Triton

Donald McKelvy
Senior Member
Joined
14 August 2009
Messages
9,707
Reaction score
2,021
Website
deeptowild.blogspot.com
I have read conflicting information concerning the Soviet N1 rocket. Some sources say that the 30 engine design of the first stage was fatally flawed and the complex piping was damaged during rail transport to Baikonur. But then another source says that Nikolai Kuznetsov continued to work to perfect the engine design and the revised engine was known as the NK-33, replacing the NK-15, in the first stage and the NK-43 replaced the NK-15V in the second stage. The rocked with the updated engines was known as the N1F.

If the Soviet Union's lunar program was in the hands of someone with more charisma and political astuteness than Vasily Mishin and Soviet industry was behind the N1, could the N1 have been made to work and cosmonauts could have actually walked on the moon? Or was the design fatally flawed from a technical perspective and if the Soviets were going to the moon they would require a different launch vehicle? Such as Chelomei's UR-700 or Glushko's Vulkan?

I understand that development of the N1 was officially abandoned in 1976. For the sake of this discussion, can we ignore the whose first to the moon rationale for a manned landing on the moon and the political squabbles that derailed the project. My question is more could the rocket have been made to work technically.
 

Attachments

  • 285px-Saturn_V_vs_N1_-_to_scale_drawing.png
    285px-Saturn_V_vs_N1_-_to_scale_drawing.png
    61.8 KB · Views: 1,160
  • 466px-GPN-2002-000188.jpg
    466px-GPN-2002-000188.jpg
    82.2 KB · Views: 1,125
  • N1-1.jpg
    N1-1.jpg
    68.5 KB · Views: 1,150
As I recall each of the 4 failures were due to different causes. That suggests poor quality control more than anything.
 
some facts

first
as Korolev dies 1966, N-1 is far from to be complet design
original N1 is to have a payload capability of 75 tonnes to a 250 km altitude orbit.

but the needed payload is now 95 tons !
so Vasily Mishin start redesign to increase payload to 95 tonnes
increase the propellant mass by supercooling the propellants
the kerosene to be at -15 to -20 degrees Centigrade,
the liquid oxygen to -191 degrees centigrade;
add six engines to the first stage center; and increase thrust of all the engines on the N-1 by 2%

the question here has Mishin made change in steel alloy of oxidiser tube to engine ?
because of much cooler oxygen as planned. if not, it explane allot why they tore after liftoff !


second:
another problem was NK-15 engine
tested were only some engine, the rest untested and not cleaned were shipped to Baikonur
and build in to N-1 first stage
the complex piping was damaged during rail transport to Baikonur
no the N-1 was build near Launchsite and Move by train to there

N1 5L launch was failure because slag fragment left in NK-15 Engine nr 8°
the oxygen Turbopump explode after sucking this in, start a chain reaction Wat destroy the rocket
Question: was NK-15 not change on new design of Vasily Mishin ?

ironically
Korolev and Glushko were in dispute over engine for N-1 in beginn 1960's
(Korolev hated Glusko, because he had betray denounced Korolev in 1930 and years in Soviet gulag)
Glushko had proposal of Modular Engine blocks for N-1
but this was prevented by an intriguers employee of Korolev , Vasily Mishin !!!
so Koroley take Kuznetsov for NK-15, a company with no experience with rocket engines !

the 1974 N-1F had working NK-33 engine, but lunar program was chancels.
i think that N-1F had launch payload in to orbit.

good source on N-1 here
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/n1.htm
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/whynrace.htm

Nikolai Petrovich Kamanin Diaries
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/kamaries.htm
Boris Yevseyevich Chertok's Memoirs
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/chemoirs.htm
they give deep look on program and how Vasily Mishin screw things badly
 
Was Korolev's hatred of Glushko the real reason Korolev did not use the RD-270 engine? The propellants used in the RD-270 are unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4). I understand that these propellants are toxic and if an explosion were to occur on the pad at Baikonur that Korolev claimed that the area would be toxic for the next ten to twelve years? The engine also produced toxic exhaust. But I also understand that it was used as fuel for Soviet ICBMs. Did any incidents of explosions or problems with toxic exhaust occur with ICBMs fueled by these toxic propellants?

