Can you? Are you sure? To the best of my knowledge, HII never showed a version with more than 16 Mk41 cells. Based on operations off Yemen, that's marginal for self-defense, especially if you want any VLA in the mix.

View: https://youtu.be/5OJZ8eB_mPA?si=fwDqJKBNNh_FTJbf
Strongest argument seem 'that if you commit to a configuration it will either be too expensive, obsolete, or wrong for the evolving mission or all three at once or any combination of said' 'faster than your head can spin'.
 
Carriers were the last war's great powerful weapon. Battleships were the one before that. Submarines are the next great weapon.
People have been saying this about torpedo boats (surface and subsurface) since the 1870s and it's still not happened. Jeune Ecoleism is foolishness and always has been.
 
Can you? Are you sure? To the best of my knowledge, HII never showed a version with more than 16 Mk41 cells. Based on operations off Yemen, that's marginal for self-defense, especially if you want any VLA in the mix.

View: https://youtu.be/5OJZ8eB_mPA?si=fwDqJKBNNh_FTJbf
When was the last time the USN actually bought VLA? I don't think there's been a VLA successor program either, despite a few being pitched (IIRC the most straightforward was HAAWC on a booster)
 
People have been saying this about torpedo boats (surface and subsurface) since the 1870s and it's still not happened.

Submarines used to be little more than surface vessels. "Now" (c. 1960 or so), they can live underwater.

There haven't been any relevant large scale wars since 1945. Some people won't realize potential until it sinks their battlegroup.
 
Submarines used to be little more than surface vessels. "Now" (c. 1960 or so), they can live underwater.
And yet they are one part of a balanced fleet, alongside surface vessels, aviation vessels, etc. The principle is combined arms, not the foolish devotion to any single branch.
 
The actual Plan B is to order more Burkes to replace the 20-ish FFG(X) because that will result in hulls in the water, eventually, which isn't much different than the Connies.
Otherwise, the Navy is better off adding another 20 Burkes to its back order and having FMM produce them. It can just seize the design rights using force from Bath or whoever owns the DDG-51 TDP, if it has to, since it's a matter of national security at this point.

I know Phelan has already said something about an "American-designed frigate," but I'll just point out that Austal USA will soon be able to produce Burkes if so desired. They have their hands full with other projects, but they're working on a new final assembly hall and ship lift that's more than large enough if a true Burke spam is ordered.
 
And yet they are one part of a balanced fleet, alongside surface vessels, aviation vessels, etc. The principle is combined arms, not the foolish devotion to any single branch.

Escorts' job seems to be protecting carriers from air attack, whose job is to swat airbases and maritime patrollers in the theater of operations, so the submarines can interdict and destroy the enemy's carriers, so the Allied maritime patrollers can sweep the theater of operations for enemy submarines.

It's all about killing the submarines at the end of the day.
 
When was the last time the USN actually bought VLA? I don't think there's been a VLA successor program either, despite a few being pitched (IIRC the most straightforward was HAAWC on a booster)

I think probably last new ones was around 2012, but the total procurement was well over 1000 rounds and there has been a fairly steady rebuild program to convert them all to Mk 54 torpedoes and to regrain the motors. So there's not a small inventory. LM says it is still available for purchase; it's listed in the proposed sale of MMSC to Greece (which didn't happen).

Around 2009, LM was openly pitching VLA-ER, which was indeed HAAWC on a VLA booster. I think it's been reoffered more recently as well.
 
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What the hell are you talking about? Should we refer to precedent? FFGs that sustain serious combat related damage (mine and missile hits) do not sink, they are saved, patched up, and returned to service.
What makes you think any of the currently fielded surface combatants of the USN could even survive a single modern AShM or AShBM hit? Looking at what China has been rolling out I'd have serious doubts. And at that point "muh survivability standards" become a redundant burden because no matter what you do, your ship won't survive a hit. It's also amusing how you repeatedly equal even slightly loosing the ridiculous NAVSEA delusions as immediately resulting in the whole thing sinking and the entire crew dying and then the dinosaurs will die and then....
 
Escorts' job seems to be protecting carriers from air attack, whose job is to swat airbases and maritime patrollers in the theater of operations, so the submarines can interdict and destroy the enemy's carriers, so the Allied maritime patrollers can sweep the theater of operations for enemy submarines.

It's all about killing the submarines at the end of the day.
This is incorrect
 
What makes you think any of the currently fielded surface combatants of the USN could even survive a single modern AShM or AShBM hit? Looking at what China has been rolling out I'd have serious doubts. And at that point "muh survivability standards" become a redundant burden because no matter what you do, your ship won't survive a hit. It's also amusing how you repeatedly equal even slightly loosing the ridiculous NAVSEA delusions as immediately resulting in the whole thing sinking and the entire crew dying and then the dinosaurs will die and then....
Well, given Sea Venom and LMM are technically AShM...
 
