involved in the creation of the system. Probably, in the second half of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, a prototype KAZ of the silo of ICBMs was tested at the Kura test site on the Kamchatka Peninsula (w / w 25522, Klyuchi-1).

The complex would be the last frontier of missile defense. It must destroy the objects that managed to break through the curtain of the existing anti-missile "Gazelle" and the prospetive S-500 "Prometheus." The KAZ includes radar detection and guidance systems, as well as special artillery units. KAZ is designed to cover point objects, such as missile launchers, command posts, communication nodes, and this differs from anti-missiles that cover the sky by sectors. The military expects that the complex will be able to destroy not only ballistic missiles, but also all types of modern precision weapons, including cruise missiles and GPS-corrected bombs.

KAZ design contains a huge amount of stacked barrels a small caliber (complex "Mozyr" According to various sources, included between 80 and 100 barrels), any of which contains a charge of powder and hitting the core element (shell?) From durable alloy. When a signal of the attack of the enemy on the protected area for the second bit of the standby KAZ captures the approaching target and fires it towards the damaging hundreds of small parts (shells). Shot done once all barrels, one gulp. Before the enemy warhead appears wall or accumulation of iron shells, the density of which is such that to overcome this obstacle is virtually impossible. As a result, the purpose of which, in this case, the enemy's warhead, destroyed (at a distance of up to 1000 meters) short of the goal.

High-precision bombs and missiles are difficult to detect, as they maneuver or hide in the folds of the terrain. The intercontinental rocket flies faster, but it is easier to track. The first complexes tested in the early 1990s could not destroy both types of air units with the same efficiency. But at the modern level of computer technology and radar it is quite achievable.

The first products were called Mozyr. On Kamchatka training range, they immediately built not by mock-ups, but by the real warhead of the "Voevoda" rocket, and the target was struck. The project was canceled only because of problems with financing, and not for technical reasons. In case of successful tests of the new-old complex, the first positional areas can be deployed within 2-3 years - technologies allow. The design bureau and the manufacturing plant of the "Iron Cloud" are currently classified. It is known, that the project used the experience of protecting armored vehicles from anti-tank missiles. For example, the complex of tank defense "Arena" destroys incoming missiles with volley balls at a distance of 25 meters.

The complex "Mozyr" was established in the early 1980s, and the first prototype was sent for testing at the SMU RVSN polygon, military unit 25522, located in Kamchatka. Where, again, according to unconfirmed reports, as part of the tests, in the late 1980s the interception of a target block simulating the warhead of an R-36M2 intercontinental ballistic missile launched from Baikonur was carried out for the first time (however, some sources claim that the launch was made from a range located in Plesetsk).

To conduct tests at the Kura test site, probably between 1985 and 1988, an imitation of a ICBM silo type OS was built and a prototype of an active protection complex was placed around the silo. During the tests in the late 1980s, for the first time, a low-altitude non-nuclear interception of a simulator of a combat ICBM unit launched from the Plesetsk test range (according to other sources from Baikonur) was carried out for the first time. Probably the development carried the name of the R & D "Mozyr".

At higher altitudes the arrows are more effective, on smaller ones the balls. The arrows fly higher, and the balls have a more dense volley. Because of the huge counter speeds, it is possible to simply riddle the target, but it is required to destroy or cause detonation. So the combined types of elements increase the damaging ability. The most complicated thing in the complex is the mathematical calculation of the algorithm of the convergence of the attacking elements with the object, taking into account the speed of convergence at Mach 3-4.

Independent military expert, editor of the site Millitary Russia Dmitry Kornev in his conversation with Izvestia confirmed that the project can be considered unique in the world. In his opinion, "neither the US, nor Israel, nor anyone else has been able to create an effective model of an anti-missile active defense system. Scientific work was carried out in many countries, but it did not go further than sketches and full-scale mock-ups, and the Soviet "Mozyr" was a successful project and the creation of the last echelon of missile defense in the form of active protection was completely justified.

The tests were recognized as successful. However, experts found that KAZ are not equally effective against ballistic and aerodynamic purposes, and the lower probability of their destruction was due to the weak computational capabilities of the complex. The development of the complexes was terminated due to a lack of funding.

It is difficult to judge how effective KAZ Mozyr was and how the future of the project would have developed, if the Soviet Union had not disintegrated. Data on this project have not been disclosed, and all the information has a presumptive nature. However, the very idea of creating this fundamentally new weapon gave impetus to the creation of other models (complexes "Arena", "Drozd"), the action of which is based on the principle of self-defense and worked out in the creation of the first domestic active defense complex.