My understanding is that Korolev wanted high performance fuels like kerosene/liquid oxygen for manned flight.
 
...As several space historians - myself included - have noted over the years since the fall of the Evil Soviet Empire opened the floodgates of data on the development of the N-1, the failure of the program can be attributed to a combination of three factors:

1) The whole program got a late start and was underfunded from Day One. The Soviet Politburo expected miracles on a shoestring budget with their lunar program in the same way they managed to pull them off with their previous programs. There's at least a magnitude of complexity between even a multi-orbit manned mission and a lunar landing mission, if not two magnitudes. A mission of that scale can't be done on the cheap.

2) The design of the N-1 was such that all-up testing was a stupid idea that was made necessary by the secrecy under which the program was held. Such restrictions prohibited static engine tests that would have uncovered many of the design flaws that contributed to the four launch failures, even though some have argued that the probability was high that such tests would have invalidated the N-1's Block A design and forced a complete redesign, possibly switching to Glushko's designs much to Korolev's chagrin.

3) Which brings us to the most important factor in why not only the N-1 failed, but why the Soviets lost the Moon Race *and* their lead in space: They simply did not have one single strong leader under which all resources could be united and coordinated towards the target goal. Had Korolev been made sole head of all the rocketry bureaus assigned to the manned space efforts, or if Glushko had been told point blank that either he voluntarily cooperated with Korolev without interference and/or backstabbing or start picking out some nice snowdrift property in a Siberian gulag, then odds are that the Soviet resources could have been redirected towards at least a successful first circumlunar mission. Considering how quickly Miskin's teams redesigned the Soviet lander's Descent Module to match that of the Grumman verson after Apollo 11, and what we now know about the characteristics of the LK design, significant doubt exists as to how successful the LK design would have wound up. Either way, the Soviet program suffered the greatest from the infighting between Korolev and Glushko. Had they worked in unison, their combined efforts would have been at least equal to Von Braun's own results.
 
From what I have read, it seems like it was Vladimir Chelomei and Glushko against Korolev and later Vasily Mishin. Chemolomei preferred a direct flight to the moon using his UR-700 rocket using Glushko's RD-270 and the toxic hypergolic fuel that was so objectionable to Korolev. Was the three man LK-700 lander even a contender? Was it just a design on paper.

It also seems strange that the Chelomei after he lost the moon rocket, was instructed to modify the UR-700 design for a manned journey to Mars.
 
lets beginn in 1930's

Glushko betray Korolev to save his neck in 1938 Stalin Great Purge
He was accused of deliberately slowing the work of the research institute with his rocket science
Korolev was imprisoned for almost six years, including some months in a Siberian gulag
but in sadistic twist of fate, he end up in a slave-labor camps where scientists and engineers worked on
Top secrets Projects
a camp under control the rocket engine designer Valentin Glushko !
you understand now why Korolev hate so much Glushko

until then the Red Army found the first V-2 Rockets
Stalin give order to Korolev to check this new technology...

1950's under Khrushchev things change fast
Korolev had build R-7 and Launch Spunik 1-2-3-4 and shock the U.S.
but as ICBM R-7 was a disaster need 24 hours to prepare and full loaded it had only 30 min
then it had to be Launch or the R-7 became useless junk !

Khrushchev demand in conference at Korolev it possible to change R-7 Fuel to long storage propellants
Korolev say "no", Glushko say "Yes"

and this was begin of R-16 project was end up in Nedelin disaster http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nedelin_disaster

beginn 1960's
another Rocketbuilder Vladimir Chelomei rise to top because Khrushchev son work in his OKB-52 Bureau
he was advisers for Khrushchev on rocket question
Unfortunately as he was arrogant and disrespectful against top Spovjet KP and special to
Dmitriy Ustinov heat of ICBM programs in USSR
after the ousting of Khrushchev, Chelomei fall deep and Korolev rise again to top until his death in 1966

Vasily Mishin was a alcoholic Intriguer
he prevented last chance of Korolev and Glushko to get a Consent on N-1

another for him typical behaviour was happen to Soyuz-IV Project

Kozlov made out Soyuz a innovative MOL like space station !
but his boss Vasily Mishin had other ideas, he take program from Kozlov into his hand in 1967
"Because Kozlov had insulted them by redesigning the VI to rectify the 'defects' of their Soyuz 7K-OK design."
and proposed new Concept called Soyus-R with two soyuz space craft (that was also stolen from Kozlov ! )
bizarre on that case was Mishin lost intrest on Soyuz-R project, until was chancels in 1970

also his way of Troubleshooting: ignore problem and get drunk until Coma

forget soapopera and telenovela - Sovjet spaceflight history is better !
 
