Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

[Fluff]

Just like to leave this here for 10 years:

I predict an Aukus 2. UK and Aus both get 12 x B21 - in UK service to be known as the Vulcan II. 3 country operation, with USAF.

 

[Fluff]

Any reporting that uses numbers over 30yr periods or similar is deliberately inflammatory. It is exactly the same with the F-35 "$1 Trillion fighter" which also used multi-decade periods to come up with a big number.

Also likely factors in inflation estimates and all sorts of future material/equipment costs that are ludicrously difficult to accurately quantify.

Ask an accountant what 2+2 is.

Accountant - what do you want it to be?

 

[jeffb]

https://twitter.com/x/status/1635433292760776706

View: https://twitter.com/PeterCronau/status/1635433292760776706?s=20

Any reporting that uses numbers over 30yr periods or similar is deliberately inflammatory. It is exactly the same with the F-35 "$1 Trillion fighter" which also used multi-decade periods to come up with a big number.

The headline figures are just that, intended to grab your attention and cause you to pause, possibly to consider that the money might be spent on something far more worthwhile.

The other thing of course is the rapid escalation from the original figure of $170B, to $180B, then to $200B and now to $368B, a curiosly precise number given the nature of the beast. The last escalation happening over just a couple of days. Has it stopped now or will there be a new figure next week?

And it doesn't even start to cover the rest of the AUKUS spend either.

12 Attack class boats that could cover 95% of the capability of the currently planned SSNs would have cost less than a quarter of the current proposal.

 

[jeffb]

That said the agreement seems “violate the spirit” of NPT, per the official Chinese statement, which implies it doesn’t technically violate it. I’m not sure of the treaty’s exact wording. Certainly opening up the reactor core and harvesting Pu would make sub forever inoperative and as such would make for very expensive warheads.

See back on Page 34 of this exact thread where I addressed the NPT issue. And as for taking China's word on anything to do with this, one might as well take Russia's on anything to do with Ukraine.

You didn't really 'address the issue', GTX, you merely pointed out the loophole the US and the UK are using to export weapons grade material to a third party.

I'd say a loophole that opens up a difficult for the IAEA to regulate path for non-nuclear nations to obtain weapons grade material "violates the spirit" of the NPT, wouldnt you?

I suspect if it was the Russians or Chinese doing it, you'd be demanding action from the UNSC.

 

[Josh_TN]

That said the agreement seems “violate the spirit” of NPT, per the official Chinese statement, which implies it doesn’t technically violate it. I’m not sure of the treaty’s exact wording. Certainly opening up the reactor core and harvesting Pu would make sub forever inoperative and as such would make for very expensive warheads.

See back on Page 34 of this exact thread where I addressed the NPT issue. And as for taking China's word on anything to do with this, one might as well take Russia's on anything to do with Ukraine.

You didn't really 'address the issue', GTX, you merely pointed out the loophole the US and the UK are using to export weapons grade material to a third party.

I'd say a loophole that opens up a difficult for the IAEA to regulate path for non-nuclear nations to obtain weapons grade material "violates the spirit" of the NPT, wouldnt you?

I suspect if it was the Russians or Chinese doing it, you'd be demanding action from the UNSC.

In my opinion, that assumes they are acting in good faith. Which seems like a stretch.

The US is hardly perfect, but it strikes me as a better hegemony than Russia or China. If your argument is that those powers are equivalent hegemonies were they to take power, I’d say we would have to agree to disagree.

 

[jeffb]

What this map leaves off is the states within and on the coast of East Africa that China is doing a bunch of deals with via the BRI.

IMO, interdicting those routes are a large part of why AUKUS generally and HMAS Stirling specifically.

 

[NeilChapman]

.

Then at the reactors end-of-life, it will magically become unsealed again and the reactor and any remaining fuel will be taken out of its sealed box and put into a high-level nuclear waste storage facility at a location yet to be determined somewhere in Australia.

Although important, this issue is a long way off. It's 2023. You won't get an AUKUS boat until 2040+. Then the life of the boat will be 25-30 years - if it even happens. Perhaps the RAN will change its mind again.

In the meantime, there will be 3-5 Virginia-class boats and an $8 billion upgrade to Perth. These boats will have a 30 year life. I can't see the Australian government scrapping Virginia-class boats.

Looks like visits to start in 2026. That, to me, is the bigger deal. There will be quite the building boom getting ready for that.

---

Jeff - please lay off the histrionics and US bashing. If we start laying out the positive results of the rules based order initiated and maintained by the US since WWII this entire thread will be shut down. If you absolutely cannot control yourself, please confine it to direct messages. Thanks!

