They indeed have developed it, but it was not used on French fighters.
French airforce from 1935 to 1940-41?
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They indeed have developed it, but it was not used on French fighters.
What about a better engine than the HS12Y? While the Russians and Swiss did wonders with it, it never became the equal of the Merlin, DB, or even Allison. If the French government and industry had supported the French Schneider Trophy efforts to the extent that Britain did, perhaps they might have made something of the Renault 12Ncr, an enlarged Delage 12GVis, or the Lorraine 12Rcr Radium racing engines.
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Fascinating thread. In relation to iverson's comment #42 I've long wondered what could be done with the Lorraine 'Sterna' engine. Lorraine were technically innovative, though IIRC the 'Radium' was a bit twitchy. The Sterna was oversquare at 148 X 148 mm and had a two speed supercharger but turning at a comparatively sedate 2700 RPM produced 900 hp.
There were planned / flown variants of Dewoitine D-520 with Merlin and V-1710. Same for the Arsenal VG-30 series.
Unlike the Merlin and DB-601, indeed the 12Y was at the end of its development rope. 12Y-51 with compressor had 1085 hp but would go nor further. Same for the Swiss variant, Saurer needed a new engine to go to 1430 hp; same for the Soviet M-100/103 : M-105 / VK-107 were only loosely related.
12Z was to be THE engine, but never worked properly, in 1939 or 1946.
Hispano Suiza sucked. The Front Populaire nationalized and played haoc with airframes manufacturers, but left the engine makers untouched. I've heard horror stories about Hispano-Suiza and Gnome & Rhone bosses...
Unlike the Merlin and DB-601, indeed the 12Y was at the end of its development rope. 12Y-51 with compressor had 1085 hp but would go nor further. Same for the Swiss variant, Saurer needed a new engine to go to 1430 hp; same for the Soviet M-100/103 : M-105 / VK-107 were only loosely related.
12Z was to be THE engine, but never worked properly, in 1939 or 1946.
Hispano Suiza sucked. The Front Populaire nationalized and played haoc with airframes manufacturers, but left the engine makers untouched. I've heard horror stories about Hispano-Suiza and Gnome & Rhone bosses...
Elan Vital
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I agree that the lack of interest in the Schneider Trophy led to a lack of interest for powerful, large engines. The focus on the Deutsch Trophy conversely didn't help either because France didn't produce any of the tiny light fighters with small engines in huge numbers.
It probably screwed over the aerodynamic work on normal-sized fighters (well a bit larger than normal-sized French fighters).
Seemed like the worst of both worlds. Kinda sad for companies like Lorraine.
True.
I suppose that depends on how you define "loosely". To my non-engineer eye, the Klimov engines were similar in all major respects--and, despite some brilliant engineering workarounds, fundamentally limited by the underlying design.
To be fair, it was never seriously developed. It was new in 1939, at a time when the the Merlin was (or at least quite recently had been) still giving problems. It sat out six years of war. It ony resumed development, briefly and half-heartedly, at a time when better engines were freely available as surplus and military piston engines--especially liquid-cooled V-12s--were obsolete.
I have to disagree. In its time, the Hisso was a great engine. But it was designed to an old formula and old requirements. It was a low- to medium-altitude engine with an emphasis on large displacement and relatively light weight as a means of getting acceptable performance without the complexity, weight, and lengthy development cycles occasioned by gear-driven superchargers. Arguably, this meant that France at least had a working engine in 1939. Remember that the Italians could not get any of their small-displacement, highly supercharged engines fully developed and into production before the war, despite the extensive expertise of Isotta-Fraschini, FIAT, and Alfa-Romeo. The British had a lot of trouble with Merlin combustion and could be seen as plain lucky.
We should remember that accident, past success, and timing often seem play more of a role in technical advance or stagnation than design insight or sound decision making. Military aviation development between the world wars is a case in point. The technically weakest and most under-invested nations at the start of WW2--France, Italy, and Soviet Russia--were the most advanced and heavily invested in the '20s and early '30s. The Dewoitine D.500/501/510, Fiat CR.20/30/32, Savoia SM.79, Polikarpov I-15/16, and Tupolev TB-3 and SB were world leaders when they appeared. But this was because the cycle of investment, technical development, and production/deployment had peaked mid-decade in these countries, and the resources and time spent were thus not available in 1939. In contrast, the US, Britain, and Germany lagged behind during the '30s, started late, and, as a result, approached their peak just as the war started. Timing. Synchronicity. Luck.
