NATO Mechanised Infantry Combat Vehicle for 60s and 70s

uk 75

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The Russians introduced their BMP family of MICVs in the 1960s.
In NATO the only country to do likewise was Germany which replaced
its basic HS 30 vehicle (an early MICV of a sort) from the 70s with the
Marder. Modified Marders are still in service with the German forces.

In contrast Britain stuck with its primitive FV 432 APC until the Warrior
finally arrived in the 80s. Similarly, the US Army did not get the excellent Bradley M2/3 family until the early 80s.

In a half way house Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Turkey used vehicles
developed in the 1970s from the M113.

If political and financial considerations had permitted (a whopping if I know)
what MICV should NATO tried to have deployed in the 1970s (developed in
the late 60s like Marder)?

The developed M113 option seems at first sight the most sensible, as it
built on a vehicle already in widespread use (except by the UK and France).

US attempts to build their own Marder/BMP equivalent had a number of false
starts in the XM701 (developed at least from a chassis in wide NATO use)
and later XM723 (the basis for the Bradley).

In fact did NATO need or want MICVs. The British challenged the Germans on this point, arguing, perhaps from financial necessity rather than real conviction, that armouring infantry was a bad way of deploying them and defending the "battle taxi" troop carrier.

Interestingly France built a half-hearted MICV and preferred to deploy lots of wheeled vehicles instead. Something which it still does today.

UK 75
 
uk 75 said:
The British challenged the Germans on this point, arguing, perhaps from financial necessity rather than real conviction, that armouring infantry was a bad way of deploying them and defending the "battle taxi" troop carrier.

The British view seems to have been proven by historical events.

The Warrior was developed as a MCV (Mechanized Combat Vehicle) not and MICV. Troops were never intended to fight from under armour as intended by Marder, Bradley and the BMP1. It was intended to move them closer to the enemy than possible by the limited armour of the FV432 and offer fire support with the Rarden Cannon.

The U.S. and Germany have up armoured the Bradley and Marder, eliminating the ability for the infantry to fire from under armour and the new German Puma was developed without such a facility.

Regards.
 
Maybe not entirely pertinent to the topic, but here's a send up of how the Bradley came to be from "Pentagon Wars".

[flash=200,200]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pyakI9GeYRs[/flash]
 
Wasn't the reason for not developing an IFV like the BMP due to the fact that unlike the Soviets, the NATO forces wouldn't be operating over a battlefield laid waste by tactical nuclear weapons? So they didn't need to fight from under NBC protection. Whereas the BMP was designed for that role. Perhaps the UK / US attitude only changed when fexible response was adopted.
GM
 
This is the first time I have heard or seen Pentagon Wars
Thanks for the heads up!!!

So how much of this book (and movie) is true in regards to the Bradley???
Its some what deja’ vu, in that I for one have always been dubious about the Bradley's troop carrying capacity, its high silhouette, its aluminum makeup, its lack of amphibious capability and its high cost.

Let's face it we all know that the Pentagon is capable of such fraudulent behavior, as has been seen in many cases in the past and percent!

Now many would argue that the Bradley has proven all its critics wrong – due to its combat debut in Gulf War 1 and Gulf War 2.
But these wars hardly compare to the battles envisaged that the Bradley was designed for and intended to face – Warsaw Pact Vs NATO.

It is interesting and very valid about the aluminium burning and toxins - but this has been a fact since the M113 APC was introduced and long exposed to combat.
I wounder though how composit materials would go after a hit - would its toxins be worst and do they burn furiously????

The interesting thing was the scene about the Israeli modification to an order for the Israeli Army!
This is the first time I have heard of Israel purchasing the Bradley?

As for someone who spends a lot of time in the back of an APC’s, I will be taking a somewhat deeper and more interested look next time I am in the back!!!!!

P.S. has anyone read the book Pentagon Wars?
If so does it go into more depth regarding the Bradley?
And does it cover other projects?


