Replacement of Australia's Collins Class Submarines

GTX said:
www.abc.net.au

Leaked document sheds light on cancellation of French subs contract

A leaked confidential document gives an insider's perspective on how the Morrison government went about cancelling the French submarine contract, highlighting how officials running the contract were kept in the dark.
www.abc.net.au www.abc.net.au
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Here’s the full note written by Kim Gillis… I haven’t had time to read the whole thing but certainly he seems like one of the best positioned experts to talk about the history of the Attack program.


I was a member of the Naval Group Australia Board since January 2021 and resigned as an Independent Director of Naval Group Australia on the 30th of June this year. I write this to you in my personal capacity to the last few remaining NGA staff members and to those who have left the business.

For some context, I retired four years ago as the Deputy Secretary CASG. I am in the unique position of having been involved in the Competitive Evaluation Process (CEP), the decision to select Naval Group, the negotiations of the contract and SPA and as an Independent Director for Naval Group Australia. After I retired from Defence, I was asked by
MINDEF to return to assist in finalising the negotiations between Naval Group France and Defence so that the Strategic Partnering Agreement (SPA) could be signed.

I was asked by Pierre Éric Pommellet to join the Naval Group Board in late December 2020 as an independent Director. I accepted that offer with some trepidation because like many of you, much of what I had heard or read about the program in the media was negative. I was however so impressed with Pierre Éric and the calibre of my fellow directors that I decided to accept the role. And like many of you I was excited about the challenge of being involved Australia’s most complex and challenging program.

The purpose of this note is twofold firstly to express my pride in NGA’s contribution to the submarine program and to recognise the sacrifices that each one you and your families have made. Secondly, I would like to provide you with a personal perspective into the schedule and cost blowout commentary that contributed to the decision made by the Government in 2020. These are my own views and may not reflect the views of the any of the ex Naval Group Australia Board or even the Board of Naval Group France.

(Continues in linked document)
 

Attachments

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Standouts for me:
It would also be prudent for the Commonwealth to include the Suffren Class submarine option in any evaluation of a future nuclear submarine capability. This is for the following reasons. It is the most modern Nuclear submarine in the world. It is at a size, crewing and capability that best fits the Australian requirements. It is the most cost effective nuclear submarine solution both for construction and sustainment and critically it utilises Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) as a source for power generation making it fully compliant with both the rules and intent of the IAEA and Australia’s commitments to support Nuclear non-proliferation. And finally and critically to the defence of Australia it is the only option that offers full sovereignty over the deployment of the asset. Neither of the US or UK options will provide a sovereign capability and we would be reliant on operational preapprovals from the US to operate and deploy our most important Defence assets.
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Recommended reading (by Kim Gillis):
For anyone who would like more information on LEU vs HEU the best article that I have found is by George Moore titled “Life of Ship Reactors and accelerated Testing” Federation of American Scientist, March 2017.
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fas.org

Life-of-the-Ship Reactors and Accelerated Testing of Naval Propulsion Fuels and Reactors - Federation of American Scientists

This special report is a result of the FAS U.S.-French Naval Nuclear Task Force and is focused on the life-of-the-ship reactors and role of accelerated testing on naval propulsion fuels and reactors. The report is written by Dr. George Moore.
fas.org fas.org
 
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There is some confusion in the use of the word "independent" to describe both UK nuclear weapons and submarines.
Anyone who has read Peter Hennessy's excellent book "Silent Deep" about the RN postwar submarine fleet knows how interdependent our submarines are with the USN.
However, political control over the deterrent whether on RAF V bombers or RN subs has rested solely with Downing Street. That is why successive governments continue to use the word "independent".
In pracice even at their lowest ebb (Wilson /Johnson Heath/Nixon Major/Clinton May/Trump Johnson/Biden) relations between the RN and USN have remained "in the family'.
The most likely phrase included in all PM's letters of "last resort" to submarine commanders is "Put yourself under US command if it survives".
I see no difficulty in including the RAN in the family. I think they already are in many ways.
 