Koolhoven FK.55
From 1935 the Koolhoven firm had tried to compete with Fokker using radical aerodynamic solutions.
In November 1936 it presented the mock-up of an advanced fighter at the Salon de l'Aviation in Paris. It had slot-spoilers (instead of conventional ailerons), retractable landing gear and in-line engine, mounted behind the cockpit, driving contraprops via an extension shaft. A prototype was built in 1938 with conventional ailerons and 9 m wingspan, solely to test the operation of the power system. It took its first flight on 30 June, powered by an 860 hp Lorraine 12 Hars Petrel, suffering insurmountable problems with the Duplex reduction gear and the engine cooling system. The prototype was destroyed on 10 May 1940 during the bombing of the Koolhoven factory.
The production version, called Koolhoven FK.55, with 9.60 m wingspan, 9.25 m overall length and 16 sq.m wing surface, would have had an estimated maximum speed of 520 kph (powered by one 1,200 hp Lorraine Sterna) and 2,100 kg gross weight. It would have had a 20 mm Oerlikon cannon firing through the hub propellers and two 7.7 mm machine guns in the wings.
Attachments
@Justo Miranda - have you ever tried to do a D.500/501/510 with enclosed cockpit and retractable U/C?
Dewoitine D-513, it would be. Missing link between D-510 and D-520, between 1935 and 1938.
en.wikipedia.org
Unfortunately a hopeless piece of junk that delayed the D-520 to October 1938.
Admittedly "one learns from its mistakes" (Supermarine 224 & Spitfire, cough) but Dewoitine knew enough with D-510.
Another of these innumerable failures that, together, doomed 1940 France.
- MS-406 picked instead of LN-161
- Dewoitine D-513 a waste of time that delayed the D-520
- MB-150-01 unable to fly, 151 & 152 not good enough
- H-75s at least came in time, and in numbers, but from Casablanca (!) losing precious time.
Dewoitine D.513 - Wikipedia
Unfortunately a hopeless piece of junk that delayed the D-520 to October 1938.
Admittedly "one learns from its mistakes" (Supermarine 224 & Spitfire, cough) but Dewoitine knew enough with D-510.
Another of these innumerable failures that, together, doomed 1940 France.
- MS-406 picked instead of LN-161
- Dewoitine D-513 a waste of time that delayed the D-520
- MB-150-01 unable to fly, 151 & 152 not good enough
- H-75s at least came in time, and in numbers, but from Casablanca (!) losing precious time.
I didn't mention the otherwise interesting Sterna because it appears to represent the same general design philosophy as the HS12Y and had the same sort of development history--without the latter's commercial success (I suspect that there is a reason for that).
The Radium was of course as twitchy as you say--it was a racing engine and never got beyond the early development stage. But it was also in the same size range as the Merlin and Allison and was intended for 2000-hp in racing form, which suggests that it at least had potential.
1940 theater of operation, via google maps.
The black arrow is where the Germans broke the front with 7 panzer divisions.
Red is the border protected by the northern tip of the Maginot line: Longwy, La Ferté.
Red spots are four crucial towns were the Battle of France was fought, and lost - Sedan, Abbeville, Dunkirk, and... Breda (where the supposed French strategic reserve was sent).
What is pretty amazing is how von Manstein
a) picked the northern tip of the Maginot line: La Ferté
b) added some gun range / safety margin
c) broke the front right there
Note that Stonne / Le mont Dieu are in the same area (more or less the "A34" rectangle even if the motorway did not existed back then) as Sedan and La Ferté. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedan_(1940)#Battle_of_Stonne
Also Namur / Hannut / Gembloux.
en.wikipedia.org
On these two positions, the French Army did not failed, and the germans got their arses kicked pretty brutally.
Problem: the black line and the arrow... that's 100 km wide !
The black arrow is where the Germans broke the front with 7 panzer divisions.
Red is the border protected by the northern tip of the Maginot line: Longwy, La Ferté.
Red spots are four crucial towns were the Battle of France was fought, and lost - Sedan, Abbeville, Dunkirk, and... Breda (where the supposed French strategic reserve was sent).
