Sandboxx put out a video about the two F-14As that the Israelis destroyed:


Israel just released footage of the first F-14 Tomcats lost in combat since the 1980s, and tragically, they weren’t even airborne at the time. According to a statement from the Israeli Air Force, two F-14 Tomcats were destroyed at an airport in Iran’s capital city of Tehran — likely the Mehrabad Airport. The Israeli Air Force claims these fighters were indeed operational, and were staged to launch intercepts of Israeli aircraft.
 
Those two F-14As clearly are either grounded airframes no longer airworthy and have been stripped for spare-parts before being left as decoys or they are high-fidelity full-scale mockups serving as decoys.
 
Sandboxx put out a video about the two F-14As that the Israelis destroyed:


I somehow doubt the veracity of the claims. Israel is known for many things, being trustworthy isn't one of them. And them blowing up glorified static displays that are stationary for years isn't something they'd like to admit, as it would make them look sloppy
 
Found this interesting article in the September 22, 1979 issue of Flight International.

Turkey expressed interest in purchasing Iran’s F-14 fleet to replace their F-100 Super Sabres. The payment was going to be half in cash and the other half with industrial and agricultural products.

Here is the link:
https://web.archive.org/web/20121112162355/http://www.flightglobal.com/pdfarchive/view/1979/1979 - 3478.html
Here's the complete story from the Turkish perspective, written by @orko_8 :

Turk_F-14.jpg

The Untold Story of Turkey's Unfulfilled F-14 Tomcat Acquisition


For many military aviation enthusiasts like myself, the fascination with fighter jets like the F-14 Tomcat has its roots in the iconic Top Gun film and the charismatic fighter jets that played a leading role in it. Manufactured by Grumman, these strikingly designed aircraft, with their large bodies, variable-sweep wings, twin tailfins, and the impressive naval insignia of the U.S. Navy, decorated the walls, notebooks, and dreams of many young people.


The F-14 Tomcat has had only one foreign user besides the U.S.: Iran. Iran purchased the aircraft during the Shah’s era. Despite severing ties with the West and being under embargo after the revolution, the country continued to operate the aircraft.


However, perhaps Turkey would have been the only other foreign user of the F-14s. An initiative that remained hidden behind the scenes might have come to fruition if events had turned out differently...




Iran’s F-14 Procurement Project: Persian King


Under the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Iran had very close political, economic, and military ties with the West, particularly the U.S. Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union and Central Asia, along with its vast energy resources, naturally made it one of the U.S.’s closest allies in the region. As part of this relationship, Iran served as a forward base for U.S. military and intelligence operations against the Soviet Union.


Since the 1950s, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (Niru-ye Havaiye Shahanshahi-ye Iran) initiated a secret reconnaissance program in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force and the CIA. As part of this program, U.S. Air Force reconnaissance RF-4 aircraft conducted flights over the Soviet Union from Iranian bases. Later, starting in 1967, Iran supported these missions by purchasing numerous F-4D, F-4E, and RF-4E aircraft (a total of 32 F-4D, 208 F-4E, and 32 RF-4E were delivered).


In response, the Soviet Union also increased reconnaissance flights over Iran with its Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25R ("Foxbat") jets. Iran’s F-4s and ground-based air defense systems were inadequate to detect or intercept the MiG-25s, which could fly at speeds three times the speed of sound at high altitudes. In an effort to meet this need, Iran contacted U.S. manufacturers, and Grumman offered the F-14A, while McDonnell Douglas proposed the F-15A Eagle. In March 1971, General Hasan Tufanyan, the Shah’s chief military advisor, visited Grumman and received a briefing on the F-14’s design and performance. The evaluation team, led by Tufanyan, presented a report to the Shah recommending the purchase of the F-14. The key points highlighted in their evaluation were the F-14’s performance in both high-altitude, high-speed regimes and low-altitude, close air combat conditions, the powerful AN/AWG-9 radar that would fill gaps in Iran’s air defense radar network, and the advantages provided by the Phoenix long-range missiles.


