Could TSR2 have been made to work?

[Derfel Cadarn]

What does “work” mean?

“Work” for who?

I’m absolutely sure TSR2 development would have eventually yielded a system that would have skimmed across the Russian country side at supersonic speed, any weather, while navigating precisely with a few tactical nukes.

However we’ve now given up on tactical nukes as informed understanding is that they’re unnecessary, indeed maybe unworkable. Furthermore the first Gulf war showed low level was not a good place to be, so due to high losses, was rejected after only a few days. So is this a concept that worked?

The low level supersonic tactical penetration was rejected by the RAF shortly after they got the capability in the Tornado;- they disabled the capability by inhibiting (latter removing) the inner workings intake ramp control actuators. So why didn’t they even try to make that aspect work?

Such a niche, small numbers inservice, would have required disproportionate funding. What capability would have been lost to pay for it? There would have been no Vulcan, black bucking the runway at Port Stanley…. Would this have worked for the RAF and the U.K. actual national defence needs ?

A production run of 50 aircraft, maybe 3-4 years wouldn’t have worked for BAC, indeed it may have been a disaster, starving other projects of resources. Additionally probably it’s existence would mean, no 365/1000 aircraft production run Tornado. Damaging your ability to produce a weapon system, is that worth making TSR2 work?

The comparison with Tornado in the Gulf doesn’t hold water.

Big difference between the dangers of overflying a well defended airfield to deliver JP233, or lobbed iron bombs - where the enemy can simply hose down the sky with AAA and short range SAM - and delivering a tactical nuke from outside the chaos.

Close is as good as on with nuclear weapons.

The problem with low level AD is its lack of range and reaction time. To cover every avenue of approach to every possible target in East Germany with spray and pray defences would be far far too much.

In 1962 the Tac Nuke was far better placed in the nose of ballistic or cruise missile. From 1971 conventional bombs were best delivered from a medium altitude strike package of ECM and SEAD.

TSR.2 and its descendants simply ran out of time.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

So a bit of reality;-

Tactical nukes proved to be so useful they all got scrapped from the U.K. arsenal.

50 TSR2’s make it service by 1975 which was the governments expected purchase. With no follow on product, both Warton and Weybridge close a few years later, with massive job and capability loses.

Vulcan out of service by 1976. TSR2 lacks the legs to do anything in the Falklands.

By 1990, 25% of the TSR2 fleet have been lost in peace time training attrition (typical for period);- 38 left, with one third in deep maintenance at anyone time, half the U.K. available fleet, go to GW1. Yes, that’s 12 AC which have to do overflight weapons delivery.

Loses - compared to Tornado anything up to half the TSR2 deployment could be expected to be lost.

Is this the TSR2 working?

 

[Rule of cool]

There seems to be an idea that if the TSR2 entered production on about 50 would be produced, rather than the 158 and 193 fleet numbers that are out there. I've been trying to find info on the cost assumptions of the F111K and AFVG that led to TSR2 cancellation, but have only found a post on another forum, but one by NOMISYRRUC who also posts here and references Charles Gardner's history of BAC and Derek Wood's Project Cancelled.

I'm looking at this from a fleet perspective, ie the cost of building the full number of TSR2 vs the cost of both the F111K and AFVG.

At the time of cancellation TSR2 was expected to cost £780 million, that is £270 million R&D including 9 prototypes and £510 million for the production of 9 pre-production and 141 production aircraft. £125 million had actually been spent and £70 million was cancellation charges, which is where the £195 million comes from.

• £125 million for 50 F-111K.
• £170 million for the UK share of AFVG development.
• £170 million for 100 AFVG at £1.7 million each (which was half the projected production cost of a TSR2 in 1965).
  
  • £445 million Total, which is an impressive saving of £335 million, but once the £195 million already spent on TSR2 is deducted its only £140 million.

However the F111K escalated to £425 million by 1968, the RAAF F-111Cs cost 2 1/3 times more than the original price and the R&D and production costs for AFVG were escalating at cancellation too.

One fleet that entered service at the time was the Spey Phantom which was estimated to cost £25 million to develop, but ended up costing £100 million and the production cost was double that of a standard Phantom.

