USN Missions around Taiwan

[TwoTribes]

You are forgetting at one point in time about decade or so ago Taiwan had one of the largest gold reserves in the world.
The other reason was more or less the official goal (2005 Anti-Secession Law) of reuniting before the 100 year celebration of the PRC's establishment. They would lose face if they don't get it done now.

I think that law does not specify any specific time limit. Perhaps you should refer to the original text.

In fact, no senior official at the highest level has ever proposed any so-called taiwan timeline.

 

[Josh_TN]

Another thought that came to mind, my apologies for replying twice: while China is clearly building a robust amphibious force, I find it unlikely they are looking just at Taiwan. For all the “pivot to the pacific” talk, it is impossible to ignore the role of the US navy as a global fighting force and that is what China seeks to emulate and/or surpass. They need ships for more than a Taiwan fight for that

PLAN amphibious capability is built for global expeditionary missions like the US equivalent. You do not need a sustained marine presence for an amphibious landing, and in fact there are six separate amphibious army brigades built around the Taiwan mission that would be delivered by civilian ro/ro ferries. China has 1.5 - 2 million tons displacement of high capacity multi vehicle deck ferries in the 20,000-40,000 ton range, along with car carriers, that would be the backbone of amphibious lift in a Taiwan invasion. The marines would probably be used on smaller more far flung objectives.

 

[Josh_TN]

How were the defenders of Normandy ‘defeated in the east’?

It’s not the 1940s any more, not only do we have aircraft that can carry many more paratroopers now, but we have dedicated amphibs that can deliver troops behind the beaches via helicopter, helicopters that can then provide some CAS. Before anyone attempts to hit the beaches.

That’s not included precision weapons that can hit specific targets like bunkers, or other firing positions…

ROC’s best bet at spoiling the invasion is good intelligence giving them a few days heads up, and a decisive deployment of their fast minelayers to cripple the invasion fleet as they cross the straight.

China could potentially use air mobility to deliver troops directly to objectives in Taiwan; the distance involved is such that a round trip to westernmost areas would be possible. Certainly a one way trip or a landing on a platform or island in the straight world allow direct insertion. There are I believe six air mobile brigade reserved for this purpose with unique TO&E for the mission.

But the other thing that has changed since Normandy is that modern ISR will likely be staring at the landing ships the entire time, allowing missiles and artillery to fired at them at almost any point in the load - traverse - unload cycle. And individual hits on fully loaded car ferries will likely start fires that burn the ship to the waterline. Defending the landing force would be incredibly difficult, aa everything from tube artillery to hypersonic intermediate ranged weapons might be used (if the US actually got involved).

 

[Josh_TN]

Indeed, all things considered I doubt the US will truly intervene in what's essentially a civil war. They'll instead fortify their positions further back, fortify Japan, the Philippines and carry on with their strategy of containing the PLAN from there, with much better chances.

Fighting China while China is committed to destroying Taiwan’s defenses makes far more sense than waiting for them to destroy the keystone of the first island chain and *then* fight them. This is even more true if China has the burden of landing and defending beaches and loading points. This is why Japan has inserted itself into the conversation: because waiting to fight China after it absorbs Taiwan is to effectively yield control of WestPac to China.

Whether the US gets involved or not is as much of a psychological question as a political one; certainly there is doubt about the current administration. I would expect that to be probed and potentially exploited before 2029.

 

[Josh_TN]

I think that's everything summed up. The US is happy to sell Taiwan equipment, but they won't deploy the sons and daughters of Americans to die in a war that in no way, shape or form threatens the US directly.

The loss of Taiwan would effectively kick the US out of the WestPac, and as recently as the previous administration there were multiple assertions that the US would get involved. Every DoD strategic document assesses China to be the pacing threat.

US involvement ultimately is a POTUS decision, with essentially no off ramp once the battle is joined.

 

[Josh_TN]

It doesn't matter, Taiwan (TSMC) just produces what they're contracted to produce. To manufacture their products they use ASML machines, Machines that can be bought, installed and used by literally anyone anywhere. The only benefit about Taiwan is that labor and material is dirt cheap. Taiwan isn't worth defending over their semiconductor production, that can be set up anywhere.

The only reason for the US to intervene over Taiwan would be to simply mess with China as much as possible. But given the current trajectory of the PLA and US Military, and the PLAN and USN in particular, that would be suicidal for the USN as a branch and politcal suicide for any government as people would be rather unhappy when thousands of sailors perish once destroyers and carriers sink into the sea.

It would also be fairly suicidal for the PLAN to try it, especially if they did not neutralize local US assets first. The most recent public wargames generally have both sides taking catastrophic losses. The primary problem for the PLAN becomes creating an AD bubble around Taiwan during a major operation, and the ships east of Taiwan being in open deep water on the wrong side of the first island chain. This force would be exposed to SSNs and bombers with long ranged cruise missiles, even if USN surface fleet is gone.

The PRC might find itself in the same position as Imperial Japan: no desire to engage the US if it can get what it wants without that fight, but risking far too much to NOT engage the US with a first strike on the off chance it DOES get involved.

