McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II

What I can't understand with the F-4 that after several years of combat over North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail during the mid to late 1960s that it needed an internal cannon that while the USAF when they introduced the F-4E with its' internal M61 Vulcan gun the USN's new much more capable F4J (A massive improvement on the F-4B) didn't have an internal gun.
 
NMaude said:
What I can't understand with the F-4 that after several years of combat over North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh trail during the mid to late 1960s that it needed an internal cannon that while the USAF when they introduced the F-4E with its' internal M61 Vulcan gun the USN's new much more capable F4J (A massive improvement on the F-4B) didn't have an internal gun.
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No room, the AWG-10 dish is like 80cm, the F-4E uses a small nose and smaller pulse radar.
 
F-2 said:
No room, the AWG-10 dish is like 80cm, the F-4E uses a small nose and smaller pulse radar.
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While a good point there were USN and USMC F-4 pilots who did miss having a gun, for instance Dan Pedersen (The first officer in charge of a newly formed Top Gun at Miramar) mentioned several times in his book "TOPGUN: An American Story"* (Which I read last January) he found himself when flying over Vietnam (He flew F-4Bs then F-4Js during the war) in situations where he sorely missed having a gun.

*I highly recommend reading his book.
 
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F-2 said:
No room, the AWG-10 dish is like 80cm, the F-4E uses a small nose and smaller pulse radar.
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That's exactly it. The F-4E has a much smaller antenna diameter than the F-4J (~20"?), even though the nose of the -E is ~5ft longer.
 
Scott Kenny said:
That's exactly it. The F-4E has a much smaller antenna diameter than the F-4J (~20"?), even though the nose of the -E is ~5ft longer.
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There's no reason why the USN couldn't have purchased a few F-4Es when it became abundantly clear an internal cannon was needed for the Phantoms.
 
NMaude said:
There's no reason why the USN couldn't have purchased a few F-4Es when it became abundantly clear an internal cannon was needed for the Phantoms.
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Didn't have the right radar and other avionics (radios, at the least). I don't have the full list of changes between F-4B and F-4E.
 
NMaude said:
There's no reason why the USN couldn't have purchased a few F-4Es when it became abundantly clear an internal cannon was needed for the Phantoms.
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Other than the fact that it probably couldn't be successfully be launched from the carrier due to forward c.g. due to the gun+ammo+radar.
 
F-2 said:
No room, the AWG-10 dish is like 80cm, the F-4E uses a small nose and smaller pulse radar.
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Scott Kenny said:
That's exactly it. The F-4E has a much smaller antenna diameter than the F-4J (~20"?), even though the nose of the -E is ~5ft longer.
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The AN/APQ-120 in the F-4E had an antenna 70 cm x 62 cm.

The AN/APQ-72 in the F-4B/J/N/S had a circular antenna of ~81 cm diameter (32").

According to a poster on the NavWeaps forums (Wabpilot, who flew USN F-4s & F-14s and had an exchange tour with the USAF flying F-4Es) the APQ-120 had a much shorter detection range.
He said that even with the later modifications to try to improve look-down capability (which mainly just allowed the back-seater to tell the radar which returns to ignore) and target ID it was still significantly below the capability of the radar in the F-4J/N/S.
 
Very interesting, Njiiaf. What exactly was attacked in Baghdad by the F-4s as the vid of burning oil tank seems to be independently shot from the footage with the F-4?
 
yahya said:
Very interesting, Njiiaf. What exactly was attacked in Baghdad by the F-4s as the vid of burning oil tank seems to be independently shot from the footage with the F-4?
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No clue. I only have the details of the first clip.
 
Which year did the low altitude sorties near Khorramshahr as depicted in the vid take place?
 
njiiaf said:
Very early in the war. 80-81, don't have the exact date.
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So it took place in the early war period when IRIAF was capable of long-range airstrikes within Iraq, eg. on 4 April 1981 on the H-3 airbase.
 
yahya said:
So it took place in the early war period when IRIAF was capable of long-range airstrikes within Iraq, eg. on 4 April 1981 on the H-3 airbase.
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Roughly around that time yes. Coincidentally, the leader of the H-3 operation is the pilot of the Phantom in the 1st clip. Farajollah Baratpour
 
Right, that mission made him quite famous.

