Alt 60s US Navy

[uk 75]

The Royal Navy in the 1960s has been the place for many alternative history threads helped by the excellent books on the subject and the enthusiasm of Brits like me for CVA01 and co. The US Navy offers even more scope for programmes that could have been. Some thoughts to kick things off.
Enterprise was the only nuclear carrier till the 70s. Nukes vs conventional options.
The large cruisers of the 50s reached their zenith with Long Beach. In the 60s frigates like Bainbridge, Truxtun, Belknap and Leahy were the big ships, though to Europeans they were destroyer leaders/cruisers. Typhon was ditched and AEGIS didnt arrive .
Huge numbers of warbuit destroyers were converted with ASROC but could have had better helicopters than DASH.
The Knox and then Spruance classes came along, but were they the best answers.

Lots of scope and I havent even mentioned subs, helicopter carriers etc

 

[isayyo2]

Ideally a quicker adoption of gas-turbines for surface ships and a more coherent high-low strategy.

Keep Typhon as a developmental project, rather than doubling down on its future and scrambling when it gets cancelled.
Further develop the DASH drone with more reliable parts and multi-use sensors or armaments.
Hamilton class Cutter as a FRAM DD replacement?
Continue development of diesel submarines for coastal defenses against Soviet SSG/SSGNs.
Never forget the importance of heavy naval artillery, get a Mk 71 out into the fleet or develop dedicated bombardment monitors

 

[SSgtC]

Mk 71 out into the fleet or develop dedicated bombardment monitors

Not really needed to be honest. The USN had 16 Heavy Cruisers either in active service or in reserve up through the 70s with 3 remaining in reserve up until 1991. Plus you have 10 battleships in reserve at the start of 1960 with that dropping to 8 in June, 1960 and to 4 by June, 62. If you really need heavy gunfire support, just keep the battleships in reserve longer and/or pull some of the CAs back into service.

Hamilton class Cutter as a FRAM DD replacement?

That's a possibility, but the first one wasn't laid down until 1965, the same time at the Knox-class. Which would have the exact same mission in the Navy. So going with the Hamiltons means no Knox. Either or here choice here. Maybe if you combine the power plant of the Hamilton with the larger hull of the Knox you'd have a winner for the Navy.

Continue development of diesel submarines for coastal defenses against Soviet SSG/SSGNs.

Not really a need. The Navy did not plan to engage Soviet subs in American Littorals. They planned to engage them in deep water as they crossed the SOSUS line. For that mission, nuc boats were the better option.

 

[CV12Hornet]

Well, this was the wishlist in 1958.

APPENDIX

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA​

A. TENTATIVE ACTIVE FLEET OBJECTIVES

52 MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINES, ALL NUCLEAR POWERED

40 with POLARIS or a successor, 1500-mile or greater range
12 with smaller missiles, 1000-mile or greater range

87 SHIPS IN SURFACE STRIKING FORCES

12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power)
3 Large Training Carriers
18 Guided Missile Cruisers (12 with Nuclear Power)
54 Guided Missile Frigates (18 with Nuclear Power)

398 SHIPS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES

9 Anti-submarine Aircraft Carriers
75 Submarines (65 with Nuclear Power)
72 Destroyers
60 Ocean Picket Ships
182 Ocean Escorts

90 SHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

18 Helicopter Assault Ships
58 Assault Transports and Landing Ships
14 Command and Support Ships

110 MINE WARFARE AND SMALL PATROL SHIPS

190 AUXILIARIES

50 Fast Underway Replenishment Ships
140 Tenders, Tugs, Repair and Supply Ships

927 [Total Ships]

SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR POWER............................................150-Plus
SHIPS WITH LONG RANGE SURFACE MISSILES................52-Plus
SHIPS WITH AIR DEFENSE MISSILES...................................200-Plus
SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE MISSILES...........................450-Plus
SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.........................150-Plus

B. TENTATIVE OBJECTIVES FOR OPERATING AIRCRAFT
(Approximations: Air Reserve Aircraft Included)​

600 FIGHTERS WITH LONG-RANGE AIR-TO-AIR MISSILES

400 for Attack Carriers
200 for Marines

1250 LIGHT ATTACK AIRCRAFT

1000 for Attack Carriers
250 for Marines

400 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (Navy and Marine)

