French airforce from 1935 to 1940-41?

In the case of the DB-7 it was proven the twin tail degraded performances.
And look at the (weird) twin tails on the LeO-451: they made the plane tricky to fly. The LeO was fast but it had dangerous landing characteristics and got a lot of crashes.
B-25: twin tail, excellent performance, good handling. The twin tails were a boon later on because was easy to install a taller "hood" for the tail gunner and make that installation far more effective.

Pe-2: twin tail, fast, fighter-like performance.

B-24: twin tail, made it simple to install a full powered turret in the tail with an absurdly huge cone of fire.

Avro Lancaster: see B-24

There was nothing inherently wrong with twin tails--Liore et Olivier simply did a bad job designing the 451.
 
The LN dive bombers were the closest thing from a Stuka France ever got.

Mind you, the Armée de l'Air started that program in 1937 only to dump it (and dive bombing) the next year, to the Aéronavale; and start the Breguet 690 series in its place.
The Aeronavale initiated the design work that eventually produced the LN.401 in 1932. The ill-fated program dragged on until a redesign replaced the fixed gear with fully retractable landing gear, along with many other refinements and improvements. The Adl'A came along for the ride when Stuka fever broke out.

And the Adl'A even stuck with the airframe--they just wanted a much faster, more powerful aircraft. The LN.42 was supposed to have a 1100hp 12Y.
The very Breguets that lost 8 out of 18 at their first raid against Panzers in Central Belgium on May 12, 1940.

Which brings the following points
- the Armée de l'Air never clearly defined how it intended to destroy panzers
D.510s making dive attacks and firing through the top armor of the tanks. When the D.510 was still a fairly modern aircraft, that it.

Sorry that I can't dig out a citation, but I found a diagram showing this in a manual or something when I was reading on Gallica. There was text explaining it as well.

In any case, any attempt would have been a failure. Operations research revealed that aircraft killed near-zero aircraft in Normandy in 1944. And that was and Allied air force that threatened to blot out the sun.

You don't use airpower to stop tank forces by blowing up tanks. You use airpower to blow up all of the logistics vehicles that that tanks can't operate without. Fuel, mechanics, spare parts ... See Ukraine, February 2022.

(The D.510 had the HS-7 or -9 cannon, but that was definitely powerful enough to blow through the 10mm or less top armor of the tanks of the period. The slugs would add about 200mph to their muzzle velocity for the speed of the aircraft, and they'd have gravity accelerating them to offset drag. It appears that the intent was that the M.S.405 or L.N.161 would have an anti-tank role, but it wasn't appreciated just how slick those aircraft were and how quickly they would get fast in a dive. Pulling out from the dive in time proved to be deadly for one test pilot, apparently.)
- Dive bombing with LN ?
- No "Stuka blietzkrieg" tactics like the Germans
- Nope, Breguet 690 at tree tops... right into the thick of the flak
This is hilariously wrong because it was the total lack of trees that did them in. The Br.693s were wrecked by flaks on their first mission because they were flying over the open plains of the Low Countries, following a road to their target. Unfortunately, the road had a long, long German column on it with Flak set up to protect it. The French pilots stuck to their designated target, which is the sort of error we always see in the opening phases of wars.

Once the fighting got to more forested and rolling ground, the approaches of the Breguets weren't completely exposed to flak. Unfortunately, the Adl'A seems never to have thought out the problem of "If I'm popping over a rise and catching them by surprise, how am I identifying the target in time to hit it?"
- final answer: surviving Breguets at 1000 to 2000 feet, semi-diving... but they had no bomb sights ! (facepalm).
Against fuel trucks and the rest of the logistical tail of a german tank regiment, the Breguet was a pretty good choice. A stick of eight 50kg bombs against a column on a road ...
On top of that, the few LN-401/411 dumped at the Navy were called to the rescue mid-May, along with the Vought V-156F "Wind indicator / Cheese cake"; five squadrons worth of dive bombers (three of Vought, two of LN) that were wiped out in three or four raids against bridges in northern France.
One squadron of Voughts was wiped out by a bombing of their hangar on Day 1
Second squadron was wiped out by flak, along LNs, on a couple of attacks on bridges
Third and last squadron was caught unescorted by 109Es and wiped out.
Unfortunately, the LN.401 was a truly terrible aircraft. I found the post-war parliamentary testimony the commander of one of the two (?) LN.401 units. He called it "A wonderful aircraft for peacetime flying."

It was grossly under-powered, with the earlier, less boosted version 12Xcrs. It was designed with a tail gunner, but he had to be cut from the design because it couldn't lift both the gunner and a bomb. I recently found an account from one pilot who recalled that they flew every mission at an overload weight, even though they didn't fill the ammunition drum for the cannon.

Pilots considered the Vought V-165F superior in every way. True, it lacked the powerful forward-firing armament, but that's not really the purpose of a dive-bomber.
 
B-25: twin tail, excellent performance, good handling. The twin tails were a boon later on because was easy to install a taller "hood" for the tail gunner and make that installation far more effective.

Pe-2: twin tail, fast, fighter-like performance.

B-24: twin tail, made it simple to install a full powered turret in the tail with an absurdly huge cone of fire.

Avro Lancaster: see B-24

There was nothing inherently wrong with twin tails--Liore et Olivier simply did a bad job designing the 451.
I should also mention that the single tail on the B-26 severely limited the ability of its top turret to engage fighters attacking from nearly 6 o'clock. The guns were mounted far enough apart the it was theoretically possible to have the bullets pass on either side of the fin when firing dead astern, but that would have been ... risky.

You also see a lot of dorsal positions where the gun in offset to one side so that it can fire dead astern. Unfortunately, this enlarges the total blind area, so that fighters approaching from astern, but slightly to the opposite side, couldn't be engaged. It was a nasty problem for everyone and I'm not convinced that there was a good solution, except for a well-armed true tail gunner. The HS.404 probably couldn't be used there because of center of gravity issues, structural complications due to the great weight, hydraulic system limitations (I think it was engine-driven, so you would have much longer lines), structural complications from having so much weight so far back on the fuselage of an Am.451, etc., etc.
 
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in passing, the LeO-451 rear-firing gun station was open, at least from the rear.
Incidentally, the early B-26 tail gunner position was sort of a cone, with the top half a canopy. It opened to the sides, like a coin purse or an inverted bomb bay.

This left the tail gunner almost in the open air. However, he had the entire fuselage behind him to act as a wind break, so no need for a flip-up hood.

A lot of dorsal gunner positions had canopies or hoods that slid back, telescoped back, or flipped back to put the gunner pretty much in the open air. If they were at the end of a greenhouse, there wasn't usually a need for an additional wind breaker, but you do see them from time to time.
 
We agree on the fact that a) a 20 mm gun (except on a B-52 much later) is not a good defensive weapon
The Wildcat pilots quickly came to fear the 20mm tail gun on the G4M "Betty." (The usual phrase is, "Developed a healthy respect for," or some other euphemism.) See John Lundstrom's First Team: Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway or this YouTube video from Military Aviation History:
View: https://youtu.be/gsiNOoLKHPs
(I hope that's the right one!) The pilots switched to beam attacks to avoid it.

Yep! This is one case, but 20mm cannon were not completely useless as defensive guns.
 
You also see a lot of dorsal positions where the gun in offset to one side so that it can fire dead astern. Unfortunately, this enlarges the total blind area, so that fighters approaching from astern, but slightly to the opposite side, couldn't be engaged. It was a nasty problem for everyone and I'm not convinced that there was a good solution, except for a well-armed true tail gunner.

The Bristol Blenheim's dorsal turret had a moveable gun to overcome this problem.

This from 'BRITISH AIRCRAFT ARMAMENT VOLUME 1: RAF Gun Turrets from 1914 to the Present Day' , R.Wallace Clarke, Patrick Stephens Ltd., 1993, page 31.

"A feature unique to the [Blenheim's] B.I turret was the ability to turn the gun independently of the main rotation system. A ram controlled by foot pedals turned the gun cradle, enabling the gunner to fire at a target approaching from dead astem, where an attacking fighter could not usually be engaged from a mid-upper turret."

Blenheim Turret.png

cheers,
Robin.
 
Unfortunately, that does limit you to a single gun and .50s are probably to heavy for it. Did this sort of flip the gun cradle upside down? Any photos?
 
The best fighter in the world in 1937 was French. The airplane, named Morane-Saulnier M.S.405, was a single-engine, single-seat, low wing monoplane with retractable undercarriage and closed cockpit.

The production model M.S.406 C.1 of 1939 was armed with a 20 mm gun (a secret weapon at that time) firing through the propeller hub, capable of shooting any German bombers in service. It also possessed enough speed and manoeuvrability to face the Bf 109 B, C and D of the Luftwaffe using its MAC machine guns.

