What if WW2 broke out in 1944? Alternative Royal Navy and some related considerations.

[DWG]

If General Wever had not been killed in an accident in 1936, a fleet of Ju 89 and Do 19 heavy bombers would have been available in 1941, instead of the Ju 88.

And Goering still wouldn't have been interested in using them against shipping.

 

[DWG]

That's true because Germany's industrial capacity and access to raw materials was limited, but to wipe out the Royal Navy a hundred specialized planes manned by naval pilots and supported by several dozen reconnaissance seaplanes equipped with maritime surveillance radar would have sufficed.

Imagine if the planes of the Regia Aeronautica had been equipped with Ftitz X remote-deflected bombs during the convoy battle to supply Malta.

The RN's antiaircraft defenses in 1940-1941 were totally inadequate and the capacity of its carriers was too reduced to withstand the attack of fifty strategic bombers. Before the British fighters managed to reach interception altitude, the missiles would have already been launched, and the bombers would be returning to their bases lightened of the weight.

I'd really suggest going and reading accounts of the Pedestal battle to understand the historical state of RN fighter operations - they didn't sit on the flight deck waiting.

The RN's air defences in 1940/41 were the best in the world. Still inadequate, but the best in the world. Given an extra five years of development, they would have solved their major weaknesses. However you seem to want to give Germany the advantages of an extra five years of development, within 2 to 3 years, while restricting the RN to historical systems and losses, and ignoring the political constraints that would have prevented the German forces from developing that capability. That's not realistic, nor how alternate timeline development is generally expected to work.

 

[Justo Miranda]

And Goering still wouldn't have been interested in using them against shipping.

Göring had his reasons for not trusting naval aviation.

In the morning of October 7, 1939, a concentration of British warships was located in the North Sea by a Heinkel He 111 H-6 reconnaissance aircraft of the KG 26 photographic unit.

This powerful naval group was attacked by 127 Heinkel He 111 and 21 Junkers Ju 88 bombers from the X Fliegerkorps.

The Kriegsmarine staff was also ordered to co-ordinate an aerial attack of its naval air arm. Five Heinkel He 59 torpedo-bomber floatplanes and 23 Dornier Do 18 reconnaissance flying boats were deployed but, despite hours of searching, they failed to contact the enemy, and no concerted Luftwaffe attack was mounted.

On October 22, a new Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine joint action was attempted against convoy FN24 from Methil to Orfordness.

The attack involved three Ju 88s of the 1.KG 30 and ten Heinkel He 115 floatplanes of the 1./Kü.Fl.Gr.406, but it turned out that the Ju 88s were faster and reached the convoy much earlier than the He 115, alerting the British defenses. When the naval planes began the attack, they were intercepted by Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire fighters of the 46th and 72nd RAF squadrons that managed to shoot down four floatplanes and damaged others.

The disaster was used politically to benefit the Luftwaffe. In November 15, Reichsmarshall Hermann Göring ordered the reduction of the Küstenflieger units to just nine long-range reconnaissance and nine multipurpose Staffeln.

By that time, the Graf Zeppelin aircraft carrier was 85 per cent complete and the first carrier-borne wing Trägergruppe 186 (equipped with Junkers Ju 87C and Messerschmitt Bf 109 T-1) was formed at Kiel Holtenau.

Halting all work on the aircraft carrier was proposed on April 28, 1940, during a naval conference. In July, the ship was towed from Kiel to Gdnya and its guns and aircraft were transferred to Norway.

After the loss of its air arm, the Kriegsmarine was forced to operate under the protection of the Luftwaffe in an area comprising most of the Baltic Sea and the Norwegian coast, remaining within the range of the Messerschmitt Bf 110 heavy fighters.

The strategic situation changed in 1941 making it necessary for the German fleet to enter the Atlantic Ocean and raid Allied shipping from North America to Great Britain.

In May, the Bismarck battleship, along with the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen, were detected off Scandinavia and dozens of Royal Navy combat units were deployed to block their route.

Both German ships were detected again successively by one Short Sunderland from No. 201 Sqn, one Lockheed Hudson from No. 269 Sqn and two Consolidated Catalina from Sqns. Nos. 209 and 240.

After being located by reconnaissance aircraft, the German naval formation was attacked by a squadron of Fairey Swordfish torpedo-bombers from the aircraft carrier Ark Royal.

In the rough sea the German anti-aircraft guns were unable to break up the attack and a torpedo managed to disable the steering system of the Bismarck. The damage delayed the ship enough for the slower British battleships to catch up and sink her.

None of this would have happened if the German naval formation had included an aircraft carrier. The slow biplanes of the Ark Royal would not have stood a chance against the formidable Messerschmitt interceptors, which could also have scared away the reconnaissance aircraft. But all available Bf 109 T-1 units, specially designed for carrier use, were used by the I./JG 77 as night fighters in Norway.

 

[Justo Miranda]

I'd really suggest going and reading accounts of the Pedestal battle to understand the historical state of RN fighter operations - they didn't sit on the flight deck waiting.

The RN's air defences in 1940/41 were the best in the world. Still inadequate, but the best in the world. Given an extra five years of development, they would have solved their major weaknesses. However you seem to want to give Germany the advantages of an extra five years of development, within 2 to 3 years, while restricting the RN to historical systems and losses, and ignoring the political constraints that would have prevented the German forces from developing that capability. That's not realistic, nor how alternate timeline development is generally expected to work.

Yes, I have read Max Hastings' book, but my view of British defenses differs from yours. They were of little use to defend HMS Prince of Wales against antiquated Japanese bombers or to defend Ceylon against Nagumo's fleet.

Ceylon (5 to 12 to April 1942)​

Early April 1942, two powerful Japanese fleets penetrated the Indian Ocean with the mission to annihilate the British Eastern Fleet based in Ceylon.

The Malay Force, formed by an aircraft carrier with 38 aircraft, 6 cruisers and 4 destroyers, left Burma on 1 April to attack merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal.

This Force sank 23 merchant ships by gunfire in three days, while sixteen B5N2 Kate bombers and twenty-two A5M4 Claude fighters from Ryujo carrier attacked Cocananda and Vizagapatan ports on the east coast of India. On 7 April the Malay Force retired to Rangoon.

On 26 March, the 1st Air Fleet, formed by five aircraft carriers with 247 aircraft, departed from Kendari-Celebes with an escort of 7 cruisers, 11 destroyers, 5 submarines and 6 tankers, starting their raid in the Indian Ocean on 1 April. Four days later fifty- three B5N2 Kate bombers, thirty-eight D3A1 Val dive bombers and thirty-six A6M2 Zero-Sen fighters attacked Colombo sinking three British cruisers and one destroyer. They also shot down twenty-one Hawker Hurricane, six Fairey Fulmar and six Fairey Swordfish, losing one Zero and six Val of their own.

The defences of Colombo consisted of twenty-one Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIb from the 30th Squadron, twenty-four Fairey Fulmar Mk. II from the 803rd and 806th squadrons based at Ratmalana airfield, ten Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIb and seven Hawker Hurricane Mk. I from 258th Squadron based at Racecourse airfield, and one AMES Type 9 mobile radar station that, poorly located among hills, was unable to detect the attacking aircraft.

On 9 April, ninety-one B5N2 and thirty-eight A6M2 attacked Trincomalee. They sank one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, one corvette and two tankers. They also destroyed eight Hurricane, two Fulmar and five Blenheim in combat and eleven Fairey Albacore in the ground, losing three Zeros and two Kates of their own. Three days later the 1st Air Fleet retreated to Malacca straits.

The defences of Trincomalee consisted of sixteen Hawker Hurricane Mk. IIb from the 261st Squadron, sixteen Fairey Fulmar Mk. I and Mk. II from the 273rd Squadron and three Martlet (unserviceable) from the 888th Squadron, based at China Bay and Kokkilai airfields. On this occasion the Type 9 radar did locate the attackers giving the alarm.

These attacks were intended to force the intervention of the Eastern Fleet, formed by 3 aircraft carriers with 91 aircraft, 5 battleships, 7 cruisers and 16 destroyers. Despite having the advantage of radar and their superiority in artillery, the British evaded a confrontation with the Japanese Fleets and the overwhelming Carrier Force. The Eastern Fleet remained hidden in Addu Atoll, a secret base located 1,000 km to the southwest of Ceylon, until the attacks ceased. On 15 April, ignoring the Japanese withdrawal, they moved to Kilindini-Mombasa on the east African coast.

The 'Panic Fighter' of Ceylon was the Fulmar, a two-seat heavy fighter designed to protect the British Fleet against the attacks carried out, far from the coast, by German and Italian bombers that operated without fighter escort.