 

[jeffb]

Jeff - please lay off the histrionics and US bashing. If we start laying out the positive results of the rules based order initiated and maintained by the US since WWII this entire thread will be shut down. If you absolutely cannot control yourself, please confine it to direct messages. Thanks!

It was a simple statement of fact, Neil. Frankly disturbing to see this sort of groupthink response.

 

[Hood]

I wouldn't jump up and down about events still over a decade away.
The costs will be eye-watering - everyone knows that and that's the rub of the whole deal.

Whether Australia can build 8 SSNs within a decade (the 2040s) remains to be seen - I'm sceptical. BAE have failed to do so, the US with 2 yards have just about exceeded that figure now with a submarine in its third and fourth production blocks. You would like to think that the UK can have SSN(R) ready for beginning of fabrication by the end of the 2030s for the RN - though we don't yet know how many the MoD will fund yet. Certainly Rolls-Royce have their order books full for reactors.

 

[GTX]

You didn't really 'address the issue', GTX, you merely pointed out the loophole the US and the UK are using to export weapons grade material to a third party.

To call it a loophole is inaccurate - go read the text of the NPT. More importantly though the IAEA has already stated that "...on the basis of technical consultations and exchanges it has conducted with the AUKUS parties to date, is satisfied with the level of their engagement". No one is hiding anything from the AUKUS side. Moreover, read the following statement that shows both sides are working in a consultative, appropriate manner:

Director General Statement in Relation to AUKUS Announcement | IAEA

www.iaea.org

I'd say a loophole that opens up a difficult for the IAEA to regulate path for non-nuclear nations to obtain weapons grade material "violates the spirit" of the NPT, wouldnt you?

No I do not agree with you. As already stated above and in earlier posts, I am comfortable that the appropriate actions have taken place and that this is fully IAW the NPT requirements that Australia is a supporter of. It is obvious you are against the SSN deal and you keep trying to raise objections and the like to justify your position. These are also countered and shown to be inaccurate - as I did with the NPT issue.

I respect that you have your opinion. However, May I suggest you raise your concerns with the relevant authorities in Govt as there is nothing you write in this thread that is going to change the outcomes.

I suspect if it was the Russians or Chinese doing it, you'd be demanding action from the UNSC.

Please stop making such assertions. I would deal with the facts of the case. My comments re not taking China's word re this deal is based upon a clear connection between China's obvious dislike of the AUKUS deal and self interests and thus any statements from them should be treated with appropriate scepticism.

 

[GTX]

Australian SSNs will open up opportunities for advanced undersea operations | The Strategist

The announcement of the agreed pathway for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) under the AUKUS deal provides clarity about how and when Australia will have this important capability. The process begins with an increased ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[uk 75]

Sorry folks, time for some politics.

When the going gets tough the country you need is not France or Britain. The USA remains the beat cop you go to.

So, yes, our French friends might have been able to supply some SSNs more effectively than the AUKUS deal but the US provides a whole lot more. You only have to listen to Beijing and Moscow to realise that.

 

[zen]

12 Attack class boats that could cover 95% of the capability of the currently planned SSNs would have cost less than a quarter of the current proposal.

Based on what?

BAE have failed to do so,

Failed?
Don't you mean UK Government failing to commit the spending?
Barrow had to slow the whole build down to fit No.11 dripfeed because next generation SSN and the SSBN were being questioned....by No.11 and a mixture of End of History and anti-nuclear campaigners.

 

[Pioneer]

So confirmed:

• 3 Virginias to be acquired with possibility of two more
• New "SSN-AUKUS" Class - presumably replaces SSN(R), or more to the point, SSN(R) is SSN-AUKUS
• SSN AUKUS start construction before EO Decade - first built in UK but others also in Australia (Adelaide)
• Cross postings, training etc happening
• More US/UK deployments to Australian ports
• RAN boats will be Nuclear powered but not Nuclear armed
• Australia will not be producing its own 'fuel'

And there is my assumption of the principle thing behind AUKUS - bases for use by the USN.

The other interesting announcement was the spent nuclear fuel dump for these subs. It wouldn't suprise me in a year time the Australian government will announce that this nuclear fuel dump will be used by both the U.S. and Britain as well.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Volkodav]

I wouldn't jump up and down about events still over a decade away.
The costs will be eye-watering - everyone knows that and that's the rub of the whole deal.