During the Phoney War (3 September 1939 to 10 May 1940) the M.S.406 made 10,119 combat missions destroying 81 German airplanes. The appearance of the Bf 109 E over the French skies on 21 September 1939, amounted to a technological advantage that gave the aerial superiority to Germans at the critical moment of the Blitzkrieg offensive in May 1940.

The French answer was an improved version of the M.S.406, the M.S.410, that was externally different from the M.S.406 by having four guns in the wings, a fixed cooler, increased armour, a more inclined windshield (to house the GH 38 gunsight), Ratier 1607 electric propeller and Bronzavia propulsive exhaust pipes. It did not arrive on time though and only five 406s were transformed before the defeat.

In 1935 the firm Morane-Saulnier decided to develop a two-seat trainer to facilitate the transition of the pilots from the Dewoitine D.510 to the M.S.405 with retractable landing gear. The first prototype, called M.S.430-01, flew at 360 kph in March 1937, powered by a 390 hp. Salmson 9Ag radial engine. In June 1939 l’Armée de l'Air ordered the production of 60 units under the name M.S.435 P2 (Perfectionnement biplace), powered by a 550 hp Gnôme-Rhône GR 9 Kdrs radial engine, but the acceleration of the production of the M.S.406 and M.S.410 fighters and the acquisition of the North American 57 and 64 trainers in the USA led to the cancellation of the M.S.435.

Foreseeing the possibility of a serious delay in the production of the Hispano-Suiza H.S.12 Y-31 engine, the firm considered the construction of M.S.408 C.1 single-seat light fighter, powered by a radial engine GR 9 Kdrs or a Hispano-Suiza 14 Aa-10 armed with only wing mounted MAC 34A machine guns. The prototype M.S.408-01, with 10.71 m wingspan, was built using many parts of the M.S.430 and a Salmson 9 Ag engine, but the increasing availability of the 12Y-31 dismissed its serial production.

On 15 June 1936 l'Armée de l'Air high command published the Chasseur Monoplace C.1 specification, calling for a single-seat fighter capable of flying at 500 km/h at an altitude of 4,000 m, reaching 8,000 m. ceiling in less than 15 minutes. Intended to replace the Morane-Saulnier M.S.406, the new fighter should be powered by a 935 hp Hispano-Suiza H.S. 12Y-45, 12-cylinder ‘Vee’ liquid-cooled engine and armed with one cannon and two machine guns.

Upon learning of the performances of the Messerschmitt Bf 109 B-1, that the Germans had started to manufacture in the fall of 1936, the C.1 specification was amended as Program Technique A23 (12 January 1937) calling for 520 kph maximum speed and armament increase to one 20 mm Hispano-Suiza H.S.404 cannon and four 7.5 mm MAC 34 M39 belt-feed machine guns. Four prototypes were produced to fulfil the requirement: The Morane-Saulnier M.S.450, the S.N.A.C.A.O. 200, the Arsenal VG 33 and the Dewoitine D.520.

By January 1938, French intelligence services estimated the Luftwaffe strength at 2,850 modern aircraft, including 850 fighters. In response the Ministère de l'Air issued the Plan V (15 March 1938) to increase the inventory of the Armée de l'Air to 2,617 aircraft, including 1,081 fighters, to equip 32 Groupes de Chasse and 16 Escadrilles Régionales. But on 1 April 1939 l'Armée de l'Air had only 104 M.S.405/406, one Bloch M.B.151 and 42 Curtiss H.75A and none of these fighters reached the 500 kph.

The M.S.450 prototype was an aerodynamically improved version of the M.S.406. It could fly at 560 kph propelled by an 1,100 hp H.S.12 Y-51 engine, but the Ministère de l'Air did not want to interrupt the manufacturing of the M.S.410 and dismissed its production.

The C.A.O. 200 reached the 550 kph with the same engine than the M.S. 406, but its production was also dismissed due to a longitudinal instability revealed during test flights in August 1939. During the Battle of France the prototype participated in the Villacoublay defence, armed with a H.S. 404, managing to shoot down a Heinkel He 111 on 15 June 1940.

The Arsenal VG 30 was designed as a light fighter to fulfil the Chasseur Monoplace C.1 (3 June 1937) specification that called for a small fighter propelled by one 690 hp Hispano-Suiza H.S.12 X crs engine and armed with one 20 mm H.S.9 cannon and two 7.5 mm MAC 34A drum-feed machine guns, from the obsolete Dewoitine D.510 fighters. Anticipating the possibility of a long attrition war, the VG 30 was built in wood/plywood, not to compete with the conventional fighters in the use of strategic materials. It could be manufactured in the third part of the time than an M.S. 406 for 630,000 F, a 75 per cent of the price of a Bloch M.B.152.

On October 1938, the VG 30-01 prototype reached a maximum speed that was 30 kph higher than that of the M.S.406, propelled by a less powerful 180 hp engine. It was estimated that it could fly at 560 kph with the engine of the M.S.406 and the VG 33 prototype, armed with one H.S. 404 and four MAC 34 M39, was built with that purpose.

Fifteen days after the declaration of war on Germany the S.N.C.A. du Nord received a commission for the manufacture of 220 units of the VG 33, later expanded to 500. Deliveries to l’Armée de l’Air should start at the beginning of 1940. But there were problems with the import of spruce from Canada and Romania and only seven planes entered combat between 18 and 25 June 1940, carrying out 36 missions with the GC I/55. The VG 33 outperformed the Bf 109 E-1 in manoeuvrability and fire power and was almost as fast with a less powerful 240 hp engine.

On 20 January 1940, the VG 34-01 prototype reached 590 kph, powered by one H.S.12 Y-45.

In February the VG 35-01 flew powered by a 1,100 hp H.S.12 Y-51 engine and the decision was taken to start the production of the VG 32, propelled by the American engine Allison V-1710 C-15, but only a prototype was eventually built before the German attack. In May, the VG 36-01 flew with a 1,100 hp H.S.12 Y-51. The VG 39-01 flew during the same month, propelled by a 1,200 hp H.S.12 Z reaching the 625 kph.

The first aircraft to fulfil the specifications of the Programme Technique A23 was the prototype Dewoitine D.520-01, exceeding the 520 kph speed on December 1938 and being declared winner of the contest. In June 1939 the Ministère de l'Air made an order of 600 planes, later expanded to 710, that were to be delivered to the l'Armée de l'Air from the beginning of January 1940. Unfortunately for the French the deliveries were delayed by problems with the engine cooling, the freezing of the MAC 34 M 39 machine guns and the pneumatic firing system.

The day of the German attack (10 May 1940) only two-hundred-and-twenty-eight D.520 had been manufactured, 75 out of which had been accepted by the Centre de Réception des Avions de Série (CRAS) and 50 were making their operational conversion into the GC I/3. When the armistice came (25 June 1940) four-hundred-and-thirty-seven D.520 had been manufactured, of which 112 were in the CRAS for armament installation and 105 had been destroyed by different causes, 53 of them in combat.

The D.520 was the only French fighter that faced the Bf 109 E-3 in conditions of equality. That, despite the scant experience of its pilots with the new model and the accidents caused by the HE 20x110 ammunition of the H.S.404 cannon, causing premature explosions within the barrel when firing the second burst. Tests carried out with a Bf 109 captured at the end of 1939 revealed that the D.520 matched its climb rate between 4,000 and 6,000 m (with 190 hp less power) beating the German aircraft in diving, structural strength, manoeuvrability and fire power.

To avoid competing against Morane-Saulnier for the Hispano-Suiza engines, the Marcel Bloch firm chose the Gnome-Rhône Série 14 radial engines to propel its fighters between 1937 and 1942. Its first design, the Bloch M.B.150, was a loser in the Chasseur Monoplace C.1 contest of 1934. However, the publication of Plan V (15 March 1938) allowed the firm to obtain a contract for the manufacture of 140 units of the improved M.B.151 model, powered by a 920 hp Gnôme-Rhône 14N-35.

During the Spanish Civil War, the radial engine fighters proved that they needed a 30 per cent of extra power to fight on equal terms with the in-line engine fighters. The M.B. 151 had 180 hp less than the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E, was 105 kph slower due to the poor aerodynamic design of the engine cowling and was only armed with four 7.5 mm MAC 34A drum-feed machine guns, with 300 rounds each.

On July 1939, after some tests carried out in the Centre d’Expériences at Rheims, the M.B.151 was considered unsuited for first-line duties. l’Armée de l’Air and l’Aéronavale (French naval aviation) mainly used it as advanced trainer at the Centres d’Instruction de Chasse. It was eventually used in combat, four were destroyed and one of them rammed a Fiat C.R.42 of the Regia Aeronautica.

