Larger British light fleet carriers?

Lascaris

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What it says in the tin basically. In OTL Britain laid down 10 Colossus class ships in 1942-43, followed by 6 larger Majestic class in 1943 and then the Centaur class in 1944, going from 18,000t to ~20,000 and then 26,000t full load in two years.

So how do you get the British designers to start with a larger ship, ideally Centaur sized straight from 1942 or from the time of the Majestics? I understand the light fleets were initially the response to needing more carriers for convoy protection, so if the battle of the Atlantic is going better for the allies does this suffice total the design process towards larger ships earlier for example?
 
Er, no. The idea of light fleet carriers was to quickly build a number of FLEET carriers - capable of operating as part of battlefleet, in combat operations. They weren't escorts.
 
Take the Ark Royal design, drop the centre shaft, turbines and boilers, delete the second hanger, reducing freeboard and you have a very effective, slightly slower but still more than large enough carrier that is a lot quicker to build than the various armoured fleet carriers.

I have heard the Light Fleet Carriers described as basically an unarmoured Illustrious using a half Fiji set of machinery, an Ark Royal derivative, logically should have been available earlier, been larger, and above all, been perfectly good enough.
 
So how do you get the British designers to start with a larger ship, ideally Centaur sized straight from 1942 or from the time of the Majestics?
Several things need to change.
1. A large(r) number of drydocks need to be longer, as they were a limiting factor. Ideally wider too.
2. Propulsion needs to increase in power for Cruiser sized machinery.

Centaurs used capital ship machinery however and these took longer to build apparently.

Post War the new Cruiser plants offered substantial increases.
 
The problem with a larger propulsion plant was that "half a Fiji plant" was not pulled out of the ether; the Light Fleets reused machinery originally ordered for additional cruisers and using anything else would have meant significant delays. That 2/3 Ark Royal plant, for example, would run into that problem.

Personally, I'd leave the 10 Colossus-class alone and replace the Majestics with a new-design ship - the Royal Navy already had to extensively redesign them to take in war lessons and they were all ordered a good year after the Colossus-class. An earlier Centaur design, perhaps?
 
More Centaurs can only be a bonus in the (very) long term when
- Rebuilding of the Illustrious / Implacables / Indomitable "six" proves a nightmare (Victorious)
- Ark Royal and Eagle agonize until the 1970's with half baked rebuilds at horrible cost.
Invest on the Centaurs (eventually with Harriers) the right way and the RN has no need to build new carriers until the end of Cold War ! (and yes, this encompass both CVA-01 and Invincibles).
 
More Centaurs can only be a bonus in the (very) long term when
- Rebuilding of the Illustrious / Implacables / Indomitable "six" proves a nightmare (Victorious)
- Ark Royal and Eagle agonize until the 1970's with half baked rebuilds at horrible cost.
Invest on the Centaurs (eventually with Harriers) the right way and the RN has no need to build new carriers until the end of Cold War ! (and yes, this encompass both CVA-01 and Invincibles).
Well more Centaurs is most convenient for the smaller powers that got used Colossus/Majestic class ships as well. My understanding is you can't get a Br.1120/Mirage F1M class aircraft operating off a Majestic can you? You could off a Centaur. But given the machinery constraints you'd be exchanging 2 Colossus for each Centaur. How do you convince the admiralty to exchange 6 carriers capable of carrying 37 aircraft each for 3 carrying 42 each during the war? Looks unlikely to me.

Too bad. I'd like a viable scenario with high performance not V/STOL aircraft usable from light carriers.
 
My understanding is you can't get a Br.1120/Mirage F1M class aircraft operating off a Majestic can you?
Hell no. The Arromanches is case in point. It could operate Aquilons ( = Hawker Sea Venom) Breguet Alizés (slow turboprop ASW birds) and Fouga Zephyrs (naval Magister trainer, light and slow too) but Crusaders ? it was never tried, because it would have been suicide. They were already pushing the Clems safety limits.
Neither did any Etendard IV ever flew out of Arromanches.
Etendard IV & Crusaders very much brackets a naval F1, you can guess Arromanches is impossible.

You could off a Centaur.
Depends what Centaur we are discussing. Post-1959 Hermes, maybe. Anything else - Centaur itself, Albion, Bulwark - forget it.

What bothers me is that Hermes rebuild was as massive and expensive as Victorious, also taking a veeeeery long time.

Took me a very long time to grasp the difference between Hermes and Victorious.
Victorious was supposedly a heavy carrier, when Hermes was a light one.
Yet as far as modernizations went, Hermes was easier because it was... fresher: post-WWII.
Victorious and its five half-siblings were WWII veterans, half of them worn out or mutilated; the other half either with the wrong aircraft hangar height or only "half sisterships" between them. The differences making a "standard rebuild block" to be applied to the six, an elusive nightmare.

In an ideal world...
- none of the six Illustrious-Indomitable-Implacable would have been crippled in WWII, by Stukas or Kamikazes
- they would all have been true clones, like the 24 Essex were (as of 1945 at least)
- all of them with the correct hangar height to house jets.

All six could have then been modernized more easily than OTL Victorious but to the same advanced shape.

Alas, we are not living in an ideal world, and the RN atempt at SBC-125-ing the six turned into the Victorious quagmire.
 
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So yes you can modify the Colossus/Majestic design to handle the likes of Scimitar, Crusader, Mirage F1 etc....
But beyond the substantial and expensive modifications, the actual numbers of aircraft and limitations on operations are such.....
That it's not really worth it.
Even if you built new carriers of that size so designed to handle such aircraft, as was debated between RN's DAW and DNC during the mid 50's as Trade Protection Carriers. The numbers and the squeezing of personnel and resources is just not worth it.

So what gets the Admiralty to switch to more Centaurs is either:-
A) not having to because AH Colossus design is bigger using more powerful machinery.
B) switching orders over because the balance of capability and delivery makes it viable. Or to put it another way realising they need Centaurs earlier.

Hermes was easier to modernise, because there was literally less of her to change above the hanger deck floor.
But some of the delays are technology related and some decision related.
 
The reason for the Centaur-class was the ever-growing size and weight of carrier aircraft. Once you start planning for airwings of Spearfish and Wyverns for a 1946-47 campaign against Japan the Colossus-class were too small. And those Specs didn't materialise until about 1943 so that is why the 1943 Light Fleet happened when it did.
They also had higher-power machinery so they had the speed to keep up with the true fleet carriers and were intended to receive more powerful AA batteries with 4.5in guns etc. plus the addition of some armour.

The 1942 Light Fleet was always intended as a cheap and cheerful way to get more carrier decks for the least drain on shipbuilding resources and quick build times.

Personally I feel that the Admiralty was overzealous in its ordering of the Majestics and perhaps the last 6 of the 1942 order should have been cancelled. The gap between them and the 1943 Light Fleet of 12 months would have been seen as a potential problem but it would have been known the last 6 ships would not complete until 1946-47 anyway. Whether you could bump up the lay down dates for the Centaur-class by 6 months would probably depend on slipway availability and the pressures of work on the DNC's staff to complete the design in time.

Most of the wartime carrier programme came too late to be of much use - build times were just too long. The only fleet carrier completed during the timespan of the war was HMS Indefatigable (laid down 3 November 1939).
Only 6 Colossus were completed before the war ended despite laying down in 1942-43 (HMS Ocean just pips in at 8 August 1945).
In the dark days of 41-43 it might have looked like the Eagles and Colossi had a potential war-ending role (even the USN's own Essex and CVL programmes were still ramping up) but in reality it proved not to be. Maltas and Centaurs were never going to be anything but post-war replacements in reality. In fact you could argue the same for the cruiser programme of Bellerophons, Neptunes and N2s; they were all actually quite pointless for wartime needs as they could never be completed for anything but a post-war RN.
So there is perhaps a case that in early 1944 a long hard look should have been given to the 1944 and 1945 Programmes and a more realistic view taken of the size of those programmes given how much of them ended up as scrap or quickly sold off as surplus. The same could equally be said of the USN build programme post 1944.
 
