Unless the PRC can divorce productivity from labor force (which I think is something they are attempting), it seems unlikely even the exaggerated economic growth of the current PRC keeps on going.

It's been declining since the 1980s from 15-20% GDP/year to now 4-5%. It's likely they can maintain this for another half decade though and that will allow them to break through to reusable rockets. They're really not some great big moat. They'll probably have a Falcon 9 in regular operation before 2030.

China's issues will come into play in the latter half of the next decade (2035+) but if they play their cards right, like they have been for the past 40 years, they'll be able to keep negotiating down GDP targets from 4-5% to 3-4% and then 2-3% while automatizing stuff and reducing reliance on young workers. It's a plateau for sure, but they will likely sit higher up than the U.S. at the end of it, if only because they already sitting higher than the U.S. economy and that translates to a higher future end goal.

The jury is out on whether or not they'll ever be able to solve the rural-urban investment divide, so they'll be incredibly advanced in highly concentrated economic zones (unless automatizing opens up new growth disconnected from labor [it almost certainly won't] it will consume the margin with maintenance like it does in Europe and America today), and end up basically half a century behind in random villages or whatever.

This isn't a big issue if you don't care about rural poor places and most people don't tbh because that won't impact solar panel outputs.

IMO, that’s why I think war is far more likely: if China was inevitably going to be the global economic superpower, all it has to do is wait.

There simply won't be superpowers in the future.

There will be several regional powers with spheres of influence. The European Union, Russia, America, China, maybe a couple others, and their respective vassals. China also won't be a financial superpower and it knows this. I suspect it will try to lean heavily on Europe for this task if it can get them on their side but that again implies China has anything Europe wants.

It's the 19th century age of empires all over again with all the chaos and uncertainty that entails.

Instead it seems on a rapid collision course of war with Taiwan and the US.

This is partially an American projection and I think that is feeding into Chinese planning in particular (mainly it's accelerating certain programs like J-20/J-35 and the SSNs), but yeah. There's no way to prove the Chinese shipbuilding program is an actual attempt to militarily retake Taiwan next year, until it happens, and it could actually just be a massive subsidy/jobs program intended to keep employment rates up.

Given the structure of the PRC, and the social compacts the CPC has made with the population, it's 55/45 in favor of a jobs program IMO.

If Xi was confident China will eventually prevail; all he has to do is watch and wait.

That's essentially what is being done, at least from the outside looking in, but it's possible the USIC has some hidden information.

China still spends less as a percentage of its GDP than the United States. It's actually on a downwards trend lately. It was closer to 2% a decade ago and now it's similar to Japan in the 2000s. It's simply a massive economy and it has a lot of labor and industrial capacity that needs subsidy. Supercarriers and such are necessary to force the U.S. out of Asia, but there's also the domestic component of not reducing the labor force, even as the commercial shipbuilding industry picked back up.

When the 2008 crash happened the PRC shifted gears from commercial shipbuilding to military shipbuilding. Now, they're doing both, but perhaps they don't actually want to conquer Taiwan militarily, and just want to keep their shipyard workers employed? Yes, their shipbuilding plan looks very much like a military build up, but only because that's the only shipbuilding plan that makes sense in the context of a regional war with the United States, and the only people making noise about a military invasion are the United States and Taiwan.

China could literally be perfectly content to wait out Taiwan while building a navy prepared for WW3. That's what the U.S. and USSR both did in the Cold War: neither side had any offensive designs on the other but assumed the opposite of the enemy. That's simply what an arms race is.

The U.S. might sleep walk its way into WW3 because it will get so paranoid over 2027, that it will cause it to happen by sending the U.S. Marines to Taiwan or building an embassy or giving them F-35 or something, and I'm not entirely unconvinced that isn't the plan for a preemptive war that's on the table somewhere. Provoke China into action and strike them hard before they can react on the pretext of "defending Taiwan" or something.

It's just about the only way America can defuse this issue before the USN reaches its actual relative force nadir after 2036 (and at this rate, with DDG(X) being delayed, the force structure won't recover until the latter 2040s at least rather than the early 2040s). Otherwise, it's pushing hard into Starshield and some sort of ABM system, and relying on the U.S. nuclear weapons as a first strike to cripple the Chinese war economy before it can get started. That might not work if the PRC is able to beat the reusable rocket moat and they likely will at some point because their constellation size will go from ~300 to probably ~30,000 (enough to defeat a U.S. nuclear attack) very quickly.

If America were smart and had some sort of centralized censorship regime, it would act aloof about China's military buildup rather than running endless NYT and NPR news articles, which makes it look weak. The problem is that America, in addition to looking weak due to its own political self-denigration, is actually weak from the perspective of a protracted industrial war. So, while there's a time crunch involved but it's on the Americans' end to not get 1898'ed out of Asia rather than on China to race to capture Taiwan.

