US forces with a second JFK term and shorter/no Vietnam war?

Citing the US Naval Institute article:


There were two incidents. The first (August 2, 1964) involved the USS Maddox, which it was fired upon by a NV torpedo boat and the Maddox returned fire. This event was supported by NSA documentation showing that the NV navy gunboats communicated the incident with Hanoi.

The second incident (August 4, 1964) involving the Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, which included 'faulty signal intelligence' and a misrepresentation of the facts by Robert McNamara led to the reporting of a second attack. The basis for declaring this an attack was based on very flimsy evidence, which was likely obtained from a very nervous US Navy crew, who misinterpreted lights on the water, boats that came near the area, and false sonar information. There was no evidence from among NSA documents released that the misinterpretation of the events was intentional from anyone. However, there are many historians who believe otherwise, and the NSA collaborates that their was no real evidence, such as SIGINT data collected on the Aug 2 incident, that was obtained during the Aug 4 attack.

However, many point to the statement made by Johnson on the incident saying, “Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.” This implies that the attack information supplied by the naval crew on the Aug 4 incident was unsubstantiated by any other agency and he was not confident in the report. How long after the incident did he make this statement? Idk.

It is unknown of course if Kennedy, having received the same intelligence, would have believed the events as presented to Johnson or came to the same conclusions that an attack had or had not occurred. If not, both did not believe the information were they 'railroaded' into making a decision to go to war by politicians and generals? We can only assume that if the intelligence was believed (no matter how confusing the information was) and the forces that shaped Johnson's decisions were the same that Kennedy would have faced (i.e. an upcoming election, the need to take a hard stand against communism, and a show of force to prevent a future attack (as on Aug 2), Kennedy, from my perspective, would have had only a few options available:

1. Done nothing, which would have made him look weak on foreign affairs.
2. Condemned the action and impose some embargo on NV. However, the Geneva Accords of 1954 suspended export licenses to NV. Johnson imposed sanctions on commercial and financial transactions when the war started, which did little to NV as their aid and economic system was tied to China and the USSR during the war. Attacks by NV would likely continue in SV as embargos would have had little affect.
3. Conduct a limited attack on NV naval installations and airfields. This could easily have escalated in to a war with N Vietnam. Hanoi would likely have stepped up their campaign of terrorism in S. Vietnam (i.e. destroying bridges and schools, burning medical aid stations, bombings of public spaces, and kidnapping of civilians). Soviet and Chinese aid in military equipment would also have continued.
4. Assisted SV army and air forces in prolonged attacks against the North without regular ground forces. This would have been very limited in effect without more training and better aircraft and equipment for the SV army and air force. Essentially, the US would have been advising, then leading SV forces in combat against a growing NV military threat.

All but one of these calls for military action and the first option would not have been a real option for Kennedy in the political climate he would have found himself in during the 1964 election.
 
Dynoman said:
Citing the US Naval Institute article:


There were two incidents. The first (August 2, 1964) involved the USS Maddox, which it was fired upon by a NV torpedo boat and the Maddox returned fire. This event was supported by NSA documentation showing that the NV navy gunboats communicated the incident with Hanoi.

The second incident (August 4, 1964) involving the Maddox and the USS Turner Joy, which included 'faulty signal intelligence' and a misrepresentation of the facts by Robert McNamara led to the reporting of a second attack. The basis for declaring this an attack was based on very flimsy evidence, which was likely obtained from a very nervous US Navy crew, who misinterpreted lights on the water, boats that came near the area, and false sonar information. There was no evidence from among NSA documents released that the misinterpretation of the events was intentional from anyone. However, there are many historians who believe otherwise, and the NSA collaborates that their was no real evidence, such as SIGINT data collected on the Aug 2 incident, that was obtained during the Aug 4 attack.

However, many point to the statement made by Johnson on the incident saying, “Hell, those damn, stupid sailors were just shooting at flying fish.” This implies that the attack information supplied by the naval crew on the Aug 4 incident was unsubstantiated by any other agency and he was not confident in the report. How long after the incident did he make this statement? Idk.