Unaware of Iran’s decision to choose the F-14, the U.S. Navy, in collaboration with Grumman, launched a marketing campaign in 1973 to sell the F-14, an aircraft that was not widely loved in the U.S. At Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland during the Shah's visit to the U.S. in July 1973, a spectacular air demonstration featuring the F-14s helped finalize the decision: Iran would indeed purchase the F-14s.


The Persian King project, which began with a $300 million contract signed on January 7, 1974, included the delivery of 30 F-14A-GR Tomcat aircraft, extensive spare parts and engine stock, and 424 AIM-54A Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles. A second contract in June of the same year ordered 50 more F-14A-GR Tomcats and 290 additional AIM-54A missiles. The total cost of the Persian King project would reach $2 billion, making it one of the largest defense exports in U.S. history. The F-14s produced for Iran were almost identical to those built for the U.S. Navy, with only minor differences. There was no difference in radar, electronic warfare, or self-defense systems, and Iranian F-14s were equipped with the highly classified AN/APX-81-M1E IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system. A large base, the 8th Tactical Fighter Base, was constructed in Isfahan to house the aircraft. At the same time, numerous pilots, weapon systems officers, and technicians were sent to the U.S. for training.


The delivery of F-14s began in January 1976, with the first two aircraft arriving in Iran. The 79th aircraft was delivered in 1978. The last aircraft remained in the U.S. for weapons and system testing. Of the 714 AIM-54A missiles ordered, 284 were delivered by the time of the 1979 revolution (discussions for an additional 400 missiles were ongoing at the time of the revolution).


The most significant problem with the Persian King project was the low reliability of the Pratt & Whitney TF30-PW-414 turbofan engines used in the aircraft. In 1976, Iran began discussions with the U.S. to replace the TF30s with new engines and to purchase 70 additional F-14A aircraft with upgraded engines. These negotiations were cut short by the revolution. [1] [2]




The Islamic Revolution


Dissatisfaction with the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who governed Iran as a repressive regime and was seen by many as a puppet of the U.S., grew rapidly in the second half of the 1970s. Large-scale protests against the Shah intensified from 1977. The anti-Shah movement, led by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, gained widespread support within the country, despite harsh measures by the Shah’s regime. By January 1979, protests erupted into a full-blown revolution: on January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family fled the country, and on February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran, marking the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. [3]


IIAF+F-16.jpg


An illustration of an F-16A in Iranian Air Force colors.


The F-14s that were under production at the time were instead delivered to Israel. Following the revolution, the new Islamic regime, led by Khomeini, canceled all military, economic, and commercial agreements previously made with the West. The contracts and discussions for several air force projects were also terminated, including:


  • The establishment of a training and exercise center similar to the U.S. Red Flag program.
  • Two military communication satellites.
  • Seven E-3A Sentry AWACS (USD 1.267 billion).
  • Ten C-5A Galaxy strategic transport aircraft.
  • Six Boeing 707 tanker aircraft.
  • 160 F-16A/B aircraft (USD 14.8 billion). A 140-aircraft option package and the purchase of 250 Northrop F-18L aircraft were also canceled after the U.S. government refused to approve the deal.
  • Thirty-one F-4G Wild Weasel tactical bomber aircraft and 1,000 AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles.
  • Numerous AIM-7 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles; AGM-65A/B air-to-ground missiles; GBU series guided bombs. Technology transfer and production line establishment for AGM-65 production.

The U.S. suffered the most from these cancellations, and in the aftermath of the revolution, efforts to establish new relations with the Iranian regime began. Iran had been one of the largest customers for U.S. defense industry products, and American manufacturers were heavily reliant on Iranian contracts for their continued operations.


One of the most significant decisions made by the Khomeini regime was the massive reduction in the size of the Iranian military. Many personnel who had been trained during the Shah's era either fled the country, were arrested, or were executed. Among them were many air force personnel who had been trained in Western countries and were therefore labeled "agents" by the Islamic Revolution.

