Replacing the Hunter

[Scott Kenny]

Correct. By that late in their careers, you're basically looking at using them like an A-4. Maybe with sidewinders for self-defence. They aren't going to be used hunting MiG-21's.

Exactly my point.

Not that a Hunter can't dance, but you don't want to if you can avoid it.

And for that job, you can keep the Hunters around until AFVG/Tornado/Jaguar comes into service.

 

[alertken]

uk75 #159: MRCA took so long...need to compromise with Germany and Italy (which at least ensured it survived the crises of '70s).

That is so.
13/11/67: UKVG Project Study on BAC. Dribble, no real political will.
17/7/68: 6 Nations' MRCA Feasibility Study.
22/7/70: UK+FRG launch MRCA Development Phase, +Italy, 9/70. Empty shell first flight 14/8/74.
1/5/75: Materials Release, Tornado Batch One (40 a/c); 29/7/76: Full Production contract.
1/3/84: 16 Sqn/Laarbruch opnl on WE177C. Could/would that have been quicker on solo UKVG? Or an HSAL spoiler?

A design point: a GMR/TFR radar bid by Elliott+Ferranti for MRCA (drawing on TSR.2) lost to Texas (drawing on an F-111, I forget which).
The wing pivot/sleeve solution was by MBB, drawing on F-111B. The INS was Litton. So, here, let us assume UK-solo: no slower/worse.

Well, let us also assume solo-UKVG, funded when France stayed in NKF-90 7/68, would move to Ready-for-Development-go c. mid-69, so first flight (empty shell) around 1/73. Q: would Full Prodn contract have been earlier than 7/76, opnl earlier than 3/84? A: maybe...
if Buyer funded Industry and left them to do their job. Which is what happened on Tornado. Petrified of being treated as Lockheed on F-104G, which was as lambs to the slaughter, FRG/Italy ensured that no Officer or Official was allowed to compromise prices reached with Panavia. Turbo-Union and Mauser. Tornado was 1st. Big Project in any of the 3 funders, to be brought in even vaguely at Launch prices, R&D and Unit. At any of multiple General Elections, 1970-77-or-so, cost drift would have let US snare one, soon all Users.

 

[red admiral]

Correct. By that late in their careers, you're basically looking at using them like an A-4. Maybe with sidewinders for self-defence. They aren't going to be used hunting MiG-21's.

But there were no plans in the UK for hunting MiGs over the FEBA? It was either interceptors to destroy bombers heading to the UK, or V-bombers and fighters hauling tactical nukes. There really wasn't much in between for the UK until the mid 70s when people started to care about fighter bombers hauling BL.755s to have some close combat capability. Even the F-4Ms bought were for strike (and recce), not air superiority.

 

[Rule of cool]

Again?
Venom/Vampire was to be replaced by intermediate use of Hunters while NMBR.3/P1154 was brought into service. Expected to complete delivery by '68.

Upon cancellation in '65 the F4 was stood in ...late delivery in '68 until Jaguar entered service '75.

Had any MRI platform arrived into service by '68 on time. It would save the country a great deal.

Scimitar could have delivered before '64. Obviating the need for Hunter completely and remaining relevent in developments until '75 or even later.

I'm aware of the P1154-Phantom-Jaguar path, my line of inquiry is that it didn't seem to begin until 1961. In 1956 there didn't seem to be any plan to replace the multitude of fighter-bombers in service outside the UK.

Apparently in 1956 DCAF approached Sidney Camm about adapting the P1103 into a long-range multi-role aircraft that became the P1121. Now DCAF carried a lot of weight, but how much backing did this approach have from the RAF? If it carried some weight then we can draw a path: Vampire-P1121- 57 DWP-VRET (Hunter beat Gnat)-NMBR3/P1121-Phantom-Jaguar that appears to have some planning coherence and continuity.

However I suspect a far less coherent and continual planning process, where the VRET was a necessary-evil concession by Sandys, hence the initial plan to only trial the Gnat against the Jet Provost Mk5 with the Hunter included after lobbying by Hawker. I don't think the 1958 the plan was 'some awesome plane is coming down the pipeline, lets put the Hunter in service until it arrives' rather 'we need something until missiles replace planes, lets put something cheap in place until then' which is flawed thinking.

