There is no mention of special Arctic features (ice-strengthened hull, insulated accommodations, etc.) in the otherwise-detailed video presentation of Captain Graham, the director of the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette program. I queried Captain Graham about this matter a month ago, using his public email address as listed in the presentation, but he didn't respond. (I am after all a foreigner.) I'm interested in Canada's defense of its unpopulated northern regions, and in general, I think it would be wise to give all RCN and CCG ships at least moderate Arctic capability (i.e. a Polar Class rating), and to exercise that capability from time to time. But Scott Kenny, as we saw H_K thinks it unlikely that anything serious could fit into a design of 1.0 or 1.1 kt light displacement.

Apophenia mentioned earlier that the Kingston class has "proven surprisingly useful in relatively ice-free Arctic waters" during summers. Maybe real Arctic capability is another of those good-things-to-have that must be left off the Canadian Multi-Mission Corvette, due to Ottawa's weight constraint.
Well, I think we all know what I think of Ottawa's weight constraint...
 
The Merlin order was cancelled because of a spur of the moment decision in order to gain a couple of points in polling. As to saving money the they didn't save a penny.
Between cancellation fees and the lawsuits plus the cost of running two different competitions for replacement aircraft. And then purchasing a standalone micro fleet of S92s .
I suspect when it's all said and done we're probably looking at 2-3 times the original cost of Merlin purchase in favour of an aircraft that they to cook the specs of the competition in order for it to win.
And if my sources are correct they to rejig the competition at least two times because the Merlin had an annoying habit of winning.
And that does not even begin to cover the costs of modifying the various frigates and destroyers to first take the Merlin and then remodify them to take the Cyclone

This is pretty much what I had heard secondhand, GK Dundas. The cancellation penalty was a steep 500 million dollars (about C$950 million in today's currency).

I keep wondering how the RCN would have developed had we built the Merlins or rather the our variant of it .
I mean the City Class had pretty much designed around a helo with the Merlin's capabilities. Ironically it's now finally getting a modern aircraft that while it does have a lot of the capabilities that the Airforce and the Navy were looking for .
So many questions,so many possibilities.

I had wondered the opposite: that if the Royal Canadian Air Force had dropped its "assembled in Canada" demand (which it later did anyway), then the original 48-helicopter order could have been cheaper.

Canada had some major budget issues in 1993 when the big Merlin order was finally cancelled. Looking back, the real mistake was not sticking to that cancellation and buying some sort of standard US Navy spec S70 variants for the navy and perhaps surplus CH-46s for the less vital SAR function. As it turned out, those 15 reduced commercial specification EH101s have been embarrassingly expensive to operate and the long running S-92 saga was an expensive embarrassment. Considering the US State Department use of surplus CH-46s up until at least 2021, the CH-149 Cormorant buy was probably premature and unnecessary. I never exactly understood why a simple S70 derivative wouldn't have sufficed for the Canadian Navy. It's worth remembering that Canada only procured the original Sea Kings for carrier operations and then continued to use them after disposing of the Bonaventure essentially as surplus aboard their surface escorts with the vital development of the innovative Beartrap haul down. A direct replacement was never strictly speaking necessary.

Merlins are not used here in the United States (planned use for the President was cancelled in 2009), and my sole encounter was during a Sept 2022 visit of HMS Queen Elizabeth to New York Harbor. I took this photo of the carrier (see attached) from the Staten Island Ferry, with three Merlins on the flight deck. At least one of those flew up and down the East River. The Royal Navy's Merlins are configured for ASW, while the RCAF's are a variant of the transport version. As far as I have heard, the Merlin has in general been a success for its several users, and it remains in production by AgustaWestland. TinWing, you mention that Canada's Merlins (CH-149 Cormorants) have embarrassingly expensive operating costs. Presumably this is compared and contrasted to the operating costs of Canada's earlier CH-124 Sea Kings and/or today's CH-148 Cyclones, and/or compared to the US Navy's operating costs for its SH-60 Seahawks. Are the CH-149's especially expensive costs per flight hour due to inherent design faults? Or due to shoddy construction by the manufacturer? Or from buying too few aircraft to cover the expected duties? Or other? Please expand on Canada's actual experience with the CH-149 for us, TinWing. I and no doubt others would be interested.
 