Regards
Pioneer
 
Pyrrhic victory said:
Maybe not entirely pertinent to the topic, but here's a send up of how the Bradley came to be from "Pentagon Wars".

The book is even funnier...it does go into more depth (and accuracy - the movie is only mildly accurate to the book). The book is more about Col Burton's fight to get true OT&E practices in place. BTW, for those unaware, Burton was one of Col. Boyd's disciples.

Regards,

Greg
 
I have read somewhere that when being subjected to live fire testing, the target Bradley had it's fuel system filled with water, and the ammo was filled with sand instead of propellant!!!
 
Pioneer said:
The interesting thing was the scene about the Israeli modification to an order for the Israeli Army!
This is the first time I have heard of Israel purchasing the Bradley?

I've seen one of these Israeli Bradleys at RAFAEL’s “mini Latrun” at Akko - but no photos allowed. The IDF considered the Bradley as a solution to its requirement for a highly protected APC in the 1980s. They decided in the end to convert T-55s to Azcharits. Their Bradley had the turret removed and a layer of ERA around the front and sides.

The original Bradley armour was much better than the M113 with lots of sloped aluminum alloy armour (nothing wrong with this, much better than steel in similar applications) and “laminate” armour. Which was effectively 0.25” HHS [high hardness steel], 0.5” air space, 0.25” HHS, 3.5” air space, 1” 5083 or 7039 aluminum alloy. This could stop a 14.5mm AP or splinters from a nearby burst of 152mm HE.

Because so much fuel and ammunition – including highly sensitive rocket motors – was stored inside the Bradley’s crew compartment it was a very dangerous place to be after any penetrating hit. Out of Burton’s OT&E activity a “Minimum Casulaty” variant of the Bradley was developed. This vehicle had all the fuel and M3 (ie stored) ammunition moved to outside the crew and dismount compartments.

Ironically some of these changes, including the Israeli turretless approach and the external fuel pods are now being proposed by BAES (acquirer of FMC) for Bradleys to replace M113 variants in place of FCS MGV.
 
geeshockbloke said:
Wasn't the reason for not developing an IFV like the BMP due to the fact that unlike the Soviets, the NATO forces wouldn't be operating over a battlefield laid waste by tactical nuclear weapons? So they didn't need to fight from under NBC protection. Whereas the BMP was designed for that role. Perhaps the UK / US attitude only changed when fexible response was adopted.

There were two main influences on NATO armies adopting firing ports to their 3rd generation post war APCs. The ‘need’ to match the Soviet BMP and counter insurgency fighting in Vietnam. The later was why the first mass production APC with firing ports was actually the French AMX-VTP of 1957. The US Army also modified M113s to have firing ports or multiple roof mounted machineguns in the 1960s. Nuclear warfare policy had little to do with it because many early NATO APCs didn’t even have NBC defence kits.

Interestingly the APC armament policy of NATO APCs before the Marder simply followed the standard practice of each armies arming of infantry battalion MG platoons. The Germans used the 20mm in the HS.30, the British the 7.62mm in the FV432 and the US their ever present .50 cal. The French of course armed their vehicles with whatever the Germans did so went from 7.62 to .50 to 20mm in ten tears. But all these weapons where in single man cupolas or turrets.

It was only with the Marder the first post BMP APC that a two man turret was fitted. This was very much for the requirement to “wash away the BMPs” on the battlefield as the tanks can concentrate on other tanks. The Bradley took it a step further with a TOW so it could “wash away the T-55s…”
 
sealordlawrence said:
And now the German Puma is getting Spike.

Which is so it can take out insurgent firing positions with low collateral damage risk! The changing world...
 
Ironically some of these changes, including the Israeli turretless approach and the external fuel pods are now being proposed by BAES (acquirer of FMC) for Bradley's to replace M113 variants in place of FCS MGV.

Interesting!
It would help somewhat with standardisation - if addopted by the US Army!