In 1942, the Eastern Fleet already had several American Martlets and gave part of their Fulmars to the RAF to reinforce the few Hurricanes available in Ceylon. The Fulmar had the same engine and armament than the Hurricane but was slower and less manoeuvrable due to its excessive weight (4,950 kg). If they could avoid being exterminated by the Zeros in Ceylon was thanks to the support of the Hurricanes that suffered the greatest losses. The Fulmar Mk. II had a maximum speed of 417 kph, a climb rate of 7.8 m/sec and a service ceiling of 7,300 m.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

It would help if you had any awareness at all of what actually existing British and German rearmament programs looked like. The Germans were not building four engines heavy bombers armed with guided missiles (and had no plans to do so), and Britain had requirements for new naval fighters (Specifications N.8/39 and N.9/39) with more performance than the stop-gap Fulmars and Hurricanes rushed into service in a wartime emergency.

 

[Justo Miranda]

It would help if you had any awareness at all of what actually existing British and German rearmament programs looked like. The Germans were not building four engines heavy bombers armed with guided missiles (and had no plans to do so), and Britain had requirements for new naval fighters (Specifications N.8/39 and N.9/39) with more performance than the stop-gap Fulmars and Hurricanes rushed into service in a wartime emergency.

I send you some illustrations of German four-engine bombers (two engines attached to each propeller) armed with missiles that fought during World War II.

And some facts about British naval fighter projects.

 

[Justo Miranda]

With the loss of the HMS Glorious and the HMS Courageous, the Royal Navy did not have enough aircraft carriers to escort all convoys and Winston Churchill pressed for an interim solution.

In spring 1941, thirty-five merchant ships were to be converted to 'Catapult Aircraft Merchantman' (CAM Ships) with the installation of a 70 ft rocket catapult in the forward deck, to launch surplus Hurricanes.

These Hurricat /Catafighters were standard Mk. Is, modified with catapult gear as Sea Hurricane Mk. IA.

From November 1941 to July 1943, only eight catapult launches were made from CAM Ships, with six enemy aircraft shot down and the loss of one pilot.

The major drawback of the Hurricat system was that, once the interception was completed, the fighter had to be ditched and the pilot would be picked up by the mother ship or by the nearest escort vessel, the average time to pick him up is between four and six minutes.

For artic operations the survivability was improved with the fitment of one Type K single-man dinghy.

The CAM system was dropped when some merchant ships were converted in small escort carriers (MAC ships) and a new type of fighter, fitted with catapult spools and arrester hook, was developed as Sea Hurricane Mk. IB, for MAC operation.



In April 1940 one Mk. I airframe was fitted with two modified Blackburn Roc floats for operation in Norwegian coastal waters, the estimated top speed of the seaplane version was 210 mph at 10,000 ft.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

I send you some illustrations of German four-engine bombers (two engines attached to each propeller) armed with missiles that fought during World War II.

And some facts about British naval fighter projects.

In a situation where war does not break out until 1944, those guided missiles will not be in service, as there will be no impetus to put them into service.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

With the loss of the HMS Glorious and the HMS Courageous, the Royal Navy did not have enough aircraft carriers to escort all convoys and Winston Churchill pressed for an interim solution.

In spring 1941, thirty-five merchant ships were to be converted to 'Catapult Aircraft Merchantman' (CAM Ships) with the installation of a 70 ft rocket catapult in the forward deck, to launch surplus Hurricanes.

These Hurricat /Catafighters were standard Mk. Is, modified with catapult gear as Sea Hurricane Mk. IA.

From November 1941 to July 1943, only eight catapult launches were made from CAM Ships, with six enemy aircraft shot down and the loss of one pilot.

The major drawback of the Hurricat system was that, once the interception was completed, the fighter had to be ditched and the pilot would be picked up by the mother ship or by the nearest escort vessel, the average time to pick him up is between four and six minutes.

For artic operations the survivability was improved with the fitment of one Type K single-man dinghy.

The CAM system was dropped when some merchant ships were converted in small escort carriers (MAC ships) and a new type of fighter, fitted with catapult spools and arrester hook, was developed as Sea Hurricane Mk. IB, for MAC operation.



In April 1940 one Mk. I airframe was fitted with two modified Blackburn Roc floats for operation in Norwegian coastal waters, the estimated top speed of the seaplane version was 210 mph at 10,000 ft.

Congratulations, you've wasted your time describing wartime emergency projects, which have almost no relation to pre-war Fleet Air Arm plans, which if given an additional 5 years, would very likely have come into production. A Fleet Air Arm in this situation is likely to have fighters with Rolls-Royce Griffons in service, as can be seen in the various N.8/39, N.9/39 and NAD.925/39 proposals put forward before the war.

 

[Justo Miranda]

In November 1939, Supermarine started the design of the Type 338, a navalised version of the Spitfire Mk.IA powered by one Rolls-Royce Merlin III engine. The project was submitted to the Fleet Air Arm on 2 January 1940 and a contract for 50 airplanes was signed in February but was cancelled on 16 March to not interfere with the production of the Merlin engine. Supermarine considered the possibility to use the

Rolls-Royce Griffon designed in 1938 after a request of the Royal Navy. A prototype already existed in November 1939.

On 16 December 1939, Supermarine issued the Technical Office Report NAD 925/39, a navalised version of the Spitfire Mk.IA powered by one 1,730 hp Griffon IIB, 12 cylinder Vee, liquid-cooled engine, with one-stage, two-speed supercharger. The new engine weighted 1,790 lbs and had a length of 5.9 ft. Its installation in the airframe of a

Spitfire Mk.IA required to increase the fuselage length by 20 cm to compensate the higher weight and power of the Griffon. The NAD 925/39 was 2,316 lbs heavier than a standard Spitfire, had fold-back wings could take off in 300 ft against a 20 knots wind.

NAD 925/39 technical data

Wingspan: 36.8 ft (11.22 m), length: 30.6 ft (9.32 m), height: 10 ft (3.04 m), wing area: 242 sq. ft (21.78 sq. m), maximum weight: 8,100 lbs (3,670 kg), estimated maximum speed: 396 mph (637 kph) at 15,000 ft, armament: eight wing-mounted 0.303-in Browning machine guns.


The Admiralty was not interested in another Spitfire Mk.IA converted. The Fleet Air Arm needed a new fighter designed specifically for naval operation and the NAD 925/39 was rejected. On 15 February 1940 Supermarine issued the Technical Report Nº 2846, a navalised version of the Spitfire F Mk IV, with inverted gull folding wings, split flaps with increased area, inward retracting landing gear, arrester hook and catapult gear.

The airplane was powered by one 1,735 hp Griffon RG2SM engine, with one-stage, two-speed supercharger and armed with six wing-mounted 13.2 mm FN-Browning heavy machine guns. Early 1940, on the orders of the Minister of Aircraft Production, work on the Griffon engine had been halted temporarily to concentrate on the urgently needed Merlin III. The Nº 2846 proposal was rejected on 29 March 1940.

Report Nº 2846 technical data

Wingspan: 40.4 ft (12.31 m), folded wingspan: 10.3 ft (3.15 m), length: 31.9 ft (9.72 m), height: 10.8 ft (3.3 m), wing area: 249 sq. ft (22.41 sq. m), maximum weight: 10,350 lbs (4,689 kg), estimated maximum speed: 397 mph (639 kph), armament: six wing-mounted 13.2 mm FN-Browning heavy machine guns.

In the Autumn of 1941, when the Luftwaffe offensive stabilised and the war at sea reached a highly critical phase, the Admiralty obtained permission to acquire 166 Seafire IB (Type 340). The naval fighter was almost identical to the Spitfire Mk.VB, apart from the A-frame arrester hook and the slinging points.

The Griffon engine was available in March 1942 and Supermarine proposed a naval version of the Spitfire F Mk IV (Type 337) powered by one 1,735 hp Rolls-Royce Griffon III with one-stage, two-speed supercharger driving a four-blade airscrew with 10 ft 9 in of diameter. The new fighter was fitted with inverted gull wings, inward retracting landing gear, modified ventral radiator, ‘butterfly’ tailplane and four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano cannons. The project was dropped in favour of the manually-folding wings Seafire III (Type 358), a total of 1,220 machines being built with Rolls-Royce Merlin 55 engines.

Supermarine naval fighter proposal (March 1942) technical data

Wingspan: 41 ft (12.5 m), length: 31.6 ft (9.63 m), height: 12.9 ft (3.95 m), wing area: 275 sq. ft (24.75 sq. m), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano cannons.

On October 1942 the Admiralty received a new Supermarine proposal for a point-defence interceptor fighter powered by one 2,240 hp Napier Sabre IV, twenty-four-cylinder, horizontal H, liquid-cooled engine driving a three-blade contra-rotating airscrew.

Supermarine naval fighter proposal (October 1942) technical data

Wingspan: 30.4 ft (9.27 m), length: 25.3 ft (7.7 m), height: 11.2 ft (3.4 m), wing area: 200 sq. ft (18 sq. m.), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano cannons.

