The Untold Story of Turkey's Unfulfilled F-14 Tomcat Acquisition
For many military aviation enthusiasts like myself, the fascination with fighter jets like the F-14 Tomcat has its roots in the iconic
Top Gun film and the charismatic fighter jets that played a leading role in it. Manufactured by Grumman, these strikingly designed aircraft, with their large bodies, variable-sweep wings, twin tailfins, and the impressive naval insignia of the U.S. Navy, decorated the walls, notebooks, and dreams of many young people.
The F-14 Tomcat has had only one foreign user besides the U.S.: Iran. Iran purchased the aircraft during the Shah’s era. Despite severing ties with the West and being under embargo after the revolution, the country continued to operate the aircraft.
However, perhaps Turkey would have been the only other foreign user of the F-14s. An initiative that remained hidden behind the scenes might have come to fruition if events had turned out differently...
Iran’s F-14 Procurement Project: Persian King
Under the rule of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Iran had very close political, economic, and military ties with the West, particularly the U.S. Iran’s proximity to the Soviet Union and Central Asia, along with its vast energy resources, naturally made it one of the U.S.’s closest allies in the region. As part of this relationship, Iran served as a forward base for U.S. military and intelligence operations against the Soviet Union.
Since the 1950s, the Imperial Iranian Air Force (Niru-ye Havaiye Shahanshahi-ye Iran) initiated a secret reconnaissance program in cooperation with the U.S. Air Force and the CIA. As part of this program, U.S. Air Force reconnaissance RF-4 aircraft conducted flights over the Soviet Union from Iranian bases. Later, starting in 1967, Iran supported these missions by purchasing numerous F-4D, F-4E, and RF-4E aircraft (a total of 32 F-4D, 208 F-4E, and 32 RF-4E were delivered).
In response, the Soviet Union also increased reconnaissance flights over Iran with its Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-25R ("Foxbat") jets. Iran’s F-4s and ground-based air defense systems were inadequate to detect or intercept the MiG-25s, which could fly at speeds three times the speed of sound at high altitudes. In an effort to meet this need, Iran contacted U.S. manufacturers, and Grumman offered the F-14A, while McDonnell Douglas proposed the F-15A Eagle. In March 1971, General Hasan Tufanyan, the Shah’s chief military advisor, visited Grumman and received a briefing on the F-14’s design and performance. The evaluation team, led by Tufanyan, presented a report to the Shah recommending the purchase of the F-14. The key points highlighted in their evaluation were the F-14’s performance in both high-altitude, high-speed regimes and low-altitude, close air combat conditions, the powerful AN/AWG-9 radar that would fill gaps in Iran’s air defense radar network, and the advantages provided by the Phoenix long-range missiles.
Unaware of Iran’s decision to choose the F-14, the U.S. Navy, in collaboration with Grumman, launched a marketing campaign in 1973 to sell the F-14, an aircraft that was not widely loved in the U.S. At Andrews Air Force Base in Maryland during the Shah's visit to the U.S. in July 1973, a spectacular air demonstration featuring the F-14s helped finalize the decision: Iran would indeed purchase the F-14s.
The Persian King project, which began with a $300 million contract signed on January 7, 1974, included the delivery of 30 F-14A-GR Tomcat aircraft, extensive spare parts and engine stock, and 424 AIM-54A Phoenix long-range air-to-air missiles. A second contract in June of the same year ordered 50 more F-14A-GR Tomcats and 290 additional AIM-54A missiles. The total cost of the Persian King project would reach $2 billion, making it one of the largest defense exports in U.S. history. The F-14s produced for Iran were almost identical to those built for the U.S. Navy, with only minor differences. There was no difference in radar, electronic warfare, or self-defense systems, and Iranian F-14s were equipped with the highly classified AN/APX-81-M1E IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) system. A large base, the 8th Tactical Fighter Base, was constructed in Isfahan to house the aircraft. At the same time, numerous pilots, weapon systems officers, and technicians were sent to the U.S. for training.
The delivery of F-14s began in January 1976, with the first two aircraft arriving in Iran. The 79th aircraft was delivered in 1978. The last aircraft remained in the U.S. for weapons and system testing. Of the 714 AIM-54A missiles ordered, 284 were delivered by the time of the 1979 revolution (discussions for an additional 400 missiles were ongoing at the time of the revolution).