Vasily Mishin was a alcoholic Intriguer he prevented last chance of Korolev and Glushko to get a Consent on N-1

...You got a source on this? Because this is the first tiime I've heard of him being directly in the middle of the Korolev-Glushko feud to this extent. Scott and I might need to contact Asif Siddiqi and Jim Oberg for further clarification.
 
My humbe understading is that Kuznestov engines were not that bad individually; they found their way into Aerojet, then Kistler K1 vehicle in the 90's (my favourite RLV ever).

They were two more N1 in the jigs when they cancelled the program; the idea was to test a dual launch lunar architecture in LEO using 8L and 9L.


On one hand, the L3M lunar lander; on the other hand, a RD-56 cryogenic upper stage. Send the two separately in lunar orbit, dock there, then crash the stage on the Moon to land the L3M. three man, three weeks stay -1980 - lunar base in the long term. Apollo beaten.

Had the US shuttle not been developped, there would certainly had no Buran nor Energia. These days I've grown interested over the famous meeting of August 13 1974, when Glushko presented the RLA / Vulkan to the VPK. Looks like no one really wanted shuttle, nor heavy-lift.

I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!
Didn't they understood that future of US nuclear deterrent was the B-1A Lancer, plus Tomahawk cruise missiles ?
A shuttle on a launch pad is an enormous, vulnerable target. For example you have to top off the ET regularly because of LH2 boil-off. How can you consider this a viable nuclear bomber ?
 
Archibald said:
I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!
Didn't they understood that future of US nuclear deterrent was the B-1A Lancer, plus Tomahawk cruise missiles ?
A shuttle on a launch pad is an enormous, vulnerable target. For example you have to top off the ET regularly because of LH2 boil-off. How can you consider this a viable nuclear bomber ?

According to Bert Vis and Bart Hendricx brand new book about Buran, the things gone exactly in that way.....
 
archipeppe said:
Archibald said:
I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!
Didn't they understood that future of US nuclear deterrent was the B-1A Lancer, plus Tomahawk cruise missiles ?
A shuttle on a launch pad is an enormous, vulnerable target. For example you have to top off the ET regularly because of LH2 boil-off. How can you consider this a viable nuclear bomber ?

According to Bert Vis and Bart Hendricx brand new book about Buran, the things gone exactly in that way.....

Also, if it's performance and reliability had lived up to the hype it would have been a passable FOBS system, for getting a sneaky first strike in. Pretty nonsensical, but probably a very possibility in the paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War Kremlin.
 
OM said:
Vasily Mishin was a alcoholic Intriguer he prevented last chance of Korolev and Glushko to get a Consent on N-1

...You got a source on this? Because this is the first tiime I've heard of him being directly in the middle of the Korolev-Glushko feud to this extent. Scott and I might need to contact Asif Siddiqi and Jim Oberg for further clarification.

you din't read this ?
good source on N-1 here
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/n1.htm
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/whynrace.htm

Nikolai Petrovich Kamanin Diaries
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/kamaries.htm
Boris Yevseyevich Chertok's Memoirs
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/chemoirs.htm
they give deep look on program and how Vasily Mishin screw things badly
 
Michel Van said:
you din't read this ?
good source on N-1 here
http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/n1.htm
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/whynrace.htm

Nikolai Petrovich Kamanin Diaries
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/kamaries.htm
Boris Yevseyevich Chertok's Memoirs
http://www.astronautix.com/articles/chemoirs.htm
they give deep look on program and how Vasily Mishin screw things badly

...Yes, I've read them all. Especially when Mark first put them online. What I'm not seeing in any of the writings is any indication that Mishin, for all his inarguable faults, prevented any sort of concensus between Korolev and Glushko, especially prior to Korolev's untimely death. Unless someone can show me the passage that clearly states this, I'm suspecting you may be under a misconception due to a translational error. It's no question that Mishin was nowhere near what the Soviets needed to get their Lunar program on track and remain that way after Korolev's death, but I honestly haven't read any evidence that Mishin was in the middle of the feud as a manipulator as you've stated.