They tried to correct all these deficiencies with the M.B.152, using a 1,100 hp fourteen-cylinder air-cooled Gnôme-Rhône 14N-49, with a new 85 cm diameter cowling, inspired by that of the Curtiss H.75A, driving a variable-pitch Chauvière 371 propeller. Its armament consisted of two H.S.404 cannon and two MAC 34A machine guns installed on the wings. The gunsight reflector was a Baille-Lemaire GH 38.

The new fighter was 88 kph slower than the Bf 109 E-1 in level flight and 50 kph slower in dive but surpassed the German aircraft in firepower and structural strength. Forced to prematurely entering service, the M.B.152 suffered several accidents. The engine caught fire in inverted flight due to of a bad design of the carburettor. The deficient pneumatically-actuated firing system operated the weapons with delay and did not have enough pressure to operate the cannons at an altitude above 7,000 m.

After the German-Soviet non-aggression Pact (23 August 1939) the French communists received order of delaying the weapons production through a program of strikes and coordinated sabotages. The most affected were the Farman and Renault factories that manufactured the only bomber capable of reaching Berlin and the tanks that could surpass those of the Germans. But the biggest damage was the chaos created in the manufacture and distribution of aircraft components.

When the Allies declared war on Germany (3 September 1939) out of the hundred-and-twenty-three Bloch fighters that have been built, ninety-five did not have propellers and half of them had not yet received weapons, radio equipment or gunsights. At the beginning of 1940, delays in the delivery of the Messier landing gear forced the manufacture suspension of fifty-nine M.B.152 fighters. Fearing that the machine guns would fall into the hands of communists, l'Armée de l'Air was in charge of the installation, but the process was slow and required numerous modifications.

The M.B.152 came from factory temporarily equipped with wooden propellers, 14N-25 engines with the old cowling of 100 cm diameter and OPL R-39 gunsights. Faced with a shortage of Chauvière 371 propellers, many were sent to combat with Gnôme-Rhône 2590 propellers (with adjustable pitch in ground only) or armed only with machine guns, due to the delays in the delivery of the H.S.404 cannons.

The replacement of the waste pneumatic firing system by Deltour-Jay electro-pneumatic devices which ensured a more rapid trigger response, caused further delays at the beginning of 1940. On 10 March 1940 there still were fifty Bloch M.B.152 fighters without armament and propellers in the Entrepôt 301 centre. When the German attack came thirty days later, hundred-and-forty M.B.151, three-hundred-and-sixty-three M.B.152, four M.B.155 and one M.B.153, with Twin Wasp engine, had been accepted by l’Armée de l’Air, but only eighty-three of them, considered bons de guerre (combat-ready), had been delivered to the Groupes de Chasse. During the Battle of France, the Bloch fighters shot downed 146 German aircraft, including forty-five Bf 109 fighters. Eighty M.B.152 and four M.B.151 were destroyed for different causes.

Worse still was the availability of the bombers, whose priority was lower than that of the fighters. The delivery of the Amiot 350, Bloch M.B.174 and Breguet 693 bons de guerre to the Groupes de Bombardement suffered from inadequate supplies of the Alkan and Gardy bomb racks and many LeO 45 did not receive the Gnôme-Rhône 2590 propellers in time, being destroyed in land without any opportunity to combat.

Consequence of the disorganization caused by the sabotages, on Armistice Day (25 June 1940) l’Armée de l’Air had 2,348 planes, many more than on the invasion day, even counting losses. Most fell intact in the hands of the Germans.

On 10 May 1940 l’Armée de l’Air had five Escadrilles de Chasse de Nuit with forty-seven Potez 631 night fighters. These aircraft were operating in sectors of the front that were 15 km wide and 20 km deep, helped by searchlights and sound locators, with one control centre positioning the airplanes by using direction finding (D/F) equipment. Depending on conditions of visibility, a night fighter pilot could see an unilluminated bomber from between 400 and 600 m, and between 1,000 and 6,000 when illuminated by searchlights. During the Battle of France, the Potez 63 managed to shoot down three Heinkel He 111 and one Dornier Do 17.

The failure of the M.B.151 and the delays in the delivery of the M.B.152 forced l’Armée de l’Air to maintain various types of obsolete fighters in service. The Dewoitine D.510, that constituted 70 per cent of the French fighter force during the Munich Agreement, still equipped five Groupes de Chasse and two Escadrilles of the Aéronavale (141 aircraft) at the time of the Poland invasion. At the beginning of 1940 two Patrouilles de Défense were still active with 40 aircraft piloted by Poles.

On September 1939 one Escadrille of the Armée de l’Air equipped with Dewoitine D.371 fighters were based in Bizerte-Tunis and the Aéronavale still used thirteen D.373 and D.376 aircraft. When the war started, three Groupes de Chasse, still equipped with Loire 46 fighters, were making the transition to the M.S. 406. By May 1940 twenty-three aircraft were left in various training schools and sixteen in reserve.

Some old biplanes of the Blériot-SPAD 510 type were got back into service in the Grupe Aérien Régional de Chasse at Le Havre-Octeville and in the Centre d’Instruction à la Chasse at Montpellier, being gradually replaced by the Bloch M.B.151.
 

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The best fighter in the world in 1937 was French. The airplane, named Morane-Saulnier M.S.405, was a single-engine, single-seat, low wing monoplane with retractable undercarriage and closed cockpit.

The production model M.S.406 C.1 of 1939 was armed with a 20 mm gun (a secret weapon at that time) firing through the propeller hub, capable of shooting any German bombers in service.
The 20mm cannon was in absolutely no way secret. Read Les Ailes and other French aviation publications of the time and the moteur canon was universally known.

After all, the D.510 had been in service for years and Hispano-Suiza advertised its engines and published sales booklets that explained the "c" suffix. Photographs and illustrations of the cannon-mounting motors were seen widely.

I'll reserve the right to address other errors in the future.
 
The 20mm cannon was in absolutely no way secret. Read Les Ailes and other French aviation publications of the time and the moteur canon was universally known.

After all, the D.510 had been in service for years and Hispano-Suiza advertised its engines and published sales booklets that explained the "c" suffix. Photographs and illustrations of the cannon-mounting motors were seen widely.

I'll reserve the right to address other errors in the future.
Hispano-Suiza H.S. 9 (20 mm)​

In 1935 a 900 hp improved version of the H.S.12 Xcrs engine appeared, known as Hispano-Suiza H.S.12 Ycrs. The integrated cannon was also an improved version of the H.S.7 although somehow lighter and with 420 rounds per minute (r.p.m.) rate of fire but maintaining the same muzzle velocity and destructive power than the Oerlikon. It fired the same type of HE, HET and AP ammunition than the Oerlikon, stored in a 60 rounds drum.

The HE type model 1936 was identified by a yellow band, the HET of 1939 with a yellow and blue band and the AP was overall painted in black. The HE had a 1937 model 17/19 B impact fuse and the HET also had a self-destruction system. The moteur-canon was very successful in the market, being acquired by the Czech Air Force to equip their Avia B-534, B-536 and B-135 fighters and by the Yugoslavian Air Force for their Ikarus Ik-2 and Rogozarski Ik-3. It was also used by l’Armèe de l’Air to power the Morane-Saulnier M.S.405.



Hispano Suiza H.S. 404 (20 mm)​

After the experience in combat against the fast and well armoured He 111 and Do 17 German bombers obtained during the Spanish Civil War, the engine designer Mark Birkigt decided to develop the H.S. 404 with higher performance. It was gas operated with a 166 per cent higher rate of fire and a muzzle velocity of 880 m/sec compared to the 820 m/sec of the H.S.9. The new weapon entered service in 1939 and could be installed either in the H.S.12 Y-31 engines of the M.S. 406 or in the H.S.12 Y-45 of the Dewoitine D.520, M.B. 155 and Arsenal VG 33 fighters.

The H.S. 404 fired 20x110 ammunition (that was not interchangeable with the 20x110 RB cartridges of the H.S .9) stored in a 60 rounds drum. There were six different types: HE model 1938 or 1939 (130 g) with a 17/19B 1938 model fuse identified by a yellow band, HET identified by a yellow and a blue-grey band, AP (165 g) black projectile with a red band, APT with black nose and metal-grey-metal-red bands, AP/HE with red-yellow-green bands and HEI with red-yellow-blue bands.

This type of ammunition had not been sufficiently tested and caused several accidents during combat. The Dewoitines D.520 of the G.C.I/3 were specially affected, experiencing premature explosions within the barrel when firing the second burst. Between 5 and 8 June 1940 the M.S.406 of the G.C.I/6, G.C.II/2 and G.C.III/7 were used in ground attack task against the German tanks with AP and APT ammunition.

The manufacturing of the H.S. 404 was slow and costly. At the beginning of the war only 928 units had been delivered to l’Armée de l’Air and in March 1940 there were 2,319 units available.