On March 1944 Supermarine initiated the design of the Type 391 (a 120 per cent homothetic enlarged version of the N5/45 Seafang), powered by one 3,500 hp Rolls-Royce Eagle II, twenty-four cylinder, horizontal H, liquid-cooled engine driving a six-bladed contra-rotating airscrew. On 20 June 1944, the project was submitted to the Royal Navy but was eventually dropped in favour of the Type 392 jet-powered fighter.

Type 391 technical data

Wingspan: 46.3 ft (13.3 m), length: 39.7 ft (12.10 m), height: 14.8 ft (4.54 m), wing area: 335 sq. ft (31.2 sq. m), maximum weight: 15,750 lbs (7,144 kg), estimated maximum speed: 546 mph (879 kph), range: 880 mls (1,415 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano cannons.

 

[Justo Miranda]

On 26 February 1944, Supermarine published the Technical Office Report No. 4040 with the description of a VTOL tailsitter fighter designed by A.N. Clifton.

It was a single-seat high performance fighter designed to protect the Fleet or convoy vessels from attack by enemy aircraft operating from small platform areas afloat or ashore.

The propulsion system had already been developed by Rolls-Royce for the Mustang F.T.B. It was a 2,490 hp Griffon 58 located behind the pilot connected to the reductor gearbox of the 5.9 m of diameter 8-bladed contra-rotating propellers by means of a long power shaft.

Not requiring a big wing surface to take-off or landing, the wings could be very small and light and the fuselage was reduced to a cone located behind the engine, to serve as support for the four tail surfaces.

Being available the first turboprop engines during the first 50s, new designs of tail-sitters appeared based in the same formula. The Lockheed XFV-1, the Convair XFY-1, the Northrop N-63 and the Martin Model 262 were not successful as a practical vertical flight control system could not be found.

Supermarine Technical Report No. 4040 (Technical data)

Power plant: one 2,490 hp Rolls-Royce Griffon 58, twelve-cylinder Vee, liquid-cooled engine, with one-stage, two-speed supercharger and water/methanol injection power boost, wing span: 22.4 ft (6.84 m), length: 27.6 ft (8.42 m), wing area: 100 sq. ft (9 sq. m), maximum take-off weight: 15,000lbs (6,795 kg), maximum speed: 450 mph (724 kph), armament: four wing pods-mounted 20 mm Hispano cannons

 

[Justo Miranda]

In March 1939 the Air Ministry published the specification N.8/39 as a two seat replacement naval fighter for the Skua, and Sea Gladiator of the Fleet Air Arm.

The demands of the war forced the modification of the N.8/39 as N.11/40 by the end of 1939, requesting a short-range, single-seat, carrier borne interceptor, armed with four guns of 20 mm, a maximum speed of 644 km/h and 4 hours endurance.

The Hawker firm proposed the manufacturing of a navalized version of the Typhoon and one Mk.IA was converted to this standard under the project designation P.1009 Sea-Phoon.

To improve the Typhoon bad performance during landing at low speed a new folding wing was designed increasing the width of the centre section. This wing housed two fuel tanks of 159 lt. each in the leading edge and two of 569 lt each in the wing roots

The main undercarriage folded sideways.

The rear fuselage was reinforced and an "A" frame arrester hook was installed on it.

Early 1941 the project was dropped in favour of the Fairey Fulmar Mk.II due to the bad reputation of the Napier Sabre engine.

P.1009 Sea-Phoon technical data

Power plant: One Napier Sabre Mk 1, 24 cylinder ‘H’, liquid cooled engine, rated at 2,100 hp, driving one de Havilland Hydromatic three-bladed constant-speed airscrew of 427 cm. of diameter, wingspan: 48.3 ft (14.73 m), length: 30.7 ft (9.36 m), height: 15 ft (4.57 m), wing surface: 354 sq. ft (31.9 sq. m), estimated maximum weight: 13,907 lbs (6,300 kg), estimated maximum speed: 342 mph at 18,000 ft (550 kph at 5,500 m), estimated ceiling: 41,656 ft (12,700 m), range: 1,180 mls (1,900 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano Mk.II cannon with 140 rounds per gun.

 

[Justo Miranda]

In March 1939 the Air Ministry published the specification N.8/39 as a two seat replacement naval fighter for the Skua, Fulmar and Sea Gladiator of the Fleet Air Arm.

The demands of the war forced the modification of the N.8/39 as N.11/40 by the end of 1939, requesting a short-range, single-seat, carrier borne interceptor, armed with four guns of 20 mm with a maximum speed of 644 km/h and an endurance of 4 hours.

Blackburn proposed the B-37, a new design specifically conceived for shipboard operation, building a mock-up in September 1940.

This was chosen for mass production of which 50 units and three prototypes were ordered under the denomination Firebrand Mk.I.

The first prototype (DD 804) made its first flight on 27 February 1942 followed by the DD 810 on 15 July and by the DD 815 on 15 September.

The DD 810 was armed with four guns and it was used in February 1943 for landing tests aboard H.M.S. Illustrious.

The DD 815 was sent to Boscombe Down test centre for armament trials.

The new airplane proved to be quite unstable when in flight at low speed and the pre-production Mk.I series (after T.F.I) was shortened to just nine units (DK 363 to DK 371) out of which two were retained by Blackburn for structural tests and the rest were sent to Boscombe Down for flight and armament trials.

Several airplanes were sent back to the manufacturer to modify the control surfaces, longitudinal instability not being completely solved, and suffering no less than six accidents during the tests.


The DK 367 was used in July 1943 to test the installation of eight rockets under the wings and the DD 810 with racks for a 227 kg bomb below each wing.

The DK 366 had a cut down rear fuselage in an attempt to improve rudder control at high speed.

The DD 810 was reconstructed after an accident, widening the central section of the wing 39 cm to allow the installation of a torpedo under the fuselage centreline.

The airplane was registered again as NV 636 being used as prototype of the Mk.II version (later TF.II).

The reason for this change was the decision to cancel the construction of the Mk.I as the Fleet Air Arm already had two more efficient naval fighters available, the Seafire and the Corsair.

Twelve T.F.II (DK 374 to DK 385) were built, out of which one was retained by the manufacturer, three were sent to the Aircraft Torpedo Development Unit for armament testing, one to Boscombe Down for flight tests and the rest to the 708 Squadron for operational trials by mid-1944.

It was not possible to continue the production of the T.F.II due to the lack of Sabre engines that had been reserved exclusively for the Hawker firm for the production of the Typhoon.

The Sabre had produced many maintenance problems to the 708 Squadron and it was thought inadequate to be used for shipboard operation.

The rest of the Firebrand production (versions T.F.III, T.F.IV and T.F.V) was made using the radial engines.

The Firebrand TF.II aircraft in the 708 Squadron used the ‘O’ letter in the code indicating that they were used for testing purposes.

The DK 383 is known to have used the ‘OC’ code.

Mk.I technical data

Power plant: One Napier Sabre Mk III, 24 cylinder ‘H’, liquid cooled engine, rated at 2,305 hp, driving one de Havilland Hydromatic three-bladed constant-speed airscrew, wingspan: 50 ft (15.24 m), length: 37.7 ft (11.5 m), height: 13.3 ft (4.06 m), wing surface: 372 sq. ft (33.5 sq. m), maximum weight: 13,625 lbs (6,172 kg), maximum speed: 357 mph (574 kph), service ceiling: 32,500 ft, range: 805 mls (1,295 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano Mk.II cannons with 200 rounds per gun.

T.F.II technical data

Power plant: One Napier Sabre Mk III, 24 cylinder ‘H’, liquid cooled engine, rated at 2,305 hp, driving one de Havilland Hydromatic three-bladed constant-speed airscrew, wingspan: 51.2 ft (15.63m), length: 38 ft (11.6 m), height: 13.3 ft (4.06 m), wing surface: 378 sq. ft (34 sq. m), maximum weight: 15,046 lbs (6,816 kg), maximum speed: 355 mph (571 kph), range: 767 mls (1,234 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano Mk.II cannons and one 457 mm torpedo with 838 kg.

T.F.V technical data
Power plant: One Bristol Centaurus IX, 18 cylinder radial, air cooled engine, rated at 2,520 hp, driving a four-bladed, constant-speed Rotol airscrew, wingspan: 51.2 ft (15.63m), length: 39 ft (11.91 m), height: 15.2 ft (4.63 m), wing surface: 378 sq. ft (34 sq. m), maximum weight: 17,500 lbs (7,927 kg), maximum speed: 340 mph (547 kph), service ceiling: 28,500 ft, range: 740 mls (1,190 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano Mk.II cannons and one 457 mm torpedo with 838 kg.

 

[Justo Miranda]

In 1942, Blackburn proposed the B-43, a single seat twin-float fighter with a Napier Sabre engine based on the Firebrand.

