M1 Abrams MBT Replacement

Ukraine has told us humans tire, robot drones do not. What if the future armor is no crew at all? Robots can search, acquire, build kill chain workflows, and execute dispositions much faster than a human can process. Humans tend to diddle.
Do you really want robots to be making unsupervised kill decisions?
 
Do you really want robots to be making unsupervised kill decisions?
The current consensus is that we want a human to give the go-ahead but for the machine to do all the pre-requisite processes and then ask for permission. This is not a measure to prevent Terminators, rather just a safety measure in the event that the machine is wrong. There are already tests underway at certain research laboratories on the capacity for AI to properly find and identify targets faster than humans. So far, they can find the targets faster but fail to identify them properly. Improvements in software should make their reliability much more consistent over time.
 
To you.

They're actually doing rather well, all things considered, in juggling the tight resource constraints and competing requirements. The M1 is a perfectly serviceable tank as is, with no serious flaws besides "it's a bit heavy", and that's more a concern for expeditionary warfare and crummy bridges I guess.
I'm not saying the M1A2 in its current form isn't a serviceable tank but there should be more planning ahead beyond SEP upgrades. The Army shouldn't take that tech demonstrator as it is and put in production, but they should be working with GD on it and refining it.

AbramsX is just a stupid design in a lot of ways. The ways it isn't are already being explored by Army research, like the Advanced Combat Transmission, datalinked ammunition, drone control, autoloaders, and electric motors for the sprocket for low RPM torque. The diesel engine, battery pack, and optionally manned turret are a bit stupid but are also the main drivers of the design, obviously.

A hybrid-electric drive doesn't require a battery, for one thing, the AbramsX has the battery to enable silent watch in lieu of an APU. Something from FCS days but is probably not really necessary either, and putting it under the turret is just asking for trouble. There's also the issue that the turret as built is already designed for the Trophy, when the Army has pretty clear that it doesn't see Trophy as a particularly good system, just a particularly necessary capability. Get better, GDLS, why aren't using Quick Kill?
I believe batteries in place of an APU have been tried in the past, I don't see them as being an inherently bad idea. I have some concerns about unmanned turrets I'll admit but it definitely has its share of advantages, as would a low profile manned turret. The AGT-1500 has given good service but surely we can do better regardless of if the choice is a new turbine or a diesel.

AbramsX also looks to have the same strain of "compromised turret syndrome" as Type 10, Leclerc, T-64/-72-/-90, and K2. Small wonder these tanks achieve such low battle weights when their protected zones are 15-20% smaller than the M1, Challenger, or Leopard 2.
Why do you consider these designs to have compromised turrets? Besides some of the older Soviet ones there aren't very accurate measurements of the armor or the makeup of the composite armor out there for those designs, at least in the public sphere.

If it's a robotic turret then it's probably too well protected and you only really need like 30mm cannon protection.
For a lighter vehicle I'd agree but not for the purpose of a main battle tank. If a crew loses their gun and everything else to enemy fire they're combat ineffective and of little use, and in their role they're going to be exposed to direct enemy fire a lot more than other vehicles.

This is sort of irrelevant. Trophy is just a particularly bad APS. The only reason people use it as a standard is because it's the first one that got bought in large quantities due to the threat of handheld grenade launchers during the Second Intifada and Cast Lead.
Bad compared to what? Hard-kill APS that are significantly better really haven't been fielded yet. The Army should be working on more capable APS and I hope they are, but for the immediate future Trophy and Iron Fist are what can be fielded. I'd have to expect that a new turret such as that of the tech demonstrator could be designed in a manner allowing it to incorporate other APS in a highly integrated manner and not just Trophy. Fitting any APS to the existing Abrams turret means adding components in a manner that leaves those parts quite exposed, easy to damage, and resulting in a higher than necessary weight increase to the tank.

There's a large battery for powering the electric motors, yes.

It may require the turret be removed to service after every major jolt or jostle. A large reason why electric vehicles tend to be so expensive to repair after extremely minor accidents is due to the fragility of a lithium-ion battery requiring a complete teardown of the vehicle to service.
They've been toying with hybrid electric AFVs for at least two decades now, I'd hope they've been able to resolve most of these challenges. Isn't the OMFV going to be using a hybrid-electric drive too?

Except the US has been planning ahead, and put into production, a bevy of re-armament programs since 2015...