What is pretty amazing is how von Manstein
a) picked the northern tip of the Maginot line: La Ferté
b) added some gun range / safety margin
c) broke the front right there
Note that Stonne / Le mont Dieu are in the same area (more or less the "A34" rectangle even if the motorway did not existed back then) as Sedan and La Ferté. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sedan_(1940)#Battle_of_Stonne
Also Namur / Hannut / Gembloux.
Battle of Hannut - Wikipedia
On these two positions, the French Army did not failed, and the germans got their arses kicked pretty brutally.
Problem: the black line and the arrow... that's 100 km wide !
D
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What the hell is a Douvres?
Do we have some concrete numbers on that?
It isn't all that amazing. The Germans did essentially the same thing in 1914, based on a plan going back to the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
France strengthened its border defense in the aftermath of its 1870 defeat--so much so that German strategists doubted the possibility of penetrating them quickly and at reasonable cost. Historically, German professional armies were relatively small compared to the huge forces that republican France could raise though mass conscription and use of its colonial troops. So Germany had to settle any war quickly, before France's full resources could be brought to bear. The German strategist Von Schlieffen thus planned to outflank the French border defenses by attacking through neutral Belgium and Holland, a plan Germany followed, in modified form, when it invaded Belgium in 1914.
By 1940, the Maginot Line protected the French frontier with Germany so much more effectively than the earlier French forts had that there were not a lot of alternatives to Schlieffen's strategy. It has been common to denigrate the Maginot line forts because they did not win the war for France. But this ignores the fact that they successfully sealed the border with Germany, just as they were intended to. The Germans certainly had no illusions about their strength. The German Army had carefully inspected Czechoslovakia's French-inspired "Baby Maginot Line" and had practiced assaulting some of its strongponts. The strength of even these lesser positions left them in little doubt of the likely outcome should they mount a frontal assault on the French originals. Remember, Patton's troops had trouble breaching even the rear faces of Maginot line positions, which were designed to be thin enough to facilitate French counter attacks. The US Army had to use point-blank, direct fire from 155-mm heavy guns to break through and dislodge the Germans inside.
The French did not neglect to plan for a flanking movement around the Line, either. They simply considered the Ardennes forests and the wet low ground along the Belgian border to the northwest unsuitable for Maginot-style construction. So, in the run up to any future war, they envisioned preparing a line of field fortifications, in depth, from the terminus of the Maginot Line proper to the Channel. With its right flank protected by the Maginot Line, a French field army could deploy behind the field fortifications and hold up the German attack while France mobilized. Once the front stabilized, with Germany's forces fully committed in the northwest, French mobilization would complete. At that point, superior French forces could hold the line to the north while advancing through the Maginot Line to strike deep into a relatively undefended German heartland, outflanking the invaders and ending the war.
Had the French constructed the planned field fortifications in 1938 and 1939 and had they deployed infantry and armor accordingly, Nazi Germany might have collapsed under the shock of defeat in 1940. Unfortunately, the political and economic situation in France does not seem to have been hospitable to decisive action.The French Right was already sympathetic to fascism. The Left was, at best, justifiably suspicious of the government's intentions. Moreover, successive governments clung to the idea that an expensive and time-consuming program of field fortification would be unnecessary: surely, when push came to shove, Belgium would abandon its neutrality and allow French troops to occupy its territory, either prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities or soon after, while Belgium's own, supposedly formidable fortifications held up the German advance. Unfortunately for France, Belgium took its own, perceived national interest and its declared foreign policy seriously, while it's fortresses proved all too easy to defeat.
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The place that its inhabitants, in their ignorance, call Dover. Douvres got of lightly. Consider the poor, ignorant populace of the Danish capital, who think it is called København. *Nobody* outside Denmark agrees with them. Or with each other...
And don't start me on Beijing having been translated as PEKIN in French. I vividly remind my faculty english teacher blowing a fuse over that siliness.
Unfortunately no. Just like Soviet pilots raming their adversaries later in the war, it was a case of desperate measures (and personal initiatives) after June 5-8, when the Weygand defensive line north of Paris started to crack and Paris itself was declared an "open city".
After Dunkirk France was left with 64 infantry divisions versus 142+ for Germany...
Thanks you for that very informative post.
As highlighted on the map...
a) on the central Belgium front (battles of Hannut and Gembloux, Prioux and Blanchard) the excellent and well equiped French First Army hold on superbly - Hoepner 2 panzers divisions there never broke through, and took huge losses. Even with all the well known flaws of French doctrine and tanks, when firing face to face with B1bis the Panzers ended in flaming shards of metal.