Search for Customers for the Tomcats


After the Khomeini regime decided to significantly reduce its military capabilities, in April 1979, it put most of its inventory up for sale. During this period, delegations began talks with the United States on a bilateral basis. The main topics of the discussions were the resale of equipment and systems procured during the Shah's era and the fate of canceled projects. Interestingly, shortly after the Revolution, when the Grumman company announced that it would halt F-14A spare part shipments to Iran, the U.S. government reacted strongly, probably fearing it could negatively affect the course of these talks.


Naturally, the F-14s, one of Iran's most advanced systems, were at the center of these discussions. The delegation, led by Defense Minister Ahmad Madani, was asking for around $20 million per aircraft, which was higher than the market price at the time. The possibility of an American technician group coming to Iran to help with maintenance, repairs, and upgrades was also discussed. Iran's goal was to keep its F-4 and F-5 jets operational, while selling other aircraft and platforms for the highest price possible.


At this point, Canada emerged as the first potential customer for the F-14s. Canada had previously considered the F-14 for its new fighter procurement project but dismissed it due to the high cost. However, after Iran announced it was selling the aircraft, Canada began negotiations in June 1979. The solution Canada was considering was using a combination of F-14A and F-16 aircraft. The negotiations made progress on price and seemed to be moving in a positive direction until November 1979, when it was revealed that six U.S. embassy staff had been secretly rescued from Iran with Canada’s help in January 1980 (an operation later depicted in the film Argo). Ultimately, Canada would choose the U.S.-made F/A-18 Hornet in 1980.


In August 1979, after the Iranian government publicly stated its intention to sell 70 F-14s, the United Kingdom also considered buying the aircraft. The UK was initially thinking about purchasing them as a stopgap until the newly developed Tornado air defense version was ready to enter service. However, the UK decided against it after assessing the cost of bringing the aircraft back into flying condition.


At this point, Turkey stepped in.




Turkey's New Fighter Jet Search


The Turkish Air Force's need for a modern fighter aircraft had become a top priority by the mid-1970s. The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation had demonstrated the need for a fighter capable of air defense over the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as one capable of tactical bombing with modern munitions. Following Greece’s order for F-4Es, Turkey began its Peace Diamond project in 1974, acquiring the same model aircraft and making significant strides in modernizing its air force.


However, the 1975 U.S. embargo caused substantial damage to the readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces, particularly the Turkish Air Force. During this period, Turkey began exploring non-U.S. sources, including Germany, the UK, and France, for various combat and training aircraft. Joint production programs, such as the attack aircraft Jaguar (funded by Libya), Alpha Jet, and MB-339 trainers, were also discussed. However, one of the most serious moves during this period was the purchase of 40 F-104S Starfighters from Italy.


In parallel with these efforts, the establishment of TUSAŞ (Turkish Aerospace Industries) in 1973 and the "Build Your Own Aircraft" campaign coincided with Turkey's ongoing search for a domestically produced fighter jet. Following the lifting of the embargo, Turkey sought to procure various second-hand aircraft from the U.S. and other NATO allies. However, the Turkish Air Force continued to search for a high-performance fighter aircraft from non-U.S. sources, as the country’s economy was not in a position to support a comprehensive acquisition.


It was at this point that Iran’s August 1979 announcement to sell 70 F-14s came as a timely opportunity for Turkey.




Efforts to Acquire the Tomcats


Immediately after the announcement, the Turkish Air Force, through the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated official talks and expressed interest in purchasing the aircraft. The Turkish Embassy in Tehran conveyed Turkey’s request to the Iranian government. Discussions focused on the possibility of part payment in hard currency, with the remainder being paid in industrial goods and wheat—both of which Iran was in urgent need of. Given that Iran had already started selling discounted oil to Turkey, it was thought that they could provide favorable terms for the aircraft.


