Japanese Shuttle, Space Plane & other Projects

[Grey Havoc]

PAYLOAD BOOMERANG TECHNOLOGY DESCRIBED

Tokyo KOGIKEN NYUSU in Japanese Sep 86 pp 1-2

[Article by Akira Onchi]

[Text] Payload boomerang technology means that after an experimental PS
(payload satellite) is launched from the SS (space station) into space and
experiments are performed while flying the experimental PS in space, the
experimental PS will be recovered by the SS. Such an experimental PS can be
regarded as a kind of free flier, and compared with free fliers which are
usually considered, it is possible readily and inexpensively to perform
repeated experiments by using such an experimental PS. It is necessary to
collect basic data on space experiments, and it can be considered that this
payload boomerang technology is extremely useful because experiments can be
performed readily and repeatedly.

The PS which has been assumed up to now has a mass of 500 kg, a flight time of
several hours or 10-odd hours, and a relative speed of less than 100 cm per
second against the SS. A gravity environment of 10~6 gravity or 10 gravity
will be realized. Also as mentioned later on, the PS will correct its orbit
by opening an aerodynamic parachute and changing the aerodynamic resistance
during flight. Figure 1 shows an imaginary picture of PSs, which will land
and take off from the top of a DTB (deployable truff beam) which will be
installed on the module of the SS.

The payload boomerang technology is characterized by the fact that the orbit
of PSs is controlled by positively using aerodynamics in a rarefied atmospher-eat
an altitude of 400 to 500 km. The movement of the PS and SS will be
mentioned in the item "dynamics" including aerodynamics. Inoue, an engineer
with the First Aerodynamics Division, has calculated the perturbation on the
assumption that the orbit is close to a circle, and has made a program and an
equation for indicating the orbit, which can be put to practical use. Figure
2 is an example of the above calculation and shows the relation between the
polar coordinates R and 0 Phi of the orbit. All land and take-off places are
located 30 meters below the center of gravity of the SS. The circular mark
means the orbit in which a PS opens a parachute at 3,800 seconds after it is
launched from the SS, and after 7,600 seconds, it will return to the SS. The
launch speed is 11.7 cm per second. The return orbit and launch speed are
related to the altitude of the SS, solar direction, shape (aerodynamic
resistance) of the PS, etc. When the value of these items is different from
that of the items during the actual flight of the PS, the PS may deviate from
its orbit and may not be able to return to the SS. For example, when the
value of the launch speed is different from that of the actual one by 5
percent and is 12.3 cm per second, as shown in dotted lines in Figure 2, the
orbit will deviate 80 meters from its return position. In such a case, the
deviated orbit can be corrected to its original return orbit by changing the
time for opening a parachute. The asterisk shown in Figure 2 is an example of
the corrected orbit. It can be appreciated that when the time for opening a
parachute is determined at 4,600 seconds after a PS is launched, the PS will
return to a place close to its landing and take-off place. In the case of
actual flight, the initial orbit of the PS will be chased, the time for
opening a parachute will be calculated on the basis of data obtained from this
chase, and this time will be corrected in accordance with instructions given
from the outside (for example, the SS). As mentioned up to now, the
correction of the orbit of the PS is carried out by controlling the time for
opening a parachute. This correction work does not need any active control
according to the jet.

The main processes in the use of the payload boomerang technology are the
launching of a PSS from the SS, flight (experiment), opening of a parachute,
and recovery of the PSS to the SS. A unit for launching PSs must have the
very small error of the launching speed. Also, the PS must be constructed so
that it can smoothly open a parachute in accordance with instructions given
from the outside. It is necessary to make the unit and PS on an experimental
basis and to conduct preliminary tests for them, because they will be operated
in a weightless environment. The method of throwing a net and direct
acquisition according to a manipulator can be considered as methods of
recovering the PS. Also, it is desirable to design a PS so that the
restoring force of both aerodynamic torque and gravitational inclination
torque can act on the PS, because the attitude stability must be ensured in
the PS during flight. The above topics are presently being studied.

It is not long since research on the payload boomerang technology was started
and there are many problems which should be solved from now on, but
preliminary experiments will be performed by using a space shuttle at a stage
in which research is promoted to some extent. This is because it is
considered that these preliminary experiments are effective for the future
PS.

20,143/9599
CSO: 4306/2534

http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a348897.pdf

 

[OM]

http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000292152

...Thank you, sir, for the chart post. A student of my brother's sent an RFI to me yesterday asking if I had comparative info between the Proton, Atlas and Ariane boosters for a report he's working on. This should give him enough data start with, after which he can hit Mark Wade to help do his homework for him

 

[Grey Havoc]

I'm glad that I was of help.