The most significant problem with the Persian King project was the low reliability of the Pratt & Whitney TF30-PW-414 turbofan engines used in the aircraft. In 1976, Iran began discussions with the U.S. to replace the TF30s with new engines and to purchase 70 additional F-14A aircraft with upgraded engines. These negotiations were cut short by the revolution. [1] [2]
The Islamic Revolution
Dissatisfaction with the rule of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who governed Iran as a repressive regime and was seen by many as a puppet of the U.S., grew rapidly in the second half of the 1970s. Large-scale protests against the Shah intensified from 1977. The anti-Shah movement, led by the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini, gained widespread support within the country, despite harsh measures by the Shah’s regime. By January 1979, protests erupted into a full-blown revolution: on January 16, 1979, the Shah and his family fled the country, and on February 1, 1979, Khomeini returned to Iran, marking the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty. [3]
An illustration of an F-16A in Iranian Air Force colors.
The F-14s that were under production at the time were instead delivered to Israel. Following the revolution, the new Islamic regime, led by Khomeini, canceled all military, economic, and commercial agreements previously made with the West. The contracts and discussions for several air force projects were also terminated, including:
- The establishment of a training and exercise center similar to the U.S. Red Flag program.
- Two military communication satellites.
- Seven E-3A Sentry AWACS (USD 1.267 billion).
- Ten C-5A Galaxy strategic transport aircraft.
- Six Boeing 707 tanker aircraft.
- 160 F-16A/B aircraft (USD 14.8 billion). A 140-aircraft option package and the purchase of 250 Northrop F-18L aircraft were also canceled after the U.S. government refused to approve the deal.
- Thirty-one F-4G Wild Weasel tactical bomber aircraft and 1,000 AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles.
- Numerous AIM-7 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles; AGM-65A/B air-to-ground missiles; GBU series guided bombs. Technology transfer and production line establishment for AGM-65 production.
The U.S. suffered the most from these cancellations, and in the aftermath of the revolution, efforts to establish new relations with the Iranian regime began. Iran had been one of the largest customers for U.S. defense industry products, and American manufacturers were heavily reliant on Iranian contracts for their continued operations.
One of the most significant decisions made by the Khomeini regime was the massive reduction in the size of the Iranian military. Many personnel who had been trained during the Shah's era either fled the country, were arrested, or were executed. Among them were many air force personnel who had been trained in Western countries and were therefore labeled "agents" by the Islamic Revolution.
Search for Customers for the Tomcats
After the Khomeini regime decided to significantly reduce its military capabilities, in April 1979, it put most of its inventory up for sale. During this period, delegations began talks with the United States on a bilateral basis. The main topics of the discussions were the resale of equipment and systems procured during the Shah's era and the fate of canceled projects. Interestingly, shortly after the Revolution, when the Grumman company announced that it would halt F-14A spare part shipments to Iran, the U.S. government reacted strongly, probably fearing it could negatively affect the course of these talks.
Naturally, the F-14s, one of Iran's most advanced systems, were at the center of these discussions. The delegation, led by Defense Minister Ahmad Madani, was asking for around $20 million per aircraft, which was higher than the market price at the time. The possibility of an American technician group coming to Iran to help with maintenance, repairs, and upgrades was also discussed. Iran's goal was to keep its F-4 and F-5 jets operational, while selling other aircraft and platforms for the highest price possible.
At this point, Canada emerged as the first potential customer for the F-14s. Canada had previously considered the F-14 for its new fighter procurement project but dismissed it due to the high cost. However, after Iran announced it was selling the aircraft, Canada began negotiations in June 1979. The solution Canada was considering was using a combination of F-14A and F-16 aircraft. The negotiations made progress on price and seemed to be moving in a positive direction until November 1979, when it was revealed that six U.S. embassy staff had been secretly rescued from Iran with Canada’s help in January 1980 (an operation later depicted in the film
Argo). Ultimately, Canada would choose the U.S.-made F/A-18 Hornet in 1980.
In August 1979, after the Iranian government publicly stated its intention to sell 70 F-14s, the United Kingdom also considered buying the aircraft. The UK was initially thinking about purchasing them as a stopgap until the newly developed Tornado air defense version was ready to enter service. However, the UK decided against it after assessing the cost of bringing the aircraft back into flying condition.
