Could TSR2 have been made to work?

[NOMISYRRUC]

Of course having funded 20 Gyron Junior sets for S1 Buccaneer and a tiny number for T.188.
It would be curiously helpful for HSA P.1121 had a limited number of full size Gyron been produced for early TSR.2 development work......

But there is the Conway......

Or the RB.142? That's the engine used by the English Electric P.17 & Vickers 571 which were the basis of TSR.2. Rolls Royce was the firm that BAC wanted to develop TSR.2s engine. However, for all we know it would have cost more and taken longer to develop than Olympus 320.

 

[Archibald]

Think France wanted that one in 1959 for the B-58-size Mirage IVB. But they picked instead the J75 (and Pratt as a partner in the next decade, up to TF306E). Olympus was also in the competition (4 years before Concorde, the irony), as was the PS.13 Iroquois.

 

[zen]

RB.142 was developed, for HS.681, civil applications and it's scaled down version.....the RB.168 Spey.

 

[Archibald]

And Spey was considered down the road for another "super Mirage IV" six years later, in 1965.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

Is that a reference to the one that destroyed a test-bed Vulcan (fortunately on the ground) when the shaft broke?

My source for that is Page 49 of "Modern Civil Aircraft: 2 Concorde" by Philip Birtles. He wrote that the cause was had been a difference in temperature in the shaft as the engine cooled after shut-down, leaving the top warmer than the bottom. When the engine was restarted and the power increased, the additional strain on the shaft that caused it to break. He wrote that the simple solution for Concorde's engines was a low rotation to even out the temperatures before restarting.

Ah no;- An engine comes up to temperature equilibrium very quickly typically 90 -120 seconds, maybe less on a smaller engine. That’s why you have a warm up time.

What happened was insufficient LP shaft structural damping in the torsion mode. What was “sufficient” wasn’t known at the time.

From “Sleeve Valve Notes”;- Rolls Royce Heritage & my dear friend G Ford (RIP) who witnessed this day by day.

The Oly 301 had an inter shaft bearing between the LP and HP shafts. While this worked it was troublesome leading short overhaul life’s and at least one major Vulcan incident(#). So on the 22R it was decided to delete the bearing, compensating for longer unsupported length by making the shaft much larger in diameter (increasing its section inertia). In addition it was decided to route cooling air through (maybe alongside) the shaft cavity.

Initially all went well on early testing, until out of the blue came a catastrophic failure on a ground test run in a test cell. The engine failed at full throttle and was so extensively damaged, determining it initial failure point proved extremely difficult. The failure was thought to have started in the new technology cast turbine blades so these switched back to tried an trusty forged blades. All was well when they started running again until a second, then a third failure in test cell and due to program pressure, the infamous Vulcan test failure that burnt out the fire engine.

Following an extensive investigation (•)it was discovered that a valve controlling air could flutter when near to closed;- a max power condition has minimal air bleed. This produced a cycling air pressure with the shaft causing to “ring like a bell”. The LP shaft should have dampened this out but was designed too close to its resonance harmonic so could expand and contract to the point it could touch the HP which it was running inside. Given the massive relative surface speeds a touch would be sufficient to sever the shaft, sheading all the turbine blades, releasing the turbine disc. In one early failure, the free disc ran around and around the test cell, like a buzz saw, cutting in two the overhead crane. Then the shattered engine couldn’t be removed but then again they couldn’t remove the broken crane either. With the Vulcan failed disc it bounced across the airfield for about a Km just missing the Bristol T188 being flight prepared.

The initial fix was to fully close the air valve and shrink a series of thin bands around the outside of the LP shaft. The final fix was the “Cake Stand”;- a series of disc mounted on a central shaft, heat shrink inside the LP shaft so that it considerable stiffened the shaft against bell resonance.

A very expensive test was undertaken at Pyestock whereby an engine was deliberately failed with a artificially induced pressure oscillation at the valve. Lots and lots of submarine netting limited the test cell damage, but still took about 18months to recommission the cell.