Unfortunately all this was for nothing - they were trapped from the south; yet Blanchard 1st Army recovered enough to give the Germans another bloody nose in Lille - and allow Dunkirk miracle to happen.
Blanchard 1st Army and Prioux cavalry corps truly did the job as planned.
b) same for the Maginot line up to La Ferté / Longwy / Luxembourg border: it hold pretty well, as planned.
c) The HUGE and deadly collapse happened right between a) and b): Huntziger 2nd Army, Corap 9th Army: in the Ardennes.
Corap was a good guy who raised alarm many times about his cruel lack of essential stuff: concrete for bunkers, AAA, munitions, MGs... and secondary infantry divisions with rather low morale.
Gamelin answer was "I don't care about the Meuse, your sector".
Huntziger (his neighbourgh) answer was (twice: in April and May 7, 1940, VERBATIM)
"Meh. The germans will never attack on the Ardennes sector" (what a visionary, I kid you not, he really said THAT TWICE)
A rather baffled Corap went to the French parliament in despair, telling them all this.
He found there Pierre Taittinger, a WWI veteran and champagne tycoon turned MP (vive la France !) who listened to him carefully; went to the exact place where the Germans broke through three months later (it was March 1940) and was appalled.
He told Corap "Don't worry, the parliament backs you, it's a scandal, we will write a vitriolic report and get you more funds and weapons".
Sure, dude.
Despite Taittinger best efforts, his report went nowhere. It probably got lost into the fast decaying 3rd Republic red tape nightmare.
And the Germans broke at the exact juncture between Huntziger and Corap armies.
But make no mistake, Huntziger went to Vichy, licked Pétain arse, zealously helped writing the antisemit laws of shame, and in passing, put the 1940 disaster squarely on Corap shoulders...
What is also quite infuriating is that all four DCR armored divisions (the 4th led by De Gaulle in Moncornet is best known, but there were three others led by General Bruneau, Bruché and Brocard) were send near Sedan to try and stop the breakthrough... and all three ended scattered, or dry of fuel, or simply flattened.
Bruneau put a decent fight with the 1e D.C.R but had to fight static as its tanks ran out of fuel, and the Panzers simply rolled over them.
2e D.C.R was scattered from the start and could not do much.
3e D.C.R was the best placed to counter-attack the German bridgehead on May 14 in the mid-afternoon; but Flavigny decided to wait for the next morning to attack (facepalm)
De Gaulle only did slightly better with the 4e D.C.R in Moncornet and Abbeville: too little, too late.
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Bingo - we can well imagine French pilots trying to kill tanks in ones or twos, but going after the tanks with fighters en masse was never an official tactic or strategy. That will, again, require FAF having probably the double the fighters numbers to work.
Plus the in-line engine types like the MS-406 being whoefully unsuited to that job, just like Mustangs were - because of that glycol radiator on their bellies... no such issue for MB-152s. In fact the real loss was perhaps with the latter - maybe the MB-152s should have been sent straffing panzers rather than battling with 109s.
But as you said - way too few of them...
Consider the following numbers.
After June 5 and on the Weygand line the French armies fought much better, and so did the Armée de l'Air.
Which was now 2000 aircraft against 1500 on May 10, and this despite a loss of 700.
Which mean the industry, after years and years of misery, had finally started going full bore... 1200 aircraft churned out over the months of April, May, June 1940: an average 400 to 600 per month (depends from April and June).
And this despite the German invasion (as far as SNCA were concerned, Sedan - Abbeville - Dunkirk was far from Bordeaux, Toulouse, Cannes, Bourges, Saint Nazaire... only Méaulte suffered)
Yet over those 2000 aircraft, only 529 were ready to fight, barely 30%. All the others lacked subsystems (propellers, radios, sights) or were stored in depots.
(Vichy and the Germans made a detailed count and found 2800+ combat aircraft by the fall of 1940.)
The lack of pilots was the final nail in the coffin.
But as you said - way too few of them...
Consider the following numbers.
After June 5 and on the Weygand line the French armies fought much better, and so did the Armée de l'Air.
Which was now 2000 aircraft against 1500 on May 10, and this despite a loss of 700.
Which mean the industry, after years and years of misery, had finally started going full bore... 1200 aircraft churned out over the months of April, May, June 1940: an average 400 to 600 per month (depends from April and June).