In parallel with these discussions, a Turkish military delegation visited Tehran in September 1979 to inspect the aircraft in person. According to reports in the aviation press, the Turkish Air Force was planning to replace the F-100 Super Sabre jets in the 111th, 132nd, 162nd, and 171st squadrons with the F-14s. The agreement would also have involved providing maintenance and refurbishment services for Iran’s F-14s at Turkey's Eskişehir and Kayseri Air Force Maintenance and Repair Bases. Since U.S.–Iran relations had not yet been completely severed in September 1979, the possibility of obtaining U.S. approval for such a deal made the proposal particularly attractive to Turkey.




Outcome


However, the Iranian F-14s, which had been grounded shortly after the revolution and had not undergone maintenance or repairs, would require significant work to become operational again. The TF30 turbofan engines, already problematic before the revolution, had become unusable, and it was estimated that restoring the aircraft to flying condition would take around 18 months and require a substantial investment. Furthermore, this work could not be done by Turkey or any other country alone. It would require extensive support from the United States, including personnel, parts, and equipment for the maintenance program.


Due to the resources required, as well as Turkey’s economic difficulties, the F-14 acquisition was abandoned.




Conclusion


Had Turkey acquired the F-14s, it could have significantly enhanced its air defense capabilities. With long endurance and the powerful AN/AWG-9 radar, the F-14s would have been a major force multiplier in the Aegean and Mediterranean, providing long-range target detection and interception capabilities. Turkish Tomcats could have also enhanced deterrence against Soviet air assets in the Black Sea and northeastern Anatolia. Additionally, these iconic aircraft would have attracted international aviation enthusiasts to Turkey.


Ultimately, Turkey did not purchase the F-14s. Shortly afterward, the Turkish Air Force began negotiations with France and the UK for the Mirage 2000 and Tornado aircraft. However, due to political and economic factors, these deals fell through. By the mid-1980s, Turkey turned to modernize its existing fleet with second-hand aircraft from the U.S. and Germany, leading to the selection of the F-16C/D as the Turkish Air Force's new fighter jet.
https://www.siyahgribeyaz.com/2014/09/turkiyenin-gerceklesmeyen-f-14-tomcat.html
 
“The F-14s that were under production at the time were instead delivered to Israel.”

I’m assuming this is a typo, and they meant F-16s that were under production, or did I just miss an entire chapter in the F-14’s history?
 
I’m assuming this is a typo, and they meant F-16s that were under production, or did I just miss an entire chapter in the F-14’s history?

I have no doubt the Israeli airforce would loved to have had the F-14 in its' inventory.
 
I have no doubt the Israeli airforce would loved to have had the F-14 in its' inventory.
No, IIRC they evaluated both the Tomcat and Eagle and their conclusion was that the Eagle was much better suited for their needs.
 
“The F-14s that were under production at the time were instead delivered to Israel.”

I’m assuming this is a typo, and they meant F-16s that were under production, or did I just miss an entire chapter in the F-14’s history?

F-15 rather than F-14.

Indeed, it was the F-16 in production for Iran that were redirected to Israel.
 
Indeed, it was the F-16 in production for Iran that were redirected to Israel.

I wasn't aware of that but imagine if the Iranian revolution had happened in 1981 instead of 1979 Iran would've had at least one squadron of F-16s in service.
 
“The F-14s that were under production at the time were instead delivered to Israel.”

I’m assuming this is a typo, and they meant F-16s that were under production, or did I just miss an entire chapter in the F-14’s history?
Not a typo but a strange error on behalf of Google translation, I guess. The original text mentions the very first F-16A/B's produced for Iran's order being diverted to Israel. As a twist of fate, some of these aircraft will later take part in the famous Osiraq attack.