A representative of the military-industrial complex familiar with the situation told Izvestia that the first complexes tested in the early 1990s could not destroy both types of air units with the same efficiency. But at the modern level of computer technology and radar it is quite achievable. He explained that "the first products were called "Mozyr". On Kamchatka training range, they were immediately beaten not by mock-ups, but by the real warhead of the "Voevoda" rocket, and the target was struck. Funding for the works was discontinued in August 1991. The project was canceled only because of problems with financing, and not for technical reasons. According to him, in case of successful tests of the new-old complex, the first positional areas can be deployed within 2-3 years - technologies allow. The design bureau and the manufacturing plant of the "iron cloud" are currently classified. Other accounts report that in 1994 the work was stopped, so as not to provoke the US to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.

It was thanks to this initiative and perseverance that the Soviet, and then the Russian army, received a new type of weapon, such as MANPADS "Strela", and a complex of active defense "Arena" created for the tanks. The principle of KAZ "Arena" is the same as that of KAZ "Mozyr". In total, more than 250 different enterprises of Soviet industry of almost all the ministries of the USSR worked on the KAZ "Mozyr" project.





The Russian Ministry of Defense continues to revive Soviet-era projects closed in the 1990s due to lack of funding. Now came the turn of the active defense complex (KAZ) from missiles. The source of the newspaper "Izvestia" in the military department said that it was decided in principle to resume testing the complex in 2013. According to this report, "the KAZ's feature is that the destruction of air objects occurs with metal arrows and balls with a diameter of 30 mm at an altitude of up to 6 km. Arrows and balls shoot with an initial speed of 1.8 km / s, which is comparable to the projectile of the longest-range gun, and create a real iron cloud. In one volley up to 40 thousand elements. KAZ can be considered as anti-missile artillery."

Currently, the effectiveness of the covering of the capital region, according to the acting Chief of the Air Defense and Defense Command, Major-General Andrey Demin, Air Defense Forces, is 90 percent, and the Central Industrial Region is 60 percent. All these indicators are planned to be improved by introducing not only new S-500 and A-235 systems, but also active protection systems (KAZ).

In mid-2012, it became known that the Ministry of Defense planned to resume work on KAZ in 2013. Among other things, this will require the creation of more powerful computing systems, especially when it comes to complexes of kinetic targets. In the latter case, computers will have to calculate the point of approach of the antimissile system or the striking elements with a target flying at high speeds.

If for ordinary ballistic purposes such a problem is solved very quickly, then for maneuvering it is complicated at times. Modern ballistic missiles are already equipped not only with combat units of individual guidance, capable of maneuvering, but also with false targets, whose main task is to considerably complicate the identification of dangerous nuclear charges and their defeat. The ballistic missiles themselves (for example, the promising Russian P-30 Bulava-30) are also equipped with the ability to maneuver within narrow limits, complicating the interception task at the initial and middle sections of the flight path.

Independent military expert, editor of the site Millitary Russia Dmitry Kornev in his conversation with Izvestia confirmed that the project can be considered unique in the world. In his opinion, "neither the US, nor Israel, nor anyone else has been able to create an effective model of an anti-missile active defense system. Scientific work was carried out in many countries, but it did not go further than sketches and full-scale mock-ups," and the Soviet Mozyr "was a successful project and the creation of the last echelon of missile defense in the form of active protection is completely justified.

Other analysis suggests that it is preferable to create the defense on the basis of the modern multichannel medium-range SAM "Buk-M2" (in the versions "Buk-M2" and "Buk-M2-1") supplemented with combat vehicles of the multi-channel short-range SAM "Tor-M2" ". These facilities, operating in a single information and control space and, in essence, representing a single polygamous anti-aircraft missile system, provide a highly effective fight against cruise missiles of a "rapid global strike" and self-defense against the impacts of anti-radar missiles
 