www.oral-history.ir

Air Raid to Al-Waleed (14)‎

Air Raid to Al-Waleed (14)‎
www.oral-history.ir www.oral-history.ir

www.atlanticcouncil.org

How Iranian Phantoms pulled off one of the most daring airstrikes in recent memory

On April 4, 1981, eight F-4 Phantom fighter bombers conducted a daring airstrike on three airbases deep inside Iraqi territory.
www.atlanticcouncil.org www.atlanticcouncil.org

www.atlanticcouncil.org

How the Iranian air force turned the tide of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980

In the case of the Iranian armed forces, one must speak of months of prosecution, summary executions, and an almost complete breakdown of the chain of command following the 1979 revolution. Yet, despite all odds, the Artesh chose to fight bravely when the Iraqi army invaded Iran on September 20...
www.atlanticcouncil.org www.atlanticcouncil.org
 
KJ_Lesnick said:
From numerous sources, it would seem the F-4 Phantom had a somewhat heavily-loaded wing (medium, medium-heavy).

I'm not saying I dispute this as the F-4's performance obviously reflects it, but I am wondering how an aircraft with such large wings, which appear to be substantially cambered, fairly thick for a supersonic design, and not exactly razor sharp at the leading edge (all things that generally reflect a high L/D ratio) would yield a somewhat heavily-loaded wing?


KJ Lesnick
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All -

I am sending part 2 to my comments about the F-4… with the associated first comments I made appearing on pg 4, with my submission dated 18 Nov 2024.

…. While working on F-4Es as an Aircraft Electrician serving in our local Air National Guard 122nd Fighter Wing, we encountered 2 problem aircraft that required an excess amount of troubleshooting. I previously mentioned Aircraft 452, which had an extended history of “ Generator fail “ lights. The other aircraft was 844….

The 122nd Fighter Wing operated F-4Es from 1986 until they were replaced by F-16s immediately after the “ Gulf War “.

A/C 844 would sporadically have the “ Master Caution “ light come on in the cockpit, with pilot’s attention then drawn to the cause… illumination of the “ Bus Tie “ fail light.
The F-4 as a twin engine fighter/bomber, had an electric generator attached to each
J-79 engine. The generators and aircraft battery we connected to various electrical buses, for example…the battery to a D/C “ bus “; and the A/C generators to a variety of A/C buses. Since both generators and their control systems were designed to generate and provide basically the same levels of A/C power; a means was needed to tie the power “ buses “ together to allow aircraft electric power consumption. Such hardware included things like a “ Frequency & Load Control“ box, 2 “Generator Control“
boxes, “ Bus Power Contactor “; etc.

Background info:
The U.S. Air Forcs, Air Force Reserve, an Air National Guard flying units all performed aircraft maintenance in-compliance with the same established regulations and standards. For logistics analysis and mechanic time accounting purposes, aircraft maintenance information was/is similarly input to a centralized logistics data collection and analysis system; using a dedicated computerized reporting system.
Sets of codes were provided through each type of aircraft’s “ Automated Technical Order Maintenance System “; in what was called the “ -06 “ code book.

The rules:
When serious aircraft systems deficiencies were/are uncovered by the ground crew or discovered by the aircrew, a “ when discovered “ code is assigned. This was a single
alphabet letter assigned to specifically state when the systems deficiency was discovered. For example ( from memory ):
when discovered “A” meant “before flight, abort “ “ B “ = before flight, no abort
“C”= inflight abort “ D “= inflight, no abort. “ F “= between flights.
Even if I have some codes listed out of sequence, you still get the idea.

* For systems / components failures, those that were serious enough and/or negatively impacted the necessary “ minimum equipment list “ for safety of flight generated
“Aborts “. Two aborts in-a-row when trying to fly assigned missions, and the plane’s
systems problem would be labeled a “ repeat “ discrepancy; which garnered increased scrutiny of the resulting troubleshooting and repair actions that had been taken to resolve the discrepancy. A/C 452 previously mentioned on pg 4 had developed a series of aborts over time, with many happening 2 or even 3 aborts in-a-row ( some were preflight ground aborts, some… were an air aborts ).