When TSR2 was flying they didn’t have the fully Cake Stand modified engines (external bands and air valve preloaded to shut only) so they installed a vibration pick up tuned to shaft resonance frequency wired to two lights in front of the pilot. They frequently illuminated but the shaft damped out successfully. I believe Roly got so fed up with them he ordered the lights be disconnected. Two fully Cake Stand modified 22Rs were either at Boscombe or about to be delivered when the project was cancelled.

The Cake Stand became a common feature on Bristol engines such as the Pegasus;- I’ve noticed recently it’s on a few non U.K. engines as well.

*a dynamics expert was brought in from NGTE Pyestock who was “an extraordinary clever chap”

# a Oly 301 was tested in a disused railway tunnel to see if they could get it to fail by cutting of the inter shaft bearing oil supply. It didn’t, so in addition to no oil they took the engine apart, sliced through part of the bearing support structure thus simulating a crack. Upon reassemble and test with no oil it properly went pop!

Edit
Just re-reading the article. They also shortened a aux pump drive shaft to decouple from the LP shaft and modified the reheat fuel flow.

To be fair there were a bunch of other problems on the engine;- bearing fires and fatigue cracking but pretty normal for early development and manageable.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is Derek Wood's plan for TSR.2 in his Scenario 1964.

Document Finally, the thorny problem of the TSR.2 is resolved. So much money has been spent and so much effort put in, it is obvious that the project must go on. Sixty TSR2s are ordered, but initially with less sophisticated equipment than originally envisaged. The weapons system package is built up gradually, allowing for an easier flight test programme. TSR2 becomes the most potent strike/recce aircraft in the NATO armoury. A further 25 are ordered and Australia, thoroughly disenchanted with delays and price rises on the F-111 cancels its order for that type and turns to TSR2, with major sub-contracts being placed with Australian companies.

In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.

In order not to waste all the variable geometry know-how accumulated in Britain, an experimental TSR2 is flown with VG incorporated and research is kept up. At the same time negotiations are begun with a group of European nations, including West Germany, for a variable-geometry fighter/ground attack aircraft to be the ultimate successor to the F-104.

I count a total of 135 production aircraft comprising the 60 strike/reconnaissance aircraft, the 50 air defence versions and the 25 sold to Australia.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Spey Phantom was developed and built under a fixed price contract that apparently was in vogue at the time. These contracts seem to be problematic, apparently the F14 was developed to a fixed price contract and it nearly drove Grumman out of business forcing a re-negotiation.

On a fixed price contract the development increase from 25 to 100 million drops the numbers from 300 to 238 and devaluation of 14% drops the numbers from 238 to 205, which is pretty close to the 170 built and 7 + 21 options not exercised. These are the roughest numbers; I've seen that some 400 not 300 Phantoms were required and some 45% of the flyaway cost of the Spey Phantom was parts made in Britain which presumably don't cop the 14% devaluation but have their own cost premiums. However they do give an indication of what was happening at the time.

This saga is likely indicative of what was happening with the F111K at the time of cancellation, which make the TSR2 look more attractive.

 

[zen]

Two fully Cake Stand modified 22Rs were either at Boscombe or about to be delivered when the project was cancelled.

So had TSR.2 got the modified engines, development could have progressed.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The Spey Phantom was developed and built under a fixed price contract that apparently was in vogue at the time.

Now rather forgotten but the Spey in the Phantom was a bit of a disaster ;- engines becoming unresponsive to throttle command mid flight, reheats refused to light, asymmetric flame outs, violent reheat light up damaging the engine, to mention a few, Mac Dacs chief test pilot said of the RR Spey “with an engine that bad who needs an enemy?”

Many of the Spey problems were not fixed upon entry into service.

It’s not easy…

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

So had TSR.2 got the modified engines, development could have progressed.

The worst was behind them, but the Landing Gear maybe was about to fail big time ( XR219’s bogie sheared off a few years later, probably a combination of flight induced fatigue cracks enhanced by corrosion). The LG in general needed quite a bit of work and from the guys (D Young & D Roy) I’ve spoken with, I’m unconvinced by the opinion that it was all good at cancellation .

 

[Rule of cool]

Therein lies my support for the TSR2.