XM7, the XM1299 ERCA, the GMLRS upgrades, the HEMTT Tomahawk launcher, LRHW, etc. Tanks aren't high on the priority list because...the PLA has just now figured out how to make T-80Us I guess lol? ZTZ-99 isn't a particularly frightening tank to an M1 TC, and the M1 has been receiving semi-constant upgrades on a fairly good clip of 6-7 years since 1995, so an M1 today is a bit more muscular than the M1 of 1989.
Yes some progress is finally being made after too many false-starts although some of the specifics leave room for concern. The XM7 has its share of questionable requirements and decisions and I wouldn't be all too surprised if it meets the same fate as the past however many programs there have been to replace the M4. The XM1299 is handicapped by manual loading of those huge charges until it finally gets an autoloader with a pretty low capacity a few years from now. They may be trying to cram too much into the M109A7 hull.

So, either Lima will need to wait until someone makes a tank better than the M1 to see any serious investment in a brand new tank, which seems impossible a task for any opponent we might face; or Lima will need to wait until M1 losses become so catastrophic, yet somehow LATP still exists, to necessitate new hull production.

Both are less compelling than "we have enough M1s to weather the storm" (we have about 5,000 hulls total between SIAD and Army inventory) and "the M1 is a world class tank given proper turret improvements and drive train upgrades" (which is correct until someone's wagon disproves it, but I don't think a 50-ton medium-bordering-on-light ZTZ-99 is gonna be the wagon to do that).

The need for long range guns to duke it out in a thundering rendition of Quemoy and Matsu is a tad more pressing for Army planners.
Decreasing the size of the logistics train necessary for combat operations alone would be enough of a reason to invest in a new MBT or major (A3) upgrade to the Abrams. The way I see it it's better to start work now than later.
 
Regarding laser weapons for a ground battlefield, I think that they wouldn't replace the gun, not even necessarily as the primary weapon of a military's armoured vehicles.
Laser is more like machineguns, ammo is so cheap that you can constantly fire without needing to detect the opponent. Ultimately lasers is the few real countermeasure to small and invisible threats that currently difficult to counter.

New propulsion concept for projectiles on the other hand, will change very little since within the direct fire context, current propellants are "good enough."

So any army in the OECD? Got it.
If you are under a reliable nuclear umbrella, tanks is indeed for beating up far weaker powers and proxy/limited conflicts.

Since offensive warfare without at least Iraq-US levels of mismatch is probably a horrible idea, armor overmatch doesn't matter because the enemy ought to be too weak to employ armor. Armor have too much logistics and systematic requirements that is easy to disrupt. Israel style HAPC/HIFV for all around protection would be vehicle of choice in reducing losses.

In the context of proxy war, I think easy to supply, easy to train items is far more decisive. You can fly tens of thousands of rounds of ATGM into a place and equip the local force in no time, while getting even a few MBT into the fight takes like a year.
 
If you are under a reliable nuclear umbrella, tanks is indeed for beating up far weaker powers and proxy/limited conflicts.

We'll see how this plays out in the coming months, I guess, considering both the US and PRC are gearing up for a major war within 5 years. ADM Donaldson pegged June-August 2027 based on a speech given by Chairman Xi back in March; GEN Minihan thinks 2025, presumably based on the election of William Lai to presidency after Tsai Ing-wen. DOD seems to be swinging more towards the sooner, rather than later, date in its planning.

Somehow I doubt Taiwan will be thankful if it has to fight a land invasion unsupported because "it's under a reliable nuclear umbrella". There will be tank battles between superpowers in any case, or at least, battles involving tanks and both superpowers' troops. Possibly more than that.

Since offensive warfare without at least Iraq-US levels of mismatch is probably a horrible idea, armor overmatch doesn't matter because the enemy ought to be too weak to employ armor.

If ISIS can use tanks, which they did, anyone can use tanks...

Yes, people die in wars. That comes with the territory. Not much you can do about it past a point.

The PLA has lots of tanks, I don't know what you're talking about. They're not especially advanced or ultra-modern vehicles, comparable to the M1A1(HA) at best maybe, but they're okay in general. Making sweeping statements like "armor overmatch is a luxury" sounds less like a serious statement in real life contexts of M1 replacement though. The M1's armor is perfectly fine for most of, if not any of, the anti-tank threats in the world.

