Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

[GTX]

The Australian government will still control the RAN, the difference is they will no longer have complete control over the over the contractors doing the maintenance.

arguably this already happens with many platforms, especially at the deeper maintenance levels. For instance the C-17s and F-35s are part of global support programs where the RAAF is only indirectly contracting those doing the actual maintenance.

 

[Pioneer]

If there were an accident or a radiation leak during construction,

People keep raising this sort of thing in this thread but I am yet to see anyone provide examples of similar occurring in all the decades of o/s nuclear vessel operation.

if there was some blow up with the IAEA and public opinion turned against them, the whole program could be put in jeopardy.

Exactly what sort of IAEA blowup??

Public opinion here in Australia has been pretty much in support of the SSNs since they were announced apart from some minor "won't somebody think of the children" style fringe groups.

Hell, they might have to debate the necessity of nuclear subs in the Australian Parliament (something they haven't actually done yet).

Both main sides of Australian politics have been equally in support of the SSNs and AUKUS so what would be the point apart from allowing some inconsequential elements to make some irrelevant noise.

In all due respect GTX I don't think many Australian's have a clue as to the cost of purchasing, operating and maintaining these proposed SSN's - they sure didn't know, let alone care about the shit fight that was the Collins-class.
I personally felt ill, when former Defence Minister Dutton, vomited his pathetic bullshit comment: “Every major city in Australia, including Hobart, is within range of China's missiles”, like some regurgitation of McCarthyism/Bomber Gap/Missile Gap fear mongering from the 1950's and 60's.....!
The vast majority of ignorant Australians not just ate this shit up, as intended, it was deliberate engineered wedge politics tactic that Labor swallowed hook, line and sinker.

Regards
Pioneer

 

[Josh_TN]

Aukus will lock in Australia’s dependence on US, intelligence expert warns

Clinton Fernandes argues in provocative new book the security pact will make it impossible to have an independent defence policy

www.theguardian.com

Not sure how this is a change from the status quo. When's the last time Australia manufactured its own aircraft, for instance? How much is Australia's defense is truly self sufficient in the first place?

 

[Pioneer]

Wow, I can't help but wonder how biased this analysis by the Australian government was/is when you utilise twelve retired US Navy officials as consultants ......

Australia's submarine debacle, and how the carousel keeps spinning for retired US Navy officials

An investigation by The Washington Post has revealed that a dozen Americans received around US$10 million as consultants on Australia's botched submarine program.

www.crikey.com.au

Regards
Pioneer

 

[NeilChapman]

Wow, I can't help but wonder how biased this analysis by the Australian government was/is when you utilise twelve retired US Navy officials as consultants ......

Australia's submarine debacle, and how the carousel keeps spinning for retired US Navy officials

An investigation by The Washington Post has revealed that a dozen Americans received around US$10 million as consultants on Australia's botched submarine program.

www.crikey.com.au

Regards
Pioneer

Wow, I can't help but wonder how much confirmation bias has been brought into that article.

It's a pretty small community.
1. Which country likely has the most depth of naval warship construction program expertise?
2. Who would one suggest they get as consultants?
3. Were only US consultants ever used?
4. Did they only advise on the submarine program?

My experience suggests that consultants respond to the wishes of those paying the bills. If the threat warrants SSNs then perhaps Australia has a shot at the best deal possible because of AUKUS. If these consultants had a hand in AUKUS then I will posit Australia got a great deal for $10M.

 

[jeffb]

My experience suggests that consultants respond to the wishes of those paying the bills.

Indeed, and once this consultancy is completed, who will they be going home to?

Australia got a great deal for $10M.

On top of the proposed $170 billion you mean?

New French SSN FS Suffren (lead boat of the Barracuda-class) arrives for her first visit to Falsane this morning (22 Sept).

 

[zen]

There is 'cost' and there is 'cost'.
Just because something looks cheaper doesn't guarantee it is actually cheaper.

 

[GTX]

There is 'cost' and there is 'cost'.
Just because something looks cheaper doesn't guarantee it is actually cheaper.

That's why one uses Total Lifecycle Cost calculations...which are then twisted by people (e.g. Trillion $ fighter).

 

[H_K]

There is 'cost' and there is 'cost'.
Just because something looks cheaper doesn't guarantee it is actually cheaper.