The H.S. 404 was a formidable weapon when integrated in a Hispano-Suiza engine or installed in the nose of the twin engine Potez 631 fighters. However, it was less resilient when installed in the wings of the Bloch fighters, causing different problems of vibration, stoppage, freezing and dispersion of firing.

The H.S. 404 was acquired by the RAF and manufactured under license in the United Kingdom as Hispano-Suiza Mk I, Mk II and Mk V and as Hispano AN/M2 in the USA. A version over flexible mounting was also manufactured to be used by the rear gunners of the French medium bombers LeO 451 and Amiot 354.

A feature common to all the Polikarpov fighters was their longitudinal instability, caused by the short length of their fuselage that had been designed to save weight and building materials. For their part, the Polikarpov fighters suffered snaking problems that affected weapon accuracy during combat manoeuvres.

The Soviets believed to have found the solution by increasing the rate of fire of the machine guns. In 1933 they began to build the ShKAS, a 7.62 mm gas-operated machine gun that used the Polish Szakats revolver-feed system and the French Berthier gas regulator.

The ShKAS had a rate of fire of 1,300-1,800 rounds/minute, but it presented numerous problems of maintenance and jamming, due to the low manufacturing quality of the 7.62x54R ammunition.

The reality of the aerial combat in Spain showed that the ShKAS was effective against slow aircraft built in wood and fabric, but to destroy the new German fast bombers it was necessary to use more powerful weapons.


The Soviets failed with the 12.7 mm ShVAK heavy machine gun of 1932 and could only build the version of 20 mm after studying the gas-operated locking bolt of the French cannons. The H.S. 9 technology was acquired on February 1936, together with the Dewoitine D.510R c/n 45, while the H.S. 404 was considered a secret weapon by l'Armée de l'Air and not authorized for export. But in May 1936 the communists of the Front Populaire stole an entire set of drawings from the H.S. 404 from the Bois-Colombes Hispano-Suiza headquarters.
 
After the experience in combat against the fast and well armoured He 111 and Do 17 German bombers obtained during the Spanish Civil War, the engine designer Mark Birkigt decided to develop the H.S. 404 with higher performance.
This is simply untrue on two accounts.

First, the very early Do17s and He111s used in Spain had no effective armor.

Second, Marc Birkigt had already embroiled Hispano-Suiza in a patent and royalties dispute with Oerlikon over the HS-7/-9, so there were legal problems with continuing production of those cannon. (Having read the semi-official history of Hispano-Suiza, Birkigt seems to have had a visceral hatred of paying licensing fees, which led to some ill-considered projects developing H-S products to replace licensed products. Superchargers are a good example.)

As to the political bit at the end ... Ugh.
 
The Phoney War ended with the invasion of Belgium and the Netherlands and the German attack against France, using 860 fighters Bf 109E, three-hundred-and-fifty Bf 110, 1,120 medium bombers, 342 dive bombers and 591 reconnaissance airplanes.

L'Armée de l'Air had only thirty-seven Bloch M.B.151, ninety-three Bloch M.B.152, ninety-eight Curtiss H.75A, two-hundred-and-seventy-eight Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 and sixty-seven Potez 631 fighters bons de guerre, supported by thirty Gloster Gladiators and forty-eight Hurricanes British fighters. During the Battle of France 1,279 German, 872 French and 944 British airplanes were destroyed by different causes.

One of the main reasons for the success of the Blitzkrieg against the French and British Armies, in May 1940, was the aerial superiority obtained when the Messerschmitt Bf 109 E-3 entered service with the Luftwaffe. It happened at the right time, when the main French fighter Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 was replaced by the second generation fighters Dewoitine D.520 and Arsenal VG 33. During the Phoney War, l’Armée de l’Air tried to fill the gap with the Bloch M.B.152 and Curtiss H.75A fighters, helped by the British Hawker Hurricane Mk.I. But the Messerschmitt would prove superior.

This seems to be the origin of the commonly accepted paradigm about the assumed inferiority of the French technology. It is not common knowledge that France already had operational naval radar in 1934. And that, at the beginning of June 1940, the antiaircraft artillery defending Paris was controlled by the most advanced radar in the world, able to operate in wavelengths from 80 to 16 cm against the 3.5 to 1.5 m of the British or the 2.4 m to 53 cm of the German radar.

The French scientists were also ahead of their German equivalents in the field of nuclear fission. By early 1940, the CNRS controlled the highest reserve in the world of uranium (8 tons coming from the Belgian Congo) and 200 kg of heavy water from the Norwegian enterprise Norsk Hydro.

The French tanks of 1940 had better armour and armament than the Germans. The Marine Française (the French combat fleet) was superior to the Kriegsmarine in firepower with the Béarn carrier and six squadrons of Loire Nieuport L.N.401/411 dive bombers that technically surpassed the German Ju 87.

The destructiveness of the air-to-air weapons installed in the French fighters was slightly higher that their German equivalents, although the quality of the aiming devices OPL 31, RX 39 and GH 38 used by l’Armée de l’Air was somehow inferior to the Zeiss Revi C/12 reflector gunsight of the Luftwaffe. The following text compares the armament used by the French and German fighters during the Battle of France.


Ikaria MG FF (20 mm.)​

During the 20s, the Swiss firm SEMAG committed itself to the design of the 20 mm gun Becker used during the WWI by some German bombers. During the first years of the 30s, the research was continued by the Swiss firm Oerlikon who, in 1933, started to commercialize three basic models using cartridges of progressive length and power. They were the Oerlikon FFF type (72 mm case length), the Oerlikon FFL type (100 mm case length) and the Oerlikon FFS type (110 mm case length).

The FFS was acquired by l’Armèe de l’Air to serve as a base for its own Hispano Suiza H.S.7 and H.S.9 designs which were both modified for aircraft engine mounting. The FFL was acquired by the Imperial Japanese Navy in 1939 and manufactured under license from 1941 onwards, as 99-2 Type, to be used in the Zero-Sen fighters. The FFF was chosen by the German, Polish and Romanian Air Forces to equip the Bf 109 E-2/E-3, Bf 110C, PZL P-24 C/F/G and IAR 80 fighters.

The Luftwaffe version was extensively modified to adapt the original design to the German production techniques, being mass manufactured by the Ikaria Werke Berlin as MG FF (Maschinen Gewehr Flügel Fest = Machine Gun Wing Installation) from 1935 onwards. It was the lightest short barrelled weapon in its class with just 28 kg. But it had a lower effective range and power of penetration than the contemporary French and Swiss designs.

These shortages were partially compensated by a higher rate of fire and the introduction of the MG FFM (Modifizierung = Modification) which could fire the HE ammunitions Minengeschoss.

It is unclear if the MG FFM was ever used during the Battle of France. Some authors state that the Bf 109 E-2 were armed with four MG 17 machine guns and at 20 mm cannon located behind the engine, firing through the axis of the hub propeller. As per this version of facts, the 'M' meant Motor.

The Bf 109 E-2 passed through some operational tests with discouraging results because of the strong vibrations that the cannon produced in the engine crankcase during firing. Apparently, the decision to mount the two cannons in the wings of the Bf 109 E-3 went against the initial German project that preferred the French moteur-canon device. This system was eventually adopted as a matter of urgency after the failure of the Bf 109 E-2 to alleviate the big difference in firepower between the Bf 109 E-1 and the Morane and Hurricane fighters.

The MG FF fired 20 mm ammunition of the 20 x 80RB type that could be HE (134 g), HEI (115 g) or M-Geschoss (92 g). When installed in the Bf 109 E and Bf 110 C fighters of, it used a 60 rounds drum while the Do 17Z night fighters used a 15-45 rounds drum which could be manually replaced in combat. The Luftwaffe always considered the MG FF a transition weapon to fill the gap until the excellent MG 151 was available.


Oerlikon FFS (20 mm)​

A small amount of these guns, together with their manufacturing license, was acquired by France in 1933. The FFS was not suitable for aircraft engine mounting because of the too advanced position of the recovery cylinder/yoke unit and had to be modified as Hispano-Suiza H.S.7. The French developed the SPAD S.XII in 1916 for the destruction of balloons. It was armed with a single-shot SAMC (APX) 37 mm cannon mounted between the V8 cylinder blocks of the 200 hp Hispano-Suiza 8c engine.

The moteur-canon was not very successful, due to its slow reloading capacity and excessive recoil shock, and the SPAD S.XII was abandoned, but the French retained the idea until the arrival of the right time. This came in 1932 with the 690 hp liquid-cooled engine Hispano-Suiza H.S.12 Xbrs of 12 cylinders in 60º 'Vee' configuration.

This was the right engine to combine with one 20 mm Oerlikon FFS cannon -manufactured under license as Hispano-Suiza H.S.7- mounted between the two-cylinder banks. The crankcase was strengthened, and the reduction gear modified to bring the hollow propeller shaft in line with the gun barrel.