 

[EmoBirb]

The whole PRC obsession over Taiwanw is really just bad blood stuff and there's no reason to expect them to get reasonable over it.

What's unreasonable about dealing with a renegade faction of a previous (bloody) civil war? This whole discussion only exists because two sides claim to be the actual state of China with all the territorial and cultural claims. And why I can understand why someone would sympathize with the KMT (although most people who view Taiwan favorably do so simply because it's backed by the US, with little to no historical or cultural knowledge), it is objectively an on going civil war. And people who cheer on the violent suppression of separatist movements elsewhere in the world, because they feel good about it, fail to realize that the very same dynamics are at play in the PRC-ROC relationship. The Taiwan is more akin to the Houthis, DPR or DPRK than it is to other states.

 

[EmoBirb]

Fighting China while China is committed to destroying Taiwan’s defenses makes far more sense than waiting for them to destroy the keystone of the first island chain and *then* fight them.

The issue with that line of thinking is that the window of opportunity is extremely small. Taiwan would fall much quicker than a naval response could be organized, unless an SSGN or SSN is in the immediate area of conflict. And that's a response that might surprise some targets but ultimately it would be a suicidal engagement. The same goes for airborne responses, long range aviation.

The loss of Taiwan would effectively kick the US out of the WestPac

Would it? The US still has a strong presence in Japan, in Guam, is on good terms with the ROK and is also expanding their presence in the Philippines. While the PRC taking over Taiwan wouldn't really move their immediate influence further out, simply due to how close they are. For comparison, the US also wouldn't have a dramatically changed presence in the Atlantic if they annexed Cuba. To kick the US out of the Western Pacific South Korea would have to completely pivot towards China, Japan would have to kick out the Americans (which would actually amuse me, I admit as much) and Guam would have to be submerged into the sea. Aside from the Korea maybe switching up in the very long term I find these scenarios unlikely. It's like saying losing the Russo-Ukrainian War will kick the Americans out of Europe, so to speak.

 

[EmoBirb]

Whether the US gets involved or not is as much of a psychological question as a political one

It is, I fully agree with that. And while people like to draw Pearl Harbor parallels because there's an Asian power that's threatened by US intervention, I think these people forget that today isn't the 1940s.

When a country loses public support over low intensity forever wars in the desert with minimal casualties. And when a country loses public support over a jungle campaign that was militarily successful but suffered from publicity and saw unrest at home as a consequence. Well, I think it's reasonable and valid to doubt that such a country, that such a population, would be willing to stomach hundreds of thousands of body bags over a foreign island. And in the days of social media the public opinion and flow of information would ultimately prove devastating. In essence, I fail to see how in the 21st century the US government would try to sell such an inevitably disastrous intervention to a population that's more dissatisfied by domestic conditions and their government than ever. Or to put it very bluntly and I think I reflect a good chunk of my generation saying this: why would one want to die en masse for foreigners and a government full of rich pedophiles?

So yes, the matter is arguably far more psychological than actually political. And because of that I'd doubt intervention would happen or it would collapse quickly as losses mount and public opinion swings. And losses would mount, quickly and in unprecedented numbers. Simply because even a single destroyer, a single submarine, a single LHD or a single CVN is already a huge number of potential casualties. And while this may venture a bit out of the scope of this specific thread, I think this applies to the vast majority of the western bloc, notable examples may include countries like Israel, Poland or the ROK.

 

[Josh_TN]

What's unreasonable about dealing with a renegade faction of a previous (bloody) civil war? This whole discussion only exists because two sides claim to be the actual state of China with all the territorial and cultural claims. And why I can understand why someone would sympathize with the KMT (although most people who view Taiwan favorably do so simply because it's backed by the US, with little to no historical or cultural knowledge), it is objectively an on going civil war. And people who cheer on the violent suppression of separatist movements elsewhere in the world, because they feel good about it, fail to realize that the very same dynamics are at play in the PRC-ROC relationship. The Taiwan is more akin to the Houthis, DPR or DPRK than it is to other states.

Characterizing the relationship as a 3/4 century civil war seems incredibly silly. The two countries have a large degree of trade and the last time there was an exchange of fire was in the 1950s. The PRC never controlled Taiwan since its inception in 1949.

That said, clearly the CCP has a desire to control the island that goes far beyond any practical considerations, and I have no doubt an attempt to take control is made. Exactly when that occurs and what form that takes probably depends on what political opportunities Xi can leverage.

 

[Josh_TN]

The issue with that line of thinking is that the window of opportunity is extremely small. Taiwan would fall much quicker than a naval response could be organized, unless an SSGN or SSN is in the immediate area of conflict. And that's a response that might surprise some targets but ultimately it would be a suicidal engagement. The same goes for airborne responses, long range aviation.

That is your interpretation. Most wargames have the PLAN also taking huge losses. And it seems perfectly likely that one of two conditions occur: the US deploys its forces to match an invasion build up or an active blockade, or the PRC strikes the US units in theater with a surprise attack that cements popular support for an open ended war. It is possible the US never gets involved, but it is fairly impossible that the US fails to notice or react to a major change in PRC military posture or direct attack. The current NRO satellite fleet is something like 250-300, not counting commercial satellites on contract. It seems exceeding unlikely a Cuba level blockade or Normandy level invasion is unnoticed.