But… « a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush ».

The RAN could buy 4 large SSKs for well under AUD$10B, if they were built in a foreign yard and delivered « turnkey ». These would be available 2030-2035 to replace the Collins class, saving the money to be spent on an expensive (and risky) life extension. With double crews these SSKs would deliver the same number of sea days as 6 Collins SSKs (600-700 days per year), while being operationally superior and buying time for the AUKUS SSN design to be delivered from 2040+.

(Plus double crewing allows for crew rotations in Singapore or Guam, saving 20-30 days transit for each patrol… effectively increasing time on station by 20-50%).

Most of the total lifecycle cost would still be spent in Australia for infrastructure, maintenance and manning… to increase AUS content some of the hull rings could even be made in Australia and shipped abroad.

That’s what the French, Germans and Koreans are proposing in a nutshell, with varying levels of design maturity (the Korean KSS-III and French Shortfin Barracuda being the lowest risk). Worth a look even if that means accepting non-USN standard systems.

 

[GTX]

AUKUS Submarines: Options update

Australia has committed to building nuclear submarines (SSNs) at ASC Adelaide. I leave the debates over their military merits to others.

www.linkedin.com

 

[jeffb]

AUKUS Submarines: Options update

Australia has committed to building nuclear submarines (SSNs) at ASC Adelaide. I leave the debates over their military merits to others.

www.linkedin.com

Also, Attack class SSKs potentially lead into Barracuda SSN and mitigate the need for Collins LOTE or a third interim type.

 

[GTX]

Preserving an Australian submarine capability: a wicked problem hedged | The Strategist

In my previous post, I suggested that Australia has insufficient submarine personnel to start a transition to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) while maintaining its existing operational capability to deploy at least two Collins-class submarines in ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[jeffb]

Preserving an Australian submarine capability: a wicked problem hedged | The Strategist

In my previous post, I suggested that Australia has insufficient submarine personnel to start a transition to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) while maintaining its existing operational capability to deploy at least two Collins-class submarines in ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Sigh.

Additional to the raft of high cost, high risk issues talked around in the article above, the perennial issue of manning the new subs still has not been addressed.

Crew sizes:-
Collins: 58
Suffren : 60
Astute : 98
Virginia: 132
Colombia: 150+ (Based on SSBN nos).

 

[Volkodav]

There is 'cost' and there is 'cost'.
Just because something looks cheaper doesn't guarantee it is actually cheaper.

But… « a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush ».

The RAN could buy 4 large SSKs for well under AUD$10B, if they were built in a foreign yard and delivered « turnkey ». These would be available 2030-2035 to replace the Collins class, saving the money to be spent on an expensive (and risky) life extension. With double crews these SSKs would deliver the same number of sea days as 6 Collins SSKs (600-700 days per year), while being operationally superior and buying time for the AUKUS SSN design to be delivered from 2040+.

(Plus double crewing allows for crew rotations in Singapore or Guam, saving 20-30 days transit for each patrol… effectively increasing time on station by 20-50%).

Most of the total lifecycle cost would still be spent in Australia for infrastructure, maintenance and manning… to increase AUS content some of the hull rings could even be made in Australia and shipped abroad.

That’s what the French, Germans and Koreans are proposing in a nutshell, with varying levels of design maturity (the Korean KSS-III and French Shortfin Barracuda being the lowest risk). Worth a look even if that means accepting non-USN standard systems.

This comment demonstrates that you have no concept of what is involved with submarine sustainment. Four hulls, double crewed or not, will never provide the same number of sea days as six hulls when operating in the same navy to the same conops.

A key limitation with the Collins has always been the RAN needed more hulls not less. If you don't have sufficient hulls you can't train and certify sufficient numbers of crew as well as provide the boats themselves with the required level of maintenance.

 

[Volkodav]

Preserving an Australian submarine capability: a wicked problem hedged | The Strategist

In my previous post, I suggested that Australia has insufficient submarine personnel to start a transition to nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) while maintaining its existing operational capability to deploy at least two Collins-class submarines in ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Sigh.

Additional to the raft of high cost, high risk issues talked around in the article above, the perennial issue of manning the new subs still has not been addressed.