Its not that it didn't have problems, it did. Not that the mission wouldn't change, it would. Rather that in hindsight none of the alternatives went down the primrose path of on-time, on-budget development and production that could reasonably be used to justify the TSR2s cancellation.

 

[Scott Kenny]

To be fair there were a bunch of other problems on the engine;- bearing fires and fatigue cracking but pretty normal for early development and manageable.

Not sure I'd be willing to write off bearing fires, but fatigue cracking is definitely "normal for early development"

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

On a fixed price contract the development increase from 25 to 100 million drops the numbers from 300 to 238 and devaluation of 14% drops the numbers from 238 to 205, which is pretty close to the 170 built and 7 + 21 options not exercised. These are the roughest numbers; I've seen that some 400 not 300 Phantoms were required and some 45% of the flyaway cost of the Spey Phantom was parts made in Britain which presumably don't cop the 14% devaluation but have their own cost premiums. However they do give an indication of what was happening at the time.

I've seen no reference to 400 Phantoms being the original requirement (which doesn't mean it wasn't) although Roy Boot (who was in a position to know) wrote on Page 185 of "From Spitfire to Eurofighter" that MACAIR based its policy on an expected order for 400 aircraft from the United Kingdom.

The highest numbers that I've found are 315 Phantoms (175 F-4D & 140 F-4K) by @Yellow Palace in Post 206 of the thread "The Royal Navy with CVA.01" and an original intention to order 322 aircraft (140 F-4K & 182 F-4M) when the Phantom had been adopted by both the RN & RAF which is according to Peter R. Foster on Page 5 of "Aircraft Special Illustrated RAF Phantom".

I don't have any squadron patterns for the period between March 1964 (Plan P) and March 1966 (Defence Costings 1966 (WF1/66) which wasn't a lettered plan). The former was produced between the cancellation of P.1154RN (February 1964) and the cancellation of P.1154RAF (February 1965) so it doesn't tell us what we want to know. The latter was produced the month after the cancellation of CVA.01 (February 1966) so it doesn't tell us what we want to know either.

For what it's worth the March 1966 squadron patterns show 148 Phantoms being delivered to the RAF 1967-70 and doesn't show how many FAA Phantoms would be transferred to the RAF in 1975. I think the 148 Phantoms doesn't include the 2 YF-4Ms so the grand total would have been 150 Phantoms.

Though it does show the RAF as having a total fighter force of 120 Phantoms in 10 squadrons on 31.03.77. That includes 36 in 3 maritime squadrons. The deployment of the force in March 1977 was to have been 5 squadrons in Fighter Command (including 2 maritime squadrons), 2 squadrons in Germany, one squadron in FEAF and 2 squadrons in FEAF (including one maritime squadron).

The RAF actually had 9 fighter squadrons in March 1977 including 2 squadrons equipped with Lightnings and one maritime fighter squadron. However, there was also 892NAS aboard Ark Royal which made a total of 10 squadrons including 2 maritime squadrons. The deployment was 6 squadrons in Strike Command including both Lighting squadrons & the maritime squadron and 2 squadrons in Germany.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The Spey Phantom was developed and built under a fixed price contract that apparently was in vogue at the time. These contracts seem to be problematic, apparently the F14 was developed to a fixed price contract and it nearly drove Grumman out of business forcing a re-negotiation.

On a fixed price contract the development increase from 25 to 100 million drops the numbers from 300 to 238 and devaluation of 14% drops the numbers from 238 to 205, which is pretty close to the 170 built and 7 + 21 options not exercised. These are the roughest numbers; I've seen that some 400 not 300 Phantoms were required and some 45% of the flyaway cost of the Spey Phantom was parts made in Britain which presumably don't cop the 14% devaluation but have their own cost premiums. However they do give an indication of what was happening at the time.

For what it's worth I've read that the number of Spey Phantoms was reduced because it was a fixed price contract too, but I don't remember where I read it. I also remember the same source saying that the number of F-4Ms was reduced because the RAF received F-4Ks ordered for the RN, but that may have been because they were too far down the production line to be completed as F-4Ms.