 

[Josh_TN]

It is, I fully agree with that. And while people like to draw Pearl Harbor parallels because there's an Asian power that's threatened by US intervention, I think these people forget that today isn't the 1940s.

When a country loses public support over low intensity forever wars in the desert with minimal casualties. And when a country loses public support over a jungle campaign that was militarily successful but suffered from publicity and saw unrest at home as a consequence. Well, I think it's reasonable and valid to doubt that such a country, that such a population, would be willing to stomach hundreds of thousands of body bags over a foreign island. And in the days of social media the public opinion and flow of information would ultimately prove devastating. In essence, I fail to see how in the 21st century the US government would try to sell such an inevitably disastrous intervention to a population that's more dissatisfied by domestic conditions and their government than ever. Or to put it very bluntly and I think I reflect a good chunk of my generation saying this: why would one want to die en masse for foreigners and a government full of rich pedophiles?

So yes, the matter is arguably far more psychological than actually political. And because of that I'd doubt intervention would happen or it would collapse quickly as losses mount and public opinion swings. And losses would mount, quickly and in unprecedented numbers. Simply because even a single destroyer, a single submarine, a single LHD or a single CVN is already a huge number of potential casualties. And while this may venture a bit out of the scope of this specific thread, I think this applies to the vast majority of the western bloc, notable examples may include countries like Israel, Poland or the ROK.

I meant the psychology of POTUS, with regards to the US getting involved.

If China strikes US units first, I think a closer parallel will be 9-11 rather than Iraq. The immediate mood of the public was practically ready to support nuclear weapon use. The Pearl Harbor comparison is pretty apt if China attacks the US first; it will not be viewed as a war over an island no one cares about but I fight against an opponent who killed Americans for no reason.

I think it is also worth pointing out that the Chinese population is not completely immune from the effects of casualties or economic pain. The zero covid policy collapsed overnight due to public pressure.

 

[EmoBirb]

Characterizing the relationship as a 3/4 century civil war seems incredibly silly. The two countries have a large degree of trade and the last time there was an exchange of fire was in the 1950s. The PRC never controlled Taiwan since its inception in 1949.

It's ultimately comparable to the relation of the ROK to the DPRK. While a status quo has been established and the two countries mostly coexist, the score has never officially been settled. And while the ROK has a powerful conventional Military and is backed by the US and the DPRK a nuclear power with vast stockpiles of weapons, the balance between China and Taiwan is so heavily leaning towards China it's remniscent of the "Coughing Baby vs Hydrogen Bomb" meme, in many ways actually. Taiwan lacks strategic depth, it lacks a military with the capabilities that are actually important in a potential conflict, it lacks demographic depth, it's easily isolated and completely within range of almost everything the PRC has in store. The fact that the Civil War hasn't been resolved to this day is because China has always been preoccupied with bigger external or internal matters and pacing greater powers. This is about to change, and with the US undeniably waning in power it's also where all the uncertainty and alarmist attitudes encountered these days come from.

Most wargames have the PLAN also taking huge losses. And it seems perfectly likely that one of two conditions occur: the US deploys its forces to match an invasion build up or an active blockade, or the PRC strikes the US units in theater with a surprise attack that cements popular support for an open ended war. It is possible the US never gets involved, but it is fairly impossible that the US fails to notice or react to a major change in PRC military posture or direct attack.

A build up doesn't have to be secret to witness an absent response from the US. The US could very much be present in the area and choose not to intervene in order to not risk further escalation and preserve it's force for potential future conflicts, should China start behaving aggressively towards the Philippines or Japan, as in threatening Invasion and annexation. As for wargames, the conditions of such are not known, I doubt the outcome from 2015 is the same as 2025, or 2035. And given the sheer distances involved for US forces which puts supply lines under immense stress, and the fact that the US can only deploy a portion of their entire force against the entire PLA with all it's branches in play, active right in their frontyard, that PRC losses would be anywhere near US losses.

I meant the psychology of POTUS, with regards to the US getting involved.

If China strikes US units first, I think a closer parallel will be 9-11 rather than Iraq. The immediate mood of the public was practically ready to support nuclear weapon use. The Pearl Harbor comparison is pretty apt if China attacks the US first; it will not be viewed as a war over an island no one cares about but I fight against an opponent who killed Americans for no reason.

I think it is also worth pointing out that the Chinese population is not completely immune from the effects of casualties or economic pain. The zero covid policy collapsed overnight due to public pressure.

