Vic could have easily made 20 years of actual service... so ~1980-82 after a 1969-71 Phantomization that made modifications to catapults, arresting gear, support equipment, and a ~1975 overhaul of the boilers' linings etc.
No need to redo everything, as she was in better shape than Ark Royal.

Eagle had just come out of a 5-year rebuild in 1964 and only needed a 12-18 month refit in 1972-73 to update the 3 unmodified arresting engines, add water-cooled JBDs, and support equipment.
Her boilers would need attention in 1978-79, then she could serve until ~1984-85.

Ark badly needed more propulsion plant/auxiliary equipment work than she got, so doing that work in 1980-82 would bring her to the late 1980s or early 1990s.

Ultimately all you're doing is kicking the can down the road, the RN needed new carriers by the 60s and extensive rebuilds of old carriers and even the helicopter cruisers equated to a significant percentage of the cost of CVA01 for a fraction of the capability.

The Ark carried 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneer, 5 Gannet and 5 Sea Kings in the 70s, presumably the Eagle would have carried the same. The Vic was considerably smaller so would have carried less aircraft, likely akin to what the Hermes carried in the late 60s but still cost tens of millions of pounds to convert to last for a decade.

In contrast CVA01 was quoted at 56-70 million pounds just before her cancellation, would have a 30-year life and carry 36 Phantoms and Buccaneers, 5 Gannets and 6 Sea Kings. Bargain!
 
For comparison, Hermes was in service until 2016-17, with refits in :

April 1986
July 1999
Mid-2003-November 2004
August 2008-November 2009
November 2012-July 2013
India, like the South American navies, kept WW2-era ships active far, far longer than the US or any European navy.

India got Vikrant in 1961 and decommissioned her in 1997.
 
Ultimately all you're doing is kicking the can down the road, the RN needed new carriers by the 60s and extensive rebuilds of old carriers and even the helicopter cruisers equated to a significant percentage of the cost of CVA01 for a fraction of the capability.

The Ark carried 12 Phantoms, 14 Buccaneer, 5 Gannet and 5 Sea Kings in the 70s, presumably the Eagle would have carried the same. The Vic was considerably smaller so would have carried less aircraft, likely akin to what the Hermes carried in the late 60s but still cost tens of millions of pounds to convert to last for a decade.

In contrast CVA01 was quoted at 56-70 million pounds just before her cancellation, would have a 30-year life and carry 36 Phantoms and Buccaneers, 5 Gannets and 6 Sea Kings. Bargain!
But Parliament etc made it clear that there would be NO new carriers built in the 1960s or early 1970s... leaving modernizations etc the only remaining possibility for remaining in the fixed-wing carrier game.
 
But Parliament etc made it clear that there would be NO new carriers built in the 1960s or early 1970s... leaving modernizations etc the only remaining possibility for remaining in the fixed-wing carrier game.

That early 1966 decision led to the modernisation of Ark and the order of 48 F4Ks for Ark, Eagle and the HQ sqn, but it certainly didn't put the RN carrier force on a solid footing for the future. That decision was chopped back even further less than 2 years later, with Eagle's Phantom refit being cancelled, 20 F4Ks being diverted to the RAF and the Ark expected to serve only until 1972.

The 1970 Conservative government extended the Ark's life out to 1978 but didn't refit the Eagle as the RAF needed her aircraft.
 
But Parliament etc made it clear that there would be NO new carriers built in the 1960s or early 1970s... leaving modernizations etc the only remaining possibility for remaining in the fixed-wing carrier game.
Someone telling Treasury/Parliament that for the cost of those refits they could get a whole new carrier might have helped.
 
India, like the South American navies, kept WW2-era ships active far, far longer than the US or any European navy.
Which demonstrates the physical service life stretch potential of the hull and machinery. Only when the refits became more frequent (2004 and forward, 4 years cycle) suggests the structure began to deteriorate beyond feasible maintenance level. So by western standard it could have been possible to keep Vic/Eagle/Ark Royal in service till about 2000, and with some effort make a smooth transition into 3-unit QE class. Technically, of course, politics aside.
 
New carriers be acceptable between 1952 to 1966. But threading the needle is no minor feat.
Hence my minor obsession with the Medium Fleet studies. Which could have evolved F4 compatibility but not A5 to F111B to F14 compatibility. Which sadly through OR.346 and the USN influence was almost inevitable on the CVA-01 process.
Now had AFVG continued, this might shift the dial here, since then the future post F4 is visible and not as demanding as the USN platforms.