 

[Stargazer]

According to TsAGI's Tekhnicheskaya Informatsiya (No.20, 1983) this was a Japanese space shuttle project. I never realized that Japan had begun working that early on a shuttle of their own, nor that they had a program that was designed so closely along the lines of Rockwell's general configuration (despite a smaller size and very different tail and rear).

 

[Michel Van]

According to TsAGI's Tekhnicheskaya Informatsiya (No.20, 1983) this was a Japanese space shuttle project. I never realized that Japan had begun working that early on a shuttle of their own, nor that they had a program that was designed so closely along the lines of Rockwell's general configuration (despite a smaller size and very different tail and rear).

That's must be a early study of HOPE shuttle in begin 1980s or so.
so far i know the Japanese start around 1978 on HOPE.

 

[blackstar]

I've never seen a good detailed discussion of just what Japan did on HOPE. Did it ever get past basic paper studies to the point where they started to do more detailed design work? I don't think so. But I just don't know.

 

[Grey Havoc]

Regarding the design for the H3: http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0002276630

 

[Grey Havoc]

Some more stuff from 1989 on Japanese goals and projects for space can be found in this old JPRS report: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a347751.pdf

 

[Grey Havoc]

Japan launches first military communications satellite (Reuters)

The first official satellite, that is.

 

[blackstar]

Japan launches first military communications satellite (Reuters)

The first official satellite, that is.

I'm sure they have rented commercial transponders for decades. And they may have even had access to an encrypted American comm channel for naval operations.

 

[hesham]

From L+K 14/1986,

the Japanese HIMES in details.

 

[Vahe Demirjian]

I'm curious. Does anyone have an idea of which Japanese company or institution conceived this hypersonic airliner design?

 

[blackkite]

Hi!

https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/japanese-nal-hypersonic-spaceplane.3238/

https://repository.exst.jaxa.jp/dspace/bitstream/a-is/459735/1/AA1530023015.pdf

 

[hesham]

From Aviation magazine 1989.

 

[TheKutKu]

in the late 80s and early 90s NASDA was deep into the HOPE program, in the end the budget was not negligible, the equivalent of over a billion current dollars were invested into it through the decade!

After the HOPE-X demonstrator, the operational manned HOPE spacecraft was planned. However there was a fundamental problem: with a mass already predicted to be over 20 tons, no Japanese launcher could send it to orbit! A new variant of the H-II, then in development, was necessary.

However at the time the H-II's main engine, the advanced closed cycle hydrolox LE-7, was running 2 years behind schedule, suffering repeated explosions and development problems (including one which killed a worker) and was looking to be as expensive as a RS-25. Duplicating it like in the H-IIB or the famous two and three cores H-IIA 212/222 was therefore not attractive yet.

The other options? MOAR BOOSTERS.
Enter the six-boosters H-IID,

no they didn't skip B and C; D is for "Derivative"

source: Concept and Technology Development for HOPE Spaceplane, 1991

But it had a... peculiar staging. You've heard of air-started SRBs like the Ariane 3 or the SRB-X? Air-started hypergolic liquid cores like GSLV or Titan IV? Well here you have 4 pad-started SRBs, followed by 2-air started SRBs once they burn out, followed then by the hot-staged, air-started hydrolox core!

source: same as above

Concept Study of HOPE

Access full-text academic articles: J-STAGE is an online platform for Japanese academic journals.

www.jstage.jst.go.jp

Japanese Launch Vehicle Propulsion - Status and Direction, 1991

H-IID (Japan) Total height 49 m Thrust ・・・ 110+ Booster 320t x 6* Capable of launching a 20t payload to an altitude of 460 km. Launch vehicle for Japan's planned cargo shuttle HOPE.
*I think it's more 320t * 3.


You've probably already seen this concept art, which was shared earlier this thread

Well, if you squint, you can see that it actually took this particular "asparagus" staging into account!

However, around 1991-1992, there were already doubts that such monster would be capable of lifting the 20 tons HOPE

Europe and Asia in Space, 1991-1992.

This is reminescent of the Hermes mass creep...

Eventually HOPE would be cancelled, H-II after a rough start would eventually get a good reliability, and more ambitious multi-core or multi-LE-7 designs were conceived, eventually becoming the H-IIB.