The prime mover here is not that China wants to militarily take Taiwan though, or thinks it has to, because it knows it can afford to wait. The problem is the U.S. is posturing itself to suggest that, not only will it be unlikely to do anything, it's also increasingly incapable of doing anything regardless. This is without any actual plan of what happens when that "trap" is sprung and America finds itself watching Chinese Marines in Super Frelons orbit over the Presidential Office Building in Taipei or something.

This is why some people talked about "sleep walking into WW3" a few years ago in the Atlantic or whatever: America is causing China to act a bit more aggressively by presenting itself as openly declining. Unfortunately, this is merely a symptom of America's free press and genuine industrial decay, rather than some masterful chess gambit.

It's a hard sell on the aloof bit because even if America plays the cool cucumber, like it should, it's actually in the position of being unable to do anything. It should ideally be talking about cutting Taiwan loose and establishing deep defense-industrial ties with Korea and Japan in particular. Building American ordered Burkes in Korean or Taiwanese yards would let it at least utilize its financial muscles to get tangible returns, and having an actual plan for what happens if Taiwan gets taken (if it happens) means the Pacific allies won't feel left out in the cold or can steel themselves emotionally for it.

Expecting basic things like this from the past few U.S. admins is a bit futile though. America is quite bad at managing decline, so I suspect within a decade or so it will be pushed back to Guam (or leave Guam of its own volition) and return to the Western Hemisphere, with the rest of Asia (really, Korea/Japan/Australia/Philippines) will be in a loose military alliance to counteract a Chinese regional hegemony.

That seems to be the trend line unless something major happens, like the Jones Act gets amended to allow for warships to be purchased overseas if American shipyards are unable to meet the demands, or something. That's something that should have been changed 5-10 years ago with the Pacific Pivot. We'd probably have another half dozen or so Burkes in the water if we could buy them from Japanese and Korean yards, and an actually useful FREMM derivative, in addition to our present yard capacities given Jones Act waivers outside of wartime.

Sadly, that won't be until we end up in a major war with the PRC, and that might be over before the yards can spin up.
 
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I think both sides have a clock, but one has the advantage of simply holding still. The other has to flip the whole table over and change how the WestPac works. How that dynamic plays out will consume the region for the next decade.
 
I'm sure the PRC is aiming for well above parity. My expectation is that they're aiming for a GDP-per-capita equal to that of the US, which means a total GDP 3-4x the size of the US.

I am sure that is a goal. I question how long it will take them to achieve that when they are being beaten 10:1 and a full generation behind the most advanced US launch systems.
 
Technical parity and purchasing parity are not the same thing.
Correct, they aren't.

I expect GDP parity with the US in about 8-10 years, based on growth rate from 2021-2024. And Chinese GDP will double in about 15-18 years after that, if they can maintain the 4-5% growth rates. It'll take up to 30 years if the growth rate drops to 2%.

Technical parity partially depends on the Chinese finally grokking QA/QC culture, across all the industries. No more "Chinesium" parts.


This is partially an American projection and I think that is feeding into Chinese planning in particular (mainly it's accelerating certain programs like J-20/J-35 and the SSNs), but yeah. There's no way to prove the Chinese shipbuilding program is an actual attempt to militarily retake Taiwan next year, until it happens, and it could actually just be a massive subsidy/jobs program intended to keep employment rates up.
It's long been joked that Newport News is nothing but a US jobs program that spits out a carrier every decade.


I am sure that is a goal. I question how long it will take them to achieve that when they are being beaten 10:1 and a full generation behind the most advanced US launch systems.
Fully reusable rockets are demonstrated and honestly pretty low-hanging fruit. How long did it take SpaceX to get the basic Falcons sorted out? 15 years? But if China is willing to spend the cost for disintegrating totem poles they could match the launch rate. I'm sure the rockets would be cheap when you're building a thousand of them.
 
aiming for well above parity
They can aim, the question is whether they can actually do it.

Fundamentally, as Hugh White pointed out very succinctly in a podcast, the idea that China would not achieve parity was a mirror of the idea that Japan would surpass the United States. Japan has less than half the population of America; surpassing America would require a GDP/head and level of development more than twice as high as the US, which common sense suggests is kinda hard to say the least. China has four times the population of the USA; to achieve parity only requires a level of development less than a third as great. Which is not necessarily extremely difficult.

Absent suprises, it was almost certain that China would one day surpass the USA, the question was how and when and in what form and on what terms. China is not on a ticking clock; demographic issues are unlikely to bite until the 2040s. The ticking clock is more on the American end.

Any sense of urgency is on the economic end rather than the military end; which is why China is sprinting towards automation and paying down debt to avoid running into economic issues in the 2040s and 2050s and save money for pensions and stuff. It is relatively cheap and sane and positive-sum to fix up the economy and make investments to avoid issues down the road and ensure continued growth into the future.

If Xi was confident China will eventually prevail; all he has to do is watch and wait.

I am fairly sure Xi is confident that China will eventually prevail on the Taiwan front, which is why he is watching and waiting. As long as nothing unusual happens (and as long as the economy keeps going - which is why his efforts have been on the economic front to deleverage, get rid of real estate, build up the high-tech economy by various means), Taiwan is as good as conquered by 2050. To prevent unusual things happening, it is necessary to establish deterence to minimize the temptation by other parties to do unusual things.