However, whatever the number required had been, the number actually ordered was 223, as follows.

• 4 on 27.10.64 consisting of 2 YF-4K and 2 F-4K - all for the MinTech/MoD (PE).
• 60 on 06.07.65 consisting of 2 YF-4M for the MinTech/MoD (PE), 20 F-4K and 38 F-4M.
• 159 on 26.10.66 consisting of 35 F-4K and 124 F-4M.

My source is the articles on British military aircraft orders 1950-87 in Aeromilitaria Magazine, which can be downloaded from the Air Britain website.

The 223 aircraft consisted of 59 Phantom FG.1 (2 YF-4K & 57 F-4) and 164 Phantom FGR.2 (2 YF-4M & 162 F-4M). As you and I know only 170 (consisting of 52 FG.1 and 118 FG.2) were actually built. That is 14 F-4M from the July 1965 order were cancelled and 39 aircraft (7 F-4K & 32 F-4M) were cut from the October 1966 order.

I suspect that a greater proportion of the aircraft ordered and build were to have been F-4Ks but they were changed to F-4Ms as the number of RN versions required was reduced from 140 to 52.

The 223 aircraft ordered match other sources such as the British Military Serials books, the UK Serials website and P.R. Foster's book. However, they don't match the March 1966 squadron patters which shows a requirement for 148 Phantoms (38 on requisition & a further requirement for 110) when 162 were ordered (38 in July 1965 & 124 in October 1966).

 

[Yellow Palace]

The highest numbers that I've found are 315 Phantoms (175 F-4D & 140 F-4K) by @Yellow Palace in Post 206 of the thread "The Royal Navy with CVA.01" and an original intention to order 322 aircraft (140 F-4K & 182 F-4M) when the Phantom had been adopted by both the RN & RAF which is according to Peter R. Foster on Page 5 of "Aircraft Special Illustrated RAF Phantom".

That figure comes from @alertken back in 2010: https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/raf-with-tsr2-etc-but-what-fighters.10445/#post-98246

That figure lines up nicely with ten squadrons of 12 aircraft to replace Lightnings, as per the 1964 plans you've shared elsewhere (5 UK, 2 Germany, 1 Middle East, 2 Far East). The usual allowance for OCU and spare aircraft gives 120 operational aircraft from a total order of 175.

 

[Kiltonge]

"Desired" is the wording used in GOR.339 with M0.95 specced

OR.343 updates to M0.9 with "and ability to make a short burst at supersonic speed provided that this can be done without affecting the design of the weapon system"

For reference, MRCA requirement late 1968 was 250nm radius lo-lo at M0.9.0

Germany required M1.8 dash at altitude, UK M2.0, Italy M2.2

 

[Rule of cool]

Whatever the number, in a fixed contract the increase of development from 25 to 100 million reduces the number that is affordable by ~62 if the unit price is 1.2 million which is fair enough assumption. As for the rest the devaluation raises the cost of everything US by 14%, and the 1965 Plowden report on British airliners said British production costs are 10-15% greater than the US, which likely takes out another ~40-45 aircraft at 1.2 million each, so we're down over 100 aircraft already before any other costs.

IIUC the F111K was supposed to cost 125 million pounds back when the TSR2 was cancelled in 1965 but itself was 425 million pounds at cancellation in 1968, presumably after devaluation jacked up the price by 14% in one day.

 

[orlovsky]

The "up to 400" is from wiki, quoting Hobbs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_Phantom_in_UK_service#cite_note-Hobbs-23
I assume this book? https://shop.keypublishing.com/products/british-phantoms

The P1154 would have split 2 RAF : 1 RN, so 400 total would be close to the 140 F-4K often mentioned.

I vaguely remember reading that the price rose from 1.2 to 3 million L per copy, which would be in line: 400x1.2=480; 3x170=510
Apart from development costs, the offset agreements, costs of tooling, the spey problems and the ever smaller production run probably drove up unit costs.

On the other hand, here we have "280"...

Wayback Machine

 

[zen]

Gunston states it was projected to cost £1.2 million per plane and actually cost £3.55 Million per plane

 

[orlovsky]

Question is if that is apples to apples. But it would give a total budget of 600 Mio L.

