Could TSR2 have been made to work?

[Rule of cool]

The reverse is true.
By strengthening our forces in Europe and disengaging from outdated colonial fantasies Britain moved closer to the EEC and reinforced RAF Germany and the RN's crucial nuclear submarines and ASW forces.
BAC was able to play a leading role in the largest European collaborative defence project: MRCA(Tornado). Hawker Siddeley developed the Hawk, a simple beautiful airframe in the Camm tradition.

TSR2 would have been like the BR decision to cling on to steam and diesel locos in the 50s rather than electrifying major lines as they did in W Europe.

Britain doesn't need to cancel the TSR2 to become a bit player in a multi-role plane a decade later. Indeed if Britain had bought the TSR2 into service it could have dictated the MRCA project in the 70s as the senior partner.

As for non NATO commitments being fantasies, Britain was very adversely affected by the Middle East wars in 1973 and 1979, to the point of reestablishing a naval force in the Persian Gulf in 1980.

 

[Rule of cool]

It appears that you are seriously arguing that cancelling the TSR2 “likely prolonged” the Cold War. I need someone to explain that apparent rationale to me as otherwise that just sounds like an utterly ridiculous non-factual argument to make.

Not seriously arguing, just a bit of hyperbole.

That said, the Cold War was a contest that had much to do with military forces and alliances worldwide. By weakening its military capabilities from 57-71 Britain weakened the 'West' efforts in this contest. It made the Soviet Union relatively stronger, it weakened alliance structures like NATO/CENTO/SEATO and cost Britain exports that would have helped with this overall East-West contest.

Now maybe this could have shortened the Cold War, maybe not, but it certainly wouldn't have helped the Soviets.

 

[kaiserd]

The UK was not a “bit player” in the Tornado project, was very much a senior partner and largely got the aircraft it wanted (other partner countries generally made greater compromises re: their requirements; the idea of single seat variants were dropped and the aircraft ended up larger and longer ranged than Germany or Italy initially intended).
Further info on the genesis of the Tornado project:

https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/documents/research/RAF-Historical-Society-Journals/Journal-27A-Seminar-Birth-of-Tornado.pdf

In relation to “fantasies” are you advocating that the UK should or could (in capability terms) become directly militarily involved in the 1973 and 1979 conflicts? To what end/ purpose ? Are you saying that the UK could have somehow prevented these conflicts? And what impact would the TSR2 existence or non-existence have on any of this? Given that the US, a global economic and military superpower didn’t become directly involved in these conflicts and also didn’t/ couldn’t prevent these conflicts occurring then I’m not sure of how realistic your expectations re: the UK (with the TSR2 in this scenario) may or may not be.

 

[Rule of cool]

The UK was not a “bit player” in the Tornado project, was very much a senior partner and largely got the aircraft it wanted (other partner countries generally made greater compromises re: their requirements; the idea of single seat variants were dropped and the aircraft ended up larger and longer ranged than Germany or Italy initially intended).
Further info on the genesis of the Tornado project:
https://www.rafmuseum.org.uk/docume...nals/Journal-27A-Seminar-Birth-of-Tornado.pdf

Germany as a 42.5% equal partner in Tornado lied about the numbers it was going to buy (~600) in order to get the program HQ and first flight in Germany. Once this was signed Germany reduced its numbers to ~320, less than Britains 385. This couldn't happen if Britain had The largest workshare, as it probably should have giventhe capabilities of its industry.

In relation to “fantasies” are you advocating that the UK should or could (in capability terms) become directly militarily involved in the 1973 and 1979 conflicts? To what end/ purpose ? Are you saying that the UK could have somehow prevented these conflicts? And what impact would the TSR2 existence or non-existence have on any of this? Given that the US, a global economic and military superpower didn’t become directly involved in these conflicts and also didn’t/ couldn’t prevent these conflicts occurring then I’m not sure of how realistic your expectations re: the UK (with the TSR2 in this scenario) may or may not

Firstly the US did directly get involved in the 1973 war with Operation Nickelgrass, as well as having a pair of carriers very close by on DEFCON3. In Iran they launched Eagle Claw and much later Praying Mantis that sank Iranian warships.

As for Britain, I said that the TSR2 is one of several factors including CVA01 and was part of the confusion and decline of Britains military and foreign affairs power 1957-68. With TSR2 in Cyprus and/or an attack carrier in the Med in 1973 Britain might have been able to make its voice heard as well as the US and Soviets, maybe with 2 interested Western powers the Soviets might not have been so belligerent.

In a boarder sense Britain that had declined gracefully would exert far greater influence on world affairs to its benefit. Wider exports of complex military equipment, if not the TSR2 per se, means greater political leverage over the customers, it was something the Soviets used to their advantage.

 

[uk 75]

The debate here reflects the debates over the cancellations in 1964 to 67.

We are now in deeply political rather than technical territory. It is pointless to re-argue the debate over Britain's role in the 1960s world.

This thread has shown that TSR2 was badly managed and expensive with some serious technical challenges.

The proponents of TSR2 may be right in suggesting the technical challenges could have been met and a useful plane brought into service.

But the manufacturer and the RAF did not share this view. By 1965 both wanted shot of their creation.

Further discussion is pointless as it is clear that some here would pay the price which those in 1965 were not.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I would go so far as to say BAC was incompetent in their handling of the program. Someone who cannot even come up with a guess as to how much more money they need has no clue what issues were holding up the program. Edit: or, if they knew what the hold-ups were, had no clue how to fix them. In either case, complete failure of project management.

A5 and F111 show that the basic capabilities desired were achievable.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Didn’t stop the cancellation of YB49, Avro Arrow or Nimrod MRA4 or Martin P6M Sea Master

YB49 had issues in that it could not physically carry the nuclear bombs of the time (bays wrong dimensions, because expletives deleted USAF would not tell Northrop how big the bombs were). Plus, the change from props to jets halved the range of the plane, making it no longer intercontinental. Early jets were THAT thirsty compared to R4360s.

Arrow was largely trapped due to insistence on the Active Sparrow. Had someone put their foot down and said "we cannot make an EFFECTIVE active radar homing missile with the available technology" then gone to SARH Sparrows like Phantom was carrying...

P6M Seamaster was operationally replaced by Polaris. Not to mention Polaris needing that budget...

I know we've gone over why MRA4s were canceled, and I know it's not because no two airframes were the same. *forum search* Ah, right. Nobody left knew how to design mechanical control cable systems, and they searched all over the globe to try to find some.