The ammunition was the same than that of the Swiss gun, contained in a 60 rounds drum. The H.S.7 was heavier, due to the fixation system to the engine, and had a rate of fire of just 350 rpm (compared to the 470 rpm of the Oerlikon) to protect the engine from any destructive vibration. This engine was then known as Hispano-Suiza 12 Xcrs (‘c’ for canon = cannon) and had reduced its power to 680 hp, consequence of the modifications made in the gearbox. The new moteur-canon was installed in the Dewoitine D.510 fighter and in the Loire-Nieuport L.N. 401/411 dive bombers of l’Aeronavale which fought the panzers on 15 May 1940.

The Germans tried to use the moteur-canon system with their Bf 109 V4, C-2 and E-2 fighters, trying different combinations of Jumo 210 and Daimler Benz 601 engines with MG 17 machine guns and MG FF cannons. But they found insoluble problems of cooling and crankcase destructive vibrations. On October 1940, they finally adapted an MG FF cannon behind the DB 601N engine of the Bf 109 F-0, but the device suffered structural damages during tests. The problem could not be solved until the MG 151/20 gun was available and could be installed in the Bf 109 F-2 in March 1941.
 
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- Payen Fighters​

Between 1932 and 1942, Nicolas Payen designed a series of wooden canard-delta airplanes with a radical tandem-wing configuration.

In 1933 he built the Pa 100 Flèche Volante with small wings called machutes and a 67 degree swept delta tailplane, to compete in the 3rd Coupe Deutsch. The machutes had mobile wingtips which acted as ailerons and electrically-operated metallic flaps. The landing gear consisted of one centreline main leg, retracting backwards, and two outrigger auxiliary wheels retracting into the tailplane.

The engine should have been one 180 hp Regnier R6, six-cylinder straight air-cooled, driving a fixed pitch wooden airscrew. But it was not possible to get one in time to participate in the competition and Payen had to adapt his project to the only engine available: one 380 hp Gnôme-Rhône 7Kd Titan Major seven-cylinder radial air-cooled, weighting 270 Kg, totally unsuited for a racing aircraft. It was necessary to install a fixed undercarriage in more advanced position, to compensate the extra weight, and a tail skid. The wingtips ailerons were also changed by others, safer and of conventional type.

The refurbished plane was named Pa 101 Avion-Flèche, had 4.26 m wingspan, 5.75 m length, 2.2 m height, 6.86 sq.m wing surface, 750 kg maximum weight and one estimated maximum speed of 400 kph. It flew for the first time on 17 April 1935, being damaged in an accident just eight days later.

The Pa 101 airframe served as the basis for a new racer project, called Pa 110 CD (Coupe Deutsch). Designed in 1935, it differed from the previous model by its conventional landing gear, retracting backwards into the fuselage sides. It was hoped that it might be able to fly at 490 kph powered by one 200-240 hp Hirth 508D, eight-cylinder inverted-Vee, air-cooled engine, but the project was cancelled due to lack of funding.

When the Spanish Civil War began, the Republican Government had great difficulties in acquiring combat airplanes abroad, due to the international blockade. In the summer of 1936 Nicolas Payen offered the Spanish communists to build the Pa 110 C.1, the military version of the racer, through the Luxembourgian banker Rosenthal.

The power system designed for the fighter was made up of two 220 hp Renault 6Q-01, six-cylinder straight air-cooled engines installed in tandem face-to-face. Both engines were connected to the contra-rotating propellers power shaft by means of a Cotal-Baudot gearbox that allowed to electrically disconnect any of the engines by means of a clutch.

It was going to have an armament of two 7.5 mm Darne machine guns installed under the machutes and one 20 mm H.S. 9 cannon, firing through the propellers hub, but the French Government had banned its export to Spain and had to be replaced by one 23 mm Danish Madsen cannon. The Pa 110 C.1 would have an estimated maximum speed of 460 kph, flying with one engine, and 550 kph with both engines. The estimated range was of 850 km.

The arrival of the Soviet fighters Polikarpov to Spain in October meant the cancellation of the project, which was redesigned as Pa 112 C.1 to adapt it to the Chasseur Monoplace C.1 specification published by the Ministère de l'Air on 3 June 1937.

The Renault 6Q were replaced by two 200-205 hp Salmson 9ND nine-cylinder radial air-cooled (surplus) engines commonly used by the Bloch M.B.81 of the l’Armée de l’Air and by the Besson B. 411 of the l’Aéronavale. Proposed armament was either a 20 mm H.S. 9 or an Oerlikon FFS cannon and two 7.5 mm MAC 34 M39 belt-feed machine guns installed in the interior of the machutes, or two MAC 34A drum-feed installed under the machutes.

A mock-up using the airframe of the Pa 101 was built in 1938. After being examined by technicians of the l’Armée de l’Air, the project was rejected at the beginning of 1939, because of the great complexity of the power system. Payen offered to build the Pa 300 instead, a fighter capable to surpass the 520 kph of the Programme Technique A23 if they provided him with an H.S.12 Y-45 engine. But the military, who had done most of his career flying in biplanes, found the flèche aerodynamic solution to be too radical and preferred to build the Arsenal VG 33.

To fight these prejudices, Payen built the technological demonstrator Pa 22/2 Fléchair, which was captured by the Germans in 1940 while performing aerodynamic tests in the O.N.E.R.A. wind-tunnel of Chalais-Meudon. Under the new administration, the prototype was modified with the installation of a 180 hp Regnier R6B-01 engine and a new open cockpit with the windscreen of one Arsenal VG 33. It made his first flight on 18 October 1941 and was destroyed during an Allied bombing in April 1944.
 

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- Bugatti 110 C.1​

On September 1937, Louis de Monge designed the Bugatti Model 100, a Monoplace de Course (Single-seat racer) to beat the Germans on their own soil in the Deutsch Cup Race of 1938. Underpowered with one 450 hp Bugatti T50 B engine, it was necessary to use one ultra-sleek highly streamlined airframe with forward swept wings, variable geometry automatic flaps, 120 degree V-tail and retractable landing gear.

To save weight the engine crankcases were made of magnesium and the airframe mostly of wood with sandwiched layers of balsa and tulipwood. Looking to restore national pride after the exhibition made by the Messerschmitt Bf 109 V13 on November 1937, the Ministère de l’Air offered to finance the construction of two special planes to break the world speed records of 634 kph over 100 km and 709 kph over 3 km.

The first, called Bugatti Model 100P (Poussée-boosted) with two 525 hp Bugatti 50P eight-cylinder straight liquid-cooled engines, two drive shafts, one gearbox reduction, two counter-rotating Ratier S.O.B. airscrews, 8.23 m wingspan and 650 kph estimated maximum speed. The second, Model110P, with two 50P engines boosted to 550 hp, clipped wings with 6.7m wingspan and 750 kph estimated maximum speed. The contract, signed in August 1938 by 6.900.000 F, included two Type 50P spare engines and a bonus of 1.800.000 F if the two records should be broken.

In 1939, the German accepted the 'Propaganda War' making fly the Heinkel He 100 V8 at 746.606 kph on 30 March and the Messerschmitt Me 209 V1 at 755.138 kph on 29 April. The French prototype Dewoitine D.551 tried to overcome that mark on 22 November but could only reach 701.5 kph powered by one H.S.12 Y boosted to 1,300 hp.

At the end of 1939 the French preferred to concentrate its efforts on the production of 'panic fighters'. Anticipating the possibility of a long attrition war, the Ministére de l’Air promoted the construction from wood/plywood of the Arsenal VG 33 and commissioned the design of the Bugatti 110 C.1 (a third-generation fighter of the M.S.460 and D.520T class) with increased wingspan and propelled by one 1,600 hp H.S.12 Z or one 1,500 hp Bugatti T67 sixteen-cylinder ‘Vee’ liquid cooled engine. Production should be made at the new Bugatti factory in Bordeaux.

The construction of the Model 100P suffered delays caused by the complexity of the transmission, cooling and automatic flaps control systems. On 10 May 1940 the prototype was just nearing completion and was hidden to prevent access to their secrets by the Germans.



Author note

A service aircraft would have needed larger air intakes for the radiators and less complex cooling and flaps systems. The magnesium engine crankcases would have been very vulnerable to the incendiary ammunition and the tulipwood, with a breaking strength of 70 MPa, too fragile to stand the tensile strength during a dogfight.

In my opinion, the Bugatti 110 C.1 should have been armed with six 7.5 mm, MAC 34 M39 machine guns in the wings (similar to the D.520T installation) and one H.S.404 cannon.
I believe that the fighter version would have a unique power shaft in starboard position and a flat windscreen to avoid the optical distortion when using the GH 38 gunsight.