70 Long Range Seaplane, Mining and Recco
180 Early Warning and Air Control
150 Photographic, Electronic, Tactical Recco

1300 ANTI-SUBMARINE

500 Long Range, Land and Seaplane
400 Short Range, for Carriers
400 Helicopter

500 ASSAULT TRANSPORTS (MARINE)

1250 AIRCRAFT FOR SUPPORT OF FLEETS (Target, Logistic, Development and Test, Rescue, Fleet Training)

1700 AIRCRAFT FOR TRAINING COMMAND 7000

7000 [Total Aircraft]

Naturally, by the time 1970 actually rolled around the US Navy was short in just about every category except Polaris submarines.

 

[isayyo2]

@SSgtC nice to see you online and a good retort

My primary thought were keeping manning costs lower than IRL. Love me some cruisers and battleships, but their operational costs are prohibitive so realistically how many of those reserve ships would be brought back? Perhaps a good compromise would be single-ended Talos CAGs with at least one forward turret active? Ditto on the steam turbine manning vs gas turbines with the Knox having 70 more Officers and Enlisted. Maybe skip the Knox entirely and have a re-order of the Brooke Class with the Hamiltons FT4/Diesel propulsion? Staying with the reduced manning crusade, how much manpower and $$$ could have saved by improving DASH over the three LAMPS competitions? How many officer slots did the SH-2s and 60s take up?

 

[SSgtC]

@SSgtC nice to see you online and a good retort

My primary thought were keeping manning costs lower than IRL. Love me some cruisers and battleships, but their operational costs are prohibitive so realistically how many of those reserve ships would be brought back? Perhaps a good compromise would be single-ended Talos CAGs with at least one forward turret active? Ditto on the steam turbine manning vs gas turbines with the Knox having 70 more Officers and Enlisted. Maybe skip the Knox entirely and have a re-order of the Brooke Class with the Hamiltons FT4/Diesel propulsion? Staying with the reduced manning crusade, how much manpower and $$$ could have saved by improving DASH over the three LAMPS competitions? How many officer slots did the SH-2s and 60s take up?

Thanks. I got covid so I've been out of it for awhile.

Obviously, a single Mk71 mount well require less crew than an entire cruiser or battleship will. But the point I was making was, if there is a big enough need for NGFS that the Navy is developing an entirely new system to mount on destroyers and cruisers, then the need is probably great enough to warrant either reactivating some cruisers or keeping the battleships in reserve longer.

The problem with keeping the CAGs around was that they were pretty worn out by the time they were retired. The Navy ran those ships hard. The 8" ships in the reserve fleet were probably in better condition.

More Brooke Class instead of the Knox may be a good thing, but they were very limited in the air defense role. They had a single arm launcher and only 16 Tartar missiles. Of course, that's still better than the Knox and their lack of any kind of anti air weapon other than close range, self defense systems. Just going to a full gas turbine may be the answer, honestly. On the other hand, having all those steam powered ships makes it pretty simple to reactivate the older BBs and CAs should they be needed. That's probably not a deciding factor, but it wouldn't surprise me if that thought at least crossed the Navy's mind.

DASH is good to have, but it's really no match for a LAMPS helo. Minimal weapon and sensor load, short range. It's better than not having anything, but a LAMPS pretty much beats the brakes off of it.

 

[CV12Hornet]

I'd say what a Brooke brings to the table over a Knox isn't really all that important. As we can see in the fleet plan I posted, the US Navy weighed ASW ocean escorts more than the Ocean Picket type the Brookes fall under. And with the Sumner and Gearing classes starting to age out it's definitely an impending hole in the force structure.

 

[Moose]

In 1959 BuShips proposed a multiple-tier Typhon fleet and, with greater forethought than is normally seen, included alternative schemes for the proposed combatants to be completed without Typhon if it wasn't ready. The death of Typhon and the issues with SCANFAR aren't easily waved away, but a 1960s USN with active large-hull CG, DLG, and/or DDG production lines would be pretty interesting regardless. Especially if they were built light in the non-Typhon configurations and thus had abundant growth margin.

 

[Foo Fighter]

I cannot understand the cessation of development in conventional subs. The Baltic and eastern Atlantic have choke points that have long been used in exercises against a theoretical surge of Soviet nuclear and conventional subs.