 

[Hood]

People are forgetting that the cancellation of TSR.2, P1154 and HS.681 and adoption of F111, F4 and C130 was on terms of a new US loan negotiated by the Wilson Government. The US made it clear, it was to dictate what the monies were spent on.
It was made clear TSR.2 wasn't something that this loan could be used for and it's reasonable to assume that applied to the other domestic efforts.

Source?
The November 1964 and May 1965 loans were from the IMF, not the USA directly. From some digging I've done, it seems like Britain had done well at resisting the imposition of IMF rules until the May 1965 loan - when the IMF was getting worried about the frequent handouts.
They don't fit that will with the P.1154 and HS.681 cancellations in terms of timing either.
I'd need some evidence of these so-called clauses, so much of the TSR.2 tale is myth and spin and without concrete sources I take everything with shovelful of salt these days.

The economy was a basket case end of.
Had TSR.2 survived devaluation in 1967 might have knocked a bit off the list price, but with so much home-grown kit on it, it might not have made much a difference in reality.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

The following isn't 100% correct, but its accurate enough for my purposes.

Plan A - The major aviation projects at 16th October 1964, which was the day after the 1964 General Election

• Concorde.
• HS.681.
• P.1154.
• F-4K Spey-Phantom.
• TSR.2.

Plan B - Projects Cancelled 1965 and their replacements.

• HS.681 - Replaced by the C-130K Hercules.
• P.1154 - Replaced by the Harrier, Jaguar and F-4M Spey-Phantom.
  • 110 of the 200 Jaguars planned were the two-seat advanced trainers to replace the Hunters used as advanced trainers.
• TSR.2 - Replaced by F-111K and AFVG.

Plan C - Projects cancelled or cut 1966-69 and their replacements.

• F-111K - Cancelled due to the East of Suez withdrawal and a horrendous increase in its cost. The latter was increased by the devaluation of Sterling.
• France pulled out of AFVG, but the UK continued the project as UKVG which sort of became Tornado.
• Both Spey-Phantoms. At one time a total of over 300 was planned, but.
  • F-4K was cut to 52 due to the phasing out of the strike carriers and escalating costs.
  • F-4M was cut to 118 due to the F-4Ks being transferred to the RAF, the East of Suez withdrawal and escalating costs.
  • The escalating costs of both Spey-Phantoms were increased by the devaluation of Sterling.
• Jaguar
  • The two-seat to single-seat seat ratio was changed from 110:90 to 37:165, because the requirement for supersonic advanced trainer was abandoned.
  • The supersonic advanced trainer was succeeded by the Hawk. It replaced the Gnat as well as the Hunters used as advanced trainers.

The point of the above and the other posts that I was writing at the time was to provide background information for the following suggestion.

I think the title of this thread should have been "Could TSR.2 been paid for?" rather than "Could TSR.2 been made to work?" as the consensus of the thread is yes it could have been made to work and instead the affordability (or unaffordability) of the project has dominated the thread.

If TSR.2 wasn't cancelled it has to be paid for somehow. According to Gardner 150 aircraft would have cost £750 million at 1965 prices of which £125 million had been spent. Another £70 million would be spent on cancellation charges and £46.4 million was spent of F-111K 1965-68. That gets us to about £240 million (about 30%) of the £750 million.

My suggestion is that the balance (plus inflation and any further non-inflation cost increases) be paid for with the money spent on Spey-Phantom, Jaguar, AFVG, UKVG, the Buccaneers bought for the RAF and what the UK spent on Tornado to the late 1970s.

A total of about 220 production TSR.2s would be built to the late 1970s and equip 11 strike & reconnaissance squadrons in the RAF, which happens to be the number of Tornado IDS squadrons in the RAF at the end of the Cold War. They'd have an avionics upgrade in the 1980s along the lines the one that F-111's Avionics Modernisation Programme (AMP) which would be paid for by not having the Tornado IDS.

As suggested by Wood in his Scenario 1964 there would also be a TSR.2 ADV which in my timeline takes the place of the Phantoms in the RAF's TASMO force. There'd still be 2 or 3 Buccaneer maritime squadrons ITTL which would be equipped with some of the 84 Buccaneer S.2s that would still be built for the RN in this timeline. Due to the earlier phasing out of the strike carriers (see below) the 2 or 3 squadrons are all formed by the end of 1972.

ITTL Ark Royal isn't Phantomised at Devonport 1967-70 because there aren't any Phantoms for her to operate and she has to make do with Sea Vixens until 1978. Except she's probably paid off early in 1972 and Eagle is run on to the end of 1978 instead.

Or Lion the third Tiger class cruiser is converted to a helicopter cruiser at Devonport 1967-70 (at about one sixth of the cost of Ark Royals' refit) and she remains in service until late 1978 so Eagle is still paid off early in 1972 and Ark Royal is paid off early in 1972 instead of being paid off in late 1978. As Ark Royal had a crew of 2,640 in the 1970s and the Tiger class had a crew of 885 some of the balance could be used to keep Albion (crew 980) in commission to the end of 1978 (instead of being paid of when Hermes completed her conversion to a commando carrier) and keep Bulwark in service 1976-79.

So the RN has 3 commando/ASW carriers and 3 helicopter cruisers 1972-78 instead of one strike carrier, one or two commando/ASW carriers and 2 helicopter cruisers over the same period.

Two things that I want to happened (instead of what I think would have happened) are the earlier development of the ski jump, Sea Harrier and AEW Sea King. In the case of the earlier ski jump and Sea Harrier they come into service in 1972 to coincide with the withdrawal of Ark Royal & Eagle. Some of the R&D and production costs could have been paid for with the money saved by rebuilding Lion instead of Phantomising Ark Royal.

One flaw in that argument is that the Tornado IDS only replaced the 5 Jaguar squadrons in Germany and therefore what equips the 3 Jaguar squadrons (which previously operated Phantoms) in Strike Command? My answer to that is more Harrier Mks 1 to 4 in the 1970s. Plus the cost of the TSR.2 AMP in the 1980s may be less than buying new IDS Tornados so some of the money could be used to buy more AV-8Bs to replace the first-generation Harriers in the 3 UK based squadrons. Maybe the larger number of aircraft makes the "Big Wing" Harrier cost effective?

