What if WW2 broke out in 1944? Alternative Royal Navy and some related considerations.

[EwenS]

That's what I'd been using. I started off with Andrew Boyd's The RN in Eastern Waters, which has a discussion of the battle tagged onto the main narrative about policy and Force Z, but I needed more detail and found Stuart.

You might like these titles that draw more heavily on Japanese sources

Amazon.co.uk

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Darkest-Hour-Japanese-Offensive-Indian/dp/1804510238/ref=pd_bxgy_thbs_d_sccl_1/525-2891305-6733953?pd_rd_w=IjOVl&content-id=amzn1.sym.ec630614-3f9e-4b7f-ba9a-fe89f8e4113f&pf_rd_p=ec630614-3f9e-4b7f-ba9a-fe89f8e4113f&pf_rd_r=DKMBPPCGQ9EDJPMBPSJV&pd_rd_wg=ZIT9O&pd_rd_r=ef99f801-e79a-4cc3-bf11-c4bfce66531d&pd_rd_i=1804510238&psc=1

 

[EwenS]

There seems to be a lot of assumptions that without war in Europe in 1939 various historical events would still have happened. As pointed out earlier just what is the departure point?

But a few things to bear in mind.

RN dispositions.
RN planning in early 1939 considered ship dispositions in 1942 in the event of
1. Peace
2. Axis (Germany / Italy) war
3. Far Eastern war

The last is the relevant one here. It envisaged the following aircraft carrying vessels

Trincomalee - Courageous (24 aircraft so clearly intended only for trade protection), Albatross (9 aircraft) + 5 cruisers with seaplanes / amphibians

Singapore (forward based at Hong Kong in peacetime) - Ark Royal (60 aircraft), Indomitable (45 aircraft), Implacable & Indefatigable (each with 48 aircraft), Glorious (with 24 aircraft so again clearly intended for trade protection), 12 battleships & 15 cruisers with seaplanes / amphibians.

Simonstown - 2 cruisers
New Zealand - 2 cruisers

The battleships were intended to be the 5 QEs, Nelson, Rodney & the 3 best R class and they would be joined by the first pair of Lions one they had worked up. I suppose that availibility of Nelson & Rodney would be dependent on the actual reconstructions being planned for them being carried out. In Sept 1939 the first pair of Lions were expected to complete in Aug 1942. At that point the completion dates for Indomitable, Implacable & Indefatigable were scheduled to be April & Oct 1941 and June 1942 respectively. The latter pair had a lot of modifications brought about by early war experience so may have been nearer to Indomitable in appearance than historical.

FAA aircraft
Its not clear just what the carriers would have aboard without war in Europe in 1939, because the FAA had to play second fiddle to the RAF for the early part and so much got delayed. The Admiralty only got full control of the FAA in May 1939. There were for example virtually no new designs for naval aircraft between 1940 & 1943. But there are some clues based on an Admiralty report of June 1939, these being the factories producing naval aircraft.

Fairey Hayes factory - Swordfish production to end late 1939 and to be succeeded by Albacores. Production of latter due to end about Aug 1941.

Fairey Stockport - Fulmars from Nov 1939 to about March 1941. Then Barracuda until April 1942.

Supermarine Woolston - Walrus to Jan / Feb 1940 followed probably by Sea Otter until Jan 1942.

Continuation of Swordfish production was an emergency plan with it transferred to Blackburn in a new shadow factory.
Barracuda would probably have gone ahead with the original RR Boreas / Exe engine. It was Aug 1939, two months after the production contract for the Barracuda was issued, that RR asked to suspend all work on its engine to concentrate on sorting problems with the Peregrine, Merlin & Vulture. Take away the pressure of looming war and there is scope for this not happening. With fewer redesign / development delays it is possible that Barracuda could be in service in 1941.

And with the pace of aircraft development it is entirely likely that a new spec for a TB would be issued in 1940 for a Barracuda successor (Barracuda was after all a 1937 spec). A Spec E.28/40 was in fact issued in Feb 1941 for a TBR research aircraft to investigate problems associated with increased weight of deck landing aircraft, making use of high lift devices. Folland produced the Fo116 design for this but it was low priority and was cancelled in 1943.

Sea Otter production was delayed and transferred to Saunders Roe because of demand for Spitfires. Does this change with no immediate war in Europe.

The Fulmar always was an interim design for an FAA fighter. Sea Gladiator was an emergency purchase to fill slots on Furious, Glorious & Courageous until something better came along. N.8/39 & N.9/39 issued in June 1939 saw all the initial proposals made to the Admiralty rejected by the end of 1939. The Admiralty then redrew its requirements. Out went the whole turret fighter concept. In came a single engined, single seat concept that saw selections in Jan 1940 for further development, eventually emerging as the Firefly and Firebrand. But both these types saw serious development delays right from the start, the latter suffering even more when the RAF got priority for the Napier Sabre engine. Take away the wartime pressure in Europe how much changes?

The RN was planning in 1939 for much increased FAA resouces to be placed at Singapore.

RN ships at Hong Kong
As noted the 4th Sub Flotilla was based out of Hong Kong. These subs had even carried out "sneaky" operations interwar around southern Japanese ports. In conjunction with the 5th cruiser squadron (5 County / Town class) and the 8th / 21st destroyer flotilla were based out of Hong Kong interwar these were intended to try to delay any movement of IJN ships southward. All these vessels began to be withdrawn on the outbreak of WW2 to be replaced by a collection of 4 old D class cruisers and 5 WW1 vintage S class destroyers.

But again with war in Europe?

French Indochina.
Japan sought to exploit French weakness in 1940 by demanding closure of the China supply route via Haiphong from June 1940. That led to occupation of northern Indochina in Sept 1940, and eventually expansion south for air bases in July 1941. Thailand also sought to exploit French weakness in 1940 when it invaded Indochina, securing part of its demands with Japanese support in early 1941.

But how much of this happens if there is no war in Europe and France is in a much stronger position to reinforce its colony and oppose Japan? Does part of the main French Fleet get deployed (they always had one or two cruisers in the region, but the weakness was lack of repair facilities to support them). An IJN invasion fleet heading for Thailand & Malaya has potentially to come round a hostile French Indochina with no Japanese air bases for protection to face a substantial RN fleet coming up from Singapore to meet it, with RN units behind it based out of Hong Kong threatening its lines of communication to home. The IJN Thailand / Malaya invasion force departed from ports on Hainan Island not Indochina.

So no war in Europe in 1939 changes everything in the Far East politically as well as militarily.

