RAF Fighter Command after 1957

[Hood]

There

Did the reorganisations reduce the number of companies or just redcue the number of names?

There were some losers, Hunting Percival at Luton being disbanded and absorbed into Warton, arguably BAC eventually made better progress at rationalising its design teams, HSA seems to have stuck to its original Hawker Siddeley design locations and BAe just added more (Prestwick ex-Scottish Aviation).

MoS efforts in the early 1950s seem to have been more geared to stifling new entrants, especially in the lower levels (trainers, general aviation etc.) but its also remarkable how the older firms ditched the low-end sector. So much so Masefield brought Beagle into being - only to promptly attempt another shotgun marriage of Miles and Auster, which ended badly.

But for a series of bad luck events.......
DH could have stormed through the lot.

They had a lot of bad luck, all three DH.108s killed their pilots, DH.110 Farnborough and Comet. But that's a lot of bad luck and lot of structural issues too, coincidence or a deeper undiagnosed problem?

DH had huge success with Vampire but it stifled further developments, Venom came along as a big-wing Vampire when other air forces were looking at next-gen swept wing jets like F-86 - though it too sold well. Sea Vixen was simply a beefed up Vampire in design. The DH.116 Super Venom was swept-wing and very 1950s but still a Venom front end grafted onto new wings and a rear end.

Also the Vampire and Venom retained the wooden experience that had served DH so well. They had never really done anything in full-metal other than Flamingo before the Comet. Did they place too much faith in Redux bonding methods? They did bounce back pretty quickly on Comet though and did perhaps as well as they could have.

I will agree the GOR.339 submission was good (after they ditched notions of Sea Vixen lash-ups), though perhaps lacking on systems details. The DH.117 F.155 submission was perhaps too pedestrian and safe, maybe they took simple robust structures too far? Maybe the lack of previous high-speed swept wing experience after the early start by DH.108 hampered them and had done no other fighter design work at all. DH.127 was a bit later, the final throw of the dice for what by then was mainly a civil-oriented firm and not a bad design, just a pity OR.346 was a vapourware spec. I don't lay much blame at DH's door for Trident though, perhaps a little more backbone to tell BEA to stop fretting over graphs would have helped (and maybe not letting Boeing look over the plans!).
So I'd say by 1958-59 DH were back on track but the 1950s was something of a dip I think in terms of what they could have achieved and they seem to have concentrated on civil work post-1955 barring three military projects.

 

[zen]

They had a lot of bad luck, all three DH.108s killed their pilots, DH.110 Farnborough and Comet. But that's a lot of bad luck and lot of structural issues too, coincidence or a deeper undiagnosed problem?

Indeed and yes it's a key question how much is bad luck and how much is institutional flaws?
We know DH was under severe pressure to deliver Comet ASAP, and the extent delays with DH110 must have resulted in more pressure to deliver in the hope of drawing the RAF back onboard.
We know there must have been severe disappointment over DH116 not being deliverable, only making the need to deliver DH110 all the more pressing.

Yet my impression on the missile effort is one of very thorough and careful design and engineering.
Could it be they were doing too much?

 

[JFC Fuller]

I will agree the GOR.339 submission was good (after they ditched notions of Sea Vixen lash-ups), though perhaps lacking on systems details. The DH.117 F.155 submission was perhaps too pedestrian and safe, maybe they took simple robust structures too far?

The De Havilland GOR.339 submission looks, to me, suspiciously like it started life as the DH.117. The engines are moved under the wing to provide space for a bomb bay and the wing is moved to the shoulder position to facilitate variable incidence and keep the landing gear arrangement simple but otherwise the fuselage, especially the cockpit, nose and tail sections, look identical.

@red admiral's post didn't get much comment but I absolutely agree that on paper the DH.117 has all the desirable features of the F-4 Phantom, a large nose radome for a big AI radar, large internal fuel capacity, tandem seating and c.50k lbs take off weight. As presented the design shows stations at the wing tips and under the inner wings but there appears to be space for another under each outer wing and probably space under the fuselage, between the engine bays, for a large external tank, reconnaissance pod or bombs. Swapping the Gyron Juniors for Speys, as in the Buccaneer Mk.II, would allow for a significant performance improvement.

 

[zen]

What I see in the DH.117 is a series of elements that can be trialled separately.
Wing can be flown on a Sea Hawk.
Engine arrangement under a V-Bomber or maybe a Canberra.
Main gear wheels are small and easily trialled.
Main gear leg easy to prove.
Nose is again fit-able to a Canberra.