Whether Australia can build 8 SSNs within a decade (the 2040s) remains to be seen - I'm sceptical. BAE have failed to do so, the US with 2 yards have just about exceeded that figure now with a submarine in its third and fourth production blocks. You would like to think that the UK can have SSN(R) ready for beginning of fabrication by the end of the 2030s for the RN - though we don't yet know how many the MoD will fund yet. Certainly Rolls-Royce have their order books full for reactors.

Reading the releases so far, the plan is not to build all eight within a decade but to achieve a total of eight, including three to five Virginas, by 2050. If a delivery rate of one AUKUS SSN every two years can be achieved the three Virginias will do, if it is one every three years, there will need to be five Virginias.

This will still require the Collins LOTE to trail into the delivery of the Virginias and the first AUKUS boats.

I just about fell off my chair when I saw comments from Keating and White etc. (I'm used to it from other quarters) about better to spend the money on variously 25 to 50 conventional submarines. Reality check, that's basically the same as saying buy 1000 bombers instead of 1 battleship, its exactly the same sort of hyperbola. They may as well say 1000 Gripens instead of 100 F-35, or 1000 jeeps with ATGW instead of 100 Abrams.

The choice is 8 SSN or 12 SSG, its not the procurement cost, it's a reality check on the numbers that can be operated and i don't think there is any doubt 8 SSN are more capable and have more presence than 12 large SSG.

 

[uk 75]

I wouldn't jump up and down about events still over a decade away.
The costs will be eye-watering - everyone knows that and that's the rub of the whole deal.

Whether Australia can build 8 SSNs within a decade (the 2040s) remains to be seen - I'm sceptical. BAE have failed to do so, the US with 2 yards have just about exceeded that figure now with a submarine in its third and fourth production blocks. You would like to think that the UK can have SSN(R) ready for beginning of fabrication by the end of the 2030s for the RN - though we don't yet know how many the MoD will fund yet. Certainly Rolls-Royce have their order books full for reactors.

I think you are right to point out the chokepoints in the plan.. However, the plan's ambitions are already acting as a deterrent to China.
Even if only a handful of Virginia boats serve with the RAN at some point, the increased focus of the US and UK on Australia's defence can leave Beijing in no doubt that it will not be allowed any Ukraines in the region.

 

[Hood]

Failed?
Don't you mean UK Government failing to commit the spending?
Barrow had to slow the whole build down to fit No.11 dripfeed because next generation SSN and the SSBN were being questioned....by No.11 and a mixture of End of History and anti-nuclear campaigners.

Astute was "laid down" 31 January 2001, Agincourt might commission in 2026 - that's 25 years to build seven submarines.

The MoD accounting officer assessment in 2019 in response to the two-year delay to Audacious seemed to put the delays down to "emergent technical issues within the build programme. The emergent issues have required unplanned repair and rework to facilitate the submarine proceeding forward with the normal commissioning process."
As to costs he wrote "The delays to the build have not currently caused the programme to overrun in cost terms given that the financial approval is at the programme level (rather than by individual boat) and includes contingency. However, there has been a knock-on schedule delay to ANSON and further schedule challenges with the remaining build. Consequently, the level of schedule risk provision is being reviewed and, longer term, it may be necessary to seek to increase this."

He concluded, "Collaboration with and investment in our lead supplier has been key in improving the operational management of the AUDACIOUS build. The key repair has successfully completed and AUDACIOUS has re-entered the normal commissioning process for a new build nuclear submarine. As with any programme of this complexity, there remains a susceptibility to low probability, high impact events and MOD staff continue to work with the BAES Systems to ensure these are effectively mitigated."

So the MoD were putting the blame squarely on BAE for unforeseen technical challenges. Of course there were other issues too, such as many sub-contractors having left the industry in between the time elapsed during the gap between the Batch 1 and Batch 2 contracts which led to the need to find new suppliers and equipment.

There is no doubt stretching the build times has helped to reduce the cost burden by spreading the programme costs out - just as we're seeing with the 2-year pause in HS2. Certainly the MoD has attempted to maintain BAE and Rolls-Royce nuclear skills ticking over for the longest possible period to ensure no gaps between classes and it has done reasonably well in this regard - though £5bn investment for AUKUS suggests that there is a sizable shortfall in capability that needs to be filled. Stretching to keep BAE occupied to spread the costs implies that the SSN(R) build programme could be dragged out similarly for 20-25 years until an SSBN(R) is required in the 2060s. There is indeed very little incentive to speed up construction at all.