At the end of the day I really think the M113 has seen its day. It has served well and beyond what anyone would have thought!
Although I still think the basic tracked APC has a role on the modern battlefield.
Although I would like to think it stuck with a dismounted-troop number of a minimum of eight; far better ballistic shaping of its composite armour (who ever designed the M113 had never learned from the revolutionary T-34 tank!); add a remote operated, stabilized 25mm cannon, with coaxial 7.62mm MG (to save weight and lower silhouette); anti tank capability being provided by the 'mounted' infantry weapons - which could be fired from the roof of the vehicle or after dismounting!


Regards
Pioneer
 
At the end of the day I really think the M113 has seen its day

:mad:You have angered the Great God 'Gavin'!!! :mad:

Mike Sparks and his hordes will be round to speak to you later!

LOL! Sorry, couldn't resist.....

cheers,
Robin.
 
It is my opinion that we; the British, missed out on a simple an economic way to upgrade our tracked armour years ago - instead of the farce that is FRES. We should have simply bought Warrior 2000 and the proposed scout variant, then used the hulls of the original Warriors to replace the FV432 and other vehicles as needed.

I just believe that our procurement proceedurs are a joke, wasn't the new procedure called SMART, what the hell is smart about it - whenever I read that stupid term Main Gate my blood boils :mad:!!!
 
Ahem, it could be worse... In Australia we launched a $1-2 million per vehicle program to rebuild M113A1s as M113A4s with hull stretch and A3 drive system and a new 12.7mm armed turret. Which on paper is not such a bad thing as the only thing remaining from the original M113A1 is the alumunium armour hull which will last for centuries. The project is however running 5+ years late, hugely overbudget and delivering something with far less useable internal volume, armour and firepower than a new build IFV (CV90, Bradley, ASCOD, etc).
 
sealordlawrence said:
FRES-UV kicking the bucket was a good thing as it enabled immediate investment in vehicles actually required for operations and will mean that when the programme restarts the British Army will be able procure a vehicle that actually incorporates the lessons of the last 8 years.

Do you think it likely that FRES-UV Mk 2 could just be a FRES-SV without the 40mm gun turret?
 
robunos said:
At the end of the day I really think the M113 has seen its day

:mad:You have angered the Great God 'Gavin'!!! :mad:

Mike Sparks and his hordes will be round to speak to you later!

http://home.comcast.net/~genericdad/m113gavin.html

Despite the lunacy of Mike Sparks you have to admire one man's ability to shape the minds of so many people to think the M113 is called the “Gavin”. Admittedly people with no direct involvement in what they are thinking about but still impressive.
 
Abraham Gubler said:
Ahem, it could be worse... In Australia we launched a $1-2 million per vehicle program to rebuild M113A1s as M113A4s with hull stretch and A3 drive system and a new 12.7mm armed turret. Which on paper is not such a bad thing as the only thing remaining from the original M113A1 is the alumunium armour hull which will last for centuries. The project is however running 5+ years late, hugely overbudget and delivering something with far less useable internal volume, armour and firepower than a new build IFV (CV90, Bradley, ASCOD, etc).

Having been involved in the M113 upgrade programme, Abraham, although it must be admitted at a little indirectly (I worked for the company which produced the CNC milling machine for the hulls), I have some idea of what went on with this project.

Basically, it started out as a good idea - a basic upgrade of the M113s to a lengthened version by inserting a roadwheel and stretching the hull. It grew like topsy, not because the manufacturer wanted it but because the customer kept adding bells and whistles and didn't know when to stop. Each change to the specification necessitated a delay to the project while it was redesigned. The result was a machine that is excellent for what it was but is basically useless outside of Australia's relatively benign threat environment. It is perfectly adequate for the SW Pacific but would be at a bit of a disadvantage in the Middle East or Korea.

What particularly impressed me from the early days of the project though, was the decision to go with improved sensors rather than merely sticking a big gun on it which was I suspect a big temptation. We don't need bigger guns but improved sensors give the Army a decided advantage over potential opponents in the region.