Wing pylons for the missiles speak of keeping the weight near the fusilage and curiously inside any potential future wingfold. That's why there are only drop tanks on the wingtips.

I agree had it gone ahead, this would benefit immensely from RB.106 or later Spey. In either case the rocket virtually becomes superfluous beyond the specialist needs of F.155.

The amount of volume in the nose and cockpit speaks of a recognition of how much is needed.
Only Avro's twin delta canard shows the scale of the size of the avionics. Which is more than the crew!

But then DH had an appreciation of all this. DH.110 must have exerted a severe lesson in systems integration, avionic, structure etc.....

 

[Archibald]

You guys made me like the DH.117. Nice bird indeed.

 

[Hood]

We know DH was under severe pressure to deliver Comet ASAP, and the extent delays with DH110 must have resulted in more pressure to deliver in the hope of drawing the RAF back onboard.
We know there must have been severe disappointment over DH116 not being deliverable, only making the need to deliver DH110 all the more pressing.

Yes Comet and Sea Vixen must have put enormous pressures on the company that no other UK (or even global manufacturer) faced at that time. Must of had an impact.

Missiles were under DH Propellers, so a slightly different environment and managerial hierarchy. Probably an advantage.

It's a shame they never made more use of Airspeed and de Havilland Canada as proper two-way collaborations.
But to pick up further on my previous post, a focus on commercial was probably common sense given the demands and hopes of Comet (which makes killing Ambassador more of a crime imagine a Dove - Heron - Ambassador - Comet product range) and probably welcome to the MoS who had more than enough competitors on its hands already in the military sphere.
On some level the big rewards of F.155, GOR.339 and OR.346 must have attracted the management to deviate into military aircraft projects again (GOR.339 of course offering a military side to firm up the AIRCO plans to produce DH.121).

The De Havilland GOR.339 submission looks, to me, suspiciously like it started life as the DH.117.

You could well be right in some respects, would have made sense to build on an existing design since the drawing boards at Hatfield were not overwhelmed with previous bomber studies to draw upon.

 

[zen]

Ok can someone just put me out of my misery and tell me what was DH's last minute submission design to F.155?
Was it possibly more like the the GOR.339 submission?
Certainly the climb characteristics of that later design is very high and suitable for interceptor type missions.
A feature of using big Medway or Olympus engines.....

 

[uk 75]

I think the main problem is that the UK tries to do too much with its limited resources.
The US is fortunate to have Boeing who evolve a bomber solution from B17 through B29/50 to B47 (incorporating German swept wing) to B52.
The UK is much more adventurous and leaps from the Lincoln to the Canberra and then to Vulcans and Victors with Valiants and Sperrins too.
The US again evolves a family this time Convair Delta wings which give it the F102 and F106. The latter served nearly as long as the Lightning and is arguably the plane the UK and Canada should have bought too
McDonnell Douglas have the F101 then the F4.
The US are fortunate to have much larger resources and orders.
The UK perhaps settles too easily for the Hunter. It dominates the RAF fighter line up and seems for a while to be excellent.
Then we have the trio of Scimitar, Vixen and Javelin which were obsolete compared with US designs by the time they enter service.
In desperation the Lightning is developed.
Just as we bought Canadair Sabres to replace the awful Swift I think we should have scrapped the Vixen, Scimitar and Javelin in favour of the F8 Crusader and Avro Arrow. We could then have cleared the decks to build a Fighter/Bomber for the 60s.

 

[Nick Sumner]

I think the main problem is that the UK tries to do too much with its limited resources.

Most certainly. The financial burdens of drawing down the Empire, opposing Soviet expansion, building the Welfare State, reconstructing the housing stock (as well as other infrastructure like roads and telecommunications) allied to the unfavorable terms (for UK Inc) of the American designed post-war financial settlement meant a squeeze on government funded R&D and industrial investment. (Oh, and no-one else was going to fund R&D and industrial investment for engineering - certainly not the banks.) Thus, 9 years of post-war rationing, National Service till 1963 etc. Corelli Barnet's Lost Victory and Verdict of Peace give the polemic view of the calamities, a more technical take is that in British Imperialism 1688-2015 by Cain and Hopkins. (Possibly among the most misleading book titles ever - its not about imperialism, its about economics.)

 

[alertken]

zen #42: Could it be they were doing too much?

There's an Economic History dissertation, nay thesis, in Compare & contrast the fortunes of DH and Boeing from 1955.