It is unknown of course if Kennedy, having received the same intelligence, would have believed the events as presented to Johnson or came to the same conclusions that an attack had or had not occurred. If not, both did not believe the information were they 'railroaded' into making a decision to go to war by politicians and generals? We can only assume that if the intelligence was believed (no matter how confusing the information was) and the forces that shaped Johnson's decisions were the same that Kennedy would have faced (i.e. an upcoming election, the need to take a hard stand against communism, and a show of force to prevent a future attack (as on Aug 2), Kennedy, from my perspective, would have had only a few options available:

1. Done nothing, which would have made him look weak on foreign affairs.
2. Condemned the action and impose some embargo on NV. However, the Geneva Accords of 1954 suspended export licenses to NV. Johnson imposed sanctions on commercial and financial transactions when the war started, which did little to NV as their aid and economic system was tied to China and the USSR during the war. Attacks by NV would likely continue in SV as embargos would have had little affect.
3. Conduct a limited attack on NV naval installations and airfields. This could easily have escalated in to a war with N Vietnam. Hanoi would likely have stepped up their campaign of terrorism in S. Vietnam (i.e. destroying bridges and schools, burning medical aid stations, bombings of public spaces, and kidnapping of civilians). Soviet and Chinese aid in military equipment would also have continued.
4. Assisted SV army and air forces in prolonged attacks against the North without regular ground forces. This would have been very limited in effect without more training and better aircraft and equipment for the SV army and air force. Essentially, the US would have been advising, then leading SV forces in combat against a growing NV military threat.

All but one of these calls for military action and the first option would not have been a real option for Kennedy in the political climate he would have found himself in during the 1964 election.
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"We can only assume..."? Seriously? In depth research requires in depth research, not some quote from here or there. Also, online forums are a bad place for actual researchers since all and sundry can interrupt to make unsubstantiated remarks. Imagine a closed meeting of The Royal Society being interrupted by some random person from the local pub. In that case, he would be escorted out.

The above is a good example of unsubstantiated assumptions after the posting of a credible article from a credible source.

President Kennedy, like all Presidents, would have been given a daily briefing related to current events. He was well aware of his standing among politicians and the military regarding the 1964 election. He had to make plans to keep combat troops out of Vietnam. I previously posted the headline to a Pacific Stars and Stripes story about a White House Report, "U.S. seen out of Viet by '65." which was apparently ignored here. There is nothing vague about that.

"As his first step, Kennedy sent Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Secretary McNamara to Saigon in late September 1963. They returned to the White House and presented him with their voluminous report on October 2, 1963. In part that report said: 'It should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time....'"

"That time," as stated clearly in their report, was the end of 1965. One thousand troops were already slated to come home in time for Christmas 1963.

"Kennedy planned to get out of Vietnam and to turn the war over to a new leader in South Vietnam. This was the first order of business. To his adversaries, this confirmed the nature of the course he had chosen. They began to move, to move swiftly and with finality."

"In March 1964 the familiar team of McNamara and Taylor made another fact-finding trip to South Vietnam. They returned and made their report to the President and the NSC [National Security Council - Ed.] on March 16. As a result of this report the President approved and signed NSAM #288 on March 17, 1964. By this time, of course, the Kennedy plan for Vietnam had been altered considerably. In their report, McNamara and Taylor said that 'the situation in Vietnam was considerably worse than had been previously realized at the time of adoption of NSAM #273' on November 26, 1963 -- not to mention at the time of NSAM #263, which was signed by Kennedy on October 11, 1963."

"On July 30, 1964, 'South Vietnamese' PT boats made a midnight attack, including an amphibious commando raid on the Hon Me and Hon Nieu islands just off the coast of North Vietnam above the 19th parallel, north latitude. The North Vietnamese responded by sending their high-speed KOMAR boats after the raiders. The 'Swift' PT boats escaped; but the KOMARS spotted the U.S.S. Maddox in the vicinity. The Maddox claimed that the KOMARS fired torpedoes and that 'a bullet fragment was recovered from the destroyer's superstructure.'