It certainly would be somewhat transformative if more Centaurs had survived the cull and entered service. A few completed to HMS Hermes spec would undermine the case for modernisation of Illustrious class and later variants.
Centaurs were cheaper to run and required less personnel.
Cheaper to alter, and nearly similar capability for aircraft.

Even if more vulnerable, the early Atomic Age views might consider the tradeoff worth it.

It potentially puts more emphasis on the Medium Fleet Carrier.

But once we get to CVA-01 processes this kind of reasoning falls. However it does alter the landscape for after CVA-01 cancellation.
And just maybe.....just... some backup Centaur Successor might have been proposed.
 
The reason for the Centaur-class was the ever-growing size and weight of carrier aircraft. Once you start planning for airwings of Spearfish and Wyverns for a 1946-47 campaign against Japan the Colossus-class were too small. And those Specs didn't materialise until about 1943 so that is why the 1943 Light Fleet happened when it did.
They also had higher-power machinery so they had the speed to keep up with the true fleet carriers and were intended to receive more powerful AA batteries with 4.5in guns etc. plus the addition of some armour.

The 1942 Light Fleet was always intended as a cheap and cheerful way to get more carrier decks for the least drain on shipbuilding resources and quick build times.

Personally I feel that the Admiralty was overzealous in its ordering of the Majestics and perhaps the last 6 of the 1942 order should have been cancelled. The gap between them and the 1943 Light Fleet of 12 months would have been seen as a potential problem but it would have been known the last 6 ships would not complete until 1946-47 anyway. Whether you could bump up the lay down dates for the Centaur-class by 6 months would probably depend on slipway availability and the pressures of work on the DNC's staff to complete the design in time.

Most of the wartime carrier programme came too late to be of much use - build times were just too long. The only fleet carrier completed during the timespan of the war was HMS Indefatigable (laid down 3 November 1939).
Only 6 Colossus were completed before the war ended despite laying down in 1942-43 (HMS Ocean just pips in at 8 August 1945).
In the dark days of 41-43 it might have looked like the Eagles and Colossi had a potential war-ending role (even the USN's own Essex and CVL programmes were still ramping up) but in reality it proved not to be. Maltas and Centaurs were never going to be anything but post-war replacements in reality. In fact you could argue the same for the cruiser programme of Bellerophons, Neptunes and N2s; they were all actually quite pointless for wartime needs as they could never be completed for anything but a post-war RN.
So there is perhaps a case that in early 1944 a long hard look should have been given to the 1944 and 1945 Programmes and a more realistic view taken of the size of those programmes given how much of them ended up as scrap or quickly sold off as surplus. The same could equally be said of the USN build programme post 1944.

Implacable class
The delays in their completion were largely before they were launched. Indefatigable suffered a period of suspension in 1940. Fairfields had an insufficiently large workforce to allow Implacable to be progressed for about 10 months in 1940/41. In both yards repairs were prioritised over new build in 1940/41 and destroyers were prioritised over the carriers in 1941/42. John Brown were told to prioritise the build of the monitor Roberts (ordered March 1940, laid down April, launched Feb 1941) over that of Indefatigable in 1940/41 which was building on the next slip between the launch of DoY and laying down of Vanguard. And then we had the design changes that were made to the ships in the light of war experience which, when you study the design, included many changes to the forward hull to accomadate the wider lift.

Im really not sure how much of that, if any could really have been avoided given the pressures on the shipbuilding industry as a whole in wartime Britain.

1942 Colossus / Majestic class
The 1942 Colossus/Majestic classes need to be viewed in the context of the time of the development of the design. That was late 1941/early 1942 especially following all the disasters that had befallen the RN off Norway in 1940, in the Med off Crete in May 1941 and the Force Z debacle in Dec. The need was for carriers to defend the fleet and to get them quickly so building smaller was essential. Hence the use of a machinery design that was already available. Also their size meant they would occupy slipways that could otherwise accomodate cruisers. So we see 5 planned light cruisers not ordered / cancelled in Aug-Nov 1942 just as the Colossus/Majestic class are ordered (see below).

The initial plans for the 1942 Programme in mid-Feb 1942 included 3 Colossus class ships. A month or so later a fourth ship was planned, to be built at Vickers Tyne in place of the battleship Lion but to be ordered later in the year.

Between Dec 1941 and April 1942 the Admiralty Plans Div were reassessing the numbers of carriers that the fleet was likely to need. And as it did so the carrier numbers kept increasing. By the end of April 1942 they wanted another 6 light fleets. (So we are now at a requirement for 10). Demands rose again and by Aug 1942 it was decided to order 9 extra ships (so taking the plan to orders for 13).

And that batch of extra orders results in the cancellation of 5 cruisers that had been in the initial Programme. That generates the capacity to construct the machinery for 10 light fleets.

By this time the carrier requirement at Jan 1944 was seen as 16 fleet of which only 4 would be available (plus the old Argus, Furious & Eagle which were all worn out) with the two Implacables about to complete / building. And 1 fleet carrier = 2 light fleets. Against that background it was decided to order another 3 light fleets. So we get to the eventual total of 16 light fleets.

So at that point, late 1942, the Admiralty have the prospect of 6 fleet (Illustrious/Implacables) plus the 1940 improved Implacable (Irresistible reordered as the Audacious class Ark Royal) plus 2 Audacious (1942 Programme Audacious and Eagle) and 16 1942 Programme light fleets (equivalent to 8 fleet carriers). A grand total of 17 fleet carrier equivalents vs the perceived requirement for 16. At that point all the light fleets are expected to be in service by the end of 1945 with the first pair of Audacious class by March 1946. So the RN would finally have met its target not by early 1944 but by March 1946. That is still in time for the then estimated end of the Pacific war.

Order dates
14/3/42 - 3 ships Colossus, Edgar (later Perseus) and Glory
7/8/42 - 10 ships
16/10/42 - 2 ships Magnificent & Powerful at Harland & Wolff Belfast
7/12/42 - 1 ship Terrible at Devonport

These are then laid down between 1 June 1942 and Nov 1943 (8 in 1942 and 8 in 1943). Only 3 of these are after the order for the Hermes class were issued in July 1943 (see below).

There were delays in building these Colossus light fleet carriers due to changing priotities after they were laid down. So VA Tyne, Harland & Wolff, Hawthorn Leslie, Stephens, Fairfield & VA Barrow all received orders for LST(3) between Dec 1943 and Feb 1944 while they all still had light carriers in the yards and sometimes even on the slips. These had a high priority as they were needed for the 1945 far east campaigns and it was clear that the US was not willing to supply RN needs. That was not forseen until late 1943. The various yards also faced competing priorities for destroyers and submarines.