DH had prominence in the Exhibition Hall, Farnborough, 9/55, deservedly: world-wide Subsidiaries, one-stop-shop airframe/engine/Props &tc, and:
- RN order, 2/55: 78 (to be) Vixen FAW.1,
- BOAC order 17/3/55: 19 Comet 4, so moving on from catastrophe, and about to receive £10Mn. MoS Study funds for:
- Comet 5 (late-'55), then D.H.118 (mid-'56) for BOAC ( K.Hayward,Govt.& Br.Civil Aerospace,MUP,83,P20),
- (Saro R&D funded 9/55 for SR.177/DH Gyron Jr.+Spectre): DH Enterprise would buy 33.3% of Saro 9/56 and was to have assembled it at Christchurch.
But more, much more than this, in 1955 DH turned away from doing it My Way, Sir Geoffrey's Way. He had stepped down from centrality.

AM Sir Ralph Sorley was DH Props MD, 1948 - HSAL takeover, 12/59. He, he alone, took DH into GW and so destroyed them.

New in the job, he chose not to attempt to persuade Sir G.DH to accept MoS 1948 invitation to take on a Land SAM (it became Bristol Bloodhound), but his opportunity was Rocket Man Sandys as Minister of Supply, 31/10/51 - 18/10/54. They had worked together 1944/45 on response to German GW. He secured IR AAM R&D funds 4/52 (to be Firestreak) (then from MoD Sandys, 7/57, to be Red Top). But the greatest of these was his alacrity rescuing Sandys from the indignity of rejection by EE's H.G.Nelson, Study Contractor 1954/55 for use of US ICBM data Sandys had secured 30/7/54. MoS had given a nice new factory to Nelson to build Thunderbird, gratiously accepted, while declining any involvement in UK/MRBM. Funds to DH as Co-ordinator, 4/55.

In mid-56 BOAC said, no thanks to D.H.118, having used it to extract concessions from Boeing, RR (Conway) and odd radiofolk. They successfully batted away their public duty to support the Home Team by pointing out that their Transatlantic routes carried few £-pax (we were rationed for personal $), and that more $-pax could be carried cheaper, 707 v.D.H.118. That upset Sandys. Then DH messed up the MRBM schedule/cost spectacularly, despite him scooping Convair, Rocketdyne, Sperry, Kearfott et al data. DH's “managerial resources not equal to the load” MoD 23/4/58 R.Moore,Nuc.Illusion/Reality, P'grave ,10, P247. Told it was beyond DH’s span, he “asked whether (DH) could be replaced”, 25/9/58 positing UK warhead on owned Thor, or a (non-DH) solid-fuel MRBM. M.Jones, UK Strategic Nuc.Deterrent/1,Routledge,17,P125/130/132. Doomed.

Boeing won Minuteman, 9/10/58; 1A was opnl. 27/10/62. Atlas contract was 14/1/55, -D opnl. 31/10/59. Thor contract was 27/12/55: no.60 would arrive in UK 11/3/60. By then the DH Enterprise was defunct.

 

[zen]

Ken.
So if I read your view correctly, DH staying out of guided weapons, particularly the MRBM effort could have saved them?

 

[BLACK_MAMBA]

I think we should have scrapped the Vixen, Scimitar and Javelin in favour of the F8 Crusader and Avro Arrow. We could then have cleared the decks to build a Fighter/Bomber for the 60s.

Would buying US not totally decimate local design and manufacturing capability? In a poor post war economy it would be even easier to just kill of most aviation firms and buy US. Then there will be nothing left to design for the 60's.

I'd rather argue for more consolidation. The UK persued too many avenues and entered multiple types into service. Somewhere, somehow we need to get a rational person in the mix that orchastrates a common goal rather than multiple projects drawing precious resources with plenty overlap in abilities.

 

[alertken]

zen Yes. Explicitly... to cover the Minister of Defence in ordure was not helpful when he was arranging a certain measure of coalescence.

 

[zen]

I think we should have scrapped the Vixen, Scimitar and Javelin in favour of the F8 Crusader and Avro Arrow. We could then have cleared the decks to build a Fighter/Bomber for the 60s.

Would buying US not totally decimate local design and manufacturing capability? In a poor post war economy it would be even easier to just kill of most aviation firms and buy US. Then there will be nothing left to design for the 60's.

I'd rather argue for more consolidation. The UK persued too many avenues and entered multiple types into service. Somewhere, somehow we need to get a rational person in the mix that orchastrates a common goal rather than multiple projects drawing precious resources with plenty overlap in abilities.