As for the USA, depending on when the point of departure from historical is, does it get the big head start on armament production from European orders and money 1938 to 1941? And given much stronger European colonies in the Far East does the IJN have the striking power to hit all of Pearl Harbor, Philippines & Malaya simultaneously with the DEI shortly thereafter.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Another thing to note is that the deployment of Prince of Wales and Repulse along with the rest of Force Z was part of a pre-war contingency plan drawn up under the so-called Singapore Strategy; said contingency plan originally envisaged a joint deployment alongside fleet units of the the Marine Nationale which France and Great Britain hoped would deter and defend against any Japanese aggression. Of course the fall of France clobbered that part of the plan. Also, there weren't nearly as many RN units available for Force Z as had been expected, in part again because of said disaster. The RAF, in particular their Headquarters Air Force Far East Command, were confident that local RAF elements would be able to make up for the shortfall as well as provide air cover in general for both naval and army forces. This confidence proved to be rather misplaced.

 

[DWG]

As for the USA, depending on when the point of departure from historical is, does it get the big head start on armament production from European orders and money 1938 to 1941?

That is a particularly good point. I'm inclined to think yes, because even without actual hostilities you've still got German rearmament in full swing and the resulting tension. Changing that would need a much earlier PoD. The UK concluded we were potentially headed for war in Europe as early as 1932, leading to the abandonment of the 10 Year Rule.

 

[EwenS]

That is a particularly good point. I'm inclined to think yes, because even without actual hostilities you've still got German rearmament in full swing and the resulting tension. Changing that would need a much earlier PoD. The UK concluded we were potentially headed for war in Europe as early as 1932, leading to the abandonment of the 10 Year Rule.

I'm not so sure. Yes the US Govt was spending but British orders and money were not only being used to buy equipment from existing and expanding plants but to create new facilities and refurbish facilities that had been lying empty and unused since the Great Depression. That helped provide more manufacturing space than would otherwise have been the case. By way of example:-

The Merchant Shipbuilding Commission went to the USA arriving Oct 1940, by which time losses to U-boats were piling up. Having found little interest from existing shipbuilders, who had full order books, they met Henry J Kaiser. Out of that came contracts to build two new shipyards from scratch, one on each coast, which were each to build 30 "Ocean" class ships. Construction of the ships themselves was able to begin in April / May 1941 with the first launch in Aug. These yards went on to produce ships for the US merchant fleet.

From that emerged the Liberty Ship design first ship laid down April 1941.

Fewer shipping losses means more work for British yards able to work without interruption and no losses to enemy action.

The British Purchasing Commission went looking for tanks in Aug 1940, due to losses in France and slow British production. That included paying to refurbish various factories including an unused plant owned by Pressed Steel Car to build the M3 Grant. Lima Locomotive was another. While some of this was later counted as Reverse Lend Lease, it was British cash that kick started this work.

Again no war in Europe in 1939 allows Britain time to develop a decent tank from its own resources before rushing inadequately developed vehicles into front line service. Maybe a properly sorted Cromwell could have been available for production in 1942 instead of 1944.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The British Purchasing Commission went looking for tanks in Aug 1940, due to losses in France and slow British production. That included paying to refurbish various factories including an unused plant owned by Pressed Steel Car to build the M3 Grant. Lima Locomotive was another. While some of this was later counted as Reverse Lend Lease, it was British cash that kick started this work.

Again no war in Europe in 1939 allows Britain time to develop a decent tank from its own resources before rushing inadequately developed vehicles into front line service. Maybe a properly sorted Cromwell could have been available for production in 1942 instead of 1944.

I'm not convinced that the British could have sorted out the Cromwell in time. No combat lessons to apply to correct issues.

First, the guns were being designed by a different branch than the rest of the tank.

Hence 2pdrs lingering on well past their sell-by date, and then 6pdrs being used when everyone else had settled on 75mm as the minimum sized tank gun. 6pdrs were viable anti-tank guns, but not tank guns. Turns out that tanks don't spend a lot of time shooting at other tanks, but do spend an awful lot of time shooting HE at things. Yes, even in North Africa.

Side note, the Cromwell's OQF 75mm was a 6pdr bored out to use American 75mm ammunition. Or rather, French mle1897 ammunition. No lend-lease, no American ammunition to standardize on.

I suspect that you'd see something closer to Comet, or at least a tank carrying the 77mm HV. 17pdr projectiles getting launched out of 3" 20cwt cases.

 

[EwenS]

I'm not convinced that the British could have sorted out the Cromwell in time. No combat lessons to apply to correct issues.

First, the guns were being designed by a different branch than the rest of the tank.

Hence 2pdrs lingering on well past their sell-by date, and then 6pdrs being used when everyone else had settled on 75mm as the minimum sized tank gun. 6pdrs were viable anti-tank guns, but not tank guns. Turns out that tanks don't spend a lot of time shooting at other tanks, but do spend an awful lot of time shooting HE at things. Yes, even in North Africa.

Side note, the Cromwell's OQF 75mm was a 6pdr bored out to use American 75mm ammunition. Or rather, French mle1897 ammunition. No lend-lease, no American ammunition to standardize on.

I suspect that you'd see something closer to Comet, or at least a tank carrying the 77mm HV. 17pdr projectiles getting launched out of 3" 20cwt cases.

Whatever!
Point is Britain would not be going to the USA in Autumn 1940 to spend money refurbishing US tank factories etc because there is no crisis in this alternative history with no war in Europe. Money will be getting spent at home.

That slows down subsequent US war production.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Welding. Very important in tank building but, a shortage of welders who were mostly employed building ships. On top of that, how many different tanks on the go? Engines? Any joined up thought at all?

Not a lot.

A time when muddling through was the Norman Stanley Fletcher standard.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I'm not convinced that the British could have sorted out the Cromwell in time. No combat lessons to apply to correct issues.

First, the guns were being designed by a different branch than the rest of the tank.

Hence 2pdrs lingering on well past their sell-by date, and then 6pdrs being used when everyone else had settled on 75mm as the minimum sized tank gun. 6pdrs were viable anti-tank guns, but not tank guns. Turns out that tanks don't spend a lot of time shooting at other tanks, but do spend an awful lot of time shooting HE at things. Yes, even in North Africa.

Side note, the Cromwell's OQF 75mm was a 6pdr bored out to use American 75mm ammunition. Or rather, French mle1897 ammunition. No lend-lease, no American ammunition to standardize on.

I suspect that you'd see something closer to Comet, or at least a tank carrying the 77mm HV. 17pdr projectiles getting launched out of 3" 20cwt cases.

Without actual wartime experience, and likely experience against the Germans, it's likely that the British go from the 2 pdr to the 6 pdr and don't bother to develop HE rounds for either. The 17 pdr is likely just a paper project that isn't getting made at all because it's too expensive.