Post '66 new carriers might become acceptable under 'different circumstances' (the basis of this thread) either in the early 70's or 80's.
 
The window for new carriers is very narrow and depends on a lot of factors.
1967 - Devaluation, big economic problems and little cash for big projects like a couple of new carriers.
1971 - withdrawal from EoS, removes the biggest rationale for the carrier strike fleet at a stroke, but CCH sneaks through as a 'Command' ship given the new ASW emphasis. Arguably the CCH is more important to providing adequate ASW resources. Start of T42/21/22 build programme - Barber's supercharged economy with more ships than planned generally hurts more than it helps (both the RN and the national economy).
1974 - Mason defence review, while things are being cut, the RN succeeds in getting Sea Harrier without much political hassle at all. Shows that some measure of air defence is still sufficiently arguable and that fixed-wing flattops are not taboo.
1975-79 - the building programme is in full swing, CCH, T42, T21, T22 plus Swiftsures. Not much spare cash to fund carriers, the shipbuilding industry is slowly collapsing despite these orders. Building something like a CVA would only be possible in a couple of yards at best.
1980 - Hello Mr Nott....
1983 - post-Falklands boom - spend baby spend! Got to get as much in as you can before Trident subs hoover up the budget in the late 80s.

So for me the 1970s are out for various reasons. I think had Ark and Vic made it through to the early 1980s, that there would be an excellent chance of a new class of CVAs but there would also be replacements for the F-4Js or Ks or whatever model you have and thus falls outside the scope of this thread.
 
Vic could have easily made 20 years of actual service... so ~1980-82 after a 1969-71 Phantomization that made modifications to catapults, arresting gear, support equipment, and a ~1975 overhaul of the boilers' linings etc.
No need to redo everything, as she was in better shape than Ark Royal.

Eagle had just come out of a 5-year rebuild in 1964 and only needed a 12-18 month refit in 1972-73 to update the 3 unmodified arresting engines, add water-cooled JBDs, and support equipment.
Her boilers would need attention in 1978-79, then she could serve until ~1984-85.

Ark badly needed more propulsion plant/auxiliary equipment work than she got, so doing that work in 1980-82 would bring her to the late 1980s or early 1990s.

Behold : HMS Eagle in the Falklands https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/hms-eagle-in-the-falklands-story-only.506141/
 
Medium Fleet Carrier almost threads the needle.
All it needs is either the whole New Carrier effort to start 1950 instead of '52 or to accelerate around 1958 as Victorious is working up for 1960.

Laying down in '55 or '56, one or two such could complete and enter service by the early 60's.
Have one ISD by '63 and Ark Royal gets scrapped due to her poor condition.
Have the other ISD to takeover Hermes, which is sold on.
That leaves an early 60's decision on replacing Victorious and a mid 60's decision on Eagle.

'66 abandonment of new carriers will cull Victorious and Eagle successors.

Two Medium Fleet running on into the 90's.
 
Medium fleet may also work along with the french and their PA58 45000 tons improved Clemenceau. Starting from their common BS.5A catapults... the 199 ft variant. Design an optimized carrier around them, 45000 to 50 000 tons.
 
Of all my virtuous circle fantasies I think the carriers are the hardest in the sense that they're not a single political line-ball decision that can be reversed with different/better advice/argument. However my response to that isn't to aim for a different ship such as the Medium Carrier or Escort Cruiser, but rather to get the CVA01 laid down within the window or clear some political obstacles to widen the window.

The Spey Phantom development cost went from an estimated 25m pounds in early 1964 to some 80-90m pounds in mid/late 1965. Given the fixed budget for FAA fighter procurement this would have put pressure on CVA01 and been another nail in it's coffin. In contrast a J79 F4K Phantom's development would have been orders of magnitude cheaper, taking great pressure off the Navy's procurement and therefore CVA01's budget.
 
There is probably a window '62-'63 were one of the more modest CVA-01 studies could have been given the go ahead. Just need a compromise agreement of the senior figures at that time.

It's likely this is the largest project to then survive Wilson/Heath cull in '65 (beyond Concord) and with MOTS F4K shift the dial over that fateful decision in '66.
But it would help if Type 82 was a bit cheaper....
However this might eat up Ark Royal's funds, but that's a trade worth having to get CVA-01 of some sort into service.