 

[Rule of cool]

I think there is a confusion between the role of UK close air support squadrons caused by the equipping of P1154 with Red Tops.
Hunter squadrons (and later Harrier or Jaguar squadrons) were armed with cannon and bombs not AAMs. They would be supported by RAF, RN and/or Allied fighters like Lightnings and Phantoms. Sidewinders did appear on Bucs and Jags as a self defence measure with ECM.
AFVG could and should have been in service around 1972. MRCA took so long because of the need to compromise with Germany and Italy (which at least ensured it survived the crises of the 70s).

The VRET had a significant air to air component, and the Gnat was better than the Hunter. Given the interim requirement of 1958 where the aircraft was to be phased out in a decade and the deployment was in 'the East' presumably guns were accepted as the air to air armament. By 1962 the requirement had changed, it was still focused on 'the East' for the most part but by 1969 air to air combat was to be fought with missiles, hence the P1154 was to carry Red Tops. This was in support of the 'Island Base Strategy' in the Indian Ocean.

The NATO CAS role was barely a thing for the RAF before 1968. Britain was regularly in disagreement with the Continental NATO members about having so many resources deployed outside NATO with Britain wanting credit from them for preserving peace worldwide which benefited them. The new Labour Government did a defence review in 1965 and decided the British world role would remain indefinitely, it was electorally popular after all, in 1966 an end date of 1975 was given for the East of Suez commitment and Lightnings were deployed to Cyprus and Singapore in 1967 in support of this policy. It didn't become 'cut and run by 71' until after the November 1967 devaluation of the pound, incidentally during the Tet offensive and when Australia lacked a Prime Minister with the drowning of Harold Holt.

Presumably the plan as late as mid 1967 was for the Phantoms were to be deployed to Cyprus and point east with a significant air to air role like the Hunters.

 

[Rule of cool]

But there were no plans in the UK for hunting MiGs over the FEBA? It was either interceptors to destroy bombers heading to the UK, or V-bombers and fighters hauling tactical nukes. There really wasn't much in between for the UK until the mid 70s when people started to care about fighter bombers hauling BL.755s to have some close combat capability. Even the F-4Ms bought were for strike (and recce), not air superiority.

After the 57 DWP when RAFG was shrunk to 12 sqns 2 of them were fighters; Javelins until 1964, Lightnings until 1977 and Phantoms after that. Presumably these fighters were defending RAFG/BAOR assets in Germany rather than being part of the air defence of the UK.

 

[uk 75]

The two fighter squadrons in West Germany were there in peacetime to patrol the skies(Luftwaffe only joined in after a war started) including in Live Oak plans to force the air corridor to West Berlin.
In wartime they would have tried to hack down incoming strikes.

 

[Scott Kenny]

The two fighter squadrons in West Germany were there in peacetime to patrol the skies(Luftwaffe only joined in after a war started) including in Live Oak plans to force the air corridor to West Berlin.
In wartime they would have tried to hack down incoming strikes.

And IMO that's a failing of the UK to provide CAS or Battlefield Air Interdiction.

 

[uk 75]

The all singing all dancing TSR2, P1154, AW681 combo was originally intended to bring tactical nuclear weapons to either NATO or East of Suez commitments (CENTO and SEATO).
By 1964 the Berlin and Cuba crises had made this approach obsolete. The replacements (Phantom and Hercules) were affordable and could support conventional military action.
Phantoms initially replace Hunters and Canberras but give way to Jaguar so that the Phantoms can replace Lightnings in the 70s.
1969 sees the RAF modernised but with US rather than UK designs. The RAF had the 1127 forced on it.

 

[MadRat]

I can imagine if your focus is on a gunfighter then the Gnat is useful.

But defense of the island and strategic hotspots should have focused on missiles by this era, as performance of the Gnat couldn't cut it in a modern missile conflict. Lightning certainly had the performance, but in a way the Hunter had potential to carry missiles other than Skyflash. Hunter with Sidewinder or Magic would have been lethal in a self escort role. It also would have been useful for localized daytime defense when necessary.

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

The all singing all dancing TSR2, P1154, AW681 combo was originally intended to bring tactical nuclear weapons to either NATO or East of Suez commitments (CENTO and SEATO).

The above aircraft were much more focused on the delivery of conventional weapons and the support of ground troops when East of Suez, as were their American replacements in the form of Phantom, AFVG, F-111K and C-130 (remember the orders for these aircraft were made before Britain's withdrawal from Eas tof Suez).