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TinWing, you mention that Canada's Merlins (CH-149 Cormorants) have embarrassingly expensive operating costs. Presumably this is compared and contrasted to the operating costs of Canada's earlier CH-124 Sea Kings and/or today's CH-148 Cyclones, and/or compared to the US Navy's operating costs for its SH-60 Seahawks. Are the CH-149's especially expensive costs per flight hour due to inherent design faults? Or due to shoddy construction by the manufacturer? Or from buying too few aircraft to cover the expected duties? Or other? Please expand on Canada's actual experience with the CH-149 for us, TinWing. I and no doubt others would be interested.
My initial assumption would be that the expensive operating costs are from buying too few aircraft to cover the duties, so each airframe is running through the big heavy checks faster than the original plans. And those heavy checks are expensive, time consuming, and force the aircraft not in depot for heavy checks to work even harder to cover for the missing airframes.
 
100% agree here. If you want to claim it, you need to enforce the claim. Same issue with Canada. Country too physically big for the economy to produce an adequate defense force.

I think this is a misunderstanding. Let's look at the numbers. In 1945, the population of Canada (including the Dominion of Newfoundland) was about 12 million. The thriving economy had doubled from 1939 (i.e. the start of WW2) due to Allied demand for Canadian foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactures. The Royal Canadian Navy, a victor in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic, had the third-largest fleet on Earth (after the USN and RN), much of it home-built, with 90,000 men, yet the Army had enough manpower to land the 1st Division in Sicily, land the 3rd Division on Juno Beach, and push more divisions through the Low Countries in 1944-45 against vicious resistance.

In 2025, Canada's population is about 40 million people, and its economy (GDP) is approximately ten times what it was in 1945, adjusted for inflation. The entire Canadian Forces (navy + army + air force) has about 64,000 active personnel. The (civilian) Canadian Coast Guard has another 6500 or so.

NATO members had agreed in writing eleven years ago to each spend a minimum of 2.0% of GDP on defense. Canada today remains nowhere near that. Canada's annual federal government spending is at record highs—the money is there. But Canadians in aggregate, through their elected representatives, want the money spent on other things. Don't blame the acreage, Scott Kenny, which is the same as it had been eighty years ago. In a free country like Canada, ultimately it's the voting public that is accountable for shirking responsibilities, if that's the case.
 
A recent article in the UK's Daily Telegraph, "How Russia and China are seizing on Canada’s carelessness in the Arctic", engages with the defense of sparsely populated northern Canada, a matter key to our thread; see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/poli.../?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first

This article is interesting, as are the (often pointed) comments left by readers. Of special interest are the observations of Glenn Cowan, who is (the Telegraph states) a retired Canadian Army special forces soldier and Afghanistan vet, about the challenging climate of northernmost Canada. The planned naval base at Nanisivik (at 73 degrees N) has been scaled back and in any case remains unfinished. According to the article, Canada's government spent 1.37% of GDP on defense last year, even though Canada (like other members of NATO) had agreed eleven years ago that the minimum is 2.0%. If I am understanding correctly, these issues are being vigorously debated among Canadians in time for their next national election coming up in four weeks. I wish Canada the best.
 
A recent article in the UK's Daily Telegraph, "How Russia and China are seizing on Canada’s carelessness in the Arctic", engages with the defense of sparsely populated northern Canada, a matter key to our thread; see https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/poli.../?ICID=continue_without_subscribing_reg_first

This article is interesting, as are the (often pointed) comments left by readers. Of special interest are the observations of Glenn Cowan, who is (the Telegraph states) a retired Canadian Army special forces soldier and Afghanistan vet, about the challenging climate of northernmost Canada. The planned naval base at Nanisivik (at 73 degrees N) has been scaled back and in any case remains unfinished. According to the article, Canada's government spent 1.37% of GDP on defense last year, even though Canada (like other members of NATO) had agreed eleven years ago that the minimum is 2.0%. If I am understanding correctly, these issues are being vigorously debated among Canadians in time for their next national election coming up in four weeks. I wish Canada the best.
It seems that effectively every notable Canadian political party has agreed that the 2% of GPD on defence benchmark needs to be reached within the coming years, so that is good, if long overdue progress. Additional funding is always a good thing however, I think the larger issue is the fact that the Canadian Forces procurement system is such an inefficient labyrinth of bureaucracy that even simple procurements become drastically over overschedule/over budget. We drastically need reform within the larger government procurement system, to allow the Canadian Forces to actually make proper use of these additional funds.