In terms of the actual completion dates, it is true that only 5 completed as carriers plus 1 as an aircraft maintenance ship before the end of the war, but even in March 1945 the Admiralty was expecting another 5 carriers and the remaining 1 aircraft maintenance ship by the end of the year with the remaining 4 carriers by June 1946. Having looked at the build times of the earlier ships and comments about the state of completion of the later ships in Aug 1945 then it is conceivable that, with one exception, completion dates would have slipped only another couple of months from that estimate. But even that one ship, Hercules at VA Tyne, should have been able to be completed by the end of 1946. The big issue is the postwar slowdown in the yards. The 5 wartime completed carriers took an average of 29 months from lay down to completion (26-33 months). The next 3 (Theseus, Warrior & Triumph) averaged 39 months (37-39 months). 7 of the 10 average months extra was after the hulls were launched and some 6 months of that for each ship was after March 1945, the last time I have data. For example, the RCN were planning to have both Warrior and Magnificent completed by the end of the year so that they could be in the Pacific in the first half of 1946. When you see photos of Magnificent lying at Harland and Wolff Belfast in 1946/47 she doesn't seem that far away from completion when laid up. 7 of the 8 squadrons for the air groups for the next 4 completions had formed between 1 Feb and 1 Aug 1945. The RN policy had been for this to happen only a few months (usually 3-6 months) before the parent carrier was due to be ready.

The two aircraft maintenance ships make an interesting comparison. The decision to convert them was not taken until around Dec 1943 while both were still on the slips. Pioneer completed first despite having been laid down 6 months later. Her build time was 26 months. Perseus took 41 months. Most of the extra time was after she was launched. There are reports that VA Tyne had a particular shortage of electrians in 1944, something that affected other yards from time to time in wartime Britain.

In terms of their reaching the combat zone, their work up in the Med in 1945 was extended, much to the frustration of their aircrews, by the lack of a sufficiently large Fleet Train with the British Pacific Fleet to support them in Pacific operations. Ultimately plans would have seen the first 3 (maybe 4) undertake operations in the South China Sea starting late Aug 1945. That deficiency probably added 3-4 months to their work up time.

1943 Light Fleet Carrier (Hermes Class)
The limits for the new generation of aircraft weren't produced until the end of 1942 at which point it became clear that a new light carrier design would be required to accomodate them. If ordered mid-1943 it was hoped they could be laid down between Dec 1943 and Sept 1944 for completion in 1946. The Admiralty Staff Requirement for them was dated 2 April 1943 and the first sketch design 29 May 1943. The initial design was for an 18,000 ton ship, based around a half set of Audacious machinery able to carry 18 TBR and 6 FF or 24 FF. The next generation of aircraft included the 1943 Fairey Spearfish. Then the modifications began. A design was not finally approved until Feb 1944 but I don't know exactly what form it took relative to the May 1943 sketch. So the 8 orders placed in July/Aug 1943 were no more than placeholders in the yards. That design was further modified in 1947 before work recommenced on the ships after their postwar suspension.


And the same competing priorities were still there in 1943/44 as in 1942. At VA Barrow the choice was a 1943 light fleet or more submarines for example.

The 1943 light carriers proved controversial from the start. Almost immediately there emerged an argument between the politicians, in the form of the First Lord, and the sailors, in the form of the Sea Lords. Were they ships for this war or peacetime? The compromise was to build 4 and postpone the others meantime.

By Jan 1944 4 were scheduled to proceed and it was hoped to start another ship in each of Q1 & Q2 of 1945 with the last pair (Monmouth and Polyphemus at Fairfield and Devonport) postponed until they did not interfere with other production. Even in March 1944 just as the first, Albion at Swan Hunter, was being laid down her completion date was predicted to be Aug 1946 with the rest following in 1947. And of course completion dates continued to slip to the right. So by then they really do become post war / peacetime ships.

And then you have capacity problems in the yards again. Monmouth at Fairfield had been one of the ships initially chosen to proceed back in 1943. But in the end, in early 1945, she was replaced by Bulwark at H&W which was laid down about a year after the other 3 that eventually were built. But she was laid down (in May 1945) on the same slip as Powerful was launched from (in Feb) with an LST occupying part of the slip until Sept. Could that have been forseen in mid-1943 allowing Bulwark to be laid down in Nov 1943 instead of Powerful? The 1943 light fleet carrier design was not sufficiently advanced at that point to allow that to happen.

Centaur, also at Harland & Wolff, was laid down (30/5/44) 10 days after the launch of Warrior (laid down 19/12/42) from the same slip. So again impossible to bring forward.

Conclusion
Proceeding with the 16 (reduced to 14) 1942 light fleet carriers was a sound decision at the time it was made based on good research. But no one could predict the shifting priorities and shortages in the yards and elsewhere in wartime that would delay service entry.

Could the design process behind the 1943 carrier been compressed? 10 monhs from Staff Requirement to approved design. The 1942 light fleet carrier took about 12 months from revised proposals being sent to the DNC for a hybrid carrier in Jan 1941 to the finalisation of a pure light fleet carrier in Feb 1942. Maybe a few months but I doubt it would be enough to allow them to enter service even in the first half of 1946.
 
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More Centaurs can only be a bonus in the (very) long term when
- Rebuilding of the Illustrious / Implacables / Indomitable "six" proves a nightmare (Victorious)
- Ark Royal and Eagle agonize until the 1970's with half baked rebuilds at horrible cost.
Invest on the Centaurs (eventually with Harriers) the right way and the RN has no need to build new carriers until the end of Cold War ! (and yes, this encompass both CVA-01 and Invincibles).
Well more Centaurs is most convenient for the smaller powers that got used Colossus/Majestic class ships as well. My understanding is you can't get a Br.1120/Mirage F1M class aircraft operating off a Majestic can you? You could off a Centaur. But given the machinery constraints you'd be exchanging 2 Colossus for each Centaur. How do you convince the admiralty to exchange 6 carriers capable of carrying 37 aircraft each for 3 carrying 42 each during the war? Looks unlikely to me.

Too bad. I'd like a viable scenario with high performance not V/STOL aircraft usable from light carriers.

Indeed, how would a larger Veinticinco de Mayo have served Argentina in 1982...aumining no change elswhere.
 

Implacable class
The delays in their completion were largely before they were launched. Indefatigable suffered a period of suspension in 1940. Fairfields had an insufficiently large workforce to allow her to be progressed for about 10 months in 1940/41. In both yards repairs were prioritised over new build in 1940/41 and destroyers were prioritised over the carriers in 1941/42. John Brown were told to prioritise the build of the monitor Roberts (ordered March 1940, laid down April, launched Feb 1941) over that of Indefatigable in 1940/41 which was building on the next slip between the launch of DoY and laying down of Vanguard. And then we had the design changes that were made to the ships in the light of war experience which, when you study the design, included many changes to the forward hull to accomadate the wider lift.

Prioritsie a monitor over a carrier??
 
The limits for the new generation of aircraft weren't produced until the end of 1942 at which point it became clear that a new light carrier design would be required to accomodate them.
And this is part of where it is arguably possible to have forseen this much earlier. Strictly such could have been considered as extension of trends in RAF aircraft. Such as Spitfire, Whirlwind, Beaufort Mosquito etc.... possibly as early as 1938 and certainly by 1942.

Arguably the continuation of high scale production of Cruiser plant for the 1942 Light Fleet Carrier was a mistake and manufacture of more Capital Ship Plant would be of more benefit. Delays yes but not impossible and not beyond achieve-ability.
 
The limits for the new generation of aircraft weren't produced until the end of 1942 at which point it became clear that a new light carrier design would be required to accomodate them.
And this is part of where it is arguably possible to have forseen this much earlier. Strictly such could have been considered as extension of trends in RAF aircraft. Such as Spitfire, Whirlwind, Beaufort Mosquito etc.... possibly as early as 1938 and certainly by 1942.
When you look at the Specs issued for naval aircraft from 1938, it is surprising how few there are until 1943. Barracuda was 1937. In 1938-40 the search is for carrier fighters that culminate, after cancelled specs and interim purchases (Fulmar & Sea Gladiator) in Firefly and Firebrand orders in 1940. With the exception of N.1/41 for a naval version of the Miles M.20 in mid-1941, it is 1943 before new specs for naval aircraft begin to emerge. These lead to the Seafire XV, Sea Fury X & Spearfish. In that time we have the handover of the FAA from RAF to RN control and the outbreak of war that sees FAA needs bumped down the priority list for British aircraft production, leading to the need to rely on US naval aircraft.