However I disagree that Dreadnought has been substantially delayed by anti-nuclear feeling. There hasn't been any anti-nuclear political pressure at all from the mainstream parties (it remains to be seen whether an independent Scotland will throw a massive spanner in the programme though), even if there is a reluctance to spend from the MoD. Government approval to order long lead items like steel was given as far back as 2011 and construction work began in 2016 and second-phase construction began in 2018. So if Dreadnought completes in 2030 it will have taken 14 years to build from initial work to commissioning - or 12 years if the original 2028 date is maintained.

The recent push to recruit 1,700 new staff at this stage implies BAE were in no position to speed up either Astute or Dreadnought given Dreadnought has been in build for 7 years already and Agincourt for 5 years to date.

 

[zen]

There is no doubt stretching the build times has helped to reduce the cost burden by spreading the programme costs out

No it spreads out the total cost, but that total is actually higher. Low rate production is inherently expensive, but means there is no complete production stop. You pay for premium of not loosing the capability to build more later on.

 

[Archibald]

Astute was "laid down" 31 January 2001, Agincourt might commission in 2026 - that's 25 years to build seven submarines.

One every 8 eight years. To think the USN build the 41 for freedom in, what - a decade (1958-1968 ?) It didn't took them 328 years ! Plus all the nuclear attack subs (Skipjacks & Permits and a few others - two dozens ?)
(I know the comparison is unfair if not completely bonkers, I was half-joking).

 

[GTX]

And there is my assumption of the principle thing behind AUKUS - bases for use by the USN.

I think you will find that AUKUS was triggered/driven more by Australian requests than by US ones but that is taking us further off topic

 

[GTX]

So, yes, our French friends might have been able to supply some SSNs more effectively than the AUKUS deal but the US provides a whole lot more. You only have to listen to Beijing and Moscow to realise that.

Key point there: While the SSN deal might be the headline act, AUKUS is about a lot more than SSNs. There is more to come...

 

[NeilChapman]

There is no doubt stretching the build times has helped to reduce the cost burden by spreading the programme costs out

No it spreads out the total cost, but that total is actually higher. Low rate production is inherently expensive, but means there is no complete production stop. You pay for premium of not loosing the capability to build more later on.

I took a trip to Boston during a project called the "Big Dig." Taking a taxi from the airport one had to traverse a great deal of construction. So I asked the cab driver when the project would be finished. He told me his brother-in-law was a welder on the project and he said "when his last child finishes college."

There is an inherent cost to slowing down projects. The workers, themselves, will determine that it's in their best interest to slow it down even further.

 

[starviking]

There is no doubt stretching the build times has helped to reduce the cost burden by spreading the programme costs out

No it spreads out the total cost, but that total is actually higher. Low rate production is inherently expensive, but means there is no complete production stop. You pay for premium of not loosing the capability to build more later on.

I took a trip to Boston during a project called the "Big Dig." Taking a taxi from the airport one had to traverse a great deal of construction. So I asked the cab driver when the project would be finished. He told me his brother-in-law was a welder on the project and he said "when his last child finishes college."

There is an inherent cost to slowing down projects. The workers, themselves, will determine that it's in their best interest to slow it down even further.

If I recall correctly, this was also a feature of the drawdown in US and French nuclear plant production - though whether it was due solely to the workers themselves, or some external factors (supply-chain contraction, managerial matters, etc), who knows?

 

[Archibald]

Considering the present, growing chaos in my country (and the worst is probably to come) Australia might have been right to walk away from Attacks / Barracudas...

 

[GTX]

Australia’s submarine acquisition is about deterrence, not aggression | The Strategist

While we await the AUKUS partners’ announcement of their plans for Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), the public discourse on the agreement has become wildly out of sync with reality. Charges that Canberra’s SSN ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[NeilChapman]

Considering the present, growing chaos in my country (and the worst is probably to come) Australia might have been right to walk away from Attacks / Barracudas...

For context, to which country are you referring?

 

[GTX]

Considering the present, growing chaos in my country (and the worst is probably to come) Australia might have been right to walk away from Attacks / Barracudas...

For context, to which country are you referring?

France

 

[NeilChapman]

So, yes, our French friends might have been able to supply some SSNs more effectively than the AUKUS deal but the US provides a whole lot more. You only have to listen to Beijing and Moscow to realise that.

Key point there: While the SSN deal might be the headline act, AUKUS is about a lot more than SSNs. There is more to come...

We've seen Switzerland’s adherence to a ban on the export and re-export of weapons and ammunition to conflict zones blocking NATO countries from giving Ukraine their stocks of Swiss-made ammunition and arms. Could the Australians have be assured of submarine systems support from France in some future conflict with an aggressor? Very likely. But, God love them, one never quite knows with the French. There is, unequivocally, no question with the US and UK. It is a clear signal to aggressors of unified power.