POTUS isn't the only person involved when it comes to such decisions. And certainly not when it comes to the potential duration of hostilities. I also don't think 9/11 is a valid comparison. A terrorist attack by non state actors against a civilian structure on American soil is a very different scenario than a USS [Insert Name] getting send to the bottom of the ocean via AShBM, full of combatants, after attacking a warship of a nuclear power that operates basically at home. That's less 9/11 and not even Pearl Harbor, more like USS Liberty if Liberty was a destroyer and tried to shoot as Israeli aircraft. Quite frankly, soldiers dying in combat a continent away (or FAFO as some might say) is more acceptable to a society than thousands of civilians dying in downtown area. Only when losses mount and the disaster becomes undeniable does a society start to question an operation. And it would be hard for the US to pull out PR victories over there that would offset the psychological impact of a CVN getting blasted to kingdom come. And while Chinese society, like any society, has certain boundaries, I think we can all agree that they're less sensitive than US society. One just has to look towards Ukraine and Russia to see what more hardy people are willing to put up with. I think I heard today for the first time that TCC has been shot at in Ukraine. It took 3 years of constant forced conscription for a single person in Ukraine to shoot at someone. That's a country that's experiencing constant draft, manpower issues and has their energy grid dismantled. US soldiers started fragging their superiors for laughable reasons by comparison even back then in Vietnam, when the US Military was very different culturally. Or the huge anti-war movement that errupted in America over Vietnam, something that's still lingering in their social subconsciousness to this very day as a form of generational Trauma. And Vietnam saw pitiful casualty numbers in the grand scheme of things. The material loss alone in an intervention against the PLA would be significantly higher. I doubt the American public would be ready for that or willing to stomach that.

 

[Josh_TN]

It's ultimately comparable to the relation of the ROK to the DPRK. While a status quo has been established and the two countries mostly coexist, the score has never officially been settled. And while the ROK has a powerful conventional Military and is backed by the US and the DPRK a nuclear power with vast stockpiles of weapons, the balance between China and Taiwan is so heavily leaning towards China it's remniscent of the "Coughing Baby vs Hydrogen Bomb" meme, in many ways actually. Taiwan lacks strategic depth, it lacks a military with the capabilities that are actually important in a potential conflict, it lacks demographic depth, it's easily isolated and completely within range of almost everything the PRC has in store. The fact that the Civil War hasn't been resolved to this day is because China has always been preoccupied with bigger external or internal matters and pacing greater powers. This is about to change, and with the US undeniably waning in power it's also where all the uncertainty and alarmist attitudes encountered these days come from.

Militarily China obviously can take Taiwan, so long as there is no outside involvement. That in and of itself does not make it a “civil war”.

The US currently retains the ability to cause massive casualties in the in the event of a blockade or invasion, and it essentially rules the waves outside the Western Pacific even should it withdraw or be ejected from the region. If there is a war between the US and PRC, it seems very unlikely it ends with Taiwan.

 

[Josh_TN]

A build up doesn't have to be secret to witness an absent response from the US. The US could very much be present in the area and choose not to intervene in order to not risk further escalation and preserve it's force for potential future conflicts, should China start behaving aggressively towards the Philippines or Japan, as in threatening Invasion and annexation. As for wargames, the conditions of such are not known, I doubt the outcome from 2015 is the same as 2025, or 2035. And given the sheer distances involved for US forces which puts supply lines under immense stress, and the fact that the US can only deploy a portion of their entire force against the entire PLA with all it's branches in play, active right in their frontyard, that PRC losses would be anywhere near US losses.

You stated that the USN would not be deployed in the event of a war and I pointed out hat is really unlikely. Whether the US gets into the conflict or not is another question, but no blockade or invasion is going to occur without a deployment of US forces, even if ultimately they are not committed to battle.

The CSIS wargame explicitly describes its rules and assumptions. The casualties to PLAN were predominantly inflicted by bomber launched standoff weapons, though these were exhausted within three weeks in most every one of the two dozen games. Everything about the game and its model is available for review; feel free to comment on their methodology.

 

[Josh_TN]

POTUS isn't the only person involved when it comes to such decisions.

Maduro would be really surprised to hear that. Congress was not even briefed. Realistically, once the US and PRC are engaged in fighting, there is not going to be an effective off ramp until one side concludes that it cannot achieve its goals, regardless of how the conflict started. If the president orders an attack on Chinese units, the war is on and it will still be on even if the president were removed.

 

[Dilandu]

The whole PRC obsession over Taiwanw is really just bad blood stuff and there's no reason to expect them to get reasonable over it. The bottlecap needs a corkscrew over it for the liquor to unleash, eh yeah?

And what about USA obsession over Taiwan, I'd like to know? China never renounced their claims on Taiwan; USA renounced their recognition of Taiwan many decades ago. Why should China "be reasonable", but USA aren't?

 

[Josh_TN]

And what about USA obsession over Taiwan, I'd like to know? China never renounced their claims on Taiwan; USA renounced their recognition of Taiwan many decades ago. Why should China "be reasonable", but USA aren't?

Well the Taiwanese clearly have their own opinions on the matter and most every poll indicates they do not “feel” Chinese. I think engaging in a conflict that will almost certainly set off a global recession (regardless of outcome) to take back an area that was never under your control against the will of the people that live there can qualify as “unreasonable” in most cultures and contexts.