Bigger flaws that I can think of are:

• No F-4K Phantom.
  • I've already addressed that in detail. Suffice it to say that it's place in the RAF's pair maritime fighter squadrons is taken by TSR.2 ADV, both of which would be formed by the end of 1972 due to the earlier retirement of Ark Royal.
• No F-4M Phantom.
  • IOTL the RAF's F-4Ms initially equipped 7 strike & recce squadrons (3 in Strike Command & 4 in RAF Germany.
    • These squadrons re-equipped with Jaguars 1974-77 and the redundant Phantoms replaced the Lighting in 6 squadrons (4 in Strike Command & 2 in RAF Germany).
    • At 30.09.74 the RAF had a total of 9 fighter squadrons.
      • The maritime squadron with F-4Ks.
        • And.
      • 8 Lighting squadrons.
        • The replacement of F-4M by the Jaguar allowed 6 of them to convert to the F-4M 1974-77.
        • The other 2 squadrons retained their Lightinigns until 1988 when they converted to the Tornado ADV.
    • The plan was to form a second maritime fighter squadron with Ark Royal's F-4Ks, which would have increased the number of fighter squadrons in the RAF from 9 to 10.
      • Instead the F-4M squadron at Leuchars (where the existing F-4K squadron was based) converted to the F-4K in the interests of standardisation.
      • One of the other existing F-4M squadrons became the maritime fighter squadron.
      • Thus, the number of fighter squadrons in the RAF was still 9.
    • Another Phantom squadron was formed in the 1980s with second-hand F-4Js which brought the total to 10 of which 8 (including the 2 maritime squadrons) had Phantoms and 2 had Lightinngs.
  • ITTL the 7 strike & recce squadrons were equipped with TSR.2s instead of F-4Ms and they keep those aircraft instead of re-equipping with Jaguars and therefore there were no F-4Ms to replace the Lightning in 6 out of 8 squadrons 1974-77.
  • More TSR.2 ADVs are probably not fit for purpose. So a new aircraft would be needed.
  • Ironically, the best aircraft I can think of is the F-4E Phantom with the minimum number of changes to suit the RAF's requirements to keep the cost down. Phantom was still in production in the middle 1970s. E.g. the Luftwaffe was buying F-4Fs at about the same time.
  • F-14 and F-15 were probably too expensive and I know that's ironic as I'm trying to justify the expense of the TSR.2.
  • A new British aircraft probably wouldn't be ready for 1974 because it couldn't be developed in time and the money & design resources needed to pay for it & design it were taken by TSR.2 anyway.
• There's, no Tornado ADV either. So what does the RAF buy instead of that?
  • The number of fighter squadron in the RAF had increased to 11 in March 1990. There were
    • 7 Tornado ADV squadrons which included the 2 TASMO maritime fighter squadrons.
    • 4 Phantom fighter squadrons (including one formed on second-hand F-4Js).
  • My guess is that the TSR.2 ADVs equipping the 2 TASMO squadrons ITTL have an avionics modernisation.
  • But what equips the other 5 squadrons that had the Tornado ADV in 1990?
  • Maybe the F-4Es that I think would have been purchased in the middle 1970s were run on because they were newer and as a consequence would not wear out as quickly as the F-4Ms.
• What happens to Tornado if it's a German-Italian only project?
  • Do they buy F-16s or F-18s instead?
  • Or do Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands remain within the Starfighter Replacement Group from which Tornado evolved if the UK doesn't join? If that's the case does a completely different aircraft emerge?
  • If the UK's still in Tornado they'd want an interceptor first (to replace Lightning) and a strike-reconnaissance aircraft second (to replace TSR.2) instead of the other way round. If it did my guess is that there'd be no aircraft to replace the Lighting 1974-77 and they'd have to be run on until the early 1980s when the proto-Tornado ADV became available.
• What happens to Eurofighter? The RAF would be looking for a TSR.2 replacement rather than a Phantom-Jaguar replacement.

Likely, there are other flaws, which I haven't thought of but others will spot instantly.

To summarise the TSR.2 would have improved the RAF's strike and reconnaissance capabilities in the 1970s & 1980s because it would have been better than the Phantoms, Jaguars and Tornados IDS that I think it would have taken the place of. However, there would have been costs. Firstly, the earlier demise of the RN's strike carriers. Secondly, an inferior fighter force from the middle 1970s to the end of the Cold War because there's no F-4M to replace the Lightning 1974-77 & no Tornado ADV to replace the F-4M in the 1980s and the cost of TSR.2 may mean that there's no money to buy substitute aircraft of the same quality.

 

[Archibald]

Arrow was largely trapped due to insistence on the Active Sparrow. Had someone put their foot down and said "we cannot make an EFFECTIVE active radar homing missile with the available technology" then gone to SARH Sparrows like Phantom was carrying...

Sparrow II came from F5D Skylancer - which had a Westinghouse APQ-64 radar. Which happened to be a close sibling of early Phantoms APQ-72 - with Sparrow III.
Both derived from the APQ-50 of Skyray fame.

Silver lining: Skyray radar had a 24 inch antenna which was expanded to 32 inch for the Phantom. Not much of a stretch to add 8 inch again and get the desired 40 inch antenna for the Arrow.

Bottom line: had the Arrow got the F5D radar on top of its Sparrow IIs, it could have easily shifted (Plan B, 1957) to the Phantom radar and missile systems mass produced from 1960 onwards. Drastically cutting cost of the Arrow and helping, somewhat, integration into NORAD and ADC.

But instead, the RCAF prefered RCA blue-sky ASTRA-1 radar, and the equally blue-sky Sparrow II.

And yes, there was a Canadian Westinghouse company ideally suited to take an APQ-64 or APQ-72 licence from its american mother company. But they did not bid against RCA and Hughes, despite Sparrow II.

I use to see the Arrow as the first casualty of radar+missile+avionics costs taking the lead over engines and airframe costs. Orenda and Avro did a very good job at the airframe and engine levels: bad luck, the main big cost had shifted to radar+missiles. And there, RCA and Sparrow II (and RCAF requirements) failed miserably. Had they stuck with the F-106 MA-1 in the year 1956-57, it would have solved a major development cost problem. ASTRA-1 and Sparrow II were the core reason of Arrow cancellation.

 

[Yellow Palace]

Had TSR.2 survived devaluation in 1967 might have knocked a bit off the list price, but with so much home-grown kit on it, it might not have made much a difference in reality.

IMHO, the main difference that devaluation makes to this kind of thing isn't that it makes the domestic product cheaper, as that it makes the imported one more expensive. That might help prop up domestic industry, but it makes budgetary pressures worse!