Strongest argument seem 'that if you commit to a configuration it will either be too expensive, obsolete, or wrong for the evolving mission or all three at once or any combination of said' 'faster than your head can spin'.

Go back to the requirements. The NSC doesn't cut it. If producability in the near term is what you are aiming for then it will be as useless as the LCS. If they are aiming for a ship with a robust ASW capability and AAW suited to lower threat environments then may be a sub $1 billion frigate wasn't going to cut it?

Could they have froze the design in 2020/21? What would it look like and how would it compare to the alternative? Or did the additional weapons, sensors, power generation, and increase in size require additional working of the internal structure which is still not done?
 
I still think the 3-faced, 9RMA SPY-6 is a bit of an "overkill."

In my view, a rotating 2-faced, 8RMA SPY-6 or a rotating single-faced, 10RMA SPY-6 would be more suitable.
Depends on cost of antennas versus costs of Aegis software.



Also, it’s better not to have more than 32 MK-41s.
How so?

8 cells (32x) of ESSMs only leaves you with 18-24x SM2s (depends on ASROCs). I would want equal numbers of SM2s and ESSMs for a small ship. So that's ~48 cells with ASROCs.
 
How so?

8 cells (32x) of ESSMs only leaves you with 18-24x SM2s (depends on ASROCs). I would want equal numbers of SM2s and ESSMs for a small ship. So that's ~48 cells with ASROCs.
But you can't allways get what you want.
32 cells still gives you you're 32 ESSM, 18-20 SM-2 and 4-6 VLA. Enough to give you AA capabilitys closely to some european warships while you're not Limited to longer range ASW with a helicopter if needed even if its your Main weapon
 
What makes you think any of the currently fielded surface combatants of the USN could even survive a single modern AShM or AShBM hit? Looking at what China has been rolling out I'd have serious doubts. And at that point "muh survivability standards" become a redundant burden because no matter what you do, your ship won't survive a hit. It's also amusing how you repeatedly equal even slightly loosing the ridiculous NAVSEA delusions as immediately resulting in the whole thing sinking and the entire crew dying and then the dinosaurs will die and then....
Have you watched any SINKEX like ever? US standards work against anti ship weaponry, even old Perrys consistently demonstrate an astounding degree of resilience to damage.

Again the "ridiculous" standards are combat proven because, shock horror, there are other threats than just China who have actually damaged US warships and they've survived. I know that you don't care about crew survival or hull survival but the USN actually does and so does the US people. That's why Connie was to be built with a high degree of survivability. If every anti ship weapon ever was an AShBM then maybe your argument would make a bit of sense but that isn't the case. Survivability is about reducing the rate at which ships are sunk, not mission killed. When faced with attack from an AShM a DDG may be mission killed, withdrawn, saving a crew and keeping a hull which can be repaired but not sunk. A ship with less survivability would be sunk, no ship to be repaired, likely a significant number of trained crew killed.

If America shouldn't accept these standards, which should they accept? If survivability standards are useless should less damage control training be administered to crews? Is that a superfluous waste?

You know nothing of what you're talking about and listening to your drivel is tiresome. SPF used to be a place for educated people to educate other people, not fools like you to spout rubbish. You have consistently demonstrated a failure to understand US shipbuilding timelines such as when you expressed disgust at DDG(X) being roughly 5 years away (despite the program being on a very reasonable and historically similar timeline) or when you tried to justify that design studies are a waste of resources (despite being formative and educational processes crucial to naval shipbuilding and design). Your profile states "don't drink the drone kool aid" yet you just repeated the "survivability is useless because China has AShBMs and AShMs", despite these type of threats consistently appearing in some form for over 20 years and systems being designed to counter them for longer. Sounds like you're listening to the anti ship Jim Jones.
You talk about 'slightly reducing' the standards for no reason other than it might make importing foreign designs easier, despite foreign designs being less capable.
You can stretch the design to hold 32-48 tactical cells.
The growth weight margins would be so negligible the platform would be essentially useless.
  • I'd argue no land-attack missions.
  • Does need SPY6, but maybe not GPI or SM6s (depends on exactly what threat levels we're expecting).
  • And honestly, we're getting pretty close to no longer needing to escort merchant ships. Certainly no need to escort container ships, they're averaging too fast for even a 35kt submarine to get in front of easily.
  • I will go ahead and assume Pacific endurance (IIRC the USN standard for skimmer targets is Pacific Range but Winter North Atlantic seakeeping)
  • I expect it will end up as being fast enough to keep up with carriers, though there are some arguments to be made for only fast enough to keep up with the Amphibious fleet.
Land attack would come with full length cells and it needs full length cells so it's a nice to have. This is the same with missile systems. It's a capability by virtue of other aspects of the design even if they aren't always used.
If doing escort duties it would be like Earnest Will, not WW2 convoys.
It is crucial that an FFG for the USN can keep up with carriers because the FFG will assume the ASW picket role, freeing up a DDG to focus mostly on air warfare.
I still think the 3-faced, 9RMA SPY-6 is a bit of an "overkill."
It is not, it's essentially the bare minimum. AN/SPY-6(V)2 EASR cannot effectively provide the coverage required for an American FFG
 