Crew sizes:-
Collins: 58
Suffren : 60
Astute : 98
Virginia: 132
Colombia: 150+ (Based on SSBN nos).

Rear Admiral Peter Briggs' (https://www.navy.gov.au/biography/rear-admiral-peter-douglas-briggs) suggestion probably won't happen, that doesn't mean it doesn't have merit, or that it is not possible. Ironically a build of additional Collins was the plan B before the Japanese and French fiascos and would de risk LOTE.

Something needs to be done to rebuild the skills base of these required to sustain, operate and build submarines in Australia, the most important change required and its needs to be soon, is to ramp up recruitment and training now instead of waiting for the work to start. If you hire your apprentices as you start work, its already too late, you need to be training a cohort every year from now as if you are already building, same with grads, sailors and officers

 

[H_K]

This comment demonstrates that you have no concept of what is involved with submarine sustainment. Four hulls, double crewed or not, will never provide the same number of sea days as six hulls when operating in the same navy to the same conops.

A key limitation with the Collins has always been the RAN needed more hulls not less. If you don't have sufficient hulls you can't train and certify sufficient numbers of crew as well as provide the boats themselves with the required level of maintenance.

I am just pointing out that some navies are able to sustain 135+ sea days per sub over very long periods of time (3-4 decades), peaking at 150-165 sea days in good years, without any shortfall in maintenance or training. Whereas the RAN considers a great year to be about 100-110 sea days per sub.

Applying the same crewing & sustainment model to the RAN would yield 550-650 sea days with 4 subs and 6 crews - identical to 6 Collins today. This means 2 subs at sea most of the time, occasionally 1 during quiet periods, and up to 3 subs at sea for very short surges.

Additionally this real-world benchmark is with old nuke subs that require substantially more complex maintenance and longer dockings over and above an SSK. Newer SSNs are expected to increase availability and sea days by ~20%, and an SSK should aim for the same if not better.

Now of course this is a paper exercise and likely can’t be achieved in Australia without substantial changes to current practices (the difficulty of which is unknown). But it CAN be achieved in the real world, as indeed it has been achieved outside of Oz.

Finally this would really be only for a transition period of 10-15 years until SSNs are delivered after which the op. tempo might slow down somewhat if need be (i.e. in time for the 2nd big docking / mid-life upgrade as once you hit that big milestone requiring longer dockings
that’s when a fleet of 4 subs might go off the rails).

I realize that’s a lot of ifs but wanted to lay out the logic behind my thinking.

 

[Volkodav]

This comment demonstrates that you have no concept of what is involved with submarine sustainment. Four hulls, double crewed or not, will never provide the same number of sea days as six hulls when operating in the same navy to the same conops.

A key limitation with the Collins has always been the RAN needed more hulls not less. If you don't have sufficient hulls you can't train and certify sufficient numbers of crew as well as provide the boats themselves with the required level of maintenance.

I am just pointing out that some navies are able to sustain 135+ sea days per sub over very long periods of time (3-4 decades), peaking at 150-165 sea days in good years, without any shortfall in maintenance or training. Whereas the RAN considers a great year to be about 100-110 sea days per sub.

Applying the same crewing & sustainment model to the RAN would yield 550-650 sea days with 4 subs and 6 crews - identical to 6 Collins today. This means 2 subs at sea most of the time, occasionally 1 during quiet periods, and up to 3 subs at sea for very short surges.

Additionally this real-world benchmark is with old nuke subs that require substantially more complex maintenance and longer dockings over and above an SSK. Newer SSNs are expected to increase availability and sea days by ~20%, and an SSK should aim for the same if not better.

Now of course this is a paper exercise and likely can’t be achieved in Australia without substantial changes to current practices (the difficulty of which is unknown). But it CAN be achieved in the real world, as indeed it has been achieved outside of Oz.

Finally this would really be only for a transition period of 10-15 years until SSNs are delivered after which the op. tempo might slow down somewhat if need be (i.e. in time for the 2nd big docking / mid-life upgrade as once you hit that big milestone requiring longer dockings
that’s when a fleet of 4 subs might go off the rails).

I realize that’s a lot of ifs but wanted to lay out the logic behind my thinking.