Part of the reason OMT was so limited and Decisive Lethality Platform is so nascent is that the actual improvements M1 needs are shrouded and obscured by the mists of time. There's simply no vehicle comparable enough to the M1 used by any hypothetical opponents, unless America returns to the early 1990's and starts economically and militarily feuding with the European Union or something, and even then it's debatable.

Armor have too much logistics and systematic requirements that is easy to disrupt. Israel style HAPC/HIFV for all around protection would be vehicle of choice in reducing losses.

These are literally two mutually exclusive statements.

In the context of proxy war,

What proxy war? Where? With who? When?

The United States is preparing to fight another nuclear superpower for dominance in a war whose importance has not been seen since 1939, and in the midst of the sort of political-economic competition whose stakes most weird pundits and talking heads thought vanished in 1991, so talking about "proxy wars" like they're a concern for U.S. troops (who are only in Ukraine as foreign mercenaries and special operations troops) and some war that happened 20 years ago (Iraq) comes off as simultaneously inane and outdated.

Proxy wars aren't the future unless you've been living under a rock for the past decade or so: The future is at minimum major naval war, and possible land war, and at maximum a limited thermonuclear exchange, centered in East Asia. Tanks are pretty relevant for the time being, as they always have been. Seems like all the proxy wars of the early XXI and late XX were just, as usual, colonial sideshows and bizarre flailing of a superpower without a foe.

I think easy to supply, easy to train items is far more decisive.

That's great but America has trouble producing enough barrels for 5.56mm rifles, let alone main battle tanks. In relative terms, we have a more useful quantity of tanks than rifles, and probably a more useful quantity of AFVs in general than most man-portable weapons, so the main constraining factor (besides manpower) itself in raising formations will be finding sufficient small arms and CSWs for them.

You can fly tens of thousands of rounds of ATGM into a place

If only we could make that many. If only we had that many...

and equip the local force in no time,

Taiwan has plenty of anti-tank weapons. Their lack is in aviation and warships. Ukraine has taken literally over a year to receive enough weapons of all forms to form roughly two and a half brigades of tanks and mechanized infantry, which they've since split into four brigades.

Expect it to be worse in a major war in Asia because supply lines will be actually getting attacked lol.

while getting even a few MBT into the fight takes like a year.

Ukraine tells us that it's more important to have MBTs available at all times in reserves, and even old ones, like Sixties or Centurions, can be useful. A year is both almost nothing for a medium-intensity war like Ukraine, Korea, Vietnam, or WW2, obviously.

After all, Ukraine took a year to receive more than 10,000 Javelins. That's hardly "no time", as you claim, and actually about the same amount of time to receive M1A1s. It will probably take longer to ship anti-tank missiles to Taiwan simply because they're already trained on M1A1s though.
 
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This may seem like an absolute obvious observation in the “well duh of course” category but it seems:

1) There has been, developed and tested, many technologies that could significantly improve MBT performance
2) It is ultimately not “game changing” enough nor is it worth the price to build new fleets of armored vehicles
 
Does anyone know if the proposed M1 Abrams X can accommodate any of the proposed 130 mm or larger tank guns?
Well, the old 140mm gun is a direct replacement for the 120mm, the 120mm breech and barrel diameter are the same as the 140mm.

I'm not sure about the new 130mm.
 
Yes. However, the Abrams-X has an entirely new turret. The new turret is suppose to accommodate an auto-loader, plus be able to launch one-way attack drones (loitering munitions), such as the Switchblade and support a 30mm cannon. Is there still room for the larger breech and ammo within the new turret configuration?
 
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Yes. However, the Abrams-X has an entirely new turret. The new turret is suppose to accommodate an auto-loader, plus be able to launch one-way attack drones(loitering munitions), such as the Switchblade and support a 30mm cannon. Is there still room for the larger breech and ammo within the new turret configuration?

The 130mm ammo is substantially longer than 120mm (but not much, if any, wider). I don't think the example of Abrams X we've seen so far is designed with that ammo in mind, but it's literally a one-off demonstrator. If there was a desire to switch to 130mm, it would require a new, longer, turret design, but it would be doable.
 
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Yes. However, the Abrams-X has an entirely new turret. The new turret is suppose to accommodate an auto-loader, plus be able to launch one-way attack drones(loitering munitions), such as the Switchblade and support a 30mm cannon. Is there still room for the larger breech and ammo within the new turret configuration?
I think the Abrams-X turret was set up around the 120mm, so it would take some re-working of the internals to fit 130mm or 140mm ammo. Those are twice the length of 120mm.
 
