AWA.166 instead of Bristol 188

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Despite being favoured over Bristol's design, AWA was not able to spare the staff to realise the ER.134T research aircraft requirement, and so Bristol was awarded the contract.
As we know Bristol's 188 took a long time and was hampered by the Gyron Junior engines.

But what if AWA had staff available for some reason instead?
Decision point being mid December 1953.
Perhaps with less Javelin work for instance?
Under such circumstances AWA's plan was a machine in conventional light alloy first, with a second steel wing on a second machine.
We know that Sapphire with reheat was much more widely used than limited virtual prototype Gyron Juniors.
So arguably AWA could have not only completed the design earlier, but it's performance would be less hampered.
What does this do to later decisions?
Do we see that steel wing second machine?
Do we see a swap to Avons?
Certainly the naccels are easy to change on this design.
As it was Bristol did try to interest the RAF in a fighter version.
And we know AWA did produce a brochure for a interceptor development to Australia.
Although not very agile, the design could become a very fast climbing fighter.
 
Worth reading posts here
The Bristol 188 had a complicated and not altogether successful career
Assuming a similar period of development and service for the AW aircraft. Does it alter the cancellation of the Avro 730? (No)
Does it add more info for the devlopment of Concorde? (perhaps?)
Does it morph into a competitor to the Lightning? (cue Harry Potter music)
 
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#3 alludes to me saying AWA was assessed as 2nd to Bristol, whereas BSP/Fighters, P.78 (1st.Ed) has Tender Design Conference 8/8/53 recommending AWA selection, the stated reason for ITP to Bristol mid-12/53 being AWA "was full with Javelin work"...though Bristol sub-contracted the tail to AWA.

We are both right. The remit of MoS' Tender Conferences is to recommend the best technical solution to the Reqt; that outcome becomes known to tenderers as it goes upstairs to Ministries' seniors, on to Ministers, if necessary to Cabinet. On that journey nothing, or much can happen. A reason is needed to over-rule a Recommendation -some form of bigger-picture, to calm down the disappointed. AWA, 12/53, was not full with Javelin design work; they were full with all manner of production, where HSAL and MoS held them in high regard. This job was not a production job. MoS/HSAL would not invest in an original AWA design until 1957, fat cargo fuselage on Shackleton wing.

#1 Qs: for me, none of the above. 2 problems: 1. RAE's 6/52 Tech Memo's (Meteor-esque) layout proved to be taken up only for Avro 730 (briefly);
2. faster than M.2.2 proved to be painful, expensive...and of little military purpose.
That is me indulging in hindsight, though maybe even in 1953 the pain of exotic materials could have been foreseen.

For me the T.188 Q is...how on earth did it avoid the axe when Avro 730 died? And, oddly, I think the A is...Gyron Jr.
UK then had no Altitude Test Facility so we still needed Flying Test Beds. Gy.Jr was (in SR.177: not chopped until notions of exports lapsed, 12/57) in R&D for Blackburn (to be Buccaneer S.1). Plus Avro W.114 Super-Steel to be funded 5/58 in stainless steel, Mach-lots (FTB for steel).
 
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It might also make sense if policy was to say favour a supersonic transport or hypersonic aircraft in the future. At that time, talk was still of just pushing up the mach numbers. So to kill two birds, a flying testbed for engines (AWA's design is frankly better for that) and trial fabrication of steel for such aircraft has some sense behind it.

Certainly by the early 60's the difference between going at mach 0.9 and mach 1.2 at low level was of little value, but considerable cost. At that time Pt.428 was being conceived and even Mauler showed how risky it was going to get down amongst the weeds.
While up high and fast, unless you were aiming to go above mach 3 and 80,000ft life was going to get short in face of SAM batteries.
 
For me the T.188 Q is...how on earth did it avoid the axe when Avro 730 died? And, oddly, I think the A is...Gyron Jr.
UK then had no Altitude Test Facility so we still needed Flying Test Beds. Gy.Jr was (in SR.177: not chopped until notions of exports lapsed, 12/57) in R&D for Blackburn (to be Buccaneer S.1). Plus Avro W.114 Super-Steel to be funded 5/58 in stainless steel, Mach-lots (FTB for steel).

The Gyron Junior must have some fascinating backstory. Powered or planned to power two cutting edge aircraft (Buccaneer and SR.177), lost one, was a disappointment in the other, and scuppered the T.188.

If only they’d decided to trial it in the SR.177...
 
For me the T.188 Q is...how on earth did it avoid the axe when Avro 730 died? And, oddly, I think the A is...Gyron Jr.
UK then had no Altitude Test Facility so we still needed Flying Test Beds. Gy.Jr was (in SR.177: not chopped until notions of exports lapsed, 12/57) in R&D for Blackburn (to be Buccaneer S.1). Plus Avro W.114 Super-Steel to be funded 5/58 in stainless steel, Mach-lots (FTB for steel).

The Gyron Junior must have some fascinating backstory. Powered or planned to power two cutting edge aircraft (Buccaneer and SR.177), lost one, was a disappointment in the other, and scuppered the T.188.

If only they’d decided to trial it in the SR.177...
From my reading, Gyron Junior was the cheap option for new small turbojets. The other options being effectively new, such as BE.33, a scaled RB.106 or Armstrong's offering P.151(started as a scaled Sapphire and seems to evolve).
 
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