Given the decentralization policy of aeronautical production, started by the French government in the last years of the decade of the thirties, it seems reasonable to assume that the Bugatti military version would have been propelled by an engine of the same firm and I have been working on the scale drawings of the T67 V16 engine as published at

http: //www.bugattiaircraft.com.


As per my estimations, the installation of the T67 in the Model 100P airframe requires the following modifications: The undercarriage wide track should have been increased to 3.3 m, wingspan to 8.68 m, tailplane to 1.46 m, overall length to 8.33 m, height to 2.16 m and propeller disc diameter to 1.89 m. Based on all these assumptions I will try to draw the look that the mythical airplane might have had.
 

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Unfortunately, that does limit you to a single gun and .50s are probably to heavy for it. Did this sort of flip the gun cradle upside down? Any photos?

Well it was designed before the War actually broke out, so a single gun was probably deemed sufficient.
Here are a photo and diagram from the above mentioned book. Note the separate turret and gun rotation rams.

Blenheim Turret.gif

Blenheim Turret controls.png

and lastly, my interpretation of how the system worked . . .

Blenheim Aim 1.jpg

Blenheim Aim 2.jpg
Blenheim Aim 3.jpg


cheers,
Robin.
 
... the H.S. 404 was considered a secret weapon by l'Armée de l'Air and not authorized for export.​
"

Earliest Birkigt Type 404 Cannon​


In 1933 Birkigt began work on the devisement of a weapon he later produced successfully. This mechanism could in no sense rise to the dignity of an invention, the principles involved having been long known by those who followed the profession of gun design. A combination of already established methods of operation was arranged in such a manner as to result in a shooting prototype."

...........

"Upon hearing of the successful manufacture of this automatic: cannon with its unusually high rate of fire, the French Air Ministry notified the Hispano company that no other country could be offered the weapon without its approval. Three countries, England, Russia, and Czechoslovakia, learning of experimental results through their military attachés, began to make overtures to the Hispano-Suiza company to purchase the cannon for testing purposes."

"A rumor that a 23-mm version was sold to Russia without the consent of the Air Ministry placed the whole project practically under secret status. It was charged and denied on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies that the Russian sale had taken place. The Czechoslovakian Commission was unable to obtain official Government sanction to buy the gun and not until the fall of 1936 were British representatives permitted to see it in action."

The Machine Gun
History, Evolution, and Development of Manual, Automatic, and Airborne Repeating Weapons

Lt. Col. George M. Chinn

Two important points here:

1. The existence of the new Hispano-Suiza cannon was in no way secret.

2. Details of the gun and its exact performance were locked down after the questions in the Chamber of Deputies. "Practically" is not the same as "legally" secret.
 
But in May 1936 the communists of the Front Populaire stole an entire set of drawings from the H.S. 404 from the Bois-Colombes Hispano-Suiza headquarters.​
Could you provide a citation for this remarkable bit of history?

Thanks,

Ethan
 
The gun was mounted on a hydraulically-powered pedestal--essentially, it was a turret with no rotating glass. You can find photos of the only surviving mount online at a museum web site.

The hood the flipped up in front of the gun station was an air brake--or rather, a wind break. The slipstream was so strong that the gunner couldn't operate without something to break up the airflow. You see a more extreme version of this Hawker Demon turret fighter, where they put an almost cylindrical windshield around the gunner.

The point was to clear the 6 o'clock line for the cannon. The LeO451 and the Am35 series were supposed to be so fast that fighters would only be able to make relatively slow approaches from astern. The best tactic for that fighter would be to hide in the blind spot caused by the tail.

There were at least two problems with achieving a much wider firing arc. First, the narrow fuselage of the LeO451 simply didn't have enough space for everything to rotate much further. The gunner's seat was attached to the rotating pedestal, so there has to be enough space on both sides for him to be swung around. Of course, there's all sorts of junk on the front of the pedestal as well. Second, the long barrel of the HS.404 created increasing drag as it swung further to the side. The British attempts to build twin-engine bomber-destroyer turret fighters with quad Hispano-Suizas failed in great part because the hydraulics couldn't manage to be both powerful enough to overcome the immense drag and precise enough to aim toward the rear when there wasn't a huge load on the system. The Germans eventually modified the 20mm mounts in the Am451s for a much wider arc of fire, but only for use on the ground as flak! Since they were firing up, some problems went away.

I found this, from 'Profile 173 The Leo 45 series' :-

'At the outbreak of the war, in spite of its impressive weight and dimensions the LeO 45 was comparable
in maximum level speed with the best serving French fghters, the M.S. 406, M.B. 151 and I52, and the Curtiss Hawk 75.
Hence, the frst draft ofthe technical handbook drawn up by the S.N.C.A.S.E. presented the Le0 45 as
follows:

" . . . Further to its 480 km/h. (298 m.p.h.)
speed, very close to that of the enemy‘s fghters, it
is not possible to attack the LeO 45 except from the
rear.
When the pilot then selects full throttle, as the
cannon is not masked by any central fin, the attack-
ing fighter offers itself in front of the cannon . . .
" '

(My Bold)

cheers,
Robin.
 
Some French Air Force additional Bibliography​

Books

Green, W., Warplanes of the Second World War, FIGHTERS, Macdonald 1962.

Facon, P., L’Armée de l’Air dans la Tourmente, Economica 2005.

Joanne, S., Le Bloch M.B.152, Lela Presse 1998.

Comas, M., Le Morane-Saulnier 406, Lela presse 1998.

Cuny, J., Le Dewoitine D.520, Docavia Nº4, Ed. Larivière 1980.

Klein, B., Airplane Five Views, B.C.F.K. Publications 1974.

Marchand, P., Morane-Saulnier M.S. 406 C1, Les Ailes de Gloire Nº7, D’Along 2002.

Shores, C., Armée de l’Air, Squadron/Signal Publications 1976.

Ketley, B., French Aces of World War II, Osprey Publishing 2000.

Marchand, P., Les Moteurs à Piston Français, D’Along 2003.



Publications

Watteeuw, P., “Les Pertes de la Chasse de Jour Allemande en France 1939-45”, AVIONS, Hors Série Nº10 and 15, 2005.

Facon, P., “L’Armée de l’Air en 1939-1940”, Le Fana de l’Aviation, Hors Série Nº7, 1997.

Belcarz, B., “L’Armée de l’Air durant la Campagne de 1940”, Ciel de Guerre Nº8, 2010.

Breffort, D., “L’Armée de l’Air en 1939-1942”,Wing Masters, Hors Série Nº1, 1991.

Facon, P., “Le Sacrifice des Bombardiers Français”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº558, 2016.

Michulec, E., “Jagdwaffe en France”, Ciel de Guerre Nº8, 2011.

Mihaly, E., “Les Chasseurs Légers Caudron-Renault”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº 33 to 36.

Belcarz, B., “Le G.C. I/145”, Air Mag, Hors Série Nº6, 2009.

Nĕmeček, V., “Potez 230”, Letectvi + Kosmonautika 22/85.

Coste, A., “Le Spad 510 s’en va-t-en guerre”, AVIONS Nº128, 2003.

Moulin, J., “Loire 43, 45 & 46”, Document’air Nº3, Avia Editions, 1998.

Nĕmeček, V., “Roussel 30”, Letectvi + Kosmonautika 5/86.

Ricco, P., “Le Bloch M.B. 700 dernier des Spads”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº341.

Roux, R., “M.Bloch 700”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº8.

Mihaly, E., “Il a failli être le T6 français en 1940”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº78 & 423.

Cuny, J., “Les Chasseurs Arsenal VG 30 à VG 70”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº197 to 200.

Ehrengardt, C., “Arsenal VG 33 et dérivés”, Aéro-Éditions, Aéro Files Nº1.

Moulin, J., “C.A.P.R.A. R.30 ou R.300”, l’Aérophile 2010.

Leyvastre, P., “Bloch’s Fighters”, Air International/April 1978.

Cuny, J., “Bloch M.B.150 à 157”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº8 to 11.

Roux, R., “Bugatti 100P& 110P”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº7 & 328.

Michelet, G., “Des idées originales”, l’Aérophile octobre 1938.

Nicole, F., “Payen: un rêve de vitesse”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº266.

Roux, R., “Les Avions Payen”, Le Fana de l’Aviation Nº5, 6 and 7.

Pelletier, A., “Paper Darts to Deltas”, Air Enthusiast Nº68, April 1997.

Correspondence with Paul Deweer, Jean Cuny and Bernhard Klein.
 