According to Steve Ludlam, the former head of RR Nuclear Reactors, the only class of submarine to achieve greater availability than the Collins i.e. sea days per boat, were the Vanguard Class SSBNs. By the way, 4 boats and six crews mean crews swapping boats which results in other issues, by all means have a Blue and a Gold crew on each boat, but don't swap them.

There is an awful lot of flippant conversation and opinion on what is a highly specialised and classified capability that few who haven't worked within the capability have any idea.

 

[BlackBat242]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

The RAN tends to operate its subs far from base, which means no opportunity to pop in for a quick maintenance & relief period - the shorter the trips out, the more days you can spend out.

 

[H_K]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

Well as far as the French SSNs are concerned, since that’s what I’m referring to, they do regular long deployments to the Indian Ocean (typically 6-7 months) with crew swaps in the UAE, though they also have practised long deployments to the Pacific and Caribbean with crew swaps in Guam, Martinique etc. The double crews actually work better the farther you have to deploy.

 

[TinWing]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

Well as far as the French SSNs are concerned, since that’s what I’m referring to, they do regular long deployments to the Indian Ocean (typically 6-7 months) with crew swaps in the UAE, though they also have practised long deployments to the Pacific and Caribbean with crew swaps in Guam, Martinique etc. The double crews actually work better the farther you have to deploy.

As I recollect, the French have greater operational flexibility and higher utilization of their SSN fleet than any other nuclear navy. In short, the Aussies can’t expect anywhere near this level of efficiency or flexibility with RN or USN subs and practices.

There are significant downsides to a blinkered, exclusively Anglocentric outlook.

 

[GTX]

For those questioning whether the 'new' government is in support of the SSN plan:

Deputy PM: Australia needs long-range strike capabilities

Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has said the ADF must invest in long-range strike capability because Australia cannot rely on the US to guarantee its safety. Speaking at the

www.defenceconnect.com.au

 

[Volkodav]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

The RAN tends to operate its subs far from base, which means no opportunity to pop in for a quick maintenance & relief period - the shorter the trips out, the more days you can spend out.

Spot on. The Swedes for instance often went out in the early morning and returned in the evening.

 

[jeffb]

For those questioning whether the 'new' government is in support of the SSN plan:

Deputy PM: Australia needs long-range strike capabilities

Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has said the ADF must invest in long-range strike capability because Australia cannot rely on the US to guarantee its safety. Speaking at the

www.defenceconnect.com.au

Then why is Australia entertaining the construction of SSNs whose reactors are effectively on-loan from the US/UK because Australia can't build or refuel them because of NPT obligations?

French SSNs of course run on commercial grade LEU technology for which a global market already exists and, at a stretch, Australia could make for itself.

 

[BlackBat242]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

Well as far as the French SSNs are concerned, since that’s what I’m referring to, they do regular long deployments to the Indian Ocean (typically 6-7 months) with crew swaps in the UAE, though they also have practised long deployments to the Pacific and Caribbean with crew swaps in Guam, Martinique etc. The double crews actually work better the farther you have to deploy.

As I recollect, the French have greater operational flexibility and higher utilization of their SSN fleet than any other nuclear navy. In short, the Aussies can’t expect anywhere near this level of efficiency or flexibility with RN or USN subs and practices.

There are significant downsides to a blinkered, exclusively Anglocentric outlook.

And there is the difference between SSKs and SSNs... SSNs are capable of longer-range longer-duration deployments than SSKs, which exactly fits Australia's historic and planned use of their sub force - and yet we still have people insisting that SSKs are just perfect for Australia!

 

[BlackBat242]

For those questioning whether the 'new' government is in support of the SSN plan:

Deputy PM: Australia needs long-range strike capabilities

Defence Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles has said the ADF must invest in long-range strike capability because Australia cannot rely on the US to guarantee its safety. Speaking at the

www.defenceconnect.com.au

Then why is Australia entertaining the construction of SSNs whose reactors are effectively on-loan from the US/UK because Australia can't build or refuel them because of NPT obligations?

French SSNs of course run on commercial grade LEU technology for which a global market already exists and, at a stretch, Australia could make for itself.

Because there is still solid majority opposition in both main Australian political parties to any development of a domestic nuclear industry!

In order to get the parties behind the SSN plan, the whole "we don't touch the fuel or the insides of the reactors ever" bit was REQUIRED!