It's worse since buying in Dollars is sucking that limited resource away from 1.paying off debts, 2.crucial other stuff.

Plus getting a industry going means time, effort and money. All of which has to be spent to achieve it. Delaying that doesn't make it free.

Plus at the time, reliance on the US was not a given....frankly it never was nor will be.

 

[zen]

zen Yes. Explicitly... to cover the Minister of Defence in ordure was not helpful when he was arranging a certain measure of coalescence.

However....
If DH had told D.Sandys to sling his hook....and maybe told BOAC no.
As EE had done.
And clearly HP did
And I suspect Camm did as well....
And Petters clearly wasn't interested.
It might be enough to tip the scales with Vickers.

If you have leading industry players across the board walking away from a ministers wacky ideas. Maybe it's time to find another minister.....

 

[red admiral]

Its difficult to see how to rationalise:

Industry can buy out competitors and close down their design teams, or somehow convince everyone else to leave the market? Seems unlikely. How does any company afford to do this in the short term.

The Ministries can't tell Industry what to do but can encourage which is what happened.

Maybe fewer competitions but have them winner takes all? But how do you know that you're backing the right horse when every industry team develops awful aeroplanes every so often?

 

[zen]

You cannot avoid getting things wrong all the time. Often it's how we learn.
But.....Superpriority set the scene for compound errors.
RAF should never have been allowed to veer off and hand the FAW job to Glosters. Divergence of resources, loss of main customer with only limited numbers ever likely for the RN made DH.110 less of a priority.

Supermarine should have never put Swift into production. Just a series of research machines to learn.

 

[alertken]

Super Priority: (to remind the young) Korean War, seen as rehearsal for WW3 (like Spain, 1936, trials for the Big One). New China seen as mere mercenary for Stalin, human waves. We need quantity NOW! not maybe-Quality later. US was willing to spread $ to anyone who would share the dying. We revived the WW2 system of materials Priorities - so, for bauxite everyone jostled for the output of ALCOA+ALCAN, so there was a Committee process - say North American Avn has first dibs for material for Sabres, a Standard Type; then, say, UK can put its nose in the trough for Swift, a Standard Type (yes, really!)

UK 1952 had 6 Types* attracting Super-Priority: so, the domestic electricals industry - say Cossor, was expected to slow radiogram output to deliver avionics.
Like most systems of rationing it was manipulated, until we had >20 Super Priority types...inc. our hopes for exports - Britannia, Viscount, Comet.

zen's point is that the wrong Types monopolised favour.

(* added 4/8/21) I have a note (now unsourced) that Super Priority was eventually extended to 43! products, not solely Aero).

 

[zen]

Wouldn't have been so bad had the Swift turned out better. But the design it should have been was the later evolution Type 545.

Though strictly the swept wing Sea Hawk evolution was the way forward.

But key has to be letting the RAF walze away from DH.110 for the lure of Glosters Javelin.

 

[Hood]

True, Superpriority became meaningless as the list grew and grew.

For me an AH Fighter Command begins circa October 1945 when the RAF ended its interest in the Hawker P.1040 citing its ample supply of Vampires and Meteors. This was short-sighted, the P.1040 had the Nene, a more powerful engine which the Vampire could not easily take and the Meteor with its twin engines was expensive to operate and its brutal asymmetric thrust issues would go on to kill off 450 pilots....

The first prototype flew in September 1947, it took 11 months before the navalised prototype appeared and then another 14 months for the third prototype in October 1949, a month before the production order, not until November 1951 did the first production Sea Hawk fly. That's 7 years from the first 1944 proposal to production...
RAF support behind the programme might have given some impetus to get the programme moving.
In the meantime the swept-wing P.1052 had flown in November 1948 and with refinements became the P.1081 in June 1950... 15 months before the Sea Hawk entered service. But even then the RAAF and RAF went for Sabres instead knowing it would probably take another 2-3 years to get the P.1081 into production and by then the P.1067 prototypes had been ordered the prototype P.1067 flew in July 1951 - still 4 months before Hawker got the Sea Hawk into service.

