View: https://www.reddit.com/r/nuclearweapons/comments/1txpjbd/it_looks_like_russian_eks_early_warning/
Proof of what has been suspected for a long time but never proven until now – the GNSS constellations are highly susceptible to extremely wide area jamming from GEO/HEO, and apparently Russia has already fielded and tested multiple satellites with this capability.
Even crazier, the satellites with this capability have been identified to be satellites that are publicly identified as being the Russian equivalent of DSP satellites — so in other words, their nuclear early warning satellites are playing double duty as
continental-scale GNSS jammers!
Including this capability aboard their DSP-equivalent satellites instead of on board separate satellites may not be the smartest move since it strongly incentivizes targeting their DSP satellites, the loss of which would be incredibly destabilizing in the most dangerous way possible (one of the fundamental tenants of "stable MAD" is that you do not touch or interfere with nuclear early warning systems in any way, as degrading or destroying them is massively destabilizing and greatly increases the odds of nuclear first use by the nation with degraded/destroyed nuclear early warning capabilities).
On the other hand, by co-locating it with the DSP satellites, you could argue that they've tried to take advantage of how damaging it would be to nuclear stability to target and destroy their DSP satellites, thereby relying on the importance of not damaging nuclear warning capabilities to shield the blatantly weaponized wide area GNSS jamming capability from interference. It's a ballsy and risky move, but it could pay off for Russia.
This also lends further credence to the long-standing dogma in the US nuclear ballistic/cruise missile design community of never ever relying on GNSS in any way on nuclear delivery platforms (e.g. pure INS or pure INS + star sighting on ballistic missiles, onboard SINS/ESGN with extended period between resets and multiple PNT sources beyond GNSS for resets aboard ballistic missile submarines, pure INS or pure INS + TERCOM/DSMAC for cruise missiles, etc), and limiting its use to only one of multiple sources for periodic ESGN resets aboard the Trident submarines (which can operate in GNSS-denied environments with minimal accuracy degradation in the short to mid term, although in the long term accuracy would degrade more significantly if they were forced to rely exclusively on non-GNSS PNT sources for ESGN resets over a longer period of time).
As you can see, it is quite trivial to jam GNSS over a wide area, and in any scenario involving an exchange of nuclear weapons, the designers quite justifiably assumed that GNSS would be unreliable or denied entirely. And as it turns out, Russia has actually fielded and tested the exact systems that the designers were concerned about protecting these nuclear delivery systems against the existence of.
The satellite that has been confirmed to be the source of GNSS interference is Kosmos 2546 (aka Cosmos 2546). However as the earliest detected event was in October 2019 (prior to Kosmos 2546's launch), this suggests that at minimum at least one (if not multiple) of the first three EKS satellites also has this capability. The most conservative possible explanation would be that this October 2019 event came from the recently-launched Kosmos 2541, which would possibly imply that potentially only Kosmos 2541 onwards has this GNSS jamming capability. Unfortunately high resolution raw radio data is not available for older events, so it is impossible to prove which EKS satellite(s) produced the numerous examples of GNSS jamming signals observed prior to the capture of the Kosmos 2546 event, especially so prior to the launch of the Kosmos 2546 satellite. It is equally (potentially even more) likely that all EKS satellites carry this system on board, and thus Russia only began these brief semi-operational diagnostic tests of the system after Kosmos 2541's launch (which brought the constellation to a total of 3 active satellites). The timing could be a coincidence, or it could be due to the orbits required, or due to coverage required, or due to needing a certain minimum number of operational satellites before attempting to test the system, or any of many other possible explanations.
For more information on the satellite that produced this event, refer to
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EKS_(satellite_system)
Veritasium has also produced an unusually decent quality video covering the history of this discovery in significant depth with the actual professor involved in much of the research that has been done on this, which can be viewed at:
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tz23G_UXCGA
I recommend giving it a watch – the title is pure clickbait, but the content is unexpectedly solid, and it's well worth watching for the additional background information provided thanks to their access to and extensive interviews with the actual professor who co-authored the original research paper. Note that I don't normally consider content from Veritasium (or similar channels) to be worth watching after having observed a streak of abominably poor quality reporting from them in multiple videos (and was never a huge fan of the concept to begin with), but this video is a rare exception where they actually did a pretty fantastic job, and as far as I can tell, the facts reported in it match up to the details in the original research paper on arxiv. I am a bit surprised to find myself recommending one of their videos, but hey, I can't argue with the excellent work they did on this one. It's a pity that they can't apply the same rigor to all of their other videos.