 

[Dilandu]

Obviously, a single Mk71 mount well require less crew than an entire cruiser or battleship will. But the point I was making was, if there is a big enough need for NGFS that the Navy is developing an entirely new system to mount on destroyers and cruisers, then the need is probably great enough to warrant either reactivating some cruisers or keeping the battleships in reserve longer.

The problem with keeping the CAGs around was that they were pretty worn out by the time they were retired. The Navy ran those ships hard. The 8" ships in the reserve fleet were probably in better condition.

But they would not be readily available. It took time to pull ship out of mothball. Also, those old 8-inch cruisers were not suited for modern warfare; they were near-defenselsss against air or missile attacks. I.e.even after being recommissioned, they would still need to be either refitted with new sensors, commsystems and ECM's, or their protection would require disproportionally big efforts.

The Mk-71 gun main advantage was, that it could be installed on existing ships - destroyers and missile cruisers - and thus be "on hands" anywhere and anytime it needed. US big destroyers and missile cruisers were everywhere;if each of them have one 5-inch turret replaced with 8-inch, the gun support would be available everywhere it may be required.

 

[CV12Hornet]

I cannot understand the cessation of development in conventional subs. The Baltic and eastern Atlantic have choke points that have long been used in exercises against a theoretical surge of Soviet nuclear and conventional subs.

The problem is that on a tactical level nuclear subs are so vastly superior it's not even funny. There's no contest whatsoever, especially on 1960s tech.

If you want a good hunter-killer sub, and you can afford it, you buy nuclear. Period.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Thank you, Sir. I forgot we were talkling about old tech rather than current. Must keep up.

 

[Dilandu]

I cannot understand the cessation of development in conventional subs. The Baltic and eastern Atlantic have choke points that have long been used in exercises against a theoretical surge of Soviet nuclear and conventional subs.

Well, the main problem with conventional subs for USN was, that their European and Asiatic allies have quite a lot of them anyway.

By 1980, Western Germany, Netherlands, Denmark and Norway together have about 58 conventional submarines on Baltic and North Sea.

France, Italy and Spain have 43 submarines on Mediterranean.

Japan and Australia have 18 submarines on the Pacific.

To put it simply, another bunch of conventional subs, this time - American, would add little to already formidable European submarine navies, and only cause additional problems with organization and identification, as well as logistic ones. Since American submarines would be required to operate in European waters in case of the war, they would require... excessive range, which would made them bigger and less suitable for coastal seas operations. Those submarines would also be rather poor hunter-killers, since they were slow, and American navy did not have such cool missile and submarine rocket toys as Soviet ones (one of the reason USSR liked long-range ASW rockets on conventional submarines - they gave a good chance to knock out a fleeing nuclear one). Basically, they would be strange ships with no explicit purpose.

So, just not worth it.

 

[Foo Fighter]

Thank you, Sir. Got it.

 

[James1978]

Those submarines would also be rather poor hunter-killers, since they were slow, and American navy did not have such cool missile and submarine rocket toys as Soviet ones (one of the reason USSR liked long-range ASW rockets on conventional submarines - they gave a good chance to knock out a fleeing nuclear one). Basically, they would be strange ships with no explicit purpose.

Does the UUM-44 SUBROC not count?

 

[isayyo2]

Had an interesting talk with a Capt. James Patton about "Diesel Boats Forever" and the benefits of the Barbel class. His best attribute to the diesel subs was "attritable" as having a lot of good boats on patrol was better than having only some of the best out there. A squadron or more of SS's based out of Yokosuka and Sasebo would have been a welcomed addition for PACFLT.
Some other economical benefits were:
1. Did not need the Blue/Gold crew scheme
2. Smaller crews that did not require Nuke School training
3. Could be built in a variety of yards that aren't Electric Boat or Newport News
4. The 1000ft + test-depth of the SSNs are not regularly used outside of the Atlantic
5. Development costs could be offset by export sales
Alas, Rickover had full control of the subs in the Navy and on the Hill as well as his acolytes spreading throughout the Navy as each decade passed. Ending up on a diesel boat was essentially a death sentence for anyone hoping to reach Flag and get that shiny star.
He also mentioned the Mk71 had more issues than is commonly known and placed the blame on Dahlgren themselves.