Following on from my comments above. There are no good public sources on the relationship between the UK, France and US on nuclear matters.
The Suffren, assuming France has the capacity to build four extra boats for the RAN, may well solve the problem of acquiring a fleet of subs in time to replace the Collins class.
Neither the RN or it now seems the USN are in the position to offer submarines in a faster time.
France has form on subordinating the needs of the MN to secure export orders for vessels. It may well offer the RAN vessels originally on order for the MN by slowing delivery to the MN.
I suspect relations between all four navies are closer than it suits politicians in some countries to admit.
 
I think the fact that the US and UK share the same pool of nuclear delivery vehicles is all you need to know about that relationship. For one country, it is the primary deterrent delivery system; for the other country, it is the ONLY nuclear delivery system. Tridents for RN or USN come from the same pool of missiles and it is likely there are a number of examples that have spent time in both fleets.
 
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zen said:
Volkodav said:
Don't get me wrong the Astutes are great boats, but they were built with substantial US help.
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Don't make the lazy assumption that it was beyond UK capability. It was a timing and cost issue only.
It's likely this is what holds back the Astute Option.
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Sadly, the cancelation of the W class, the resulting blackhole in design and production engineering, as well as the drawn out process in designing and procuring the Astute led to a hollowing out of the UKs design and production capability, including a loss of institutional knowledge. I know this because many of those who should have been working on Astute were working elsewhere, including on projects I worked on.

It literally was beyond UK capability because the UK government(s) had let the capability whither and many of the people who made up the institutional knowledge required had moved on. It took years and outside help to rebuild what was lost. Working with some of the people I'm referring to was a case of "Wow it is fantastic we were able to recruit them", while in the UK it was a case or "I wish they were still here".
 
jeffb said:
Pioneer said:
And so the all singing, all dancing shit show that is Australia's Collins replacement continues....


Pioneer

www.navyrecognition.com

France offers four submarines to Australia despite the stab in the back of AUKUS

French President Emmanuel Macron offered his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison four submarines.
www.navyrecognition.com www.navyrecognition.com
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Just highlights how hairbrained the AUKUS nuclear subs deal is. The more you look at it the less sense it makes.
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If you read the wording of the defence papers discussing the submarine replacement, they do not actually say twelve Attack Class, they refer to an initial batch, or batches, to be followed by a review in the later 2020s as to whether to keep building them or to build something else instead.

Call me cynical, but I suspect part of the cancellation was to push out major acquisition costs for a future government to sort out the resulting compromise in capability. The best interim option to bridge to an SSN option (following the governments killing of every other option in 2014/5) was a batch or two of Attacks. The smartest, most efficient, cost-effective way forward was to continue the Attack program while developing an SSN program. But it wasn't about efficiency, common-sense, capability or even industry support, it was about saving money in the short term so that money could be spent on more electorally beneficial things, at the same time as looking strong on defence.
 
The smartest, most efficient, cost-effective way forward was to continue the Attack program while developing an SSN program.
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Part of your post was missing, I fixed that :D

The smartest, most efficient, cost-effective way forward was to continue the Attack program while developing an SSN program out of the Barracuda class, since the two are (were !) closely related.

(just kidding !)
 
Volkodav said:

Call me cynical, but I suspect part of the cancellation was to push out major acquisition costs for a future government to sort out the resulting compromise in capability ... it was about saving money in the short term so that money could be spent on more electorally beneficial things, at the same time as looking strong on defence.
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I suspect you are correct - add to the ever growing list of poorly managed Defence programs/decisions by the previous Government. The damage they have done to Australia's Defence capability is atrocious - one has to remember that fancy announcements and headlines about acquisitions does not make a Defence Capability!:mad:
 
GTX said:
Pioneer said:
www.navyrecognition.com

France offers four submarines to Australia despite the stab in the back of AUKUS

French President Emmanuel Macron offered his Australian counterpart Scott Morrison four submarines.
www.navyrecognition.com www.navyrecognition.com
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Of course, I would expect that Naval Group/France would also return the €555 million settlement if such an acquisition were to be taken up...;)
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Think of it as a deposit, the sort that is demanded of unreliable, sketchy customers.
 