Outside of funds and procurement reform as well, the issues of recruitment and retention need to be dealt with ASAP. Army, Navy and Airforce personnel are no different than all Canadians who are suffering from the housing/cost of living crisis, although many of them are more vulnerable due to being forced to live in the vicinity of specific military bases. It doesn't matter about what figures are spent if we ultimately have nobody to use them.

As far as Arctic presence and defence goes, the CAF are doing better and will continue to in the future. The procurement of F-35's, P-8 Poseidon's, MQ-9B SkyGuardian's, AOPS and countless other upcoming icebreakers all puts the Arctic presence/defence suite in a good place. The future procurement of large conventional submarines and systems like HIMARS which can launch anti-ship missiles further improve this capability.
 
... If I am understanding correctly, these issues are being vigorously debated among Canadians in time for their next national election ...

That may have been the intent of your Telegraph article but, according to pollsters, neither military spending nor Arctic security are featuring large in the Canadian Federal election thus far. According to Gallup, the top issues are: cost of living; cost and shortage of housing option; reversed the diminished sense of personal wellbeing; responding to a US trade war; and, reducing existing provincial divides (from inter-provincial trade barriers to trade qualifications, depending upon who you talk to).

Former issues in decline amongst those polled are defence spending (GDP-related or otherwise); immigration concerns (which, rightly or wrongly, overlapped with housing cost concerns); political inexperience (ie: Carney as 'just' a chief banker versus Poilievre as a career politician since his 20s); etc.

-- https://news.gallup.com/poll/658625/canada-election-tests-next-prime-minister.aspx
-- https://angusreid.org/election-45-top-issues/

In short, seismic events in the form of Trump's '51st State' nonsense have rapidly reshaped Canada's political landscape. The two main contenders in this election agree on increased military spending. But DND's usual talking point about meeting obligations to allies now falls flat. Not surprising when our biggest ally to the south revealed itself to be our largest 'existential threat'.

Top political issues can (and will) change on a dime. Military cultures are another matter. But DND and the CAF will have to try. So long as it keeps trumpeting purchases of "F-35's, P-8 Poseidon's, MQ-9B SkyGuardian's" from the US, DND just reveals how tone-deaf it has become.
 
Top political issues can (and will) change on a dime. Military cultures are another matter. But DND and the CAF will have to try. So long as it keeps trumpeting purchases of "F-35's, P-8 Poseidon's, MQ-9B SkyGuardian's" from the US, DND just reveals how tone-deaf it has become.
I would be rather worried if DND immediately caved to the rampant anti-Americanism present now within the greater Canadian psyche and started canceling the many vital programs we currently have on order with the US, such illogical choices would set an already limited CAF back significantly. Lost time, legal action from canceled contracts and new bidding processes/contests being held at a time when we need this new equipment more than ever is an especially poor decision. Canada should be looking to diversify away from procuring US equipment wherever practical for future programs, but actively canceling ongoing programs when the alternatives don't exist, aren't economical or are entirely worse, is poor policy.
 