 

[royabulgaf]

Remember the subs are diesel ELECTRIC. How much noise does a flashlight make? With a SSN you all sorts of pumps and pipes and coolers and whatnot gurgling away to prevent another K 19. With improvements in battery technology and quieter charging engines (turbine?] you can have a very capable sub at a reasonable price.

 

[isayyo2]

Remember the subs are diesel ELECTRIC. How much noise does a flashlight make? With a SSN you all sorts of pumps and pipes and coolers and whatnot gurgling away to prevent another K 19. With improvements in battery technology and quieter charging engines (turbine?] you can have a very capable sub at a reasonable price.

And thankfully we're finally now moving towards Nuclear-Electric drive for Columbia and the SSNX follow on. Some of the more "exotic" reactor designs like molten salt have the potential to run solely on natural circulation, could be very quiet on a sub.

 

[isayyo2]

Had an interesting talk with a Capt. James Patton about "Diesel Boats Forever" and the benefits of the Barbel class. His best attribute to the diesel subs was "attritable" as having a lot of good boats on patrol was better than having only some of the best out there. A squadron or more of SS's based out of Yokosuka and Sasebo would have been a welcomed addition for PACFLT.

I have recently been made aware that Captain Patton passed away not too long after this conversation occurred in September of 2021.
Rest in Peace Captain.

PATTON-JAMES | The United States Navy Memorial

navylog.navymemorial.org

 

[apparition13]

Well, this was the wishlist in 1958.

APPENDIX

THE NAVY OF THE 1970 ERA​

A. TENTATIVE ACTIVE FLEET OBJECTIVES

52 MISSILE-LAUNCHING SUBMARINES, ALL NUCLEAR POWERED

40 with POLARIS or a successor, 1500-mile or greater range

41 for freedom, check.

12 with smaller missiles, 1000-mile or greater range

12 SSGNs, if only Tomahawk was around they could have done the same as they did with the older Ohios. Unless they mean something more like Pershing.

87 SHIPS IN SURFACE STRIKING FORCES

12 Modern Attack Carriers (6 with Nuclear Power)

6 Enterprise class, as planned. 4 Forrestals and 2 Kitty Hawks make up the other 6. I thought the number should be 13, but I didn't realize America wasn't laid down until 1960, so 12 is right.

3 Large Training Carriers

Presumably the Midways,

18 Guided Missile Cruisers (12 with Nuclear Power)

12 Long Beach? I presume the other 6 would be the converted WW2 cruisers, but I thought there were more so I'm uncertain why there are only 6.

54 Guided Missile Frigates (18 with Nuclear Power)

That would result in 6 nuclear groups of 1 Enterprise, 2 Long Beach, and 3 DLGNs, and 6 conventional groups of 1 supercarrier, 1 cruiser, and 6 DLGs. You could create all nuclear task forces of 2 or more carriers which would have enormous tactical mobility in a theater.

398 SHIPS IN ANTI-SUBMARINE FORCES

9 Anti-submarine Aircraft Carriers

Presumably Essex class. Replacements were in the planning stages, but didn't result in anything.

75 Submarines (65 with Nuclear Power)

There were only 3 Barbels, so the plan may have been to build more. If they were envisaging the possibility of a long war having the capability to build large numbers of SSKs would be helpful, but I'm not sure 10 would do it. It would have to be more like the Japanese practice of building 1 sub per year, perhaps 2 in the case of the U.S., to keep a couple yards in practice so there is a pool of expertise to draw on if an expansion of production is deemed necessary. Although Dilandu's argument for leaving SSKs to allies makes a lot of sense, in which case why plan on building more SSKs?

72 Destroyers

That doesn't seem enough for this size fleet.

60 Ocean Picket Ships

I don't know what these would be in an ASW sense. Unless they refer to radar pickets, perhaps armed.

182 Ocean Escorts

The Garcia class is about right, with DASH (and later SH-2s), but they would pretty much need to be new builds.

I suppose they might be looking at ASW groups composed of a CVS, with DDGs (Adams, Farragut/Coontz) for air defense and DEs armed with ASROC and DASH for ASW. Nine CVSs would not need 8 DDGs and 20 DEs each, so my guess is the extras would supplement CVA groups in time of war and maybe do the presence mission in peacetime. Or perhaps the intent would be to have the bulk of the DEs manned by naval reserve personnel.