In 1943 they came with the idea of the B-44, a much more complex design with retractable hydraulically-operated floats.

The idea was not new. German already built the Ursinus Seaplane during World War One The plane was fitted with a retractable twin-float undercarriage and reached a maximum speed equivalent to that of the British Sopwith Snipe.

Bill Barnes adventure stories made popular again the formula of the 30s with two extraordinary fiction models, the Scarlet Stormer in 1934 and the Lancer in 1936.

In 1938 the French aircraft manufacturer Latécoère published three projects (no. 671, 672 and 673) of seaplane fighters fitted with retractable floats.

In March 1940 the Blackburn firm built and fly tested the B-20, a medium-sized general reconnaissance flying boat equipped with hydraulically operated retractable hull bottom.

Testing was satisfactory but the only prototype was destroyed in a crash in April and the RAF preferred to recommend the manufacturing of the Saro Lerwick instead.

The B-44 have benefited from the experience obtained with the B-20, but the unfortunate Firebrand story, the increasing number of available aircraft carriers in the Pacific and the success in building ground airfields after amphibious landing were against its manufacturing and the idea never came to materialise. The project was cancelled in 1944.


B-44 technical data

Power plant: One Napier Sabre Mk IV, 24 cylinder ‘H’, liquid cooled engine, rated at 2,300 hp, driving two contra-rotating airscrews, wingspan: 50 ft (15.2 m), length (flight configuration): 39.7 ft (12.1 m), height (water configuration): 13.3 ft (4.06 m), wing surface: 393 sq. ft (35.4 sq. m), maximum speed: 360 mph (579 kph), service ceiling: 38,000 ft (11,582 m), range: 1,000 mls (1,609 km), armament: four wing-mounted 20 mm Hispano Mk.V cannons.

 

[Justo Miranda]

The Blackburn B-48 Firecrest was a naval strike-fighter designed in October 1943, under the Specification S.28/43, as a replacement of the Firebrand fitted with inverted gull and laminar-flow wings.​

In November 1943 the Ministry of Aircraft Production ordered three prototypes, but their construction was delayed with proposals for alternative engines.

The first prototype (RT651) was flown on 1 April 1947 powered by one Bristol Centaurus 57 radial engine.

The second prototype (RT656) remained unflown and was allocated to structural testing.

The third prototype (VF172) had been modified to reduce the wing dihedral angle to 3 degree only, to improve lateral control.

The aircraft made its maiden flight on 6 February 1948 powered by one Bristol Centaurus 59 engine.

On 14 March 1945 three further prototypes, powered by Napier E.122 Nomad turboprops, were ordered under the Specification S.10/45, but the entire B-48 programme was cancelled in November 1947 in favour of the Westland Wyvern.



B-48 technical data

Power plant: One Bristol Centaurus 59, 18 cylinder radial, air cooled engine, rated at 2,825 hp, driving a five-bladed, constant-speed airscrew, wingspan: 45 ft (13.71m), length: 39.3 ft (11.98 m), height: 14.5 ft (4.42 m), wing surface: 361.5 sq. ft (33.6 sq. m), maximum weight: 16,000 lbs (7,620 kg), maximum speed: 380 mph (612 kph), service ceiling: 31,600 ft, range: 900 mls (1,448 km), armament: two wing-mounted 0.5-in machine guns or two 35 mm cannons in underwing nacelles, one 951 kg torpedo or 8x60 lbs rockets.

 

[Justo Miranda]

By 1943 turbojets were available and other manufacturers proposed jet fighters with a low-drag flying boat hull not requiring water clearance for a propeller.

Jet power would be able to provide the Allies with a water-based fighter of superior performance against the Japanese piston-engined types.

The Airspeed firm suggested to the Admiralty the transformation of the radio-controlled flying-boat target aircraft AS-37 into a scaled-up jet fighter, powered by one de Havilland Halford H.1 centrifugal-flow turbojet with 1,225 kgf static thrust in the forward area of the hull with the air intake positioned in the extreme nose.

Technical data

Wingspan: 32.5 ft (9.93 m), length: 30 ft (9.14 m), height: 5.9 ft (1.8 m), wing area: 187 sq. ft (17 sq. m), proposed armament: four 4.5 in (11.5 cm) recoilless cannons

On December 1943 the Saunders-Roe firm presented their SR.44 project to the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The original design, with low-set gull-wing configuration and Halford turbojet, was modified to meet the E.6/44 specification and three prototypes, powered by two Metrovick Beryl F2/4 axial-flow turbojets, were ordered in April 1944 under the denomination SR/A-1.

By 1945 the Americans were able to build enough aircraft carriers to support air operations in the Pacific, official interest in the SR/A-1 waned and their development stayed at low priority.

With the end of the war Saunders-Roe concentrating its resources in the development of the SR.45 Princess long range civilian flying boat.

The SR/A-1prototype (TG263) flew on July 16, 1947 but the project was suspended on August 1949 after the cancellation of the Beryl turbojet.

Technical data

Wingspan: 46 ft (14 m), length: 50 ft (15.2 m), height: 16 ft 9 in (5.1 m), wing area: 415 sq. ft (37.3 sq. m), max speed: 512 mph (824 kph), max weight: 19,033 lb (8,622 kg), ceiling: 43,000 ft (13,100 m), proposed armament: four 20 mm Hispano Mk V cannons with 760 rounds each, power plant: two Metropolitan-Vickers Beryl F.2/4 axial-flow turbojets with 1,463 kgf static thrust.

 

[Justo Miranda]

Congratulations, you've wasted your time describing wartime emergency projects, which have almost no relation to pre-war Fleet Air Arm plans, which if given an additional 5 years, would very likely have come into production. A Fleet Air Arm in this situation is likely to have fighters with Rolls-Royce Griffons in service, as can be seen in the various N.8/39, N.9/39 and NAD.925/39 proposals put forward before the war.

I'm sorry I don't have any more information about British naval fighter projects, I hope what I'm sending is useful.



You can find information about the Royal Navy specification N.9/39 here:

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/gloster-n9-39-single-seat-naval-fighter-project.18589/



and here:


https://www.google.com/search?q=Roy...guMbgHgAbCBwUyLTguMsgHNQ&sclient=gws-wiz-serp



I only have something about the Firefly, the extended specification (N.5/40) specifically the night fighter version:


In response to a Royal Navy requirement for a new night fighter successor to the Fairey Fulmar, Fairey modified a Firefly F. Mk I day fighter in February 1943 as prototype NF. Mk II (Z1831/G). The letter "G" indicated that the aircraft contained secret equipment that was to be protected by armed guards, but during the flight tests at Boscombe Down Test Centre the radar had not yet been installed, and it was necessary to replace it with ballast in the rear cockpit and dummy radar pods on the wings.

The prototype showed heavy longitudinal stability and, to compensate for the additional weight, the forward fuselage was lengthened by 15 inches, and the center of gravity was brought forward 1.7 inches.

In February 1944 some operational tests were conducted with the RN Squadrons Nos. 772 and 746 and night trials of the second prototype (Z1840) highlighted additional shortcomings: the wing pods turbulence generated at high speeds required the redesign of the tail surfaces and the ailerons to improve their handling characteristics. The long nose adversely affected the fighter deck landing, the landing light reflected from the propeller blinded the pilot during the approach and the pods drag slowed the airplane about 40 mph.

The FAA requirement included the use of radar with dual AI/ASV capability (Air Interception/Air-Surface Vessel) flying at low level over the sea and on a horizontal line scanning, with automatic target tracking.

To deliver on that requirement, the Telecommunications Research Establishment (TRE) developed the AIX radar operating on 3.2 cm wavelength (“X” means X-Band 3.75 to 2.4 cm wavelength).

The equipment was very heavy and required the use of an additional generator and two parabolic scanners, with 16 inches of diameter, packaged into pods on the leading edge of both wings.

It was expected that the AIX could operate indistinctly in AI mode (with 40 degrees beam width, -5 +5 degrees in elevation and 10 miles range) and in ASV mode (with -20 degrees in elevation and 40 miles range). But the double-scanning system was difficult to synchronize with the propeller speed because the pods had been mounted too close to the fuselage.

TRE had mistakenly calculated that this could happen with a short pulse length radar, but, in practice, the returning signals were partially blocked by the propeller arc.

The NF. Mk II had been initially envisaged as a relatively straight forward adaptation of the basic F. Mk I airframe, but the introduction of a number of changes prevented easy production on the assembly lines and only 37 airframes were built.

This type was never used operationally and was retrofitted as F. Mk. IA by FAA field maintenance units.

In the summer of 1944, the main concern of the Royal Navy was the low-level nightly attacks performed by German and Japanese torpedo-bombers equipped with ASV radars.