The F-4J would be ~1 mio L before devaluation per unit, so with spares and support the 1.2 mio looks quite low. The RAN calculated a 60% markup for that on F-4Bs in its Oriskany class report.

 

[Kiltonge]

IIUC the F111K was supposed to cost 125 million pounds back when the TSR2 was cancelled in 1965 but itself was 425 million pounds at cancellation in 1968, presumably after devaluation jacked up the price by 14% in one day.

Per Hansard the 111K termination charges paid to the USA were £25 million, including expenditure already incurred, plus further charges for cancellation of UK-sourced materials ( such as the three simulators to have been built by Miles and Elliott ) and the loss of a huge chunk of the $825 million in offsets to be placed with UK companies by GD and other vendors*.

The Cabinet originally looked at sacrificing 50 Phantoms to save the 111K, but the Phantoms were going to cost as much to cancel as to deliver so they survived. The government then looked at cancelling 15 111Ks to bring them under budget but that left an unsustainable, over-priced fleet. So its fate was sealed.

* AvWeek in Jan 1968 estimated that $180 million of work had been placed into the UK up to the point of cancellation, or just short of a quarter.

 

[Rule of cool]

So much for Wilson's election promise of better, cheaper aircraft from America.

This doesn't save the TSR2 of course. The Government wasn't looking at it alone and freaking out, it was looking at the 125m TSR2, 25m P1154 and 21m HS681 and freaking out. The latter 2 need to stopped before conception for the TSR2 to survive. The P1154 is easy to substitute but I've never really looked into the HS681 other than that it was tied to P1154 via the NBMR3-4 requirement.

 

[Kiltonge]

The US DoD was so keen to save the 111K order, for industrial and capability reasons, that they added another $100 million of offsets a couple of weeks before the cancellation ( per AvWeek ).

The UK as a whole was therefore getting the F-111K at nearly a 200% discount, but the Gov budget just didn't work.

 

[Rule of cool]

By then Australia's F111Cs were being built to be put directly into storage, and the issues were arising about Australia's deal and what exactly constituted delivery of an aircraft as these were obviously not airworthy.

 

[H_K]

The RAF actually had 33 squadrons on 31.03.75

RAF Strike Command: 10 squadrons

• 6 Vulcan medium bomber (including 2 recently returned from Cyprus)
• 2 Buccaneer (incl. 1 maritime strike)
• 1 Vulcan strategic reconnaissance
• 1 Canberra tactical reconnaissance

No. 11 (Air Defence) Group, formerly Fighter Command: 7 squadrons

• 4 Lightning
• 3 Phantom

No. 38 (Tactical) Group: 4 squadrons

• 1 Harrier
• 2 Jaguar
• 1 Phantom fighter reconnaissance

RAF Germany: 11 squadrons

• 2 Lighting
• 2 Buccaneer
• 3 Harrier
• 3 Phantom ground attack
• 1 Phantom reconnaissance

Near East Air Force (Malta): 1 squadron

• 1 Canberra tactical reconnaissance

I condensed your really interesting post above. The RAF order of battle in 1975 strikes me (pun intended) as being quite a balanced and impressive force… maybe a little low on numbers (?) but high in quality.

 

[Rule of cool]

There are SEVEN different types of aircraft in that list, a successful TSR2 project would drop that number to five. A successful P1154 project (or some other, more realistic, path) would drop that number to three. The reduced overheads would likely cover a good part the cost of the TSR2.

 

[red admiral]

The P1154 is easy to substitute but I've never really looked into the HS681 other than that it was tied to P1154 via the NBMR3-4 requirement.

HS681 was easy to substitute with C-130. No one seems to argue with this one.
TSR2 was easy to substitute with F-111K, and then Buccanneer S.2
P.1154 seems hardest to substitute, with a mix of F-4K for RN, Harrier, F-4M and Jaguar

 

[Lascaris]

IIUC the F111K was supposed to cost 125 million pounds back when the TSR2 was cancelled in 1965 but itself was 425 million pounds at cancellation in 1968, presumably after devaluation jacked up the price by 14% in one day.