Canada, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea participate in TALISMAN SABRE with Australia and the United States. Additionally, some 26 countries participate in RIMPAC (and Taiwan, I believe, in 2024). These are clear signals to aggressors of unified power.

It has been mentioned in prior posts the US, UK, Japan, and Australia have systematically removed barriers for joint support in the Pacific. AUKUS is the next step in that process; displaying a clear signal of unified power.

While none of us know if clear signals of unified power will deter aggression, history is quite clear on what happens when we don't. Humanity pays a much higher price for war than we do deterrence.

There will be more to come.

 

[NeilChapman]

For context, to which country are you referring?

France

Ahh...

Thanks

 

[kaiserd]

So, yes, our French friends might have been able to supply some SSNs more effectively than the AUKUS deal but the US provides a whole lot more. You only have to listen to Beijing and Moscow to realise that.

Key point there: While the SSN deal might be the headline act, AUKUS is about a lot more than SSNs. There is more to come...

We've seen Switzerland’s adherence to a ban on the export and re-export of weapons and ammunition to conflict zones blocking NATO countries from giving Ukraine their stocks of Swiss-made ammunition and arms. Could the Australians have be assured of submarine systems support from France in some future conflict with an aggressor? Very likely. But, God love them, one never quite knows with the French. There is, unequivocally, no question with the US and UK. It is a clear signal to aggressors of unified power.

Canada, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea participate in TALISMAN SABRE with Australia and the United States. Additionally, some 26 countries participate in RIMPAC (and Taiwan, I believe, in 2024). These are clear signals to aggressors of unified power.

It has been mentioned in prior posts the US, UK, Japan, and Australia have systematically removed barriers for joint support in the Pacific. AUKUS is the next step in that process; displaying a clear signal of unified power.

While none of us know if clear signals of unified power will deter aggression, history is quite clear on what happens when we don't. Humanity pays a much higher price for war than we do deterrence.

There will be more to come.

To be fair to France are they really that likely to be less reliable than, say, the UK?
It is arguable that in more recent history France has at least as great experience and track record of supporting their export customers high tech military equipment as the UK does. And the deal for the French subs were part of a wider effort and commitment by France, hence their reaction when Australia exited that deal.

And Australia has the 1941-1942 experience of the UK being unable to come to their aid to the extent required, with the US taking up the mantle as Australia’s key military partner.

And there is always the spectre (hopefully never to become corporeal) of the US turning in on itself and abandoning it allies.
Current positions being taken on Ukraine (and on Russia) by some in the US body-politic would feed this fear about the future reliability of the US as a military and diplomatic partner. AUKUS probably should be seen as part of a concerted efforts to alleviate such concerns (including among countries not party to AUKUS).

None of this is to suggest the likelihood of a “doomsday” scenario or to talk down AUKUS. It’s more that anyone pointing to country A and definitively stating it’s more reliable than country B is at least tempting fate and that ultimately only time will tell.

 

[Ironmiked]

A new twist on the AUKUS debate:

Canada is early in the process of deciding what its future submarine force will look like in late 30s /early 40's. Will it purchase the AUKUS SSN for its future fleet? Canada was contemplating SSN's in the late 80's. The economies of scale having four nations involved in producing these subs could be a positive development for all four navies and their associated industrial bases. Just like the Type 26 Frigate, this could truly be a global program.

From Royal Navy Outlook:

What is SSN(R)?​

In simple terms, SSN is the standard naval classification for a nuclear-powered attack boat ie. “Submarine/Submersible Ship – Nuclear-powered” and the (R) stands for “Replacement”, ie. the next generation of SSNs to follow on from the Astute class. Construction work is now expected to begin on the first boat for the RN in parallel with the end of the Dreadnought programme. The first boat is expected to be delivered to the RN by the end of the 2030s and the first boat for the RAN built in Australia and delivered in the early 204os. With Australians now participating, the programme has assumed a global profile and hopefully, someone will soon come up with a more inspiring and memorable name than SSN-AUKUS. (“The Commonwealth class” or “Minogue class” perhaps?)

The Maritime Underwater Future Capability (MUFC) was the early name for the RN’s programme to consider replacements for the Astute class. The Concept Phase commenced in early 2018 but was suspended in May 2018 for two years. Work on the project resumed and very shortly after AUKUS was made public and in September 2021, the MoD awarded a £170 million contract split between BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce for initial design work on the new attack boats.