The availability of the American AN/APS-4 radar (ASH or AI Mk XV in British parlance) when the US Navy selected the AN/APS-6 for the Grumman F6F-5N, persuaded the Admiralty to order the modification of 236 F. Mk. I airframes into FR. Mk. I fighter- reconnaissance planes, with the APS-4 installed on the production lines, modified windscreen, IFF Mk. III and improved gyro gunsight.

The Sperry/Western Electric AN/APS-4 AI centimetric radar set with beacon function, weighed 180 lb., and could pick up fighters at 4.5 miles, bombers at 5 miles and battleships at 30 miles, operating in X-band at 3.2 cm wavelength.

It could be operated in three modes: manual (aimed by the pilot), search and intercept.

In search mode the scanner antenna executed a two-line scan and a four-line scan in interception mode.

The radar provided suitable indication for firing guns but was relatively fragile and aerobatics in dogfight were forbidden.

Though rather too complex for effective use in single-seat airplanes, operating with a dedicated navigator-radioman as a second crewman, it could be used in air-to-surface mode to spot surface and underwater vessels at sea, with a secondary air-to-air capability against torpedo-bombers flying at low level over the sea.

The compact unit and the 18-inch diameter parabolic scanner was carried in a pressurized fiberglass pod mounted below the engine cowling, with the readouts installed in the rear cockpit.

To enable the radar beam to clear the propeller arc, the pod was installed in a simple crutch pointing 5 degrees downwards.

Deliveries of the FR. Mk I dual fighters started late in 1944 and entered service on July 1, 1945, with the 816 Squadron RN on board HMS Nairana, but the type never saw action during the Second World War.

The NF. Mk I night fighter variant was developed in parallel with the FR. Mk I. The only external differences between both types were the shrouded exhausts and the anti-dazzle shields mounted above the last three exhausts pipes.

In addition, one slave radar screen was installed in the front cockpit for the pilot. But the system was not very effective because, as expected, caused the deterioration of the pilot night vision when regularly looking onto the indicator tube.

Trials with the 746 Squadron RN were completed by August 1944.

During the weeks that followed the 'D-Day', the forces of the Allies neutralized in their advance numerous V-1 launch sites built by the Germans in northern France. When the units of the Wehrmacht retreated eastward, the new frontiers of the Reich got progressively further away from London. The V-1s launched from central Netherlands, with its maximum range of only 240 km, could no longer reach the British capital.

The Luftwaffe intended to continue its bombing offensive on July 9, 1944, launching the V-1 from the obsolete bombers Heinkel He 111 H-16 of the III./KG3. Taking off with great difficulty from the Dutch airfields of Gilze-Rijen and Venlo, the Heinkels ventured far into the North Sea to launch their missiles against English cities. These V-1s came from the east, thus taking by surprise the British defenders that expected them from the south. Until the end of the war in Europe the III./KG3 made just 300 launches, and it was a dangerous work as some V-1 exploded prematurely and crashed against the bombers after launching, because of turbulence.

From the strategic point of view, the low frequency of launches was useless and the Heinkels were easy prey for the all-weather interceptors that searched them over the sea, but some German bombers managed to escape the detection of the British Chain Home early warning radars flying below six hundred feet and the AI radars of the Mosquitoes and Black Widows were not designed to detect aircraft flying so low over the sea.

In October 1944 several Fireflies NF. Mk. I of the experimental Night Fighter Interception Unit undertook night patrols over the North Sea, alongside the Mosquitoes NF. Mk. XVII of the No. 68 Squadron RAF.

In April 1945, the 1790 Squadron RN received 18 NF. Mk I night fighters on board the HMS Vindex. The carrier sailed to Australia to take part in the Operation Olympic, the invasion of Kyushu scheduled for November. But the war was ended sooner than expected and the fighter had no opportunity to fight against Japan.

The night fighter paint scheme of the 1790 Sqn. airplanes were overall Sky Grey (FS 34424) with disruptive pattern in Grey Green (FS 34096) applied over the upper surfaces and BPF ‘roundel & bar’ identification markings.

Fairey Firefly Fr. Mk I - technical data

Wingspan: 44.5 ft. (13.56 m); length: 37.6 ft. (11.45 m); height: 13.6 ft. (4.15 m); wing area: 328 sq. ft. (30.47 sq. m); max weight: 14,488 lb. (6,563 kg); max speed: 304 mph (489 km/h); service ceiling: 28,000 ft. (8,536 m.); range (with two 90 Imp. gals drop tanks): 1,364 miles (2,195 km); power plant: one Rolls-Royce Griffon II B twelve-cylinder Vee liquid-cooled engine rated at 1,730 hp.; armament: four wing mounted 20-mm Hispano cannons and eight 60 lb. RP-3 rockets.

 

[Scott Kenny]

It's very hard to posit a later WWII start without determining a Point of Departure from the Original Timeline, and determining what would happen instead in the Alternate Timeline.

Exactly.

There were an insane number of pressures that all forced the war in Europe to kick off in 1939-41.

What was happening in the Far East? Was Japan's initiation of their half of the war also pushed back?

Considering that the Japanese war started in 1936...

This is incredibly wishful thinking, especially the adoption of Japanese Long Lance Torpedoes, which required larger diameter torpedo tubes carried by no German ship or submarine. German Japanese cooperation is unlikely to be as close (and it was not alm that close) as it was during wartime if they are not co-belligerents.

You do know that the Japanese made 21" Long Lances for subs (Type 95s), as well as the big 24" surface ship versions (Type 93s), right?

Getting Japan to share their use of pure oxygen in torpedoes is a different discussion entirely, they didn't even tell their ship crews that it was different from compressed air!

If we're still talking subs, then Japanese sub doctrine was to ignore the merchant vessels, it's the Germans who had things to teach the Japanese, not vice versa. Meanwhile, using a compressed oxygen torpedo on a sub would have been interesting, for Kursk values of interesting.

Not really any more hazardous than keeping oxy-acetylene welding rigs around, or carrying compressed oxygen tanks to help keep the air breathable for longer.

All of which has been done since the 1940s on subs.

If you mean on the surface fleet, the problem there is German destroyers weren't great, and Plan Z didn't change that.

Yeah, German destroyers were really little more than MTBs with delusions of adequacy.

 

[DWG]

Considering that the Japanese war started in 1936...

Plus the difficulty persuading every single junior IJA officer that starting a war wasn't a decision he got to make on his own.

Not really any more hazardous than keeping oxy-acetylene welding rigs around, or carrying compressed oxygen tanks to help keep the air breathable for longer.

I was presuming more that there'd be problems with the external oxygen generators that seem to have had some issues on the surface warships, not with the torpedoes themselves.

Yeah, German destroyers were really little more than MTBs with delusions of adequacy.

The larger fleet boats were a decent size, but Typ 1936A was flawed by twin 150mm guns whose shells were too large for a lively destroyer, and really a two-man load, not to mention the high pressure, high temperature, low reliability boilers in all the Typ 1936 variants.

And then there's the Plan Z Typ 1945, 2,700t standard, with 4x2x128mm+2x4x53.3cm TT at 42.5kts.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Plus the difficulty persuading every single junior IJA officer that starting a war wasn't a decision he got to make on his own.

Exactly.

I was presuming more that there'd be problems with the external oxygen generators that seem to have had some issues on the surface warships, not with the torpedoes themselves.

Electrolytics isn't bad. Still potentially explosive, but that's par for the course when dealing with hydrogen and oxygen.

The larger fleet boats were a decent size, but Typ 1936A was flawed by twin 150mm guns whose shells were too large for a lively destroyer, and really a two-man load, not to mention the high pressure, high temperature, low reliability boilers in all the Typ 1936 variants.

And then there's the Plan Z Typ 1945, 2,700t standard, with 4x2x128mm+2x4x53.3cm TT at 42.5kts.

What I'd meant was that the Germans saw them as oversized torpedo boats, not fleet units.

 

[DWG]

Four days later fifty- three B5N2 Kate bombers, thirty-eight D3A1 Val dive bombers and thirty-six A6M2 Zero-Sen fighters attacked Colombo sinking three British cruisers and one destroyer.

Cornwall and Dorsetshire weren't at Columbo, but two-three hundred miles away at sea, and caught unescorted. Meanwhile the third 'cruiser' sunk was at Colombo, but was the former armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, which had neither the compartmentalisation, armour, nor AA suite of an actual cruiser, and was in fact in the middle of converting to a troopship (her AA armament was 2 3" 20 cwt, one of which was not used due to lack of ammunition, plus two Lewis guns vs the typical light cruiser standard of 4x2x4" Mk XIX, and 2 quad Pompoms).

On 9 April, ninety-one B5N2 and thirty-eight A6M2 attacked Trincomalee. They sank one aircraft carrier, one destroyer, one corvette and two tankers.