 

[martinbayer]

in the late 80s and early 90s NASDA was deep into the HOPE program, in the end the budget was not negligible, the equivalent of over a billion current dollars were invested into it through the decade!

After the HOPE-X demonstrator, the operational manned HOPE spacecraft was planned. However there was a fundamental problem: with a mass already predicted to be over 20 tons, no Japanese launcher could send it to orbit! A new variant of the H-II, then in development, was necessary.

This is reminescent of the Hermes mass creep...

Eventually HOPE would be cancelled, H-II after a rough start would eventually get a good reliability, and more ambitious multi-core or multi-LE-7 designs were conceived, eventually becoming the H-IIB.

Just like Hermes was a European mini Space Shuttle aspirational me too vanity project, so was HOPE with respect to both Shuttle and Hermes. Budget/cost constraints, lack of clear mission needs, requirements and mass creep, TRL deficiencies, and changing priorities put paid to both.

 

[TheKutKu]

in the late 80s and early 90s NASDA was deep into the HOPE program, in the end the budget was not negligible, the equivalent of over a billion current dollars were invested into it through the decade!

After the HOPE-X demonstrator, the operational manned HOPE spacecraft was planned. However there was a fundamental problem: with a mass already predicted to be over 20 tons, no Japanese launcher could send it to orbit! A new variant of the H-II, then in development, was necessary.

This is reminescent of the Hermes mass creep...

Eventually HOPE would be cancelled, H-II after a rough start would eventually get a good reliability, and more ambitious multi-core or multi-LE-7 designs were conceived, eventually becoming the H-IIB.

Just like Hermes was a European mini Space Shuttle aspirational me too vanity project, so was HOPE with respect to both Shuttle and Hermes. Budget/cost constraints, lack of clear mission needs, requirements and mass creep, TRL deficiencies, and changing priorities put paid to both.

I recently read that the cost of the HOPE demonstrator program in the 1987-1997 period was about 400 million dollars at the time.

And then I also read that the cost of the cancelled Maia demonstrator for Hermes, which was seriously considered in the 1986-1987 period was estimated to be in the 250-400 MAU (basically euro, slightly more than a dollar) range.

Apparently NASDA-ESA collaboration on hermes only started to happen at the tail end of the program in 1992.

I can’t be the only one who sees a HUGE missed opportunity there.

I think ideally instead of Hermes there should have been a full ESA-Japan collaboration with the aim of developping only an advanced reentry demonstrator.

This would have fit perfectly in both sides budget, and benefited both sides, Japan could have had a more extensive and ambitious hyflex, Europe would have had IXV 20 years ahead of schedule.

And it could probably have laid the bases for more cooperation.

But really, more generally (launchers, manned spaceflight, observation satellites, BLEO scientific missions) the lack of ESA-Japan cooperation in the 80s and 90s is one of the BIG missed opportunities in european space history, too much was wasted on purely local and national consideration, too much was wasted by having the USA as intermediary and not planning directly.

 

[Byeman]

oo much was wasted on purely local and national consideration,

That is the only reason why ESA and member state space agencies exists

 

[NavarchNicias]

One of the HOPE-X test models is on display at JAXA's Aerospace Center in Chofu. I've been playing with a photo-text translator to try to wring some additional insight out of museum signage, so I added some of those here too. The translations are mostly functional and occasionally hilarious, but for some of the more obscure projects that have not had much written about them in english, it's been a big help. That doesn't really describe HOPE, but there is a whole fleet of hypothetical Japanese spaceplanes to try to keep straight.

 

[Archibald]

NASDA-ESA collaboration on Hermes only started to happen at the tail end of the program in 1992.

Whaaaaaaat ?

 

[TheKutKu]

NASDA-ESA collaboration on Hermes only started to happen at the tail end of the program in 1992.

Whaaaaaaat ?

From van den Abeelen's book: "Towards the end of the Hermes programme, ESA and NASDA were in contact
about their respective spaceplanes and discussing the possible exchange of data and
cooperation in the fields of facility utilisation, crossed ground support, robotics and
rendezvous and docking techniques. A dedicated Hermes-Hope Cooperation
Working Group was set up in July 1992 ."

European Archive document ESA-17241 says that a memorandum of understanding between ESA, NAL and NASDA was signed in April 1993 for cooperation between Hermes and HOPE
It seems to have been very late agreements.

 

[Archibald]

Indeed, official Hermes cancellation is Granada ESA meeting 11/1992 - smack dab between the two dates you mention.