"On the night of August 3, 1964, more commando raids were made on the coast of North Vietnam, and the Vinh Sonh radar installation was hit. Because of its importance, this raid was most certainly made by CIA mercenaries. Following it, a claim was made of an intercepted radio transmission saying, 'North Vietnamese naval forces had been ordered to attack the patrol' consisting of the Maddox and Turner Joy. It was this incident that triggered the action that led to the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of August 1964."

The above quoted portion was written by Colonel L. Fletcher Prouty who worked in the Pentagon. After the assassination of President Kennedy, he resigned. The following is from a letter he received from The Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 26 December 1963.

"SUBJECT: Letter of appreciation

"TO: Colonel Leroy F. Prouty
Chief, Special Operations Division
Office of the Special Assistant for
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities,
Joint Staff"

Colonel Prouty had been involved with the military since the Second World War. President Johnson had been maneuvered into a position where he responded to what was presented as credible intelligence, forcing him to declare war.
 
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Edwest4 - I agree with your statements, however, as Fredrik Logevall (Pultizer Prize winning historian) "NSAM 263 hardly represented the kind of far-reaching policy initiative that the incipient-withdrawal proponents suggest. It was but one part of a larger 'selective pressures' policy designed to push the Diem regime into greater effectiveness." Logevall concluded that "The great preponderance of the evidence...would appear to refute any notion that John Kennedy had decided to withdraw from Vietnam." However, Logevall goes on to speculate that Kennedy, because of his character and personality, might have considered, at a later date, a unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam."

I agree with your statement: "President Johnson had been maneuvered into a position where he responded to what was presented as credible intelligence, forcing him to declare war."

My stance is despite Johnson's claim, the day after Kennedy was killed, affirming the withdrawal called for in NSAM 263, which was initiated with the withdraw of 1,000 troops of the over 15,000 troops that remained, by saying "The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963," his decisions were shaped by the events that transpired afterwards.

Kennedy, if he would have lived, having the same advisors and intelligence available to Johnson, would have likely made similar decisions. I believe Kennedy was an intelligent and contemplative individual who did not make rash decisions nor necessarily trusted what he was told by the CIA or the Joint Chiefs, however, he did listen to McNamara and it was there that I think the seed of war was planted.
 
Dynoman said:
Edwest4 - I agree with your statements, however, as Fredrik Logevall (Pultizer Prize winning historian) "NSAM 263 hardly represented the kind of far-reaching policy initiative that the incipient-withdrawal proponents suggest. It was but one part of a larger 'selective pressures' policy designed to push the Diem regime into greater effectiveness." Logevall concluded that "The great preponderance of the evidence...would appear to refute any notion that John Kennedy had decided to withdraw from Vietnam." However, Logevall goes on to speculate that Kennedy, because of his character and personality, might have considered, at a later date, a unilateral withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam."

I agree with your statement: "President Johnson had been maneuvered into a position where he responded to what was presented as credible intelligence, forcing him to declare war."

My stance is despite Johnson's claim, the day after Kennedy was killed, affirming the withdrawal called for in NSAM 263, which was initiated with the withdraw of 1,000 troops of the over 15,000 troops that remained, by saying "The objectives of the United States with respect to the withdrawal of U. S. military personnel remain as stated in the White House statement of October 2, 1963," his decisions were shaped by the events that transpired afterwards.

Kennedy, if he would have lived, having the same advisors and intelligence available to Johnson, would have likely made similar decisions. I believe Kennedy was an intelligent and contemplative individual who did not make rash decisions nor necessarily trusted what he was told by the CIA or the Joint Chiefs, however, he did listen to McNamara and it was there that I think the seed of war was planted.
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"Ngo Dinh Diem, the first President of South Vietnam, was killed on November 1, 1963, and Kennedy was killed on November 22, 1963."