That's what I thought. Thanks for confirming! Here is an image of turret testing by General Dynamics (Note the absence of many of the port and starboard features from the completed prototype) :

1693788275051.png
 
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[Opposed Piston diesels are] pretty bad in tanks.
That's specifically the 5TD in the T64. Other places have been using opposed piston engines for decades without issue. Example: USN subs (pre-Virginia class) use a 1930s design Fairbanks-Morse 38D 8 1/8" as the emergency diesel generator. Virginia class doesn't because the doofus engineers packed the hull too tight to fit in a 38D, so they have a newer Cat engine. I expect that the Columbia class subs will stick with Cat engines.

And then there's the old Dark-class MTBs and Nasty-class PT boats, which used Napier Deltics. 3 banks of opposed pistons arranged in a triangle shape for even more complexity. With supercharger blowers for exhaust scavenging because it's a two-stroke, and then turbochargers on top of that for boost for the MTB/PT boats. Other users were Ton- and Hunt-class Minesweepers, who absolutely loved the very smooth running engines; as well as British Railways Class 55 and Class 23 locomotives; and the NYPD for their super pumper system to fight high-rise fires.

The non-turbocharged Deltics could make 2500hp at 2000rpm for 15 minutes, or 1875hp at 1700rpm continuous. As fitted in the Nasty class they made more like 3100hp (I think, wiki is unclear. May really be 6200hp each, as the throttle throw past the continuous HP rating overrode the fuel racks and basically put the engine into a near-runaway state), but if you exceeded 15minutes at that power you had to pull the engines for overhaul right then. At the continuous 1875hp, they'd last 10,000 hours between overhauls, almost 2 years of continuous running.

What's especially odd is the AbramsX is using the 8-cylinder version, not the 12-cylinder one explicitly for MBTs.
Again, hybrid driveline, and I believe parallel hybrid like a Prius in this case. Which requires an even larger capacity battery pack than an Abrams already has normally, especially since the SEP2 package replaced 1/4 the battery pack with an APU. Or maybe they just replaced the lead-acid batteries in the original battery packs with lithium batteries, which would give about 5-6x the capacity by either weight or volume.

Using a battery-backed hybrid power pack allows you to use an engine sized for the average power demand, not sized for the maximum demand.

Electric motors for torque when the driver is demanding more than the diesel can deliver. Diesel sized for (slightly above) average power demands, say, doing 70kph on-road. Electric motors augment the power when going 50kph off-road, or 100kph on-road. Slightly above average demand so that it can keep the batteries at about 85% charge.

And because the engine you have spends most of the time closer to the design load instead of only rarely getting to the design load, that further improves fuel economy. Not quite as good as a series hybrid setup where the engine spins at best-economy RPM 24/7 driving a generator with no mechanical connection to the final drive, but closer to that ideal.
 
The L60 in the Chieftain didn't exactly cover itself in glory either. Oil, yes. Glory, no. Although it was apparently reasonable enough after a decade or two of working out the kinks.
Wasn't that a result of the multifuel requirement, plus the assumed 2hr combat life of the tank where they'd just replace the engine after each battle?
 
Also it should be pointed out that there are many NEW designs for opposing pistol engines as well that have a good reputation.

Tech has move a whole lot since the days of the L60.

But I say a modernize turbine will do fine.

It not only lighter with more power, but so long as it properly filtered, turbines been shown to be stupidly reliable.

Which are extremely important for tanks.

Only issues is idle fuel consumption, which is easy fixed by a APU resulting in the same M1A2 Sep3 having the same mileage as the diesel Leopard.

And the Exhaust, is largely an idle issue, and can be fixed by the same trick as what Stealth Copter use. Only reason why the M1 hasn't got it is the double combo of no space or budget.
 
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Also it should be pointed out that there are many NEW designs for opposing pistol engines as well that have a good reputation.

Tech has move a whole lot since the days of the L60.

But I say a modernize turbine will do fine.

It not only lighter with more power, but so long as it properly filtered, turbines been shown to be stupidly reliable.

Which are extremely important for tanks.

Only issues is idle fuel consumption, which is easy fixed by a APU resulting in the same M1A2 Sep3 having the same mileage as the diesel Leopard.