 

[ComradeVortex]

they do not “feel” Chinese

I’m not sure about that, I personally know and have multiple friends from both Chinas, and they have roughy the same cultures, minus religion. They feel proudly Chinese, endorsing Chinese culture, when you ask one of them where they’re from they’ll answer "China", not "Taiwan." As far as I’m concerned, it’s all a thing that goes to the higher-ups. The people are the same.

 

[Josh_TN]

I’m not sure about that, I personally know and have multiple friends from both Chinas, and they have roughy the same cultures, minus religion. They feel proudly Chinese, endorsing Chinese culture, when you ask one of them where they’re from they’ll answer "China", not "Taiwan." As far as I’m concerned, it’s all a thing that goes to the higher-ups. The people are the same.

Most polling indicates otherwise, now adays. I suspect the failure of the one country, two systems in HK contributed.

Opinion polling on Taiwanese identity - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Scott Kenny]

POTUS isn't the only person involved when it comes to such decisions. And certainly not when it comes to the potential duration of hostilities. I also don't think 9/11 is a valid comparison. A terrorist attack by non state actors against a civilian structure on American soil is a very different scenario than a USS [Insert Name] getting send to the bottom of the ocean via AShBM, full of combatants, after attacking a warship of a nuclear power that operates basically at home.

That is not the same opening conditions at all.

Let's change this to "PLAN shoots first" and try again.

That's less 9/11 and not even Pearl Harbor, more like USS Liberty if Liberty was a destroyer and tried to shoot as Israeli aircraft. Quite frankly, soldiers dying in combat a continent away (or FAFO as some might say) is more acceptable to a society than thousands of civilians dying in downtown area. Only when losses mount and the disaster becomes undeniable does a society start to question an operation. And it would be hard for the US to pull out PR victories over there that would offset the psychological impact of a CVN getting blasted to kingdom come. And while Chinese society, like any society, has certain boundaries, I think we can all agree that they're less sensitive than US society. One just has to look towards Ukraine and Russia to see what more hardy people are willing to put up with. I think I heard today for the first time that TCC has been shot at in Ukraine. It took 3 years of constant forced conscription for a single person in Ukraine to shoot at someone. That's a country that's experiencing constant draft, manpower issues and has their energy grid dismantled. US soldiers started fragging their superiors for laughable reasons by comparison even back then in Vietnam, when the US Military was very different culturally.

You mean when US soldiers would frag an officer too stupid for his troops to survive? One that was noisy in the bush (and showing no signs of improving), one that demanded soldiers do things that would get them killed?

Or the huge anti-war movement that errupted in America over Vietnam, something that's still lingering in their social subconsciousness to this very day as a form of generational Trauma. And Vietnam saw pitiful casualty numbers in the grand scheme of things. The material loss alone in an intervention against the PLA would be significantly higher. I doubt the American public would be ready for that or willing to stomach that.

The anti-war movement that acted straight out of Mao's playbook?

 

[Josh_TN]

The US public has had a remarkably high tolerance for casualties if it does not immediately affect them or if they feel their country was attacked unjustly. Pearl Harbor part 2 will have similar consequences, long term. No president will have to do anything underhanded to simply start an open ended war with China. Again, I was in my early 20s when 9-11 happened and the Bush administration could have justified most anything at that point in time. People were talking about nuclear weapons in public conversations, though obviously there was no center of gravity to nuke.

An attack on Taiwan that did not involve the US might be ignored…but then the problem becomes PRC forces being vulnerable to a large unmitigated US counter attack at the time of its choosing if it suddenly did get involved. The imperial Japan problem all over again - they mostly just want the oil from the Dutch possessions, but cannot take the chance that the British or Americans will intervene, so they have to go all in on the first strike.

 

[johnpjones1775]

I’m not sure about that, I personally know and have multiple friends from both Chinas, and they have roughy the same cultures, minus religion. They feel proudly Chinese, endorsing Chinese culture, when you ask one of them where they’re from they’ll answer "China", not "Taiwan." As far as I’m concerned, it’s all a thing that goes to the higher-ups. The people are the same.

That’s because of the one China policy.
Do they feel Chinese in the sense of the mainland, or do they feel Chinese in a historical and cultural sense?

Main land China has a very different culture from Formosa/taiwan China. Heck the written language is the same, but the spoken language is completely different as an example.

So do your friends feel kinship with the main landers, or do they identify as Chinese in completely different way?

 

[TwoTribes]

Main land China has a very different culture from Formosa/taiwan China.

China is a vast country.

Indeed, Taiwan culture is quite different from that of Beijing, Northeast China (or Manchuria, as you might be more familiar with), and Xinjiang.

However, just across the strait, there is a place called Fujian Province. The foundation of Taiwan culture is rooted in the Han culture of Fujian (The Han are the majority ethnic group in China).

Why is that? The answer is simple: the majority of people in Taiwan are descendants of Han immigrants from Fujian.

Heck the written language is the same, but the spoken language is completely different as an example.

Okay, the writing and language of Taiwan are somewhat different from those of the mainland, but the gap isn't that significant. Yes, the language gap is small.