I find it strange that you would cite a historian as opposed to Colonel Prouty who was there and in a position to deal with classified information. Further, both he and others were sometimes asked to provide guidance.

"First of all, NSAM #263, October 11, 1963, was a crucial White House document. Much of it, guided by White House policy, was actually written by my boss in the Pentagon, General Krulak, myself, and others of his staff."

Colonel Prouty was not just a passive observer.

You paint a picture of Kennedy that is not accurate. His brother, Robert Kennedy, was Attorney General, and they often discussed sensitive matters together. Kennedy did not trust the CIA, and he did not entirely trust the intelligence coming in either. He had served on a PT boat during the war so he had seen war first-hand. He was not just another politician.

"...
his decisions were shaped by the events that transpired afterwards.
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That's an assumption only. You seem to forget that Kennedy blamed the CIA for the failed Bay of Pigs operation. Of course Castro contacted his friends in the Kremlin who sent in Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles. I watched President Kennedy announce this to the people on TV. He also said that an attack on Western Europe would be regarded as an attack against the United States. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were urging him to go to war against the Soviet Union by striking first and ending the threat. He did not follow their advice.

McNamara? He listened to McNamara? What gave you that idea?
 
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Why would the Gulf of Tonkin incident not have happened?
DESOTO patrols off China and North Korea had been taking place since April 1962. In mid-1962 a division of large minesweepers (MSOs) had been conducting ELINT operations off North and South Vietnam and they were replaced by destroyers under DESOTO, the first operation of which in the Gulf of Tonkin was in December 1962
In July 1963 the DOD took over the CIA's 'Nautilus' commando raids and spy-insertion missions as Operational Plan 34A when the switchover took effect on 1 January 1964 - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group taking control.

DESOTO and OPLAN34A were running side-by-side, both were experiencing reactions - often the OPLAN34A missions using small craft like the Nasty-class PT boats would cause reactions from the North Vietnamese Navy and that Elint would be hoovered up by the DESOTO ships.
At some point the reaction was bound to lead to an exchange of fire. The first incident on August 2 1964 was probably the Captain of USS Maddox getting too jumpy - perhaps the culminative effect of nearly 2 years of these operations and expecting some kind of reaction - perhaps on faulty intel of South Vietnamese intentions. Either way two nights later that jumpiness got worse and they fired at nothing. I suspect the whole thing wasn't so much a carefully contrived plot - both DESOTO and 34A had been running for too long, but a face saving exercise at having opened fire for no reason on two occasions and relayed up the command chain all the way to the White House as a provocation in order to cover up the fact there was no threat.

But the key thing is that DESOTO and OPLAN34A were Kennedy administration initiatives.
There were two fatal mistakes.
First, removing CIA control from Nautilus was counter-productive, once the USN had opened fire the operations lost any deniability - it wasn't as if it could be handwaved away as being deniable. A couple of South Vietnamese in a CIA-supplied and operated boat doing some smuggling was one thing but this was a US-flagged destroyer.
Two, these operations were inherently dangerous because any recon operation designed to set off a reaction to be measured by the intel platform risks that reaction being serious - thus all the Elint aircraft shot down in the Baltic/Barents/Pacific, Gary Powers and Rudolf Anderson, USS Liberty, USS Pueblo were exactly the same case - their luck ran out. Sooner or later one of the NV P-4s were going to have a pop at a US ship it was only a matter of time.