Let's look at those new limits in more detail. From Friedman British Carrier Aviation.

1. take off distance 500ft (up from 350ft) with 20 knots of wind over the deck (down from 27 knots)
2. all future aircraft to be equipped for RATOG to overcome accelerator / catapult limits
3. folded width up to 27ft (previous limit 18ft but 1940 fighter designs were supposed to be 13.5ft)
4. allowable span 60ft (up from 50ft)
5. max height tail down 17ft (with max height to unfold 20.25ft between the beams in Ark Royal lower hangar)
6. max weight 30,000lb (up from 11,000lb)
7. stall speed 75 knots (meaning all future arrester and accelerator gear would have to accomodate that)

Take off distance - both the Albacore (1936 spec) & Barracuda (1937 spec) were designed around 200ft with 20 knots WOD so I'm not sure where the 27 knots Friedman quotes comes from. In 1940 this was relaxed to 300ft for the Firefly and 350ft for the Firebrand, both at 20 knots.

RATOG - Well using this does mean less worry about the ships flight deck equipment becoming obsolete due to increasing aircraft weights.

Folded width - 18ft allowed 3 abreast in hanagrs of Ark Royal III and Illustrious classes. 13.5ft allowed 4 abreast in the latter. The new limit of 27ft would only allow 2 abreast even in the Audacious class unless some judicious juggling could be done. Avenger was 19ft. Not sure where the USN was going. Spearfish was to be 20ft per the spec.

Allowable span - this depended on the width of the flight deck abreast the island for free take offs. Relaxation became possible with the larger Audacious and Hermes classes.

Max height - driven by the need to match US carrier hangars with a height of 17.5ft in view of liklihood of operating US designed aircraft. RN carriers generally had 14-16ft hangar height until the Colossus class..

Max weight - a recognition that aircraft were getting heavier and that carrier flight deck equipment needed to become more capable.

But just how forseeable was that weight growth? By 1940 the RN was recognising the issue in the Firebrand spec (increased to 12,500lb). At that time the USN was ordering the SBD (max weight of SBD-3 was 10,400lb). It is only with the next generation that weight begins to rise sharply (SB2C-1 16,607lb having been designed initially around 10,000lb in 1938/39. TBF-1 ordered April 1940 15,905lb). By this time the RN is struggling to get even aircraft like the Barracuda into service (design target 10,500lb in 1937. 14,250lb on service entry in 1943).

The British BH.III accelerator fitted in the Illustrious and Colossus classes was steadily upgraded as the war went on from the initial 11,000lb at 66 knots to 16,000lb at 66 knots using the trolley or 20,000lb at 56 knots using a bridle for tail down launching.

But the same process went on in the USN. The H-2 catapult fitted in the Yorktown class and early CVE was rated at 7,000lb at 61 knots initially. The H-4 in the Essex class and later CVE started life at 11,000lb at 74 knots but was upgraded to 16,000lb at 74 knots in 1943/44.

Arrester gear in both navies increased in its capacity to deal with increased aircraft weight as the war went on.

Stall speeds - Albacore & Barracuda were designed around a requirement for 58 knots. By 1940 this had been relaxed to 68 knots for Firefly & Firebrand.

When it comes to aircraft weights the RAF suffered the same weight growth problems in at least some of the aircraft it selected for production in the period leading up to WW2 which meant that they were entering service underpowered. So I'm not sure that asking them for advice would do much good.
 
EwenS as usual provides a much fuller and detailed response to illustrate the points I was making.
Proceeding with the 16 (reduced to 14) 1942 light fleet carriers was a sound decision at the time it was made based on good research. But no one could predict the shifting priorities and shortages in the yards and elsewhere in wartime that would delay service entry.
Delayed building programmes is par for the course during a major war. My point about the Implacable-class wasn't so much to lament the delay but that in reality building a fleet carrier takes the best part of 3-4 years at anytime, let alone during a war. Losses in 41-42 could never be made up until 45-46 at best. Had carrier losses for the RN continued at the same pace during 1943 then there might well have been a serious problem and there no doubt the 1942 Light Fleet was a sound attempt to get a decent carrier relatively quickly without having to resort to less effective expedients like trying to make Fiji hulls into CVLs for example (shuddering at the thought) given the Audacious-class would probably take the best part of the war to complete.

Designing a fleet carrier in 1943 was not easy - we can all appreciate the size and bulk of the resulting Malta that maxed out dock capacity. In that regard the Centaur looked a much cheaper option for a decent carrier that wouldn't break the bank or the available slips. But coming off the back of a mass Colossus building programme it raises the question of whether they were a luxury choice given by then the four Audacious were closer to completion.

When you look at the Specs issued for naval aircraft from 1938, it is surprising how few there are until 1943.
Beaverbrook's 1940 halt to all but 6 main types certainly stopped any FAA progress in its tracks. Whether this was positive or negative impact depends on your point of view I guess. Certainly it allowed the FAA to jump to bigger and heavier hardware to replace its pre-war designs and tap into the bigger piston powerplants then coming into delayed maturity (plus by 1944 a surprisingly larger number of piston-jet hybrids than the RAF considered). But surprisingly few of those 1943 types actually made it to production. Luckily, as you say, plentiful US supply plugged any gaps.
 
Designing a fleet carrier in 1943 was not easy - we can all appreciate the size and bulk of the resulting Malta that maxed out dock capacity. In that regard the Centaur looked a much cheaper option for a decent carrier that wouldn't break the bank or the available slips. But coming off the back of a mass Colossus building programme it raises the question of whether they were a luxury choice given by then the four Audacious were closer to completion.

There were only 3 Audacious class "closer to completion".

Short version. The "fleet aircraft carrier" (no specific mention of class) ordered from Fairfield in July 1943 was never progressed beyond a placeholder order before cancellation in Oct 1945.

The cancellation of Eagle from VA Tyne in Dec 1945 divided opinion within the Admiralty. The sailors wanted to cancel her while the aviators wanted to keep her. But she was only 26% complete and required another £5.5m to be spent. And so the sailors won! In the Dec 1945 round of cancellations, only the cancellation of 4 cruisers on which no work had begun saved more money.
 
There were only 3 Audacious class "closer to completion".

Short version. The "fleet aircraft carrier" (no specific mention of class) ordered from Fairfield in July 1943 was never progressed beyond a placeholder order before cancellation in Oct 1945.
Ah yes, I was quoting from mis-memory of their being four Audacious, given all the interminable swapping of contracts in 44-45 that's a dangerous thing to do!
 
I often wonder about that third Audacious class carrier...

Designing a fleet carrier in 1943 was not easy - we can all appreciate the size and bulk of the resulting Malta that maxed out dock capacity. In that regard the Centaur looked a much cheaper option for a decent carrier that wouldn't break the bank or the available slips. But coming off the back of a mass Colossus building programme it raises the question of whether they were a luxury choice

This. A hundred percent. In a sense the Centaurs were a much better option than the six Illustrious-Indomitable-Implacable - to bridge the gap between Majestic and Audacious...
With perfect 100% hindsight of course.
 
Well more Centaur-class carriers is most convenient for the smaller powers that got used Colossus/Majestic-class ships as well.
Depends, can they afford them? A larger size and capability generally equates to larger crew sizes and running costs.
 