Leaders from both sides of the Strait speak the same language in formal settings. Alright, it's 75% similar, not 100%—the main differences lie in the pronunciation of some characters.

"Oh, 25% is still a significant number." Well, let me tell you something else. The official language of Taiwan (though not legally defined, but effectively it is)—the one their president often speaks—where does its standard pronunciation come from? Beijing. Yes, you read that correctly—that President Xi city, the capital of China.

"Oh, if it's from the same place, then why is there a 25% difference?" Well, to put it simply, Taiwan uses the standard pronunciation of Beijing from nearly a hundred years ago. But why a hundred years ago? Why not fifty years ago or two hundred years ago? That requires a bit of understanding of Chinese history. You can find it all on Wiki.

"Oh, I've heard somewhere that the language spoken by Taiwan people is different from that of the mainland." Well, perhaps you are referring to the local dialect, Taiwanese.

However, as I mentioned, there is a place called Fujian Province. Taiwanese actually originates from the Min language, which belongs to the Min dialect group. ("Min" is the abbreviation for Fujian.)

This means many people across the strait can understand the Taiwan dialect — at least ordering a bowl of noodles is no problem.

 

[Tomboy]

I mean HK and Macao still use traditional Chinese and speak Cantonese yet there is no issue.

 

[SUPER=BUG]

Sir, the way people from Taiwan speak and their customs are almost exactly the same as those from Fujian in mainland China.

 

[AverageAmmonite]

My personal guess is that space warfare platforms and technology may be the only area where China has no hope of catching up. This is critical in both preemptive war and deterrence.

Never say never. 10 years ago people were saying China was only going to build J-20 in the dozens. Now we have hundreds plus J-35 in production and the sixth gens in the pipeline, possibly beating US to IOC. Difficult to imagine that back in 2016.

 

[johnpjones1775]

China is a vast country.

Indeed, Taiwan culture is quite different from that of Beijing, Northeast China (or Manchuria, as you might be more familiar with), and Xinjiang.

However, just across the strait, there is a place called Fujian Province. The foundation of Taiwan culture is rooted in the Han culture of Fujian (The Han are the majority ethnic group in China).

Why is that? The answer is simple: the majority of people in Taiwan are descendants of Han immigrants from Fujian.


Okay, the writing and language of Taiwan are somewhat different from those of the mainland, but the gap isn't that significant. Yes, the language gap is small.

Leaders from both sides of the Strait speak the same language in formal settings. Alright, it's 75% similar, not 100%—the main differences lie in the pronunciation of some characters.

"Oh, 25% is still a significant number." Well, let me tell you something else. The official language of Taiwan (though not legally defined, but effectively it is)—the one their president often speaks—where does its standard pronunciation come from? Beijing. Yes, you read that correctly—that President Xi city, the capital of China.

"Oh, if it's from the same place, then why is there a 25% difference?" Well, to put it simply, Taiwan uses the standard pronunciation of Beijing from nearly a hundred years ago. But why a hundred years ago? Why not fifty years ago or two hundred years ago? That requires a bit of understanding of Chinese history. You can find it all on Wiki.

"Oh, I've heard somewhere that the language spoken by Taiwan people is different from that of the mainland." Well, perhaps you are referring to the local dialect, Taiwanese.

However, as I mentioned, there is a place called Fujian Province. Taiwanese actually originates from the Min language, which belongs to the Min dialect group. ("Min" is the abbreviation for Fujian.)

This means many people across the strait can understand the Taiwan dialect — at least ordering a bowl of noodles is no problem.

No mandarin and Cantonese are completely different spoken language.

Don’t you really believe that the culture and Fujian have similar cultures after 70 years?
The culture of Taiwan after the civil war ended isn’t even that similar to what it is today.

Let me guess you think Okinawa and fujian have the same cultures because of fujian’s influence on karate right?

 

[johnpjones1775]

My personal guess is that space warfare platforms and technology may be the only area where China has no hope of catching up. This is critical in both preemptive war and deterrence.

Just like the idea China would have the second largest carrier fleet seemed unfathomable to most in the US in 2008, yet here they are with 3 carriers and a fourth super carrier well on the way.

 

[Josh_TN]

China has a lot of catching up to do in space. Comparing satellites put in orbit for 2025 is not an apples to apples comparison of capability, but it gives a rough comparison: 3700 vs 300. Obviously most of that was Falcon 9 launches (130) and most of those satellites were Starlink, but nevertheless the gap is quite huge. The PRC is focusing a vast amount of resources on government and private medium lift reusable 1st stage rockets (F9 analogs), and probably a majorly of them ultimately become operational and are run concurrently to close the gap (along with obsolescent CZ-2/3/4 and CZ-6/7/8 families). But it will be probably be years to a decades for China to catch up. US launch capabilities keep expanding as well.

 

[TwoTribes]

No mandarin and Cantonese are completely different spoken language.

Yes. However, they are all languages of China.

Dialects differ from the common language and official language. You cannot simply compare them. Comparing Cantonese with Mandarin, or Taiwanese with Taiwanese Mandarin, is not appropriate.