Ironically Victorious might have her galley refurbished '67 and kept on until '72 as planned. Depending on the progress with CVA-01 and the Command Cruiser....
 
.......Wilson/Heath cull in '65

This is the problem I'm trying to solve with my delusions.

With no P1154 and HS681 Wilson/Heath won't face an overwhelming development-procurement crisis in 1965, it will face a couple of big ones (TSR2 and CVA01) and a couple of small ones (P1127 and MOTS F4K) with Buccaneer and Lightning chugging along nicely which would likely result in different decisions.
 
Well if Alerken is right, the argument for NMBR.3 dispersed VTOL delivery of tactical nukes died in '62 along with Dassault's and HSA's designs being declared 'joint' winner.

The French refocus on what became F1 and the UK doubled down on P.1154. Hoping others would buy once the RAF had some in operation.

Arguably if Lightning with or without VG takes tactical lay down and conventional munitions delivery, there isn’t any need to continue with P.1154. But the future is more F2 to Mirage G like and can be pushed off for the next five years. Which might make a synergy with the French....

In turn if VTOL NMBR.3 is dead, VTOL to STOL tactical airlift is released from it's expensive requirements to something more achievable and affordable. HS.681 either morphs or dies come '65.

Leaving TSR.2. Which despite a desire to avoid politics, is as much the victim of the US defining what credit monies can be spent on as anything technical.

And there is the problem. The UK programs will only really survive, if the US credit needed is much less.
 
If the British decide to go with a fighter-bomber Lightning for the 1958 Venom replacement it wouldn't be interested in NBMR3 (and by extension NBMR4) because by August 1961 it would have several Lightning F-B sqns in service with the aircraft for several more already in production. Governments and Air Forces do not lay aside millions of pounds of brand-new aircraft.

I could see Britain being interested in the subsonic NBMR3b published in December 1961 as by then 2 P1127 prototypes were already flying, and the MoS had asked HS for a quote to build 100 of them. Orders for 9 Kestrel evaluation aircraft were placed in May 1962, improving the prospects of the type.

.......victim of the US defining what credit monies can be spent on as anything technical.

And there is the problem. The UK programs will only really survive, if the US credit needed is much less.

What do you mean by this? US or IMF loans, or buying things in USD?
 
Agreed, and probably if it goes through Kestrel might be overtaken by GOR.345 transonic/supersonic at altitude design. But it all depends on money.

On credit.
There is a reminiscence by a certain figure in the cabinet at the time, that suggests the US was effectively determining what the line if credit was spent on. That this is why TSR.2 was really cancelled in favour of F111.
If true, this puts the Spey F4 in another light, as ministers sought to keep more of the money spent in the UK. Rather than cycled back to the US.
The business is an onion of layers as to why this or that was done.
 
Agreed, and probably if it goes through Kestrel might be overtaken by GOR.345 transonic/supersonic at altitude design. But it all depends on money.

Perhaps the P1150 might get some traction, however I think it would be low on the priority list compared to the TSR2 when the P1127 could do much of the job and have some of the development paid for by the US and West Germany.
 
Certainly if the UK commits to Kestrel and does this earlier as in 62-63 could this swing Germany?
 
A switch point I could see is the early 50s, when it was planned to upgrade all of the armoured fleet carriers. Had it been realised, by whatever mechanism, that it was not worth upgrading Illustrious and Formidable, the first four ships may have been dropped from the program, and the Implacables upgraded instead.

The newer larger Implacables would have provided longer life and greater capability but also dropping four ships would have made developing a new medium carrier more critical.
 
A switch point I could see is the early 50s, when it was planned to upgrade all of the armoured fleet carriers. Had it been realised, by whatever mechanism, that it was not worth upgrading Illustrious and Formidable, the first four ships may have been dropped from the program, and the Implacables upgraded instead.

The newer larger Implacables would have provided longer life and greater capability but also dropping four ships would have made developing a new medium carrier more critical.
The plan dates back to the late 1940s, when it was not expected they could get new ships at all before 1954 (and frankly they were mostly correct about that). Illustrious and Indomitable were already dropped early in the program; the problem with upgrading just Implacable and Indefatigable is that they would've required the most work at the time.

This was, in fact, what motivated the Brits to not modernize the two after all the headaches Victorious went through and the existing delays on the ships.