Well more Centaur-class carriers is most convenient for the smaller powers that got used Colossus/Majestic-class ships as well.
Depends, can they afford them? A larger size and capability generally equates to larger crew sizes and running costs.
They do. By the same token though, it is potentially easier to justify. 20 Mirage F1M on a Centaur come 1975 look, emphasis on look, a more potent force than Skyhawks on a Colossus against enemies with supersonic jets of their own.
 
20 Mirage F1M on a Centaur come 1975 look, emphasis on look, a more potent force than Skyhawks on a Colossus

Potentially. Back in the day I’d drawn up a Centaur with Mirages (the swing wing Mirage G) and compared it with a Colossus with Skyhawks.

The result was the Centaur looked marginally better but still could only operate ~18 fighters once you leave enough space for some AEW/ASW aircraft/helos.

Centaur-Mirage-G.jpg


Colossus_CVL.jpg
 
The Mirage G is the closest thing from a MiG-23 the West ever had. Except it was better. It combined a big and massive SNECMA TF306 (cured of many lethal flaws) and Dassault savoir faire. End result: it touched down at 108 kt only, for a 16 tons aircraft.
Could have been a world beater, but was always a one-off demonstrator for larger, twin engine types - also an AFVG killer.
Still the USN and Vought grew very interested in it, in the summer 1969. They even asked Dassault if he could build three more Mirage G for a (not unlike P.1127) "test squadron" at Patuxent River.
The Aéronavale also wanted it but had little money: the Jaguar M and later the S.E sucked every penny (goddam sexual innuendo, no, it wasn't deliberate LMAO)
 
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The Mirage G is the closest thing from a MiG-23 the West ever had. Except it was better.
Agreed. That said I think the Mirage F1 was the right call.

Why? Because the Mirage G’s swing-wing / turbofan combo compromised fighter performance in certain key areas (high altitude / supersonic / pulling Gs etc). Would have made a great striker though… MiG 27 or Su-17/22 like.

Certainly for naval use the G would have had good arguments vs. the F1M… sadly neither was pursued.
 
No the VG wing is nearly as good as a similar fixed delta for altitude and speed.

The closer ideal for fixed wing would be the Mirage F2 and F3 variants. F1 was a bit too small.

However the Mirage G has a better bringback load/recovery speed and is essentially safer.

Shame Vought didn't get it's way there.

18 Mirage G is not to be sniffed at....depending on the avionics.
 
No the VG wing is nearly as good as a similar fixed delta for altitude and speed.
Perhaps, but what I meant was that the TF-306 turbofan probably wasn’t that hot at high altitude / supersonic compared to a pure turbojet like the Atar.

Add the weight penalty of the heavy engine and swing wing mechanism, plus g limitations, and the Mirage G’s real world performance as a fighter probably degraded pretty quickly in anything but a straight level dash.
 
The ability of either the British or French navies to pay for and crew aircraft carriers reduces as World War Two recedes.
By 1962 the British can only operate four ships as full carriers which is why Bulwark and Albion can be spared to operate as commando ships rather than be upgraded to Hermes standards or used like Centaur with Sea Vixens
France has a similar problem which is why only two carriers (Foch/Clemenceau) serve and only one replaces them (DeGaulle).
By 1972 the RN can only crew one carrier and one commando ship in service.
Even if Centaur hulls rather than command/through deck cruisers had been retained or built as a new design a maximum of three ships could be built and for much of the time only one would be in service.
France's experience with the DeGaulle is similar to what might have happened if CVA01 had entered service in 1972.
Fewer SSNs and escort ships (T42/22) could have been afforded)crewed.
I make these points to highlight the reason why both Britain and France have consistently gone for the most capable carrier design they could afford.
I include the cruiser rather than carrier hull Invincible class in this because they were optimised to provide NATO SACLANT's two US carrier groups with the most effective ASW cover possible. Centaurs with S3 Vikings might have been better but the UK could not afford them and the big US CVs carried the same number anyway.
 
The French Navy very badly wanted a third carrier: after the now well-known PA.58 (45 000 tons in 1958) they tried a strictly third clone of Foch & Clem in 1959, all 35 000 tons of it. Unfortunately the Force de Frappe had started sucking all the french military budget into a black hole. Instead the Arromanches was kept in service until 1974 as a "swiss knife carrier": LPH, ASW, training, hospital / crisis ship... it was pretty good in that role, as it kept its catapults (unlike the British Centaurs) and thus Alizés had a third deck they could use, plus helicopters of course and a peculiar guest: the naval Fouga Magister, called the CM-175 Zephyr.

arromanches8698.jpg


Funnily enough while Crusaders and Etendards were out of Arromanches reach, it was that very ship that ferried all 42 Crusaders in 1963-64.
 
The only way I could see larger Light Fleet Carriers happening is if the existing ships are transferred or lost during the war, requiring all Centaurs to be constructed urgently and perhaps followed by an even larger evolution.

There was the major structural damage to Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable, that potentially could have been identified much earlier, perhaps during US refits/ repairs, meaning the RN is aware that these ships need to be replaced. This means the RN knows they will only have Victorious, Implacable and Indefatigable capable of extra service post war.

Implacable and Indefatigable were apparently offered for transfer to Australia due to crewing issues, I believe this was during construction and had this been accepted the Australian crews would have commissioned them in 44 instead of RN crews. Potentially the RN could have been aware by late 43, early 44 that they would only have one of the original Armoured Fleet Carriers for extensive post war service.

The RN was rethinking the design of the Maltas, uncertain of the long term viability of the Audacious, the 1942 Fleets were already seen as too small, and maybe this is enough for all eight 1943 light fleets to proceed and a new larger design developed to follow them. There was a post war financial crunch and a lot of wartime construction was suspended or cancelled, but plans were also in place assuming two fleets, each with multiple carriers and proposals for carriers and large destroyers to replace many station cruisers,
 
The only way I could see larger Light Fleet Carriers happening is if the existing ships are transferred or lost during the war, requiring all Centaurs to be constructed urgently and perhaps followed by an even larger evolution.

There was the major structural damage to Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable, that potentially could have been identified much earlier, perhaps during US refits/ repairs, meaning the RN is aware that these ships need to be replaced. This means the RN knows they will only have Victorious, Implacable and Indefatigable capable of extra service post war.

Implacable and Indefatigable were apparently offered for transfer to Australia due to crewing issues, I believe this was during construction and had this been accepted the Australian crews would have commissioned them in 44 instead of RN crews. Potentially the RN could have been aware by late 43, early 44 that they would only have one of the original Armoured Fleet Carriers for extensive post war service.

The RN was rethinking the design of the Maltas, uncertain of the long term viability of the Audacious, the 1942 Fleets were already seen as too small, and maybe this is enough for all eight 1943 light fleets to proceed and a new larger design developed to follow them. There was a post war financial crunch and a lot of wartime construction was suspended or cancelled, but plans were also in place assuming two fleets, each with multiple carriers and proposals for carriers and large destroyers to replace many station cruisers,

These stories about "major structural damage" to the Illustrious class persist but there is no evidence that war damage went unrepaired in any but perhaps Formidable, where the position is not clear.

Illustrious was in refit at Rosyth from June 1945. The last damage she suffered in the Pacific in April 1945 from a near miss by a kamikaze was repaired as part of that and she returned to the fleet in August 1946. She then went on to serve as a trials and training carrier until Feb 1955 when she was paid of until sold for scrap that Nov.