Don’t you really believe that the culture and Fujian have similar cultures after 70 years?
The culture of Taiwan after the civil war ended isn’t even that similar to what it is today.

Taiwan culture certainly differs from the Mainland culture and Fujian culture, and I do not deny that. China is vast. The cultural gap between Fujian and Taiwan is smaller than that between Fujian and Northeast China (Manchuria). Yet, which region shares the same government with Fujian?

The Taiwan culture of 70 years ago is also distinct from the present-day Taiwan culture, and I will not deny that either.

But I am talking about something more fundamental, more traditional—the kind of thing that silently permeates your cultural heritage.

Language, writing, festivals, religion, food, traditional architecture, customs... These elements are extremely resistant to change; they form the very foundation of Taiwan's cultural "tower." All developments are built upon this bedrock.

Moreover, cross-strait cultural exchanges have not been frozen in time since 70 years ago. Indeed, political atmosphere and levels of economic development do impact cultural exchanges, but such interactions have persisted and continue to this day.

Mainland China possesses a massive economic scale and an extensive cultural industry, which consequently produces an immense volume of Chinese-language cultural products. In contrast, the scale of Taiwan's local cultural industry is relatively limited. More importantly, as people in Taiwan also use the Chinese language, they encounter lower barriers when accessing and enjoying the Chinese cultural products from the Mainland.

Let me guess you think Okinawa and fujian have the same cultures because of fujian’s influence on karate right?

Okinawa? It is true that Okinawan culture has been influenced by Chinese culture. But what is the ethnic composition of Okinawa today? Is there a clear "Okinawan ethnicity"? No, they have all become Japanese. Colonialism and World War II essentially wiped out the "Okinawan ethnicity."

Now, are Okinawans' language, writing system, religion, and customs—these cultural "foundations"—more similar to China's or Japan's?

What about Taiwan? 96.2% of Taiwan's population is of Han ethnicity. Han? Do you remember what I said? This is also the majority ethnic group in China, accounting for 91.1%. Oh, Taiwan is even more "Chinese" than the Mainland.

 

[Tomboy]

China has a lot of catching up to do in space. Comparing satellites put in orbit for 2025 is not an apples to apples comparison of capability, but it gives a rough comparison: 3700 vs 300. Obviously most of that was Falcon 9 launches (130) and most of those satellites were Starlink, but nevertheless the gap is quite huge. The PRC is focusing a vast amount of resources on government and private medium lift reusable 1st stage rockets (F9 analogs), and probably a majorly of them ultimately become operational and are run concurrently to close the gap (along with obsolescent CZ-2/3/4 and CZ-6/7/8 families). But it will be probably be years to a decades for China to catch up. US launch capabilities keep expanding as well.

Give it about 2030 for effectively all sectors that China is still behind it to reach parity with the collective west, they are already expecting ~120 launches this year with no reusable rockets in service, once they become regularly operational the launch rate should reach parity very soon.

 

[Josh_TN]

Give it about 2030 for effectively all sectors that China is still behind it to reach parity with the collective west, they are already expecting ~120 launches this year with no reusable rockets in service, once they become regularly operational the launch rate should reach parity very soon.

We shall see. They reached 90 last year, which was an increase of about 20+, but on the other hand the previous several years all hung around 60-70 despite stated goals of expansion. Also the US industry is a moving target: Spacex has permission to launch an extra 50 missions from Vandenberg this year, New Glenn is going to have its first stage reused along with a with a planned Kuiper/Leo launch first use of the LEO second stage end of year, 3-4 Starship pads are in various stages of building at three sites, and Vulcan heavy lifters have launches pretty much every months indefinitely (very cost effective in the high orbit, heavy payload regime even if non reusable). 30 more launches probably just barely keeps up with the normal yearly increase in SpaceX cadence, ignoring all other rocket programs, and only truly keeps pace if all 30 of those launches are of similar lift to F9. It is described rather modestly as a medium lift rocket, but at 17 tonnes to low earth orbit with recovery and >20,000 kg if expended, it heavily outperforms almost all of China’s current rockets, with the only exception being their sole heavy lifter Long March 5. The new crop of Chinese F9 analogs is just reaching first flights (two last year, rest this year); it is hard to imagine the extra 30 launches are all from those programs.

I think once Starship is thrown in, predictions concerning when China closes the gap are problematic. A dozen launches would be far greater than the capacity of the entire Chinese space industry in 2025, and likely 2026 as well.

ETA: off topic at this point i know, but i the naval war will be increasingly decided in space, and that the side with the most transmitted energy and edge processing power will have a big advantage.

 

[Tomboy]

I think once Starship is thrown in, predictions concerning when China closes the gap are problematic. A dozen launches would be far greater than the capacity of the entire Chinese space industry in 2025, and likely 2026 as well.

Remember LM-9 is coming online in 2031, if Starship starts regular service by 2027, they are really only 4 years behind. There's been massive expansion at the Hainan spaceport in the past few years, they've been pulling off decent numbers with effectively half finished facilities and non-reusable launchers.