While aircraft 452 ( previously mentioned ) had experienced a series of repeated
“ Generator Fail “ lights which caused numerous before flight and in-flight aborts…
A/C 844s aggravating, random “ BUS Tie “ fail lights were labeled as “ reoccurring “.
Intermittent failures in complex electrical systems are well known for being comparatively harder to troubleshoot & define down to a specific… repeatable failure. And that’s how it was with A/C 844. Severely compounding troubleshooting efforts, was the fact the
“ BUS TIE “ fail light COULD not be made to illuminate during ground ops check engine runs ! It could not be duplicated on the ground ! No Generator system defects were seen on the slaved-in “ Generator Tester “; either. The recurrence of the discrepancy continued to defy troubleshhooting resolution through numerous; re-curring events. Things blossomed to the point where the plane’s smart Alec crew chief called his plane
“ BUS TIE BETTY “.

Troubleshooting 844’s bus tie light problem ( like 452’s long history of generator fail light-induced aborts ) would require grounding the plane for an extended period. Such an extended grounding of an aircraft for expansive, more-detailed troubleshooting required approval upper management approval. *** The unpredictable cadence of random re-occurring aborts caused by “ Bus tie “ light illuminations were j-u-s-t far enough apart, that the Deputy Commander for Maintenance and subordinate
“ Maintenance Control “ ( who schedule each aircraft for flight or ground maintenance ) were loathe to ground the aircraft for the really extensive troubleshooting it needed…. in the absence of “ Bus tie “ light illumination discrepancy. I repeatedly asked and eventually fairly begged for them to ground the jet…. even if it were to ultimately require
2 weeks to troubleshoot to a provable causative defect. The reoccurring problem persisted…

844 would abort…. hours would be spent on inconclusive trouble shooting…. a line replaceable unit would be changed… the plane would pass systems ground operational checks…and returned to fly for several missions, before the BUS tie light came on again.
And so… the intermittent, niggling problem kept getting “ kicked down the road “ ***
*** I wanted to definitely find an enduring “ fix “, but was never allowed the required amount of time it would have taken to find the ( assumed ) wiring problem. ***

Fast fwd to the end of “ Desert Storm “:
As the 122nd FW was transitioning to F-16s arriving direct from their “ Gulf War “ service, we were also prepping our outgoing F-4Es to either go out to the drone missile target program, or be transfered to Greece.

As it turned out, 844 wound up in the last batch of 4 jets set to fly-out for transfer to Greece. The intent was, our unit would launch all 4 planes together. After those last 4
F-4Es departed, the 122nd would officially be done with the F-4E being the “ Primary Assigned Aircraft”. Once they reached a point more than 1/2 way towards their Eastern US jumping off point for the trans-Atlantic hop; 122nd’s Electric Shop would be absolved from having to go work on the plane if it aborted flight into some closer airbase or airport before reaching the 1/2 way point. This for us, was more like…hoping the plane would go some place else, to “ Abort “ ! A place past the specified mid-way point.

“ BUS TIE BETTY “ had its last “ BUS tie “ light illumination the day before the last 4 jets were scheduled to depart for Turkey. This event had ramifications for the when/ where/ how and with whom 844 would go across the Atlantic. Having been an Aircraft Electrician on F-4s for several years, and having looked at 844 many times myself…
I knew full well that the extended grounding I had hoped to be granted for the aircraft never did take place. Moreover, I already KNEW the night before, how long, difficult; and high pressure the next day would be… in my trying to return the jet to flighable status !!

And I KNEW, that for THIS attempt to fix the jet…more than ever…everyone else other than me…. was ( unreasonably ) expecting to see a timely “ fix “. In-particular… because the President of the United States was slated to make an announcement on national news that evening; to state that the U.S. was supplying its ally Greece with a batch of
F-4Es. The aircraft transfer had visibility not only at the National Guard Bureau; but also @ the Pentagon.

I went in extra early that day, to work on the jet; knowing from the outset….it was going to be at least a 12hr day. It was going to be a hot one, with temps in the mid 80’s, along with the extreme humidity we had in NE Indiana. I removed the fwd Sparrow missile recess covers to access the Lt & Rt Generator control boxes. When Egress Shop came in to work, I requested that Maintenance Control dispatch Egress to remove the rear ejection seat “ bucket “, so I could access a control box located beneath the rear cockpit’s Rt aft console. Multiple large wire harnesses carrying Generator control, frequency & load control; and Bus Tie circuit electricity and signals passed through the Aft cockpits lower aft side wall, passing into and through the Rt intake vari-ramp.
Once I was done in the rear cockpit with my checks, I called for Egress to re-install the Aft seat bucket. At the end of the “fix”, 844 needed to be flight ready; so the seat bucket needed to be reinstalled before Egress Shop’s work shift was over.