You keep making the assertions which are not borne out in anything we have available on British post war plans. British plans for interventions East of Suez all primarily used conventional forces, and the aircraft intended to support them, whether developed domestically, jointly developed or purchased from overseas were supposed to do this support with conventional weapons. The nuclear role was almost entirely limited to Europe.

 

[_Del_]

But defense of the island and strategic hotspots should have focused on missiles by this era, as performance of the Gnat couldn't cut it in a modern missile conflict

Honestly, by 1957 the UK should have begun divesting fighter aircraft for Bloodhounds and Thunderbirds.


*exits quickly*

 

[red admiral]

The above aircraft were much more focused on the delivery of conventional weapons and the support of ground troops when East of Suez,

Doesn't this just get to primary Vs secondary roles? Although potentially for use East of Suez, which requirements actually flow down from that vs just being fall out? I'm unclear that any of the aircraft performance or avionics do. Maybe simply carrying conventional weapons, but you still need something to practice with?

No question that they actually spent all their time hauling conventional weapons

 

[A Tentative Fleet Plan]

Certainly the long range of TSR-2 and F-111K were justified based on the East of Suez role, and all the aircraft were to be part of the Island Base strategy.

Avionics-wise it does seem that they more optimised for the delivery of conventional weapons given the demanding requirements for terrain-following radars with ground mapping capability, moving map displays, HUDs and inertial navigation systems. They weren't sufficient for blind delivery of conventional ordnance, but that has more to do with the limited technology of the time rather than intent.

 

[Rule of cool]

Honestly, by 1957 the UK should have begun divesting fighter aircraft for Bloodhounds and Thunderbirds.


*exits quickly*

That's exactly what they did do, by 1965 Fighter Command consisted of 5 fighter sqns and the entire RAF 'fighter' force was 20 sqns scattered around the world, indeed the 1964 plan was to have more Bloodhounds in the FEAF than with Fighter Command.

Of course that's an extension of a very limited view of fighter capability, ie point defence of particular targets rather than a broader air superiority view of what a fighter could do by 1960.

 

[Rule of cool]

I can imagine if your focus is on a gunfighter then the Gnat is useful.

But defense of the island and strategic hotspots should have focused on missiles by this era, as performance of the Gnat couldn't cut it in a modern missile conflict. Lightning certainly had the performance, but in a way the Hunter had potential to carry missiles other than Skyflash. Hunter with Sidewinder or Magic would have been lethal in a self escort role. It also would have been useful for localized daytime defense when necessary.

This is my contention entirely, and in a perfect world something like the P.1121 would have been developed. However Sandys 57 DWP dogma eliminated good sense from British planning, so even with the requirement to save 100 million pounds the best available alternative to the P.1121 was not chosen.

 

[_Del_]

That's exactly what they did do,

I was just having a go at the Sandy White Paper debate. That's why I used 57 as the date.

 

[tomo pauk]

Britain is a great power, and great powers don't remain that way by short sighted decisions and keeping obsolete aircraft in their force structure even though it's physically possible to do so. I see going big with the Hunter as a strategic risk, and the advancement of Britain's strategic position is why the RAF exists.

Great powers don't depend on other great powers to help them financially every now and then. They develop the military hardware on their own (no need for cooperation with anyone foreign), and export it by and large, with attractive deals, that are sometimes close to giving the military hardware for free (while receiving other stuff in return, like favorable/amicable foreign policy deals, intelligence gathering/sharing, usage of bases etc.).
Great powers don't relent when other great power say so.

Britain was a great power before 1945. Come 1960, it was not.

As I've said, the Hunter got by in Iraq 61, Aden 63 and Indonesia 64 but the latter in particular was a considerable strategic risk against an adversary equipped with Tu16s-AS1, Mig 21 and Mig 19/17/15. If Britain had decided to join Vietnam or wanted to intervene in the Arab-Israeli wars from 1964-69 or India-Pakistan 1965 & 71 relying on Hunters is a recipe for disaster. Indeed to assist the Saudis in 1966 against the Egyptians the British sent Lightnings and Hunters and the Saudis then bought a fleet of Lightnings while donating the handful of Hunters to Jordan in 1968.

Hunter replacement will not cut it anyway if the enemy can deploy the latest Soviet-made stuff. People that really want to have British aircraft will need Lightnings. from mid-1960s.