Without wartime experience, it's likely that the Germans think 50 to 60mm of armor, at most, is just fine for a tank while they continue their focus mostly on a smaller antitank weapon like the 50/60 that can fire HE along with some improved 75/24 that can toss HE rounds. If the Russians do build the T34 as their next generation tank, that would have more influence on Germany than anything Britain is doing in tanks.

I could see the British thinking that a 50mm armored version of the Crusader or maybe Cromwell is perfectly acceptable without wartime experience.

 

[Foo Fighter]

The Russians had a perfectly good 57mm gun that outperformed the 76.2mm early doors. Apparently on a very fine light tank the T-50 which was just too expensive.

Proper development of the 6 pounder would leave us with a good early to middle war weapon.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Whatever!
Point is Britain would not be going to the USA in Autumn 1940 to spend money refurbishing US tank factories etc because there is no crisis in this alternative history with no war in Europe. Money will be getting spent at home.

That slows down subsequent US war production.

Instead the crisis is the Second Sino-Japanese War, and Japan attacking Pearl Harbor.

So I guess the US would be a year behind on spooling up the War Production.

Welding. Very important in tank building but, a shortage of welders who were mostly employed building ships. On top of that, how many different tanks on the go? Engines? Any joined up thought at all?

Not a lot.

A time when muddling through was the Norman Stanley Fletcher standard.

The US did discover that you can teach welding pretty quickly, which I bet the UK would not like.

But yes, the UK was really bad about not picking a design and having multiple factories make that.

 

[DWG]

The US did discover that you can teach welding pretty quickly, which I bet the UK would not like.

The UK was running welding schools in the Royal Dockyards pre-war (see HMS Seagull), so that's not a lesson that needed teaching. The problems we faced with switching to welding in shipbuilding were extremely technologically conservative ship-builders (cf their attempt to have an RCNC constructor fired for specifying longitudinal rather than transverse framing for the J, K, N class destroyers), extremely bad labour relations in the dockyards, and rigid positions on demarcation from the riveters and their unions - possibly not unreasonably when welding would destroy their trade. And yet we still went for heavy use of welding in prefab construction for the escort force, so the same potential should have existed in tank manufacture, particularly in new plants.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The UK was running welding schools in the Royal Dockyards pre-war (see HMS Seagull), so that's not a lesson that needed teaching. The problems we faced with switching to welding in shipbuilding were extremely technologically conservative ship-builders (cf their attempt to have an RCNC constructor fired for specifying longitudinal rather than transverse framing for the J, K, N class destroyers), extremely bad labour relations in the dockyards, and rigid positions on demarcation from the riveters and their unions - possibly not unreasonably when welding would destroy their trade. And yet we still went for heavy use of welding in prefab construction for the escort force, so the same potential should have existed in tank manufacture, particularly in new plants.

Interestingly enough, hot rivets are still used in skyscraper construction, while welding is by and large not used. So it didn't have quite the end of the trade effect that they were afraid of, but I suppose the US answer of drafting all the male riveters and teaching the ladies to weld could be used once the fighting actually started.

 

[DWG]

The Russians had a perfectly good 57mm gun that outperformed the 76.2mm early doors. Apparently on a very fine light tank the T-50 which was just too expensive.

Proper development of the 6 pounder would leave us with a good early to middle war weapon.

The T-50 had the 45mm 20K, similar performance to everyone else's 47mm. The 57mm you're thinking of was the 57mm/73 ZiS-4, which went in a limited number of T-34-57s. Note the long barrel length, where the 6 Pdr was L43 and later L50.

Allegedly the 6 Pdr was designed for L50, but there weren't enough lathes able to handle that. The number able to handle L73 would be even fewer.

 

[DWG]

First, the guns were being designed by a different branch than the rest of the tank.

Which was also true of the US.

Hence 2pdrs lingering on well past their sell-by date, and then 6pdrs being used when everyone else had settled on 75mm as the minimum sized tank gun. 6pdrs were viable anti-tank guns, but not tank guns. Turns out that tanks don't spend a lot of time shooting at other tanks, but do spend an awful lot of time shooting HE at things. Yes, even in North Africa.

Remember we had two lines of tanks, Infantry and Cruiser. Infantry tanks were supposed to shoot at whatever the infantry needed them to shoot at, while the cruisers took on the enemy armour. The infantry tanks routinely had versions armed with the 3" howitzer, even pre-war.

Without Dunkirk we start phasing out the 2 Pdr for hole-punching and standardizing on the 6 Pdr in late 1940.

The Germans paralleled UK usage in arming Pz III and IV with both a long 50mm for punching tanks, and a short 75mm for softer targets. Pz III didn't switch to the Ausf N with the short 75mm until 1942. So anything you accuse the UK of wrt tank armament also applies to the renowned German tank arm....

 

[Scott Kenny]

Remember we had two lines of tanks, Infantry and Cruiser. Infantry tanks were supposed to shoot at whatever the infantry needed them to shoot at, while the cruisers took on the enemy armour. The infantry tanks routinely had versions armed with the 3" howitzer, even pre-war.

I think you have that backwards, as the infantry tanks were primarily armed with 2pdrs, and only a few of them had the bigger guns for HE and smoke-chucking. On the order of 2 in 13 with support howitzers, if Flames of War has their formations correct (3 platoons of 3, Company CO and 2iC in small-gun tanks, and a pair of support howitzer tanks at company command level).

Infantry tanks were not much faster than a man walking but could go just about anywhere the infantry could, and acted as mobile MG and AT gun bunkers.

Cruiser tanks were not too far from the US concept of the Tank Destroyer, until the formations of Cruiser tanks got a unit of motorized infantry added to them. And then they operated more like US Infantry Divisions.

The Germans paralleled UK usage in arming Pz III and IV with both a long 50mm for punching tanks, and a short 75mm for softer targets. Pz III didn't switch to the Ausf N with the short 75mm until 1942.

And the Panzer IV got the long 75mm/L43 or L48 for harder targets in 1942 as well.

IIRC 1942 was about the time that the Pz3 ran out of growth options, so what had been the "support tank" with the HE-thrower got pressed into use as the main tank. The Pz4.

So anything you accuse the UK of wrt tank armament also applies to the renowned German tank arm....

Correct. I have entire rants about how messed up German tank procurement was. Still not as bad as Soviet tank procurement, which saw The Chieftain looking rather worse for wear after taking a shot for every WTF moment.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The Russians had a perfectly good 57mm gun that outperformed the 76.2mm early doors. Apparently on a very fine light tank the T-50 which was just too expensive.

Proper development of the 6 pounder would leave us with a good early to middle war weapon.