While searching for this topic, I did my utmost best to reach Turkish Air Force sources for a bit of information regarding the negotiations or inspections, but without any results. My personal conclusion is, some discussion did take place and even some Turkish officers (maybe from Embassy) paid a visit to an F-14 base, but did not go beyond that, most probably due to the financial burden the F-14's would bring.

It is worth noting that the first half of 1980s saw seveal attempts by Turkey to rapidly modernize its Air Force, which had already suffered badly from the US arms embargo between 1975-1978. Some of these were negotiations with the UK for 40 Tornado, with Egypt for its F-4E's and with France for Mirage 2000. I also wrote the Tornado story here: https://www.siyahgribeyaz.com/2010/11/turkiyenin-gerceklesmeyen-tornado-alm.html
 
Excellent news, though a pity more F-14s couldn't be saved.
Something useful for us
The jets will be provided in “as-is” condition, with the Navy permitted to include relevant technical manuals and limited excess spare parts needed for restoration and static display

Maybe we can get releasable radar and system manuals for the site.


It would be nice to see a non stripped F-14D in person.
 
Something useful for us


Maybe we can get releasable radar and system manuals for the site.


It would be nice to see a non stripped F-14D in person.

Keywords here are "RELEVANT" and "De-Militarization". With the aircraft being de-militarized, the accompanying "relevant" technical documentation will most likely not include anything of relevance here.
 

Sandboxx has just put out a video about this:


Is the F-14 Tomcat making a comeback? Operationally, no — but the new “Maverick Act” that just passed the Senate and is now headed for a vote in Congress aims to pull three Tomcats out of the Boneyard and potentially even make one flight-capable.
But we're not talking about a walk in the park, here...
(Feature image includes elements from Adobe Stock and a real "image of a VF-2 F-14 shot by “Bio” from a C-2 Greyhound ramp," sourced via The Aviationist here: https://theaviationist.com/2020/12/14...)
 
You know, thinking of the unprecedented scrapping of the F-14 by the americans to supposedly stop parts reaching Iran (was/is the american security so lax/porous?), why didn't they scrapped all the F-4 and F-5 for the same reason? Imo i rather think it was behind the scenes political corruption, either from Boeing or LM MIC minions or both, to make sure nothing interferes with the SH and F-35.

Considering the limitations of the former and woes of the latter, it's not unlikely the USN might have been really keen to reactivate at least part of the retired fleet, certainly the F-14 would have made a much better AIM-174 carrier than the underpowered SH.

Incidentally roughly at the same time the brits were really keen to get rid of the recently modernized Sea Harriers, probably for the same reasons, but that's another subject.
 
I mean no disrespect, but there is absolutely no world in which the U.S. Navy would have ever considered bringing back any F-14s in any capacity.

It was an astronomically maintenance-intensive platform, and by extension, incredibly expensive to operate. Whilst the Tomcat community and NAVAIR had done a great job in the 1990s at implementing a credible strike capability on the platform through LANTIRN, JDAM, and the various Paveway series LGBs - it was still fundamentally an aircraft that was limited to 1980s-1990s weaponry - no AIM-9X, no AMRAAM, no HARM, no JSOW, no SLAM/ER, no AGM-65, even. The AIM-54 had been retired without replacement in 2004 - leaving you with AIM-9M and AIM-7M. There was zero money to spend on implementing any of those capabilities into a hodgepodge fleet that consisted of 2 squadrons worth of Ds and then a mix of Bs and As, which spanned 2 different engine types and commensurate logistics trails.

The “limitations” of the Super Hornet get vastly overexaggerated, especially by F-14 apologists - the truth is that it was the airplane the Navy wanted. Tomcat variants and upgrades were considered and set aside - no political corruption or MIC machinations - the F-14 was just too much of a specialist in an era that called for jack-of-all trades capabilities.

As for “why didn’t they scrap all the F-5s and F-4s”? Well, the U.S. would not have had much in the way of an F-5 fleet in the boneyard to worry about - aside from the Skoshi Tiger birds that were passed to South Vietnam, it had only ever really been an Aggressor in U.S. service, and the F-4 was still being actively regenerated and converted to QFs for the FSAT program.