Also, the Implacables are liable to undergo the scope creep Victorious did if they're slotted in in her place.

And the nail in the coffin: by the time the Medium Carrier was being considered the carrier fleet was cut from 12 to 6 ships, meaning that if you have two Implacables being reconstructed instead of one Victorious the urgency is less critical than OTL, not more.
 
The Vic's (and Eagle's) rebuilds were good for about 15 years and was completed in 1958. By the time the Phantom was entering service in 1968 the Vic had about 5 years of comfortable service left in her, so wasn't a good candidate to refit for Phantoms even compared to the less than tip-top Ark Royal.
I think Victorious could have definitely lasted a lot longer than she did at least in terms of hull life, given she’d received new machinery (including a modern AC electrical system, rather than the dated DC systems of her compatriots) and that she was basically a new ship from the waterline up.

Had the Harrier been selected in the 60s to replace the Sea Vixen she may very well have been the first Harrier Carrier.
 
The 1970 Conservative government extended the Ark's life out to 1978 but didn't refit the Eagle as the RAF needed her aircraft.
I was under the impression that the Tories did plan to modernise her but the grounding and then the later O2 plant fire was enough for the Treasury to say nope.
 
The newer larger Implacables would have provided longer life and greater capability but also dropping four ships would have made developing a new medium carrier more critical.
Their Four shafts would have made them better ships too.

Although when you look at it from a 1940s perspective where they didn’t know how bad of a condition Illustrious and especially Formidable would end up in. The three original design Illustrious’ would be a more attractive option since there’s more of them to rebuild to one single design, compared to the two Implacables, and then Indomitable who was her own unique thing.
 
It's likely this is the largest project to then survive Wilson/Heath cull in '65 (beyond Concord) and with MOTS F4K shift the dial over that fateful decision in '66.
But it would help if Type 82 was a bit cheaper....
However this might eat up Ark Royal's funds, but that's a trade worth having to get CVA-01 of some sort into service.
The funny thing about Concorde is how badly Wilson wanted it gone, but he couldn’t because the French (thankfully) stuck a certain clause in the treaty that would have made Britain pay for it even if it had withdrawn.

If he could have cut it he absolutely would have.

So much for the “white heat of technology”
 
A switch point I could see is the early 50s, when it was planned to upgrade all of the armoured fleet carriers. Had it been realised, by whatever mechanism, that it was not worth upgrading Illustrious and Formidable, the first four ships may have been dropped from the program, and the Implacables upgraded instead.

The newer larger Implacables would have provided longer life and greater capability but also dropping four ships would have made developing a new medium carrier more critical.
No by '52 that was ditched and the New Carrier was begun.
 
#496, zen's onion. $. The certain figure was confused. US did not tell UK what to buy. UK secured an IMF loan, 1/12/64 Most IMF money came from US, but the process involves examination of causes of Borrowers' penury and of what fixes are credible. LBJ was not about to assial UK Defence budget, then greater than nearly all his Allies' and was pro UK overseas involvement: unknown to UK he had just authorised Laos Op. Barrel Roll: To PM Wilson, 7/12/64: US “could not (be) gendarmes of the universe. At heart (US is) isolationist (others' effort has) great effect on what (US can do)SecDef:For.Rels,V.XII,W.Europe,UK236,Memo.Conversation,Def.Probs.NARA,RG59,Ball Pps. Lot 74 D272, MLF.4.95/09/11;For.Rel,648,Vol.13,Pres/PM9/12/6. He wanted us there too: boots, not 1xSSBN jostling 6xUSN on Guam: “all we needed was a Regt. The Black Watch would have done.” What SecDef said was: (UK has) projects which made no sense militarily." In 1964 we still hoped MAD would deter, but we now know LBJ's Team recoiled from suicide or surrender, but would need some years to shift NATO to "flexible and appropriate response" which was more expensive (for non-nuclear States). US had already cancelled some, and would chop all notions of AW-launch off dispersed hides. TSR.2, hauling AW and iron, made just as much sense militarily as F-111s, where he spoke of 3,000.

Wilson's line was that East of Suez took £1Bn, 5% of his Defence Budget, so...can you help? So, the credit offer for any-$-thing. Wilson offered £500Mn for 50 TSR.2, but that included all sunk £ (unclear: I think: inc engine - BAC was 20%-owned by Bristol Aeroplane who owned 50% of BSEL - but excluding chunks of avionics outside BAC's control). BAC's Owners declined. 1/68 F-111K chop was precisely because EoS, that last 5% of total defence, was the least painful way to make £ ends meet, post 11/67 £ devaluation.
 