How undersea warfare will look in the 2040s and beyond is hard to predict. Despite the rapid growth of autonomous systems and potential improvements in detection technology, the promise of an entirely ‘transparent ocean’ may never be fulfilled. Leading nations continue to invest heavily in crewed submarines and AUKUS is another endorsement for their long-term future. Submarine design will continue to evolve but the ability to deploy, communicate with, and even recover, uncrewed submersibles to and from submarines will be of increasing importance.


Very little can be stated with certainty about SSN(R) at present and details of future submarine designs are highly classified. For reasons of cost and expediency SSN(R) is likely to have much in common with the preceding Dreadnought class SSBNs that are currently being built in Barrow. Assuming they will have the same PWR3 nuclear reactor, they would have the same pressure hull diameter as Dreadnought – around 12.8m. SSN(R) would therefore be substantially larger than Astute, although considerably shorter than Dreadnought. The additional space should provide for heavier armament and defensive countermeasures as well as better crew habitability. Larger boats with better access and internal volume eases the application of acoustic hygiene measures and are actually easier to construct and maintain in service although the capacity of available dry docks may be a constraining factor.

The key difference between Astute and SSN(R) is likely to be the inclusion of payload modules for vertical launch of missiles, medium-sized UUVs or seabed sensors. The Tomahawk missiles carried by RN submarines that are launched conventionally via torpedo tubes are no longer being manufactured. Vertical launch modules allow for a wider variety of payloads that can be larger than the 21-inch diameter of standard heavyweight torpedo tubes. It also allows the Weapon Stowage Compartment to carry a full load of torpedoes and mines with the land-attack missiles relocated in the VL modules. Hypersonic or cruise missile launch capability to strike both land and shipping targets will be a key requirement for both the RN and RAN. The ability to penetrate anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) bubbles with little or no warning will provide a critical conventional deterrent to the primary adversaries.

 

[NeilChapman]

To be fair to France are they really that likely to be less reliable than, say, the UK?

France is one of the oldest US allies. It's aggressors that may irrationally question the support of France. And, again, France would be very likely to support Australia.

But there is no denying the 'special relationship' between the US, UK, and Australia. Therein accentuates no ambiguity and a clear signal to aggressors of unified power.

It is arguable that in more recent history France has at least as great experience and track record of supporting their export customers high tech military equipment as the UK does. And the deal for the French subs were part of a wider effort and commitment by France, hence their reaction when Australia exited that deal.

And Australia has the 1941-1942 experience of the UK being unable to come to their aid to the extent required, with the US taking up the mantle as Australia’s key military partner.

Neither was France able to come to their aid.

You will recall that Australians were subjects of the British Empire at the time. Their men and women deployed in 1939 to fight the Nazi regime ravaging Europe. So, actually, the US came to the aid of the UK, protecting Australian families while they were away fighting. That might add to a special relationship.

And there is always the spectre (hopefully never to become corporeal) of the US turning in on itself and abandoning it allies.

Always the spectre? Always widely feared? What evidence do you posit for such a statement?

Current positions being taken on Ukraine (and on Russia) by some in the US body-politic would feed this fear about the future reliability of the US as a military and diplomatic partner.

Election primary rhetoric adds to this nascent belief but $80 billion of support does not refute it? You must be tough to buy Christmas gifts for. That certainly doesn't constitute always widely feared.

AUKUS probably should be seen as part of a concerted efforts to alleviate such concerns (including among countries not party to AUKUS).

But not the $80 billion of support. The US Congress approved much of this aid, and the US is a representative democracy. 'The people' of the United States are supporting Ukraine and Europe.

Note too, the US is providing foreign military financing for allies to help backfill donations of military equipment they’ve made to Ukraine. The US is actually financing Europe to assist Europe.

It is fairly obvious that the US has led admirably during this crisis in Europe. Do you actually believe Sweden and Finland would have decided to join NATO if they widely feared the US would abandon her allies?

None of this is to suggest the likelihood of a “doomsday” scenario or to talk down AUKUS. It’s more that anyone pointing to country A and definitively stating it’s more reliable than country B is at least tempting fate and that ultimately only time will tell.

Yet that is exactly the contention you made with the prima facia argument being primary rhetoric. A "doomsday" scenario where the US will abandon her allies is widely feared
1. even though the US is has provided $80 billion in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and
2. even though historically neutral Sweden and Norway have decided to enter NATO of which the primary power projection is from the United States.

France is a noble country and a great democracy. The point amplified the distinctive relationship between the AUKUS members as amplified by the sharing of SSN technology and how that relationship should be viewed by aggressors.