Their 57mm also had horrid accuracy. They tried in the T34, among other tanks and found both the HE shell and accuracy so bad they dropped it as a tank gun initially. After a rework to address these issues it was found that the extra time and cost to make the ZIS 4 gun wasn't worth it in terms of production costs.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

One thing that would be interesting here is in an Asian war would the British who can commit more ships to that war without one in Europe fight for a bigger role in setting strategy with the US and Dutch, and would these allies listen? This would be very critical for naval operations in the SW Pacific area in particular.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 79

First, in peacetime the British Army would be much smaller. Calling up, or drafting, units from India or Australia will be difficult other than those already in peacetime service. The RAF wouldn't be pressed to build as many aircraft as possible and even development of new types would slow down markedly. This would, in turn, leave the RAF with only the real choice to send some Hurricanes at most as the Spitfires would be retained for home defense.

What @A Tentative Fleet Plan said, that is.

They would have lost harder, and even sooner. Part of the reason why Germany went to war in 1939 is that they could not keep up with Britain and France's rearmament programs, and were beginning to lose the lead in armaments they had built up earlier in the 1930s, whilst simultaneously hitting the limits of their economic potential.

The Regular British Army was relatively small, but it was supported by the Territorial Army which at the outbreak of OTL World War II was being doubled from 12 to 24 infantry divisions plus an armoured division and several independent armoured and tank brigades. Also conscription was introduced in 1939 when the Military Training Act was introduced in April of that year. Another thing to say about the British Regular Army is that it's overseas garrisons (including the Far East) were being reinforced and modernised as part of the ongoing rearmament programme and would have been completed by 1944. In practical terms the land forces available in 1944 ITTL would be the same if not larger than at the end of 1941 IOTL.

As you mentioned the Australian and Indian Armies, the Dominions and India were modernising and expanding their regular and reserve armies at the outbreak of OTL World War II and those programmes would have been complete by 1944. So were the parts of the Regular British Army that were recruited from the colonies (including those in the Far East) and the armies of the colonies that weren't part of the British Army like the King's African Rifles were being expanded and modernised too.

The Axis nations were expanding and modernising their armies too, but as others have explicitly written or alluded to, the gap between their armies and those of the British Empire & Commonwealth (BEC), France and the other European nations (in quality and quantity) would be much smaller in 1944 that it was in 1939.

Edit: I thought you were writing about the Pacific War breaking out in 1944. You were actually talking about the Pacific War still breaking out at the end of 1941. The expansion and modernisation programmes in progress in September 1939 IOTL would have been well advanced by the end of 1941 ITTL if the European War hadn't started. Therefore, in practical terms the land forces available at the end of 1941 ITTL would have been the same if not larger than at that date IOTL and the quality of equipment would have been the same if not better as well.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Message 79

First, in peacetime the British Army would be much smaller. Calling up, or drafting, units from India or Australia will be difficult other than those already in peacetime service. The RAF wouldn't be pressed to build as many aircraft as possible and even development of new types would slow down markedly. This would, in turn, leave the RAF with only the real choice to send some Hurricanes at most as the Spitfires would be retained for home defense.

What @A Tentative Fleet Plan said, that is.

They would have lost harder, and even sooner. Part of the reason why Germany went to war in 1939 is that they could not keep up with Britain and France's rearmament programs, and were beginning to lose the lead in armaments they had built up earlier in the 1930s, whilst simultaneously hitting the limits of their economic potential.

The RAF expansion programme in force at the OTL declaration of World War II was Scheme M which was to see the RAF expand from 157 squadrons at 3rd September 1939 to 212 squadrons by 31st March 1942. The Dominions and India were expanding their air forces too, e.g. IIRC the current RAAF expansion programme was for 31 squadrons by the end of 1941.

Going by past experience Scheme M wouldn't have been completed on time in terms of the number of squadrons, number of aircraft and types of aircraft. However, it would have been completed by 1944 and depending upon what the Axis air forces do between 1939 and 1944 ITTL the RAF will be onto Scheme N, Scheme O or even Scheme P at the TTL declaration of war.

If we're talking about the Pacific War starting in 1944 (which is what I thought you meant) the Spitfire and Hurricane would have been replaced by Typhoons and Tornados and their replacements would be coming into service. If we're talking about the Pacific War still starting in 1941 the Typhoon and Tornado would have entered service in 1941 to replace the Spitfire and Hurricane (due to the OTL Battle of Britain not happening) which isn't necessarily a good thing because they'd still have the teething problems with their Sabre and Vulture engines, ditto with the Avro Manchesters that was intended to be most numerous of the 1,360 heavy bombers in 85 Bomber Command squadrons.

Expansion Schemes F, L and M included large increases in the overseas commands from 292 aircraft in 27 squadrons in Schemes A and C to 636 aircraft in 49 squadrons in Scheme M. They included substantial increases in the size of the Far East Command which would have a number of fighter squadrons which weren't in the earlier expansion schemes. In the event of war the standing forces in the Far East were to be reinforced from India, the Middle East and the Home Commands. And as there's no European War ITTL they'd be sent.

The situation at home in 1941 ITTL was a lot less desperate than it was at the end of 1941 IOTL. Germany wasn't occupying France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway so it could only attack the UK via NE Germany so the Luftwaffe was attacking from fewer directions, could make fewer sorties due to the longer flights and Fighter Command had more warning time. Plus the bombers would have had much less or no fighter protection. Could a Bf109 or Fw190 with drop tanks fly from Hamburg to the east cost of England?

Though I think you're right that the RAF would only send Hurricanes. The Typhoons and Tornados were too unreliable at this stage and while the extra performance of the Spitfires wasn't as important for home defence ITTL, the RAF would keep them at home and have an all-Hurricane force in the Far East for logistical reasons.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Part of Message 79

What @A Tentative Fleet Plan said, that is.

The RAF expansion programme in force at the OTL declaration of World War II was Scheme M which was to see the RAF expand from 157 squadrons at 3rd September 1939 to 212 squadrons by 31st March 1942. The Dominions and India were expanding their air forces too, e.g. IIRC the current RAAF expansion programme was for 31 squadrons by the end of 1941.

Going by past experience Scheme M wouldn't have been completed on time in terms of the number of squadrons, number of aircraft and types of aircraft. However, it would have been completed by 1944 and depending upon what the Axis air forces do between 1939 and 1944 ITTL the RAF will be onto Scheme N, Scheme O or even Scheme P at the TTL declaration of war.

If we're talking about the Pacific War starting in 1944 (which is what I thought you meant) the Spitfire and Hurricane would have been replaced by Typhoons and Tornados and their replacements would be coming into service. If we're talking about the Pacific War still starting in 1941 the Typhoon and Tornado would have entered service in 1941 to replace the Spitfire and Hurricane (due to the OTL Battle of Britain not happening) which isn't necessarily a good thing because they'd still have the teething problems with their Sabre and Vulture engines, ditto with the Avro Manchesters that was intended to be most numerous of the 1,360 heavy bombers in 85 Bomber Command squadrons.