Formidable was refitted and laid up in "maintained" reserve at Rosyth in March 1946 after her trooping duties were complete. There she lay until being towed to Spithead in 1949. At that point she was earmarked as the first of the Illustrious / Implacable class to undergo modernisation, probably because she was the ship that was immediately available. Her hull was surveyed and found to be in a "poor material state". I've never found any explanation of that statement beyond a lack of maintenance in the intervening years. In particular I've never found any mention of hull damage from her wartime years.

Indomitable was engaged in trooping duties until Jan 1947 then refitted and laid up. In 1950 she was given a limited modernisation and became operational again. She was only taken out of service in May 1953 before being scrapped in 1955.

There were however recurring centre shaft and rudder problems with the 3 screw ships both during and after the war. But that seems to be related to design issues rather than war damage.

So there was plenty of time to identify problems with these ships and yet 2 of the 3 saw extensive service postwar. Initial plans for modernisation were for all 6 ships starting with the 3 Illustrious class (the most numerous so greatest payback from the design work), moving onto the Implacables and finally Indomitable to a lesser standard. Illustrious couldn't be spared from her role. Formidable had her problems so Vic went first to modernisation. Then attention turned to Implacable before the whole project got shelved.

So if you have any evidence to support your statement about lasting major structural damage I'd like to hear about it because, as I said above, it would be new to me.

AIUI there never was "an offer" to transfer either Implacable or Indefatigable to Australia either during or after the war.

The proposal to acquire a carrier or carriers arose in Australia when the then RAN Chief of the Naval Staff was formulating plans in late 1943 / early 1944 about the shape of the RAN going forward. The discussions at that stage were about a "carrier" (type unspecified) to be acquired by Australia. In May 1944 when the matter was discussed in London, Churchill offered a Colossus class, with Venerable (available Dec 1944) plus 2 cruisers being discussed. In the interim an escort carrier could be provided on loan to give the RAN experience. At that point a decision was deferred by Australia. The main issue was that the RAN too had a manning problem. And Australia wanted these ships transferred without payment. In June 1945 Australia decided not to proceed with acquiring the ships.

The next proposal to acquire carriers arose in Australia in Feb 1946 as the shape of the post-war RAN was being discussed. That resulted in a request to the Admiralty for two CVL, with the first to be available in 1947. The Admiralty then offered two Majestic class in Sept 1946 which was accepted by Australia in June 1947.
 
The only way I could see larger Light Fleet Carriers happening is if the existing ships are transferred or lost during the war, requiring all Centaurs to be constructed urgently and perhaps followed by an even larger evolution.

There was the major structural damage to Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable, that potentially could have been identified much earlier, perhaps during US refits/ repairs, meaning the RN is aware that these ships need to be replaced. This means the RN knows they will only have Victorious, Implacable and Indefatigable capable of extra service post war.

Implacable and Indefatigable were apparently offered for transfer to Australia due to crewing issues, I believe this was during construction and had this been accepted the Australian crews would have commissioned them in 44 instead of RN crews. Potentially the RN could have been aware by late 43, early 44 that they would only have one of the original Armoured Fleet Carriers for extensive post war service.

The RN was rethinking the design of the Maltas, uncertain of the long term viability of the Audacious, the 1942 Fleets were already seen as too small, and maybe this is enough for all eight 1943 light fleets to proceed and a new larger design developed to follow them. There was a post war financial crunch and a lot of wartime construction was suspended or cancelled, but plans were also in place assuming two fleets, each with multiple carriers and proposals for carriers and large destroyers to replace many station cruisers,

These stories about "major structural damage" to the Illustrious class persist but there is no evidence that war damage went unrepaired in any but perhaps Formidable, where the position is not clear.

Illustrious was in refit at Rosyth from June 1945. The last damage she suffered in the Pacific in April 1945 from a near miss by a kamikaze was repaired as part of that and she returned to the fleet in August 1946. She then went on to serve as a trials and training carrier until Feb 1955 when she was paid of until sold for scrap that Nov.

Formidable was refitted and laid up in "maintained" reserve at Rosyth in March 1946 after her trooping duties were complete. There she lay until being towed to Spithead in 1949. At that point she was earmarked as the first of the Illustrious / Implacable class to undergo modernisation, probably because she was the ship that was immediately available. Her hull was surveyed and found to be in a "poor material state". I've never found any explanation of that statement beyond a lack of maintenance in the intervening years. In particular I've never found any mention of hull damage from her wartime years.

Indomitable was engaged in trooping duties until Jan 1947 then refitted and laid up. In 1950 she was given a limited modernisation and became operational again. She was only taken out of service in May 1953 before being scrapped in 1955.

There were however recurring centre shaft and rudder problems with the 3 screw ships both during and after the war. But that seems to be related to design issues rather than war damage.

So there was plenty of time to identify problems with these ships and yet 2 of the 3 saw extensive service postwar. Initial plans for modernisation were for all 6 ships starting with the 3 Illustrious class (the most numerous so greatest payback from the design work), moving onto the Implacables and finally Indomitable to a lesser standard. Illustrious couldn't be spared from her role. Formidable had her problems so Vic went first to modernisation. Then attention turned to Implacable before the whole project got shelved.

So if you have any evidence to support your statement about lasting major structural damage I'd like to hear about it because, as I said above, it would be new to me.

AIUI there never was "an offer" to transfer either Implacable or Indefatigable to Australia either during or after the war.

The proposal to acquire a carrier or carriers arose in Australia when the then RAN Chief of the Naval Staff was formulating plans in late 1943 / early 1944 about the shape of the RAN going forward. The discussions at that stage were about a "carrier" (type unspecified) to be acquired by Australia. In May 1944 when the matter was discussed in London, Churchill offered a Colossus class, with Venerable (available Dec 1944) plus 2 cruisers being discussed. In the interim an escort carrier could be provided on loan to give the RAN experience. At that point a decision was deferred by Australia. The main issue was that the RAN too had a manning problem. And Australia wanted these ships transferred without payment. In June 1945 Australia decided not to proceed with acquiring the ships.

The next proposal to acquire carriers arose in Australia in Feb 1946 as the shape of the post-war RAN was being discussed. That resulted in a request to the Admiralty for two CVL, with the first to be available in 1947. The Admiralty then offered two Majestic class in Sept 1946 which was accepted by Australia in June 1947.
What you have written is correct but not the whole story. For instance multiple carriers were discussed for wartime transfer, the first being Hermes before her loss, Ocean was also mentioned before it became more an issue of formulating a post war RAN rather than an RAN contribution to the BPF.

The transfer of Implacable and Indefatigable to Australia is in my hard copy library but it has been discussed online as well. I have seen both Australian crewed and transferred mentioned. A major sticking point was the PM was left out of the loop and another was the assumption that Australia was not charging for the services and logistics support being provided to the BPF. When Australia started talking about payment, the UK stopped talking about transfers.

As for the structural damage, I am surprised that you are demanding evidence to support the statement. One of the well known effects of the armoured hangar, was, despite its advantages, once it was distorted such as occurred in Illustrious' bombing and the torpedoing of the other two, there was no economical way to fix it. Once distortion of the hangar was identified it would have been pointless to have planned to life extend the ships and more sensible to replace them. Are you suggesting the widely reported and referenced distortion did not in fact occur?

I am not suggesting that the armoured hangar concept was wrong, as the ships could often fight on or be repaired and returned to service, rather I am saying that being aware of difficult, and expensive to fix distortion of the hangar, would have made new build, large light fleets a more attractive proposition that modifying the armoured ships to use larger aircraft.
 
With regard to the damage I don't believe that it was considered so bad as to prevent their reconstruction as some of your statements don't fit with the damage that these ships suffered during wartime.