 

[TheKutKu]

I love little known rockets, if it doesn't have an Astronautix page, it's my stuff. I'll talk about the J-II today, what, at the turn of the millenium, looked like to be Japan's next medium launcher and an interesting product of Japanese-Russian-American collaboration.

Some of you may have heard of the GX, put simply, it was IHI Aerospace attempt at having a slice of the Japanese governmental launch market and nascent commercial market (which only became possible in the late 90s following renegociations of fishing launch restrictions) through a collaboration with Lockheed, first stage was basically a repurposed Atlas III, a way for lockheed to keep the production lines busy after Atlas V took over, while the upper stage was a Methalox one (!) using a LE-8 engine, itself mostly a way to milk JAXA R&D funding. (The quick story of LE-8: Based on 80s IHI internal work on methane propulsion, after GX cancellation was used for Japan's VTVL R&D program and for in collaboration for Airbus's ACE-42R program which became Arianegroup's Prometheus)

But GX didn't come out of nowhere, and it's actually the continuation of the J-I Upgrade program, a NASDA program to build a new rocket on the basis of the (itself relatively unknown) J-I rocket.

J-I was a joint (J for Joint) NASDA-ISAS (Japan had three space agencies before they were merged into JAXA in 2003) program to quickly develop a low cost small launcher (~1t to LEO) from existing solid motors that could launch from Tanegashima (which was the space center used by NASDA and which by this time only launched the heavy H-II rocket, while ISAS's smaller rockets launched from Kagashima/Uchinoura space center), to cut cost it used the SRBs of the H-II rocket while the upper stages were based on ISAS's Mu-3SII's rocket.

It was built by Nissan (the main manufacturer of big SRBs in Japan) and launched the first time in october 1996 to launch the HYFLEX reentry demonstrator in an incomplete configuration , however by that time the Mu-3SII's production line had closed and the H-II was getting phased out (due to extremely high cost) for the H-IIA, which used different SRBs, so that the J-I just couldn't piggyback existing production lines, resulting in very high costs too (about $45 millions at the time; $85 millions today, for less than a ton to LEO!), this wasn't acceptable at a time of austerity in Japan.
-
So NASDA, which was still interested in having a small launcher to complement their larger H-II that could be used from their launch center in Tanegashima, looked in the way to rework the rocket, the first option was to adapt it to the HIIA's new SRB, this resulted in the J-I F2 rocket which never flew; (fun fact, the HIIA's SRB was initially too large for Uchinoura, so this was a way for NASDA to ensure the light launcher would launch from their own space center, without extensive infrastructure work)

But they had another program, called alternatively J-I Upgrade or J-IU or J-IA or J-1改 or -II or 先端技術実証ロケット(Advanced Technology Demonstration Rocket)

A main source is the 2010 book: In Defense of Japan: From the Market to the Military in Space Policy
-----
"In May 1997 the Science & Technology Agency (STA) set an informal target of developing a vehicle that would be able to launch 1 to 2 tons to LEO at a cost of $10 to $20 million a launch (compared to the J-I’s nominal cost of $35 million per launch for a 900-kilogram-to-LEO payload, according to estimates using U.S. dollars at the time)."
And indeed, in 1998 the Japanese government canceled the J-I program due to cost (and threatened the Mu-V program, which managed to survive for some time, until finally being cancelled after the merging of the space agency under JAXA, which allowed NASDA to take the precedence over ISAS and cancel competitors)

"Following the MCA report, the STA saw Japan’s options for a new launcher as,among others, developing a completely new vehicle that used proven foreign components, upgrading the M-V, launching smaller payloads as piggyback on the H-II, or simply relying on proven foreign launchers."

"This opened a three way competition for the J-IU (U for “upgraded”) vehicle. Nissan offered an SRB-A first stage with several options for the second stage, among them one based on a methane or solid propellant; Ishikawajima-Harima Industries (IHI) offered a liquid booster design, powered by a Russian liquid-kerosene engine marketed by a U.S. company (Aerojet); and MHI countered with the adapted application of its own LE-5B engine, then being improved for the second stage of the H-IIA, for the first stage of the J-IU. It also incorporated the use of an existing second stage from Boeing."

Eventually NASDA chose an IHI-led consortium for the J-IU (also called the J-II) that was expected to fly in 2005 and to enter service in 2006.

It was NASDA's first rocket outside of the N and H series, and they wanted to apply the same lessons they had learnt with it, as one former NASDA employee put it in his blog in 2006:

"When developing a rocket for the first time, the second stage, which is relatively easy to develop, is developed first to gain experience in actual operation, and then the first stage, which is more difficult to develop, is started.