Would Kennedy have been more cautious? Who knows for sure but we can make some surmises. On the one hand it was a minor skirmish in a campaign of skirmishes of two nations already in proxy combat with each other. In the grand scheme of Cold War geopolitics it was almost a non-event. Kennedy might have asked for more detailed information but its unlikely that Captain John Herrick would own up to opening fire for no reason. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy felt the evidence was dubious and its likely that Kennedy would have listened to them

Whether it was a Johnson stitch up is open to question but the fact he authorised Operation Pierce Arrow within 30 minutes and addressed the public just before midnight on the same day is rather suspect. Given that the 'incidents' were very minor infractions given the scale of previous Cold War incidents (no loss of life, one single bullet hit) this seems like overkill. In other cases RB-47s could get blown apart by Soviet SAMs and the public were told nothing. Four years later the Pueblo Incident provoked a massive military response by the USN and USAF but no active combat took place. Given his previous form Kennedy is unlikely to have gone to the press nor to have authorised a Pierce Arrow-style operation that quickly, though he is unlikely to have been politically unable not to retaliate in some way. The caveat of course is, unlike the USSR shooting down a U-2 or Cuba in October 1962 there is no direct risk to the USA, no nuclear retaliation. North Vietnam is a convenient punchbag with far fewer consequences.

But we have to ask ourselves, if this wasn't a stitch up then 2 and 4 August might never have happened so its immaterial what Kennedy would have done - though both DESOTO and 34A were provoking probes and one that provocation was likely to cause a genuine incident at some point. If it was a genuine combination of trigger-happy nerves and poor intel assessment from NSA then its 50/50 whether Kennedy would believe the USN and NSA story or not. Even if he did its open to question what he would do about it. If it was a conspiracy its hard to determine whether Kennedy was unlikely to manufacture an event like that - after all Bay of Pigs went ahead etc., DESOTO and 34A were already running, all the aspects were there to be used in just that way.
 
Hood said:
Why would the Gulf of Tonkin incident not have happened?
DESOTO patrols off China and North Korea had been taking place since April 1962. In mid-1962 a division of large minesweepers (MSOs) had been conducting ELINT operations off North and South Vietnam and they were replaced by destroyers under DESOTO, the first operation of which in the Gulf of Tonkin was in December 1962
In July 1963 the DOD took over the CIA's 'Nautilus' commando raids and spy-insertion missions as Operational Plan 34A when the switchover took effect on 1 January 1964 - Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group taking control.

DESOTO and OPLAN34A were running side-by-side, both were experiencing reactions - often the OPLAN34A missions using small craft like the Nasty-class PT boats would cause reactions from the North Vietnamese Navy and that Elint would be hoovered up by the DESOTO ships.
At some point the reaction was bound to lead to an exchange of fire. The first incident on August 2 1964 was probably the Captain of USS Maddox getting too jumpy - perhaps the culminative effect of nearly 2 years of these operations and expecting some kind of reaction - perhaps on faulty intel of South Vietnamese intentions. Either way two nights later that jumpiness got worse and they fired at nothing. I suspect the whole thing wasn't so much a carefully contrived plot - both DESOTO and 34A had been running for too long, but a face saving exercise at having opened fire for no reason on two occasions and relayed up the command chain all the way to the White House as a provocation in order to cover up the fact there was no threat.

But the key thing is that DESOTO and OPLAN34A were Kennedy administration initiatives.
There were two fatal mistakes.
First, removing CIA control from Nautilus was counter-productive, once the USN had opened fire the operations lost any deniability - it wasn't as if it could be handwaved away as being deniable. A couple of South Vietnamese in a CIA-supplied and operated boat doing some smuggling was one thing but this was a US-flagged destroyer.
Two, these operations were inherently dangerous because any recon operation designed to set off a reaction to be measured by the intel platform risks that reaction being serious - thus all the Elint aircraft shot down in the Baltic/Barents/Pacific, Gary Powers and Rudolf Anderson, USS Liberty, USS Pueblo were exactly the same case - their luck ran out. Sooner or later one of the NV P-4s were going to have a pop at a US ship it was only a matter of time.