90 SHIPS IN AMPHIBIOUS FORCES

18 Helicopter Assault Ships

Iwo Jima and Tarawa are a ways off, so presumably these would be Essex and Casablanca/Commencement Bay class ships.

58 Assault Transports and Landing Ships
14 Command and Support Ships

110 MINE WARFARE AND SMALL PATROL SHIPS

190 AUXILIARIES

50 Fast Underway Replenishment Ships

50 Sacramento and Wichita class AOE/AOR would be quite the replenishment fleet.

140 Tenders, Tugs, Repair and Supply Ships

927 [Total Ships]

The total is in line of the size of the Navy at the time.

SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR POWER............................................150-Plus

Subs, CVANs, CGNs, and DLGNs. I count 153..

SHIPS WITH LONG RANGE SURFACE MISSILES................52-Plus

The 52 missile subs.

SHIPS WITH AIR DEFENSE MISSILES...................................200-Plus

72 cruisers and DLs, plus 72 destroyers?, plus the 12 Carriers would leave you short by quite a bit. Perhaps they are counting the 60 Picket ships?

SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE MISSILES...........................450-Plus

That seems off. I count 410 surface combatants.

SHIPS WITH ANTI-SUBMARINE AIRCRAFT.........................150-Plus

There are only 21 carriers, and I don't think any other class ship has helicopter hangars at this time. The only other option would be a lot of DASH capable ships, unless they had DDs and DEs in planning stages with helicopter hangars.

 

[CV12Hornet]

12 Long Beach? I presume the other 6 would be the converted WW2 cruisers, but I thought there were more so I'm uncertain why there are only 6.

Given the timing I think 11 of the CGNs would be Typhon cruisers. The 6 CGs would all be the Albany-type, as the earlier half-conversions were probably expected to be obsolete by 1970 and indeed the Bostons were.

72 cruisers and DLs, plus 72 destroyers?, plus the 12 Carriers would leave you short by quite a bit. Perhaps they are counting the 60 Picket ships?

Yes, I'm fairly certain the picket ships would be DEGs like the Brookes.

 

[apparition13]

12 Long Beach? I presume the other 6 would be the converted WW2 cruisers, but I thought there were more so I'm uncertain why there are only 6.

Given the timing I think 11 of the CGNs would be Typhon cruisers. The 6 CGs would all be the Albany-type, as the earlier half-conversions were probably expected to be obsolete by 1970 and indeed the Bostons were.

As I understand it there were supposed to be 6 Long Beach, 1 per Enterprise, but both programs got cut to 1 due to expense. Perhaps the others were to be Typhon. What has me stumped circa 1958 is are the 54 DLG/Ns.

 

[SSgtC]

12 Long Beach? I presume the other 6 would be the converted WW2 cruisers, but I thought there were more so I'm uncertain why there are only 6.

Given the timing I think 11 of the CGNs would be Typhon cruisers. The 6 CGs would all be the Albany-type, as the earlier half-conversions were probably expected to be obsolete by 1970 and indeed the Bostons were.

As I understand it there were supposed to be 6 Long Beach, 1 per Enterprise, but both programs got cut to 1 due to expense. Perhaps the others were to be Typhon. What has me stumped circa 1958 is are the 54 DLG/Ns.

Most likely they were meant to ensure that all the nuclear carriers had sufficient nuclear escorts that could keep up with them over long distances. If you assume that at least 1/3 are going to be down for maintenance and and another 1/3 either training or used for other missions at any given time, that gives you 18 nuclear DLGNs to escort 6 CVANs, or 3 per carrier. Add in the Long Beach that would be part of each CSG, and you've got a decent escort force of 4 cruisers and destroyers that can escort the nuclear carrier at high speed over long distances

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

12 with smaller missiles, 1000-mile or greater range

12 SSGNs, if only Tomahawk was around they could have done the same as they did with the older Ohios. Unless they mean something more like Pershing.

This may be referring to ships armed with the Regulus missile.

 

[Archibald]

Regulus missile submarines - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[uk 75]

Initial optimism about using nuclear reactors in large numbers of ships in the 1950s is hard to sustain once Enterprise, Long Beach and Bainbridge are actually in service.
Similarly the retrofitting of SAMs to old units.
The destroyer Gyatt is the first and smallest vessel to get a Terrier system.