Since the many previous BUS TIE occurances were never duplicated during ground engine runs, I decided to forgoe wasting time on a having a diagnostic engine ground run performed; but did specifically ask that they have flight line personnel prep the plane for a double engine run. I put-in that request early, knowing that an eventual final engine run ops check would still be required; after I completed whatever fix I would ultimately pick.

Many hours of toil were expended in a fruitless effort to find any wire with a defect that could have caused the BUS TIE lights… again, all to no avail. I could find nothing.
All the while, I had to respond to periodic radio calls asking about my progress on the jet. Signing-off the aircraft 781A forms stating that the problem “ cannot not be duplicated “ ( CND ) was not an option, as everybody knew the jet was proven to have the discrepancy return frequently. A final engines running ops check would be mandatory, since multiple electrical/generator systems canon plugs had been disconnected.
Everything was going ( unfortunately ) pretty much as I had expected it would.

With the end of the normal work day approaching and with 10+ hours already under my belt; I called Maintenance Control to have them ensure an Engine Shop or Aircraft Crew Chief would be tasked with staying late; for purposes of performing the after maintenance systems ops ck. It came down to whoever of those wanted to accumulate the “ comp time “, and didn’t mind going home late.

A couple hours later, I had completed all the wiring checks the day’s “ short “ troubleshooting period allowed, and had decided on which “ Line Replaceable Unit “ I’d replace; to allow my saying some “ hard fix “ had been applied to the plane.
*** Such maintenance actions are never desired or preferred by mechanics.
Unfortunately, once again for 844…. not enough troubleshooting time ( the amount that was really needed ) was alloted… there was no duplication of the light on the ground…and no wiring defects could be found.

I personally from Base Supply had stayed a couple hours later, and was chaffing at the bit to go home. He had to stay late, to access the parts I might require from Supply, especially is the part was located in the “ War Reserve Materiels Kit “ ( WRSK ).
Turns out, the LRU I asked for was Down in the WRSK kit… locked in a warehouse…
located 1/2 mi from the flight line. I put-in the parts order, told the engine run guy and the Supply guy myself … how long the “ fix “ would take to install; as Maintenance Control and everybody else had gone home.

The Supply dude drove me to the warehouse, and got out the outsize padded box holding the LRU, from the WRSK connex container. I staggered to the warehouse door, trying to hold onto the ungainly box. The door locked behind me once I was outdoors.
Much to my chagrin and surprise… the Supply puke had drove off…. leaving me to carry the awkward outsized box the 1/2 mile back to the flight line. Even with the sun setting,
the whole ordeal left me over-heated. 2 1/2 hr later after installing the part and paneling-up the aircraft, I walked to the engine shop to let the guy know I was ready for the final engines running ops check.

I sat in the rear seat, while holding the Generator Tester on my lap. ( The tester was connected to the plane via use of dedicated test recepticals Mounted to the side of the Aft ejection seat’s Lt rail. The engines were run up to the maximum amount of power allowed for a “ chocked “ aircraft. And again… no “ BUS TIE “ light was seen.
We signed-off the 781A forms, and I left a note on Maintenance Contol’s entry door that 844’s discrepancy was at last “ signed off “. I left a recording for my boss on his desk phone. After securing all tools,and equipment… I went home; after putting in 14.6hr .

It was a 45 min drive home, and I happened to arrive there just in time to see & hear the President announce the F-4 transfers to Greece on the 11p.m. news. I was whipped, but made it a point to eat Supper, and shower before bed. I was back to work 7a.m. the following morning.

We all watched with great interest, as 844 fired up, taxied; and launched on its way.
With even greater interest… I hung out in Maintenance Control as 844s time to pass the 1/2 way “ point of no return “. No phone call or radio call came in to tell us that 844 had aborted, and had landed somewhere short of the P.O.N.R. And with that, the saga of
“ BUS TIE BETTY “ had at long last; finally concluded !!

In the following days, word went around that 844 had made it to Greece without event. Years later, I saw a small color picture in ( I think Air International ) that showed 844 in shiny grey Greek livery; at an airshow in Germany. I sometimes wondered how that jet worked out for the Hellenic Air Force ?!
 
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Iranian F-4 shot down over Baghdad, Iraq. Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988.