 

[kaiserd]

To be fair to France are they really that likely to be less reliable than, say, the UK?

France is one of the oldest US allies. It's aggressors that may irrationally question the support of France. And, again, France would be very likely to support Australia.

But there is no denying the 'special relationship' between the US, UK, and Australia. Therein accentuates no ambiguity and a clear signal to aggressors of unified power.

It is arguable that in more recent history France has at least as great experience and track record of supporting their export customers high tech military equipment as the UK does. And the deal for the French subs were part of a wider effort and commitment by France, hence their reaction when Australia exited that deal.

And Australia has the 1941-1942 experience of the UK being unable to come to their aid to the extent required, with the US taking up the mantle as Australia’s key military partner.

Neither was France able to come to their aid.

You will recall that Australians were subjects of the British Empire at the time. Their men and women deployed in 1939 to fight the Nazi regime ravaging Europe. So, actually, the US came to the aid of the UK, protecting Australian families while they were away fighting. That might add to a special relationship.

And there is always the spectre (hopefully never to become corporeal) of the US turning in on itself and abandoning it allies.

Always the spectre? Always widely feared? What evidence do you posit for such a statement?

Current positions being taken on Ukraine (and on Russia) by some in the US body-politic would feed this fear about the future reliability of the US as a military and diplomatic partner.

Election primary rhetoric adds to this nascent belief but $80 billion of support does not refute it? You must be tough to buy Christmas gifts for. That certainly doesn't constitute always widely feared.

AUKUS probably should be seen as part of a concerted efforts to alleviate such concerns (including among countries not party to AUKUS).

But not the $80 billion of support. The US Congress approved much of this aid, and the US is a representative democracy. 'The people' of the United States are supporting Ukraine and Europe.

Note too, the US is providing foreign military financing for allies to help backfill donations of military equipment they’ve made to Ukraine. The US is actually financing Europe to assist Europe.

It is fairly obvious that the US has led admirably during this crisis in Europe. Do you actually believe Sweden and Finland would have decided to join NATO if they widely feared the US would abandon her allies?

None of this is to suggest the likelihood of a “doomsday” scenario or to talk down AUKUS. It’s more that anyone pointing to country A and definitively stating it’s more reliable than country B is at least tempting fate and that ultimately only time will tell.

Yet that is exactly the contention you made with the prima facia argument being primary rhetoric. A "doomsday" scenario where the US will abandon her allies is widely feared
1. even though the US is has provided $80 billion in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine and
2. even though historically neutral Sweden and Norway have decided to enter NATO of which the primary power projection is from the United States.

France is a noble country and a great democracy. The point amplified the distinctive relationship between the AUKUS members as amplified by the sharing of SSN technology and how that relationship should be viewed by aggressors.

Perhaps trying reading outside the bubble, particularly re: the feelings and fears of those outside the bubble;

Some random examples:

No laughing MAGA: What the next US presidential election could mean for Europe

Europeans should be concerned not just with whether Trump will win but how to deal with the version of post-Trump America that could emerge in 2025…

ecfr.eu

Polarized Politics Has Infected American Diplomacy

Foreigners aren’t laughing at us. They pity and discount us.

www.theatlantic.com

Unreliable US leadership in the shadow of elections

Biden, Trump, DeSantis and the scenarios for the 2024 presidential elections.

www.aljazeera.com

 

[uk 75]

Sorry folks, time for some politics.

When the going gets tough the country you need is not France or Britain. The USA remains the beat cop you go to.

So, yes, our French friends might have been able to supply some SSNs more effectively than the AUKUS deal but the US provides a whole lot more. You only have to listen to Beijing and Moscow to realise that.

i was being tongue in cheek saying this was a political point.
Truth is that it simply reflects the difference in size between the USA and everyone else in the West.
UK and France have much to offer allies and in many cases have fought local wars over decades in support of them. But the US has a much broader range of military assets. It is also a much bigger economic and industrial power.
The reliability of any government in the West can change not just with an election but also with personalities in power. This has been particularly true in the UK and US. But France is also a different country under Macron than it was under Hollande or Sarkozy. Germany under Scholz after years of Merkel.
But the relationship lower down the government and military chains run much deeper and persist whatever the man or woman at the top does or says. This is as true in the UK and US as in Canada or Germany.

 

[GTX]

If you would like to continue this conversation I'd suggest a DM.

Shall we move on?

Good call - please take this off line guys.