Would Kennedy have been more cautious? Who knows for sure but we can make some surmises. On the one hand it was a minor skirmish in a campaign of skirmishes of two nations already in proxy combat with each other. In the grand scheme of Cold War geopolitics it was almost a non-event. Kennedy might have asked for more detailed information but its unlikely that Captain John Herrick would own up to opening fire for no reason. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy felt the evidence was dubious and its likely that Kennedy would have listened to them

Whether it was a Johnson stitch up is open to question but the fact he authorised Operation Pierce Arrow within 30 minutes and addressed the public just before midnight on the same day is rather suspect. Given that the 'incidents' were very minor infractions given the scale of previous Cold War incidents (no loss of life, one single bullet hit) this seems like overkill. In other cases RB-47s could get blown apart by Soviet SAMs and the public were told nothing. Four years later the Pueblo Incident provoked a massive military response by the USN and USAF but no active combat took place. Given his previous form Kennedy is unlikely to have gone to the press nor to have authorised a Pierce Arrow-style operation that quickly, though he is unlikely to have been politically unable not to retaliate in some way. The caveat of course is, unlike the USSR shooting down a U-2 or Cuba in October 1962 there is no direct risk to the USA, no nuclear retaliation. North Vietnam is a convenient punchbag with far fewer consequences.

But we have to ask ourselves, if this wasn't a stitch up then 2 and 4 August might never have happened so its immaterial what Kennedy would have done - though both DESOTO and 34A were provoking probes and one that provocation was likely to cause a genuine incident at some point. If it was a genuine combination of trigger-happy nerves and poor intel assessment from NSA then its 50/50 whether Kennedy would believe the USN and NSA story or not. Even if he did its open to question what he would do about it. If it was a conspiracy its hard to determine whether Kennedy was unlikely to manufacture an event like that - after all Bay of Pigs went ahead etc., DESOTO and 34A were already running, all the aspects were there to be used in just that way.
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More unsubstantiated assumptions.

The wartime Office of Strategic Services, along with its counterpart, the Special Operations Executive, had men in countries around the world. Colonel Prouty was there in 1945 and witnessed the following.

"Despite the terrific damage done to mainland Japan by aerial bombardment, even before the use of atomic bombs, the invasion of Japan had been considered to be an essential prelude to victory and to 'unconditional' surrender. Planning for this invasion had been under way for years. As soon as the island of Okinawa became available as the launching site for this operation, supplies and equipment for an invasion force of at least half a million men began to be stacked up, fifteen to twenty feet high, all over the island.

"Then, with the early surrender of Japan, this massive invasion did not occur, and the use of this enormous stockpile of military equipment was not necessary. Almost immediately, U.S. Navy transport vessels began to show up in Naha Harbor, Okinawa. This vast load of war materiel was reloaded onto those ships. I was on Okinawa at that time, and during some business in the harbor area I asked the harbormaster if all that new materiel was being returned to the States.

"His response was direct and surprising: 'Hell, no! They ain't never goin' to see it again. One-half of this stuff, enough to equip and support at least a hundred and fifty thousand men, is going to Korea, and the other half is going to Indochina.'

"In 1945, none of us had any idea that the first battles of the Cold War were going to be fought by U.S. military units in these two regions beginning in 1950 and 1965 -- yet that is precisely what had been planned, and it is precisely what happened. Who made that decision back in 1943-1945? Who selected Syngman Rhee and Ho Chi Minh to be our new allies as early as mid-1945?'

The OSS was disbanded in 1945. It was briefly replaced by the Central Intelligence Group, and reappeared as the CIA. The same men who were scouting the world for the military also served other U.S. interests. Trade between countries resumed after the war. The contest was about where the money would go. It was either going to the treasuries of Communist countries or those aligned with the West. The planning for the new order began before the end of World War II.

The CIA arranged for the assassination of President Kennedy. It was done to ensure that he did not stand in the way of operational objectives in Vietnam. Certain events were arranged to happen by the CIA with NSA support.