GTX said:
Tangentially linked:

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power? | The Strategist

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s lethality in the context of China’s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au
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Not a fan.

The whole idea falls over when you realise the reason SSNs are seen as necessary is Chinas area denial capabilities make it too dangerous for forward basing of conventional boats to work. Now if you installed AEGIS with CEC and an ABM capability to the tender.......;)
 
Keeping to the technical side. I leave the politics to Australians for obvious reasons.
It is significant that Canada, Italy and the Netherlands (Brasil is a separate case) all looked closely at building or buying SSNs and then opted for SSK instead.
China is still finding it hard to build a decent modern nuclear submarine without Russian help. India has had Russian help and still finds it hard.
The UK and France have been building nuclear submarines since the 1960s but have hollowed out their surface fleets in order to do so.
Australia arguably now faces a new threat from China for which one solution is a force of SSN presumably with cruise missile capability.
It has not been mentioned but I assume Tomahawk or its successor will equip the RAN boats as it already does the US and RN.
The Suffrens do not carry Tomahawk.
An SSN without it is reasonable for France which has both an SSN force and cruise missile equipped aircraft on a carrier and in its air force.
Australia is a pretty big place so a long range missile force could be based on land and move around on TELs (Australia is famous for its "roadtrains").
SSK can carry Tomahawk or a system that has a bigger warhead and faster missile. Perhaps Australia needs a missile rather than an SSN?
 
Volkodav said:
If you read the wording of the defence papers discussing the submarine replacement, they do not actually say twelve Attack Class, they refer to an initial batch, or batches, to be followed by a review in the later 2020s as to whether to keep building them or to build something else instead.
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More evidence, if you needed it, that the decision to go with the French design was a well thought out acquisition plan put together by professionals.

uk 75 said:
The Suffrens do not carry Tomahawk.
An SSN without it is reasonable for France which has both an SSN force and cruise missile equipped aircraft on a carrier and in its air force.
Australia is a pretty big place so a long range missile force could be based on land and move around on TELs (Australia is famous for its "roadtrains").
SSK can carry Tomahawk or a system that has a bigger warhead and faster missile. Perhaps Australia needs a missile rather than an SSN?
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The Suffrens carry the MdCN ground attack cruise missile in its submarine borne version, launched via torpedo tube.

The Attacks were to have US weapons and combat systems. The Tomahawk Block IV can be launched via torpedo tube which it is on the Astutes.
 
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Volkodav said:
GTX said:
Tangentially linked:

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power? | The Strategist

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s lethality in the context of China’s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au
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Not a fan.

The whole idea falls over when you realise the reason SSNs are seen as necessary is Chinas area denial capabilities make it too dangerous for forward basing of conventional boats to work. Now if you installed AEGIS with CEC and an ABM capability to the tender.......;)
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It would still be huge force multiplier in peacetime, and presumably the USN could help protect it in times of tension or war. I think it is a great idea; it wouldn't take any high tech items or research and could be produced domestically with little effort. Now that I think about it, it is really rather strange that RAN doesn't have a vessel of this type.
 
More evidence, if you needed it, that the decision to go with the French design was a well thought out acquisition plan put together by professionals.
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This whole case and that very interesting thread right here, makes me realize that (AFAIK) France is one of the few countries in the world with one foot planted in SSK, and the other in SSN. Put otherwise: the one and only to propose an AIP submarine (SSK Attack) derived from a nuclear SSN (Barracuda).
In passing - just dawned on me - why not an AIP Astute or an AIP Virginia for Australia ? as an early, easier step toward full-blown, nuclear Astute or Virginia ?
Don't tell me America is unable to master AIP technology. Or Great Britain. Take a licence from the big AIP submarine players - Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea,, Japan... learn, build, sell to Australia.
 