1947 the Admiralty planned to modernise all 6 Illustrious / Implacables in the order Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, Illustrious, Implacable and finally Indefatigable. With regard to the selection of the first ship for modernisation Friedman notes (with my emphasis):-

"Formidable was laid up and required a long refit in any case, so she was provisionally selected for modernisation. Illustrious was a deck landing training and trials carrier, and could not be spared, particularly as she was needed to test the new generation of naval aircraft. This left HMS Victorious as the only other candidate."

As previously noted Formidable was rejected in 1949 following an inspection that found her to be in a "poor material state". In Friedman's "The Postwar Naval Revolution" he quotes an unidentified source as describing her as being "in an indifferent state structurally, mechanically, and electronically", after a comment that "Only later was it discovered that she had suffered irremediable structural damage", but again without a source.

By early 1951 the modernisation programme was reduced to Victorious, to be followed in 1953-55 by Implacable and then Indefatigable in 1954-57. Indomitable was then scheduled for a "more limited modernisation" in 1957 as the future deck landing training ship.

"The big modernisation programme was stopped in 1952 with HMS Victorious, when it became apparent that reconstruction was too expensive."

So the reasons given do not involve the wartime damage to either Illustrious or Indomitable.

Having dug deeper into my library to refresh my memory, both Hobbs & Brown comment that Formidable still carried the scars of wartime service in the shape of "a distorted flight deck, propellor shaft defects and a considerable amount of internal structure that had been damaged by kamikaze and fire in 1945 but only hastily repaired or painted over". Hobbs says she had been in "unmaintained reserve" since 1947 which is contrary to other sources. The shaft damage may be due to the design issues or to the bomb damage that she suffered off Crete by a bomb that passed through X gundeck to explode in the water alongside her stern. Friedman notes about her " It was later said that she had suffered permanent hull distortion due to the shock effects of these hits" but then provides no reference that this was the case. Why not if it is available?

But the modernisation involved stripping the ships to the hangar deck anyway so how much of a hindrance was the flight deck / hangar damage really? It seems that cost of a deeper refit was the reason for her being taken out of the programme, which according to Friedman would have had to have included a retubing of the boilers that would have taken 6 months.

And if the damage was discovered in 1949 to be so bad as to have her considered for scrapping in 1951 according to Friedman in "The Postwar Naval Revolution", why was the RN even considering her as a double ended Seaslug fitted fleet escort ship in 1951? Frankly none of the comments seem to bring any clarity to her true condition. And see below for my comments about her actual damage in WW2.

The armoured hangar complicated repairs but how many of the ships actually suffered serious damage to that? And remember that the lift spaces were not part of the armoured hangar itself and that the only armour around those spaces was 1.5" on the flight deck with the lifts themselves being unarmoured.

Illustrious off Malta in 1941. Severe damage to the after part of the hangar and the deck beneath it.

Formidable was not torpedoed. The bomb damage off Crete was fore and aft of the hangar itself. The aft hit passed through X gundeck and exploded alongside her stern, which may account for some of her later shaft problems. Off Okinawa the only damage below hangar deck level was from a splinter from the armoured flight deck that penetrated the boiler room. But again I ask, what difference does this make if the ship itself needs stripped to the hanagr deck anyway to be modernised.

Indomitable 's bomb hits in Aug 1942 were again fore and aft of the hangar (the only hangar damage was due to a small petrol fire in the forward end). Her torpedo damage in 1943 was just ahead of the forward end of the lower hangar deck, and was confined to the boiler rooms and side compartments. It hit the lower edge of her armoured belt.

Indefatigable received probably the worst kamikaze damage after Formidable (a steep hit into the flight deck at the base of the island that dented the flight deck to a depth of 3 inches and the wrecking of part of the island) but we never hear of problems with her.

So given all of that you will perhaps understand why I am so sceptical about your comment that:-

"There was the major structural damage to Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable, that potentially could have been identified much earlier, perhaps during US refits/ repairs, meaning the RN is aware that these ships need to be replaced."

Like many ships in WW2 the Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable carried battle scars. But I'm struggling to find that as the reason for their not being modernised, with the possible exception of Formidable. And then how much was due to her being tied up and seemingly left to rust. The other 5 Illustrious / Implacable class all saw significant service postwar even if it was only, in some cases, in the lowly role as training ships.
 
Instead the Arromanches was kept in service until 1974 as a "swiss knife carrier": LPH, ASW, training, hospital / crisis ship...
David Hobbs makes an argument that it was silly of the Admiralty not to have retained a couple of Colossus/Majestic-class carriers as helicopter carriers instead of the Escort Cruiser concept that he pretty well lambasts on several counts.
There is some merit in that refitting two of these would have been better than converting Tiger and Blake but even so the Centaur Commando conversions were probably still superior given the additional room for accommodation. And given the manpower issues its likely the RN couldn't keep Antique Royal, four Centaurs and two Colossi going through the 1970s so something has to give.

HMS Formidable was found to have a "distorted flight deck" (quoting from Hobbs) plus much of the fire damage from the late-war Kamikaze hits had merely been painted up and never properly repaired so her material condition deteriorated rapidly while laid up in reserve. Plus the centreline shaft was suffering from mechanical problems.
But there is often no mention of how bad this "distortion" was or how much of the flight deck was affected. D. K. Brown goes into some details on how much punishment the armoured hangar carriers took during the war but he never mentions any serious structural defects resulting from them.
For HMS Formidable he lists:
25 Jun 1941 - 2 1,000lb bombs (550kg most likely), severely damaged underwater. Spall from flight deck armour penetrated centre M/C space. Brown doesn't elaborate on any effects on the hull following this.
4 & 9 May 1945 - 2 Kamikaze on flight deck.
One 9ft to port of CL Fr 79. Depression 24 x 20ft [presumably 480ft sq area?], hole 2ft sq. Deep beam buckled. 3 fragments pierced hangar deck, one went through boiler room to double bottom. Fully operational.
Second port of CL Fr 94. Deck depressed 4.5in, beam distorted 3in. Heavy fire in parked aircraft. Brown notes this hit might not have pierced even an unarmoured deck.

So of this damage, the Kamikaze hit of 4th May seems the most serious and certainly a 24ft section of the flight deck was damaged and deformed and at least one deck beam at Frame 79 was buckled.
Immediate repair was filling the dent by wood and concrete, covered by thin steel plates welded to the deck. At the end of the month she arrived at Garden Island for repairs. Two of the three armour plates were repaired, but the third was replaced by two 1.5in high-quality steel plates the necessary armour plating was not available in Australia.

If anything HMS Victorious had a worse Kamikaze hit on 9 May 1945; 3 Kamikaze hit, two caused no damage but the second hit at Fr 30 at junction of 4.5in and 1.5in D plates, 3in depression and pierced, 25sq ft hole, depression 144 sq ft, bulkhead buckled and accelerator broken. Brown notes the deck armour was "invaluable". Perhaps being so far forward prevented any worse structural damage, but its noteworthy that Victorious was never described as having a "distorted" deck.

Even assuming it was the near-misses in 1941 that damaged the hull and shock did warp her, it couldn't have been serious enough to prevent her operation given she had four more years of heavy wartime use. It certainly didn't stop the lifts running true on their rails for example.
 
David Hobbs makes an argument that it was silly of the Admiralty not to have retained a couple of Colossus/Majestic-class carriers as helicopter carriers instead of the Escort Cruiser concept that he pretty well lambasts on several counts.
There is some merit in that refitting two of these would have been better than converting Tiger and Blake but even so the Centaur Commando conversions were probably still superior given the additional room for accommodation. And given the manpower issues its likely the RN couldn't keep Antique Royal, four Centaurs and two Colossi going through the 1970s so something has to give.
Fascinating.