To summarise the TSR.2 would have improved the RAF's strike and reconnaissance capabilities in the 1970s & 1980s because it would have been better than the Phantoms, Jaguars and Tornados IDS that I think it would have taken the place of. However, there would have been costs. Firstly, the earlier demise of the RN's strike carriers. Secondly, an inferior fighter force from the middle 1970s to the end of the Cold War because there's no F-4M to replace the Lightning 1974-77 & no Tornado ADV to replace the F-4M in the 1980s and the cost of TSR.2 may mean that there's no money to buy substitute aircraft of the same quality.

Given the environment at the time, I think it's reasonable to suppose that the 'fighter gap' isn't going to be filled by an aircraft that's wholly or partially British developed. Since it'll be the only game in town for the British fast jet design industry, that's probably dead, with the RAF flying second-hand Phantoms at worst, or licence-produced teen-series fighters at best.

I'm also very skeptical about a notional 'TSR-2 ADV'. I know it was studied, I just don't see it as a particularly inviting prospect.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I would go so far as to say BAC was incompetent in their handling of the program. Someone who cannot even come up with a guess as to how much more money they need has no clue what issues were holding up the program. Edit: or, if they knew what the hold-ups were, had no clue how to fix them. In either case, complete failure of project management.

BAC's counter-argument would have been that the Government's over-supervision of the TSR.2 prevented them from managing the project competently. Whether, that's true or BAC trying to blame others for their own failings (which is human nature) is another matter.

In the "Replacing Canberra Sensibly" thread I asked.

Are there any remotely plausible ways in which the "real world's" TSR2 could have been put into service on time and at cost?

And you replied.

First is to have a Competent Project Manager. One man in charge, who can tell the ministers what the holdup is, what they're doing to fix it, and probably how much more time and/or money it'll take to fix.

As far as I know the way the project didn't have a project manager (let alone a competent one) and the way the project was supervised by the Government meant one couldn't have been appointed, competent or not.

However, Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled" wrote that what TSR.2 lacked was a chief designer a few times in Chapter 11 "TSR.2: the rise and fall". E.g. on page 146 he wrote that the project needed a chief designer of the same calibre as Petter & Page at English Electric, Sydney Camm at Hawker and Jean Babriere & Marcel Dassault at Dassault. On Page 156 he wrote that what was lacking was an "iron man" engineer and nominated George Edwards as "one man who could fill the post and pulled TSR.2 into line" but at the time he was heavily involved in the BAC.111 & VC.10 airliners and that his feelings about a military aircraft organised by Military Committees required not stretch of the imagination.

Better Government supervision of the project is what I had in mind when I wrote this in Post 136 of this thread.

If it's the latter is better management of the project allowed?

What I mean by that, is as I understand it the TSR.2 was more complex than it needed to be, took longer to develop than need be and was more expensive than it needed to be because the project was supervised by umpteen Government committees.

 

[zen]

Source?
The November 1964 and May 1965 loans were from the IMF, not the USA directly. From some digging I've done, it seems like Britain had done well at resisting the imposition of IMF rules until the May 1965 loan - when the IMF was getting worried about the frequent handouts.
They don't fit that will with the P.1154 and HS.681 cancellations in terms of timing either.
I'd need some evidence of these so-called clauses, so much of the TSR.2 tale is myth and spin and without concrete sources I take everything with shovelful of salt these days.

The economy was a basket case end of.
Had TSR.2 survived devaluation in 1967 might have knocked a bit off the list price, but with so much home-grown kit on it, it might not have made much a difference in reality.

Correct. My bad on two, which preceed the events around the loan. But not TSR.2.

Julien Amery in Adam Curtis Documentary.
"The Americans said to them look here yes we'll let you have the money, but we don't see why we should subsidise prestige projects like the Concord. As by this time they were much more worried about the Concorde as it was going ahead but they would have nothing comparable.
Anyway we couldn't untie the treaty, so they went back to Washington and said so. It is at that point as far as I understand it the Americans said what else could you cut? You've got this very expensive TSR.2 which is much the same as our F111.
Why don't you cancel the TSR.2 and we'll let you have the F111 fairly cheap."

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I would go so far as to say BAC was incompetent in their handling of the program. Someone who cannot even come up with a guess as to how much more money they need has no clue what issues were holding up the program. Edit: or, if they knew what the hold-ups were, had no clue how to fix them. In either case, complete failure of project management.

FWIW, given the cost and time overruns on F-111, where the cost and time estimates General Dymamics provided 1963-65 truthful and was it managed any more competently than TSR.2?

By truthful I mean.

• Was is it what GD's management genuinely thought at the time?
  • Or.
• They didn't know & made something up.
  • Or.
• They did know how long development would take and how expensive it would be and lied to undercut the competition.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Britain doesn't need to cancel the TSR2 to become a bit player in a multi-role plane a decade later. Indeed if Britain had bought the TSR2 into service it could have dictated the MRCA project in the 70s as the senior partner.

For What Its Worth (1) the bit of Tornado IDS was 48% of its R&D cost (if I remember Gardner correctly) and Tornado ADV was an all-British project.

For What Its Worth (2) one of the things I wrote in Post 289 is that the RAF doesn't need Tornado IDS if TSR.2 isn't cancelled. Which is just as well as most of the money the UK spent of Tornado IDS to about 1980 is needed to build some of the TSR.2s and some of the money spent afterwards is needed for the TSR.2s mid-life upgrade.

 

[zen]

ADV TSR.2......

The chief issue is how much change on the in production TSR.2 this entails and many devils lurk in those details.
Some things we can be sure of like the AI radar effort and the new missile seeker.
But those very things impose substantial changes.

We can be sure the high wing loading on TSR.2 is not ideal. Great for straight line speed, but turning might need multiple states permissions for overflight

But at least the wing is high, bolts onto the fusilage, doesn't have the undercarriage in it and in theory.....a new larger one could replace it.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

ADV TSR.2......

The chief issue is how much change on the in production TSR.2 this entails and many devils lurk in those details.
Some things we can be sure of like the AI radar effort and the new missile seeker.
But those very things impose substantial changes.

We can be sure the high wing loading on TSR.2 is not ideal. Great for straight line speed, but turning might need multiple states permissions for overflight

But at least the wing is high, bolts onto the fuselage, doesn't have the undercarriage in it and in theory.....a new larger one could replace it.

AIUI the Tornado ADV wasn't an ideal fighter either. However, does it matter as TSR.2 ADV's job would have been to shoot down Soviet LRMP aircraft and anti-shipping bombers in the GUIK Gap?

What Wood wrote again.