In addition, the manufacturer adopted several crazy ideas. Perhaps the worst of which was that it would be easier to cut each hull and then fabricate new hull sections and weld them into the gap to lengthen the hull. The result was twice as many welds and each representing a potential failure at some future date. When I first saw this, I was stunned, wondering why they just didn't either use two vehicles to produce one new one (half the number of welds) or simply order new hulls from FMC, who'd have been very happy to supply them (and the amortised cost would have such that they'd have been cheaper than engaging in all that cutting and welding). Then, to cut costs, they decided to use the prototype CNC milling machine as the production machine - it had only tools on one side, which effectively doubled the manufacturing time and so increasing costs again! I was once given a tour of the production-like "line" at then Thales in Adelaide.

In the end, the Army decided that they had to cut costs even further and have reduced the buy to only a third of what was originally intended. In the end, we will more than likely end up with revamped Bradleys, despite the limitations of such a vehicle, as we have with M1 Abrahms because they are cheap.
 
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Fascinating stuff and much info here.

I take the point about the Warrior. It was an MCV and
not an MICV. I gather that early versions of the proposal
had much heavier armour and were more like battle tanks.
I still think, however, that it was cost rather than doctrine
that forced the BAOR to soldier on with FV432s only until
the 80s.

The Bradley controversy was covered also in an excellent
Panorama at the time back in the 80s

UK 75
 
rickshaw said:
Having been involved in the M113 upgrade programme, Abraham, although it must be admitted at a little directly (I worked for the company which produced the CNC milling machine for the hulls), I have some idea of what went on with this project.

While I didn't supply milling machines to the upgrade I've followed the various projects that became the upgrade from its inception in the early 1990s: so no history lesson needed. I've even interviewed the then Major who wrote the first requirement for an M113A1 to M113A3 upgrade in the 1990s. He is now a recently retired Brigadier making a name for himself as a theorist. I tried to keep a mention of the program to just a quick paragraph in the interest of not diverting this thread.

The Tenix Turret (not Thales) for the M113AS4 is the best way to take a 12.7mm MG into a land battle the world has ever seen. However that does not make it anywhere near the kind of combat power (sighting, SA and firepower) available on a GEN III ASLAV turret. As to stretching the vehicle this was the cause of all the problems. Not so much the idea of stretching it but choosing Tenix and their unproven German solution compared to the OEM. Of course combining a new turret, a hull stretch, A1 to A3 automotives, appliqué armour into a single project is shear lunacy. Any half decent leader would have stood back and said - stuff this, let’s just spend the money on a new build vehicle to the spec.
 
uk 75 said:
Fascinating stuff and much info here.

I take the point about the Warrior. It was an MCV and
not an MICV. I gather that early versions of the proposal
had much heavier armour and were more like battle tanks.
I still think, however, that it was cost rather than doctrine
that forced the BAOR to soldier on with FV432s only until
the 80s.

The Bradley controversy was covered also in an excellent
Panorama at the time back in the 80s

UK 75

I remember an episode of Panorama that covered the MCV80; as it was then, in 1983/4. It did state that the early proposal was for a much heavier vehicle fitted with Chobam armour, and I do seem to remember there being a prototype; at least as they were talking about the concept a vehicle was shown. Unfortunately further details have been lost in the mists of time - and bearing in mind I was a student then probably mists of something else. I would be very interested to see if there was an earlier prototype?
 
JohnR said:
I remember an episode of Panorama that covered the MCV80; as it was then, in 1983/4. It did state that the early proposal was for a much heavier vehicle fitted with Chobam armour, and I do seem to remember there being a prototype; at least as they were talking about the concept a vehicle was shown. Unfortunately further details have been lost in the mists of time - and bearing in mind I was a student then probably mists of something else. I would be very interested to see if there was an earlier prototype?

Christopher Foss's book "Warrior Mechanised Combat Vehicle 1987–94" also mentions this ~30-40 ton proto-Warrior with Chobam armour.
 
Thank you. Glad to see my memory still works in my mid forties, sometimes I think I've dreamt things.