Expansion Schemes F, L and M included large increases in the overseas commands from 292 aircraft in 27 squadrons in Schemes A and C to 636 aircraft in 49 squadrons in Scheme M. They included substantial increases in the size of the Far East Command which would have a number of fighter squadrons which weren't in the earlier expansion schemes. In the event of war the standing forces in the Far East were to be reinforced from India, the Middle East and the Home Commands. And as there's no European War ITTL they'd be sent.

The situation at home in 1941 ITTL was a lot less desperate than it was at the end of 1941 IOTL. Germany wasn't occupying France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway so it could only attack the UK via NE Germany so the Luftwaffe was attacking from fewer directions, could make fewer sorties due to the longer flights and Fighter Command had more warning time. Plus the bombers would have had much less or no fighter protection. Could a Bf109 or Fw190 with drop tanks fly from Hamburg to the east cost of England?

Though I think you're right that the RAF would only send Hurricanes. The Typhoons and Tornados were too unreliable at this stage and while the extra performance of the Spitfires wasn't as important for home defence ITTL, the RAF would keep them at home and have an all-Hurricane force in the Far East for logistical reasons.

I see it as more likely without a European war the Tornado / Typhoon gets cancelled or is in protracted development much like say, the Blackburn Firebrand. If the plane isn't perfect, the RAF won't put it into production in peacetime, and that's what we're talking here. For an Asian war, the British might well just buy US aircraft instead. After all, the Spitfire proved nearly worthless as a fighter in Asia. The Australians made use of some but the performance in hot, humid weather was poor, reliability execrable, and the range of the plane far too short to make it useful. That last one did the P-39 in more than anything else in the Pacific.

So, I'd see the British and Commonwealth opting for P-40's possibly an improved P-39 in a 1941-42 Pacific War.

You have to remember, what was allowed and acceptable in wartime doesn't mean it would be accepted in peacetime. I could see the Spitfire being increasingly the plane of choice in England for home defense. The Hurricane gets sent elsewhere to supplement, then replace, stuff like the Gladiator.

If the Germans are doing clandestine very high-altitude reconnaissance flights--in peacetime--near or over France and England, I could see the RAF ordering small numbers of something like the Welkin to deal with that.

I'd also say that the FAA remains woefully ill-equipped with iffy aircraft in inadequate numbers through the start of the Pacific War. At that point they're more likely to simply purchase US manufactured aircraft while they diddle around endlessly with domestic designs that just don't come up to snuff. At the same time, being in combat with the IJN and IJAAF more leads to most of the early stuff being dumped PDQ as it gets decimated in combat. Swordfish worked in the Med and Europe because they could almost always attack unopposed by fighter opposition. Against the Kido Butai, they'd be shot down to the last one long before they reached a launch position. Even the RN would have to admit sending them against the Japanese was suicide.

Given the replacement Barracuda or Albacore isn't much better, the RN likely would simply buy Avengers from the US instead since they have nothing to replace their own designs with. The same goes with Fulmars and Fireflies. Neither is going to do well versus the Zero. The FAA likely would come around to see the USN deck park and massive air wing on a carrier as the only viable option against the Japanese where limited numbers of planes worked at least satisfactorily against the Italians and Germans who had no carriers of their own and rarely had to deal with fighter escorted land-based bombers.

 

[Antonio]

Topic renamed according to thread evolution

 

[DWG]

the 2 pdr gun system was prone to jamming due to use of cloth belts.

(Missed this post last week).

The WWI era 2Pdr Mk II and the Mk II* used cloth belts, the 2 Pdr Mk II*C used metal link belts, as did the Mk VIII used in all the multiple pom-pom mountings, along with many singles.

Their heavy AA guns were still in transition with the 4.5" being the preferred standard while there were still 4", 4.7" and 5.25" guns in service complicating things.

It is more complicated, much more complicated. Firstly 5.25" wasn't an HAA gun, it's a dual purpose weapon, intended as the main battery on light cruisers (the Didos were not CLAAs), or the secondary on battleships - that's why it was retained in production and development throughout the war. There were multiple 4.7" designs: the Nelsons and Courageous had 4.7"/40 high angle (90 deg) HAA guns, meanwhile 4.7"/45 was the preferred low angle destroyer mounting, with elevation of between 30 and 60deg depending on the mounting. There was limited introduction of a new 4.7"/50 (50deg) enclosed twin in the L and N classes immediately prewar, but production of the 4.7"/50 turret conflicted with 5.25" production and was not repeated. 4.5"/45 (80 deg) was a new development as the preferred HAA gun in the new carriers and late war replaced the 4.7"/45 as destroyer armament in the Battles and Darings, giving them a DP armament. The 4"/45 (80 deg) was the HAA armament on interwar battleships and cruisers, where it was in the process of being doubled from singles to twins as part of the fleet AA upgrade programme; it was also the preferred armament for lighter escorts and some destroyers, though opposed by the gun-club admirals who felt it wasn't heavy enough for anti-surface use.

That last point is probably the primary problem with RN HAA development between the wars, there was a strong clique who wanted all destroyer guns optimised for anti-destroyer use with heavy shells and low barrel axes, while HAA demanded lighter shells for sustained fire and high barrel axes for high angle fire.

The other thing the RN failed to do was design and build a good fire control system for any of this. They were definitely trying but most of what got put in service was a half assed lash up of a system cobbled together on limited funding.

HACS wasn't a lash-up, it was just limited by a conclusion in the early 20s that current technology wasn't up to tachometric systems. Its primary weakness was an inability to deal with diving targets, but that was true of most HAA control systems, even the tachometric ones struggled. A replacement tachometric system was under development in the late 30s, but had to be cancelled on the outbreak of war. With the introduction of the Gyro Rate Unit in 1940 the HACS became effectively a tachometric system. The pre-war fleet AA upgrade programme included additional HACS (where able) as much as additional guns.

Their destroyer force was expected to avoid air attack mainly by maneuver with the AA battery being severely lacking.

Name a destroyer class in service at the outbreak of war with a better LAA suite than a quad pom-pom and 2 quad .50 Vickers? The US had a better HAA gun in the 5"/38, but was behind in LAA. The RN suffered from having evaluated dive-bombing as ineffectual just before the USMC got it sorted out, followed by the Luftwaffe and IJNAF. Against level bombing manoeuvre was effective, and essential vs torpedo attack.

This brings up a second problem they--and every navy except the USN in 1939-40 had: The doctrine for defense against air attack was each ship defending itself with a combination of its AA battery and maneuvering independently as necessary. The USN alone at that time had a doctrine in place of using ring formations and the entire formation operating in unison against an air attack.