I think both the US and the UK (after getting no orders for new build Upholders) have opted solely for SSNs.
If a requirement emerged for a USN or RN SSK I suspect we would turn to one of the countries with a good bid for the boats.
Australia traditionally was more concerned with threats from its neighbours, notably Indonesia, rather than the Soviet Bloc for which the US was around.
As I wrote above only Australians can determine what capability they need, as it is as much a political as a military issue.
France has had good reasons for maintaining a mix of SSN and SSK. It has the Mediterranean to consider where SSK offer advantages as well as it's out of area commitments where an SSK is less sensitive.
France also always has a sharp eye for exports, especially to countries who want to steer clear of the US or Russia. It has a distinguished record of submarine sales.
 
Archibald said:
More evidence, if you needed it, that the decision to go with the French design was a well thought out acquisition plan put together by professionals.
Click to expand...

This whole case and that very interesting thread right here, makes me realize that (AFAIK) France is one of the few countries in the world with one foot planted in SSK, and the other in SSN. Put otherwise: the one and only to propose an AIP submarine (SSK Attack) derived from a nuclear SSN (Barracuda).
In passing - just dawned on me - why not an AIP Astute or an AIP Virginia for Australia ? as an early, easier step toward full-blown, nuclear Astute or Virginia ?
Don't tell me America is unable to master AIP technology. Or Great Britain. Take a licence from the big AIP submarine players - Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, South Korea,, Japan... learn, build, sell to Australia.
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Neither the US or UK have any interest in an SSK. The UK gave their SSKs up as soon as the cold war ended. The US hasn't operated one for almost half a century. If the RAN wants that, they need to look elsewhere, be it France or another supplier. The US/UK are only in the business of nuke boats.
 
Archibald said:
In passing - just dawned on me - why not an AIP Astute or an AIP Virginia for Australia ?
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I'd be surprised if it is possible to redesign a Virginia or Astute into a viable AIP sub. Nuke power is just so dense (power wise and physically) compared to AIP, and both of these subs are 75-100% larger than the largest AIP subs out there.

You'd have to find a way to incorporate large LOX tanks and much larger diesel tanks (and batteries) compared to the nuke boat, and still would likely lose the high speed sprint performance. (Assuming Stirling AIP. Fuel cell AIP needs hydrogen stowage as well.)
 
Josh_TN said:
Volkodav said:
GTX said:
Tangentially linked:

www.aspistrategist.org.au

Could a submarine tender enhance the ADF’s offensive power? | The Strategist

A significant proportion of defence commentary these days is focused on quickly and cost-effectively enhancing the Australian Defence Force’s lethality in the context of China’s growing power and assertiveness. Much of this discussion is concerned ...
www.aspistrategist.org.au www.aspistrategist.org.au
Click to expand...
Not a fan.

The whole idea falls over when you realise the reason SSNs are seen as necessary is Chinas area denial capabilities make it too dangerous for forward basing of conventional boats to work. Now if you installed AEGIS with CEC and an ABM capability to the tender.......;)
Click to expand...

It would still be huge force multiplier in peacetime, and presumably the USN could help protect it in times of tension or war. I think it is a great idea; it wouldn't take any high tech items or research and could be produced domestically with little effort. Now that I think about it, it is really rather strange that RAN doesn't have a vessel of this type.
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In peace time the submarine would call into friendly ports and do some flag showing. I can see a point for a destroyer tender or mothership for USVs, but not for a submarine tender.
 
TomS said:
Archibald said:
In passing - just dawned on me - why not an AIP Astute or an AIP Virginia for Australia ?
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I'd be surprised if it is possible to redesign a Virginia or Astute into a viable AIP sub. Nuke power is just so dense (power wise and physically) compared to AIP, and both of these subs are 75-100% larger than the largest AIP subs out there.