And the Exhaust, is largely an idle issue, and can be fixed by the same trick as what Stealth Copter use. Only reason why the M1 hasn't got it is the double combo of no space or budget.
Understood turbine engines only approach the fuel efficiency of diesels if the compressor is operating at 90% plus rpm, so question is what percentage of time is the tank turbine operating in that range, would guess limited time.

The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) have invested heavily in recent years in the Cummins Advanced Combat Engine (ACE), a compact modular range of fuel efficient diesel two stoke opposed cylinder engines, configured in 3 cylinder, 4 cylinder, and 6 cylinder arrangements to deliver power ranging from 750 to 1,500 horsepower.

Assuming TARDEC only making that investment in ACE as in their judgement its the better option than the turbine option?
 
Understood turbine engines only approach the fuel efficiency of diesels if the compressor is operating at 90% plus rpm, so question is what percentage of time is the tank turbine operating in that range, would guess limited time.

The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) have invested heavily in recent years in the Cummins Advanced Combat Engine (ACE), a compact modular range of fuel efficient diesel two stoke opposed cylinder engines, configured in 3 cylinder, 4 cylinder, and 6 cylinder arrangements to deliver power ranging from 750 to 1,500 horsepower.

Assuming TARDEC only making that investment in ACE as in their judgement its the better option than the turbine option?
They must be considering hybrid, so electric final drive, then you can run the turbine for a few minutes, charge the batteries and then sit on the batteries. If encamped, a roll up solar panel would be a big help. massive fuel efficiency gains versus idling engines.
 
The M88A3 is getting a conventional drivetrain with the M1's X1100 transmission mated to the ACE 6-cylinder.

The only people talking about hybrid drivetrains are General Dynamics salespeople.
 
The M88A3 is getting a conventional drivetrain with the M1's X1100 transmission mated to the ACE 6-cylinder.

The only people talking about hybrid drivetrains are General Dynamics salespeople.
Are you sure? Most articles on it (BAE itself) mention a Caterpillar C32 ACERT diesel V12. Maybe you confused the ACERT with ACE?
 
Are you sure? Most articles on it (BAE itself) mention a Caterpillar C32 ACERT diesel V12. Maybe you confused the ACERT with ACE?

Might be early onset dementia but I could have swore there was an Army article talking about ACE and M88A3.
 
Might be early onset dementia but I could have swore there was an Army article talking about ACE and M88A3.

Cummins has definitely talked about the ability of the ACE to fit in the M88 but it would have to be the next gen, I think.


A special consideration that went into the engineering of ACE was to ensure that it could fit into the engine compartments of tanks [sic] such as the M88.
 
Wasn't that a result of the multifuel requirement, plus the assumed 2hr combat life of the tank where they'd just replace the engine after each battle?
L60 would take between 18 to 24 real time hours to change from diesel to petrol and no, no plans to change the engine after each battle. Simple logistics suggest changing fuel type was never going to happen and it was not even rehearsed in units. We were too busy replacting engines that farted their internals due to hydraulic and coolant issues I have listed elsewhere.

We were the first unit to get Challenger so missed the supposed reliability improvements but I have spoken to people who were involved. One suggestion was to fill the bottom of the engine compartment with sand to block any oil leaks, I know hardly realistic.
 
Understood turbine engines only approach the fuel efficiency of diesels if the compressor is operating at 90% plus rpm, so question is what percentage of time is the tank turbine operating in that range, would guess limited time.

The U.S. Army Tank Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC) have invested heavily in recent years in the Cummins Advanced Combat Engine (ACE), a compact modular range of fuel efficient diesel two stoke opposed cylinder engines, configured in 3 cylinder, 4 cylinder, and 6 cylinder arrangements to deliver power ranging from 750 to 1,500 horsepower.

Assuming TARDEC only making that investment in ACE as in their judgement its the better option than the turbine option?
Is the Army looking at tge ACE for the M1 or just the 20 odd other diesel vehicles?

Cause everything I see of the Ace says it being looked at for replacing all the M109, M2/3 Bradleys, XM1299, M88 and like diesel engines.

Only time I seen the M1 on the list is on forums or when 3rd party articles put Tanks as the descriptor for what its going in. Or the concept car that is the AbramsX.

I have yet to see an Army Article stating use for the M1.