It really depends on how fast they can get reusable fleet operational, if ZQ-3 and LM-12B/10B/A are successful with their recovery attempts this year, its likely they'll start mass producing these by next year. I suspect the bottleneck would not really be rockets but launchpads available at that point.

 

[chimeric oncogene]

LM-9 is coming online in 2031

the first flights of Starship were in 2023... it's going to be a long, hard road to parity, but I think the PRC will climb it, whatever it takes.

 

[Josh_TN]

Remember LM-9 is coming online in 2031, if Starship starts regular service by 2027, they are really only 4 years behind. There's been massive expansion at the Hainan spaceport in the past few years, they've been pulling off decent numbers with effectively half finished facilities and non-reusable launchers.

It really depends on how fast they can get reusable fleet operational, if ZQ-3 and LM-12B/10B/A are successful with their recovery attempts this year, its likely they'll start mass producing these by next year. I suspect the bottleneck would not really be rockets but launchpads available at that point.

I think it is a little early to be setting any dates for CZ-9. I have no doubt that every Chinese rocket company with a potentially reusable vehicle gets money thrown at it until almost all of them are successful as way of diversifying and expanding the industry, but again it is not like the US space industry is holding still either.

 

[Scott Kenny]

the first flights of Starship were in 2023... it's going to be a long, hard road to parity, but I think the PRC will climb it, whatever it takes.

I'm sure the PRC is aiming for well above parity. My expectation is that they're aiming for a GDP-per-capita equal to that of the US, which means a total GDP 3-4x the size of the US.

 

[Kat Tsun]

My personal guess is that space warfare platforms and technology may be the only area where China has no hope of catching up. This is critical in both preemptive war and deterrence.

Historically, China has had exponential growth when it finally figures something out. This is mostly accounted for by the fact that it's the largest manufacturing base in the world while the U.S. and Europe are still actively decreasing in overall industrial investment and manufacturing capacities. We've seen it with submarines, guided missile destroyers, main battle tanks, and stealth fighters. We'll see it with on-orbit ABM and ISR networks too.

America's best way to win would be to either leverage what competitive advantages it has now to initiate a Pearl Harbor type attack by the end of the decade (in the next 30-40 months or so), or to start talking about how it will definitely be able to defend Korea and Japan while leaning more towards the One China aspect of its strategic ambiguities, which is ostensibly what strategic ambiguity is supposed to allow.

Either go to war on its own terms, without being caught on the back foot by an industrially superior foe, or seek to avoid war entirely.

Within a decade we'll probably see the U.S. and China being equals in all aspects, with the PRC pulling ahead in some areas, but the PRC may start to flatten out its growth curve as the demographic bomb bites down while the U.S. will continue to decline in a Soviet-esque manner rather than a British-esque one. America doesn't do managed decline well because that would imply America is declining and every American policymaker simply knows that isn't true.

The U.S., funnily enough, also doesn't do preemptive war. That's almost entirely an Israeli thing.

I'm sure the PRC is aiming for well above parity. My expectation is that they're aiming for a GDP-per-capita equal to that of the US, which means a total GDP 3-4x the size of the US.

Yeah they've been at or above it for the better part of a decade now going by PPP.

 

[Josh_TN]

I'm sure the PRC is aiming for well above parity. My expectation is that they're aiming for a GDP-per-capita equal to that of the US, which means a total GDP 3-4x the size of the US.

Technical parity and purchasing parity are not the same thing.

 

[Josh_TN]

Historically, China has had exponential growth when it finally figures something out. This is mostly accounted for by the fact that it's the largest manufacturing base in the world while the U.S. and Europe are still actively decreasing in overall industrial investment and manufacturing capacities. We've seen it with submarines, guided missile destroyers, main battle tanks, and stealth fighters. We'll see it with on-orbit ABM and ISR networks too.

America's best way to win would be to either leverage what competitive advantages it has now to initiate a Pearl Harbor type attack by the end of the decade (in the next 30-40 months or so), or to start talking about how it will definitely be able to defend Korea and Japan while leaning more towards the One China aspect of its strategic ambiguities, which is ostensibly what strategic ambiguity is supposed to allow.

Either go to war on its own terms, without being caught on the back foot by an industrially superior foe, or seek to avoid war entirely.

Within a decade we'll probably see the U.S. and China being equals in all aspects, with the PRC pulling ahead in some areas, but the PRC may start to flatten out its growth curve as the demographic bomb bites down while the U.S. will continue to decline in a Soviet-esque manner rather than a British-esque one. America doesn't do managed decline well because that would imply America is declining and every American policymaker simply knows that isn't true.

The U.S., funnily enough, also doesn't do preemptive war. That's almost entirely an Israeli thing.



Yeah they've been at or above it for the better part of a decade now going by PPP.

Unless the PRC can divorce productivity from labor force (which I think is something they are attempting), it seems unlikely even the exaggerated economic growth of the current PRC keeps on going.

IMO, that’s why I think war is far more likely: if China was inevitably going to be the global economic superpower, all it has to do is wait. Instead it seems on a rapid collision course of war with Taiwan and the US. If Xi was confident China will eventually prevail; all he has to do is watch and wait.