It used to be that any possibility of the RAN operating SSNs was "unthinkable" because there was always the assumption that operating SSNs would require a Australian domestic nuclear industry.

It is only since the UK & US offered to provide reactors on a "sealed box" basis that SSNs and AusDomNucInd could be separated.

 

[Volkodav]

And most of those high-operational time navies operate their subs HOW far from their base(s)?

Well as far as the French SSNs are concerned, since that’s what I’m referring to, they do regular long deployments to the Indian Ocean (typically 6-7 months) with crew swaps in the UAE, though they also have practised long deployments to the Pacific and Caribbean with crew swaps in Guam, Martinique etc. The double crews actually work better the farther you have to deploy.

As I recollect, the French have greater operational flexibility and higher utilization of their SSN fleet than any other nuclear navy. In short, the Aussies can’t expect anywhere near this level of efficiency or flexibility with RN or USN subs and practices.

There are significant downsides to a blinkered, exclusively Anglocentric outlook.

And there is the difference between SSKs and SSNs... SSNs are capable of longer-range longer-duration deployments than SSKs, which exactly fits Australia's historic and planned use of their sub force - and yet we still have people insisting that SSKs are just perfect for Australia!

Again spot on. Australia was actually assuming in the mid 60s that we would obtain SSNs, Nuc weapons and nuclear power, Australia backed the non-proliferation treaty as a cost saving.

 

[GTX]

Then why is Australia entertaining the construction of SSNs whose reactors are effectively on-loan from the US/UK because Australia can't build or refuel them because of NPT obligations?

Where in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is there anything limiting the building/refuelling of reactors?

 

[Josh_TN]

Then why is Australia entertaining the construction of SSNs whose reactors are effectively on-loan from the US/UK because Australia can't build or refuel them because of NPT obligations?

Where in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is there anything limiting the building/refuelling of reactors?

US/UK sub reactors are bomb grade material and thus could be interpreted to fall under some aspects of the NPT. I'm not certain of the legal particulars but I've heard of the issue being raised before. Though the fact that these reactors are also for the life of the boat should sidestep most deep maintenance of the reactor plant or even access to the core itself, so I suspect there is some legalize where Australia wouldn't technically be the owner of the material or some such.

 

[jeffb]

Then why is Australia entertaining the construction of SSNs whose reactors are effectively on-loan from the US/UK because Australia can't build or refuel them because of NPT obligations?

Where in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is there anything limiting the building/refuelling of reactors?

Enrichment of uranium to the 97% enriched state required by nuclear weapons and the LOB reactors that power US and UK submarines is a clear breach of Australia's NPT obligations.

Are you suggesting Australia should withdraw from the NPT?

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

They could however build and refuel LEU reactors because LEU cannot readily be converted into weapons grade material, it's already distributed via a well regulated global industry (of which Australia is already a part) and doesn't impact NPT obligations.

Use of LEU technology actually opens a whole series of possibilities for Australia beyond SSNs, without the need for an Australian uranium enrichment industry. It's a wonder the Australian Liberal Party, which is always banging on about SMRs and the role of nuclear in a future Australian energy mix, aren't pushing harder for it.

 

[starviking]

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

The LOB reactors are Life of Boat, so they will be independant for the lifetime of the sub.

A sub, which doesn’t need refuelling for 40-odd years. Pretty damn good deal.

 

[jeffb]

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

The LOB reactors are Life of Boat, so they will be independant for the lifetime of the sub.

A sub, which doesn’t need refuelling for 40-odd years. Pretty damn good deal.

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Australia’s defence dilemma: projecting force or provoking China? (ft.com, registration or subscription may be required)

 

[Archibald]

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

The LOB reactors are Life of Boat, so they will be independant for the lifetime of the sub.

A sub, which doesn’t need refuelling for 40-odd years. Pretty damn good deal.

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

Well, that's kind of unfortunate, really. Then again, the 688 fleet was huge and funded through Reagan military budget pornfest of the mid-1980's. After what, Cold War ended and 688 replacement became a very tortured issue: Seawolf, Virginia, with the usual issues: very expensive, stretched in time. So much stretched in time that the earliest 688 reached the end of their useful lives... and since, unlike French subs, they were not build with repleaceable LEU reactor cores, but sealed-off, long life HEU ones... well, the submarines had to be retired.