Also the ACE 6 cylinder does weight bit over 1000 pounds [3571lb/1600 kg dry] compare to ATG1500 at [2,500 lb/1,100 kg dry].

Which is a fairly major consideration considering that unless you want to drop armor or crew.

The next best way to loss weight on a tank is counting the small stuff like that.

Also while the Abrams is running, as in bumbling around at speeds faster then 10 mph, so basically everywhere but motorpool, the turbine is running at around 90 percent RPM with the gearing and light throttle control doing most of the speed control work.
 
L60 would take between 18 to 24 real time hours to change from diesel to petrol and no, no plans to change the engine after each battle. Simple logistics suggest changing fuel type was never going to happen and it was not even rehearsed in units. We were too busy replacting engines that farted their internals due to hydraulic and coolant issues I have listed elsewhere.

We were the first unit to get Challenger so missed the supposed reliability improvements but I have spoken to people who were involved. One suggestion was to fill the bottom of the engine compartment with sand to block any oil leaks, I know hardly realistic.
You might want to edit the wikipedia article, then, because they're claiming that since the average battle was expected to be 2 hours, they would pull and swap the power packs (which could be done in an hour and a half or so).

Maintenance​

The Chieftain's L60 engine and cooling system were designed into an integrated engine-pack which could be changed "in the field" using the crane of an FV434 Armoured Repair Vehicle, which had been designed for this purpose and a complete engine change took around one-and-a-half, to 2 hours.

The requirement for an easily changeable engine pack was the result of a British Army analysis of previous tank battles that concluded that a likely future tank battle would last no longer than two hours and so the most demanding requirement expected for any tank engine during wartime would be for it to be run at full power for this total amount of time only and so it would then be advantageous for it to be removed from the vehicle after the battle and exchanged for a fresh engine within a minimum of time.[viii]

This would also allow the engines to be worked on in properly equipped REME workshops rather than 'in the field', the engines being exchanged between vehicles and workshops as-and-when required.[ix] This philosophy was also applied to the contemporary FV430 series of vehicles.
Middle paragraph bold+italics by me.
 
You might want to edit the wikipedia article, then, because they're claiming that since the average battle was expected to be 2 hours, they would pull and swap the power packs (which could be done in an hour and a half or so).


Middle paragraph bold+italics by me.
Yet one the Chieftain Replacement Program reports says: 1693856981538.png
8 hours
 
I cannot account for wiki articles or their so called sources but, having served on Chieftain, Chellenger and FV432 (Unit medic 81-84) those figures are nowhere near doable in peace time. We avaeraged 8 hours to simply swap an engine.

My ambulance? I signed for it in 81 but the engine had been condemned in 79, the head was warped. We used to get jets of flame into the commanders/crivers compartment and it would not hot start. We were so chronically short of spares we were limited by rev counter numbers which we had to report twice a day for every vehicle.

Now, transfer that situation to war time and interdicted supplies and the whole thing comes acrosss as misinformation.

Of all the unit crash outs between 1976 and 1984, how many times do you think we got all vehicles out of camp and into the innitial deployment locations?

Zero.

To achieve any kind of result, we had to resort to towning vehicles out of camp and that could take one or two days more than the two hours we were allocated.

Are you seeing a pattern between so called government and army claims and reality yet?

If I had not been sitting down when I read that clip, I would have been on my 'arris, laughing it off. No, I tried correcting wiki with reality checks but the weenies kept changing it back to their bible settings. Sadski, really sadski.
 
I cannot account for wiki articles or their so called sources but, having served on Chieftain, Chellenger and FV432 (Unit medic 81-84) those figures are nowhere near doable in peace time. We avaeraged 8 hours to simply swap an engine.

My ambulance? I signed for it in 81 but the engine had been condemned in 79, the head was warped. We used to get jets of flame into the commanders/crivers compartment and it would not hot start. We were so chronically short of spares we were limited by rev counter numbers which we had to report twice a day for every vehicle.

Now, transfer that situation to war time and interdicted supplies and the whole thing comes acrosss as misinformation.

Of all the unit crash outs between 1976 and 1984, how many times do you think we got all vehicles out of camp and into the innitial deployment locations?

Zero.

To achieve any kind of result, we had to resort to towning vehicles out of camp and that could take one or two days more than the two hours we were allocated.
Ouch, that's far worse than I expected...


Are you seeing a pattern between so called government and army claims and reality yet?
Oh, I'm well aware that the difference between specifications and reality is often vast.