In 1968, after NATO has abandoned the ‘Trip Wire’ policy of nuclear retaliation, it becomes clear that the Soviet conventional build up will require the operation of a very long range air-to-air missile/gun-equipped fighter capable of CAP as far North as the Arctic Circle. The TSR2 with its massive internal and external fuel/weapon capability is the obvious choice. An initial batch of 50 ‘Air Defence Version’ TSR2’s is ordered and at the same time a further batch of strike aircraft is put in hand specifically for maritime operations.

• Presumably, it could have remained on station without air-to-air refuelling for longer than the Phantom and Tornado ADV.
• Could it have been fitted with a bigger AI radar than Phantom and Tornado ADV?
• How many Sky Flash missiles could be stored in the weapons bay?
• I'm not suggesting that it be done (due to the cost) but presumably it could have been fitted with the AWG-9 radar and Phoenix missiles, reinventing the F-111B.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've asked whether cancelling TSR.2 increased the cost of Concorde twice before and not received an answer.

Continuing my speculation upon how much money was saved in practice by cancelling TSR.2, my next question is . . .

Were any of the avionics developed for TSR.2 used in other aircraft? Specifically the Jaguar and Tornado IDS. If this makes sense, it can include systems that weren't developed for TSR.2, but were developed from systems developed for TSR.2 and therefore would have cost more if TSR.2 hadn't existed.

I don't know of any myself, but recall reading that some of the avionics planned for P.1154RAF was used on the Harrier. Have I recalled correctly?

 

[zen]

However, does it matter as TSR.2 ADV's job would have been to shoot down Soviet LRMP aircraft and anti-shipping bombers in the GUIK Gap?

True, what matters be endurance with good radar and reasonable missiles.

Presumably, it could have remained on station without air-to-air refuelling for longer than the Phantom and Tornado ADV.

It's a bit harder for me to say off the cuff as the VG wing allowes for a efficient loitering cruise condition. But Tornado exploited this with small efficient turbofans.
TSR.2 uses less efficient turbojets and loitering condition. But offsets that with higher acceleration and potentially higher top speeds. Which actually tell in firing solutions.

Could it have been fitted with a bigger AI radar than Phantom and Tornado ADV?

With a revised front section to house it? Obviously.

How many Sky Flash missiles could be stored in the weapons bay?

Detailed checking required there, as the specifics of the bomb bay may make multiple Sparrow storage conflict.

 

[zen]

I don't know of any myself, but recall reading that some of the avionics planned for P.1154RAF was used on the Harrier. Have I recalled correctly?

Yes you reccal correctly.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I've been skimming through AHB Narrative "Defence Policy and the Royal Air Force 1964-1970" by Anthony S Bennell (National Archives Reference AIR41/94) which I downloaded from the internet.

These are consecutive paragraphs from Chapter 1 "Defence Review (1964-66): First Enquiries: Chequers and Washington" and are on Pages 1-2 & 1-3 of the book (Pages 7-to-8 of the PDF) which is the states of play of TSR.2, P.1154 and HS.681 when the Wilson Government came to power.

Before the beginning of the defence review process, enquiry was initiated into the programme for major incoming equipments, some of which had been the subject of open political controversy in the last months of the previous administration. As Secretary of State, Healey at once asked for a listing of aircraft development and production projects and for an assessment of possible alternatives. As commentary at the time noted, there were "all the signs of a major assault on defence spending" with the interest of the incoming government concentrated on "brush-fire operations and small wars, with the accent on tactical capability". The areas of concern were self-evident. "The TSR2 is the obvious candidate, but protected to a considerable degree by the money already spent or committed". The philosophy of the aircraft programme needed to be quite explicit in the face of the coming challenge. CAS noted privately that it was clear to him that "slashing cuts in expenditure" were being considered. "TSR2 is the most vulnerable, perhaps the P1154 almost as much so. Foreign buys, if politically possible, may be our only salvation". In response to the request from Healey, CAS set out the programme requirements and the financial position on several incoming aircraft, of which those for the TSR2, P1154 and HS681 are here noted, since it was on the intended operational role and the development and production costs of these three aircraft that an early enquiry of the new administration was to turn.

The TSR2 had first flown on 27 September 1964: it was at this time the major incoming aircraft project of the RAF. It was a strike and recce aircraft. On its development £98m had been expended and at least a further £60m was committed. The plan was for 20 pre-production aircraft and an initial production order of 30 aircraft. The total proposed buy was 158; the total programme cost was £725m, of which £270m was development and £455m production. The forecast unit cost was £2.8m per aircraft, but £5.3m for each of the first six pre-production aircraft. The forecast in-service date was 1967/68, with the delivery of the six pre-production aircraft in the period December 1966 to May 1967. The possible alternatives to the TSR2 were the American TFX, later to be known as the F111, and the Buccaneer 2, already in service with the Navy. The TFX had an inferior navigation/attack system and slightly inferior low level radar. Its unit price was possibly in the region of £1.5m. The Buccaneer 2 had inferior range and weapon load and inferior navigational capacity. It had been the collective view of the Chiefs of Staff, who had reviewed the matter at the request of the previous administration, that the central task of deep strike for which the TSR2 was designed, would be seriously prejudiced if it were to be undertaken solely by the Buccaneer 2.

The P1154 was a supersonic replacement for the Hunter, which would also bring into the RAF frontline the new feature of V/STOL, with formidable advantage to the air support of the land battle. An evaluation unit equipped with the development aircraft, the P1127, had already been formed. An initial development programme for the P1154 costing £13.5m had been authorised. The proposed buy was 182 aircraft; the total costs of the programme forecast at about £380m, of which the balance of the development programme would account for £150/170m and production a further £214m. The unit cost of the aircraft was forecast at £1m: given that the P1154 was to introduce V/STOL, there was no fully comparable alternative. The Mirage III/V with an estimated unit cost of about £3m was not yet firmly in the programme of the French Air Force, and the Phantom, which had been selected for the Fleet Air Arm, could not operate away from runways and prepared dispersal fields, and so had limited ability to adapt to the air support role.

For the HS 681, a Medium Range Transport aircraft, about £3m had been committed; the development being currently on a holding contract. The total proposed buy was 62; the total programme cost £214/224m of which the R and D cost was £60/70m and the production cost £154m. Alternatives had been considered and rejected; a British built version of the Lockheed C130 had been seen as not meeting the operational requirement and as having little development potential; an alternative design from BAC had been turned down "for technical reasons and with a view to achieving better loading on the aircraft industry".