And this despite the German invasion (as far as SNCA were concerned, Sedan - Abbeville - Dunkirk was far from Bordeaux, Toulouse, Cannes, Bourges, Saint Nazaire... only Méaulte suffered)
Yet over those 2000 aircraft, only 529 were ready to fight, barely 30%. All the others lacked subsystems (propellers, radios, sights) or were stored in depots.
(Vichy and the Germans made a detailed count and found 2800+ combat aircraft by the fall of 1940.)
The lack of pilots was the final nail in the coffin.
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MB 152s also have twice the cannons per A/C.
MS.406 was considerably smaller and faster than the Ju-87G, the tank-buster the LW used widely at the Eastern front; that type also sported the liquid cooling system. The French 25mm AA gun might've also been interesting for use at MS.406 and the like, laying between the cylinder blocks.
And a radial engine to protect the pilot.
Unfortunately Morane was agonizingly slow in delivering MS-406s between 1939 and 1940; with the Curtiss and Blochs they were the one and only modern types available.
(if you thought Supermarine's Spitfire was slow to built compared to Hurricane, check Morane numbers - and weep !)
So once again, none of them available to straffing missions...
Another teething issue: a very shitty and slow information loop. Often bombers were sent chasing ghosts of panzers hours after the facts... or dozen kilometers away.
One truly abysmal example relates to the LN-401 navy dive bombers asked by a Colonel to bomb "some panzers seen somewhere X and Z, two villages 25 km apart".
The dive bomber unit Cdt asks for better coordinates. Only for the Colonel to erupt in anger, saying essentially
"Goddam aviators, they are tasked with the all too simple task of dropping bombs on the ennemy, yet they often ask detail, and more detail."
Saint Exupéry Flight to Arras is full of similar examples; they drove the brave Saint Exupéry crazy. He had a rather justified hatred for the late 3rd Republic France seemingly endless appetite for bureaucracy and red tape, including whn fighting a war.
"Be warned, when you cross the frontline, machine guns will fire at you.
"How do I know whether they are germans or French ?
"Common, be logical. The only ones who fire at aircraft; they can only be Germans."
Unfortunately Morane was agonizingly slow in delivering MS-406s between 1939 and 1940; with the Curtiss and Blochs they were the one and only modern types available.
(if you thought Supermarine's Spitfire was slow to built compared to Hurricane, check Morane numbers - and weep !)
So once again, none of them available to straffing missions...
Another teething issue: a very shitty and slow information loop. Often bombers were sent chasing ghosts of panzers hours after the facts... or dozen kilometers away.
One truly abysmal example relates to the LN-401 navy dive bombers asked by a Colonel to bomb "some panzers seen somewhere X and Z, two villages 25 km apart".
The dive bomber unit Cdt asks for better coordinates. Only for the Colonel to erupt in anger, saying essentially
"Goddam aviators, they are tasked with the all too simple task of dropping bombs on the ennemy, yet they often ask detail, and more detail."
Saint Exupéry Flight to Arras is full of similar examples; they drove the brave Saint Exupéry crazy. He had a rather justified hatred for the late 3rd Republic France seemingly endless appetite for bureaucracy and red tape, including whn fighting a war.
"Be warned, when you cross the frontline, machine guns will fire at you.
"How do I know whether they are germans or French ?
"Common, be logical. The only ones who fire at aircraft; they can only be Germans."
Radials are not conductive for 'motor-cannon' installations...
Yes, indeed. Unfortunately, FAF was left to use not only under-performing A/C, but was also out-numbered. Toss in the bad stategy and tactics, and bad outcome was just to be expected.
Both officers (and their superiors) should've been court-martialed (the naval commander much more severely).
Army Colonel for not keeping the tabs better on panzers, the dive-bomber commander for not being flexible and not willing to recon the area. How able was he to pin-point an enemy vessel on the feature-less Atlantic, if he can't find something on a tiny patch of land?
On the other hand, was it really possible for low-level Army officer to speak directly to the low-level Navy officer?
Military units were supposed to do their own recon from age of Alexander the Great, unless the doctrine was specifically against it.
Yes but they are conductive to take bullets and damage in place of the pilot.
The Blochs had the guns in the wings, not a bad combination, as shown by countless others aircraft from P-47 to Skyraider and the like.
The entire French HQ and 3rd Republic should have been court-martialed, when you think about it.