I found this, from 'Profile 173 The Leo 45 series' :-

'At the outbreak of the war, in spite of its impressive weight and dimensions the LeO 45 was comparable
in maximum level speed with the best serving French fghters, the M.S. 406, M.B. 151 and I52, and the Curtiss Hawk 75.
Hence, the frst draft ofthe technical handbook drawn up by the S.N.C.A.S.E. presented the Le0 45 as
follows:

" . . . Further to its 480 km/h. (298 m.p.h.)
speed, very close to that of the enemy‘s fghters, it
is not possible to attack the LeO 45 except from the
rear.
When the pilot then selects full throttle, as the
cannon is not masked by any central fin, the attack-
ing fighter offers itself in front of the cannon . . .
" '

(My Bold)

cheers,
Robin.
Hi
 

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The ShVAK is very, very much not an HS.404. The overall structure is seriously different, it's belt-fed, and it uses a revolver system to raise the rate of fire to very high levels. Yes, the ShVAK uses a Browning-derived bolt locking systems, but the HS.404 used elements from existing (patented) designs.

Given the extensive differences between the ShVAK 20mm and the HS.404, the completely different proportions of the ammunition, the fact that the 20mm ShVAK entered production in 1936, the utterly different metallurgy of the two cannon, and the fact that the ShVAK 20mm was a descendent of the earlier ShVAK machine gun, it seems beyond possibility that the ShVAK was a Soviet copy of the HS.404. The time taken to produce all of the tooling would makes the timeline unlikely, beyond the time needed to adapt the design to entirely different materials and to create production methods. Also, the HS.404 was not ready for prime time in 1936, so that plans would not include all of the changes that were needed to make the gun serviceable, and even after that there was so much variation in performance from gun to gun that it didn't become a viable weapon until the UK put a large sum of money into development. (And I'm a person who really likes the HS.404.)


While that source does assert that the plans were stolen, nothing on that page attributes the theft to the PCF.
 
The ShVAK is very, very much not an HS.404. The overall structure is seriously different, it's belt-fed, and it uses a revolver system to raise the rate of fire to very high levels. Yes, the ShVAK uses a Browning-derived bolt locking systems, but the HS.404 used elements from existing (patented) designs.

Given the extensive differences between the ShVAK 20mm and the HS.404, the completely different proportions of the ammunition, the fact that the 20mm ShVAK entered production in 1936, the utterly different metallurgy of the two cannon, and the fact that the ShVAK 20mm was a descendent of the earlier ShVAK machine gun, it seems beyond possibility that the ShVAK was a Soviet copy of the HS.404. The time taken to produce all of the tooling would makes the timeline unlikely, beyond the time needed to adapt the design to entirely different materials and to create production methods. Also, the HS.404 was not ready for prime time in 1936, so that plans would not include all of the changes that were needed to make the gun serviceable, and even after that there was so much variation in performance from gun to gun that it didn't become a viable weapon until the UK put a large sum of money into development. (And I'm a person who really likes the HS.404.)


While that source does assert that the plans were stolen, nothing on that page attributes the theft to the PCF.
I think you are demanding more information than you contribute to this thread. Overly critical attitudes are not usually well received anywhere, especially in a section devoted to alternative history.:rolleyes:
 
in a section devoted to alternative history
To me, there is some ambiguity here - is the involvement in the theft of gun plans of ...
the communists of the Front Populaire
... an item of alternative history? The page in the H-S history book is a little short on details in this matter. I am quite willing to consider the possibility that the plans were stolen.
 
To me, there is some ambiguity here - is the involvement in the theft of gun plans of ...

... an item of alternative history? The page in the H-S history book is a little short on details in this matter. I am quite willing to consider the possibility that the plans were stolen.
That would lead us to a political discussion and the thread would be closed, according to Lage's book and Birgkigt's claims the plans were stolen by "someone" and the French Berthier gas regulator was employed shortly after in the manufacture of the Soviet ShVAK cannon. OK?
I understand that this section is intended to provide ideas to people interested in reading and writing alternative history, my intention is to provide unusual but authentic information to help make their stories more credible.
 
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I can confirm one thing, from the french side of the fence: that Mark Birkigt (goddam name !) was a fraud. There was a couple of blogs once, one was neutral and the other had an axe to grind, yet both were extremely informative, related to French interwar miseries. I remember reading a few things that almost made me bang my head on a wall...

Found them.

https://aviadrix.blogspot.com/2012/12/arsenal-vb-10-chasseur-arrive-sept-ans.html

http://sam40.fr/page/2/

 
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Yep, Hispano-Suiza was spreading itself far too thin in this period. Not enough focus on actually fixing their product before moving on to another.
 
Interesting article in French from "Philippe Garraud". Director of research at the CNRS. Institute of political studies of Rennes.The author gives a synthesis of the situation from various angles : "Industrial constraints in the preparation of the war of 1939-1940 - the unfinished modernization of French aviation" - "Les contraintes industrielles dans la préparation de la guerre de 1939-1940 - la modernisation inachevée de l'aviation française". (https://www.cairn.info/revue-guerres-mondiales-et-conflits-contemporains-2002-3-page-37.htm).
 
Hi Archibald,

The lethal flaw with the 12Y crankshaft is very revealing. It is rather typical of french aerospace weaknesses and the unability of the government to correct them.

What would you consider the lethal flaw with that crankshaft? It isn't quite clear to me from the article.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)
 
It was merely one issue among several. I cut down the translation into varied slices.

Hispano: the sleeping champion

Hispano-Suiza still occupied an enviable position in the 1930s, as evidenced by the number of countries producing its engines under licence: Czechoslovakia, the USSR and Switzerland in particular. With the 12Y, this company is the first to offer an in-line engine exceeding 800 hp, but this advance is misleading because this engine, an improvement on earlier models, does not incorporate the technological advances that will make the success of its competitors Rolls-Royce and Daimler-Benz two or three years later.

"Mermoz was a victim of the disease, never corrected, of the Hispano-Suiza engines with reducers: rupture of the crankshaft", could write Louis Bonte [3]. Although reinforced over earlier models, the 12 Y's crankshaft remained unbalanced, resulting in vibration problems that initially limited its rpm to 2,400 rpm.

Having recalled the success of the engines in 1918, the general engineer Raymond Marchal made the following observation [4] “From then on, the technique of liquid-cooled Hispano engines was fixed. Of course extensions such as changing to 12 cylinders, supercharging, increasing the rotational speed (2400 rpm on the 12Y, 2600 rpm on the 12X) were successfully implemented [as well as a series of other technical improvements]. All these elements, together with an exceptional concern for the quality of the machining, made the glory of the Hispano engines in a period extending until 1935. Many world records, including the historic crossing of Costes and Bellonte are registered in the prize list of the brand. Alas, the most beautiful successes only last for a time and, its period of glory passed, Hispano experienced a certain decline. An attempt to diversify into air-cooled radial engines did not succeed. The huge 1100 hp 14AA engine, the 14AB low torque engine were not successes

and the air-cooled twelve cylinders were literally strangled by the very layout which had so greatly contributed to the success of Hispano in the past. Indeed the direct attack of the valves by a single camshaft placed at the head of the cylinders had as a corollary a cylinder head with a flat bottom and an insufficient air supply […] Despite a notable improvement, to which the author of these lines was no stranger[5] , consisting of replacing the original compressor with a much more sophisticated machine due to Szydlowski and Planiol and giving the Dewoitine 520 correct performance, one can think that the inferiority of our fighter aviation in 1940 was mainly due to the insufficiency of the engines used then » [6 ] .

In 1938, on his return from his trip to Germany where he was impressed by the power of the Luftwaffe, General Vuillemin asked to meet FRBanks, a recognized English specialist in aircraft engines. “I could only suggest to the Chief of Staff that he could, as a first step, persuade Hispano to ask Rolls-Royce for help in developing the 1000 hp HS 77… But Vuillemin didn't think that was feasible because it would offend the self-respect of Marc Birkigt, Hispano's technical director […]. I also advised Vuillemin to obtain the license for English or American radial engines” [7] .

In June 1939, Minister Guy La Chambre considered that “for two years, Hispano did not pursue its technical effort as vigorously as before” [8] . There are two reasons mentioned for this disinvestment by Marc Birkigt, the engineer who, after having shaped the success of Hispano, continued to embody its technical reputation. From 1935, Birkigt abandoned the development of his engines, entrusted to his son Louis [9] , to devote himself to the definition and development of automatic cannons, but it also seems that the prospect of a nationalization of aircraft engine factories, mentioned in 1936, but replaced in fact by a facade operation [10] , diverted him from this activity .

The development of the 12Y family was resumed in 1939, leading to the type 12Y51, scheduled for production in the spring of 1940, and giving 1000 hp at 3250 m. This increase in speed and performance was authorized by a reinforcement of the crankcases and camshafts as well as the intake valves. However, it seems that the power of the 12Y51 could not have been fully exploited in 1940, as long as the Air Force did not have 100 octane gasoline. The role of the 12Y 51 would have been all the more important since its successor was to have 4 valves per cylinder, which went beyond the marginal modifications made until then, without solving all the difficulties encountered.