Readily agree that 2*Audacious + 4*Centaurs +2*Majestic would be perfectly unaffordable considering the many financial crisis GB endured between 1960 and 1980.

That's why I suggest to (somewhat) cut both ends and leave only the Centaurs in the middle - all four of them, same standard (Hermes was clearly the most capable of the lot) - including an attack wing of Buccaneers S.2.

Phantom vs Harrier for air defense is obviously a difficult step backward to take - even if, well, it WAS taken OTL (under severe duress, no other solution): from Phantoms to SHARs Mk.1 to SHARs mk.2.

Fact is that P.1127 leading to SHAR is available very early in the 1960's, so on paper at least it might be feasible to nip in the bud the entire and complete Spey Phantom saga.

And this bring us once again to the mythical P.1154. Here is one that could have married a Phantom and a SHAR under the same airframe - flying out of a HMS Hermes deck without too much trouble.

At the end of the day, in an ideal world and with perfect hindsight... wouldn't the best option for the 1961 RN future, be something akin to...

P.1154 and Buccaneer S.2 out of the four Centaurs upgraded to Hermes standard.

And screw everything else: Ark, Eagle, Escort cruisers, CVA-01, Phantom, AFVG, Tigers.
 
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With regard to the damage I don't believe that it was considered so bad as to prevent their reconstruction as some of your statements don't fit with the damage that these ships suffered during wartime.

1947 the Admiralty planned to modernise all 6 Illustrious / Implacables in the order Formidable, Victorious, Indomitable, Illustrious, Implacable and finally Indefatigable. With regard to the selection of the first ship for modernisation Friedman notes (with my emphasis):-

"Formidable was laid up and required a long refit in any case, so she was provisionally selected for modernisation. Illustrious was a deck landing training and trials carrier, and could not be spared, particularly as she was needed to test the new generation of naval aircraft. This left HMS Victorious as the only other candidate."

As previously noted Formidable was rejected in 1949 following an inspection that found her to be in a "poor material state". In Friedman's "The Postwar Naval Revolution" he quotes an unidentified source as describing her as being "in an indifferent state structurally, mechanically, and electronically", after a comment that "Only later was it discovered that she had suffered irremediable structural damage", but again without a source.

By early 1951 the modernisation programme was reduced to Victorious, to be followed in 1953-55 by Implacable and then Indefatigable in 1954-57. Indomitable was then scheduled for a "more limited modernisation" in 1957 as the future deck landing training ship.

"The big modernisation programme was stopped in 1952 with HMS Victorious, when it became apparent that reconstruction was too expensive."

So the reasons given do not involve the wartime damage to either Illustrious or Indomitable.

Having dug deeper into my library to refresh my memory, both Hobbs & Brown comment that Formidable still carried the scars of wartime service in the shape of "a distorted flight deck, propellor shaft defects and a considerable amount of internal structure that had been damaged by kamikaze and fire in 1945 but only hastily repaired or painted over". Hobbs says she had been in "unmaintained reserve" since 1947 which is contrary to other sources. The shaft damage may be due to the design issues or to the bomb damage that she suffered off Crete by a bomb that passed through X gundeck to explode in the water alongside her stern. Friedman notes about her " It was later said that she had suffered permanent hull distortion due to the shock effects of these hits" but then provides no reference that this was the case. Why not if it is available?

But the modernisation involved stripping the ships to the hangar deck anyway so how much of a hindrance was the flight deck / hangar damage really? It seems that cost of a deeper refit was the reason for her being taken out of the programme, which according to Friedman would have had to have included a retubing of the boilers that would have taken 6 months.

And if the damage was discovered in 1949 to be so bad as to have her considered for scrapping in 1951 according to Friedman in "The Postwar Naval Revolution", why was the RN even considering her as a double ended Seaslug fitted fleet escort ship in 1951? Frankly none of the comments seem to bring any clarity to her true condition. And see below for my comments about her actual damage in WW2.

The armoured hangar complicated repairs but how many of the ships actually suffered serious damage to that? And remember that the lift spaces were not part of the armoured hangar itself and that the only armour around those spaces was 1.5" on the flight deck with the lifts themselves being unarmoured.

Illustrious off Malta in 1941. Severe damage to the after part of the hangar and the deck beneath it.

Formidable was not torpedoed. The bomb damage off Crete was fore and aft of the hangar itself. The aft hit passed through X gundeck and exploded alongside her stern, which may account for some of her later shaft problems. Off Okinawa the only damage below hangar deck level was from a splinter from the armoured flight deck that penetrated the boiler room. But again I ask, what difference does this make if the ship itself needs stripped to the hanagr deck anyway to be modernised.

Indomitable 's bomb hits in Aug 1942 were again fore and aft of the hangar (the only hangar damage was due to a small petrol fire in the forward end). Her torpedo damage in 1943 was just ahead of the forward end of the lower hangar deck, and was confined to the boiler rooms and side compartments. It hit the lower edge of her armoured belt.

Indefatigable received probably the worst kamikaze damage after Formidable (a steep hit into the flight deck at the base of the island that dented the flight deck to a depth of 3 inches and the wrecking of part of the island) but we never hear of problems with her.

So given all of that you will perhaps understand why I am so sceptical about your comment that:-

"There was the major structural damage to Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable, that potentially could have been identified much earlier, perhaps during US refits/ repairs, meaning the RN is aware that these ships need to be replaced."

Like many ships in WW2 the Illustrious, Formidable and Indomitable carried battle scars. But I'm struggling to find that as the reason for their not being modernised, with the possible exception of Formidable. And then how much was due to her being tied up and seemingly left to rust. The other 5 Illustrious / Implacable class all saw significant service postwar even if it was only, in some cases, in the lowly role as training ships.
Fair call on Formidable, my bad, though Post War Naval Revolution notes is one of the references was thinking of, I have that volume in hard copy only so can't access quickly.

I am not knocking the armoured fleet carriers in any way, they served well and absorbed a lot of damage during their hard war service.

That's the thing, hard war service and battle damage, even ships that don't serve in combat suffer hogging and sagging, minor alignment issues become worse with time, there corrosion of different types in different locations, cracking, twisting. This isn't book knowledge in my case, I've worked in the industry for many years, sustainment as well as build, although I have also completed formal studies marine surveying and marine engineering on top of my mechanical and systems engineering specialities.

I'm not putting this here to brag, and I'm definitely not claiming special knowledge on the armoured fleets, most were all razor blades before I was born, I'm trying to give context to what I am saying.

Reality, I have worked with platforms that the powers that be were planning to modernise and life extend, that were structurally compromised at about half way through their initial planned life, that after huge sums were spent on them they only just made their initial life. I've worked on others that were generally believed to to be not worth proceeding with due to issues that are now expected to reach 40 years. What some politicians, admirals and others seem to believe is often little more than uninformed opinion. The cost of keeping shagged platforms in service is a killer, even upgrading pristine older platforms is often of questionable value as the returns on the expense are never as good as building new.

You seem to have a real issue with some of what I wrote but the facts are simple, when extensive surveys were undertaken an the extent of work realised, it did not make sense to modernise many older ships. They saw hard service, they suffered battle damage, refits and repairs were often compromises, these things alone reduce a ships economical service life, even with extensive repairs, modernisations and refurbishments/rebuilds. An earlier appreciation of this would have made other options more attractive, i.e. completing some of the perfectly good enough Centaurs to the original design, others to modified designs, and perhaps even evolving something larger.

Again I can't see what your issue is with my hypothetical response to a hypothetical proposition.
 
Could P.1154s been based and flown on, say, HMS Hermes ? How many could it carry ?
 
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