The conclusion I draw from all of this is that if the TSR2 does make it to production there is no benefit in cutting short production at 50 in favour of some other hypothetical aircraft because it would be cheaper. Even if that aircraft was the Phantom which had a cheap development covered by the RN, which would also cover the initial support structure investment, the unit cost approached that of the TSR2.

The fact of the matter is that the price Britain had to pay was set by those pesky Soviets, who insisted on building heavy defences around valuable targets. Perhaps the best way to get a cheaper TSR2 alternative would be to not give the Nene and Derwent jets to the Soviets in 1946.

 

[tomo pauk]

50 TSR2’s make it service by 1975 which was the governments expected purchase. With no follow on product, both Warton and Weybridge close a few years later, with massive job and capability loses.

Not sure where from is the number of 50 TSR.2s. It was, for example, pitched from the new government that 150 new bombers (50 F-111K + 100 AFVG) is to be purchased.

The follow-on product needs to be a delta-canard aircraft for the 1980s, to replace the Lightnings and Phantoms, and later the Jaguars, as well as to have a viable commercial chances on the foreign market, unlike the Tornado.

 

[Rule of cool]

Not sure where from is the number of 50 TSR.2s.

I think it's because the TSR2 is seen as a new V bomber and only 3 sqns of V bombers assigned to SACEUR needs to be replaced and the ~8 sqns of Canberras can be replaced by something else.

 

[zen]

Initial production is always the hardest and most expensive part. Once in production, it's progressively cheaper to add more on.

What logic supports advanced AFVG for strike, when TSR.2 a.k.a Eagle is in production?
Cost?
So as cost estimates rise AFVG closes on TSR.2 per-plane costs.
Cheaper to run more TSR.2 off the line, once you take in total system costs.

All that training, all those spares, all those maintainers trained up.
Not compatible with AFVG !
Which represents a massive duplication.

In this scenario there is no Buccaneer order and no need for MRCA Tornado. No international partners to veto the domestically sourced avionic package.
No Vulcans run on.

What is also likely is Air Vote is focused on other things through the 70's.
From upgrades to existing aircraft to something new.

50 F111K is based on 175 AFVG.....

 

[uk 75]

Buccaneer S2 already ordered for RN so no need for more than 50 TSR2
Bucs are cheaper and better.
AFVG still needed to replace Lightnings and conventional role Canberras.
Would love to see NATO papers on TSR2. 50 justified by East of Suez so still die in 67 crisis unless NATO needs them. They didn't save F111K

 

[alertken]

There were no NATO papers on TSR.2. Nations were/are sovereign on the kit they choose to meet their Tasks assigned by SACEUR.
(If 3 or more Nations choose to attempt Commonality for new kit they may request NATO Project Status, even though NATO itself buys nothing*: so, for eventual Canberra replacement (to be) Tornado; not, by their choice, for F-16, F-35 Users).
NATO had no view on TSR.2. It was for UK to offer Force to SACEUR for his assessment of Sqns' Operational Readiness. He is free to Fail.

SACEUR had AW targets in 2 categories: Opportunity, as the Situation evolved (cab-rank Tactical Fighters), and his Scheduled Strike Prog: Canberra B.6/US Mk.7 of RAF Tactical Bomber Force assigned 2/7/59, replaced by 13/7/61 by Valiant/Mk.5 to 26/1/65.
I have no list of those Scheduled targets: they were harmonised with USAF/USN SIOP 23/5/63 when MBF was assigned to SACEUR.
NATO/Russian Federation mutually de-targeted, 15/2/94, but doubtless the list has been updated, deleting those in Ukraine.

Exactly as PM Wilson was sitting down in DC with LBJ, 7/12/64 to talk Defence cost world-wide and to decline involvement in Vietnam, he was told of Valiant's cracks. Outcome, by 6/4/65 was UK accepting 48 SACEUR targets on Vulcan B.2/WE177B and receiving an Option for 50 F-111K, fixed price (excl any UK content) on 10 years deferred payment. Back home he addressed: TSR.2, or F-111K?

There was no magic to the number 50. It was the total of a/c+materials on order at 10/64 Election, so it was the number for which he offered £500Mn. BAC declined as it included sunk cost (at BAC, BSEL, Ferranti...), then imprecise (canx. cost would be £195Mn.) R.Gardner,Bouncing Bombs,Sutton,06,P176. Felicitously it was also a good number to equip NEAF+FEAF (32+8 Canberra B.15/16).