In 1966, attorney Mark Lane published a book titled Rush to Judgment. He showed that the Warren Commission had omitted and concealed evidence related to Kennedy's assassination. In 2011, another book by Mark Lane was released. The title says it all: "Last Word -- My Indictment of the CIA in the Murder of JFK."
 
edwest4 said:
The CIA arranged for the assassination of President Kennedy. It was done to ensure that he did not stand in the way of operational objectives in Vietnam. Certain events were arranged to happen by the CIA with NSA support.
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Warning: This is now heading into Conspiracy Theory territory
 
The original question regarding US military forces, and I assume force levels, without Vietnam would have been approximately 2,500,000 deployed worldwide. These force levels would have likely been around 2 million through the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's. Despite social backlash from an unpopular war the numbers appear to remain consistent. With regards to military projects I believe the reason identified or at least partially so) for these projects cancelations was the competition for funds with the war. A couple of these I believe were MOL- Manned Orbiting Laboratory and Lockheed YF-12.
 

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Dynoman said:
The original question regarding US military forces, and I assume force levels, without Vietnam would have been approximately 2,500,000 deployed worldwide. These force levels would have likely been around 2 million through the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's. Despite social backlash from an unpopular war the numbers appear to remain consistent. With regards to military projects I believe the reason identified or at least partially so) for these projects cancelations was the competition for funds with the war. A couple of these I believe were MOL- Manned Orbiting Laboratory and Lockheed YF-12.
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YF-12 was not cancelled due to the War taking up the funding.

YF-12 was cancelled by McNamara because he wanted the F-111 to be that interceptor. Congress allocated the funds for 100x YF-12s, McNamara refused to release the funds.
 
Scott Kenny said:
YF-12 was not cancelled due to the War taking up the funding.

YF-12 was cancelled by McNamara because he wanted the F-111 to be that interceptor. Congress allocated the funds for 100x YF-12s, McNamara refused to release the funds.
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That is not accurate. In other words, no documents or credible references were presented.

Colonel Prouty tells us this is what happened. Remember, he was working at the Pentagon during this time.

"The aircraft the military desired was called a 'Tactical Fighter Experimental,' or TFX. The air force wanted an extremely unconventional aircraft, with wings that could be swept back in flight for higher speed."

"By this time, the total program had been increased to 1,700 aircraft - 235 of which would be for the navy - for a total initial procurement cost of $6.5 billion."

"So Kennedy added Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, a wise old World War II OSS veteran, to the TFX team. ... Goldberg had an idea. It was to use this $6.5 billion potential in every possible way, in selected 'politically' marginal counties throughout the United States, to strengthen the Democratic party. Goldberg and McNamara began to work together. McNamara set up a suite of offices, one corridor ring in from his own in the Pentagon, with a staff that had nothing else to do than to plot the course of the TFX source selection program."

"Then Gilpatric closed with: 'Mr. McNamara and I , after an acceptable TFX proposal was offered, had to make a judgment between two proposals... the air force and navy will get a better buy for the taxpayers' dollars than would have been forthcoming if the contract had been let earlier....'

"Gilpatric made these statements during a time of intense Senate hearings on the TFX. You will note how carefully both he and McNamara avoided any direct mention that they had arbitrarily gone along with the Goldberg formula augmented by the assurances of Kelly Johnson at Lockheed.

"Indeed, Kelly Johnson's role in this selection has not been mentioned elsewhere. I was a friend of Roger Lewis's, president of General Dynamics, and was told this account of the 'Skunk Works' role by Mr. Lewis himself.

"To the Kennedy circle, the TFX, the Skybolt, the Dyna-Soar, the atomic-powered aircraft, and all the rest that had fallen into their laps with the election were just what Kennedy, Goldberg, and McNamara took them to be: devices that could be used to direct money into political districts that needed it for their own benefit and to assure the election of a Kennedy for years to come."
 
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edwest4 said:
That is not accurate. In other words, no documents or credible references were presented.

Colonel Prouty tells us this is what happened. Remember, he was working at the Pentagon during this time.

"The aircraft the military desired was called a 'Tactical Fighter Experimental,' or TFX. The air force wanted an extremely unconventional aircraft, with wings that could be swept back in flight for higher speed."

"By this time, the total program had been increased to 1,700 aircraft - 235 of which would be for the navy - for a total initial procurement cost of $6.5 billion."