Vichy in fact tried to conjure a grand trial of the 1940 disaster (Riom trial, 1942 - with Gamelin, Daladier, Blum and others) but
a) the accused defended extremely well
and b) they proved beyond any doubt that those present in Vichy, trialing them, were as guilty as them.
(ROTFL, well done - it's like Monty Python "Holy grail" early credits with the fired people having been fired by people soon to be fired)
And so Vichy was embarrassed and dropped the trial in a hurry and in shame...
More seriously in 1948 an in-depth parliamentary inquiry was done, euphemistically called "Report on the events happened in France, 1933-1945".
Hint: what they found, wasn't pretty by a long shot !
klem
I really should change my personal text
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Absolutely dear archibald,I will say that France at that time was a victim of its own myths: its history, its colonial power, its gold wealth...but what was the point of all this? A debacle. At a time when officers such as de Gaulle cried out for a modern and highly mechanized army, the staffs reasoned by a midieval strategy relying on fortresses, but history has shown that no citadel is impregnable, the "Magic No" line, was a political as well as a military sham to appease the fears of the French people. At the same time that Germany was at the borders of France, the French political and military circles continued to firmly believe that Germany would never attack France, worse (would never dare), they said. I am convinced that "das urteil" should have been greater than that of Pétain. But the post-war policy has seen fit to limit the responsibility to a figure of the first world war.
the Maginot line presently has a bad rep, but it did the job, actually... securing the german-french border, plus Luxembourg, plus a tiny bit of Belgium.
the Ardennes too have bad rep ("they will never try there, through mountains) but it is a bit more subtle than that.
On one side was Manstein clever plan (7 panzers divisions) , backed by Hoepner half-suicide decoy in central Belgium (2 panzers).
On the other side was a tragic serie of mistakes made from February 1940
BEFORE
- strategic reserve to Breda
- Huntziger and Gamelin arrogance and complacency
- Corap and Taittinger opposite attitude, but they were ignored
- ignored warnings: from the Vatican
- from Leopold to Gamelin (they were discussing even if Belgium was neutral): the Belgian secret services had seen the 7 panzers move from middle Germany to south Germany, toward the Ardennes
DURING the battle (10 - 16 MAy)
- the Panzers jammed into an enormous traffic jam 100 km long
- France having 27 modern bombers near the battle, on May 10
- so nobody bombed the panzer traffic jam in the end
- the French reconnaissance squadron (at least four or five Potez 63 crews) saw this coming and warned right from May 11 of what was to happen
- Rubarth insane luck (and bravery and initiative, TBH) with the Meuse crossings, his "Rambo action" with 8 survivors, storming the bunkers and securing a bridgehead all by themselves
- the inefficiencies of the DCR armored divisions sent against the German bridgeheads
a) Bruneau 1st DCR losing its fuel and fighting still
b) Bruché 2nd DCR scattered and broken during transport
c) Flavigny postponing the 3rd DCR attack to the next morning
d) De Gaulle 4th DCR not ready by May 10 and doing better, but too little, too late.
So many lost opportunities...
Charlesferdinand
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Well, in response to the original question: two general changes on a political-doctrinal level were needed (at least)
One is that the effect of air power on the ground battle should have been better appreciated by the army. For your average general, the main task of aviation was observation, just like in 1918. This led to priority for the Potez 63-11 (one of the most numerous types in mai 1940, if not the most numerous) to the detriment of bombing and attack planes. Simplifying somewhat, the idea the army had of aviation was: just tell us where the Germans are, and we'll win the battle for you. (Not that the ground commanders did anything with the reports when they got them, but that is another story)
This also answers the question what the modern bomber units were doing in the South of France. They were reading the manuals of the planes. The May 10th attack came at a particularly unfortunate time for the bomber units. The new American planes had recently arrived, and most the squadrons were South of the Loire, getting to know the new planes and working up.
The second is to build up a working relationship between the politicians and the industry. Politicians, both left and right had a deep distrust of the aeronautical industry (Do Not Let Them Have Weapons! Do Not Let Them Make Money!) so various measures to curb their perceived power were introduced, while real deficiencies in efficiency were left unadressed.