At this point, Turkey stepped in.
Turkey's New Fighter Jet Search
The Turkish Air Force's need for a modern fighter aircraft had become a top priority by the mid-1970s. The 1974 Cyprus Peace Operation had demonstrated the need for a fighter capable of air defense over the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as one capable of tactical bombing with modern munitions. Following Greece’s order for F-4Es, Turkey began its
Peace Diamond project in 1974, acquiring the same model aircraft and making significant strides in modernizing its air force.
However, the 1975 U.S. embargo caused substantial damage to the readiness of the Turkish Armed Forces, particularly the Turkish Air Force. During this period, Turkey began exploring non-U.S. sources, including Germany, the UK, and France, for various combat and training aircraft. Joint production programs, such as the attack aircraft Jaguar (funded by Libya), Alpha Jet, and MB-339 trainers, were also discussed. However, one of the most serious moves during this period was the purchase of 40 F-104S Starfighters from Italy.
In parallel with these efforts, the establishment of TUSAŞ (Turkish Aerospace Industries) in 1973 and the "Build Your Own Aircraft" campaign coincided with Turkey's ongoing search for a domestically produced fighter jet. Following the lifting of the embargo, Turkey sought to procure various second-hand aircraft from the U.S. and other NATO allies. However, the Turkish Air Force continued to search for a high-performance fighter aircraft from non-U.S. sources, as the country’s economy was not in a position to support a comprehensive acquisition.
It was at this point that Iran’s August 1979 announcement to sell 70 F-14s came as a timely opportunity for Turkey.
Efforts to Acquire the Tomcats
Immediately after the announcement, the Turkish Air Force, through the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, initiated official talks and expressed interest in purchasing the aircraft. The Turkish Embassy in Tehran conveyed Turkey’s request to the Iranian government. Discussions focused on the possibility of part payment in hard currency, with the remainder being paid in industrial goods and wheat—both of which Iran was in urgent need of. Given that Iran had already started selling discounted oil to Turkey, it was thought that they could provide favorable terms for the aircraft.
In parallel with these discussions, a Turkish military delegation visited Tehran in September 1979 to inspect the aircraft in person. According to reports in the aviation press, the Turkish Air Force was planning to replace the F-100 Super Sabre jets in the 111th, 132nd, 162nd, and 171st squadrons with the F-14s. The agreement would also have involved providing maintenance and refurbishment services for Iran’s F-14s at Turkey's Eskişehir and Kayseri Air Force Maintenance and Repair Bases. Since U.S.–Iran relations had not yet been completely severed in September 1979, the possibility of obtaining U.S. approval for such a deal made the proposal particularly attractive to Turkey.
Outcome
However, the Iranian F-14s, which had been grounded shortly after the revolution and had not undergone maintenance or repairs, would require significant work to become operational again. The TF30 turbofan engines, already problematic before the revolution, had become unusable, and it was estimated that restoring the aircraft to flying condition would take around 18 months and require a substantial investment. Furthermore, this work could not be done by Turkey or any other country alone. It would require extensive support from the United States, including personnel, parts, and equipment for the maintenance program.
Due to the resources required, as well as Turkey’s economic difficulties, the F-14 acquisition was abandoned.
Conclusion
Had Turkey acquired the F-14s, it could have significantly enhanced its air defense capabilities. With long endurance and the powerful AN/AWG-9 radar, the F-14s would have been a major force multiplier in the Aegean and Mediterranean, providing long-range target detection and interception capabilities. Turkish Tomcats could have also enhanced deterrence against Soviet air assets in the Black Sea and northeastern Anatolia. Additionally, these iconic aircraft would have attracted international aviation enthusiasts to Turkey.
Ultimately, Turkey did not purchase the F-14s. Shortly afterward, the Turkish Air Force began negotiations with France and the UK for the Mirage 2000 and Tornado aircraft. However, due to political and economic factors, these deals fell through. By the mid-1980s, Turkey turned to modernize its existing fleet with second-hand aircraft from the U.S. and Germany, leading to the selection of the F-16C/D as the Turkish Air Force's new fighter jet.