The funny thing about Concorde is how badly Wilson wanted it gone, but he couldn’t because the French (thankfully) stuck a certain clause in the treaty that would have made Britain pay for it even if it had withdrawn.

If he could have cut it he absolutely would have.

So much for the “white heat of technology”

Yep, no escape clause in the 11/1962 agreement - so huuuuge penalties to be paid if canned unilaterally... Wilson ended eating his hat (and trenchcoat).
 
I was under the impression that the Tories did plan to modernise her but the grounding and then the later O2 plant fire was enough for the Treasury to say nope.

I hadn't heard that but don't doubt it was floated as an idea. However 43 sqn RAF was stood up in 1969 with F4Ks, and a Lightning sqn disbanded at about the same time to keep the RAF fighter sqns at 9.

In any case despite the Ark being able to survive until 1979 and I believe the Eagle could go until about 1984 these ships are declining assets. In contrast CVA01 commissioning in the early 70s would have a lifespan of 30 years.
 
I hadn't heard that but don't doubt it was floated as an idea. However 43 sqn RAF was stood up in 1969 with F4Ks, and a Lightning sqn disbanded at about the same time to keep the RAF fighter sqns at 9.

In any case despite the Ark being able to survive until 1979 and I believe the Eagle could go until about 1984 these ships are declining assets. In contrast CVA01 commissioning in the early 70s would have a lifespan of 30 years.
Apparently it was still quite a shock to the navy, given Eagle was in better condition and was probably the only chance Britain had of keeping conventional carriers going, with a the likely possibility of a replacement being built after the Falklands had Eagle performed well in the war.
 
#496, zen's onion. $. The certain figure was confused. US did not tell UK what to buy. UK secured an IMF loan, 1/12/64 Most IMF money came from US, but the process involves examination of causes of Borrowers' penury and of what fixes are credible. LBJ was not about to assial UK Defence budget, then greater than nearly all his Allies' and was pro UK overseas involvement: unknown to UK he had just authorised Laos Op. Barrel Roll: To PM Wilson, 7/12/64: US “could not (be) gendarmes of the universe. At heart (US is) isolationist (others' effort has) great effect on what (US can do)SecDef:For.Rels,V.XII,W.Europe,UK236,Memo.Conversation,Def.Probs.NARA,RG59,Ball Pps. Lot 74 D272, MLF.4.95/09/11;For.Rel,648,Vol.13,Pres/PM9/12/6. He wanted us there too: boots, not 1xSSBN jostling 6xUSN on Guam: “all we needed was a Regt. The Black Watch would have done.” What SecDef said was: (UK has) projects which made no sense militarily." In 1964 we still hoped MAD would deter, but we now know LBJ's Team recoiled from suicide or surrender, but would need some years to shift NATO to "flexible and appropriate response" which was more expensive (for non-nuclear States). US had already cancelled some, and would chop all notions of AW-launch off dispersed hides. TSR.2, hauling AW and iron, made just as much sense militarily as F-111s, where he spoke of 3,000.

Wilson's line was that East of Suez took £1Bn, 5% of his Defence Budget, so...can you help? So, the credit offer for any-$-thing. Wilson offered £500Mn for 50 TSR.2, but that included all sunk £ (unclear: I think: inc engine - BAC was 20%-owned by Bristol Aeroplane who owned 50% of BSEL - but excluding chunks of avionics outside BAC's control). BAC's Owners declined. 1/68 F-111K chop was precisely because EoS, that last 5% of total defence, was the least painful way to make £ ends meet, post 11/67 £ devaluation.

I might be wrong here, I've not looked at Britain and the IMF before and am no economist, but the UK made 6 IMF standby agreements between 1956 and 1963 without drawing on these agreements. Then it drew $1b in 1964, $1.4b in 1968, $1b in 1969, $0.7b in 1975 and $2.25b in 1978, of which only the 1964 and 1968 loans are relevant for this thread and I presume the IMF money was USD.