 

[Rule of cool]

I was just having a go at the Sandy White Paper debate. That's why I used 57 as the date.

Yeah, the 57 DWP is one of those times in history where a lot of things converged into a single point and the decisions made at that point had massive knock-on effects. The decision to get the Hunter is one of those effects.

 

[Rule of cool]

Great powers don't depend on other great powers to help them financially every now and then. They develop the military hardware on their own (no need for cooperation with anyone foreign), and export it by and large, with attractive deals, that are sometimes close to giving the military hardware for free (while receiving other stuff in return, like favorable/amicable foreign policy deals, intelligence gathering/sharing, usage of bases etc.).
Great powers don't relent when other great power say so.

Britain was a great power before 1945. Come 1960, it was not.



Hunter replacement will not cut it anyway if the enemy can deploy the latest Soviet-made stuff. People that really want to have British aircraft will need Lightnings. from mid-1960s.

Britain was not a superpower, but she was a great power like France in the sense that she was a leader of alliances, could develop world class weapons from her own resources and project power globally. She, like all other West European countries, took the leg-up offered by the US as a short cut to post war recovery but that doesn't put her in the league of Sweden for example.

 

[red admiral]

When you draw on Europe maps then towards 1,000nm radius also seems to come out clearly from this from my understanding. But it was also useful to justify capability elsewhere. It'd be interesting if there were reports with maps, bases, targets used to justify any radius requirements at this time (not just TSR2)

For avionics then don't you also need that nav capability to ensure that you nuke the right place rather than wrong province/country? From what I've seen then the problem gets harder as altitude decreases below 500ft and speed increases.

Reading back over GOR.339 then it does talk about "limited war" with conventional weapons a lot, but its also bottom of the priority list. Conventional weapon delivery accuracy is either visual only or with radio aids from higher alt.

Of course that's an extension of a very limited view of fighter capability, ie point defence of particular targets rather than a broader air superiority view of what a fighter could do by 1960.

The RAF focus was really on "interceptors" and "air superiority" really doesn't seem to have been a thing. Which is very odd looking back. Sandys also seemed to find this odd but the RAF didn't take the opportunity to do anything about it at the time e.g. issue a new spec for something similar to P.1121 as a more general purposes fighter bomber.

Still, at the same point who else managed to develop such a large general purpose fighter bomber at this time? (Besides the USN with F-4?)

• Yak-28?
• Tu-15?
• F-105?

Or you pare back ambitions and go smaller. Or buy F-4s

No one complains about Sandys cancelling the Seamew...

 

[tomo pauk]

Britain was not a superpower, but she was a great power like France in the sense that she was a leader of alliances, could develop world class weapons from her own resources and project power globally. She, like all other West European countries, took the leg-up offered by the US as a short cut to post war recovery but that doesn't put her in the league of Sweden for example.

I'd certainly agree that British companies, engineers, technicians and the like were up to the task.

 

[Rule of cool]

Sandys also seemed to find this odd but the RAF didn't take the opportunity to do anything about it at the time e.g. issue a new spec for something similar to P.1121 as a more general purposes fighter bomber.

Really, when? If the RAF had laid out a requirement would Sandys have backed off his dogma and allowed it to be built?

BTW Air Superiority is merely a task that any fighter can do, like interception or bomber escort. Sure, some fighters are more suited than others, but a fighter can fitted with one load-out for ground launched interception in the morning and another for air superiority in the afternoon.

 

[Rule of cool]

I'd certainly agree that British companies, engineers, technicians and the like were up to the task.

The Politicians and Service chiefs failed to de-conflict the building and development of aircraft to avoid overloading the Treasury, with P.1154, AW.681 and TSR2 all in development at the same time when Britain could only afford one cutting edge development programme.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Politicians and Service chiefs failed to de-conflict the building and development of aircraft to avoid overloading the Treasury,

Service chiefs also failed to keep and eye for the industry making affordable fighters past Hunter and the like. Exporting of aircraft keeps the price down, and keeps the industry healthy - economy of scales matters as ever, and helps with the Treasury.

with P.1154, AW.681 and TSR2 all in development at the same time when Britain could only afford one cutting edge development programme.

Keep funding the TSR.2 then.

 

[red admiral]

Really, when? If the RAF had laid out a requirement would Sandys have backed off his dogma and allowed it to be built?