"The 1939 Fighting Instructions envisaged a close AA screen to add to the anti-aircraft firepower of the main body, and also to hamper torpedo attacks. The large new destroyers, from the ‘Tribals’ on, were particularly suited to this role; the ‘Tribals’ had been conceived for it. These destroyers would also constitute a sonar (Asdic) screen for the main body. Ships had to be separated sufficiently that pom-pom rounds fired by main body ships would not damage close escorts: minimum safe separation was set by the self-destruction range of the pom-pom shells.

On receipt of air warning, the main body would manoeuvre so as to bring its most powerful anti-aircraft firepower to bear and to present aircraft with the most difficult target."

Friedman, Naval AA Guns and Gunnery

As for the USN's circle formations, there was considerable debate over them which wasn't settled until PAC-10 was issued in June 1943. Additionally they're primarily an AA formation, whereas RN formations had to make greater allowance for the ASW role of the escort and the increased likelihood of surface action in the Med.

with the exception of the USN, every navy relied on drills for AA practice but had little or no actual live fire practice against aerial targets other than occasionally firing at a towed target sleeve flying parallel to the ship. This was very unrealistic and the US, too, was doing this up until drones became available in late 1938.

The RN actually had drones in service as of 1935 - the De Havilland Queen Bee, however the Queen Bee was fairly limited and didn't have the ability to conduct diving attacks.

Against the Japanese or for that matter the less experienced Luftwaffe, the RN didn't stand much of a chance at sea when attacked by large numbers of aircraft. Crete proved that, just as the IJN's Indian Ocean excursion did, or the sinking of PoW and Repulse. Individual ships defending themselves stood little chance against a determined air attack.

Crete - counter-invasion operations and then an evacuation of 16,500 troops out of 28,000 to Egypt, and unlike Dunkirk 350 miles from the nearest friendly airfield, so little air cover. To which problem Cunningham remarked “It will take three years to build a new fleet … it will take three hundred years to build a new tradition”
21st May: 4 hour air attack on Force C (RAdm King, Naiad, Perth, Calcutta, Juno, Kandahar, Kingston, and Nubian), starting at 0630, Kandahar counts being targeted by 5 waves in an hour and a half, but neither she nor her consort Kingston are hit. First loss is Juno at 1300, hit by three high-altitude bombs while trying to evade. Carlisle joins at 1400.
22nd May: Force C again engages invasion fleet north of the island. Calcutta shoots herself dry defending the damaged Naiad from air attack.
Greyhound - sunk by 8 Ju 87 while trying to rejoin Force A1 after detaching to finish off a caique.
Gloucester and Fiji - sent to cover the rescue of survivors from Greyhound, RAdm King hadn't realised they were almost out of AA ammo, both sunk while attempting to rejoin. Fiji was down to firing starshell by the end.
Kelly and Kashmir - three K class DDs (the other was Kipling) caught on their own by 24 Ju 87s, the only HAA able to bear being a twin 4" on each. In the next three hours Kipling rescues 279 men from the water while under continuous air attack
28th May
Imperial, steering gear disabled by near misses, crew taken off and scuttled by Hotspur.
29th May
Hereward, sunk after being separated from Force B with 450 troops from Heraklion aboard.
1st June
Calcutta (alone with Coventry), dive-bombed out of the sun by two Ju-88s and sunk

Operation C - as noted elsewhere in the thread, the only losses were to ships caught in pairs with no air support by large numbers of dive bombers.

Force Z - the screen wasn't large enough, or capable enough, with only four old destroyers, Electra and Express (1931 programme, 4x1x4.7" IX on CP XVIII, 40 degrees, 1x12 Pdr 20 cwt, no Pom-Pom) , Vampire (1916 programme, 4x1x4" Mk V on CP II, 30 degrees, 2x1x2 pdr) and Tenedos (1917 programme, 3 (or 2?) 4" Mk IV on PIX, 20 degrees, 1x1x 2 Pdr), while PoW was suffering from tropicalization issues affecting her HACS they might have fixed with a few days in dock. Meanwhile Repulse had possibly the worst AA fit of any capital ship in the fleet (6x1x4" Mk V, 2x4x 2 Pdr)

On top of everything else, Tenedos wasn't with the screen during the attack, having been detached due to her fuel state. And then when the attack started, Philips didn't order up his waiting fighter screen, while PoW was incredibly unlucky to take a hit early in the battle which knocked out almost her entire AA capability bar the single Bofors on the quarterdeck.

None of these are typical operations. What Crete and Operation C show repeatedly is the vulnerability of ships operating alone or in very small groups, while Force Z lost most of its already limited HAA to a single golden BB. I really don't see any evidence that any other navy would have performed better in similar circumstances.

 

[Scott Kenny]

production of the 4.7"/50 turret conflicted with 5.25" production and was not repeated.

I had wondered why the Brits had not built so many 4.7" armed ships.

Logistics. (groan)

4.5"/45 (80 deg) was a new development as the preferred HAA gun in the new carriers and late war replaced the 4.7"/45 as destroyer armament in the Battles and Darings, giving them a DP armament.

And the RN has been stuck on 4.5" ever since. Well, till they exhaust all the barrels made in WW2, anyways.

 

[DWG]

And the RN has been stuck on 4.5" ever since. Well, till they exhaust all the barrels made in WW2, anyways.

Type 26 is 5"/54 Mk 45 Mod 4 and Type 31 is 57mm Mk 110, it's only Type 45 left with 4.5" Mk 8.

 

[EwenS]

And the RN has been stuck on 4.5" ever since. Well, till they exhaust all the barrels made in WW2, anyways.

Funny!
The only thing the 4.5" Mk 8 has in common with earlier 4.5" guns is the calibre.

Britain 4.5"/55 (11.4 cm) QF Mark 8 Mod 0 and Mod 1 - NavWeaps

navweaps.com

 

[T. A. Gardner]

I had wondered why the Brits had not built so many 4.7" armed ships.

Logistics. (groan)




And the RN has been stuck on 4.5" ever since. Well, till they exhaust all the barrels made in WW2, anyways.

The 4.7" twin 'turret' gun mount (Mk XX) also had some serious design issues associated with it. One of the biggest flaws was the ammunition hoist in the center of the turret was fixed in place and didn't rotate with the gun mount. This meant that when the turret was faced directly forward, the shells came up in front, the powder case in the rear and loading was straight forward and simple. Rotate the guns to one beam and now the shells are on one side, the powder cases on the other and a convoluted set of acrobatics is needed to get them to each gun correctly. This made a serious reduction in ROF when the mount was rotated off pointing forward (or aft as the case might be).