You'd have to find a way to incorporate large LOX tanks and much larger diesel tanks (and batteries) compared to the nuke boat, and still would likely lose the high speed sprint performance. (Assuming Stirling AIP. Fuel cell AIP needs hydrogen stowage as well.)
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Agreed.

It was determined years ago that if there was no suitable MOTS option that the best solution would be a clean sheet design based on experience building and operating the Collins class, failing that an evolution of the Collins. The worst option in terms of both technical risk, and program risk would be extensively modifying or worse scaling up an existing design.

An AIP version of an SSN would be repeating the Attack Class project but with a partner with no recent SSK experience, increasing risk even more.
 
The US and UK boats are designed around a basically unlimited amount of power; it would be incredibly difficult to adopt an order of magnitude lower power diesel/AIP set up. In any case, RAN didn't order AIP for Collins or Attack. I believe the decision was based on the fact that for the long transit times expected of RAN boats, AIP isn't useful. Recharge rates were deemed more important.
 
Josh_TN said:
The US and UK boats are designed around a basically unlimited amount of power; it would be incredibly difficult to adopt an order of magnitude lower power diesel/AIP set up. In any case, RAN didn't order AIP for Collins or Attack. I believe the decision was based on the fact that for the long transit times expected of RAN boats, AIP isn't useful. Recharge rates were deemed more important.
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SSKs are all about power budgets and heat budgets, which and how many systems can you operate concurrently with the power and cooling available. A presentation I attended years ago on the Virginias the presenter responded to questions of heat budgets by saying that they basically refrigerated the entire boat, similar to how server room are kept uncomfortably cold, then used heaters in each compartment to make them habitable as required. That alone shows just how different they are.

Think AMG Mercedes with a turbo V8 verses a Lotus Elise with a normally aspirated four cylinder, both are great cars, both are quick, each has its strengths, but the way you use them to get the very best out of them is completely different.
 
jeffb said:
NeilChapman said:
www.wsj.com

WSJ News Exclusive | U.S. in Talks to Build First Nuclear Subs for Australia

Effort would aim to get Australia a nuclear-powered fleet by the mid-2030s until Australia can build its own, in a bid to respond to China’s growing military.
www.wsj.com www.wsj.com
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Paywalled. :(


The idea is to provide Australia with an "initial nuclear powered fleet" by the mid 2030s...
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Can anyone provide an "executive summary"?
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From a Bloomberg summary of the article:
Under the plan, the US would provide Australia with the “first few” nuclear subs by mid-2030s to tide Australia over as it continues to develop its own production capabilities, the newspaper said, citing Western officials. The proposal -- not yet approved -- is one of several being considered as a means of more quickly securing a nuclear-powered fleet for Australia, according to the report.
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Josh_TN said:
Could the US actually meet that commitment? Aren’t US yards pretty full up?
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The definition of "full" is a little debatable. The industry is currently sizing it's workforce and supply chain to support 2 SSNs and 1 SSBN a year from the mid-20s to mid-30s. The US could cut boats out of that plan for Australia without affecting that infrastructure much, though the US Navy would be... displeased to lose a few boats.

The other option is to ramp the industry up to 3 SSNs plus 1 SSBN a year. This is not quite as crazy as it sounds. For one, there's some support in Congress and in Defense circles to make such a ramp up anyway in order to soften the blow to the fleet as the remaining 688s begin retiring. For two, the math is not as simple as 2+1 vs 3+1. Block V boats with VPM installed require substantially more labor hours and materials than boats without, so if the yards were to switch from 2 VPM boats to 3 non-VPM boats a year they wouldn't be ramping up quite as dramatically as it appears. Lastly, the next generation of SSN is likely to be a very large boat, possibly based on the SSBN tooling, so maintaining a build rate of at least 2 of those a year will already require more workers and resources than 2 VA-class per year.
 

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