MoA Mulley told Parliament 10/3/66 that MoA 4/65 assumed >£475Mn. R&D+50 TSR.2s, cf .£125Mn.{+£25Mn.interest} for 50xF-111K, and that 10 yrs. TSR.2 "operation" (what scope?). was >£300Mn. >F-111K. So, it was, ah, courageous for PM to offer >£475Mn., using our taxes to subsidise Brit jobs. A cynic might imagine him holding his breath, hoping for BAC's rejection.

So: OP: could it have worked: i.e: delivered operational utility? Well, let us assume, as with F-111s, early upgrade of the avionics fit, to improve System MTBF; let us assume teething troubles as beset F-111A on first SEAsia deployment: fixed; and as terminated the Strike career of NAA Vigilante: not fixed as the User chose another way for his Mission. Well...that's what would have happened here, when UK 6/2/68 ran out of appetite to defend rich people. The Eagle OEU/Coningsby would have become, Swift F.7-like, a general Trials Unit.
(* amended 2000, 8/2/24: little: 1982 NE-3A; more since - MRTT, C-17).

 

[Archibald]

Mirage IVA days seemed to be over from 1976, as the nine squadrons were rapidly trimmed down. Yet with the countless successors invariably canned (AFVG, Mirage G4, G8, ACF, 4000) it managed to snatch the ASMP nuclear cruise missile (out of the dying ACF and from the coming Mirage 2000N, no less). And last twenty more years (-1996) in the deterrent role, and ten more years (-2005) in the strategic reconnaissance role.

So the TSR-2 probably could have lasted quite a long time. Once a plane is found to have a niche, but irreplaceable, capability and related mission, then it can last a veeeeery long time (Canberra PR.9).

In the case of the Mirage IVA it flew 12 hours long reconnaissance missions over Africa, with a multitude of C-135FR refuelings along the way. Only the Jaguar ever came close (10 hours), all the single engine Mirages being more limited by single engine lubrification (among a few other limits). Those Mirage IV and Jaguar endurance records established in the mid-1980's (because Lybia) were only beaten by Rafales.

 

[uk 75]

Alertken As ever you bring detail to help clarify musings.
I assume from what you have written that SACEUR had no view on whether Vulcan, TSR2 or F111K made any difference to the RAF dealing with their assigned targets. He just accepted whatever he was offered.
A shame but it goes along way to explain why the RAF is so relaxed about not getting 50 modern strike aircraft.

 

[Rule of cool]

Alertken As ever you bring detail to help clarify musings.
I assume from what you have written that SACEUR had no view on whether Vulcan, TSR2 or F111K made any difference to the RAF dealing with their assigned targets. He just accepted whatever he was offered.
A shame but it goes along way to explain why the RAF is so relaxed about not getting 50 modern strike aircraft.

I don't know if SACEUR had aircraft preferences, but I know that his request was a reason behind the production of WE.177Cs.

I don't think it was the RAF that was relaxed about not getting modern strike aircraft, they pursued the TSR2, F111K, AFVG, UKVG and finally got the Tornado. Rather it was the government not wanting to pay the price until it was blindingly obvious that they couldn't avoid it.

 

[Scott Kenny]

So the TSR-2 probably could have lasted quite a long time. Once a plane is found to have a niche, but irreplaceable, capability and related mission, then it can last a veeeeery long time (Canberra PR.9).

SR-71, WB-57F, U-2, ...

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

I don't think it was the RAF that was relaxed about not getting modern strike aircraft, they pursued the TSR2, F111K, AFVG, UKVG and finally got the Tornado. Rather it was the government not wanting to pay the price until it was blindingly obvious that they couldn't avoid it.

No, there was a perfectly good low cost option that the RAF refused initially to take, the Buccaneer. Like a petulant child they screamed it wasn’t supersonic, it was made for the Navy because it had a hook thingy/folding wings. The government kept throwing money at something supersonic built especially for them, only for the RAF to limit there shiny new supersonic Torando’s. to speeds pretty similar to the Buccaneer*. To add to the insult, the RAF took a bunch under protest, only to admit years later that it was really rather good.