 

[GTX]

What is SSN(R)?​

At the risk of stating the obvious, SSN(R) is now SSN-AUKUS

 

[GTX]

To be fair to France are they really that likely to be less reliable than, say, the UK?
It is arguable that in more recent history France has at least as great experience and track record of supporting their export customers high tech military equipment as the UK does.

That has not been the Australian case. I know that there was much frustration within the RAAF re Mirage III support over the years. I can also speak from personal experience with MRH90 and ARH Tiger support which was far from acceptable over the years. This to a large part has contributed to the recent decisions to exit both of these platforms from service in coming years.

 

[starviking]

Or is the reason Australia is getting second hand boats is that the reactor material of those boats will be sufficiently degraded that extracting and chemically recovering enough material for nuclear weapon use would be extremely difficult or impossible?

Ah no, nuclear physics doesn’t work like that. Here let me explain;- Pu comes in two main varieties (or isotopes) Pu239 and Pu240. Nuclear weapons are made from Pu239 and not Pu240. If you leave Pu239 in a reactor for more than about 30 days it turns (transmutes) into Pu240.

Pu239 and Pu240 are extremely difficult to separate when mixed (unfeasible really), so even if the reactor initially starts with a high degree of Pu239, after 30 days of running, it’s turned into a mixture of 239/240.

Although these burnable moderator reactors are a lot more complex in their element conversions the above holds true.

The question was more about whether there's enough fissile material in a second-hand reactor to remove enough to make a weapon/s while still retaining enough reactor life to cover up the fact that you have removed enough material to make a weapon/s, this would be the IAEAs worry. But thanks for the explanation.

You’d have to cut through the cladding for the nuclear fuel to remove the fissile material - and unless the fuel was fresh and unused you would have to problem of separating the Pu239 from the mix, and dealing with the radioactivity (and heat) of the actinides produced by the fission reaction.

Then you’d have to replace or repair the cladding - which is built to very fine tolerances, fit it back in the reactor, and hope the fiddling about has not thrown anything out of whack, or that the tinkered-with fuel rod can cope with the extreme environment in the reactor - because if it doesn’t it will show up in the reactor chemistry checks.

Then there’s the issue of the US and UK personnel who are going to be floating around the boats, and the shipyard workers who will be blabbing about any odd procedures going on on the boats.

Thing is, it's doable though. The IAEA obviously think so.

It’s less about what Australia can do, and more about what a tinpot dictator with a compliant populace and chained press could do.

 

[jeffb]

Or is the reason Australia is getting second hand boats is that the reactor material of those boats will be sufficiently degraded that extracting and chemically recovering enough material for nuclear weapon use would be extremely difficult or impossible?

Ah no, nuclear physics doesn’t work like that. Here let me explain;- Pu comes in two main varieties (or isotopes) Pu239 and Pu240. Nuclear weapons are made from Pu239 and not Pu240. If you leave Pu239 in a reactor for more than about 30 days it turns (transmutes) into Pu240.

Pu239 and Pu240 are extremely difficult to separate when mixed (unfeasible really), so even if the reactor initially starts with a high degree of Pu239, after 30 days of running, it’s turned into a mixture of 239/240.

Although these burnable moderator reactors are a lot more complex in their element conversions the above holds true.

The question was more about whether there's enough fissile material in a second-hand reactor to remove enough to make a weapon/s while still retaining enough reactor life to cover up the fact that you have removed enough material to make a weapon/s, this would be the IAEAs worry. But thanks for the explanation.

You’d have to cut through the cladding for the nuclear fuel to remove the fissile material - and unless the fuel was fresh and unused you would have to problem of separating the Pu239 from the mix, and dealing with the radioactivity (and heat) of the actinides produced by the fission reaction.

Then you’d have to replace or repair the cladding - which is built to very fine tolerances, fit it back in the reactor, and hope the fiddling about has not thrown anything out of whack, or that the tinkered-with fuel rod can cope with the extreme environment in the reactor - because if it doesn’t it will show up in the reactor chemistry checks.

Then there’s the issue of the US and UK personnel who are going to be floating around the boats, and the shipyard workers who will be blabbing about any odd procedures going on on the boats.

Thing is, it's doable though. The IAEA obviously think so.

It’s less about what Australia can do, and more about what a tinpot dictator with a compliant populace and chained press could do.

I think you meant a compliant press and a chained populace, yes?

 

[jeffb]

An interesting article

Who killed the Attack-class? - Australian Defence Magazine

The death of the Attack class reveals multiple efforts from within the Government to undermine its own defence programs and pin the blame on industry.

www.australiandefence.com.au