Regards.
 
sealordlawrence said:
Bits of that book are available on Google Books, apparently an automotive test rig was developed and it was to have a 750 hp engine. If it got that far there must be an image and maybe even design drawings somewhere. At 30 - 40 tons it would be in a similar class to the Puma and Marder 2.

http://books.google.com/books?id=6qCeUtY8Ya8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Warrior+Mechanised+Combat+Vehicle+1987%E2%80%9394&ei=-R4LS_eRGZ_4lASK75njCQ#v=onepage&q=&f=false

Page 5.

Glad to see my memory hasn't failed in my mid 30s! Though the source mentions the vehicle weighed in at 30 tons. I would imagine it wouldn't look that much different to the original Warrior prototypes but probably with a more regular exterior as you wouldn’t be able to interrupt the thicker armour array with things like the NBC filter on the left side. It would have certainly been a better solution than the appliqué up-armouring of the Warrior at the later date. Having the 750hp engine/transmission and the right suspension for the weight of armour would have made for a much better vehicle.
 
Regarding the M2 Bradley, I believe that in the end, it provided a capable counterpart to the BMP series and was comparable to most other IFVs of the day. It provided much more anti-AFV capability to the units equipped with it. However only carrying 6 soldiers in back would mean the infantry would be restricted to supporting the division's armor, and couldn't effectively operate independently. Divisions with Abrams and Bradleys would certainly have plenty of armored punch, could move rapidly, and against a heavily mechanized Soviet force these were useful traits. Yet when it came to combat in urban or forested areas, they would really need some support from straight-leg infantry units.

Tankers I have talked to who have been inside a Bradley say the turret is pretty poorly laid out, so it is possible it could have been somewhat smaller. Personally I believe the design and ammo load-out should have been tweaked enough to allow an 8 man squad to be carried, even if it cost the amphibious capability which was apparently rather worrisome to the crew anyway. The vehicle being lengthened by a seventh road-wheel might have helped.
 
Regarding the M113 in US service, what is to happen to them in the next few years/decade? I saw the video of the proposal from BAE to use the Bradley Fighting Vehicles as a common chassis/system bit it that the right thing to be done? We have like 10,000-25,000 M113 series of vehicles in the system and it will be hard to replace them with just the 7-8000 Bradleys we have bought.

Right now we have the Bradley series to replace most front line troop carrier model 113s but what about the thousands of medical and command models out there than can not be easily replaced? I have a feeling the M577/M1068 and models like the medical vehicles and smoke generators are going to be us for a long while still. ;)

Maybe I am just sad to see the old stuff go out of service. :'( I just have a bad feeling about replacing stuff due to budgets and so on before there is a replacement in service. I remember fondly the A-6 Intruder, ES-3A and EF-111A...etc. All retired in the Clinton years with no suitable replacement. Damn him. :mad:
 
Being a bit tough there on Ol' Bill, mate. I don't think he was personally responsible for the decision to retire those aircraft.
 
rickshaw said:
Being a bit tough there on Ol' Bill, mate. I don't think he was personally responsible for the decision to retire those aircraft.

In fact, the A-6 retirement decision had been made under the previous administration, as had the cancellation of its replacement.
 
Colonial-Marine said:
Tankers I have talked to who have been inside a Bradley say the turret is pretty poorly laid out, so it is possible it could have been somewhat smaller. Personally I believe the design and ammo load-out should have been tweaked enough to allow an 8 man squad to be carried, even if it cost the amphibious capability which was apparently rather worrisome to the crew anyway. The vehicle being lengthened by a seventh road-wheel might have helped.

There is no way you are going to be able to reduce the consumed volume of a Bradley type turret by changing its “layout” as long as it remains a two person turret. Also you can’t “tweak” the vehicle to fit in more people. Even if you remove all the spare TOW missiles you can only fit in an additional seat. Lots and lots of engineer hours have been spent adjusting the interior arrangement of the Bradley and no one has managed to shoe horn in extra seats.

The problem with the Bradley’s volume consumption is caused by the length of the engine bay that it inherited from the XM723. In the engine bay the motor is mounted inline with the centreline axis of the vehicle forcing the turret ring to be located at and to the rear of the middle of the hull. The XM723 only had a single person turret so there was ample space to accommodate a full nine dismount strong infantry section. With the Bradley’s two person turret a lot more space is required to allow for the much larger turret ring and subsequently a reduced dismount squad.

The solution to the problem is to mount a transverse engine and reduce the length of the engine bay enabling the turret to be moved forward.
 
sealordlawrence said:
What about an unmanned turret, such as the new Kongsberg medium calibre system shown at AUSA, you would lose out on TOWS (and TOW reloads) and probably take a hit on situational awareness but it would probably free up some internal space? Just a thought?

BAES are way ahead of you. The Bradley Technology Demonstrator unvieled at AUSA in 2006 had a remote turret (unoccupied) enabling a crew of 12 including a nine person dismount section. Also the original XM1206 FCS ICV had a remote turret enabling an 11 crew with nine dismounts.

sealordlawrence said:
Or is the reduced squad now so engrained in the system that it is no longer an issue?

The US Army wants a nine strong dismount squad for infantry platoons.
 
Would it be possible to refit the existing Bradleys with a Transverse engine of would it only be applicable to new chassis?

If this is a stupid question I qualify it by adding my usual line that I am by and large a technical Luddit.
 
JohnR said:
Would it be possible to refit the existing Bradleys with a Transverse engine of would it only be applicable to new chassis?

If this is a stupid question I qualify it by adding my usual line that I am by and large a technical Luddit.

You can rebuild a tank to any extent you want though it often reaches a point in which it may not be as economical as a new build. In the case of Bradley you would have to find an engine that fits (in the transverse position) or relocate the driver's position (move it to the rear) plus a new roof for the new turret ring and so on.

The point I was trying to make is if you design the vehicle from scratch for a capability: 8-9 dismounts and a two person turret, then you can make it all fit. But when you convert a major feature of an existing design (one to two person turret) then you are going to suffer for it. The CV90 has pretty much the same plan footprint as a Bradley yet can fit a two person turret and eight dismount seats. Of course it isn’t as high as a Bradley so you probably have to pull at least one of those seats to fit in a useable supply of stores.
 
I was going to start a thread comparing the BMP with Western vehicles but found this very full and detailed thread about Western vehicles.
I wonder now that we know so much more about the BMP, how radical a it was? In 1967 it was described in glowing terms. After the Yom Kippur War 1973 it tended to be seen much less so.
 
Poor old BMP-1 design.....

When talking about the BMP-1, I think one seriously needs to fairly take into consideration, that the Soviet Army when drawing up its requirements for an MICV study indepth many configurations before deciding on the Ob’yekt 764 configuration, which was for all intent and purposes, unique in its concept - even more so than the SPz Kurz and the SPz Lang that its so often associated with as being the first MICV's. One should also seriously take into consideration that Soviet Army doctrine stipulated a more cost-effective (and if you like - more expendable weapon system) than would later be acceptable in the West. Add to this the acceptable levels of crew/troop comfort/lay out.....

Another point I have about the Western criticism of the BMP-1 is that the West in most cases, bar the West Germans had the advantage of using the BMP-1 as a design yardstick for a decade or two whilst they developed their own doctrine, devise and test their own MICV's......

Another point is that the Soviet's themselves were realistic enough to see and improve the short comings of the BMP-1 once they were identified after real combat exposure, which lead to the BMP-2, not to indifferent to what the West did with their own MICV/IFV....

Finally, I'm of the opinion that the part of the BMP-1's criticism is due to its operational performance at the hands of Arab armies from 1973 onwards. The fact that the BMP-1 wasn't employed on a peer basis by the likes of the Soviet Army, leaves a lot to be debated IMO. Id be very interested to see how effectively the likes of the Finnish and Swedish Army's would have operated their BMP's if things had of gone hot for them.


Regards
Pioneer
 
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I wonder now that we know so much more about the BMP, how radical a it was?
In line with mainstream Western ideas on MICV of the time, with the exception of 73mm gun firing rocket-propelled grenades (thanks to Soviet missile/rocket craze of late 50s - early 60s) which proved to be dead end. Which is natural, since Soviets apparently "borrowed" whole concept of IFV/ICV from Western Germans - may be /it's unclear/ with some French influence.

Western articles of that time are available, and it is certain that Soviets read those articles back than - as all non secret, many of restricted access, and at least some amount of secret Soviet military-related publications of at least Cold War era were based on translations of readily available non-classified western publications.

There were other Soviet ideas on what vehicle could fulfill role of IFV,
some of which were developed into prototypes - such as wheeled object 1200 and GAZ-50; tracked/wheeled hybrid object 911 and wheeled/tracked hybrid object 19; tracked cheaper and simpler alternatives to BMP as built (obj. 765) - objects 912, 914/914B, and 13;
and some of which remained on paper -
two tank-based (obj.167, 432 /T-64/) vehicles with either new or the same turret, longer hulls and infantry compartment between turret and engine, and without firing ports - kinda like ukranian BMT-72,
and proposal from Leningrad Kirov plant of a tank with two dismounts, using them as machineguners for hull-mounted MGs.

None of that was adopted, as they went with Object 765, which had a layout possibly inspired by that of Spz 11-2 Kurz.
That was inconsistent with expanding theoretical views (of Soviet analogue of TRADOC, more or less) on how BMP which swims properly and has dismounts which flight mounted should look like (much better fulfilled by BMDs and later BMP-3, with hull-mounted MGs at vehicle's front, and with water jets), so requirement for better BMP was there even before BMP-1 was adopted into service - with proposals such as object 764 in 1964-65, and in late 60s - early 70s - another version of object 765, and testbed object 677-Sp.1.
But, as we all know, BMP-2 has layout similar to that of BMP-1, without water jets or hull-mounted MGs at front, and even additional MG /mounted on top of the hatch for soldier sitting directly behind driver/ was removed, reportedly because of probability of misfire at driver) and it was only with adoption of BMP-3 into service, in 1987, when those requirements were finally fulfilled.

...as demonstrated by tank-based proposals, idea that IFV which supports and accompanies tanks, should be as protected as one - including radiation from nuclear weapons, btw (bmp-1/2, and most likely bmp-3 too - have protection against radiation several times lower than that of the tanks) - was there in USSR in early 60s, but was not adopted.
Although economical reasons come to mind, one has to remember that BMP-1 itself failed to be as cheap as it should be to fulfill Soviet General Staff requirements on BMP's - reportedly, 70 thousand vehicles - in the end, only about 35 thousand were produced, (and 18 thousand more in Czechoslovakia, though apparently most of those went to WARPAC countries and some were exported outside WARPAC), with BTR-60PB, BTR-70 and BTR-80 with their even weaker armor trying to fulfill the same role.
Reportedly, BMP-1 costs as much as T-55 tank, i.e. about 1/3 to 1/2 as much as basic T-64/T-64A/T-72, and BMP-2 apparently was twice as expensive as BMP-1.

Anyway. AFAIK not much is known from Soviet or Russian publications about Soviet view on BMP performance in 1973 Yom Kippur war.
It's among Western publications on this topic we see doubt on survivability of mainstream IFVs, voiced by, most notably, R.M. Ogorkiewicz (Infantry's combat vehicles, Armor, 1974 Sep-Oct.)
/on BMP-1 and Marder, - skl./
Both are superior in some respects to all the earlier APCs. However, it may be doubted if they are greatly superior, overall, to the best of the more conventional APCs. What is more, it is very doubtful if either represents what is really needed.
[...]
If MICVs are to operate really close to battle tanks, and if infantrymen are to ride in them right on to their objectives, then they should logically be provided with the same degree of armor protection as battle tanks. This was, in fact, done by the British and Canadian Armies toward the end of World War II when they improvised heavily armored Kangaroo infantry carriers from contemporary battle tanks after removing their turrets. Were this example followed, it would be necessary to construct MICVs on the same chassis as battle tanks, but this should not create as many difficulties as might be feared. For instance, the Marder already weighs more than some battle tanks without their turrets do. Moreover, considerable logistics advantages might result from the use of the same chassis for infantry vehicles and for battle tanks, and this would also make further integration of the two much easier, as well as saving a great deal of development money.
and indirectly by Phillip A. Karber (The soviet antitank debate, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 18, May-June 1976, also Military Review, November 1976, and Armor, Nov-Dec. 1976)(btw, Karber's article conveys his understanding of Soviet dissatisfaction with BMP survivability after 1973 war, based on ~50 soviet publications, of which he unfortunately named only about a dozen and a half, which makes it very hard to check by now - but at least one of those Soviet articles was not as openly anti-BMP as I thought reading Karber's article).
Thanks to that, idea of tanklike protected HIFV appeared in public discussion (btw, one might remember that back in 1968 TACOM's predecessor was looking at HIFV concepts, 5 years before Yom Kippur war, - and also CNC USAREUR questioned protection levels of US MICV, or austere MICV, or something, - both of which apparently went unnoticed), which lead to SAIFV proposal in the US, reviewed by Crizer study in 1978, and then Mahaffey study next year; although Bradley won - partly thanks to very misleading reporting on what Bradley could withstand and what was expected from the Soviets, and on how much more SAIFV costs compared to Bradley.

...judging by HIFV proposal in Heavy Forces Modernization/Armored Systems Modernization program of late 80s, and some quotes from people like Gen.Starry, who was pushing HIFV in TRADOC in 70s, - an idea of HIFV for US Army was not forgotten after 1978/1979, but instead it was pushed into next-generation vehicles development.

Not much is known about Soviet thinking regarding HIFV in the 70s, but according to some latest articles - it was there in the 80s, which lead to some verbal struggle against adoption of BMP-3, and development of BMPT (btw, in Russian BMPT stands for _both_ IFV Heavy, and Tank Support Combat Vehicle, more than that, arguably, from tank-centred point of view role of IFV is that of tank support) - as HIFV for some time, with all hull machinegunners and vehicle's commander (overall, 5 man) dismounting when necessary - though later it was dropped, leading to BMPT as we know it today.
Also, there was HIFV proposal among family of vehicles based on object 299 next-generation tank from Leningrad, and at least half a dozen Russian (and half a dozen Ukrainian) HIFV/HAPC proposals in the 90s-00s, finishing with T-15.

...Although IFV on Kurganets-25 platform carries ATGM, swims and has layout with engine in front-right and driver at front-left, -
that about as much of BMP-1/2's legacy which proved useful to this day, with most notable difference been the size of new vehicles, which are apparently aiming at current (50th percentile male from 60s = 169cm, 2010s - 178cm) 95 percentile Russian, instead of 1960s ~50th percentile Soviet (btw, according to US publications, BMP-1 captured in 1973 war and delivered to US was tested on, erm, habitability with US soldiers - and they found out that vehicle would accomodate only 25th percentile man in tropical inform, and 15th percentile in extreme cold weather uniform)
and amount of BMP-1/2 in storage and active service in Russian army seems to be solely based of available funding for replacement.
 

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Interesting article not so long ago...APC's vs IFV


The author makes a lot on the Israeli Namer APC....seems not to have noticed they also have an IFV version...admitedly with an unmanned turret.

There is an interesting book 'Battlegroup: The Lessons of the Unfought Battles of the Cold War' by Jim Storr in which he discussed APC vs IFV....in gaming against a competent enemy, most IFV attacks fail and most of the ones that do succeed end up with the attackers having too few troops left to carry on....against a competent enemy.
 
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