Top political issues can (and will) change on a dime. Military cultures are another matter. But DND and the CAF will have to try. So long as it keeps trumpeting purchases of "F-35's, P-8 Poseidon's, MQ-9B SkyGuardian's" from the US, DND just reveals how tone-deaf it has become.
Not a lot of trumpeting being done lately that I can tell. And in any case, those are not purchases that can be turned on a dime. Military procurement is a matter of a decade in most nations. In Canada it is a matter of decades. The F-35 saga (interest in program in late 90’s, military recommends purchase in 2007, government finally agrees in 2010 and announces buy, buy becomes political hot potato in 2011 election, gets critiqued and hounded for the next 4 years, gets cancelled as a political statement in 2015 by new government, participates in a competition in 2019, wins said competition in 2022 and has a larger order placed than had been contemplated in 2010, first to arrive in 2026) kind of shows what trying to change our minds part way through gets us. The CF-18 fleet has already been on limited flight hours to preserve airframe life for years now. And that’s with the purchase of used Australian F-18’s for spares. Trying to change to another aircraft now will only prolong the problem. So unless we want to have no fighters at all in a couple years we probably need to take the chance on continuing the F-35 buy.

It’s similar with most other purchases. If we had made non-ITAR a priority years ago we could have been in a better place now, but No one foresaw this as a problem and it was generally considered cheaper to just order US kit as close to off the shelf as we could. Now the current tranche of purchases kind of need to be completed if possible. After that, we should probably be looking to other sources if possible. But we are kind of stuck with the kit we have spent the last 5 years or so ordering right now.
 
In short, seismic events in the form of Trump's '51st State' nonsense have rapidly reshaped Canada's political landscape. The two main contenders in this election agree on increased military spending. But DND's usual talking point about meeting obligations to allies now falls flat. Not surprising when our biggest ally to the south revealed itself to be our largest 'existential threat'.
Doesn't seem to be the case, judging by actions.

Like, if threat is from the south and urgency period is 4 years (let's assume for a second Vance doesn't exist), actions would look different.
 
Perhaps my points were not well worded.

Not a lot of trumpeting being done lately that I can tell...

I was quoting reply #127 (directly above my post).

...And in any case, those are not purchases that can be turned on a dime...

There was no mention of procurement turning on a dime. And I don't believe that anyone in Canada expects prescience from NDHQ PMOs. My reference was to military culture (particularly the habitual talking points ... like meeting alliance commitments with a now-hostile neighbour).

In any case, Owens Z implied that his paywalled Telegraph article claimed that 2% miitary spending, Arctic sovereignty, and/or naval procurement was a major political issue in the upcoming general election. However, a glance at polling information show that none of the above even register as formerly high priorities with those polled.
 
The 10 March 2025 issue of Aviation Week and Space Technology has a short article (p48) "High North Problem Will Challenge the RCAF's Rotorcraft Procurement" about Canada's 'Next Tactical Aviation Capability Set' program to replace its aging CH-146 Griffon (Bell Huey) helicopters in the 2030s with one or more new designs. The operational challenges due to the expansiveness and climate of Canada's northern reaches are touched upon, but the particular replacement helicopter is not named, and seems not to have been decided yet. The article does not say whether the similar Bell helicopters of the Canadian Coast Guard will also be replaced. And the bigger CH-148 Cyclone (Sikorsky H-92) and CH-149 Cormorant (AW101 Merlin) helicopters are not mentioned.
 
Following up on post #16, I see that during New York's upcoming Fleet Week celebration in late May 2025, among the gathered warships will be a new Harry DeWolf-class arctic patrol ship, HMCS Frédérick Rolette, coming down from Halifax. She is planned to dock at Pier 90 here in Manhattan, yet unlike in past years, there is a notice that the RCN ship will not permit visitors aboard. That's too bad—just when Canada sends a more substantial vessel. In any case, she and her crew will be welcome.

The Harry DeWolfs have a hangar and flight deck for a Royal Canadian Air Force CH-148 Cyclone (Sikorsky H-92) helicopter.
 
Following up on post #16, I see that during New York's upcoming Fleet Week celebration in late May 2025, among the gathered warships will be a new Harry DeWolf-class arctic patrol ship, HMCS Frédérick Rolette, coming down from Halifax. She is planned to dock at Pier 90 here in Manhattan, yet unlike in past years, there is a notice that the RCN ship will not permit visitors aboard. That's too bad—just when Canada sends a more substantial vessel. In any case, she and her crew will be welcome.

The Harry DeWolfs have a hangar and flight deck for a Royal Canadian Air Force CH-148 Cyclone (Sikorsky H-92) helicopter.
That's a shame that they won't be, I'd love to know the reason behind the decision.
I didn't know they'd finally qualified the ship class to land and operate the Cyclones yet .
 