Not saying that it's not there, just simply asking for the direct quote/cite so I can proceeed from there....
 
archipeppe said:
Archibald said:
I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!
Didn't they understood that future of US nuclear deterrent was the B-1A Lancer, plus Tomahawk cruise missiles ?
A shuttle on a launch pad is an enormous, vulnerable target. For example you have to top off the ET regularly because of LH2 boil-off. How can you consider this a viable nuclear bomber ?

According to Bert Vis and Bart Hendricx brand new book about Buran, the things gone exactly in that way.....

Also, if it's performance and reliability had lived up to the hype it would have been a passable FOBS system, for getting a sneaky first strike in. Pretty nonsensical, but probably a very possibility in the paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War Kremlin.

Thank you both of you. I understand better.

About Astronautix: an interesting source, BUT one has to take it with a pinch of salt, a bit like Wikipedia. Problem is sometimes Mark Wade let his feelings - anti nasa, anti shuttle - blurr the data. And well, as every encyclopedia, it has some mistakes.
 
Archibald said:
About Astronautix: an interesting source, BUT one has to take it with a pinch of salt, a bit like Wikipedia. Problem is sometimes Mark Wade let his feelings - anti nasa, anti shuttle - blurr the data. And well, as every encyclopedia, it has some mistakes.

...No, Mark's not anti-NASA, he's just a realist. If you want anti-NASA with a bias *and* a vendetta, check out anything Keith Cowing has posted about NASA in the past decade. He's still trying to exact revenge for having been justifiably terminated as a software engineer.
 
Archibald said:
I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!

In 2002 Stephen Garber of Virginia Tech wrote an interesting master's thesis entitled Birds of a Feather on political factors in the designs of the Shuttle and of Buran. On p. 16, he mentions that Soviet analysts correctly realized that the economic case for the Shuttle made no sense at all. That fact combined with the capability to fly a stealthy one-orbit mission from VAFB led them to conclude that the Shuttle was intended as a weapons system.

As you point out, the idea that the Shuttle would have been much of a weapon is pretty crazy. But there are many examples of crazy ideas being taken seriously when national security is involved. Then add in the fact that powerful people like Keldysh were happy to have an excuse to build another vehicle.
 
Proponent said:
Archibald said:
I can't believe only Keldysh paranoia ("the shuttle is a space nuclear bomber, it will drop a 25MT bomb on Moscow") drove the Soviet into Buran. Looks like a urban legend, a myth to me. The soviets couldn't really makes such an enormous mistake!

In 2002 Stephen Garber of Virginia Tech wrote an interesting master's thesis entitled Birds of a Feather on political factors in the designs of the Shuttle and of Buran. On p. 16, he mentions that Soviet analysts correctly realized that the economic case for the Shuttle made no sense at all. That fact combined with the capability to fly a stealthy one-orbit mission from VAFB led them to conclude that the Shuttle was intended as a weapons system.

As you point out, the idea that the Shuttle would have been much of a weapon is pretty crazy. But there are many examples of crazy ideas being taken seriously when national security is involved. Then add in the fact that powerful people like Keldysh were happy to have an excuse to build another vehicle.

Interestingly enough the 'crazy idea' turns up in a 1982 thriller novel ("The Red Dove" by Derek Lambert) about an American plot to persuade the pilot of the Soviet Unions first space shuttle to defect with his spacecraft. When the defection is made the pilot discovers not only is the shuttle carrying an H-bomb (yield unspecified) but the weapon has become armed during flight forcing him to make an emergency touchdown at JFK.
 
OM said:
...As several space historians - myself included - have noted over the years since the fall of the Evil Soviet Empire opened the floodgates of data on the development of the N-1, the failure of the program can be attributed to a combination of three factors:

...

2) The design of the N-1 was such that all-up testing was a stupid idea that was made necessary by the secrecy under which the program was held. Such restrictions prohibited static engine tests that would have uncovered many of the design flaws that contributed to the four launch failures, even though some have argued that the probability was high that such tests would have invalidated the N-1's Block A design and forced a complete redesign, possibly switching to Glushko's designs much to Korolev's chagrin.