"So Kennedy added Labor Secretary Arthur Goldberg, a wise old World War II OSS veteran, to the TFX team. ... Goldberg had an idea. It was to use this $6.5 billion potential in every possible way, in selected 'politically' marginal counties throughout the United States, to strengthen the Democratic party. Goldberg and McNamara began to work together. McNamara set up a suite of offices, one corridor ring in from his own in the Pentagon, with a staff that had nothing else to do than to plot the course of the TFX source selection program."

"Then Gilpatric closed with: 'Mr. McNamara and I , after an acceptable TFX proposal was offered, had to make a judgment between two proposals... the air force and navy will get a better buy for the taxpayers' dollars than would have been forthcoming if the contract had been let earlier....'

"Gilpatric made these statements during a time of intense Senate hearings on the TFX. You will note how carefully both he and McNamara avoided any direct mention that they had arbitrarily gone along with the Goldberg formula augmented by the assurances of Kelly Johnson at Lockheed.

"Indeed, Kelly Johnson's role in this selection has not been mentioned elsewhere. I was a friend of Roger Lewis's, president of General Dynamics, and was told this account of the 'Skunk Works' role by Mr. Lewis himself.

"To the Kennedy circle, the TFX, the Skybolt, the Dyna-Soar, the atomic-powered aircraft, and all the rest that had fallen into their laps with the election were just what Kennedy, Goldberg, and McNamara took them to be: devices that could be used to direct money into political districts that needed it for their own benefit and to assure the election of a Kennedy for years to come."
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So why did Congress authorize the purchase of 100x YF12s?
 
Wow, this has escalated into a fecal matter poop storm faster than, say - the Vietnam war, 1965 ? (Am I allowed to say poop ? Poop... POOOOP !)
 
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edwest4 said:
Please provide a document or other reference.
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X-Planes at Edwards by Steven Pace, ISBN 978-1-6106078605, page 53.

On 14 May 1965, the USAF placed an order for 93x F-12Bs for Air Defense Command. McNamara refused to release the funds for 3 consecutive years.
 
Scott Kenny said:
X-Planes at Edwards by Steven Pace, ISBN 978-1-6106078605, page 53.

On 14 May 1965, the USAF placed an order for 93x F-12Bs for Air Defense Command. McNamara refused to release the funds for 3 consecutive years.
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Thank you. But this has nothing to do with the Kennedy administration.
 
edwest4 said:
Thank you. But this has nothing to do with the Kennedy administration.
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Gets back to the power McNamara had. He literally ignored Congressional approved budgets.

Can you imagine the backlash today of a SecDef refusing to release funds for a program because it was competing with his pet project (the TFX)?

edwest4 said:
Colonel Prouty tells us this is what happened. Remember, he was working at the Pentagon during this time.

"The aircraft the military desired was called a 'Tactical Fighter Experimental,' or TFX. The air force wanted an extremely unconventional aircraft, with wings that could be swept back in flight for higher speed."
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And no, that is NOT what "the military" (ie, the people expecting to fight in that airplane) wanted. That is what McNamara the SecDef wanted. USN wanted no part of the F-111, it was far too big and heavy for the Fleet Air Defense role (later occupied by the F-14 Tomcat), and the engines sucked for a fighter.

McNamara's big thing was to combine procurement to save money. It worked with the F-4 and A-7, and the USAF version of the A-7 (A-7D) was such an improvement over the originals that the USN ordered enough (A-7E) to replace their earlier versions. But the F-4 was probably the first really good jet multi role fighter-bomber, and the A-7 Corsair II is one of the best battlefield interdiction aircraft ever made. Notice that both planes were originally designed for the USN and then modified for the USAF, but doing the same roles in both services.

But the design brief for the USAF TFX was a supersonic low altitude penetrator; while the design brief for the USN TFX was fleet air defense that required a supersonic dash plus long loiter times. Those are not compatible requirements!
 

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