Going from 125 million to 425 is a 240% increase. That 14% from devaluation looks like lost in the noise by comparison.

 

[Rule of cool]

Going from 125 million to 425 is a 240% increase. That 14% from devaluation looks like lost in the noise by comparison.

Devaluation was something that cannot be traded away with offsets and the like, its another nail in the coffin.

On the other hand the TSR2 would hardly be affected by devaluation.

 

[Kiltonge]

The F-111K offsets were particularly lucrative as they were in dollars.

USAF Sec Harold Brown's consideration of the Spey / TF41 for the A-7 was a direct result of the 111K contract and the DoD's vested interest in reducing the cost of UK procurement, even though it reduced commonality within the US inventory. Happily it also coincided with delays in TF30 production, so everyone except P&W was happy

 

[Yellow Palace]

HS681 was easy to substitute with C-130. No one seems to argue with this one.

The 1957 and 1966 waves of cancellation both have at least one casualty that nobody's that bothered by. In the former case, the Seamew; in the latter, HS.681, and arguably OR.357 as well.

There doesn't seem to be a lot about it out there, but the RAF also considered EC-121s for the role the Shackleton AEW filled. Which would have been an interesting sight.

USAF Sec Harold Brown's consideration of the Spey / TF41 for the A-7 was a direct result of the 111K contract and the DoD's vested interest in reducing the cost of UK procurement, even though it reduced commonality within the US inventory. Happily it also coincided with delays in TF30 production, so everyone except P&W was happy

Not entirely true - the USAF was planning TF41 for the A-7 before the F-111K was on the cards, and there was some doubt in the UK whether it should be counted as part of the offset or if the US was trying to get credit for something they were planning anyway.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I found that while looking for something else that I thought was in the book.

That is, I thought it said the cancellation Olympus 320 for TSR.2 delayed the development of Olympus 593 for Concorde and increased the R&D cost of the latter. Birtles didn't explain how. I think he meant the the engines were similar and therefore the cost of developing the 320 had to be added to the cost of developing the 593. Which, if correct means that the money required to compete the development of the Olympus 320 was spent on the development of the Olympus 593 anyway.

If correct, not cancelling TSR.2 in 1964 may have led to Concorde flying sooner and entering service sooner. At the very least the R&D cost would have been reduced because some of the R&D cost of its engines was included in the R&D cost of TSR.2.

20 Concordes were built IOTL and as each aircraft had four engines at least 80 Olympus 593 engines must have been built. How much did the 593 have in common with the Olympus 320? Because if they had a lot in common the production and operating costs of both would have been reduced if TSR.2 hadn't been cancelled and the more TSR.2s built the greater the reduction.

Combine the R&D cost borne on the R&D of TSR.2 with the reduction in production & operating costs created by a larger production run and non-aviation enthusiasts may have seen Concorde as merely a huge waste of money instead of a colossal waste of money.

Nobody's commented on the above.

• Did cancelling TSR.2 increase the R&D cost of Concorde's engines?
  • And of it did.
• Was the amount of money saved by cancelling TSR.2 not as great as was claimed?
  • It was the proverb "what we loose on the swings we gain on the roundabouts" in reverse.
    • What they gained on the roundabouts (cancelling TSR.2).
    • Was lost on the swings (the increased R&D cost of Concorde).

However, Dennis Healey wasn't stupid. He must have taken that into account when he decided to cancel TSR.2.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The "up to 400" is from wiki, quoting Hobbs: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McDonnell_Douglas_Phantom_in_UK_service#cite_note-Hobbs-23
I assume this book? https://shop.keypublishing.com/products/british-phantoms

FWIW that book's on Scribd.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

RB.142 was developed, for HS.681, civil applications and it's scaled down version.....the RB.168 Spey.

I was under the impression (which may be wrong) that.

• The Civil Medway was abandoned in 1959 when BEA abandoned the Big Trident for the Small Trident with RB.163 Civil Spey.
• The Military Medway (without reheat) was proposed for HS.681 but it wasn't developed because the BS.100 was selected.
• The Military Medway (without reheat) was proposed for HS.776 a Trident-based LRMP aircraft, but nothing came of it because the HS.801 based on the Comet and with non-reheated Speys.
• The Military Medway (with reheat) which was proposed for the EE. P.17 and Vickers 571 wasn't developed.