The first stage in the initial stage of development is introduced from a foreign country for the time being. The series of N-I → N-II → H-I → H-II has proved the correctness of this statement. This was (probably) the logic, and the same tactic was adopted for the J-I Upgrade."

IHI understood this, and their bid appealed to it, furthermore it fit perfectly with NASDA's R&D program, which at the time wanted to work on a LNG/LO2 engine, a section that IHI also had experience in.

IHI saw this as an opportunity to become a prime contractor for a rocket, in the same way Nissan and Mitsubishi had been in the past, and took the opportunity to buy Nissan's space division and create a consortium, Galaxy Express Corporation (GALEX) , including Lockheed Martin which provided the S1 structure.

Now let's talk about the rocket,

Source
Its main feature is the use of a single uprated NK-33 (1928 kN vacuum) on the first stage. Brian Harvey's 2001 book "Russia In Space, Failed Frontier" has this to say:
"In the event, the NK-33’s future may prove to be with the Japanese. In 1996, the Japanese introduced a new light booster, the J-l. Although technically successful, the J-l rocket proved to be extremely expensive, due to the Japanese zeal for quality control and using indigenous components; As part of a comprehensive review of the programme in 1999, a redesign was ordered using less expensive, already proved, bought-in components. TsSKB and Aeroject made a successful bid for the NK-33, and the first flight was set for 2003."



Another important element was its First Stage structure, directly taken from the Atlas II (later to be changed to one based on Atlas III), but with only a single engine so that it wouldn't be a "Stage and a half" anymore, this formed the basis for the cooperation with lockheed.
BTW, the "Sinusoidal Vibration reduction technology" which was developped for this was reused for the Epsilon rocket.


Its most inovative part was its Composite, Methalox upper stage, which was in many way an applied R&D program by NASDA (and later JAXA),, which had a higher level of control over it than the rest of the program., more can be read in the two linked PDF
From what I can tell, the upper stage engine was pressure-fed.

Source:
GX: A NEW LAUNCH VEHICLE UNDER DEVELOPMENT TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE
MEDIUM CLASS SATELLITE MARKET
Despite the engine making its first test in 1999, the upper stage (which did not change as much as the first one after the redefinition of the program as GX) would eventually be the most troublesome and delayed part of the GX program (see the provided timeline attached, also available here). Notably the H-II failures of 1998 and 1999 caused NASDA to lower the R&D funding until 2001 or so.

source for third pic (also provided as attached pdf)
In 1999, the program name was changed to 先端技術実証ロケット(Advanced Technology Demonstration Rocket)

The specs vary a bit, b14643.de has some numbers but they are not very coherent, I'd rather take those from nasda.go.jp

There are some slightly different numbers too, from a model of the J-II at the Tomioka IHI building

Very close numbers anyway.
The J-II was notably supposed to launch the MDS 2 satellite z

Things didn't quite turn out for the NK-33 powered J-II, already by mid-2002 the design had changed from a NK-33 to a RD-180, allowing a closer commonality with the Atlas III, and also because Kistler had priority over the NK-33.
"Meanwhile, beginning in 2002 the Space Activities Commission (SAC) began a long review of the GX program that eventually became a radically different design, one that basically broke all the original parameters for the J-IU laid out by the STA. In fact, when the SAC finally authorized the program in March 2003, it was for a design that was completely different from both the original request for a quick, cheap launcher and even the original design proffered by IHI.
The 2003 green light was dependent on a compromise between then NASDA (then JAXA) and GALEX to pay for the Liquid Oxygen/Liquid Natural Gas (LOX/LNG) second-stage propulsion development, meaning that a certain portion of the projected $420 to $450 million development costs would have to be borne by private industry"
In 2003 the rocket name was changed to GX, and it took the larger, final form it would later be known as through the 2000s.

The GX deserves its own thread I guess.

 

[Nik]

snark:
Also, IIRC, you have the non-trivial issue that Japanese fishing fleet was seriously averse to leaving fishing grounds down-range before launch, and complained about potential pollution from spent boosters etc falling into their waters...
/

 

[publiusr]

Now I seem to remember some talk of them wanting an RD-180 but with a much lesser payload than Atlas V somewhere...

 

[TheKutKu]

The Q and original N rockets, the NASDA projects of Orbital rockets before the American collaboration which resulted in Thor-Delta technology transfer.