It wasn't dogma. It was good strategy down from the Macmillan to get an effective deterrent and avoid wasting a lot of money on ineffective counters. You can't shoot down MRBMs

From my understanding it was Sandys pushing the RAF to write a new requirement but they didn't bite. This was a good session back in the day: (https://www.aerosociety.com/news/proceedings-the-1957-defence-review-the-riddle-of-the-sandys/)

Would any of the F.155 interceptors be good fighters? Or fighter bombers? The US also cancelled their interceptors - only Tu-128 survived

when Britain could only afford one cutting edge development programme.

If it was managed well... which none of those were

 

[Rule of cool]

Service chiefs also failed to keep and eye for the industry making affordable fighters past Hunter and the like. Exporting of aircraft keeps the price down, and keeps the industry healthy - economy of scales matters as ever, and helps with the Treasury.



Keep funding the TSR.2 then.

The Lightning was about halfway between the F104 and F4 in price.

Occams razor would suggest pushing the TSR2 through development into production is the right course of action as Britain already has aircraft in production that can meets it's 'fighter' requirement well enough.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Honestly, by 1957 the UK should have begun divesting fighter aircraft for Bloodhounds and Thunderbirds.

Divesting point defense interceptors for missiles, certainly.

We can argue about the other fighters later.

Really, when? If the RAF had laid out a requirement would Sandys have backed off his dogma and allowed it to be built?

BTW Air Superiority is merely a task that any fighter can do, like interception or bomber escort. Sure, some fighters are more suited than others, but a fighter can fitted with one load-out for ground launched interception in the morning and another for air superiority in the afternoon.

Not really.

Point defense interceptors need to be light at their combat load, with big wings for climbing to high altitudes, with a good thrust to weight ratio. They need some specialized electronics to talk to the ground based radars, and generally need radar guided missiles or all-aspect IR missiles sized to shoot down bombers.
Air superiority tends to require some loiter time, which requires a larger airframe for more fuel and missiles sized for fighter-bombers.
Bomber escort needs much longer range (which can also translate into loiter time), and needs missiles optimized for shooting down other fighters.

 

[Rule of cool]

It wasn't dogma. It was good strategy down from the Macmillan to get an effective deterrent and avoid wasting a lot of money on ineffective counters. You can't shoot down MRBMs

From my understanding it was Sandys pushing the RAF to write a new requirement but they didn't bite. This was a good session back in the day: (https://www.aerosociety.com/news/proceedings-the-1957-defence-review-the-riddle-of-the-sandys/)

Would any of the F.155 interceptors be good fighters? Or fighter bombers? The US also cancelled their interceptors - only Tu-128 survived


If it was managed well... which none of those were

I once read that a major problem with TSR2 management was that because it was the only game in town every Tom, Dick and Harry piled on and had their say in development. Dunno if that was the major problem, but that it was a problem wouldn't be suprising.

I'm on board the cancellation of F155 and the vast majority of other stuff in the 57 DWP. What I take issue with, and what I call dogma, is not embracing something for the rest of the RAF 'fighter' fleet in the long term. The Lightning and Hunter were both 'interim' aircraft, thought to only last until 1970 or so with nothing in the works during Sandys' tenure to replace them.

In fact no Lightning fighters, that Sandys accepted as an interim capability, were ordered during his tenure but 97 were ordered within a year of his departure.

 

[Rule of cool]

Divesting point defense interceptors for missiles, certainly.

We can argue about the other fighters later.



Not really.

Point defense interceptors need to be light at their combat load, with big wings for climbing to high altitudes, with a good thrust to weight ratio. They need some specialized electronics to talk to the ground based radars, and generally need radar guided missiles or all-aspect IR missiles sized to shoot down bombers.
Air superiority tends to require some loiter time, which requires a larger airframe for more fuel and missiles sized for fighter-bombers.
Bomber escort needs much longer range (which can also translate into loiter time), and needs missiles optimized for shooting down other fighters.

A Mirage III can be loaded with a single R530 for point defence interception, a pair of 'supersonic' fuel tanks and 2 Aim9 for air superiority or a pair of 'ferry' tanks, an R530 and 2 Aim9 for escort missions. Same plane, different loadout.

In the 60s no missiles were optimised for shooting down fighter, the Aim9, Aim7, Firestreak, Red Top and R530 were all designed to shoot down bombers. All were turned on fighters with varying degrees of success, with good pilot training and the general quality of the missile being important factors in success rather than initial design.