USS Gyatt - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The three Albany class are the last to be converted. After Truxtun new build ships get vertical rather than horizontal magazines.
The Typhon system is simply too big and costly while not delivering. Another twenty years of progress in electronics is necessary to deliver AEGIS. But the missiles it uses are evolved Tartar.
Contrast with the UK. Seaslug is our Terrier. CF299 Seadart is an improved Tartar with Talos style propulsion. NIGS would have been our Typhon.. AEGIS is too costly for the UK. T45 with PAAMS takes another 20 years to arrive.
Long Beach and the three Albany class symbolise the high watermark of US hopes for nuclear power and the 3 Ts missiles. Regulus 2 was planned for these ships.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/uss-long-beach-preliminary-studies.35675/

 

[Yellow Palace]

This may be referring to ships armed with the Regulus missile.

This is how Polmar and Moore interpret the proposal in Cold War Submarines.

As far as 65 nuclear and 10 conventional submarines go: six TANG, one DARTER and three BARBEL gets to 10 conventional submarines of then-modern design.

The 18 helicopter assualt ships were certainly IWO JIMA class - the design was pretty much finalised by mid-1957, and the first ship was laid down in early 1959.

 

[Yellow Palace]

I suppose they might be looking at ASW groups composed of a CVS, with DDGs (Adams, Farragut/Coontz) for air defense and DEs armed with ASROC and DASH for ASW. Nine CVSs would not need 8 DDGs and 20 DEs each, so my guess is the extras would supplement CVA groups in time of war and maybe do the presence mission in peacetime. Or perhaps the intent would be to have the bulk of the DEs manned by naval reserve personnel.

Friedman makes reference in US Aircraft Carriers to a CVS being accompanied by eight destroyers, so that tracks. I'd suggest that the DEG/DE force was viewed as escorts for convoys and the amphibious force; the numbers support 22 groups of 11 ships, with each having 2-3 air defence escorts. I'm certain I've seen earlier Royal Navy planning based around similar-sized escort groups, with similar numbers of Type 41 air defence escorts, but I can't seem to find it.

50 Sacramento and Wichita class AOE/AOR would be quite the replenishment fleet.

I don't think this is meant to represent just AOEs and AORs: I think it covers the single-product ships of WW2 and later design, which were 'fast' by comparison to contemporary merchant ships. This is broadly comparable - given the smaller fleet - to the 69 replenishment ships of the '600 Ship Navy' plans.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

50 Sacramento and Wichita class AOE/AOR would be quite the replenishment fleet.

I don't think this is meant to represent just AOEs and AORs: I think it covers the single-product ships of WW2 and later design, which were 'fast' by comparison to contemporary merchant ships. This is broadly comparable - given the smaller fleet - to the 69 replenishment ships of the '600 Ship Navy' plans.

Arleigh Burke was at the 1957 Mobile Support Conference which led to the design of the Sacramento class AOE, one of the talks being focused on a 30-knot 881ft design drawn up by Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation. Given the date of this document, that Arleigh Burke was the author of said document and was closely involved with the design of the Sacramento class, I think that he was thinking of a ship along those lines.

HyperWar: Gray Steel and Black Oil [Chapter 21]

 

[Yellow Palace]

50 Sacramento and Wichita class AOE/AOR would be quite the replenishment fleet.

I don't think this is meant to represent just AOEs and AORs: I think it covers the single-product ships of WW2 and later design, which were 'fast' by comparison to contemporary merchant ships. This is broadly comparable - given the smaller fleet - to the 69 replenishment ships of the '600 Ship Navy' plans.

Arleigh Burke was at the 1957 Mobile Support Conference which led to the design of the Sacramento class AOE, one of the talks being focused on a 30-knot 881ft design drawn up by Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation. Given the date of this document, that Arleigh Burke was the author of said document and was closely involved with the design of the Sacramento class, I think that he was thinking of a ship along those lines.

HyperWar: Gray Steel and Black Oil [Chapter 21]

Oh, I'm sure that they were among that total of 50 ships, I just don't believe that they'd account for the full number. Traditional single-product ships - fleet oilers, ammunition ships, and the like - would probably make a large proportion of it.