I think this is a misunderstanding. Let's look at the numbers. In 1945, the population of Canada (including the Dominion of Newfoundland) was about 12 million. The thriving economy had doubled from 1939 (i.e. the start of WW2) due to Allied demand for Canadian foodstuffs, raw materials, and manufactures. The Royal Canadian Navy, a victor in the crucial Battle of the Atlantic, had the third-largest fleet on Earth (after the USN and RN), much of it home-built, with 90,000 men, yet the Army had enough manpower to land the 1st Division in Sicily, land the 3rd Division on Juno Beach, and push more divisions through the Low Countries in 1944-45 against vicious resistance.

In 2025, Canada's population is about 40 million people, and its economy (GDP) is approximately ten times what it was in 1945, adjusted for inflation. The entire Canadian Forces (navy + army + air force) has about 64,000 active personnel. The (civilian) Canadian Coast Guard has another 6500 or so.

NATO members had agreed in writing eleven years ago to each spend a minimum of 2.0% of GDP on defense. Canada today remains nowhere near that. Canada's annual federal government spending is at record highs—the money is there. But Canadians in aggregate, through their elected representatives, want the money spent on other things. Don't blame the acreage, Scott Kenny, which is the same as it had been eighty years ago. In a free country like Canada, ultimately it's the voting public that is accountable for shirking responsibilities, if that's the case.
Agree with this!
 
... Outside of funds and procurement reform as well, the issues of recruitment and retention need to be dealt with ASAP. Army, Navy and Airforce personnel are no different than all Canadians who are suffering from the housing/cost of living crisis, although many of them are more vulnerable due to being forced to live in the vicinity of specific military bases. It doesn't matter about what figures are spent if we ultimately have nobody to use them. ...
CAF recruitment is actually a four-fold problem.

The first problem was a decline in birth-rates (see Peter Zeihan) starting back in 1970. I can remember Dr. Henry Morgenthaler being repeatedly jailed and tried in court for performing illegal abortions. The Supreme Court of Canada eventually de-criminalized abortions and most other forms of birth control. The wide-spread availability of birth-control quickly caused a drop in Canadian birth-rates to below replacement rates. Most other First-World countries suffered similar drops in birth-rates.

Secondly, while current teenagers may be fascinated by military technology via FPS video games, few are willing to put in the many hours of sports needed to make them physically fit enough to become soldiers. The US Army has recently moaned about only 25 percent of young men being healthy enough to become soldiers.

The third problem is bureaucratic with too few military bureaucrats being available to do medical and security screening of potential recruits, which means that the recruitment process drags out so long that teenagers lose interest in the army.
This is not a new problem as - 20 years ago - I can remember a conversation with a CAF Regular Army Warrant Officer assigned to an army reserve regiment in Moncton, New Brunswick bemoaning how difficult it was for him to schedule medical exams at CFB Gagetown.

The final problem is that low birth-rates have forced Canada to admit up to 400,000 immigrants power year. If any teenaged immigrant is considering enlisting, he/she faces a doubly difficult security screening process. It does not help that vastly expanded immigration quotas have opened the door to vast numbers on scammers masquerading as "immigration consultants." They cheerfully collect thousands of dollars from immigrants, but forget to file applications with gov't offices. I swear that every second bus in Vancouver carries an advertisement for an immigration consultant.
 
Secondly, while current teenagers may be fascinated by military technology via FPS video games, few are willing to put in the many hours of sports needed to make them physically fit enough to become soldiers. The US Army has recently moaned about only 25 percent of young men being healthy enough to become soldiers.
There is a distinct difference in people being interested in something in passing or even as an involved hobby, and wanting to ultimately make it your job. Even then though, the CAF isn't just a run of the mill job and is more like a lifestyle choice given how many positions require you to spin your entire life around it. With a lot of the very real issues within many of the various branches alongside the toxic culture that is shown throughout the Canadian media, it isn't surprising that young people with options aren't flocking to the CAF for such a life.