The weight of the mount also had a serious effect on the weight and size of a destroyer making it necessary to build a much larger ship to accommodate them.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The 4.7" twin 'turret' gun mount (Mk XX) also had some serious design issues associated with it. One of the biggest flaws was the ammunition hoist in the center of the turret was fixed in place and didn't rotate with the gun mount. This meant that when the turret was faced directly forward, the shells came up in front, the powder case in the rear and loading was straight forward and simple. Rotate the guns to one beam and now the shells are on one side, the powder cases on the other and a convoluted set of acrobatics is needed to get them to each gun correctly. This made a serious reduction in ROF when the mount was rotated off pointing forward (or aft as the case might be).

The weight of the mount also had a serious effect on the weight and size of a destroyer making it necessary to build a much larger ship to accommodate them.

Wow, that is a seriously egregious screw-up in design!

 

[EwenS]

Wow, that is a seriously egregious screw-up in design!

While the hoists were a fixed structure (supposedly for cost reasons) with the gun house on the upper deck revolving around it, they did deliver shells and charges direct from the magazines to the gunhouse without any intermediate handling. So any delays were within the gunhouse. And it helped to cut down crew numbers on ships that were becoming cramped.

In comparison the twin 4.5" Mk.II Between Decks & Mk IV (Battle class destroyers) saw the ammunition delivered from magazines to a handling room under the gunhouse, and from there to the mount itself. From Navweaps.

"....The modernized battleships and battlecruiser used a single stage hoist that brought rounds up into the superstructure. For all of these ships, the hoists or conveyors did not come into the gunhouse. Instead, a human chain was used to carry the rounds from the hoists to a three-round scuttle on each side of the rear of the mounting. From here, the rounds were passed by hand to a fuze setting machine, one for each gun, and then onto the loading tray."

The Mk.IV used a similar arrangement.

A similar arrangement existed with many of the USN single & twin 5"/38 mounts. Ammunition delivered from magazine to a handling room under the gunhouse by one set of hoists, then manually transferred to another set of hoists to elevate them to the gun house.

 

[Scott Kenny]

While the hoists were a fixed structure (supposedly for cost reasons) with the gun house on the upper deck revolving around it, they did deliver shells and charges direct from the magazines to the gunhouse without any intermediate handling. So any delays were within the gunhouse. And it helped to cut down crew numbers on ships that were becoming cramped.

[...] the USN single & twin 5"/38 mounts. Ammunition delivered from magazine to a handling room under the gunhouse by one set of hoists, then manually transferred to another set of hoists to elevate them to the gun house.

But that meant you needed people wrestling shells inside the gunhouse, whereas with the 2-step system the people wrestling the shells into the rotating shell hoists were out of the way of loading the guns.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Or what would have happened to the war if the Second London Naval Treaty had broken down?

The Second London Naval Treaty expired on 31st December 1942. This is what the copy of ww2ships.com says.

http://www.ww2ships.com/documents/doc0004-london1936.shtml

PART V
FINAL CLAUSES
Article XXVII

The present Treaty shall remain in force until 31 December 1942.

Article XXVIII

(1) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will, during the last quarter of 1940, initiate through the diplomatic channel a consultation between the Governments of the Parties to the present Treaty with a view to holding a conference in order to frame a new treaty for the reduction and limitation of naval armament. This conference shall take place in 1941 unless the preliminary consultations should have shown that the holding of such a conference at that time would not be desirable or practicable.

(2) In the course of the consultation referred to in the preceding paragraph, views shall be exchanged in order to determine whether, in the light of the circumstances then prevailing and the experience gained in the interval in the design and construction of capital ships, it may be possible to agree upon a reduction in the standard displacement or calibre of guns of capital ships to be constructed under future annual programmes and thus, if possible, to bring about a reduction in the cost of capital ships.

Although it was only signed by France, the British Commonwealth and United States initially, Italy did sign later (IIRC) and so did Germany under the revised Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1937, but I don't recall if they left the Treaty when the AGNA was abrogated in the spring of 1939.

My guess is that the 2nd LNT survives in its June 1938 form until the true details of the Japanese Yamato class battleships and the German "H" class battleships are discovered. That may not be until well into 1942 when the Treaty's nearly out of date in any case.

Does the Third London Naval Conference planned for 1941 happen? And if it does what might the terms and conditions of the resulting Third London Naval Treaty be? My guess is yes it does happen and the resulting treaty has more generous qualitative limits than the preceding treaty. That is the displacement limits for aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers will be raised from 23,000 tons, 45,000 tons and 8,000 tons while the gun calibre limits for capital ships and cruisers will be raised.

If the 2nd LNT did run it's full course that would create several problems for the USN.

• It wouldn't be able to lay down any Essex class aircraft carriers as we know them, because they displaced 27,208 tons (Conway's 1922-46) and the Treaty allowed a maximum of 23,000 tons. 9 were laid down 1941-42 IOTL.
• The revised maximum of 45,000 tons for battleships means that the Montana class (if designed at the same time IOTL) can't be laid down until 1943, but that's academic as they weren't built IOTL .
• The limit of 8,000 tons and 6in guns for cruisers means no Baltimore class can be laid down until 1943. IOTL 4 out of the 18 ships laid down were begun before then.
• The limit of 8,000 tons for cruisers also means no Cleveland class can be laid down until 1943. I counted 32 laid down 1940-42 from the list in Conway's 1922-46. This included 9 that were completed as Independence class light fleet carriers.

Though the number of ships laid down by the USN 1940-42 will probably be somewhat smaller ITTL than it was IOTL.

 

[EwenS]

The Second London Naval Treaty expired on 31st December 1942. This is what the copy of ww2ships.com says.

http://www.ww2ships.com/documents/doc0004-london1936.shtml

Although it was only signed by France, the British Commonwealth and United States initially, Italy did sign later (IIRC) and so did Germany under the revised Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1937, but I don't recall if they left the Treaty when the AGNA was abrogated in the spring of 1939.

My guess is that the 2nd LNT survives in its June 1938 form until the true details of the Japanese Yamato class battleships and the German "H" class battleships are discovered. That may not be until well into 1942 when the Treaty's nearly out of date in any case.

Does the Third London Naval Conference planned for 1941 happen? And if it does what might the terms and conditions of the resulting Third London Naval Treaty be? My guess is yes it does happen and the resulting treaty has more generous qualitative limits than the preceding treaty. That is the displacement limits for aircraft carriers, capital ships and cruisers will be raised from 23,000 tons, 45,000 tons and 8,000 tons while the gun calibre limits for capital ships and cruisers will be raised.

If the 2nd LNT did run it's full course that would create several problems for the USN.