As R. Marchal pointed out, the development of the Hispano 12-cylinder family came up against problems relating to their very design. “The Hispano engines were limited to a piston speed of 13.6 m/s because of their very light crankshafts. They included shock absorbers but lacked balancing weights. The difference in piston speeds resulted in a handicap of 12% loss of power compared to the Merlin (speed of 15.2 m/s)” [11] .

The experience of foreign manufacturers producing under license the HS 12Y and its derivatives confirms these problems, while indicating possible solutions. Thus, at the beginning of 1941, on the 12Y51s manufactured in Switzerland by Saurer to equip the D-3801 [version of the Morane 406] "problems with the crankshaft bearings delayed the delivery of the devices and led to numerous serious accidents" [12 ] . As a result, a crankshaft of the Swiss Saurer YS-2 engine, based on the 12Y built under license, weighed 80 kg against 50 kg Y for that of the 12Y [13].

In 1934, when Vladimir Klimov came to negotiate the purchase of the license for the 12 Y, the contract almost collapsed, the Russians considering opting for the Kestrel from Rolls-Royce because the test specimens did not achieve the advertised performance or the required reliability [14 ] . However, the Soviet manufacturer Klimov had to implement significant modifications and reinforcements, following which the Klimov VK-107 weighed 748 kg against 650 for the Hispano 12 Z [15 ] .

Another derivative, of the 12 Ydrs this time, the Avia 1000C, increased to 1000 hp by the Czech firm, adopted similar solutions [16] . It therefore seems that in the development of the 12Y family, Hispano was overtaken by the Russians and by the Czechs and practically overtaken by the Swiss.

The attachment to its machining methods, strong point of Hispano manufacturing, also leads the company to unfortunate choices. “A good example of this technique is given by the crankshaft of 12-cylinder engines, which are always high-precision components that are difficult to manufacture. Their main characteristic compared to those of similar engines is their extreme lightness obtained by a complete adjustment of all their surfaces, in addition to the recesses of all the supports and crankpins. These crankshafts were not forged but were machined directly from a large diameter cylinder and without heat treatment. This construction process was extremely expensive and delicate. The result was a sophisticated organ, very strong with minimal weight, but also extremely flexible”[17] . As a result, “Hispano engines were limited to a piston speed of 13.6 m/s because of their very light crankshafts. They included shock absorbers but lacked balancing weights. The difference in piston speeds resulted in a handicap of 12% loss of power compared to the Merlin (speed of 15.2 m/s)”. It is thanks to its more solid and balanced crankshaft that the Merlin could turn at 3000 tm

In June 1949, a report from the Atelier de l'Air de Bordeaux, which evaluated the existing stock of 12Ys with a view to possible use on Morane Vanneau, pointed out "a certain number of weak points of the engine: imperfect holding of the bearings, difficult holding of the upper metal seal of the cylinder, rapid wear of certain cams, due to the very design of the distribution, defective sealing of the water pump, as well as other less important ones" [18 ] . However, it is noted that most of these weaknesses have been corrected on the 12Z.

In July 1940, it was reported to the Equipment Committee that the Swiss, requesting the license to manufacture the HS '4 valves', as the 12Z was then commonly referred to, offered to deliver the surplus of their production as well as the assistance of their perfectly qualified specialists [19 ] . Such a technical competition could have been of real interest.
 
That would lead us to a political discussion and the thread would be closed, according to Lage's book and Birgkigt's claims the plans were stolen by "someone" and the French Berthier gas regulator was employed shortly after in the manufacture of the Soviet ShVAK cannon. OK?
I must point out that you previously posted that the Soviets started using the Berthier gas regulator in 1933 with the ShKAS. Did you misstate the timing?

We're confused by the jump from "someone" to the PCF. Did Birkigt allege this directly?
 
The commitment to machining methods of the "Birkigt method" of manufacturing (the term used by Hispano-Suiza) blocked the rapid expansion of engine production. It required exceptional skill from the machine tool operator, and that's not something that can be trained up in 6 months. Birkigt was also wedded to unique tools for every part, which required a lot of time to produce.

Of course, anything that bottlenecks engine production bottlenecks aircraft production.

Interestingly, in 1936 the union demands included massive investments in new machine tools (apparently many dated from the Great War) and having the plant open for a half day on Saturdays so that the workers could come in and perform maintenance on their tools--without pay.
 
Regarding the RCAF, did Canada use SAE or Whitworth nuts and bolts?
The RCAF used/uses whatever bolts are specified by the original equipment factory. This makes hardware “untradeable” between British-made and American-made aircraft.
 
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The commitment to machining methods of the "Birkigt method" of manufacturing (the term used by Hispano-Suiza) blocked the rapid expansion of engine production. It required exceptional skill from the machine tool operator, and that's not something that can be trained up in 6 months. Birkigt was also wedded to unique tools for every part, which required a lot of time to produce.

Of course, anything that bottlenecks engine production bottlenecks aircraft production.

Interestingly, in 1936 the union demands included massive investments in new machine tools (apparently many dated from the Great War) and having the plant open for a half day on Saturdays so that the workers could come in and perform maintenance on their tools--without pay.

Spot on. This is the exact kind of dumbarsery the article I (well, Google) translated, expressly mentions. There were a lot of things going wrong at H.S after 1935, and Birkgit, father and son, did not solved those issues. And since the 12Y & 12Z were France only game in town for a Merlin, V-1710 or DB-601 lookalike ... this proved dramatic in May 1940.
 
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“ … I don't have any experience with parachute rigging, but I'd guess that it's much like team-cell manufacturing, in which one or a small group of skilled and experienced workers perform either the total operation, or perhaps a substantial part of the total operation. … “
That really depends upon the size of the factory. During the 1990s I worked in 3 different parachute factories on the West Coast of the USA.
When I arrived at Butler’s factory in California City, he had a half dozen ladies sewing, but needed an FAA licensed parachute rigger to do final inspections, assemblies and packing. Mr. Butler was one of the few university-trained engineers working the the American parachute industry back then. I had a much broader and shallower knowledge. The ladies in production had nowhere near our breadth of knowledge, but they could sew quickly and precisely all day long. When Mr. Butler announced that he was moving the factory to Virginia, we parted ways to good terms.
Less than a year later I started working at Rigging Innovations and soon rose to manage the Customer Service Department. I did most of the repairs, but all of my repairs had to pass one of the 2 production inspectors. Production tracking paperwork included 4 pages with half a dozen sub-inspections just before a section of the container was closed. When packing work got busy, we called in one or two more riggers to handle the overload. We had between 20 and 25 mostly Latina ladies doing production sewing. They all had their specialties (e.g. one lady did most of the harness sewing) and stations and only moved when another lady got sick or quit. I soon learned to sew as precisely as the ladies, but was never as fast. When Mr. Reid announced that he was moving the factory to Arizona. we parted company on good terms.
Then I moved to Para-Phernalia up in The Washington State is hi he operated on a radically different wave-length. PP only had 3.5 sewers working on the production floor, with the 0.5 sewer serving double-duty as receptionist and typist and shipping.
The owner managed the company and did sales. The production foreman had exhaustive experience with all levels of production but only held an FAA Senior Parachute Rigger license. I was an arrogant, Southern California-trained FAA Master Rigger with broader, it shallower experience. The third man on the production floor was a hippy/hill-billy with extensive sewing experience; but no desire to earn an FAA license. After we clashed on a pulls of quality-control issues, I was “encouraged to seek employment elsewhere.” Potential PP customers need not worry Ashe quit a year or two later and overall quality of Softie pilot emergency parachutes has improved since I left.
 
Truly was an uphill battle to fix 1930's France...I'm still not sure if even a victory of the Tardieu faction in the early 30s would materially improve things.
 
Spot on. This is the exact kind of dumbarsery the article I (well, Google !) translated, expressly mentions. There were a lot of things going wrong at H.S after 1935, and Birkgit, father and son, did not solved those issues. And since the 12Y & 12Z were France only game in town for a Merlin, V-1710 or DB-601 lookalike ... this proved dramatic in May 1940.
I've been reading sam40.fr for a long time. There's an article about French aeronautical production methods (http://sam40.fr/1935-1940-la-constr...ancaise-au-defi-dune-revolution-industrielle/) that discusses the French engineer, and exile, Henry Guerin. Guerin developed methods for literally stamping out airplanes at Douglas, which was used here in El Segundo to build the SBDs that destroyed all of the Japanese carriers at Midway. (I live within walking distance of where the DB-7 carrying the French observer crashed during a demonstration flight, causing a national scandal.)

Earlier this year, I discovered that my father's first job after moving to California was working for Henry Guerin! Guerin had left Douglas several years before and he was the person who interviewed and hired my father to work on the first aerospace honeycomb structures. My father, who was 18 or 19, was simply told to get on with it, with almost no direction. It was a small company, so Guerin was his direct boss.

Learning this was pretty shocking!
 

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