 

[Yellow Palace]

When you draw on Europe maps then towards 1,000nm radius also seems to come out clearly from this from my understanding. But it was also useful to justify capability elsewhere. It'd be interesting if there were reports with maps, bases, targets used to justify any radius requirements at this time (not just TSR2)

It's not in the UK context, but the Australian requirement that led to their F-111 purchase has been digitised by their archives. It goes into a lot of detail about planned targets, mission profiles, etc.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/bac-tsr2.2041/page-5#post-617113

 

[Hood]

The Air Staff didn't specify a fighter-bomber post-Sandys because they had GOR.339 in mind already and why use a single-seat fighter to lug one Red Beard around when you could use a two-man crew with advanced navigational kit to get to the target on time and with internal storage so you don't have to worry about the bomb warming up in supersonic flight.

There was very little in the way of guided weapons for ground attack despite the efforts of the 1950s, only really Bullpup off the shelf and that didn't need a supersonic P.1121 and soon the RAF would purchase the AS.30, but again it was of limited tactical use.

Much is made of P.1121 being an F-105 analogue but it must be remembered that the USAF used the 'Thud' as a substitute tactical bomber because it failed to develop a replacement for the B-51 (Canberra) in the 1950s and the 1960s effort - Martin B-68 - was a TSR.2-esque design that got canned due to high costs. Had the USAF developed a supersonic/transonic two-man light bomber in 1957, I very much doubt that it would have relied on the F-105 and F-4 as bomb trucks to the extent that it did.

For close support a high subsonic platform with good agility, good weaponry (cannon, rockets, bombs) and pilot visibility would have been sufficient. That's what France wanted when it looked at what became Jaguar, it was the RAF that insisted it had to be supersonic (for training). An obsession with speed over capability made things more complicated for a tactical fighter than it needed to be.

 

[tomo pauk]

The Lightning was about halfway between the F104 and F4 in price.

As one-off (ie. there is no series/mass production after that), it probably was.
When we compare the prices for mass-produced examples, math gets worse for the Lightning.

Occams razor would suggest pushing the TSR2 through development into production is the right course of action as Britain already has aircraft in production that can meets it's 'fighter' requirement well enough.

Agreed.

Not really.

Point defense interceptors need to be light at their combat load, with big wings for climbing to high altitudes, with a good thrust to weight ratio. They need some specialized electronics to talk to the ground based radars, and generally need radar guided missiles or all-aspect IR missiles sized to shoot down bombers.
Air superiority tends to require some loiter time, which requires a larger airframe for more fuel and missiles sized for fighter-bombers.
Bomber escort needs much longer range (which can also translate into loiter time), and needs missiles optimized for shooting down other fighters.

See the F-4 Phantom II.
Excellent when the interception is needed (it even captured several altitude records), fast, and very long ranged when outfitted with drop tanks. Second crew member is there by default, to communicate (not with the ground-based radars - nobody was doing that - but with the C&C network) and to guide missiles, that can be radar-guided or IR-guided. All-weather capable.

This is what one gets with a 2-engined fighter done well.

See also the Mirage family, that was doing excellent in both short- and long-range roles, if with just one engine.

In the 60s no missiles were optimised for shooting down fighter, the Aim9, Aim7, Firestreak, Red Top and R530 were all designed to shoot down bombers. All were turned on fighters with varying degrees of success, with good pilot training and the general quality of the missile being important factors in success rather than initial design.

Not putting the AIM-9 in the same basket with the R530 would've probably been a prudent thing to do. The former bagged numerous fighters, and a bomber every now and then.

 

[Scott Kenny]

See the F-4 Phantom II.
Excellent when the interception is needed (it even captured several altitude records), fast, and very long ranged when outfitted with drop tanks. Second crew member is there by default, to communicate (not with the ground-based radars - nobody was doing that - but with the C&C network) and to guide missiles, that can be radar-guided or IR-guided. All-weather capable.

This is what one gets with a 2-engined fighter done well.

See also the Mirage family, that was doing excellent in both short- and long-range roles, if with just one engine.

The F-4 was designed as a CAP/air superiority fighter, with a secondary role in bomber escort. Till they started hanging lots of bombs under the wings of the F-4 directly...