 

[Pirate Pete]

BAC's counter-argument would have been that the Government's over-supervision of the TSR.2 prevented them from managing the project competently. Whether, that's true or BAC trying to blame others for their own failings (which is human nature) is another matter.

The "Replacing Canberra Sensibly" thread when I asked.

To which you replied.

As far as I know the way the project didn't have a project manager (let alone a competent one) and the way the project was supervised by the Government meant one couldn't have been appointed, competent or not.

However, Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled" wrote that what TSR.2 lacked was a chief designer a few times in Chapter 11 "TSR.2: the rise and fall". E.g. on page 146 he wrote that the project needed a chief designer of the same calibre as Petter & Page at English Electric, Sydney Camm at Hawker and Jean Babriere & Marcel Dassault at Dassault. On Page 156 he wrote that what was lacking was an "iron man" engineer and nominated George Edwards as "one man who could fill the post and pulled TSR.2 into line" but at the time he was heavily involved in the BAC.111 & VC.10 airlines and that his feelings about a military aircraft organised by Military Committees required not stretch of the imagination.

Better Government supervision of the project is what I had in mind when I wrote this in Post 136 of this thread.

What I mean by that, is as I understand it the TSR.2 was more complex than it needed to be, took longer to develop than need be and was more expensive than it needed to be because the project was supervised by umpteen Government committees.

I recall in a documentary programme (now available on You-tube) about the TSR-2 programme and it’s cancellation there are a number of interview excepts with Roland Beaumont the Chief Test Pilot and a couple of quotes from him were along the lines that:
There was a meeting held where a large number of people were present and the Chairman said it was unworkable to hold a meeting with so many present so they postponed and re-convened, only at the second meeting there were even more people present!
Another was a meeting that dragged on for a large part of the day which discussed the positioning (and I think labelling) of ONE switch in the cockpit layout.

I tend to agree with the oft stated opinion that TSR-2 was afflicted with too many people (most of which were not members of the Aviation Industry) in multiples of (largely) unnecessary meetings!

 

[Archibald]

Dassault had an original way of dealing with the AdA and government idiotic bureaucracy.
a) they accepted the AdA RFP, even if gold plated and unaffordable
b) they build a few prototypes, excellents but still unaffordable
c) meanwhile on their private dime they designed a "Plan B" solution, affordable, good enough but not what the RFP wanted
d) once the AdA realized they were trapped with too expensive a production run cost, Dassault showed them the "Plan B"
e) Plan B became the adopted product

I swear its true.

-Mirage III (1400+ built) sprung out of AdA and NATO uneffective LWFs: Mirage I and II plus Trident, Griffon, SO-4060 and many others
-Mirage F1 (700+ built) sprung out of the F2, F3, and Mirage G (unaffordable TF306E turbofans)
-Mirage 2000 (600+ built) sprung out of the G8 and ACF successive unaffordable programs (twin jets are too expensive)

Also
- Mirage IVA salvaged work done on Mirage IV-01 after the B-58 size Mirage IVB proved unaffordable (with foreign engines: meh)
- Etendard IVM salvaged french slice of NATO and AdA incredibly flawed 1958 LWF program

Pragmatism is the key. With a touch of cynicism and realism.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

No, the decision to reject the RAAFs recommendation of the A5 and go with the F111 was announced on 24 October 1963, before the November election. Mountbatten, in his role as Chief of Defence Staff, advised us not to buy it and as we know he was pushing the Buccaneer.

The F111s were delivered to storage in 1968, so there isn't much of a window of opportunity to change the F111 decision in favour of the TSR2 once it was made. Again this is another example of the sunk cost argument, once Australia was committed to the F111 its hard to get out.

Then is there a way to get the RAAF to buy TSR.2 in 1963 instead of F-111 so the sunk cost argument can used for TSR.2 instead of against it? Having Mountbatten do one or two terms as CDS instead of three springs to mind, but I don't know what the butterflies that we wouldn't want may have been.

 

[Hood]

There was a meeting held where a large number of people were present and the Chairman said it was unworkable to hold a meeting with so many present so they postponed and re-convened, only at the second meeting there were even more people present!
Another was a meeting that dragged on for a large part of the day which discussed the positioning (and I think labelling) of ONE switch in the cockpit layout.

There were a lot of problems with the organisation - too many committees and not enough power to oversee subcontractors and the like.

I think that 'Roly' is being slightly disingenuous here though. I've seen many minutes of progress meetings of aircraft design committees for all kinds of aircraft comprised of almost 30 people (or more) meeting on a regular basis, usually monthly, with sub-committees for certain aspects of a design meeting separately. That was part of the Whitehall jungle where industry and Service people got together to keep an eye on things. Most of those meetings were dull and haggles over paragraphs of specifications on whether a particular part would be used or production schedules.
Back in the 1950s the Ministry of Supply even had its own instrument panel advisory committee to just specifically look at layout issues (which is an important factor, especially when industry turned out some ergonomic nightmares).

So yes, to an interviewer who has never seen the workings of the industry, 'Roly's' reminiscences do sound like a rather dull, wasteful and red-tape fetishistic existence - but to anyone else in the business this was BAC's bread and butter.
Certainly the problem doesn't seem to have manifested itself in the other contemporary programmes or later efforts, or at least it hasn't drawn as much opprobrium - which suggests that TSR.2 was a one-off mess which may have been over-egged (both in terms of management techniques and storytelling embellishments).

 

[uk 75]

The problem I have with picking TSR2 as the only new RAF aircraft built in the 60s and 70s is that it is less flexible than the RAF created after 1965.
Phantom from the off could replace Javelins and Canberras but also Hunters and Lightnings.
Jaguar offered a cheaper substitute for the close air support and strike roles, allowing Phantoms to replace Lightnings.
Tornado was a smaller Phantom able to do everything from close air support to long range air defence in its UK version.
The range offered by TSR2 was less than the Vulcan which was still valid against peripheral targets in the SACEUR Oplan.
As usual with these what-ifs we have to take on faith paper planes which can only be guessed at- TSR2 was never developed for the air defence role by the time it was cancelled.

 

[Yellow Palace]

So yes, to an interviewer who has never seen the workings of the industry, 'Roly's' reminiscences do sound like a rather dull, wasteful and red-tape fetishistic existence - but to anyone else in the business this was BAC's bread and butter.

I've been in such meetings; it's not unusual in the slightest for some apparently-trivial detail to get discussed at great length. This can happen for any number of reasons, many of which won't get captured in the minutes. This can be because some veteran committee member has strong opinions which they feel must be shared. But it can also be because of non-obvious ways that that detail impacts all sorts of other things, requiring a high-level decision about where the compromise must be made.