An example, why would you join the RCN when many trades are deeply understaffed and overworked, the culture is toxic and you are forced to live in either Halifax, Esquimalt or Ottawa (three of the least affordable locations in Canada)? If you are actively assigned to a ship, it is even more difficult to manage your relationships and build a family that it otherwise is.

Many people are just fundamentally incompatible with military life and in order to sway folks, you'll need to be offering some serious incentives that they cannot find elsewhere to sweeten the deal.
 
One thing I found in my unfortunately uncompleted attempt to join the reserves (my employer decided they were no longer ok with the amount of time off I would need to complete training) was that many of the military trades are difficult to transfer into comparable civilian employment. Either the skills don’t quite match or it is difficult to turn military experience into civilian accreditation. Since this is literally a stated benefit with which they try to draw recruits, this is a major issue.
 
One thing I found in my unfortunately uncompleted attempt to join the reserves (my employer decided they were no longer ok with the amount of time off I would need to complete training) was that many of the military trades are difficult to transfer into comparable civilian employment. Either the skills don’t quite match or it is difficult to turn military experience into civilian accreditation. Since this is literally a stated benefit with which they try to draw recruits, this is a major issue.
This was a specific change in the past, as the CAF of years prior used to offer accreditations that were much closer/far easier to bridge towards valuable civilian equivalents. How I understand it, much of this was scaled back as they were losing more people than they were comfortable to the civilian sectors for better pay and treatment. This is another issue with the CAF, they view anybody who isn't willing to spend their entire career within the force as a liability. We should be looking to offer these sorts of incentives where yes you can come work for say a decade in the CAF and then leave with education credits/accreditation for the civilian sector if you wish, this should be a selling point and not something to stop.

Churn should be expected and taken into consideration, make the recruiting system workable in the first place and make the CAF attractive enough to keep bringing new folks in.
 
This was a specific change in the past, as the CAF of years prior used to offer accreditations that were much closer/far easier to bridge towards valuable civilian equivalents. How I understand it, much of this was scaled back as they were losing more people than they were comfortable to the civilian sectors for better pay and treatment. This is another issue with the CAF, they view anybody who isn't willing to spend their entire career within the force as a liability. We should be looking to offer these sorts of incentives where yes you can come work for say a decade in the CAF and then leave with education credits/accreditation for the civilian sector if you wish, this should be a selling point and not something to stop.

Churn should be expected and taken into consideration, make the recruiting system workable in the first place and make the CAF attractive enough to keep bringing new folks in.
I mean, crud, the US military is built around an assumption that most troops will only stay in for a single enlistment, call it 6 years max active duty (and 2 years as a drilling reservist after that, total of 8 years commitment).

Not sure if the CAF have an equivalent of Seabees, where those skills are directly translatable to civilian life as a plumber/electrician/carpenter/concrete etc tradesman. I could see some "discussions" required between the unions and the CAF about what specific things would need to be verified before they could be a Journeyman.

Grunt infantry doesn't have a whole lot of obviously transferable skills, but armor crew/heavy equipment operator does. Aircraft mechanic is directly transferable, as is avionics technician and turbine engine mechanic. Weapons types are not directly transferable.
 
I mean, crud, the US military is built around an assumption that most troops will only stay in for a single enlistment, call it 6 years max active duty (and 2 years as a drilling reservist after that, total of 8 years commitment).

Not sure if the CAF have an equivalent of Seabees, where those skills are directly translatable to civilian life as a plumber/electrician/carpenter/concrete etc tradesman. I could see some "discussions" required between the unions and the CAF about what specific things would need to be verified before they could be a Journeyman.

Grunt infantry doesn't have a whole lot of obviously transferable skills, but armor crew/heavy equipment operator does. Aircraft mechanic is directly transferable, as is avionics technician and turbine engine mechanic. Weapons types are not directly transferable.
This has most hurt technical trades like many various engineering jobs within the Navy, who are stuck being forced to directly challenge civilian certifications or be required to simply take all of their training again to qualify. People cannot leave for relevant fields and are effectively forced to stay into the Navy, due to the barrier of entry using their qualifications into other fields.
 

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