The real opportunity that was missed was the next iteration, say the Buccaneer GR1, a bit bigger for more range and the TFR/nav attack system intended for the Tornado. Then with the money saved from the TSR2/F111/ Tornado develop a all British 4th generation fighter.

*the RAF Tornado upper door intake ramps actuators were disabled which limited the Tornado to about 1.3 Mach. This was done soon after enter into service because the RAF had no supersonic tactical mission. The Tornado GR4 replaced the actuators with struts. Other GR1 or IDS operators kept there’s functional throughout their whole service life.

 

[Kiltonge]

*the RAF Tornado upper door intake ramps actuators were disabled which limited them to about 1.3 Mach. This was done soon after enter into service because the RAF had no supersonic tactical mission.

The ramps were initially inhibited because the GR.1's undernose LRMTS limited it to Mach 1.4, so losing an additional M0.1 at altitude was trivial. German and Italian IDS, with a clean underside, didn't have that restriction.

Originally the LRMTS was intended to be retractable on the Tornado, but that was descoped around 1977.

 

[Rule of cool]

What the Tornado did in the mid 80s has no bearing on what the TSR2 was designed to do in the early 60s, a lot of things changed in those intervening 2 decades. Indeed the Tornado GR1 entered RAF service as a Mach 2 aircraft, without LRMTS and it was fitted later with subsequent limit on top speed at altitude.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

What the Tornado did in the mid 80s has no bearing on what the TSR2 was designed to do in the early 60s, a lot of things changed in those intervening 2 decades. Indeed the Tornado GR1 entered RAF service as a Mach 2 aircraft, without LRMTS and it was fitted later with subsequent limit on top speed at altitude.

The real world happened in those two decades, as it inherently does. There was no RAF supersonic tactical low level mission in that time so TSR2 would have been obsolete against its design intent.

The RAF sold the family silver to buy the fastest race horse only to not enter the race.

Tornado Mach number limitation was not only at altitude, physics doesn’t work like that.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

The ramps were initially inhibited because the GR.1's undernose LRMTS limited it to Mach 1.4, so losing an additional M0.1 at altitude was trivial. German and Italian IDS, with a clean underside, didn't have that restriction.

Originally the LRMTS was intended to be retractable on the Tornado, but that was descoped around 1977.

Are you sure about that?

The RASF Tornado’s had the LTMTS and I believe serviceable inner ramps, hence full performance?

 

[Derfel Cadarn]

The primary issues with the TSR.2 were not technical, nor even financial. Politics were the big enemy. The program was a political football between Labour and the Conservatives. The lack of other programs ongoing meant the Air Ministry had license to micromanage. There was sniping between the RAF and RN over the Buccaneer. The BAC team was not long enough removed from the mergers to avoid excessive bureaucracy and friction between what had recently been different company, not helped by English Electric and Vickers-Armstrong having to merge separate designs in the process. And in hindsight the cost estimates were recklessly low.

Ultimately, though, the sense I get is that as long as Labour is in power during development the TSR.2 was dead; it was a symbol of everything they hated about the incumbent Tory government.

When you look at the list of projects cancelled by the Conservative governments of Eden, Macmillan and Douglas Home (1955-1964), you'd be hard pressed to determine who hated the British aviation industry more: the reds or the blues?

Fairey Delta and Rotordyne, F.155, thin wing Javelin, thin wing Hunter, Supermarine Swift and 545, Hawker P.1121, Red Hebe, Red Dean, Blue Envoy, Saunders Roe SR.177, Avro 730, Black Valiant, Westland Westminster - all scrapped by Tory governments, most without replacements.

It was a succession of Conservative governments that allowed TSR.2s specifications to get out of control, while reducing the eventual fleet and raising of costs from eye-watering to prohibitive. It was a conservative government that tried to force P.1154 on the RAF and RN's wildly divergent requirements.

Labour may have swung the axe of one beloved aircraft (TSR.2) and two unloved (P.1154 and AW.681), but they saved Concorde, and at least put money into TSR.2's replacement (F-111K) and its replacement AFVG and began the work on its replacement MRCA (Tornado). They also saved the Kestrel by turning it into the Harrier. AW.681 was just a silly idea that no one wanted.

Hard to say who was the more destructive force. When you factor in the shotgun marriages of the aviation industry I would argue the Conservatives did more damage.