Bottom line: procurement of 688 successors (Virginia, Seawolf, whatever) has taken so long, it has quite literally outlived the "non replaceable core" 688 reactor useful lives ! Which had been planned with big margins - alas, the said life margins were not enough to cope with the 1990's "peace dividends" - or so it seems.

Weird, so weird... another startling examples of the absurdity of the 1990's "peace dividends" military procurement policy. It was understanble: Cold War had ended without massive nuclear fireworks, gone was the evil USSR - so time to slash the military budgets.
But this logic was stretched way, way too far...

If I take the case of the French Armée de l'Air - in 1991 it had 450 combat aircraft, to be replaced by at least 320 Rafales. Nowadays the AdA target is 225 combat aircraft with 180 Rafales at a bare minimum... except present number of Rafale is 90-100. And the Mirage 2000s are getting old, and everything else has been retired.

But I digress, sorry...

 

[TomS]

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

No 688 has an LOB core -- that was a new thing with the Virginia class. The 688s retired "early" were because of the timing of their very expensive refueling overhauls versus their expected end-of-life for other reasons.

 

[GTX]

Enrichment of uranium to the 97% enriched state required by nuclear weapons and the LOB reactors that power US and UK submarines is a clear breach of Australia's NPT obligations.

How exactly would this be a breach of the NPT? The closest I can see would be Article III, clause 2, which states:

"Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article."​

But as stated, there are provisions to allow this in the very last line. Besides, remember that the NPT is, by way of its very name focussed on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, not everything nuclear related.

Are you suggesting Australia should withdraw from the NPT?

No, where did I say that? i simply asked "Where in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is there anything limiting the building/refuelling of reactors?"

Moreover, as implied above, I would argue that such transfer of reactor technology/physical product in the form of the SSNs, with appropriate safeguards is perfectly allowable.

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

Well, one can argue that one of the cornerstones of the AUKUS deal is exactly the type of technology transfers necessary to enable ongoing use. There is also the fact that all three nations are long term allies with relations going back well over a century, so hardly at risk. Finally, there is a lot going on already re building up the RAN's and the appropriate industry and other support base etc to support. BTW, I believe there is no weapon system in ADF use or planned for use which is 100% independent of external support so this is somewhat of a straw man argument.

 

[TomS]

For a discussion of NPT implications of nuclear-powered vessels, see:

https://uploads.fas.org/media/The-Nonproliferation-and-Disarmament-Challenges-of-Naval-Nuclear-Propulsion.pdf

Definitely not "this is prohibited" but does talk about a lot of steps that non-nuclear weapon states should take to preserve confidence in their NNWS status while acquiring nuclear-powered vessels.

 

[jeffb]

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

No 688 has an LOB core -- that was a new thing with the Virginia class. The 688s retired "early" were because of the timing of their very expensive refueling overhauls versus their expected end-of-life for other reasons.

This is correct, only the later build 688's don't need refueling (so only kinda LOB) and it isn't the cost of refueling them so much as a number of factors around the cost and scheduling of yard time to refuel them, my bad...

SSN-688 Los Angeles-class

www.globalsecurity.org

The Attack Submarine (SSN) Engineered Overhaul (EO) program modernizes, and upgrades SSNs for extended service in the fleet. SSN-719 USS Providence entered Portsmouth Naval Shipyard on 29 October 2003 for the Navy's first-ever Engineered Overhaul for an attack submarine. For these later Los Angeles Class submarines, the reactor doesn't need to be refueled. For these vessels the overhaul is called an Engineered Overhaul, versus the Engineered Refueling Overhaul (ERO) of earlier boats. This included maintenance and several system upgrades with an estimated total cost of $160 million.

Between 1998 and 2001 the US retired 11 Los Angeles class submarines that had an average of 13 years left on their 30-year service lives. The 18 SSN-688 class submarines that will be refueled at their mid-life made good candidates for a service life extension because they could operate for nearly 30 years after the refueling. After these submarines serve for 30 years, they could undergo a 2-year overhaul and serve for one more 10-year operating cycle, for a total service life of 42 years. The cost for the additional overhaul of SSN-688 class submarines would be about $406 million per boat.

Eight older Los Angeles-class submarines, without a vertical launch system, could be refueled at a cost of $210 million more than it would cost to inactivate them.