Unmanned underwater complex "Poseidon". Thoughts of an American columnist #Техника/armament Yesterday at 15:39 493 0 "The most dangerous drone of all developed for the Russian military in the coming years is the Poseidon, which is planned to be put into service in 2027. Despite the fact that the weapon has only been designed for a few years, it is already terrifying. " The article "Poseidon: what terrifies the Russian torpedo bomber drone with nuclear weapons" written by columnist Brent Eastwood for the online publication 19Fortyfive has already made a lot of noise. In it, he, quite vividly and figuratively, described the weapon of the "doomsday" - the Russian unmanned underwater complex "Poseidon". Can an underwater drone cross the North Atlantic and hit coastal American cities? These and other questions concern the author. Eastwood recalled that the device designed to be launched from a submarine is equipped with a nuclear warhead and a similar power plant, so "the Russians will not have to worry about running out of fuel." In addition, "Poseidon" will have an unlimited range. So, according to the expert, this "doomsday weapon the size of a bus" will not only be able to cross the North Atlantic on its own, but also hit all coastal cities of the United States. "Can the Russians build a mini-nuclear reactor and mount it on a torpedo? That remains to be seen. Even if the Russians can't make a nuclear power plant, poseidon will still be valuable as an underwater drone. It may even be able to gather intelligence and conduct surveillance off the coast of the United States." At the same time, the journalist stated that the drone will be much more difficult to destroy than the launchers of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. Earlier, military expert Dmitry Kornev told Izvestia about the tests of the Poseidon nuclear underwater vehicle. According to him, at the moment it is difficult to estimate how long it will take to test the drone system and its prototypes on board the submarine, since it has no analogues in the world. The specialist suggested that the tests may take two to three years. At the same time, Mikhail Budnichenko, General Director of Sevmash Production Association, said that the carrier of the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicles, the Belgorod nuclear submarine, and the Novosibirsk and Prince Oleg nuclear submarines will complete state tests by the end of 2021. He also noted that the ships show themselves well at sea, confirming the characteristics. On June 26, the Belgorod submarine first entered the White Sea during tests. The submarine was launched on April 23, 2019. According to open sources: in addition to the main task, Poseidon is planned to be used to perform strike and reconnaissance missions without real contact with the enemy. For what their armament comes a swarm of smaller drones, torpedoes, mines. The indisputable advantage of the BPA is the lack of means of counteraction (analogue of missile defense). If necessary, the device can be equipped with a monoblock YAG, or a cobalt bomb. According to preliminary estimates of experts, in this case, this munition can be classified as thermonuclear, with ultra-high power (up to 100 Mt). The consequences of such an explosion, (modeled in the United States) for a densely populated area, are as follows: approximately 8,000,000 people with a fatal outcome, about 4,000,000 severe, 16,000,000 will receive a dose close to critical. The area of the zone of infection is determined by the strength of the wind, its direction at the time of the explosion. In the calculations, its speed was determined at 26 km / h. In this case, the strongest radioactive contamination (without the use of cobalt ammunition) will be subjected to a section of 1700×300 kilometers. An additional problem will be created by the basic wave formed by vapors, drops of water. During the tests within the framework of the project "Crossroads" (ibid.), it was found that by washing this mixture of ships participating in the tests, creates a level of radiation on them that is incompatible with the stay of a person. Source The tsunami created by the explosion will have a height of up to 500 m, will destroy all buildings on the mainland at a distance of up to 500 km from the coast (with a flat terrain).
 
 
View: https://twitter.com/MrFrantarelli/status/1495006452850823168

The Russian Federation successfully launched hypersonic air ballistic missiles "Kinzhal " in the course of the exercise.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=abWKmsjv2n0


A cruise missile from the Iskander operational-tactical missile system was launched at the Kapustin Yar training range in the Astrakhan Region.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uHni4LWUT0c


The nuclear-powered submarine Project 667BDRM Karelia launched the Sineva ICBM from the Barents Sea at the Kura training range.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6Ki7JBgNt_o


The Yars ICBM was launched from the Plesetsk Cosmodrome at the Kura test range on the Kamchatka Peninsula.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n9QYFvfoaKM


Tu-95MS long-range strategic missile carriers fired cruise missiles at the Pemboy and Kura training grounds.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=by3hO3YnOec


The launch of the "Kalibr" cruise missile from the Project 21631 "Grayvoron" small missile ship.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhZ5UvqTv0Y
 
Given how well it currently seems to be going for Russia, it might actually lead to something of a budgetary boost.
 
 
Remarks from Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley head DIA

Russia’s development of new warhead designs and overall stockpile management efforts have been enhanced by its approach to nuclear testing. The United States believes that Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the “zero-yield” standard.

Our understanding of nuclear weapon development leads us to believe Russia’s testing activities would help it to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities. The United States, by contrast, has forgone such benefits by upholding a “zero-yield” standard.

Russia’s ongoing, comprehensive build-up in both its strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces is made possible by sustained and prioritized investments in its nuclear weapons development and production infrastructure. By 2013, Rosatom had modernized dozens of its experimental facilities, and Rosatom’s budget has increased roughly 30 percent in real terms from 2010 to 2018 to support these and other operations.

In contrast to the United States, during the past decade, Russia has improved and expanded its production complex, which has the capacity to process thousands of warheads annually.

 
Given recent events, there is a take where Russian spending on navy and strategic forces is a major mistake. The allocated army is insufficient for Ukraine scale occupation even with normal performance, and actual performance is poor and already failed at achieving many war aims.

Unlike the ongoing land war, there is no clear use case for naval and advanced strategic forces.
 
Given recent events, there is a take where Russian spending on navy and strategic forces is a major mistake. The allocated army is insufficient for Ukraine scale occupation even with normal performance, and actual performance is poor and already failed at achieving many war aims.

Unlike the ongoing land war, there is no clear use case for naval and advanced strategic forces.
And with the land side of the Ukrainian invasion showing awfully poor maintenance, and bearing in mind the famous maintenance deficits of the navy (tugs accompanying most deployments), one has to wonder how the strategic forces would actually perform if called upon to carry out their singular mission?
 