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Abbas Doran was a McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom II fighter pilot in the Iranian Air Force who played an important role in bombing Iraqi enemy targets in the early months of the Iran-Iraq War. Doran had more than 120 successful overseas operations and flights in the first two years of the war. He was killed in the Baghdad operation on Iraqi soil.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Km6HA4NTrFc
An Iraqi soldier looks at the wreckage of an Iranian F4 Phantom jet, shot down by Iraqi forces, at an open-air museum in Baghdad, April 27, 1984. Equipment seized from the Iranians is displayed here, the remains of six Iranian fighter jets among dozens of heavy equipment.
Iranian F-4 downed
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I stumbled across this 1960s film (It appears to have been before McDonnell had acquired Douglas) concerning the F-4's flight control systems, from the Periscope Films channel:


Film showing the flight control systems on the McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom. From the archives of the San Diego Air and Space Museum http://www.sandiegoairandspace.org/re...
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An interview with a USAF F-4 pilot who flew in the Vietnam war:


On 14 July 1966, Bill 'Swede' Swendner became a MiG-21 killer during the Vietnam War! Hear his incredible story as he took on the most feared Soviet fighter in its day, and won!
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On top of that, he is an excellent speaker and will make you laugh. Join us as he tells about incredible career highlights as a USAF fighter pilot.
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Recording Date: 29 October 2022
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www.flugrevue.de

Iran-Phantoms mit neuer Waffe: Iranischer AMRAAM-Klon für die F-4E

Der Iran rüstet das, was von seiner Phantom-Flotte noch übrig ist, wieder neu auf: Die alten F-4E Phantom II werden nach umfangreicher Modernisierung mit einem iranischen AIM-120C-Klon bewaffnet.
www.flugrevue.de www.flugrevue.de
Iranian AMRAAM clone for F-4E Phantom II
Iran is re-upgrading what is left of its Phantom fleet: the old F-4E Phantom II will be armed with an Iranian AIM-120C clone after extensive modernization.
On the 13. In June 2025, the Israeli Air and Space Force (IASF) destroyed ten F-4E Phantom II on the 3rd during Operation Rising Lion. Tactical Fighter Bomber Base (TFB) Nojeh near Hamadan. The attack with precision-guided GBU-39/B small diameter bombs destroyed the 31st. Tactical hunting squadrons (TFS) — Iran’s main phantom unit and main participant in the modernization program “Project Dowran”. Nearly a quarter of Iran's phantom fleet was lost in a matter of minutes -- the heaviest casualties in a day since the Iran-Iraq war. The elimination of 31. TFS forced Tehran to fully commit to the 61st and 91. TFS in Bushehr and Bandar Abbas to leave. Both squadrons had benefited from upgrades as part of the Dowran project: structural overhaul, rewiring, digitization of the AN/APQ-120 radars and integration of Chinese C-704KD and C-802KD anti-ship missiles.
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Iranian F4 with Iranien AMRAAM.jpg
cute
And that answers my question whether Greece or Iran will fly the last F-4s
 
the old F-4E Phantom II will be armed with an Iranian AIM-120C clone after extensive modernization.
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Have the Iranians actually been able to make a bootleg copy of the AIM-120C or is it just something that looks like one?
 
If they designed their own aam or bootlegged an AIM-120 why do they have to use that awkward adapter rail. It makes me wonder if that's not something Chinese in Iranian paint.
 
Forest Green said:

Flying F-4 Reconnaissance Phantoms Unarmed And Unafraid In Desert Storm​

www.twz.com

Flying F-4 Reconnaissance Phantoms Unarmed And Unafraid In Desert Storm

Distinguished Flying Cross recipient RF-4C pilot and his weapon systems officer recollect flying some of the most important recon missions of the war.
www.twz.com www.twz.com
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Forest -

Howdy !

In the article mentioned above, Pilot Gibbons and “ backseater “ Fuller mentioned someways down in their article…. there were U.S. RF-4Cs ( Air National Guard ) that flew sorties over Iraq while armed w/ at least one AIM-9.

The authors mentioned some General that forbade use of AIM-9s fired from the RF-4Cs
( to prevent “ Blue-on-Blue “ force incidents ), ostensibly because the aircraft were deficient in their airborn radar capabilities.

There WERE “ armed “ RF-4Cs operated over Iraq. From what I have read, there were no air-to-air kills attributed to a U.S. RF-4C/aircrew… for whatever reason.


With regards,
357Mag
 

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