(Not to be confused with the ETV, also called Q rocket, which flew twice in 74-75)

Concerning Japanese concrete space programs, SDC set forth the “Q” and “N” rocket program in the 1967 report. The Q rocket would launch a 85 kg satellite into an altitude 1,000 km by 1972, and the N rocket would launch a 100 kg satellite into an altitude 36,000 km, the geostationary (earth) orbit (GEO), by 1974. 2 The Q rocket would be a four-stage rocket. The third stage would be a liquid rocket, which had been developed in the “LS-C” rocket program of SDH since 1965.3 Other stages would be solid rockets, which would be mainly based on the “Mu” rocket of ISAS. The guidance and control systems would be radio guidance and gas-jet control systems, which had been developed in the “JCR” rocket program of SDH since 1966.4 The N rocket would be a more powerful version of the Q rocket. SDH, later NASDA, took charge of the Q and N rocket program. Thus, the Q and N rockets would be the product of Japanese rocket development until then.

In the late 1960s, however, it became an issue among those in the Japanese government and industry whether Japan should import foreign space technology to make practical use of space through communications and environmental satellites sooner than would otherwise be possible. At the same time, the U.S. was trying to exert influence over European and Japanese rocket development in the form of both international cooperation and the control of technical exports. Although Japan prolonged its decision between dependence and autonomy in space technology, its final decision was to receive the space technology transfer from the U.S.5 Thus, “the Exchange of Notes concerning the Cooperation in Space Exploitation between Japan and the United States of America” was concluded in July 1969.

Although Japan concluded the Exchange of Notes, it took a little long time for Japan to change its space programs in order to introduce U.S. advanced technology. The first “Space Activities Plan,” published by SAC in October 1969, reported that NASDA would continue to develop the Q and N rockets autonomously without U.S. space technology supply. This was because SAC couldn’t immediately change its space programs due to the budget estimate. In February 1970, Japan also succeeded in launching its first satellite “Ohsumi” by the “Lambda 4S” rocket, which had been uniquely developed by ISAS. But soon, SAC reached a conclusion that the Q and N rockets wouldn’t be able to meet the demand for launching practical satellites from Japanese satellite-user agencies and industry.10 Finally, SAC announced in the “Space Activities Plan” published in October 1970 that NASDA would stop the Q and N rocket programs and start the new “N-I” rocket program. Thus, Japan began to introduce U.S. space technology in 1970.


JAPAN-U.S. SPACE RELATIONS DURING THE 1970S: AFTER THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES
Hirotaka Watanabe, 2004

Interestingly the article mentions talks between Nasda and CNES for cooperation on Ariane and Cryogenic engine technology transfer in 1974, although it discusses that it may have been to pressure the USA during the negociations of Delta technology transfer.

Linked is a PDF from the Space history newsletter of
http://www.geocities.jp/uchyuu_kaihatsu_shi/
which is now on the webarchive

That site also has a summary of Q rocket

If you look at the history of space development in Japan, especially the history of rocket development, you will find the existence of the Q rocket, which ended up being a mirage. There is almost no information on the Q rocket, and even if there is, it is only a few lines, or at best, a brief description on a single page. The contents are almost the same, as follows.

Japan initially tried to develop an N rocket based on solid rockets to launch practical satellites, but this rocket was too much of a leap from the previous technology, so Japan decided to develop the Q rocket, which is one size smaller. However, for various reasons, Japan decided to abandon the Q and N rockets, and instead developed a new N rocket based on liquid rockets by introducing technology from the U.S...."

This is what it says.
In other words, to put it more simply, Japan's (NASDA) rocket development has changed from self-development to the introduction of American technology.
I had always thought so, too. However, the more I studied the Q rocket, the more I began to have doubts about this statement.

The Q rocket was originally developed mainly by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Nissan Motor, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, NEC, Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba, and Hitachi.
The roles of each company were divided as follows: Nissan was to develop the first- and second-stage solid rockets, MHI was to develop the third-stage liquid rocket and the fourth-stage solid rocket, NEC was to develop the guidance control, Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries was to develop the side jets for control, and MHI was to coordinate the entire project.
However, as development progressed, various problems emerged. The previous rockets had been unguided small rockets developed by the University of Tokyo, and the development of the guidance-controlled Q rocket was a complete exploration. The development of the Q launch vehicle was therefore far behind schedule.
However, the government's demands were so stringent that it was unlikely to meet the development schedule at this rate. Therefore, the companies in charge of the project began to reach out to the United States.