Zen hits the nail on the head with Supermarine - another baby steps programme.
Type 392 flies in July 1946, the first navalised Type 398 follows in June 1947, not ordered until November 1949 and the Type 398 takes to the air in May 1950 and enters FAA service in August 1951. An equally laggard progress comparable with Hawker.
The swept-wing Type 510 flies in December 1948 but is still a tailwheel aircraft and is rebuilt as the Type 517 with a hinged rear fuselage in trimming, the second Type 510 prototype is completed as the Type 528 and flies in March 1950 which is then promptly laid up and rebuilt with a tricycle undercarriage as the Type 535 and re-flies in August. Why the 528 hadn't been built with a tricycle layout and saved wasted time and effort is anyone's guess.
But by then Supermarine has decided on an axial-flow engine and the Type 541 flies in August 1951.

I shall spare you the saga of prototypes that led to the Scimitar.

What does this tell us? Hawker and Supermarine were roughly neck and neck, an early lead by Hawker on the P.1040 and P.1052 did not translate into quicker action. The interim swept-wing types had no impetus other than for research and so the were never properly developed into fighters and by the time they might have been ready (1951-53) the Ministries and Industry had quite rightly moved onto axial-jets and by the summer of 1951 the Hunter and Swift were born - albeit still three years away from production. 1944 to 1954, a decade of development for a transonic swept-wing fighter.
Let's take the P.1052 and Type 510 as centrifugal swept-wing types and calibrate against the competition: F-86 FF Oct 1947, IOC 1949; MiG-15 FF Dec 1947, IOC 1949; MD.452 Mystère I FF Feb 1951, IOC Oct 1954.
It's clear the new new superpowers had a decisive lead on rapid prototyping and development. MiG, Su and La being OKBs was heavily prolific in prototypes during the late 1940s-early 1950s on a scale not possible in most Western countries. North American got it right first time, even Republic had to play catch-up with the F-84. But France shows a similar trajectory. The preceeding Ouragan, very much what an RAF Hawk could have been, was flown in February 1949 and entered service in 1952, a development timescale very similar to Sea Hawk - but still P.1040 had flown in 1947 so there were two years of lag.

In conclusion, the British industry perhaps needed geeing up, of course both Sea Hawk and Attacker were naval projects, we can conjecture whether the Air Ministry might have speeded things up, or whether like Hunter and Swift it would still have been a slow process. Given France's development times perhaps we are too harsh, always imagining we had an industry like the USA - whereas as Ken rightly points out, we did not and probably never did at any point past 1930.

Even in an AH scenario its hard to imagine the P.1052 and Type 510 leading to anything useful in any Korean War MiG Alley contribution we might imagine. There simply wasn't time to spin up development fast enough. Sure the RAF could have had P.1040 Hawks in 1950-51 but still would have been envious of the USAF Sabre pilots.
In perfect scenario the RAF should have had P.1040 Hawks in 1949 and P.1081s with reheated Tays in 1951 and P.1067s in 1953 and P.1083 in 1955 and P.1A or a new supersonic hot rod in 1958. But alas this is fantasy as the RAF could never have afforded such rapid fleet changes and industry could never turn out a fighter every two years. Maybe had the engines been ready the axial-flow generation should have flown in 1949/50 and the interim swepts abandoned (Supermarine had no business toting around tailwheel jets in 1950 its frankly embarrassing).

 

[zen]

Strictly the move away from the centrifugal jets wasn't necessary for reheat and modest supersonic speeds.

Delaying reheated fighters was the result.

 

[zen]

Could government have changed direction slightly if aviation firms say no to MRBM in 54-55?
GW is costing a fortune and the science is on the cusp of solid propellant of high enough isp.
Nuclear technology is also on the cusp of lightweight smaller devices.
D.Sandys is humiliated by EE rejection and say DH does as well.
Hawkers backs DH and not interested.
Bristol too full of work.
HP says No.
Vickers similarly overloaded.
Westlands no...
AWA too loaded with Sea Slug.
Folland, Saro, Fairey too small....
Brough too absorbed in NA.39 Buccaneer.

Sandys either resigns or gets shuffled sideways to some other sector. Not compatible with industrial relations.

'57 still happens. But maybe backing of new solid rocket effort. By this time rumours of US solid success is feeding into the picture.