Also also, given Chinese economic strength (on the backs of the huge population and economy alone) and high-tech/military limitations/relative weakness, common sense suggests it would be utter folly for the PRC to pick a fight in the military sphere. Far, far better to keep the contest in the realm of economics and development.

Expecting basic things like this from the past few U.S. admins is a bit futile though.

Common sense, unfortunately, is not common. Rebuilding industrial ties with Japan, Korea, and elsewhere, rebalancing and reinvigorating the US economy... all much, much better plans to strengthen the American hand long-term, and positive sum too! This is an economic contest; this is the first resort.
 
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I think both sides have a clock, but one has the advantage of simply holding still. The other has to flip the whole table over and change how the WestPac works. How that dynamic plays out will consume the region for the next decade.

America is on the short clock. It can start a war now or it can watch China erode its Asia sphere and eventually press it back to the Western Hemisphere with minor outposts.

China has a long clock but so does America. Both will have demographic issues but China compounds this with a debt issue that exceeds America's. With luck it will be able to find the European Union amenable to continue to fund its debt addiction. It's unclear if either the US or China can beat their long term demographic trajectory that will catch up to both near the end of the next decade and start biting down in the late 30s or early 40s.

The US has a lot of money and can import advanced European and Japanese tooling to automate its economy. The Chinese have a lot of labor and can automate themselves given enough time. Both will probably happen and it's unclear if it will work. It's also irrelevant for a Taiwan fight which will happen first.

The issue is that we'll probably see a war started by either America or China in the next one to five years. The CPC can smell blood and might leap on it or the US might knuckle down and dig in at the First Island Chain. If it comes quickly, it will be a Crimea for Asia, and the US might be able to pull up from that and retrench within the Second Island Chain. If protracted, that's when stuff like the Jones Act waivers will be put down to clear up shipbuilding backlogs with MHI and HHI, and it's possible neither side wins and they simply mutually evaporate.

Common sense, unfortunately, is not common. Rebuilding industrial ties with Japan, Korea, and elsewhere, rebalancing and reinvigorating the US economy... all much, much better plans to strengthen the American hand long-term, and positive sum too! This is an economic contest; this is the first resort.

Well, I think both America and China fully realize that war is politics is economics by other means TBF. Trump just has an outdated model of US economics because he thinks it's still like 1998. Most Americans feel this way on at least some part of their views I think.

The global macroeconomic trends that ate the soul of American optimism weren't started there and they won't end there. There are few countries that have managed their eras of Imperial decline skillfully too. Most fail at it and success is hard to measure except in terms of "well, it could always be worse".
 
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They can aim, the question is whether they can actually do it.
1950, MacArthur thought the same way, but they do it, in korea.

the idea that China would not achieve parity was a mirror of the idea that Japan would surpass the United States.
I don't quite understand what you mean by "parity" in this context. If applied to the Taiwan issue, with the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as the benchmark—where two aircraft carriers confronted the PLA—this balance had already been disrupted. If referring to a decisive fleet confrontation between China and the U.S. in the central Pacific, it is still far from enough.
 
1950, MacArthur thought the same way, but they do it, in korea.


I don't quite understand what you mean by "parity" in this context. If applied to the Taiwan issue, with the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis as the benchmark—where two aircraft carriers confronted the PLA—this balance had already been disrupted. If referring to a decisive fleet confrontation between China and the U.S. in the central Pacific, it is still far from enough.
I mean economic and naval parity. GDP equal or greater than the US, a number of carriers equal or greater than what the US can deploy.
 
I mean economic and naval parity. GDP equal or greater than the US, a number of carriers equal or greater than what the US can deploy.
First, considering the immense gap between Chinese and American manufacturing—especially in shipbuilding (the U.S. takes as much time and cost to build one Arleigh Burke Flight III as China could build several Type 055s, not to mention recent satellite imagery comparing aircraft carrier construction)—and the U.S. military's global presence requirements (e.g., its presence off Venezuela over the past six months, and the recent claim by TACO about deploying a second carrier to the Middle East), GDP and naval parity are hard to assess directly through surface-level figures.

Second, under your hypothetical parity scenario, what meaningful presence would the U.S. military even have near Taiwan?
 
First, considering the immense gap between Chinese and American manufacturing—especially in shipbuilding (the U.S. takes as much time and cost to build one Arleigh Burke Flight III as China could build several Type 055s, not to mention recent satellite imagery comparing aircraft carrier construction)—and the U.S. military's global presence requirements (e.g., its presence off Venezuela over the past six months, and the recent claim by TACO about deploying a second carrier to the Middle East), GDP and naval parity are hard to assess directly through surface-level figures.
Correct.



Second, under your hypothetical parity scenario, what meaningful presence would the U.S. military even have near Taiwan?
Once the Chinese have GDP-per-capita parity with the US? And naval parity?

USN isn't going to have much business near Taiwan, except port calls.
 
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