So you had an inefficient industry making the wrong airplanes
One is that the effect of air power on the ground battle should have been better appreciated by the army. For your average general, the main task of aviation was observation, just like in 1918. This led to priority for the Potez 63-11 (one of the most numerous types in mai 1940, if not the most numerous) to the detriment of bombing and attack planes. Simplifying somewhat, the idea the army had of aviation was: just tell us where the Germans are, and we'll win the battle for you. (Not that the ground commanders did anything with the reports when they got them, but that is another story)
This also answers the question what the modern bomber units were doing in the South of France. They were reading the manuals of the planes. The May 10th attack came at a particularly unfortunate time for the bomber units. The new American planes had recently arrived, and most the squadrons were South of the Loire, getting to know the new planes and working up.
The second is to build up a working relationship between the politicians and the industry. Politicians, both left and right had a deep distrust of the aeronautical industry (Do Not Let Them Have Weapons! Do Not Let Them Make Money!) so various measures to curb their perceived power were introduced, while real deficiencies in efficiency were left unadressed.
So you had an inefficient industry making the wrong airplanes
Yes and yes, excellent post above. The Armée de l'Air got its independance in 1933 from the Army, and the latter was furious and made aviators pay the price in blood.
Their relationship was truly atrocious.
A major part of the Armée de l'Air inventory was a mass of tactical reconnaissance aircraft that were
a) perfectly obsolete (Les Mureaux, very old Potez and Breguet types)
b) under command of the Armée de Terre
that
c) did not knew how to use them properly
d) only wanted to control them to piss aviators.
What's more, even fighter squadrons could have their command transfered from Armée de l'Air to the Army during the battle in case of "emergency".
In Sedan the few Curtiss that tried to stop the massive bombing of French bunkers on the Meuse banks were, on paper at least, under control of Huntziger or Corap, commanders of the 2nd and 9th Armies; rather than AdA Cdt Henri Vuillemin.
It was a byzantine, truly awful organization.
For example the Potez 63 had fighter variant (631) bomber variant (633), strategic reconnaissance variants for the Armée de l'Air; but also the 63-11 for the Army, also for reconnaissance !
---------------
The 1934 aerial rearmement "Plan I " put into production, and large numbers, both MS-406 and Potez 63. It is because they had started so early they managed to get more than 1000 built... by 1940.
6 years is 72 months, to build 1000 aircraft: that's barely 14 aircraft per month.
Unfortunately production was sooooo slow these 1934 types entered service in 1939... and while modern at least, where obsoletes performance-wise.
The Potez flew at 430 kph and was butchered; the Morane was hardly faster (460 in a very good day).
In 1936 that was brilliant, in 1940 - not so much.
Their relationship was truly atrocious.
A major part of the Armée de l'Air inventory was a mass of tactical reconnaissance aircraft that were
a) perfectly obsolete (Les Mureaux, very old Potez and Breguet types)
b) under command of the Armée de Terre
that
c) did not knew how to use them properly
d) only wanted to control them to piss aviators.
What's more, even fighter squadrons could have their command transfered from Armée de l'Air to the Army during the battle in case of "emergency".
In Sedan the few Curtiss that tried to stop the massive bombing of French bunkers on the Meuse banks were, on paper at least, under control of Huntziger or Corap, commanders of the 2nd and 9th Armies; rather than AdA Cdt Henri Vuillemin.
It was a byzantine, truly awful organization.
For example the Potez 63 had fighter variant (631) bomber variant (633), strategic reconnaissance variants for the Armée de l'Air; but also the 63-11 for the Army, also for reconnaissance !
---------------
The 1934 aerial rearmement "Plan I " put into production, and large numbers, both MS-406 and Potez 63. It is because they had started so early they managed to get more than 1000 built... by 1940.
6 years is 72 months, to build 1000 aircraft: that's barely 14 aircraft per month.
Unfortunately production was sooooo slow these 1934 types entered service in 1939... and while modern at least, where obsoletes performance-wise.
The Potez flew at 430 kph and was butchered; the Morane was hardly faster (460 in a very good day).
In 1936 that was brilliant, in 1940 - not so much.
Interestingly enough, French-language Wikipedia notes 460 km/h for the Potez 630, the English-language Wikipedia notes only 430 km/h. Granted, the former lists the Hispano radials, later the G&R radials, but it seems too much of difference for basically the same horsepower available.
Anyone has access to some original tests?
Charlesferdinand
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Well, you have to be careful with the Potez 63 family, as there are many variants. According to L'Aviation Française (Dominique Breffort for Histoire & Collections), the 630 was the original version with Hispano Suiza, while the 631 was the version with Gnôme Rhône, here given for 443 km/h at 4500 m.