 

[uk 75]

I wonder if the problem is that the Bomber side of the RAF got the bigger share of the cake. The V Force was the UK's escape from maintaining large conventional forces.
The arrival of the Soviet nuclear force makes air defence pretty pointless. Some bombers especially once the H Bomb arrives will get through any air defence system.
The Bloodhound Force is only intended to protect the V Bomber stations from Il28 and Tu16 attacks.
Once the Soviets have SS4 and SS5s deployed in large numbers, the need for Polaris becomes unarguable. Keeping the V bombers on airborne alert was too costly. Getting them away fast was the best we could do.
Ironically Fighter Command is folded into Strike Command in 1968 just as a conventional war in Europe rather than immediate nuclear release seemed more likely.
By the 1970s the US F111s and RAF Jaguars, Buccaneers and Vulcans need defending from Tu22 and new Su19/24 and Backfire raids. But by then the RAF has itsF4s and Tornado F2 in development.
Sadly an RAF with Hawker Siddeley Arrows in 1957 was never going to happen.

 

[alertken]

(Not fruitful to surmise DH's fate if neither 9/52 D.H.110, nor 1952 Comet 1 crashes had not...but a credible POD for OP's >1957 FC is) :

* 4/8/58: Sandys' mightiest achievement, enduring today, was the Mutual Defence Agt., giving us AW access and: settling Thor-in RAF, which gave no purpose for DoD to continue its subsidy to the Anglicised version (I.Clark,Nuc.Diplomacy & the Special Relationship,Clarendon,94,P.163 has MWDP 10/7/56 agreeing 15% {of then-guessed £70Mn.} and paying $8Mn. to mid-58, implying $0 later). That helped pay for the nice new factory next to EE's at Stevenage; his other US technology was safely digested at RR &tc, so he would only have been congratulated for then chopping Blue Streak.

It is incredible it pointlessly survived until 13/4/60 and nugatory spend of £84Mn. The sole reason for any UK-owned MRBM would have been sovereign launch (one, not dual key) of indigenous warheads, but PM Mac had integrated UK Strategic Force with US wef 1/7/58 (exception for "grave National Emergency”, or “where (supreme) national interests are at stake” were 1963/64 notions for recallable and 2nd. Strike Bombers). Cabinet should not have continued spending £1Mn. p. month for a solo 1st. Strike option. Sandys confused them with the distant silo, so 2nd. Strike, distraction. If:

Blue Streak had gone, 8/58, DH's undivided attention would have been on the medium range airliner+potential AAR/MR/ECM variants, RN son- of Vixen+Scimitar, the Canberra replacement (so the alluring D.H.117), sectors such as AAM, Tape Recorded Automatic Test Eqpt., and the overseas Subsidiaries, all being neglected. When Sandys' Rationalisation was being worked out in 1959, DH could extract modest or less value in Blue Streak and settled for extinction in HSAL and BSEL, some survival in HSD. All lost to phallic dreams.

 

[zen]

So abandonment of domestic nukes isn't an option. PM not able to stop that and nor should he.
Sharing data is revelation to both sides, UK side becomes crucial element.
Stop on liquid MRBM however is a strong case once Thor arrives.
The case is already set for solid and Polaris by '58.
In fact it's also set for Pershing.

And in turn the 42" press for UK solid rocket. So original 600nm Tactical is within reach in reasonable scale and 1,500nm to 2,500nm is also in reach.
No logic in not investing in INS gyros etc these are crucial to a host of navigation for aircraft and guided weapons concepts.
Strongest argument is domestic 54" press and licensed Polaris land and Sea. Land being first strike accuracy.

'58 is GOR.339 and OR.346 territory. Unless continuation of Saro F.177.
But DH Christchurch Tamblin led design is solid for FAW, Strike and functionally easy to change wing and engines for various roles.
Buccaneer now, DH.339 tomorrow.

Counter is DH says No by '55, Thor by '58, solid by '65 to '68. Or liquid HTP/Kerosene as per Blue Steel.

 

[zen]

Additional.
Link to relevant AH in which UK solid fuel rockets is examined.

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/rn-sea-based-ballistic-missile.34917/

'58 does look intriguing for a POD. A shift to solid for licenced Polaris and Pershing.
Even if continuation of domestic only H-Bomb effort, process is headed to inevitable shift to smaller devices.

Logically cut Blue Streak, cut GOR.339, expand NMBR.3 like tactical nuke delivery or revise OR.346.
Buccaneer interim.

 

[uk 75]

Blue Streak dies because it is too difficult and expensive to deploy in the UK and its silos would draw multiple Soviet missile strikes on to the UK to stop it even being launched.
The UK realises it either has to have an airborne missile or a sea launched missile.
Friedman's new book on British postwar submarines explains how US policies on NATO nukes led first to us choosing Skybolt and then Polaris.
There is not a cat in Downing Street's chance of the overreached British Budgets of this era affording any UK built alternatives even if we had the capacity to build and deploy them.