I thought the lack of a test stand for the complete first stage was due to lack of money, rather than secrecy.

Also, the engines were single-use only, so they couldn't test-fire an engine before installing it. They resorted to testing 50% of each production batch, then installing the other 50% in the N-1.
(source: Chertok's memoirs)
 
Hobbes said:
OM said:
...As several space historians - myself included - have noted over the years since the fall of the Evil Soviet Empire opened the floodgates of data on the development of the N-1, the failure of the program can be attributed to a combination of three factors:

...

2) The design of the N-1 was such that all-up testing was a stupid idea that was made necessary by the secrecy under which the program was held. Such restrictions prohibited static engine tests that would have uncovered many of the design flaws that contributed to the four launch failures, even though some have argued that the probability was high that such tests would have invalidated the N-1's Block A design and forced a complete redesign, possibly switching to Glushko's designs much to Korolev's chagrin.

I thought the lack of a test stand for the complete first stage was due to lack of money, rather than secrecy.

Also, the engines were single-use only, so they couldn't test-fire an engine before installing it. They resorted to testing 50% of each production batch, then installing the other 50% in the N-1.
(source: Chertok's memoirs)


...In reverse order:


2) Point noted, and one I should have thrown in. Спасибо, мой друг! ;D


1) Funding no doubt had some effect on the test stand issue, but from what we'd been able to filter out of all the data that was finally being released, security was the bigger issue. I will concede that it may have actually been more of a cost issue - it's been about a decade or so since those of us on sci.space.history were going through all the N-1 stuff like kids on Christnukkah morning, so there may have been an instruction sheet or two lost amongst the Коммунистический красный gift wrapping. If you've got a source that points in this direction, I'd love to see/read it ;)
 
I think the upper stages of the N-1, which had much less engines (8, 4 instead of 30) could have made work. I just realized that, if the N-1 was cut of its first stage, the resulting rocket (think they called that the N-11) could have replaced the Proton (making Zenith and Angara unseful, by the way).
 
Quindar Beep said:
Michel Van said:

The mother lode! Thank you, Michael!

Those are pretty poor quality scans. I've seen several of those images at much better quality. The classic one of the color shot of the whole vehicle from above (on its side in the transporter) has appeared in some books at better quality.

I think that a lot of material still simply has not made it to the internet. A colleague has told me that he was invited to a private viewing after a Moscow party once where some retired Russian general pulled out a VHS tape and showed off some really incredible N-1 footage. He said that it was better than anything that has been publicly available. So there's good stuff, it just hasn't gotten out of archives and private hands yet.
 
Archibald said:
Send the two separately in lunar orbit, dock there, then crash the stage on the Moon to land the L3M. three man, three weeks stay -1980 - lunar base in the long term. Apollo beaten.

And in this case?
Can Ronald Reagan sleep under a communist moon?
Which is the move of the Americans,a new lunar program using Shuttle and Shuttle-B?
 
carmelo said:
Archibald said:
Send the two separately in lunar orbit, dock there, then crash the stage on the Moon to land the L3M. three man, three weeks stay -1980 - lunar base in the long term. Apollo beaten.

And in this case?
Can Ronald Reagan sleep under a communist moon?
Which is the move of the Americans,a new lunar program using Shuttle and Shuttle-B?


actually they look into use of a space shuttle for moon mission
Cislunar Application of the Space Shuttle OrbiterProject V1086, J. E. Blahnik; undated (post-July 1971)
http://www.secretprojects.co.uk/forum/index.php/topic,4011.0.html
 
The sticky point is that, from the moment Gemini bet Voskhod in 1965, the Soviet just adapted their program to what NASA did.
When NASA decided to go the Moon, the L3 was the answer.

The way I see it, when in 1969 the Space Task Group asked for space shuttle + nuclear engine + space station + Moon base + Mars shot, then the Soviets developed symetrical answers to all this... except for the shuttle !

Nuclear engine ? they had it, the RD-410
space station ? they had the MKBS
More lunar mission ? L3M, DLB lunar base
Mars in the 80's ? Aelita

But a reusable space plane ? sheesh. Of course they had Spiral, but it was pretty much despised. There was no enthusiasm at all for any shuttle.