As you've mentioned the Spey with reheat, the history of that engine's development makes me think that a Medway with reheat would have taken about the same length of time to develop as the Olympus with reheat and at about the same cost.

 

[uk 75]

If the RAF had come clean and admitted that what they needed was a medium bomber that could deliver two WE177s at the same ranges as a Vulcan but requiring large airfields and support to operate (Coningsby, Akrotiri, Tengah) the design impact on TSR2 would have solved many of its issues:

fuselage able to house 2 Olympus.

simple robust undercarriage.

side by side crew cockpit.

easier maintenance access.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Nobody's commented on the above.

• Did cancelling TSR.2 increase the R&D cost of Concorde's engines?
  • And of it did.
• Was the amount of money saved by cancelling TSR.2 not as great as was claimed?
  • It was the proverb "what we loose on the swings we gain on the roundabouts"in reverse.
    • What they gained on the roundabouts (cancelling TSR.2).
    • Was lost on the swings (the increased R&D cost of Concorde).

However, Dennis Healey wasn't stupid. He must have taken that into account when he decided to cancel TSR.2.

I'm not willing to take that as a given.

Is it possible that he took the Olympus engines into account? Absolutely. May even be probable that he did.
Is it a given that he did take the Olympus engines into account? No.

 

[Kiltonge]

Not entirely true - the USAF was planning TF41 for the A-7 before the F-111K was on the cards, and there was some doubt in the UK whether it should be counted as part of the offset or if the US was trying to get credit for something they were planning anyway.

Earliest funding request I can find for the USAF A-7 is Feb 1966. The FY1967 budget included funding for the short afterburner for its TF30-P-8. Spey selected early Aug 1966 by which time 111K order was six months old.

 

[zen]

If the RAF had known France would withdraw from NATO, elements of OR.339 would have been changed.
TSR.2 was designed to operate from French and German airfields of fairly austere condition.

Arguably the singled Medway powered Type 571 fits the bill of affordable Strike, with drop tanks out to 1,000nm.
In theory they imagined that a twin engined version was possible with scaled turbofans.....and that led by tortous paths to the RB.199.

 

[Rule of cool]

If the RAF had known France would withdraw from NATO, elements of OR.339 would have been changed.
TSR.2 was designed to operate from French and German airfields of fairly austere condition.

This is an interesting factor.

The timeline of French withdrawal was:

• 11 March 1959, France decided to withdraw its Mediterranean naval fleet from NATO command.
• June 1959, refused to store foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, forcing the United States to transfer 200 military aircraft out of France.
• Spring of 1960, US and UK repeatedly informed the French Government of their refusal to conclude an agreement the development of nuclear warheads.
• 21 June 1963, France withdrew its Atlantic and Channel fleets from NATO command.
• 10 March 1966, General de Gaulle officially announced that France intended to withdraw from the Alliance and demanded that all NATO bases be removed from French territory.

Aside from a general deployability, which is just as important in the British Global context as WW3 France, what could a British Government more attuned to France could do with the TSR2 design prior to actual NATO withdrawal?

As for French withdrawal.

At cancellation one aircraft was flying, one aircraft was ready to fly, the third was expected to fly in-mid-May 1965 and IIRC the next six were scheduled to make their first flights at two-month intervals between July 1965 and May 1966 when nine aircraft (less any that had been written off) would have been flying.

If the TSR2 survived then some 6-8 TSR2s would be flying by the time of French withdrawal, making it too late for changes. In any case the French didn't leave NATO, only the integrated military command structure, and leaders knew it would slot back in in a global crisis.

The ability to operate from austere airfields is an important point in the NATO VTOL and P1154 threads.

 

[Arjen]

In any case the French didn't leave NATO, only the integrated military command structure, and leaders knew it would slot back in in a global crisis.

As has been pointed out before, but it doesn't seem to sink in.