Again you're confusing two separate actions. Hermes was caught at sea, not at Trincomalee. With HMAS Vampire as her sole escort and no aircraft aboard, she was spotted off Batticaloa and attacked by 85 D3A Vals, escorted by 9 Zeroes. 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn had been despatched to assist her, arriving during the attack, and a further 6 from 803 and 806 NAS arrived after Hermes was sunk. Aircraft losses were four Vals for 2 Fulmars, with 5 Vals damaged. Hermes' AA fit at her loss was still three single 4", the planned refit with 2x2x4" + 2x8x Pompom having to be cancelled with the outbreak of war. RFA Athelstone, her escort HMS Hollyhock, the tanker British Sergeant and the Norwegian merchant Norviken were caught separately by the aircraft that had not dropped on Hermes or Vampire.

These attacks were intended to force the intervention of the Eastern Fleet, formed by 3 aircraft carriers with 91 aircraft, 5 battleships, 7 cruisers and 16 destroyers. Despite having the advantage of radar and their superiority in artillery, the British evaded a confrontation with the Japanese Fleets and the overwhelming Carrier Force. The Eastern Fleet remained hidden in Addu Atoll, a secret base located 1,000 km to the southwest of Ceylon, until the attacks ceased.

Somerville's dispositions can be criticised, but because they were so risky, not so cautious. Rather than 'hiding' at Addu, between the 30th March and the 2nd April he was operating between the Kido Butai's expected track and Ceylon, in expectation of the Kido Butai being in position to launch an attack on the 1st, and ultimately he in fact came tantalisingly close to being able to launch not just a night torpedo attack with his aircraft, but potentially a night surface action on the 5th. All this in spite of having only assumed command on the 26th.

He was forced to retire on Addu to refuel on the 3rd, at which point it was thought the Japanese weren't coming (FECB had broken the message setting the attack for the 1st, but not a later one postponing it to the 5th), and he released Cornwall and Dorsetshire, and Hermes, which were required for other operations/refits. A Catalina from Ceylon (one of only six operational), found the Kido Butai at 1600 on the 4th, but was shot down before it could give a complete sighting report. A second Catalina managed sightings at 2237, 0045, and 0615 on the 5th, but was then shot down, and never spotted the carriers.

Somerville sailed Force A (the carriers, plus Warspite, Emerald and Enterprise and 6 destroyers) from Addu at midnight, being forced to wait for Emerald and Enterprise to refuel, with Force B (the Rs, Caledon, Dragon and Jacob Van Heemskerk plus destroyers) to follow at 0700 (or later) on the 5th after it had refuelled. Search Albacores from Indomitable were attacked by Zeroes at around 1600 on the 5th, one surviving and getting off a contact report, which it amplified when it landed with injured aircrew at 1800.

"At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.

I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E."

Unfortunately the reported course had only been momentarily true, and rather than steering North West the Kido Butai's actual course was the exact reciprocal, 135 degrees/South East. Worse, Rear Admiral Boyd commanding the carriers hadn't sent off a replacement search, which wasn't corrected until Formidable launched Albacores at 1930 and contact was lost.

So rather than trying to 'hide' in Addu, Somerville consistently made every effort to close the Kido Butai, even when his entire force was two carriers, one battleship and two elderly light cruisers.

Meanwhile the Kido Butai failed in its own orders "Mission. To conduct a surprise attack on the enemy fleet in the Ceylon area and destroy it."

WRT Somerville's forces, the battleships were four unmodernized R Class, which no one would want in a fleet action if they could avoid it, plus the modernized Warspite of the Queen Elizabeth class. Formidable and Implacable were powerful carriers, but in no way a match for the entire Kido Butai (and Formidable had arrived with Somerville, so had never exercised with the rest of the Eastern Fleet), Hermes was old, slow, and at best a light carrier (though with a maximum airgroup of only 20 aircraft even some CVEs had a larger airgroup, and in fact she was only carrying 12 Swordfish during the initial stages, which were flown off to Ceylon when she headed for Trincomalee). Of the cruisers, only Cornwall, Dorsetshire and Jacob Van Heemskerk were remotely modern, while Caledon, Dragon, Emerald and Enterprise were WWI vintage,

Meanwhile the Kido Butai had much the strength it had at Pearl Harbor:
The carriers Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku (ie missing only Kaga), the battleships Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser Abukuma and eight destroyers.

The force advantage definitely lay with the Kido Butai.

 

[Martes]

Also consider that in such scenario nobody would have full scale naval war experience. That means that many of tactical and technological beliefs that were later dispelled would still be active and considered valid, and this would affect both planned modernizations and new construction plans.

Expect more battleships, less carriers, less AA, slower and more conservative technological development, more linear development from WW1 and much less optimization.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The Home Fleet would have had to face numerous German Type XXI submarines armed with acoustic torpedoes and German long-range bombers armed with radio-guided missiles. Perhaps Germany would have had the time and resources to develop some kind of nuclear weapon, more effective radars, and smarter mines. Perhaps the Manhattan Project would not have succeeded, perhaps Churchill would no longer be prime minister and other less audacious politicians would decide to make a pact with the Reich to save the Empire. Perhaps Japan would have conquered so much territory from China that it did not need to invade the Dutch East Indies for oil, intimidation would be enough to obtain it in the face of the passivity of an isolationist United States.

This is actually very unlikely. The KM, being very conservative, likely wouldn't have considered building a Type XXI. Historically, the use of the schnorkel was forced on the KM by Allied ASW measures and wasn't something that in peacetime they'd have adopted as it was a Dutch invention. Further, the Type XXI, and the H2O2 boats were a result of the same issue. The Germans needed a method to attack shipping submerged and then escape retribution from escorts. All of that was born out of wartime experience which they wouldn't have here.

Now, with the Luftwaffe, I could see they've perfected the Fritz X and other guided weapons for use against the Maginot Line fortifications that the French are very likely to still be relying on and might even have expanded further. Institutional inertia and all that. Things like the 80cm Gustav railgun and those 54cm etc., mortars are available to do the same thing.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

With the US, if things with Japan don't change, then the US actually comes out ahead here. Since there's no war in Europe but still likely one with Japan, the US still mobilizes for war on about the same timeframe. The difference is that without France and Britain pulling big orders for war material--sure they still would be but not as much or on the same urgency--the US has more 'stuff' for their own use. This likely means more material going to the Philippines making a Japanese success there less likely.

With no war in Europe, the USN can focus on a Pacific War so that goes faster and Japan finds the US ready to invade the home islands by say, the beginning to middle of 1944. The US Army can throw its entire weight of forces into that invasion too. Projects like Manhattan still go because there would still be rumors and intelligence reports that Germany is working on a bomb too. Without a U-boat campaign to fight, the US puts more resources into "real" naval vessels rather than ASW escorts.

The B-29 and B-36 are still in the works because the USAAF needs them to bomb Japan and as insurance against a war in Europe. The P-51 likely doesn't get made with the P-38 and an improved P-47 being the workhorses instead. No RR Merlin clone for the US either.

 

[Justo Miranda]

Cornwall and Dorsetshire weren't at Columbo, but two-three hundred miles away at sea, and caught unescorted. Meanwhile the third 'cruiser' sunk was at Colombo, but was the former armed merchant cruiser HMS Hector, which had neither the compartmentalisation, armour, nor AA suite of an actual cruiser, and was in fact in the middle of converting to a troopship (her AA armament was 2 3" 20 cwt, one of which was not used due to lack of ammunition, plus two Lewis guns vs the typical light cruiser standard of 4x2x4" Mk XIX, and 2 quad Pompoms).


Again you're confusing two separate actions. Hermes was caught at sea, not at Trincomalee. With HMAS Vampire as her sole escort and no aircraft aboard, she was spotted off Batticaloa and attacked by 85 D3A Vals, escorted by 9 Zeroes. 6 Fulmars from 273 Sqn had been despatched to assist her, arriving during the attack, and a further 6 from 803 and 806 NAS arrived after Hermes was sunk. Aircraft losses were four Vals for 2 Fulmars, with 5 Vals damaged. Hermes' AA fit at her loss was still three single 4", the planned refit with 2x2x4" + 2x8x Pompom having to be cancelled with the outbreak of war. RFA Athelstone, her escort HMS Hollyhock, the tanker British Sergeant and the Norwegian merchant Norviken were caught separately by the aircraft that had not dropped on Hermes or Vampire.


Somerville's dispositions can be criticised, but because they were so risky, not so cautious. Rather than 'hiding' at Addu, between the 30th March and the 2nd April he was operating between the Kido Butai's expected track and Ceylon, in expectation of the Kido Butai being in position to launch an attack on the 1st, and ultimately he in fact came tantalisingly close to being able to launch not just a night torpedo attack with his aircraft, but potentially a night surface action on the 5th. All this in spite of having only assumed command on the 26th.