-First, MHI decided to form a joint venture, Mitsubishi TRW, with TRW, which had been in charge of system design for the Apollo program, to design the entire Q launch vehicle system under TRW's technical guidance.
-MHI also decided to form a technical alliance with McDonnell Douglas for the development of liquid-propellant rockets.
-Meanwhile, Nissan Motor, which was in charge of solid rockets, also decided to enter into a technical tie-up with Aerojet General.
-NEC Corporation, which is in charge of guidance control, established NEC Honeywell, a joint venture with Honeywell, and was preparing to introduce guidance control technology from Honeywell. NEC was also in contact with Hughes.
-In addition, Toshiba and Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries, together with Mitsui & Co., were considering establishing joint ventures with Martin and General Electric.
-Kawasaki Heavy Industries, which had been slow in launching the Q rocket and had missed the boat, was trying to get into the N rocket market by teaming up with Lockheed.

In this way, the Q launch vehicle, even if it had been realized, would not have been a rocket that could have been developed on its own, but a rocket in which all key technologies were controlled by the U.S. In the end, the Q launch vehicle project stalled.

In the end, the Q launch vehicle project stalled and was cancelled. Instead, the project was reorganized into the new N launch vehicle based on the liquid-propellant rocket of the Thor-Delta rocket.

At first, there was a great deal of opposition to this major change in policy among those involved. However, looking back on it now, it was the right decision to learn large liquid rocket technology through the New N Program rather than taking a detour with a low-performance rocket that held the key technology.
If the Q rocket had gone forward as it was, Japan's space development would have been delayed by more than 10 years. This decision was a turning point in the history of Japanese space development.

 

[Michel Van]

the Epsilon S rocket program had setback as during Test of Solid motor it exploded

https://twitter.com/x/status/1679854021811552257

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[TheKutKu]

According to TsAGI's Tekhnicheskaya Informatsiya (No.20, 1983) this was a Japanese space shuttle project. I never realized that Japan had begun working that early on a shuttle of their own, nor that they had a program that was designed so closely along the lines of Rockwell's general configuration (despite a smaller size and very different tail and rear).

Additional information

On April 12, 1981, the first space shuttle, Columbia, was launched to worldwide attention. At the time, space development was all about the Space Shuttle. The space shuttle was expected to be the revolutionary child of space development. The Japanese mini-shuttle concept appeared in the newspapers. The newspaper reported that Japan was considering the development of a small shuttle. The general public was excited to hear that such a dream project was underway in Japan! The general public was excited to hear that such a dream project was underway in Japan. In fact, this Japanese-made shuttle originated from a paper entitled "A Study of Recovery and Reuse Rocket," which was presented by a NASADA researcher at the Space Propulsion Symposium held at the University of Tokyo Institute of Space and Astronautical Science in 1979. The mini-shuttle conceived in this paper was picked up by newspapers and later became known as "Yamato. A magazine(*1) published in 1982 imagined this Japanese mini-shuttle as follows. First of all, it explains why a Japanese-made mini-shuttle was necessary. At the time, the U.S. was requesting Japan's participation in the Space Operation Center (SOC, which later became the International Space Station). At the time, Japan had not yet decided whether or not it would participate and, if so, in what form. It was thought that the mini-shuttle could contribute to the operation of the SOC. In other words, the construction and operation of SOC would require an American shuttle capable of transporting large quantities of materials and personnel, but once it was operational, a rescue spacecraft would be needed for emergency evacuation of sick and injured people and for space station malfunctions, for example. In the case of the U.S. shuttle, its size makes it unsuitable for emergency access because of the time and expense required to prepare for launch. As space development progresses, the need for a mini-shuttle with a small footprint will become more apparent. In addition, scientific experiments using the mini-shuttle were also being considered. The payload of the mini-shuttle was only 500 kg, so scientific experiments would be limited, but it would still be meaningful to conduct experiments by the Japanese themselves. So what was the mini shuttle designed to do? The table shows the general specifications of the mini-shuttle. As a comparison, we compared it to the HOPE-X, whose development was halted

The Mini-Shuttle is characterized by its two turbofan jet engines. This was added for safe landing in a small area. Unpowered glide flight requires extremely precise control technology. While this may be possible in the U.S. with sufficient experience, in Japan, where there is no know-how at all, a jet engine was considered necessary to provide some margin of safety for landing. The HOPE-X was forced to be cancelled due to its insignificance, but if the mini-shuttle could achieve the above performance with only 10 tons, it would be a great success. If the Mini-Shuttle had been able to achieve the above performance with a 10-ton payload, it would have been a wonderful spacecraft.