In 1964 all of British government spending was about 12b pounds with defence being about 2b of that and in 1968 government spending was about 18b pounds with defence still being about 2b of that. The 1964 IMF loan equated to about 357m pounds of 12b and the 1968 loan 583m of 18b pounds. I struggle to believe the international equivalent of borrowing $50 til payday gives the lender great leverage of a sovereign country's foreign and defence policy. It would have some leverage for sure, nobody wants to see you with a slab of beer before you've paid them back that $50, but arranging the cancellation of aircraft projects but not other government spending seems a bit of a stretch. Perhaps the US could use their leverage to push the UK away from the Advanced Gas Reactor and to the Steam Generating Heavy Water Reactor for the next generation nuclear power reactors.
 
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Apparently it was still quite a shock to the navy, given Eagle was in better condition and was probably the only chance Britain had of keeping conventional carriers going, with a the likely possibility of a replacement being built after the Falklands had Eagle performed well in the war.

I don;t deny that, however these carriers will need to be replaced by the late 70s early 80s at the latest, meaning they will have to be laid down from the early 70s at the latest. That might be possible, but I think it's unlikely at best.
 
I hadn't heard that but don't doubt it was floated as an idea. However 43 sqn RAF was stood up in 1969 with F4Ks, and a Lightning sqn disbanded at about the same time to keep the RAF fighter sqns at 9.

In any case despite the Ark being able to survive until 1979 and I believe the Eagle could go until about 1984 these ships are declining assets. In contrast CVA01 commissioning in the early 70s would have a lifespan of 30 years.
30 years without a life extension - Kitty Hawk lasted 48.
 
IIUC the SLEP was akin to the Eagle's rebuild, and similarly gave another 15-20 years.
It wasn't quite as extensive in many ways as Eagle's rebuild, as Eagle needed more structural work to fit an angled deck, steam catapult, and the Type 984, among other improvements.

Eagle's reconstruction entailed:
- removal and replacement of existing flight deck armor with lighter plating
- structural strengthening
- removal of armament
- aviation fuel stowage increased
- steam catapults fitted
- deck blast deflectors fitted
- lifts strengthened
- upgraded arrestor gear
- electrical capacity nearly tripled
- accommodation and air conditioning improved

The Forrestal/Kitty Hawk SLEP entailed:
- refurbishment of hull, machinery, and electrical grid
- repairs to inner bottom and bilge tanks
- replacement of existing armament and sensors
- weapons elevator upgrades
- new arresting gear
- general habitability improvements

Tl;dr the SLEP refits involved more refurbishment than Eagle's reconstruction, but none of the structural work. Not coincidentally, every SLEP refit took less time than Eagle's reconstruction.

A hypothetical CVA-01 SLEP will look more like American SLEPs than Eagle's reconstruction, since CVA-01 already has as built many of the structural capabilities Eagle needed backfitted. That said, I would also expect some actual structural work unlike American SLEPs; mostly, more flight deck around the stern, a major weakness of the design.
 
.........refurbishment of hull, machinery,......

What does this mean exactly?
  • Cutting out and replacing hull plates that are in bad condition, or just a scrape and repaint?
  • Doing enough to the boiler that it doesn't need re-lining for 10-15 years as opposed to 3-4 years that's normal for a ship of that age, or do they just do a standard re-lining?
  • Are reduction gears rebuilt with new bearing etc or are major components replaced?
 
What does this mean exactly?
  • Cutting out and replacing hull plates that are in bad condition, or just a scrape and repaint?
  • Doing enough to the boiler that it doesn't need re-lining for 10-15 years as opposed to 3-4 years that's normal for a ship of that age, or do they just do a standard re-lining?
  • Are reduction gears rebuilt with new bearing etc or are major components replaced?
For the propulsion machinery, some of the turbines were re-bladed and the boilers were rebuilt in place. Anything else I can't specify beyond "if it was a piece of equipment it was probably hauled off and replaced or refurbished".
 
For the propulsion machinery, some of the turbines were re-bladed and the boilers were rebuilt in place. Anything else I can't specify beyond "if it was a piece of equipment it was probably hauled off and replaced or refurbished".

The work on the engines sounds like it would break and restart the cycle of ever-decreasing boiler brick/tile re-lining that drove the life cycle of steam powered warships. Or at least British warships as the last generation of US steam warships seemed to last forever.

But that's getting ahead of ourselves, the danger zone from British hard-power decline was 1957-68.Threading that needle with the best kit is endlessly fascinating to me.
 
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