The Potez 63 is a good example of how the French air force got their priorities wrong: you start out with a serviceable, if not particularily brilliant heavy fighter. You then take out most of the armament and put in a very draggy greenhouse front fuselage, so that the speed is actually reduced to 425 km/h. And then you decide that this will be your main type, building over 700 of them. Most of these were used in penny packets, under direct command of ground units, again just like the 'Corps Aircraft' of 1918. Needless to say, they were shot down in droves, for very little result.
The Potez 63 is a good example of how the French air force got their priorities wrong: you start out with a serviceable, if not particularily brilliant heavy fighter. You then take out most of the armament and put in a very draggy greenhouse front fuselage, so that the speed is actually reduced to 425 km/h. And then you decide that this will be your main type, building over 700 of them. Most of these were used in penny packets, under direct command of ground units, again just like the 'Corps Aircraft' of 1918. Needless to say, they were shot down in droves, for very little result.
Yep, and the H.S engines were utter shit.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispano-Suiza_14AB
14AB had cooling problems... G&R radials at least worked well enough.
Funnily enough, H.S in french is "hors service" - "out of order" (polite) or SNAFU (less polite).
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hispano-Suiza_14AB
14AB had cooling problems... G&R radials at least worked well enough.
Funnily enough, H.S in french is "hors service" - "out of order" (polite) or SNAFU (less polite).
Potez 63xy really required a much better engine than it was the 700 HP radial (of either company). So we'd probably want the HS 12Y on those, or the 14N?
Conversely, if the 700 HP radials must be used, keep the size modest, certainly not bigger than Whirlwind.
HS needs to keep it in V12 business only, leave the radials to G&R.
Conversely, if the 700 HP radials must be used, keep the size modest, certainly not bigger than Whirlwind.
HS needs to keep it in V12 business only, leave the radials to G&R.
It is hard to keep track about the many French 14 cylinders radials, because they are called "14+a letter" despite being from different builders. Makes my brain bleed as much as keeping track of Su-27 variants (the horror, the horror).
Basically the Potez 631 and Breguet 690, being from a 1934 program, had 700 hp radials - first, Hispano Suiza and then Gnome&Rhone.
Then the same G&R had a much more powerful radial for the MB.174 and LeO-451 and Amiot 350 series: 14N had 1080 hp.
Also MB-152 / 155 series, which de facto was the French 1940 fighter with the most horse power - how about that: 860 hp for a Morane, 910 hp for a Dewoitine... only the Curtiss came close, but it had a foreign engine.
This meant that, for the same mission of strategic reconnaissance
- Potez 631: 2*700 hp, 430 km per hour
- Bloch MB-174: 2*1100 hp, nearly 530 km per hour.
Sant Exupéry II/33 flew both types and quickly learned which type had the best chance to survive.
To makes matters ever more complicated, there were 14N variants of the Breguet 693 (the Breguets 697 and 700) and Potez 631 (Potez 670). The Potez wasn't worth a development, but the Breguet was great, it really benefited from the 800 hp+ in its assault mission...
Breguet 700 C2 (Heavy Fighter)
The Breguet 700 C2 (Destroyer) was the designation given to a heavy fighter that would have been based on the Br 691 two-seat attack bomber, which had itself been developed from the Br 690 twin-engined fighter
www.historyofwar.org
Both Breguet 697 and 700 were re-engined 691s, of which 78 had been built and... immediately grounded and sent to depots as their engines failed almost immediately (facepalm).
Imagine if all those Breguet 691s had been converted into 697s...
Bréguet 693 - Wikipedia
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G&R made:
- small 14M (~700 HP)
- big 14N (1000-1180 HP)
(the obsolete and unreliable 14K was long gone from production, and 14R was too late - a very promissing engine)
HS made the 14A and 14B - both of ~700 HP, difference was in rotation.
Not the same engines - the 14N was bigger, heavier and more powerful. Difference between the 14M and 14N was like the RR Kestrel vs. Merlin.
Once does wonder how the small MB 15X series was so slow on good horse power installed.
Potez was probably worth development, if the better engine can had for it.
Breguet was somewhat smaller than the Potez 63xy, so on same motorization was faster. Still 2x700 HP.
So somebody on my forum had created a thread in which he says that the Nieuport 161 could change history if it entered into service with the French Air force before the outbreak of the war, was this fighter good enough to make a difference.
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