He was forced to retire on Addu to refuel on the 3rd, at which point it was thought the Japanese weren't coming (FECB had broken the message setting the attack for the 1st, but not a later one postponing it to the 5th), and he released Cornwall and Dorsetshire, and Hermes, which were required for other operations/refits. A Catalina from Ceylon (one of only six operational), found the Kido Butai at 1600 on the 4th, but was shot down before it could give a complete sighting report. A second Catalina managed sightings at 2237, 0045, and 0615 on the 5th, but was then shot down, and never spotted the carriers.

Somerville sailed Force A (the carriers, plus Warspite, Emerald and Enterprise and 6 destroyers) from Addu at midnight, being forced to wait for Emerald and Enterprise to refuel, with Force B (the Rs, Caledon, Dragon and Jacob Van Heemskerk plus destroyers) to follow at 0700 (or later) on the 5th after it had refuelled. Search Albacores from Indomitable were attacked by Zeroes at around 1600 on the 5th, one surviving and getting off a contact report, which it amplified when it landed with injured aircrew at 1800.

"At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.

I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E."

Unfortunately the reported course had only been momentarily true, and rather than steering North West the Kido Butai's actual course was the exact reciprocal, 135 degrees/South East. Worse, Rear Admiral Boyd commanding the carriers hadn't sent off a replacement search, which wasn't corrected until Formidable launched Albacores at 1930 and contact was lost.

So rather than trying to 'hide' in Addu, Somerville consistently made every effort to close the Kido Butai, even when his entire force was two carriers, one battleship and two elderly light cruisers.

Meanwhile the Kido Butai failed in its own orders "Mission. To conduct a surprise attack on the enemy fleet in the Ceylon area and destroy it."

WRT Somerville's forces, the battleships were four unmodernized R Class, which no one would want in a fleet action if they could avoid it, plus the modernized Warspite of the Queen Elizabeth class. Formidable and Implacable were powerful carriers, but in no way a match for the entire Kido Butai (and Formidable had arrived with Somerville, so had never exercised with the rest of the Eastern Fleet), Hermes was old, slow, and at best a light carrier (though with a maximum airgroup of only 20 aircraft even some CVEs had a larger airgroup, and in fact she was only carrying 12 Swordfish during the initial stages, which were flown off to Ceylon when she headed for Trincomalee). Of the cruisers, only Cornwall, Dorsetshire and Jacob Van Heemskerk were remotely modern, while Caledon, Dragon, Emerald and Enterprise were WWI vintage,

Meanwhile the Kido Butai had much the strength it had at Pearl Harbor:
The carriers Akagi, Soryu, Hiryu, Shokaku and Zuikaku (ie missing only Kaga), the battleships Kongo, Hiei, Haruna and Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Tone and Chikuma, the light cruiser Abukuma and eight destroyers.

The force advantage definitely lay with the Kido Butai.

Your clarifications are correct, but I was referring to the battle of Colombo in general terms, on the basis that the RN's anti-aircraft defences were inadequate, which is still true.

A squadron of Swordfishes, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier, and (speaking from memory) I think also an oil tanker were massacred, without air protection, by Japanese planes.

 

[DWG]

Your clarifications are correct, but I was referring to the battle of Colombo in general terms, on the basis that the RN's anti-aircraft defences were inadequate, which is still true.

No air defences in the world could have protected two ships caught alone (whether that be Cornwall plus Dorsetshire, or Hermes plus Vampire) vs 80 to 90 dive bombers.

 

[Justo Miranda]

No air defences in the world could have protected two ships caught alone (whether that be Cornwall plus Dorsetshire, or Hermes plus Vampire) vs 80 to 90 dive bombers.

It was a bad decision by Somerville to order the two cruisers to rendezvous with the rest of the Eastern Fleet at Addu Atoll, not only did it endanger those two ships but the course they were taking when they were located by a seaplane from the cruiser IJN Tone made Nagumo suspicious what the position of the secret British base would be.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Your clarifications are correct, but I was referring to the battle of Colombo in general terms, on the basis that the RN's anti-aircraft defences were inadequate, which is still true.

A squadron of Swordfishes, two cruisers, an aircraft carrier, and (speaking from memory) I think also an oil tanker were massacred, without air protection, by Japanese planes.

The RN, prewar, made the assumption that individual ships could fend off an air attack if adequately equipped with an AA battery. Many--not all but many--RN ships had what for 1939-40 were very heavy AA batteries. A battleship or cruiser that was up to date would have 8 to 12 heavy AA guns in the 4 to 5" range, 4 8 barrel 2 pdr pompoms and 4 quad .50 machineguns aboard. That's pretty heavy for that time period.

The problem was the RN had gotten their lighter AA guns developed too early and by 1940 both the 2pdr Vickers pompom and .50 mounts had guns with too low of velocities while the 2 pdr gun system was prone to jamming due to use of cloth belts. Their heavy AA guns were still in transition with the 4.5" being the preferred standard while there were still 4", 4.7" and 5.25" guns in service complicating things. The other thing the RN failed to do was design and build a good fire control system for any of this. They were definitely trying but most of what got put in service was a half assed lash up of a system cobbled together on limited funding.

Their destroyer force was expected to avoid air attack mainly by maneuver with the AA battery being severely lacking. This brings up a second problem they--and every navy except the USN in 1939-40 had: The doctrine for defense against air attack was each ship defending itself with a combination of its AA battery and maneuvering independently as necessary. The USN alone at that time had a doctrine in place of using ring formations and the entire formation operating in unison against an air attack.

Another disadvantage was, again with the exception of the USN, every navy relied on drills for AA practice but had little or no actual live fire practice against aerial targets other than occasionally firing at a towed target sleeve flying parallel to the ship. This was very unrealistic and the US, too, was doing this up until drones became available in late 1938. With these simulating head on torpedo and dive bombing runs against a ship, the USN found PDQ that their AA doctrine in a word, sucked. There were immediate and major changes to it and live practice drills showed a vast improvement over previous doctrine.

Against the Japanese or for that matter the less experienced Luftwaffe, the RN didn't stand much of a chance at sea when attacked by large numbers of aircraft. Crete proved that, just as the IJN's Indian Ocean excursion did, or the sinking of PoW and Repulse. Individual ships defending themselves stood little chance against a determined air attack.

 

[DWG]

It was a bad decision by Somerville to order the two cruisers to rendezvous with the rest of the Eastern Fleet at Addu Atoll, not only did it endanger those two ships but the course they were taking when they were located by a seaplane from the cruiser IJN Tone made Nagumo suspicious what the position of the secret British base would be.

Cornwall and Dorsetshire were ordered to Addu not by Somerville, but by Arbuthnot (CinC Ceylon). Somerville ordered a course change for an at-sea rendezvous at 0311. Cornwall and Dorsetshire left Columbo on a course for Addu (220 degrees) at 2200, but changed course to 185 degrees at 0700 (so around first light). Somerville's order meant there was never a chance of Cornwall and Dorsetshire being sighted on a course for Addu. OTOH it did leave them in search range of the Kido Butai.

 

[PMN1]

Cornwall and Dorsetshire were ordered to Addu not by Somerville, but by Arbuthnot (CinC Ceylon). Somerville ordered a course change for an at-sea rendezvous at 0311. Cornwall and Dorsetshire left Columbo on a course for Addu (220 degrees) at 2200, but changed course to 185 degrees at 0700 (so around first light). Somerville's order meant there was never a chance of Cornwall and Dorsetshire being sighted on a course for Addu. OTOH it did leave them in search range of the Kido Butai.

That's what I thought I had read....does the original course 220 degrees take them out of range?

 

[EwenS]

Best discussion of what happened is here.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/CornwallDorsetshireX-RStuart-Adobe.pdf

Rob Stuart has written extensively about Operation C. Other articles here

Articles

 

[T. A. Gardner]

The other thing I see as a big problem for the RN is Singapore. Since there is no war in Europe, and if the Japanese still go to war on schedule, the British get smacked down hard in Malaysia. There would be little reason for any Commonwealth nations to mobilize prior to the outbreak of war. That means the land defenses in Malaysia would likely be even weaker than they were historically. Add to that that the RAF isn't any more likely to send first-line aircraft to Malaysia than they did. I could see say, Hurricanes replacing the Buffalo or possibly Curtiss P-36 or 40 fighters there purchased against potential shortages at home.

Without the urgency of war elsewhere, the British aren't likely inclined to spend big on Singapore. They might send additional ships that likely would end up sunk but that would be an area for debate. The Dutch are likely to spend big on the DEI and defense, and given that the home country isn't invaded, that might work in their favor.

French Indochina wouldn't be occupied by Japan either, another thing in the British and Dutch's favor. All of that might work against doing a Pearl Harbor attack too.

 

[Justo Miranda]

The other thing I see as a big problem for the RN is Singapore. Since there is no war in Europe, and if the Japanese still go to war on schedule, the British get smacked down hard in Malaysia. There would be little reason for any Commonwealth nations to mobilize prior to the outbreak of war. That means the land defenses in Malaysia would likely be even weaker than they were historically. Add to that that the RAF isn't any more likely to send first-line aircraft to Malaysia than they did. I could see say, Hurricanes replacing the Buffalo or possibly Curtiss P-36 or 40 fighters there purchased against potential shortages at home.