This question also completely overlooks the other elephant in the room - there were a large number of other F-4 and F-5 operators in the world at the time the Tomcat was retired. For the F-14… there was only Iran. The Tomcat had been irretrievably retired in 2006, why would you not scrap and destroy parts that only have a potential use case with an adversary who has a demonstrated commitment to sanction evasion? The museum birds had no need for the parts, and there’s no shortage of Tomcats on display across the USA.
 
You know, thinking of the unprecedented scrapping of the F-14 by the americans to supposedly stop parts reaching Iran (was/is the american security so lax/porous?), why didn't they scrapped all the F-4 and F-5 for the same reason? Imo i rather think it was behind the scenes political corruption, either from Boeing or LM MIC minions or both, to make sure nothing interferes with the SH and F-35.
<snip>
I very much doubt there was any conspiracy.

I think that the scrapping was due to the mythology that the Navy PR machine built up around the aircraft. The Navy had to justify an expensive, new, Navy-only fighter just after the expensive F-111B fiasco and during and after the ruinously expensive Vietnam War. To do that, the Navy made the F-14/Phoenix combo out to be a super weapon with unique, world-historical capabilities that more than offset its ever increasing cost, engine issues, etc. The movie Top Gun was part of that myth-making.

When the end of the Cold War and advanced naval SAMs made the F-14/Phoenix ultra-long-range air defense mission seem obsolescent, the Navy wanted to replace the F-14 with something more state-of-the-art. But the USN could only do so within the context of the mythology it had built up around the airplane. So, when the Navy wanted to retire the mythical F-14, it couldn't just send the wonder-planes to the boneyard. It had to show Congress that, while its capabilities were now surplus to USN requirements, America couldn't let anyone else have access to them. We had to scrap every example and thus keep Iran from maintaining its F-14 fleet and/or passing working examples on the Russians, Chinese, Nicaraguans, etc.

You ask, "was/is the american [sic] security so lax/porous?" The answer is/was "Probably". After all, Iran did manage to keep its F-14s (and Phantoms and F-5s) going until the present day. They can always get parts from somewhere. Some they make. Some they adapt or cannibalize. Others they buy. And realistically, the F-14 is an obsolete airplane that probably does not command the full attention of the security people. The supposed sensitivity of the F-14 technology was always more hype than reality--and that is truer now than it ever was.
 
I have to agree with HaveVoid and Iverson on the Tomcat and Super Hornet.
There was a point in time, when I was much younger, where I wished the Tomcat to have a longer service life in the USN and was part of the anti-Super Hornet block.
When I got older, worked with pilots and their crew, and looked at the details, retiring them was the right choice.
They were expensive to operate and labor intensive. The Tomcat came at a time when US aviation was transitioning from the century fighters to the F-teens, and some of the Tomcat's design fit more of the latter. The hydraulic powered controls, avionics structure, swing wing mechanism, etc are all outdated and contributes to the higher cost of operations and lower availability.
The Super Hornet doesn't have the same top speed or acceleration as the Tomcat, but for a plane of its size, its per hour operation costs are rather cheap. It is fully digital, has more RCS reduction measures built in, far more multi-role, and is much easier to land on carriers and to train pilots on.
 
Very much that, yeah - maintenance costs was the deal breaker between "more F-14D" and "Super Hornet" decision taken in the early 1990s. And in that regard, the Hornet was a major improvement over the Tomcat. Not only because of the VG wing but also analog from the 1960s versus digital from the 1980s and beyond.
I came to realize this by reading the "Advanced Tomcats" thread on this very forum. https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/f-14-tomcat-projects.589/page-2#post-66411
 
I would have thought that when the Super Tomcat 21 was doing the rounds back in the day the US Navy would have gone with that when the NATF was cancled.
 

Similar threads

Back
Top Bottom