 

[Volkodav]

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

The LOB reactors are Life of Boat, so they will be independant for the lifetime of the sub.

A sub, which doesn’t need refuelling for 40-odd years. Pretty damn good deal.

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

The LOB in the 688 was based on assumed a 24 year life of type with two extended maintenance periods. It was then deemed possible to extend them to 30 years, i.e. an additional maintenance cycle, or even 42 years with a refueling. This was always going to be case by case for each boat based on its overall condition, including that of the reactor.

Extending subs is tricky, quite often its the simple stuff that was never intended to be replaced in the life of the boat that becomes the problem because of the difficulty of removing and installing new equipment that require structural cuts for access.

 

[jeffb]

The point is though, Australia CAN'T build or refuel LOB reactors (unless they import the HEU ie with the close support of the US or UK), which is hardly independent.

The LOB reactors are Life of Boat, so they will be independant for the lifetime of the sub.

A sub, which doesn’t need refuelling for 40-odd years. Pretty damn good deal.

Depending on how hard a demand you put on it that is, a number of the 688s have been retired early because they've run down the reactor and, because they're LOB reactors, refuelling is prohibitively expensive.

The LOB in the 688 was based on assumed a 24 year life of type with two extended maintenance periods. It was then deemed possible to extend them to 30 years, i.e. an additional maintenance cycle, or even 42 years with a refueling. This was always going to be case by case for each boat based on its overall condition, including that of the reactor.

Extending subs is tricky, quite often its the simple stuff that was never intended to be replaced in the life of the boat that becomes the problem because of the difficulty of removing and installing new equipment that require structural cuts for access.

S6G

www.globalsecurity.org

As I understand it, all of the Flight I boats required at least one mid-life refueling.

Starting in the mid-1970s, the S6G with D1G-2 core was installed on all Los Angeles-class Flight I subs. The D1G-2 cores in the 17 688 Flight I boats were replaced with D2W cores during their mid-life refueling. The mid-life refuelings for the remaining 14 Flight I boats were cancelled and the boats were decommissioned early.

But then...

Starting with SSN 719 (First Flight II) and beyond the last 31 hulls of the class had 12 vertical launch tubes for the Tomahawk cruise missile, along with an upgraded reactor core which did not require refueling.

However...

Starting in the mid-1980s, all Los Angeles-class Flight II and Improved (688i) submarines, starting with USS Providence (SSN-719), were built with a newer D2W core rated at 165 MW. The 1 x S6G reactor plant with a D2W reactor core rated @ 165 MWt; 2 x main steam turbines delivering a combined 33,500 shp (est) to a single propeller. All Flight II and 688i boats require a mid-life refueling. The reactor compartment measured 33 ft in diameter, 42 ft long, and weighted 1,680 tons.

But then again...

At about 2/3 the way through its life, the submarine undergoes a large and comprehensive overhaul that includes periodic maintenance, system upgrades, and alteration. For the earliest built Los Angeles Class submarines, the work also includes refueling the ship's reactor plant. These availabilities are called Engineered Refueling Overhauls (EROs). For the later Los Angeles Class submarines, the reactor doesn't need to be refueled. For these vessels the overhaul is called an Engineered Overhaul.

Anyway...

Initially, the Navy planned to operate the SSN-688s for three 84-month cycles, perform major maintenance twice, and retire the submarines after 24 years. SSN-688 class submarines could operate for much longer than 30 years; one of the shipbuilders stated that 10 to 20 years of additional service would not be unreasonable. Past Navy actions indicated that extending a submarine's service life may be feasible. After a 5-year study was completed on the SSN-637 class submarine--the predecessor of the SSN-688 class--the design life was extended from 20 years to 30 years, with a possible extension to 33 years on a case-by-case basis. By the end of 1999 the Navy had determined that it could safely extend the service lives of all its Los Angeles and Improved Los Angeles class submarines by 3 years, to 33 years.

Needless to say, sources vary (sometimes even the same source).

 

[Grey Havoc]

Australia has entered ‘nuclear confrontation’ with China, says Emmanuel Macron

Aukus security pact with Britain and the US providing Anthony Albanese's country with nuclear-powered vessels, instead of French submarines

www.telegraph.co.uk