If the numbers were anything like the 600 Ship Navy, I'd guess in the region of 12 AOEs, with the balance being oilers (AO), ammunition ships (AE), provisions ships (AF), stores issue ships (AKS) and the likes.

 

[JFC Fuller]

For the surface striking forces we are likely seeing six carrier groups, each with two CVAs/CVANs, 9 frigates and 3 cruisers. The Navy had been planning for a 12 ship CVA fleet and two carrier CVA groups in the late 1950s. The Navy had been active planning for 12 CVAs in the late 1950s. Secretary of Defense McElroy told the Senate Subcommittee on Appropriations in 1959 that the reason for only 1 attack carrier being in the FY60 programme was:

...based on a program of the Navy to have 12 attack carriers in the arsenal, all of them of the Forrestal or of the new Enterprise type - either those two classes, either the Forrestal or the Enterprise types.
While we now have 14 attack carriers, a number of those, I think it is 9, are of the Essex class, which is really not adequate to take care, either from the standpoint of safety of aircraft or safety of personnel, of the high-performance aircraft that are coming into the fleet.
So that if we buy 1 attack carrier, either of the Forrestal or of the Enterprise class, every 2 years, 6 or 8 years from now we will have funded a force of 12 attack carriers of that class and that is what we have as our objective.

The 60 picket ships probably covers the various DERs, Guardian class AGRs and the radar picket submarines (e.g. Triton and the Sailfish class plus the converted WW2 boats). The DEW Line extension operations didn't start to be wound down until FY61 and it wasn't until the W2F/Hawkeye really got operational that the picket role for carrier groups started to go away. At that point the Navy was reporting 36 DERs in addition to the 16 AGRs and the submarines, so 60 is about right. I doubt these would have been Brookes, more likely the existing ships and/or some hypothetical replacements. The Brookes, or rather what became them, likely constituted a large part of the "Ocean Escort" category alongside other Destroyer Escort types.

In 1968, as part of the FY79 Hearings on Military Posture the House Committee on Armed Services was shown the attached table showing how the actual 1977 force structure compared with the force proposed/predicted for the 1970s in 1957.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

For what it's worth. This was the strength of the US Fleet in the 1960s according to the Naval History & Heritage Command (https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html)

​

Notes.

• This tabulation was compiled from such sources as the Navy Directory (issued at varying intervals to 1941); the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy (issued annually to 1931); Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) compilations; Department of the Navy (DON) 5-Year Program, Ships & Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables (SASDT); and records and compilations of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-802K, now N804J1D) Ship Management Information System (now Ship Management System), refined and edited with the assistance of the annual Naval Vessel Register.
• For consistent historical comparison, Naval Reserve Force (NRF) and Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) ships, and Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet support ships, are included in current and recent active totals. Figures, and conclusions drawn from them, would, otherwise, be historically inconsistent, and comparisons would be skewed.
• From 1963 through 1974, former guided-missile frigates (DLG/DLGN) are counted under the categories (cruisers, destroyers) to which they were assigned on 30 June 1975: DLG 6 class Became DDG 37 class; DLG 16 class became CG 16 class; DLG 26 class became CG 26 class; DLGN 25, 35, 36 classes became CGN 25, 35, 36 classes .
• Surface warfare ship totals do not include submarines, mine warfare, patrol or auxiliaries.
• These are the totals active at the end of the US Fiscal Year which until 1977 began on 1st July and ended on 30th June and subsequently have begun on 1st October and ended on 30th September.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

And this (according to the same source) is the strength of the US Fleet from 1959 to the end of the Cold War.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

It does exactly what it says on the tin.



Footnotes:

* During this reporting period, 1981–1996, the total carriers listed under CV does not include the carrier undergoing a major Service Life Extension Program.
** Includes all designations CV, CVA, CVB, CVAN and CVN, that have been used for the Fleet carriers; missions the same.
*** These LHA/LPH/LHDs are counted the same since mission is very similar.

Source: UNITED STATES NAVAL AVIATION 1910–1995 APPENDIX 3 Aviation Ships

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

This is the information in Post 33 in a different format.



Notes.