 

[kaiserd]

In the real world the Hunter was (at least for the RAF) replaced by a number of different aircraft undertaking somewhat different roles; Lightening (interceptor role), Phantom (tactical fighter/ ground attack aircraft), Jaguar (ground attack/ strike) and the Harrier (essentially same role as Jaguar but add in V/STOL, more focused on conventional armed close support with Jaguar at least initially more focused on the nuclear tactical strike role.).

These aircraft (in combination with the Buccaneer, and in a limited way the Vulcan) also replaced other aircraft such as the Canberra. And these replacements also replaced each other.

And that’s before considering potential alternative paper-only aircraft or very broadly equivalent non-UK designs.

As a result “Replacing the Hunter” is a Rorschach test of a question; do you want a replacement for one or for more than one of the Hunters roles, do you want the replacement to do that role similar to how the Hunter (or one or more of its actual replacements) did it but better, or in a different way with different emphasis.
You can see and then bring to the question whatever you want to short of a strategic bomber. Point interceptor to tactical strike aircraft and everything in between.

However there appear to be some lack of appreciation by some contributors of how not all designs were, in relative terms when entering/ in service, as role-flexible as the the Hunter (for example the F-4 was arguably even more flexible, but the Lightening was significantly less flexible) re: potential alternatives, and of the inevitable compromises involved. For example a close air support Lightening would likely have terrible range/ payload (fuel or bomb load? you can’t carry enough of either! Or both!), insufficient low altitude agility/ manoeuvrability for the role (just like most supersonic fighters of its era, including the F-4 as evidenced over Vietnam), insufficient systems to compensate (again fairly typical of 60’s supersonic fighters), much more expensive than simpler subsonic or less highly supersonic alternatives that are probably better at this role at this time, and more expensive than smaller supersonic alternatives that are about as good at the role at this time.

Now the actual real world replacements generally performed well in service so there’s no very clear “bullet” to dodge in that regard. The failed projects that failed to play a part in replacing the Hunter (P.1154, P.1121, in a limited sense the TSR.2, and others) each had their own problems they failed to overcome and hard to argue that what actually eventually emerged in service was not superior to these failed projects.

In a strange way the issues with the Hunter replacements worked to the advantage of the RAF as it (essentially accidentally and unintentionally) largely managed to skip the generation of late 50’s and 60’s generation of supersonic strike fighter that were essentially only suited to carrying/ delivering the one tactical nuke with not especially brilliant range or accuracy. The Phantom did this for a while (with the ability to carry larger and more diversely conventional loads than its contemporaries) but was then switched roles leaving the role to latter aircraft at least as good in the nuclear role and better in the conventional role.

 

[Rule of cool]

The Air Staff didn't specify a fighter-bomber post-Sandys because they had GOR.339 in mind already and why use a single-seat fighter to lug one Red Beard around when you could use a two-man crew with advanced navigational kit to get to the target on time and with internal storage so you don't have to worry about the bomb warming up in supersonic flight.

There was very little in the way of guided weapons for ground attack despite the efforts of the 1950s, only really Bullpup off the shelf and that didn't need a supersonic P.1121 and soon the RAF would purchase the AS.30, but again it was of limited tactical use.

Much is made of P.1121 being an F-105 analogue but it must be remembered that the USAF used the 'Thud' as a substitute tactical bomber because it failed to develop a replacement for the B-51 (Canberra) in the 1950s and the 1960s effort - Martin B-68 - was a TSR.2-esque design that got canned due to high costs. Had the USAF developed a supersonic/transonic two-man light bomber in 1957, I very much doubt that it would have relied on the F-105 and F-4 as bomb trucks to the extent that it did.

For close support a high subsonic platform with good agility, good weaponry (cannon, rockets, bombs) and pilot visibility would have been sufficient. That's what France wanted when it looked at what became Jaguar, it was the RAF that insisted it had to be supersonic (for training). An obsession with speed over capability made things more complicated for a tactical fighter than it needed to be.

I agree there is a modern fighter-bomber sized hole in RAF/MoD requirements, with the exception of the Venom replacement which I think was deliberately kept well behind the state of the art because of Sandys overly enthusiastic embrace of missiles as the future.

 

[Rule of cool]

As one-off (ie. there is no series/mass production after that), it probably was.
When we compare the prices for mass-produced examples, math gets worse for the Lightning.