 

[alertken]

CV12: Labour, so dead:

CAS ACM Sir C.Elworthy “had accepted (canx of TSR.2: costs) escalating rapidly (quantity) steadily cut (he) feared it would run the whole (RAF budget) dry”“albatross round our necks (Healey) took the decision which would have had to be taken by(a Tory Govt.MoD was) writing (it) would have (to go. It was) just that (Labour) took the opprobrium” W.Jackson/FM E.Bramall(ex-CGS), Chiefs, Brassey, 92, P361.

 

[Rule of cool]

Something I wrote in another thread reminded me of this one; the Terrier SAM had a reaction time of 30 seconds and the Sea Dart had a reaction time of 12 seconds.

This SAM reaction time is what made supersonic speed a non-negotiable requirement for the RAF and every other Air Force worthy of the name. The Buccaneer's Mach .85 is about 1000km/h and the TSR2's Mach 1.1 is is about 1300km/h, so in 30 seconds a Buccaneer would about 8km and a tsr2 10km. The horizon of a radar 50' above the ground for a target at 200' is 16km, so by the time SAM is fired at a Buccaneer it is 8km from the radar, but a TSR2 is 6km from the radar.

Now of course all of this is a movable feast; the radar might be on higher ground, and refraction means the beam curves a bit so detection range might be 40km and the reaction time might be 12 seconds but then again radars can't see through hills or into valleys, might be degraded by ECM or chaff and the radar/SAM battery might not be totally co-located with the target but a couple of km to one side side to defend an area with multiple targets.

Every situation is different, so baselines matter. The RAF, USAF, AdlA and RAAF all wanted supersonic dash over the target capability not because it was cool and cool is better than uncool (which is obviously true), but because of the simple maths of radar horizons, reaction times and the like.

Added to this is the ability to outrun a fighter lacking a quality look-down shoot-down radar and weapons system. A fighter would have to get to within IR AAM range to get a shot, and this is hard if the speed differential over the target is slim, the fighter will run out of fuel before it gets close enough to the TSR2/F111.

 

[zen]

F15s would hit bingo Fuel in Red Flag Exercises against Buccaneers.
It's a hard task taking down a fast low flying aircraft.

 

[Rule of cool]

F15s would hit bingo Fuel in Red Flag Exercises against Buccaneers.
It's a hard task taking down a fast low flying aircraft.

And the F15 is, well.....THE F15! If it struggles against a subsonic, naval bomber what hope does a Mig 21/23/25 or Su 11/15 have against a supersonic TSR2.

 

[zen]

And the F15 is, well.....THE F15! If it struggles against a subsonic, naval bomber what hope does a Mig 21/23/25 or Su 11/15 have against a supersonic TSR2.

To be fair, I don't know the conditions of those Red Flag exercises.

But we do know SAAF Buccaneers achieved quite a reputation.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

And the F15 is, well.....THE F15! If it struggles against a subsonic, naval bomber what hope does a Mig 21/23/25 or Su 11/15 have against a supersonic TSR2.

If Buccaneer did the job, then building the TSR2 to get that useless extra performance would have more damage than the Mig21/23/25 or Su11/15 ever could have done.

 

[red admiral]

There's also the AAA threat at low altitude, which caused the vast majority of F-105 losses in Vietnam rather than SAMs.

My understanding is that the speed of TSR2 / P.1154 and Buccaneer at low altitude in practise would have been very similar at around Mach 0.85-0.95 / 575-625kts (because discomfort seemed to shoot upwards above 0.85 from trials). My understanding is that the higher airframe structural limits (750-800kts) for some aircraft were more for dives to give a higher safety margin rather than sustained speed at low altitude.

 

[Rule of cool]

If Buccaneer did the job, then building the TSR2 to get that useless extra performance would have more damage than the Mig21/23/25 or Su11/15 ever could have done.

Have a look at the numbers for SAM reaction times a bit further up, the performance usefulness is easier to see.

The fact of the matter is that by the late 50s high intensity wars would have to be fought with what was in the inventory at the start, there was virtually no chance of resupply from new production, or training new pilots to replace casualties. A couple of stats off the top of my head to illustrate this:

• McD averaged 63 Phantoms produced per month in 1966-67, peaking at 72 a month, during the escalation in Vietnam.
• From Oct 6 to 14 1973 Israel lost ~30 of ~95 Phantoms, before the first USAF replacements arrived.