• This tabulation was compiled from such sources as the Navy Directory (issued at varying intervals to 1941); the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy (issued annually to 1931); Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) compilations; Department of the Navy (DON) 5-Year Program, Ships & Aircraft Supplemental Data Tables (SASDT); and records and compilations of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-802K, now N804J1D) Ship Management Information System (now Ship Management System), refined and edited with the assistance of the annual Naval Vessel Register.
• For consistent historical comparison, Naval Reserve Force (NRF) and Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF) ships, and Military Sealift Command (MSC) fleet support ships, are included in current and recent active totals. Figures, and conclusions drawn from them, would, otherwise, be historically inconsistent, and comparisons would be skewed.
• From 1963 through 1974, former guided-missile frigates (DLG/DLGN) are counted under the categories (cruisers, destroyers) to which they were assigned on 30 June 1975: DLG 6 class Became DDG 37 class; DLG 16 class became CG 16 class; DLG 26 class became CG 26 class; DLGN 25, 35, 36 classes became CGN 25, 35, 36 classes .
• Surface warfare ship totals do not include submarines, mine warfare, patrol or auxiliaries.
• These are the totals active at the end of the US Fiscal Year which until 1977 began on 1st July and ended on 30th June and subsequently have begun on 1st October and ended on 30th September.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Some more background information.

• According to the tables in Posts 32, 33 and 35 the US Navy had 932 active ships on 30.06.67. This included 105 (attack) submarines, 23 aircraft carriers, 297 surface warships and 162 amphibious assault ships.
• According to the tables in Posts 33 and 35 the US Navy had 559 active ships at 30.06.75. This included 75 (attack) submarines, 15 aircraft carriers, 193 surface warships and 64 amphibious assault ships.
• That's a reduction of 373 ships including 30 (attack) submarines, 8 aircraft carriers, 104 surface warships and 102 amphibious assault ships.
• However, in 1967 the fleet planned for 1975 had 826 active ships. This included 105 (attack submarines), 20 aircraft carriers, 243 surface warships (the source called them "escort ships" and 137 amphibious assault ships.
  • That is according to an article called "American Sea Power" by James D. Hessman in in the Second Edition of "Warships & Navies Review" Edited by Anthony J. Watts.
  • Which, in turn, said that it was according to tables provided for the Senate Armed Service Committee by by Zumwalt during the so-called "authorisation" hearings on the 1973 Defense Department budget.

 

[JFC Fuller]

• However, in 1967 the fleet planned for 1975 had 826 active ships. This included 105 (attack submarines), 20 aircraft carriers, 243 surface warships (the source called them "escort ships"and 137 amphibious assault ships.
  • That is according to an article called "American Sea Power" by James D. Hessman in in the Second Edition of "Warships & Navies Review" Edited by Anthony J. Watts.
  • Which, in turn, said that it was according to tables provided for the Senate Armed Service Committee by by Zumwalt during the so-called "authorisation" hearings on the 1973 Defense Department budget.

See attached from the 1972 (for FY73) Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, it shows how the forecasts/plans for 1975 changed year by year from 1967.

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

• However, in 1967 the fleet planned for 1975 had 826 active ships. This included 105 (attack submarines), 20 aircraft carriers, 243 surface warships (the source called them "escort ships" and 137 amphibious assault ships.
  • That is according to an article called "American Sea Power" by James D. Hessman in in the Second Edition of "Warships & Navies Review" Edited by Anthony J. Watts.
  • Which, in turn, said that it was according to tables provided for the Senate Armed Service Committee by by Zumwalt during the so-called "authorisation" hearings on the 1973 Defense Department budget.

See attached from the 1972 (for FY73) Senate Appropriations Committee Hearings, it shows how the forecasts/plans for 1975 changed year by year from 1967.

FWIW I don't need to as the article I quoted included that information. I didn't include it in Post 36 because I thought the projected fleet for 1975 at 1968, 1969 & 1970 irrelevant. (And still do.)

However, for completeness these are the projected fleets for 1975 in 1967, 1968, 1969 & 1970 and the actual fleets in 1967 & 1975 according to my sources.

And here's a full-size version your table in Post 37.

​

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Part of Post 31.

In 1968, as part of the FY79 Hearings on Military Posture the House Committee on Armed Services was shown the attached table showing how the actual 1977 force structure compared with the force proposed/predicted for the 1970s in 1957.

FWIW this is the table full-size.

​

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

There's also NSDM 344 from 1977, which shows the intentions of the Ford Administration in it's last days.