I also tend to think that Glushko takeover of 1974 was caused by that situation. Nobody on the soviet side wanted a shuttle: Glushko literally voluntered to to the dirty job, but in exchange he asked, and obtained, total control over manned spaceflight - Chelomey and Mishin empires were given to him.

Had NASA picked up either Mars, or more lunar missions, or a giant space station, then the soviets would have developed one of their symetrical projects, which all needed the N-1 (and not a 12 years late Energia). No chance for Glushko in this context.
 
Archibald said:
But a reusable space plane ? sheesh. Of course they had Spiral, but it was pretty much despised. There was no enthusiasm at all for any shuttle.

I also tend to think that Glushko takeover of 1974 was caused by that situation. Nobody on the soviet side wanted a shuttle: Glushko literally voluntered to to the dirty job, but in exchange he asked, and obtained, total control over manned spaceflight - Chelomey and Mishin empires were given to him.

Oh there were, some 1970s small space shuttle proposal.
like System 49M http://www.astronautix.com/craft/sysem49m.htm

apropos symmetrical answers, with Nixon keep the Saturn V alive, the US shuttle would be, much smaller and easier as original build...
 
re: the Keldysh / shuttle / nuclear bomber
In volume 4 of his outstanding Rockets and people space history Boris Chertok has this to say

From the information available, we know that NASA has been working successfully on a specific design for three years now. Our comrades who have visited the United States for the Apollo-Soyuz project have become acquainted with this system.

After the Americans officially pub-licized its main parameters, some young and zealous guys from the Institute of Applied Mathematics (IPM) figured out in advance the possible orbits of the Space Shuttle allowing for possible maneuvers in the atmosphere at 2,000 kilometers clear of ballistic orbit.

They scared Keldysh. Keldysh reported to Ustinov, and then to Brezhnev. It turned out that the Space Shuttle, flying far from our borders, having lulled the missile defense (PRO) and air defense (PVO) into a false sense of security, could suddenly execute a maneuver—a ‘dash to the north,’ and, flying over Moscow, could drop a 25-ton thermonuclear bomb with an explosive yield of at least 25 megatons there.

Main point: Keldysh did not become a shuttle paranoid by accident. The bizarre vision of the space shuttle as a nuclear bomber had some maths behind it.
 
Not sure if this is the right topic, but it's the closest one to my question.

In the design of the N1L3, how does the Primary Shroud open to reveal the L3 vehicle? I've seen it split down to near the base as well as it spliting at the top and the L3 launching out of it.
 
Interestingly by the late 70's they had both the kerosene fueled and hydrogen fueled engines needed to complete such a lunar mission: the RD-170/171 used on the Energia side boosters had even greater thrust and better Isp than the F-1, and the RD-0120, used on the Energia core, was an analogue to the SSME so had better thrust and better Isp than the J-2 used on the Saturn V upper stages.
I can only think after the Americans had already won the Moon race and had moved onto the shuttle program, the Soviets wanted to keep up with the shuttle program then.

Bob Clark
 
1.After unsuccessful testing of N1, it was evident that such a costly program would be hard to hide from public, especially when it desperately needed even more funding and engineering resources.
2. Soviet Union wanted to be the best in every segment, be it missiles, submarines or telescopes. My hunch tells me that they were running out of qualified enough engineers to scrap for such a massive program because too many were already involved in too many programmes going on simultaneously at that period of time.Rememeber, only certain percentage of population can be educated as engineers.
3. VABs.
 
there is a interesting study of N1 from 1965
it replace the first stage by new one, with bigger fuel tanks and better straight piping.
but the engine increased 175 to 250 tones thrust and 30 engines in first stage. :eek:

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/nim1965.htm

By the way
are there any soviet graphic on N1M study in the internet ?
 
Michel Van said:
there is a interesting study of N1 from 1965
it replace the first stage by new one, with bigger fuel tanks and better straight piping.
but the engine increased 175 to 250 tones thrust and 30 engines in first stage. :eek:

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/nim1965.htm

By the way
are there any soviet graphic on N1M study in the internet ?