What also doesn't get captured in the minutes is the countless hours of less-formal discussion between engineers, managers, and the customer that led to the majority of the design not needing to be discussed at length by the committee!

 

[uk 75]

The plan for the Royal Navy substitutes nearly a decade of capable carrier air power (Ark Royal with Phantoms and Buccaneers) from 1970 to 1979 with (I really cannot believe this) a third Tiger class conversion and ski jumps for the worn out Bulwark and Albion.
Two alternatives exist for the RN carrier force in the 80s which would be better than the Invincible Command Cruisers:

3 proper LPH/CVS ships about the size of Hermes able to operate Sea Harriers with a ski jump and Seakings for ASW/Commando lift.

in fact with the money saved on TSR2 there is scope for an "austere" CVA01 to 03 able to operate Phantoms and Bucs as well as Seakings and Gannet AEW but with basic radar fit and no armament (T22 acting as Goalkeeper as they did in otl).

 

[Rule of cool]

@NOMISYRRUC has shown the problem with the TSR2 isn't technical, or really even financial or political, it's block obsolescence within the RAF, Basically once the Hunter FGA9/FR10 enters service in numbers the TSR2 is doomed because it will need to be replaced at the same time as the TSR2 is being developed and built.

My alternative is for early and strong support for the Lightning, both as a fighter-interceptor and a fighter-bomber instead of most of the Hiunter conversions. This get the RAF out of it's own way to spend the 750 million on the TSR2.

However it does leave the RN high and dry in terms of fighters. I'd suggest that for an 'interim' fighter the RN doesn't buy the best fighter in the world, but rather an actual interim fighter that will have to be replaced by the late 70s at the same time as the big Lightning fleet; get in on the French F8E(FN) buy. No fancy changes like 2 seaters or Speys, just the electronics mods needed to slave the Red Tops to the radar.

 

[uk 75]

Cart before horse time.
The UK had a coherent plan to replace the frontline RAF in the 60s and 70s.
The V force would give way to Polaris by 1970 allowing some to be retained for use against threats East of Suez.
TSR2 based in the UK would replace UK based Valiants and overseas Canberras.
P1154 would replace Hunters in UK, Germany, TheGulf and FEAF.
Work had started on a VG trainer (P45) to also supplement the P1154.
Lightning would get upgrades including Red Top before being replaced in the 70s. Phantoms were suggested as replacements but collaboration with France was another option.
The Comet based ASW aircraft (Nimrod) was the likely Shackleton replacement.
The transport force would get Belfast and VC10s as well as a new medium sized transport (AW681).
All of this looks great on paper. By 1975 a leaner RAF would have had a mobile strike force capable of supporting interventions around the world.
Even now the drawings of the planes are achingly modern.
But by 1964 the key components of the plan were years behind schedule. Costs were spiralling. Worse still the RAF started to think it needed more aircraft than it had thought. It started suggesting that other types needed to be bought.

 

[red admiral]

Certainly the problem doesn't seem to have manifested itself in the other contemporary programmes or later efforts, or at least it hasn't drawn as much opprobrium - which suggests that TSR.2 was a one-off mess which may have been over-egged (both in terms of management techniques and storytelling embellishments).

TSR2 was the programme where BAC learnt to collaborate - between EE and Vickers. This was actually really valuable for Jaguar and Tornado.

Even in today's aircraft development programmes there are meetings with loads of people. Engineering is a social activity around influence and review rather than some sort of mathematical process.

However, Derek Wood in "Project Cancelled" wrote that what TSR.2 lacked was a chief designer a few times in Chapter 11 "TSR.2: the rise and fall". E.g. on page 146 he wrote that the project needed a chief designer of the same calibre as Petter & Page at English Electric, Sydney Camm at Hawker and Jean Babriere & Marcel Dassault at Dassault. On Page 156 he wrote that what was lacking was an "iron man" engineer and nominated George Edwards as "one man who could fill the post and pulled TSR.2 into line" but at the time he was heavily involved in the BAC.111 & VC.10 airliners and that his feelings about a military aircraft organised by Military Committees required not stretch of the imagination.

This is somewhat confusing; the government itself pushed for George Edwards to be in charge. In the end Freddy Page was put in overall charge. It didn't seem to make much impact.

@NOMISYRRUC has shown the problem with the TSR2 isn't technical, or really even financial or political, it's block obsolescence within the RAF,

As is very clear from the multiple posts, finance was the key issue.

Even from the NOMISYRRUC's speculative post about how to afford the extra development cost, then you're left with 50-200 (ish) TSR2s Vs 170 Phantoms + 46 Buccaneers + 200 Jaguars + 230 Tornado GRs. So apart from long range nuclear strike, the UK has both worse capability, and far less capacity.

I've asked whether cancelling TSR.2 increased the cost of Concorde twice before and not received an answer.

Burke gives maybe £10m on Olympus 22R that fed across to 593

Then is there a way to get the RAAF to buy TSR.2 in 1963 instead of F-111 so the sunk cost argument can used for TSR.2 instead of against it?

It's still more expensive and available later. The timing seems of more import to Australia given the OTS Vigilante recommendation, and you can only speed that up by years by making TSR2 very different.

 

[Rule of cool]

Then is there a way to get the RAAF to buy TSR.2 in 1963 instead of F-111 so the sunk cost argument can used for TSR.2 instead of against it? Having Mountbatten do one or two terms as CDS instead of three springs to mind, but I don't know what the butterflies that we wouldn't want may have been.

Buying American was somewhat new to Australia in the 60s and the US offered good financial terms. The 2 DDGs we bought in the 60s were paid for over 8 years rather than 5 for example. What's more the US was looking like a strong Ally, willing to be involved in the region in force.

This is what the TSR2 is up against. By 1963 Britain had declared manned fighters obsolescent (leading Australia to cancel a 1957 order for 30 F104), walked back this idea, began developing the Blue Streak but cancelled it, bought into skybolt but had it cancelled on them etc etc etc. On top of this you have Mountbatten, as prominent a person who existed in Britain, telling the Australians not to buy the TSR2 and it being obvious that the British weren't as strong in the region as the US and wanting to join the EEC. Then there's the financial aspect, I doubt that the British government would allow payments to stretch any more than strictly necessary.

That's not to say the TSR2 couldn't be selected, Australia was fully integrated into the British command structure in South East Asia so the relationship was extremely important and close. But Britain would need to look a bit more worthy of our business and alliance for us to go TSR2.