The difference between the Buccaneer and TSR2 might not appear to be much, but that difference will accumulate in high intensity combat to the point where the losses and subsequent diminishing of the force become a crucial factor between victory and defeat.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

There's also the AAA threat at low altitude, which caused the vast majority of F-105 losses in Vietnam rather than SAMs.

My understanding is that the speed of TSR2 / P.1154 and Buccaneer at low altitude in practise would have been very similar at around Mach 0.85-0.95 / 575-625kts (because discomfort seemed to shoot upwards above 0.85 from trials). My understanding is that the higher airframe structural limits (750-800kts) for some aircraft were more for dives to give a higher safety margin rather than sustained speed at low altitude.

A quick check of OR343 and you are correct, it demands;-

“Fly 200Nm at a height of 200ft or less above the ground level at a speed of not less than 0.9M”

The supersonic sector was immediately prior to this,

“Accelerate to and cruise at a speed exceeding 1.7M for 100Nm”

No altitude specified, but it would be reasonable to expect this was at higher altitude.

Prior to this it requires an economical cruise for 650Nm, which would typically be say 0.8M at 35kft.

So the only bit the Buccaneer was non compliant with was the 1.7M 100Nm from the target.

 

[Hood]

Jaguar was the same, Mach 0.95 clean (Mach 1.0 never exceed), Mach 0.85 with underwing stores at low level.
At 45,000ft that was Mach 1.3 clean or Mach 0.9 with underwing stores.

TSR.2 would have had the advantage over most low-level aircraft if it could keep everything internal with nothing on the hardpoints. Stores are draggy and even at high subsonic the difference is marked between Mach 0.95 and something like Mach 0.8.

 

[Rule of cool]

I thought the Buccaneer did mach .85 at low level, no doubt that the RAF specc'd the TSR2 at mach .9+ so the Buccaneer couldn't meet it.

The RAAF wanted a supersonic dash speed at low level in 1963, did the RAF spec the same?

 

[Arjen]

the RAF specc'd the TSR2 at mach .9+ so the Buccaneer couldn't meet it

An unfortunate way of trying to meet one's needs - specifying requirements in a way to expressly rule out an available option.

 

[red admiral]

TSR.2 would have had the advantage over most low-level aircraft if it could keep everything internal with nothing on the hardpoints. Stores are draggy and even at high subsonic the difference is marked between Mach 0.95 and something like Mach 0.8.

From the data I'm aware of, then actually its the other way round. The smaller, lighter aircraft with external stores has lower drag than the larger, heavier aircraft with internal weapon bays. It's only when you load with lots of external stores that the drag goes up a lot, but then you can't fit those greater number of stores in the internal bay...

I think there are larger differences from other effects e.g. aerodynamic heating of special weapons was still a thing at this point. I think this applied to Red Beard?

There's also fatigue impacts on the weapons due to the noise and vibration environment you're operating in (not a problem in wartime when you're using them). I'm not sure this was a big thing at this time though as you're not carrying special weapons much in peacetime, and the iron bombs would be less sensitive to this I expect.

My understanding is that the low altitude speed limits are more driven by ride comfort, and terrain following safety rather thrust > drag.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Not sure where from is the number of 50 TSR.2s. It was, for example, pitched from the new government that 150 new bombers (50 F-111K + 100 AFVG) is to be purchased.

It may have been because 50 TSR.2s (including prototypes) were on order when it was cancelled.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Buccaneer S2 already ordered for RN so no need for more than 50 TSR2.

Not necessarily.

When TSR.2 was cancelled IOTL the RN still needed those Buccaneers because the decision to scrap the strike carriers was still a year away. Even then, the plan was that the RN would keep them until 1975 (later brough forward to 1972) and the RAF would use them to form maritime strike squadrons which was an additional role to the one that the 50 TSR.2s were planned for. Which is roughly what actually happened.

50 additional Buccaneers (including 4 for the RAE of which 4 (including one of the RAE aircraft) were cancelled) were ordered for RAF use after the F-111K order was cancelled. These aircraft were ordered to provide the RAF with enough Buccaneers to equip the maritime strike squadrons and the two Buccaneer squadrons in Germany.