And that’s before considerations like the funds potentially freed up by an alternative choice of a more modest update of strategic forces instead being used to invest in wider economic development of an economy far too reliant on oil & gas exports and with most of its other sectors stagnating at best. But such an approach would require a very different perspective to have the leavers of power in Russia.
 
View: https://twitter.com/islamicworldupd/status/1505121990952296452
 
Might be new but all the information is both old and quite inaccurate.
In what way is it inaccurate as the guy doing it is a professional historian to the best of my knowledge. You cannot just say something is inaccurate, without stating how it is inaccurate?
Unfortunately due to what I do know, I can't go into details. But I can say that every single one of his points can be traced back to Russian news sources over the past 10 years, which we all know are of very dubious quality. He doesn't do any new analysis, just merely repeats stuff previously talked about.
 
 
It's a step down the road to suitcase nukes, assuming they don't already exist, and maybe orbital warhead deployment platforms too.
I'm pretty sure both sides did develop nuclear demolition charges. I think the US one was called SADM. Orbital nukes are banned by the outer space treaty, and I suspect that one of the things the US GEO sync inspection satellites do is check for nucleotide radiation. As far as anyone knows Kanyon is still intended to be used as a strategic weapon in a large scale exchange, so it should basically never leave a launch tube unless it's being sent to a port city that was destroyed days ago by ICBMs anyway. So I don't think Kanyon really changes anything - its a novel, rather slow, target limited way for a sub to deliver a warhead vice SLBM. It makes sense only in context of a moderately effective ABM shield, and even then I personally would have just gone with a nuclear cruise missile platform instead of this odd delivery method.
 
I'm pretty sure both sides did develop nuclear demolition charges. I think the US one was called SADM. Orbital nukes are banned by the outer space treaty, and I suspect that one of the things the US GEO sync inspection satellites do is check for nucleotide radiation. As far as anyone knows Kanyon is still intended to be used as a strategic weapon in a large scale exchange, so it should basically never leave a launch tube unless it's being sent to a port city that was destroyed days ago by ICBMs anyway. So I don't think Kanyon really changes anything - its a novel, rather slow, target limited way for a sub to deliver a warhead vice SLBM. It makes sense only in context of a moderately effective ABM shield, and even then I personally would have just gone with a nuclear cruise missile platform instead of this odd delivery method.
Unless you fired it into position before striking. Then it becomes a large underwater suitcase nuke.
 
I'm pretty sure both sides did develop nuclear demolition charges. I think the US one was called SADM. Orbital nukes are banned by the outer space treaty, and I suspect that one of the things the US GEO sync inspection satellites do is check for nucleotide radiation. As far as anyone knows Kanyon is still intended to be used as a strategic weapon in a large scale exchange, so it should basically never leave a launch tube unless it's being sent to a port city that was destroyed days ago by ICBMs anyway. So I don't think Kanyon really changes anything - its a novel, rather slow, target limited way for a sub to deliver a warhead vice SLBM. It makes sense only in context of a moderately effective ABM shield, and even then I personally would have just gone with a nuclear cruise missile platform instead of this odd delivery method.
Unless you fired it into position before striking. Then it becomes a large underwater suitcase nuke.

That assumes you have a mechanism for remote detonation and that it went completely unnoticed during the entire transit and emplacement process. That's a pretty risky delivery method unless you're just going for a strategic first strike anyway, and even then, what exactly does it bring to the table?
 
That assumes you have a mechanism for remote detonation and that it went completely unnoticed during the entire transit and emplacement process. That's a pretty risky delivery method unless you're just going for a strategic first strike anyway, and even then, what exactly does it bring to the table?
A surprise first strike with zero warning. That would be quite a lot.
 
No it isn't. 7400km with 8x475kt, 11000km with 4x475kt or 8x100kt according to a paper I have. If there is a double-digit warhead configuration (there are indications that it is possible) range would be correspondingly less than 11000km and they would be 100kt WHs.
I can only go by what I have seen (I did mean 8x475kT not 12 though, 12 x100kT I think), 7400km seems to be the range of the much smaller Trident C4 with 8 W76 warheads, that only weighed 33t and was an older design. I guess most of this stuff is classified and only partially available.

I guess a better comparison for liquid vs solid propellant and rocket size is Delta IV vs Titan IV.
 
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That assumes you have a mechanism for remote detonation and that it went completely unnoticed during the entire transit and emplacement process. That's a pretty risky delivery method unless you're just going for a strategic first strike anyway, and even then, what exactly does it bring to the table?
A surprise first strike with zero warning. That would be quite a lot.
Perhaps, but your target set is only coastal. You might hit DC with a radio active tidal wave but outside that C2 site you're limited to counter value and sub bases. The US nuclear force is still basically completely intact.
 

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