 

[Rule of cool]

As is very clear from the multiple posts, finance was the key issue.

Even from the NOMISYRRUC's speculative post about how to afford the extra development cost, then you're left with 50-200 (ish) TSR2s Vs 170 Phantoms + 46 Buccaneers + 200 Jaguars + 230 Tornado GRs. So apart from long range nuclear strike, the UK has both worse capability, and far less capacity.

Financing a block replacement of ~2/3 RAF in the late 60s is the problem rather than the TSR2 itself. 50-200 (50 is not going to happen, ~100 would be the minimum) TSR2 is better than 4 different types doing bits and pieces with none being able to match the payload-range of the TSR2. If managing 1 complex aircraft project is too hard for Britain how is managing 4 better?

 

[red admiral]

We seem to be getting more and more into anti-history rather than alt-history so maybe it's time to stop

 

[Rule of cool]

We seem to be getting more and more into anti-history rather than alt-history so maybe it's time to stop

It's a subject nobody seems to be able to let go of!

 

[uk 75]

It has, however, generated a lot of useful information and points made.
Everyone has kept it polite.
I have learnt a lot.

 

[Rule of cool]

It has, the whole British defence 60s saga is so complex and intertwined that its endlessly fascinating.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Even from the NOMISYRRUC's speculative post about how to afford the extra development cost, then you're left with 50-200 (ish) TSR2s Vs 170 Phantoms + 46 Buccaneers + 200 Jaguars + 230 Tornado GRs. So apart from long range nuclear strike, the UK has both worse capability, and far less capacity.

It was more about how to afford the production cost. Not cancelling TSR.2 and no abortive purchase of F-111s covers the bulk of the R&D cost provided Gardner's estimate was accurate and I freely admit that it may not have been.

• 220 strike/recce TSR.2s some of which take the place of the 46 Buccaneers purchased for the RAF and the 125 Jaguars required to support the 5 Jaguar squadrons in Germany. The TSR.2s were modernised in the 1980s so there was no need for 230 Tornado GRs.
  • Plus.
• 50 ADV TSR.2s to equip the 2 maritime fighter squadrons in the TASMO force, which take the place of the 52 F-4Ks.
• 75 additional Harrier Mks 1-4 to equip the 3 Strike Command squadrons that initially had F-4M Phantoms and then Jaguars IOTL (Nos. 6, 41 & 54).
• Maybe 100 extra AV-8Bs in the 1980s to re-equip the the 4 Strike Command squadrons that had first-generation Harriers ITTL (Nos. 1, 6, 41 & 54).

That leaves the 118 F-4Ms that initially equipped 7 strike-recce squadrons in the UK & Germany (which ITTL were equipped with a mix of Harriers & TSR.2s.) and when those squadrons converted to Jaguars 1974-77 the redundant aircraft were use to replace the Lightning in 6 fighter squadrons 1974-77.

It may be possible to purchase 120 F-4Es in the second half of the 1970s to replace the Lightnings. It depends upon how much of he money spent on Tornado IDS to 1980 is required to complete the production of the 220 strike-recce TSR.2s and the 50 ADV TSR.2s.

The money spent on Tornado IDS in the 1980s IOTL is spent on modernising the TSR.2s and the extra AV-8Bs. However, the money spent on Tornado ADV IOTL would be available to spend on another fighter aircraft ITTL.

Edit: 29.02.24

Quantities were added to the ADV TSR.2, extra Harrier Mks 1-4 and extra AV-8Bs.

• 50 ADV TSR.2 because that's the number Wood suggested and they in effect take the place of the 52 F-4Ks built IOTL.
• 75 extra Harrier Mks 1 to 4 because 200 Jaguars were built IOTL and 8 squadrons were formed.
  • 200 ÷ 8 = 25 aircraft per squadron IOTL and 3 x 25 = 75.
• 100 extra AV-8Bs for 4 squadrons with 25 per squadron.

Correction: 29.02.24

I thought the AV-8B only equipped the two Harrier squadrons in Germany. I was wrong. It equipped No. 1 Squadron in Strike Command too. That reduces the number of extra AV-8Bs from 100 to 75.

 

[starviking]

True, what matters be endurance with good radar and reasonable missiles.

<SNIP>

With a revised front section to house it? Obviously.

Detailed checking required there, as the specifics of the bomb bay may make multiple Sparrow storage conflict.

I can’t see the revision as being anything but bulbous, possibly affecting airflow to the engines and speed, unless the whole front fuselage is redesigned to taper gently from the radome to the intakes.

Anyway, either choice entails a large testing effort, and a large design effort for the former, somewhat smaller for the latter.

Damien Burke’s book has a bit on a TSR2 interceptor design, late 50s, early 60s. Limited missile loadout, and with wing as designed very limited at altitude. Did interestingly use a SLAR as a long-range radar, but the main radar was limited by the nosecone dimensions.

So adding better wings, to the revisions, I can’t see it as being cheaper, or better than a new design.

 

[Hood]

TSR2 was the programme where BAC learnt to collaborate - between EE and Vickers. This was actually really valuable for Jaguar and Tornado.

You could argue that BAC never totally got over the EE/Vickers split - certainly BAe never got over the Warton Vs Weybridge Vs ex-HSA sites split. Tribalism was rife and remained so for many years.

BAC was collaborating with Concorde at the same time- interestingly the MoA felt they were messing up here too, but there seems to be less vocal complaint about this in the historiography and of course the MoA still entrusted BAC with Jaguar over HSA.
Jaguar and AFVG was a different set up, lessons from Concorde certainly, from both sides.

the government itself pushed for George Edwards to be in charge. In the end Freddy Page was put in overall charge. It didn't seem to make much impact.

George Edwards was always seen as the golden boy out of all the designer/managers since the mid-1950s by MoS and MoA, though they did later feel that his powers slipped as he got bogged down in management. The trouble was the organisation of the project didn't give any 'leader' sufficient authority to act.
Maybe some of this explains Beaumont's comments - he was by trade a pilot and a freewheeling RAF leader of men, he wasn't a pen pushing managerial type, so its perhaps natural that he would rankle at long meetings (I've never met anyone yet who doesn't hate hate long meetings!).

Did interestingly use a SLAR as a long-range radar, but the main radar was limited by the nosecone dimensions.

I'm doubtful about how well that would work out, would be pushing state of the art tech of the late 1960s to integrate three radars on a two-seater and give a decent display for the radar operator. Ferranti could barely stitch together the radar picture from two radars two decades later....