ITTL attrition batches of TSR.2s might be ordered instead of the 50 Buccaneers ordered for the RAF.

Bucs are cheaper and better.

If I remember correctly from the RAF AHB narrative for the period, it was estimated that one TSR.2 could do the work of two Buccaneers, which if correct might not make Bucs cheaper or better.

E.g. there's the story about Lord Mountbatten walking around with one photograph of a TSR.2 and five photographs of a Buccaneer saying "For the cost of one of those we can have five of these!" Maybe the CAS should have put three of the Buccaneer photographs in the nearest waste paper bin and replied "And two of those re needed to do the work of one of these!"

AFVG still needed to replace Lightnings and conventional role Canberras.

Was it?

For a start, most of the Lightnings were replaced by Phantoms and it can be argued that the two Phantom squadrons that survived the introduction of Tornado ADV replaced the two surviving Lighting squadrons.

The Canberra is somewhat more complicated. The shortish answer is the only Canberras with a purely conventional role were the reconnaissance Canberras because the light bombers in Germany, Cyprus and FEAF had a conventional & nuclear roles. The Canberra light bombers were replaced by a mix of Buccaneers & Phantoms in Germany, Vulcans in Cyprus and the FEAF squadron was disbanded as part of the East of Suez withdrawal. The reconnaissance Canberra squadrons in Germany converted to Phantoms and some became ground attack squadrons, the squadron in FEAF was disbanded as part to the East of Suez withdrawal and the other three reconnaissance squadrons (one UK, one Malta & one Cyprus) kept their Canberras until at least the late 1970s.

Would love to see NATO papers on TSR2. 50 justified by East of Suez so still die in 67 crisis unless NATO needs them. They didn't save F111K.

Using the figures quoted by @Rule of cool as a bit of fun.

£195 million spent on TSR.2 at cancellation (£125 million actually spend on the project & £70 million cancellation charges)​

£425 million estimated cost of the 50 F-111Ks at cancellation.​

£620 million total​

£610 million estimated cost of 100 TSR.2s (plus 9 prototypes) at cancellation.​

Admittedly, the eventual cost of TSR.2 is likely to have been greater (for one things there's inflation) and it's also likely to have entered service even later than estimated in 1965.

One of the things that did for F-111K was the devaluation of Sterling in November 1967 (the "Pound in your pocket" and all that) which increased the price. Had TSR.2 not been cancelled in 1965 it might have survived the decision to move the East of Suez withdrawal forward from the end of 1974 to the end of 1971 because it was paid for in Pounds Sterling instead of US Dollars so it was less vulnerable to fluctuating exchange rates.

Plus as it was built in the UK instead of the USA more British (votes) jobs would be lost so it would be harder to cancel for (political) and economic reasons.

 

[Archibald]

An unfortunate way of trying to meet one's needs - specifying requirements in a way to expressly rule out an available option.

My favorite part in the entire TSR.2 saga is when, in the end, the RAF gets Buccaneer S.2 rammed into its... throat, of course. And the idiots finally learn to love the aircraft.
And then the story reach new level of absurdity when in GW1 the battered Tornados realize they have no LGB designator, but - surprise surprise ! - Buccaneers have one.
And thus, only three years from retirement (1994) Buccaneers finally go to war. Without a single loss, when Tornados paid a heavy toll to JP233 and ferocious Iraqi small arm fire.

 

[uk 75]

You will have seen the RAF history I posted today.
In sum the reasons for cancelling TSR2 do come down to money rather than any problems with the aircraft.
Faced with giving up other stuff (Orions instead of Nimrod, no VSTOL jets, fewer Phantoms or AFVG) the Air Staff opt for the superficially cheaper F111, which is then snatched away too.
It is telling that the RAF is too focussed on the East of Suez role when it is the growing Soviet air defences that make TSR2 essential for SACEUR.
The blurring of TSR2's mission with conventional ordinance does not help. I am now (even if the RAF don't agree) of the view that TSR2 or F111 is essential to replace the Vucans and Valiants in UK and Cyprus even if they are not needed in Singapore.
Buccaneer is a better platform for missiles and precision guided munitions which do not need a high speed delivery but still get an agile platform.
AFVG is not needed if we buy the F4E rather than F4K. Germany was using them into this century.
An RAF with some 80 TSR2, 150 Buccaneer and 175 F4E Phantoms could serve from 1975 to 2005 with upgrades and then hand over to a single replacement type.