The Mini Shuttle's stay in orbit is two days for a single flight and one week when docked at a space station. Although two days is a short time for a single flight, it should not be a problem for the space station's access, as was the case with the Soyuz Ferry. The one-week period for docking with the ISS does not seem to be a problem, especially if it is considered an emergency. The internal pressure of the mini-shuttle is assumed to be about 1/3 atmospheric pressure in pure oxygen. There are two reasons for this. One is that the airtight compartment can be made lighter by reducing the atmospheric pressure to one-third. Second, since the mini-shuttle is intended for emergency purposes, it is assumed that 1/3 atmospheric pressure will allow immediate extra-vehicular activity wearing a space suit. However, this is strange if you think about it. Not all emergencies require EVA. In case of emergency, when a sick or injured person needs to be rescued as soon as possible, the 1/3 bar pressure would be a hindrance. The 1/3-pressure airlock used on the Apollo-Soyuz spacecraft is needed to connect the 1-pressure space station to the 1/3-pressure spacecraft. It takes several hours to pass through the airlock. It seems unreasonable to expect an emergency spacecraft to carry four passengers. Originally, SOC was planned to have about 10 passengers, so a single mini-shuttle would not be sufficient for emergency use.

The launch vehicle for this mini-shuttle was the H-2, the successor to the H-1. The development of the H-2 had not yet been decided. So the H-2 is also imagined here as follows. First, the mini-shuttle is a reusable spacecraft, so costs can be kept low. However, if the rocket that launches the mini-shuttle is disposed of in the same way as before, the total cost will not go down that much. Therefore, the H-2 must also be reusable. The second stage is disposable because it would be too difficult to recover. In other words, the H-2 was a combination of a large, recoverable individual rocket in the first stage and a liquid rocket in the second stage. Interestingly, the mini-shuttle is not attached to the end of the rocket, but to the side of the second stage. The influence of the U.S. shuttle can be seen in the fact that the mini-shuttle, which does not have a main engine, can be attached to the side of the second stage, but it is not clear what the advantage is. The development schedule of the mini-shuttle was linked to that of the H-2, which was expected to be operational from 1990 to 1992, and the mini-shuttle was expected to be realized after 1990. This schedule was also intended to allow for the operation of the U.S. space station, which was expected to be completed in 1992, the 500th anniversary of the discovery of the Americas by Columbus. The launch base for the mini-shuttle is not on Tanegashima. In the case of Tanegashima, the launch is only twice a year due to a fishery agreement. This would be useless for a spacecraft used for emergency access

. Iwo Jima was then considered. Although Iwo Jima is said to be able to clear the fishery problem, in reality, it would be difficult due to the preparation with the U.S. military and access to the base.

The Japanese mini-shuttle was getting more and more attention from the mass media, and it began to walk on its own. However, there was no budget for the project, and when the Space Activities Commission and the Science and Technology Agency heard about the media fuss, they complained about it, and the project faded away. However, the gene was still alive and became the unmanned mini-shuttle HOPE. HOPE was then........

*:Space Illustrated, first issue (1982/7/1 World Photo Press)

 

[Maro.Kyo]

And then I also read that the cost of the cancelled Maia demonstrator for Hermes,

Funny how they are now using that name for the reusable Arianespace launcher.

I think ideally instead of Hermes there should have been a full ESA-Japan collaboration with the aim of developping only an advanced reentry demonstrator.

Well, in terms of collaboration in LVs and spacevehicles, things are not going particularly as planned for CALLISTRO, but hopefully they can get their things regarding RV-X sorted.

 

[TheKutKu]

The LE-11 was a project of an Expander-Bleed cycle (like the LE-9) upper stage rocket engine designed for the Upper (2nd) stage of the H3 in its early development. It was derived from the joint MHI-Pratt & Whitney MB-XX project that ran from 1998 to 2005


Its target performances were similar to the MB-XX; 27 tons of thrust and a vacuum ISP of 467s
Development of this engine was frozen around 2014-2015, when the final design of the H3 rocket was selected, instead the LE-5B, proven on the H-IIA rocket, was used.

In a 2015 Interview, Masashi Okada, Project lead of H3 development, asked about the engine's development freezing, commented "LE-11 had many trade-offs in its initial concept. The launch must be achieved in 2020. We have never developed completely new 1st and 2nd stages at the same time. I thought about whether I was willing to take on that challenge, and although it was necessary to extend the product's lifespan, I chose a method that would ensure reliable development.That's the part where you have to make some decisions at the end."