If I had not been sitting down when I read that clip, I would have been on my 'arris, laughing it off. No, I tried correcting wiki with reality checks but the weenies kept changing it back to their bible settings. Sadski, really sadski.
We ever meet up, first beer is on me.
 
I cannot account for wiki articles or their so called sources but, having served on Chieftain, Chellenger and FV432 (Unit medic 81-84) those figures are nowhere near doable in peace time. We avaeraged 8 hours to simply swap an engine.

My ambulance? I signed for it in 81 but the engine had been condemned in 79, the head was warped. We used to get jets of flame into the commanders/crivers compartment and it would not hot start. We were so chronically short of spares we were limited by rev counter numbers which we had to report twice a day for every vehicle.

Now, transfer that situation to war time and interdicted supplies and the whole thing comes acrosss as misinformation.

Of all the unit crash outs between 1976 and 1984, how many times do you think we got all vehicles out of camp and into the innitial deployment locations?

Zero.

To achieve any kind of result, we had to resort to towning vehicles out of camp and that could take one or two days more than the two hours we were allocated.

Are you seeing a pattern between so called government and army claims and reality yet?

If I had not been sitting down when I read that clip, I would have been on my 'arris, laughing it off. No, I tried correcting wiki with reality checks but the weenies kept changing it back to their bible settings. Sadski, really sadski.
The British Army truly was a logistical hell on Earth. Do you recall broadly what steps were required to swap the engine and how long each step took, to compare with other vehicles? Would explain the time.
 
Also while the Abrams is running, as in bumbling around at speeds faster then 10 mph, so basically everywhere but motorpool, the turbine is running at around 90 percent RPM with the gearing and light throttle control doing most of the speed control work.
Would think that very unlikely that while bumbling around at speeds faster than 10 mph the turbine running at 90 percent power, approx 1,300 hp, more likely at a lower power/lower rpm in turbine's gas guzzling range.

The Army ASM (armored systems modernization) program, cancelled back in '92, with its planned Block III tank to replace the M1A2 Abrams called for a 50% cut in fuel consumption and a power pack 40% smaller than the AGT1500/X-1100-3B.

Assuming today TARDAC still aiming for similar specs or better for a new tank power pack.
 
Ouch, that's far worse than I expected...



Oh, I'm well aware that the difference between specifications and reality is often vast.



We ever meet up, first beer is on me.
With respect, that honour will be mine mate.
The British Army truly was a logistical hell on Earth. Do you recall broadly what steps were required to swap the engine and how long each step took, to compare with other vehicles? Would explain the time.
Essentially, the LAD were time constrained and reality meant triage was the order of every day. Vehicles requiring smaller effort to fix/get moving got priority. Engine swaps done at night when play for the day had ceased.

Considering these efforts, any work done at night was with heavily fatigued support crews. Added to that, the floors of these vehicles had something like three to six inches of sludge in the engine bays/below the turret basket. Oil, grease and all kinbds of carp made the job harder to do. Remember, knackered and jaded crew/support crew.

In one of my stints as a gunner, we had a fire in the crud under the turret basket and it essentially got to my feet and lower legs in short order. Newbee commanders say's, "I don't care, engage the target. Stay on mission". Afeter a few seconds, my second word to him was 'off'.

Considering the small space available, I managed to climb over the fatherless boy and if I remember correctly delivered a few boots to the head. Sorry, my bad, boss. I was informed that charges were being considered for abandoning my post but that never happened. Scalded legs means that hair on my lower legs grows only in a few patches which looks odd while I wear my preferred shorts but no real lasting damage.

Getting back to my point/opinion, take a look at the current tactics in the Ukraine and this is where BAOR would have ended up. LAD were short staffed and overworked. They would not be risked in a situation where engine swap was the only option (Or similar level of commitment), the crew where possible would be recovered and the vehicle made beyond use/abandoned. If you take a look at current Ukraine operations on both sides, you will see that a lot of the drone attacks are on vehicles already abandoned.

You use your resources with care or the bigger picture becomes very small and very quickly.
 
M1A2 SEPV4 has been cancelled, the M1 program is now moving to a more substantial and ground-up update they're calling M1E3.
 
so basically an entirely new tank which is good news. the ukraine war has provided valuable lessons. glad leadership is adapting quickly and decisively.
 

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