 

[Rule of cool]

An unfortunate way of trying to meet one's needs - specifying requirements in a way to expressly rule out an available option.

It's no great loss, the Buccaneer was well behind the state of the art and well behind what the US and France were doing. Even the small and not amazingly well funded RAAF didn't look at the Buccaneer in 1963.

Keep in mind Blackburn didn't offer the standard Buccaneer to the RAF in the early days, but 2 modified aircraft of which one was very different to the standard Bucc although still subsonic.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think there are larger differences from other effects e.g. aerodynamic heating of special weapons was still a thing at this point. I think this applied to Red Beard?

There's also fatigue impacts on the weapons due to the noise and vibration environment you're operating in (not a problem in wartime when you're using them). I'm not sure this was a big thing at this time though as you're not carrying special weapons much in peacetime, and the iron bombs would be less sensitive to this I expect.

My understanding is that the low altitude speed limits are more driven by ride comfort, and terrain following safety rather thrust > drag.

Yes, IIUC Red Beard was limited to subsonic external carriage due to kinetic heating, however I don't know if WE177 was.

Early AAMs had a life 'on the wing' of something like 50-100 hours. The USN's problems with the Sparrow in Vietnam testify to this, the USAF with it's gentler launch-recovery had a better record with the Sparrow. I don't know about nukes, I think they'd be built tougher than AAMs as they have to hit the ground to detonate in many attack profiles.

I think the low altitude speed limits is about range, high subsonic doesn't require reheat and en-route defences can be avoided. It's only when defences can't be avoided close to the target that low level supersonic dash is required; then its life or death, success or failure.

 

[Arjen]

It's no great loss, the Buccaneer was well behind the state of the art and well behind what the US and France were doing.

Yet the Buccaneer was what the RAF received, after an intriguing series of changes of plan. Because it was available. Unlike TSR2. Or AFVG. Or F-111K.

 

[Zoo Tycoon]

It's no great loss, the Buccaneer was well behind the state of the art and well behind what the US and France were doing. Even the small and not amazingly well funded RAAF didn't look at the Buccaneer in 1963.
.

So what would those state of art peers be then?

The A5 Vigilante- offered to the RAAF but failed totally in the tactical bomber role, the RAAF dodged a bullet in not being lumbered with that donkey…

Maybe the A6, very similar spec to the Buccaneer, similarly length of service, indeed a fine AC but never offered to the RAAF, many USN/FAA exchange officers (67-75) considered it inferior to the Buccaneer.

Maybe the Mirage F2, never offered to the RAAF but turned down by the French Airforce,

Or the Mirage 4, rejected by both the RAF and RAAF.

So what’s left the F111, performed poorly at low level in Vietnam and was used at medium level in GW1.

 

[Rule of cool]

So what would those state of art peers be then?

The A5 Vigilante- offered to the RAAF but failed totally in the tactical bomber role, the RAAF dodged a bullet in not being lumbered with that donkey…

Maybe the A7, very similar spec to the Buccaneer, similarly length of service, indeed a fine AC but never offered to the RAAF, many USN/FAA exchange officers (67-75) considered it inferior to the Buccaneer.

Maybe the Mirage F2, never offered to the RAAF but turned down by the French Airforce,

Or the Mirage 4, rejected by both the RAF and RAAF.

So what’s left the F111, performed poorly at low level in Vietnam and was used at medium level in GW1.

I've attached the RAAF's 1963 list, the first 3 were for a 1966 entry to service and the TSR2/TFX were for a 1969 entry into service; the RAAF selected 36 x RA5C Vigilante.

The Vigilante was not a failure, it's primary role of strategic nuclear strike was ovetaken by the Polaris SLBM and the USN decided the A6 was good enough for their not very demanding medium attack tasks and far cheaper. The Vigilante itself was successful in the recon role, so much so that it was bought back into production years after the initial run. However the Vigi left US service in 1979 so the RAAF would struggle to keep them flying by the late 80s, which likely doesn't make it a deal breaker with hindsight.

How did the F111 perform poorly at low level in Vietnam? The initial trial deployment of 6 immature aircraft wasn't amazing but in Linebacker in 1972 the F111 was performing very well.