What do you mean one-off? By 1960 20 pre-production P1B-DBs, 147 single seat and 30 dual seat Lightnings were on order. A further 120 Lightnings were ordered for the RAF by 1966. My guess is the vague references for the Lightning as costing '4/5 of a Phantom' and 'almost as much' as a Phantom refer to production aircraft unit prices. I'd love to see if anyone knows the real flyaway costs for Lightnings.

The Wiki pages for the F104 and F4 reference Knaack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: Volume 1 Post-World War II Fighters 1945–1973. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978. According to this reference the 1960 flyaway price of an F014G was $1.4m and the 1965 flyaway price for an F4C was $1.9m. There's a $.5m price difference between the F104G and F4C, so it appears the Lightning unit cost isn't too outlandish for what it offers over the F104.

 

[tomo pauk]

What do you mean one-off? By 1960 20 pre-production P1B-DBs, 147 single seat and 30 dual seat Lightnings were on order. A further 120 Lightnings were ordered for the RAF by 1966. My guess is the vague references for the Lightning as costing '4/5 of a Phantom' and 'almost as much' as a Phantom refer to production aircraft unit prices. I'd love to see if anyone knows the real flyaway costs for Lightnings.

'One off' should be the price without the effects of mass production, that is known to keep the cost per A/C down. A.k.a. economies of the scale.
Ditto wrt. the wish to know the price of Lightning.

The Wiki pages for the F104 and F4 reference Knaack, Marcelle Size. Encyclopedia of U.S. Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems: Volume 1 Post-World War II Fighters 1945–1973. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1978. According to this reference the 1960 flyaway price of an F014G was $1.4m and the 1965 flyaway price for an F4C was $1.9m. There's a $.5m price difference between the F104G and F4C,

A much smaller spread than I was counting on - effects of US making the F-4s in much greater numbers than the F-104s (by some 7-8 times as much). F4 was actually a bargain vs. the F-104, if we take into consideration of what one was getting with the F-4.
We could also use the flyaway prices of the European-made F-104s, as well as of Mirage IIIs.

so it appears the Lightning unit cost isn't too outlandish for what it offers over the F104.

Okay. For sake of discussion, let's put the price of Lighting at $1.65M. What should one buy - these, or the F-4s?
If the Lighting was offering anything above the F-104, it surely had that well camouflaged; cost of maintenance and fueling will be much higher on the Lightning.

 

[Rule of cool]

.........not all designs were, in relative terms when entering/ in service, as role-flexible as the the Hunter (for example the F-4 was arguably even more flexible, but the Lightening was significantly less flexible) re: potential alternatives, and of the inevitable compromises involved. For example a close air support Lightening would likely have terrible range/ payload (fuel or bomb load? you can’t carry enough of either! Or both!), insufficient low altitude agility/ manoeuvrability for the role (just like most supersonic fighters of its era, including the F-4 as evidenced over Vietnam), insufficient systems to compensate (again fairly typical of 60’s supersonic fighters), much more expensive than simpler subsonic or less highly supersonic alternatives that are probably better at this role at this time, and more expensive than smaller supersonic alternatives that are about as good at the role at this time.

Now the actual real world replacements generally performed well in service so there’s no very clear “bullet” to dodge in that regard.

The Hunter was fine for good weather, daytime fighter-bomber roles in low threat areas however the window for this particular type of threat environment was closing faster than the Hunters (or Gnat, the runner up in the trials) life of type. In contrast if the Lightning was developed and adopted for the fighter-bomber role to enter service instead of much/most of the Hunters it will be inherently better able to deal with the Mig21, Su7 and SAMs that proliferated around the world in the 60s.

The bullet to dodge isn't one of bomb throw weight, but block obsolescence of the Canberra/Victor and Hunter fleets as well as the strategic risk of having a fleet of inferior aircraft.

 

[tomo pauk]

Seems like Aussies were buying 'over 100' of Mirage IIIs for AU$ 193.7 million of the mid-1960s money, that multiplied by .893 = ~173 million US$. Makes around 1.7 mil US$ per a Mirage. Initial 30 Mirages was to cost 18 mil AU pounds in 1960 money - 36 mil AU$ - or, 1.2 mil AU$ (~1.1 mil USD) per A/C , but that price point was long gone by mid-1960s.
With double the number of engines on a heavier A/C, and with less numbers being made by mid-1960s, we can only expect that Lighting was nowhere close to these figures. Even if it the cost was 20% greater than that of Mirage, it is still more than 2 mil US$ by mid-1960s.