• It wouldn't be able to lay down any Essex class aircraft carriers as we know them, because they displaced 27,208 tons (Conway's 1922-46) and the Treaty allowed a maximum of 23,000 tons. 9 were laid down 1941-42 IOTL.
• The revised maximum of 45,000 tons for battleships means that the Montana class (if designed at the same time IOTL) can't be laid down until 1943, but that's academic as they weren't built IOTL .
• The limit of 8,000 tons and 6in guns for cruisers means no Baltimore class can be laid down until 1943. IOTL 4 out of the 18 ships laid down were begun before then.
• The limit of 8,000 tons for cruisers also means no Cleveland class can be laid down until 1943. I counted 32 laid down 1940-42 from the list in Conway's 1922-46. This included 9 that were completed as Independence class light fleet carriers.

Though the number of ships laid down by the USN 1940-42 will probably be somewhat smaller ITTL than it was ITTL.

For the USA there is also their own laws to consider.

Second Vinson Act of 1938 authorised specific tonnage increases for each class of vessel.

Naval Act of 1938 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

So is there even a Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940 allowing further expansion or is it delayed? And to when? What shape does it take? Do we get the same kinds of ship or something else?

Second Vinson for example authorised only 40,000 tons of carriers over earlier WNT/LNT limits. 20,000 used to build CV-8 Hornet. Planning for CV-9 that became Essex started at a figure of 20,400 tons in 1939 being all that was left.

The increase allowed for battleships covered the first 3 Iowas.

As for the Montanas, construction of them can't begin anyway until the new building docks planned for them are built. Congress began to authorise funding to improve US Naval Yards from 1938. Work on those building docks began in mid-1940 with completions planned to be from the latter part of 1942. Hence construction of the Montanas was scheduled to begin around then.

So much of what emerged shipwise in WW2 was driven by the Two Ocean Navy Act. That became possible because the Treaties were all effectively terminated with the outbreak of WW2 in Sept 1939. In a more peaceful world at that time there is less emphasis on a push for greater size of ship and numbers from the USN, until a new Treaty can be negotiated by the end of 1942.

 

[RedLegion]

The great unknown for the new proposed treaty will be the USSR. Without war, the first battleship, the Soviet Union, will be launched. There may be pressure from Moscow to include them in the treaty system as well.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The great unknown for the new proposed treaty will be the USSR. Without war, the first battleship, the Soviet Union, will be launched. There may be pressure from Moscow to include them in the treaty system as well.

FWIW

The USSR didn't sign the Second London Naval Treaty, but it did make this bilateral agreement with the United Kingdom in 1937.

https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1938-TS0017.pdf

And this one in 1938.

https://treaties.fcdo.gov.uk/data/Library2/pdf/1939-TS0039.pdf

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The great unknown for the new proposed treaty will be the USSR. Without war, the first battleship, the Soviet Union, will be launched. There may be pressure from Moscow to include them in the treaty system as well.

Given the track record of the Red Navy, it'd just be another target for the Luftwaffe...

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For the USA there is also their own laws to consider.

Second Vinson Act of 1938 authorised specific tonnage increases for each class of vessel.

Naval Act of 1938 - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

So is there even a Two Ocean Navy Act in 1940 allowing further expansion or is it delayed? And to when? What shape does it take? Do we get the same kinds of ship or something else?

Second Vinson for example authorised only 40,000 tons of carriers over earlier WNT/LNT limits. 20,000 used to build CV-8 Hornet. Planning for CV-9 that became Essex started at a figure of 20,400 tons in 1939 being all that was left.

The increase allowed for battleships covered the first 3 Iowas.

As for the Montanas, construction of them can't begin anyway until the new building docks planned for them are built. Congress began to authorise funding to improve US Naval Yards from 1938. Work on those building docks began in mid-1940 with completions planned to be from the latter part of 1942. Hence construction of the Montanas was scheduled to begin around then.

So much of what emerged shipwise in WW2 was driven by the Two Ocean Navy Act. That became possible because the Treaties were all effectively terminated with the outbreak of WW2 in Sept 1939. In a more peaceful world at that time there is less emphasis on a push for greater size of ship and numbers from the USN, until a new Treaty can be negotiated by the end of 1942.

For what it's worth I know about the Vinson Acts and here's one I made earlier.

​

I didn't re-read my copies of the acts, but IIRC those are the total tonnages of underage warships and after the Second London Naval Treaty abolished the tonnage quotas there was nothing in the acts to prevent the USN keeping overage ships. I think the acts said ships became overage whenever the Treaties said a ship became due for replacement which under the Second London Naval Treaty was: 26 years after its date of completion for a battleship, 20 years for an aircraft carrier; 20 yeas for a cruiser laid down after 31st December 1919; 16 years for a cruiser laid down before 1st January 1920; 16 years for a destroyer and 13 years for a submarine.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The Russians had a perfectly good 57mm gun that outperformed the 76.2mm early doors. Apparently on a very fine light tank the T-50 which was just too expensive.

Proper development of the 6 pounder would leave us with a good early to middle war weapon.

The problem with that 57mm was the barrel was so long that it experienced both droop and vibration in firing making the shot dispersion unacceptable at even moderate ranges. There was also a shortage of 57mm ammunition and planners didn't want to disrupt production lines by introducing a new gun that might cause bottlenecks.

The 6 pdr would have been a perfectly adequate antitank gun, but it would also leave the British, again, saddled with a tank that had little or no HE performance and nothing but machineguns to deal with stuff other than another tank.

The US was at that time, would still likely be looking at the 37mm as a tank gun, particularly for light tanks, and putting a 75mm that had great HE performance with adequate antitank performance on their designs.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Welding. Very important in tank building but, a shortage of welders who were mostly employed building ships. On top of that, how many different tanks on the go? Engines? Any joined up thought at all?

Not a lot.

A time when muddling through was the Norman Stanley Fletcher standard.

For the British, welding means a serious union fight. You have lots of riveters employed and they aren't going to want to be made irrelevant by some upstart welders. The likelihood, in peace, is that welding remains a limited practice with riveting being the norm, not because riveting is superior but because nobody can successfully fight the unions to get it instituted on a widespread basis.

 

[Foo Fighter]

As much as the riveters wanted to be relevant, the companies that employed them more so. "We would like to make tanks but, they MUST be riveted", being a common refrain. A shortage of welders early doors and being unhappy to take them out of shipyards to produce tanks and teach others.

 

[DWG]

As much as the riveters wanted to be relevant, the companies that employed them more so. "We would like to make tanks but, they MUST be riveted", being a common refrain. A shortage of welders early doors and being unhappy to take them out of shipyards to produce tanks and teach others.

Was there actually much crossover between the maritime and tank riveter populations? Simple enough if you have both in the same area, but was that the case anywhere outside of the Tyne? And even there that was Vickers-Armstrong on both sides of the shop, so you couldn't just tell management to stuff it and cross to the other side, you might find yourself blacklisted. If they're not co-located then moving people with families becomes an issue, I know that housing shipped-in workforce was an issue at the Glasgow yards.