Without the urgency of war elsewhere, the British aren't likely inclined to spend big on Singapore. They might send additional ships that likely would end up sunk but that would be an area for debate. The Dutch are likely to spend big on the DEI and defense, and given that the home country isn't invaded, that might work in their favor.

French Indochina wouldn't be occupied by Japan either, another thing in the British and Dutch's favor. All of that might work against doing a Pearl Harbor attack too.

So, we must consider two very different scenarios:

With war in Europe and with the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine fully developed, France invaded, and England struggling to survive in the Battle of the Atlantic, Japan would have encountered no opposition of any kind to cut off all Imperial supply routes in the Indian Ocean. They could even have closed off the approaches to the Suez Canal using a few Ceylon-based mining submarines.

Without war in Europe, Japan would have been forced to attack anyway, assuming that Roosevelt's policy had been the same.

The RN would have fought hard by sending most of its fleet to protect the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal but, in my opinion, it would also have suffered great losses against the best naval aviators in the world, highly trained by the war in China and who, moreover, knew well the modus operandi of the RN having been trained by British experts.

They would have lost Singapore, Sumatra and Ceylon as well, unpleasantly surprised by the IJN's effective landing tactics, the Ki.43's maneuverability, the Zero's range and the suicidal courage of the Aichi D3A pilots. It would have been even worse than the disaster in Crete.

Here, too, is a chronological problem: Would the Japanese have retained the same aircraft models from 1941 in 1944? Possibly so, since the war had not yet begun and China was not a technologically active enemy. But it is difficult to estimate when the US blockade policy would have been unbearable for Japan. It all depends on the Japanese successes in China, perhaps if they had been defeated at Khalkin Gol and the Soviet fighters sold to the Chinese Air Force had been of better quality the American intervention would have been less urgent. How many variables!!

 

[DWG]

That's what I thought I had read....does the original course 220 degrees take them out of range?

Potentially, I think you'd need to plot everything on a map.

 

[DWG]

Best discussion of what happened is here.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/CornwallDorsetshireX-RStuart-Adobe.pdf

That's what I'd been using. I started off with Andrew Boyd's The RN in Eastern Waters, which has a discussion of the battle tagged onto the main narrative about policy and Force Z, but I needed more detail and found Stuart.

 

[Justo Miranda]

Potentially, I think you'd need to plot everything on a map.

Unfortunately, I cannot follow the development of the battle with the same precision as you, my sources are mainly about the aircraft used.

 

[DWG]

The other thing I see as a big problem for the RN is Singapore. Since there is no war in Europe, and if the Japanese still go to war on schedule, the British get smacked down hard in Malaysia. There would be little reason for any Commonwealth nations to mobilize prior to the outbreak of war.

Actually the Service chiefs warned Winston well beforehand that he needed to reinforce Singapore. He didn't really agree, but there was bugger all to send on top of that. With no war in Europe, there's the ability to substantially reinforce Singapore beforehand, and the freedom to send the Home Fleet to the East when hostilities erupt. Even without reinforcement, 4th Submarine Flotilla would be at full strength (15) and a nightmare for Japanese convoys. The question would then be could Singapore hold long enough.

Without the urgency of war elsewhere, the British aren't likely inclined to spend big on Singapore.

I'd say the opposite applies, it frees the resources for a crash reinforcement programme.

 

[DWG]

So, we must consider two very different scenarios:

With war in Europe and with the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine fully developed, France invaded, and England struggling to survive in the Battle of the Atlantic, Japan would have encountered no opposition of any kind to cut off all Imperial supply routes in the Indian Ocean. They could even have closed off the approaches to the Suez Canal using a few Ceylon-based mining submarines.

This really isn't that different to the historical scenario, because the UK had very little free to send IOTL and mostly fought the initial campaign from what was already in place. The difference might be sending the Rs, but not KGV and Renown.

Without war in Europe, Japan would have been forced to attack anyway, assuming that Roosevelt's policy had been the same.

The RN would have fought hard by sending most of its fleet to protect the eastern approaches to the Suez Canal but, in my opinion, it would also have suffered great losses against the best naval aviators in the world, highly trained by the war in China and who, moreover, knew well the modus operandi of the RN having been trained by British experts.

You really should read the Stuart articles on Operation C, he picks up exactly the same flaws in Kido Butai operations during Operation C as cost it the battle at Midway a little later. Meanwhile there was only one navy practised in night aerial torpedo strikes, and it wasn't the Japanese.

Japanese knowledge of British operations was well out of date at this point, the links had largely been cut at Washington, so that was the best part of 20 years of RN development they had no access to.

They would have lost Singapore, Sumatra and Ceylon as well, unpleasantly surprised by the IJN's effective landing tactics, the Ki.43's maneuverability, the Zero's range and the suicidal courage of the Aichi D3A pilots. It would have been even worse than the disaster in Crete.

So with more ability to reinforce than in OTL, we would have done worse. That really doesn't follow.

Here, too, is a chronological problem: Would the Japanese have retained the same aircraft models from 1941 in 1944?

The Japanese were already developing their next generation when they went to war, so they fully intended to update.

 

[T. A. Gardner]

Actually the Service chiefs warned Winston well beforehand that he needed to reinforce Singapore. He didn't really agree, but there was bugger all to send on top of that. With no war in Europe, there's the ability to substantially reinforce Singapore beforehand, and the freedom to send the Home Fleet to the East when hostilities erupt. Even without reinforcement, 4th Submarine Flotilla would be at full strength (15) and a nightmare for Japanese convoys. The question would then be could Singapore hold long enough.


I'd say the opposite applies, it frees the resources for a crash reinforcement programme.

First, in peacetime the British Army would be much smaller. Calling up, or drafting, units from India or Australia will be difficult other than those already in peacetime service. The RAF wouldn't be pressed to build as many aircraft as possible and even development of new types would slow down markedly. This would, in turn, leave the RAF with only the real choice to send some Hurricanes at most as the Spitfires would be retained for home defense.

The French would ignore Indochina for the most part because they are spending heavily at home to shore up things there. I could see the British thinking that the French are a bulwark to an invasion of Malaysia in any case.

The Dutch, like the US, took their Asian possessions more seriously. The big US hold up to reinforcing the Philippines is shipping space. Without the European war there would be a bit more available and the US could send more arms and equipment to raise a Philippine army in parallel with their own troops. Maybe even a National Guard division could be sent as this was proposed but MacArthur turned it down.

With fewer European orders for aircraft, more production goes to the Pacific sooner. The Dutch can get more of what they order meaning the DEI becomes far more formidable to take.

Submarines, as the US discovered, particularly older ones, aren't going to stop much of anything. This is something the Germans got a rude awakening to as well. The British won't send the Home Fleet either. A carrier, probably one of the older ones, would be sent. Maybe an R class or two as well. The frontline, new, stuff says in England.

 

[Scott Kenny]

With the Second Sino-Japanese war having started in 1931, I suspect that the attack on Pearl Harbor would have happened regardless of what happened in Europe.

That said, without the war kicking off in 1939 in Europe, I don't think that the German agreement to declare war on whoever declared war on Japan would have been in place. The Tripartite Pact was signed in 1940, and didn't technically require Germany to declare war on anyone declaring war on Japan or Italy, unless J or I was the defending party.

So the US would have been able to turn its full industrial fury onto Japan after December 7th, and would have been at full war output for several years by the time Europe dragged the US into things again. Yes, I am assuming that the US would not immediately jump in to the defense of Europe and would take a year or two before they got pulled in.

Note that I do not believe that the US could have defeated Japan significantly faster than happened historically, as much of the timeline is determined by how quickly the US can take/retake various islands to allow attacks onto the Home Islands. And even if the US was able to do that fight quicker, no nukes to drop before 1945 means a ground invasion of the Home Islands, with all the horrors that entails. Also, without a war in Europe, I don't think the Manhattan Project would have had such funding/pressure put behind it, so IMO it's highly unlikely that the US would have developed nukes in 1945. At least not Fat Man weapons. The US could probably have knocked out a few more Little Boy types to use if they could have scrounged the Uranium-235, and those were the easiest technically to make.​

Any situation requiring a forced landing into NWE would still require massive troop buildups taking at least one year if not two, though the US would have a much, much better idea about how to conduct those than in 1943-44.

So my guess would be US involvement in late 1945 or 46, and an opposed landing in France no earlier than 1947 more likely 1948 or even 1949. The worst part of this would be that these would not be fresh, innocent American troops, but veteran troops that had experienced the horrors of island fighting versus the Japanese. "No Quarter" would likely be standard operating procedures, with "Surrender Immediately or we kill everyone" as the other option.