There are supposedly some people working on a detailed history of the N-1, in English. But they haven't posted much other than a few, very nice, drawings showing the variants. It's hard to determine if this is a real project or more of a hobby.
 
blackstar said:
Michel Van said:
there is a interesting study of N1 from 1965
it replace the first stage by new one, with bigger fuel tanks and better straight piping.
but the engine increased 175 to 250 tones thrust and 30 engines in first stage. :eek:

http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/nim1965.htm

By the way
are there any soviet graphic on N1M study in the internet ?

There are supposedly some people working on a detailed history of the N-1, in English. But they haven't posted much other than a few, very nice, drawings showing the variants. It's hard to determine if this is a real project or more of a hobby.


...Dwayne is probably referring to this site, which has a link to a page telling people to stay tuned for more announcements. but has no visible timestamp on the page itself. However, the HTML source code lists the last page update(s) as having been posted - or at least coded - in early January of this year. The images posted of what appear to be the author's renders look good, but there's only a couple of them available, as well as a couple of short animations, but the link he posted to a Yahoo discussion group appears to be broken. In fact, the whole site appears to be a "work in progress", as one page is totally broken, several other pages have broken links, the page where he has most of his renders located either 404s or comes up with a *lot* of broken links, and above all else the site is a pain to navigate because the navigation bars aren't installed on every page. The latter may have been due to some desire to not use HTML frames, but as all browsers have supported frames for over a decade this really isn't a valid concern these days. Ergo, it doesn't matter how "k!kr@d" and "k00l" you may want your website to look, if it's a bitch to find things it'll turn off visitors quicker than the broken links will.


...That being said, I'd love to know if he started the mesh from scratch, or if he's modding the one that was floating around the rendering sites back when I still had two legs. I've got that one filed away somewhere, but I've never broken the stages apart to check the level of detailing. Also, there's some question as to his claims that the N-1 never had any of the standard Soviet "Red Army Green" (SRAG). According to the site author, he rather emphatically states that "THERE IS NO GREEN ANYWHERE ON THE HULL OF ANY N-1 ROCKET!", claiming that the "error" occurs because of poor photographic processing and erroneously colored museum models. However, he uses only one particular color reference to determine that the green striping should be grey, and that's the color of the landscape around the launch site.


...From my own experience, color correction based on just one color can be tricky at best, as the only accurate color you can be sure of matching are the colors very close in the spectrum to the sole color you're using as a reference. Two colors works a bit better, and three seems to be "the magic number" if you don't have at least an NTSC-certified color chart in the image. And to date, I've yet to see -any- N1 images with a color chart visible, nor any other reference that I can recall ever mentioning or even hinting that the dark coloration is grey and not SRAG. In all honesty, were this the case, based on all the images, documents and other data that's been declassified/uncovered/released since those first images started surfacing in the mid-90s, this coloration would have turned up a *long* time ago.



And even then, if he winds up being right about the paint scheme being grey-and-white, his claim that the N1 was *not* a Soviet military booster still flies about as high as N1-5L did... :p


:OM:
 
Via Gajitz, a short clip from a Russian TV documentary on the N1 (no subtitles, part of soundtrack missing):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=m79UO4HOQmc
 
I've seen the book now. It's impressive. It is aimed at model makers, however:

http://www.kickstarter.com/projects/jhagerty/n-1-for-the-moon-and-mars-the-soviet-superbooster
 
Some nice photos of the rocket
 

Attachments

  • soviet-n1-moon-rocket-.jpg
    soviet-n1-moon-rocket-.jpg
    864.1 KB · Views: 570
  • N-1 rocket.jpg
    N-1 rocket.jpg
    545.5 KB · Views: 517
  • N-1 rocket+.jpg
    N-1 rocket+.jpg
    706.6 KB · Views: 517
  • N-1 rocket=.jpg
    N-1 rocket=.jpg
    349.9 KB · Views: 583
;D
 

Attachments

  • N-1 rocket at pad.jpg
    N-1 rocket at pad.jpg
    1.6 MB · Views: 343
  • N-1.jpg
    N-1.jpg
    314.7 KB · Views: 217
  • N-1 cutaway.jpg
    N-1 cutaway.jpg
    367.6 KB · Views: 244

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom