MX (Peacekeeper) deployment concepts.

[Rosdivan]

You'd have a bigger problem, I think, in needing to completely revamp and set aside existing security practice for nuclear warheads if you were disguising them in regular traffic.

 

[bobbymike]

You dont use MX, you use Midgetman. MX was the biggest missile you could stuff into a Minuteman silo, if you are going road-mobile, you go with a very different design. Something that if one gets taken out you lose 1 warhead, not 10.

See far right for biggest missile they could fit in a MMIII silo.

I would have replaced MMIII with a missile as large with massive upload.

I’m kidding or am I?

 

[Sferrin]

Let’s face it: unless you can wall off millions of acres of public lands and use deceptive shelter basing, the best mobile ICBMs are probably SLBMs.

Is that what China and Russia does? Walls off everywhere their mobile ICBMs go? Because I'm not seeing the need. Few civies go out in the desert wastes where these things would be (they wouldn't be tooling around Moab and the Grand Canyon) The biggest concern would just be looking for would-be saboteurs trying to cross the desert - and shooting them.

 

[JTR]

See far right for biggest missile they could fit in a MMIII silo.

I would have replaced MMIII with a missile as large with massive upload.

I’m kidding or am I?

That graph is misleading. The silo stuffer would technically fit into the silo (with absolutely zero room to spare), but it would be impossible to fit it and the necessary shock isolation suspension systems that allow attaining 2000 psi hardness ratings. Without those systems, even minor shocks will destroy the missile.

Peacekeeper was about the longest possible missile that could fit into a minuteman silo while retaining the shock isolation systems. For anything longer than that, you'd need to dig new deeper silos.

 

[bobbymike]

That graph is misleading. The silo stuffer would technically fit into the silo (with absolutely zero room to spare), but it would be impossible to fit it and the necessary shock isolation suspension systems that allow attaining 2000 psi hardness ratings. Without those systems, even minor shocks will destroy the missile.

Peacekeeper was about the longest possible missile that could fit into a minuteman silo while retaining the shock isolation systems. For anything longer than that, you'd need to dig new deeper silos.

So it would fit notwithstanding?

 

[Forest Green]

See far right for biggest missile they could fit in a MMIII silo.

I would have replaced MMIII with a missile as large with massive upload.

I’m kidding or am I?

Above 2.11m diameter you need to use a cold launch system though. So the maximum diameters are 2.11m (hot) and 2.34m (cold).

 

[JTR]

So it would fit notwithstanding?

Without shock isolation systems, it's worthless.

Please read "Ballistic Missile Shock Isolation Systems" by David K. Stumpf.

You can access that article for free via https://www.afhistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/Winter2022_Issue-AllRevised.pdf (it starts on page 33)

Alternatively, it can be found on JSTOR at https://www.jstor.org/stable/48712154

Note that the silo stuffer would also only "fit" into the silos at Wing V, Wing VI, and the 564 SMS. These silos were 10 feet deeper than the silos at Wings I–IV.

This is also why Peacekeeper had to be deployed to Wing V – the silos at Wings I–IV were too shallow to be able to fit the missile, so there were only two wings (and the 564th SMS) that could physically accommodate the missile.

 

[Scott Kenny]

You dont use MX, you use Midgetman. MX was the biggest missile you could stuff into a Minuteman silo, if you are going road-mobile, you go with a very different design. Something that if one gets taken out you lose 1 warhead, not 10.

Still takes a 3-axle trailer and might just barely fit into a 53ft trailer envelope.

Is that what China and Russia does? Walls off everywhere their mobile ICBMs go?

Effectively, yes. Their missile guards were known for shoot-first-ask-questions-of-the-family enforcement.

Because I'm not seeing the need. Few civies go out in the desert wastes where these things would be (they wouldn't be tooling around Moab and the Grand Canyon) The biggest concern would just be looking for would-be saboteurs trying to cross the desert - and shooting them.

You greatly underestimate how many people go out into the desert to get the hell away from all the other people. Ignoring the hippies at Burning Man, of course, but they'd also be the ones protesting and otherwise interfering with operations.

 

[Desertfox]

Russian road-mobiles typically spent most of their time at garrisons and only go out for exercises. When they do go out they have extensive escorts and logistical train and are limited by how far away they can drive from the garrisons and launch requirements.

 

[Kat Tsun]

You'd have a bigger problem, I think, in needing to completely revamp and set aside existing security practice for nuclear warheads if you were disguising them in regular traffic.

A submachine gun in the door and a crew of 4-6 airmen is adequate. It's not like Waffle House goers aren't used to the sound of gunfire.

High visibility security measures would defeat the purpose of a TEL in the first place: survivability. Mobility is no longer adequate to avoid destruction, especially against penetrating anti-TEL systems like B-2/B-21/H-20, so you need to actually not look like a threat in addition to be mobile enough to not be plotted reliably. Deception measures are required now, as shown by the Iranian TEL force's rapid destruction by penetrating systems (F-35 and F-15E), and foreshadowed by the development of highly disguised launch systems in the USSR to counteract the threat of B-2.

The Russian TEL system after 1995 is rather different due to the rapidly deteriorated internal security situation demanding motor rifles and anti-IED countermeasures to defend against Chechen rebels and their CIA organized cells. This has now expanded to defense against CIA SAD and Ukrainian HUR deep reconnaissance/sabotage teams, which is very similar, but slightly more stubborn and slightly better equipped for the job.

Russia, unlike the USSR, pretty much entirely ignores the threat of B-2s as a result. They have hard garrisons and do limited patrols, and intend to only sally during wartime, rather than conduct continuous movements. This ultimately means that they're extremely vulnerable to depressed trajectory SLBMs and stealth bomber raids, more than they would be if they were mobilized on schedules, but probably not substantially more given the job of B-2 was loitering to hunt TELs in the first place.

For America, this mostly means defense against random carjackings or attempted muggings in America's heartland, and anti-nuclear protests, which are not strictly military threats. The NNSA just use submachine guns or handguns and a couple armed guards in the cab. Combine this with a Flock camera system or something to watch the route in real time, and AF SecFo call ins to the local sheriff's office, and you'd have a fairly effective anti-protester/anti-carjacking defense.

By making the vehicle externally indistinguishable to commercial truck traffic, and making the missile servicing areas and launchers mixed in with commercial depots, you pretty much eliminate the ability to track the missile fleet reliable for preemptive attack. Given that the American major urban/population centers are already the intended targets for both the PRC and Russian strategic arsenals, both during the Cold War and even more so now when their arsenals cannot spare the luxury of wasting shots on counterforce targets, this is not exactly adding much risk.

 

[Scott Kenny]

For America, this mostly means defense against random carjackings or attempted muggings in America's heartland, and anti-nuclear protests, which are not strictly military threats. The NNSA just use submachine guns or handguns and a couple armed guards in the cab. Combine this with a Flock camera system or something to watch the route in real time, and AF SecFo call ins to the local sheriff's office, and you'd have a fairly effective anti-protester/anti-carjacking defense.

By making the vehicle externally indistinguishable to commercial truck traffic, and making the missile servicing areas and launchers mixed in with commercial depots, you pretty much eliminate the ability to track the missile fleet reliable for preemptive attack. Given that the American major urban/population centers are already the intended targets for both the PRC and Russian strategic arsenals, both during the Cold War and even more so now when their arsenals cannot spare the luxury of wasting shots on counterforce targets, this is not exactly adding much risk.

I have heard rumors that the NNSA trucks supposedly hauling the pointy things have serious defenses built into the trailers. The driver said he was warned to never ever touch the trailer.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I have heard rumors that the NNSA trucks supposedly hauling the pointy things have serious defenses built into the trailers. The driver said he was warned to never ever touch the trailer.

I think most of that is just rumor? The lethal defense aspect is the counter-assault team a mile or so behind with rifles and machine guns.

They're bulletproof, at least, and AIUI they have several heavily defended compartments (rated for cutting torch attacks) and an OC spraying system to delay attackers until the response force arrives and kills or arrests them. There might be crash protection features since there's apparently a foaming system designed to keep the cargo safe in case the trailer rolls over. Only the bulletproof part is about all a SICBM TEL would want, since they're going to be highly energetic motors and possibly not IM, but you probably don't want to flood a driver's compartment with OC or some other deterrent chemical if your people are fighting inside it.

I dunno maybe there's a brace of shotguns in the wall or Claymore mines somewhere though.

The crew itself can defend such a truck with a couple SMGs or handguns, generally speaking.

The biggest lethal threat, as in Iran, would be aviation hunting them with smart bombs and guided weapons. The second biggest might be special operations forces with FPV drones or NLOS anti-tank missiles killing the vehicle. Neither are practical to defend against if you're intending to hide from the other. Defense against special forces draws the attention of aircraft due to the need to stay in hardened garrisons and move in convoys. The dispersion to hide from persistent hunter-killer aircraft degrades ambush protection due to the need to be widely separated.

NNSA's Safeguard Trailer isn't aviation protected though, its disguise is mostly to make intelligence gathering hard, which is mutually beneficial and arguably necessary for either. It's completely focused on the anti-raiding aspect. For a ballistic missile, aviation is probably the bigger threat for the country separated from its enemies by two oceans, though.

 

[yeetmahboi]

Walls off everywhere their mobile ICBMs go?

They technically do. China puts all their stuff in the tunnel network and the Rocket Force has specific heavily guard territories to parade their missile convoys around.

How much land does the federal gov still have? Is it legal to massively up the patrolling and surveillance there, and station mobile nukes on those land? If you’re waving those stuff on I-95, is it legal to do so? How assured is your protection scheme? Very pressing questions innit.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Is that what China and Russia does? Walls off everywhere their mobile ICBMs go? Because I'm not seeing the need. Few civies go out in the desert wastes where these things would be (they wouldn't be tooling around Moab and the Grand Canyon) The biggest concern would just be looking for would-be saboteurs trying to cross the desert - and shooting them.

The biggest concern are B-2s over this empty wasteland plinking anything that drives with glide bombs, because you can be assured it's some form of important TEL related vehicle, rather than somewhere far harder to determine the difference between irrelevant contact and high value target, like a road side truck stop.

A strategy rooted in such 1970s thinking is vulnerable to the same sort of 1980s solution that America invented. Mobility alone has not been enough for maybe a decade. Perhaps longer since the TELs in 2003 were not particularly threatening aside from the regrettable incident of 2nd BCT, 3d ID.

 

[Desertfox]

B-2s are no n issue over the US, so the threat would be Spetnaz teams and suicide drones. I say a couple of SUVs with EW and spec ops should do the trick.

 

[Kat Tsun]

B-2s are no n issue over the US,

They were an issue over Siberia. They'll be an issue over America when China starts producing H-20s in quantity. More than likely it won't be something as archaic as "loitering over a target zone" but rather a combination of orbital observation and stealth standoff.

so the threat would be Spetnaz teams and suicide drones.

Russia has no capacity to infiltrate America on this scale. Drone attacks like the kind Spiderweb did are much harder to pull off due to X-ray systems at border stations. It's not impossible but importing in trucks like that would be extremely difficult. China wouldn't need to.

 

[Pinotop]

See far right for biggest missile they could fit in a MMIII silo.

I would have replaced MMIII with a missile as large with massive upload.

I’m kidding or am I?

What document does this come from?

 

[bobbymike]

What document does this come from?

It was from a 1974 AW&ST issue shared on this site on another thread (can’t recall)

If you have an AvWeek subscription and access to their archives you can probably find it.

 

[TomS]

Lovely slide deck here showing MX MPS (I think). The slides look a bit repetitive; wish it came with the speaker's note that would have accompanied the presentation. I included one interesting image that shows a launch mode where the tube is pushed out the end of the shelter, erected, and launched. The deck also shows what looks like the breakout launcher that was supposed to erect through the shelter roof.

MX MISSILE — writer/editor/reporter

www.sambiddle.com

 

[Scott Kenny]

I included one interesting image that shows a launch mode where the tubs is pushed out the end of the shelter, erected, and launched.

I believe that the Chinese and Norks have adopted this CONOPS for their "road-mobile" missiles.

 

[exclaimedleech8]

You'd have a bigger problem, I think, in needing to completely revamp and set aside existing security practice for nuclear warheads if you were disguising them in regular traffic.

There's also the possibility of them getting lost. The Air Force does occasionally misplace nukes

 

[exclaimedleech8]

It certainly wasn't the Soviet plan, which was to focus all nuclear firepower on the cities and their stock exchanges and factories, because that's where America's strengths are.

I'd think the Russians would've wanted to protect their own cities, planning bureaus, and factories.

 

[Scott Kenny]

I'd think the Russians would've wanted to protect their own cities, planning bureaus, and factories.

At least the Soviet military was fully prepared to have Moscow destroyed and continue fighting for some length of time.

 

[exclaimedleech8]

At least the Soviet military was fully prepared to have Moscow destroyed and continue fighting for some length of time.

Yeah, and the American military was prepared to lose Washington. That doesn't mean anything.

 

[martinbayer]

Lovely slide deck here showing MX MPS (I think). The slides look a bit repetitive; wish it came with the speaker's note that would have accompanied the presentation. I included one interesting image that shows a launch mode where the tube is pushed out the end of the shelter, erected, and launched. The deck also shows what looks like the breakout launcher that was supposed to erect through the shelter roof.

MX MISSILE — writer/editor/reporter

www.sambiddle.com

A psychiatrist most probably wouldn't even know where to begin...

 

[Kat Tsun]

I'd think the Russians would've wanted to protect their own cities, planning bureaus, and factories.

It would be a terrible burden that the international proletariat would remember forever.

The Red Army, which became the sole organization for nuclear planning after the mid-1970s, felt there was a sufficient redundancy in infrastructure and distribution of mechanized equipment that these losses would not interfere with combat operations subsequent to nuclear war.

If the Americans had 20 tanks after the nuclear war and rifle company to defend Western Europe with, the Red Army would have 200 tanks and a motor rifle regiment to attack with, thus victory is assured.

The CPSU disagreed, and this was lodged by refusing to participate in plans where their immediate survival was assumed to be irrelevant, so the war plans of the late Brezhnev era took on rather fatalistic overtones.

 

[exclaimedleech8]

It would be a terrible burden that the international proletariat would remember forever.

The Red Army, which became the sole organization for nuclear planning after the mid-1970s, felt there was a sufficient redundancy in infrastructure and distribution of mechanized equipment that these losses would not interfere with combat operations subsequent to nuclear war.

If the Americans had 20 tanks after the nuclear war and rifle company to defend Western Europe with, the Red Army would have 200 tanks and a motor rifle regiment to attack with, thus victory is assured.

The CPSU disagreed, and this was lodged by refusing to participate in plans where their immediate survival was assumed to be irrelevant, so the war plans of the late Brezhnev era took on rather fatalistic overtones.

It's funny how this divide mirrored itself on both sides of the iron curtain

 

[bobbymike]

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1b1pNKU-lW8&ra=m