If the FFG is going to be doing mostly ASW - then we should buy an ASW ship. If you want a ship that can do everything, you're buying a Burke.

Either eliminate the heavy radar and the expensive crew required to man it, or start designing Burke flight 4.
 
If the FFG is going to be doing mostly ASW - then we should buy an ASW ship. If you want a ship that can do everything, you're buying a Burke.

Either eliminate the heavy radar and the expensive crew required to man it, or start designing Burke flight 4.
I think people might see the FFG(X) more clearly if it were called DDG(Lite). It is more cost effective to build multimission ships. If the vessel is 80% as capable it can be 50% the cost.
 
I think people might see the FFG(X) more clearly if it were called DDG(Lite). It is more cost effective to build multimission ships. If the vessel is 80% as capable it can be 50% the cost.
That's more or less what Connie was, but even cheaper than that to run and more asw.
It's AAW firepower is still near the very top for something still qualifying as a frigate.
 
Everyone want wants a Burke at half the cost, either take the penalty hits or pay for the Burke. A stripped down cheaper and more ASW focused Burke appears to be what the Navy wants, do a Spruance -> Tico but in reverse.
 
~48 Improved Kilos, and half a dozen 688is, crewed by the lowest scoring and least motivated crews you've seen (outside of TF 70) aren't gonna be doing so hot against 30 774s, maybe 20 688is, and 30 Japanese diesels crewed by actually competent people.
Why do you constantly emphasize that Chinese submarine crews are "lowest scoring and least motivated"? What is the source of this information? Or what evidence do you have to support this claim?
 
If the FFG is going to be doing mostly ASW - then we should buy an ASW ship. If you want a ship that can do everything, you're buying a Burke.

Either eliminate the heavy radar and the expensive crew required to man it, or start designing Burke flight 4.
Do you know what the Constellation class seeks to achieve or are you just talking shit? The role of an FFG in the US force structure is as a carrier ASW asset and as an independent surface combatant. It has less cells, not no cells, because it doesn’t seek to do no AAW, just very limited AAW with a greater focus on ASW. Literally no American ship since the Knox class has been designed exclusively for ASW because that’s a stupid idea.
Everyone want wants a Burke at half the cost, either take the penalty hits or pay for the Burke. A stripped down cheaper and more ASW focused Burke appears to be what the Navy wants, do a Spruance -> Tico but in reverse.
This is false. Burke is fundamentally not fit for ASW. They want Constellation which is ASW focused (IEP, sensors) with a secondary AAW capability. It is not Burke at half the cost
Why do you constantly emphasize that Chinese submarine crews are "lowest scoring and least motivated"? What is the source of this information? Or what evidence do you have to support this claim?
There is a certain degree of evidence according to US intelligence that Chinese submarines suffer from cultural issues which lend themselves poorly to excellent operational standards. It is broadly accepted that Chinese nuclear submarines are fairly good (probably better than Russia) and are equal to the best 688s. However their nuclear fleet is small, the majority are diesel electric boats which frankly aren’t good for much more than hoping a ship runs them over and they can kill it before it kills them. All indications suggest that, despite Chinese advancements, America’s fleet of 50ish SSNs is far superior in technical and crew quality.
I stress that this isn’t to say the Chinese navy is useless, it is just that the American navy is better in this regard
 
There is a certain degree of evidence according to US intelligence that Chinese submarines suffer from cultural issues which lend themselves poorly to excellent operational standards.
Could you elaborate on that? Are there any articles or sources?
 
Could you elaborate on that? Are there any articles or sources?
Yeah, USNWC did a report on it, the reports the US intelligence community releases occasionally, etc. Tbf, as with the whole “corrupt Chinese officials put water in missiles to save money” doc, they release certain information to create a narrative, hence why I’m not entirely convinced. I’ve linked an example below:

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1026&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
Similar documents are released periodically
 
Could you elaborate on that? Are there any articles or sources?
It's probably been long enough nobody will complain about me saying this. ~25 years now.

Back when I was a non-qual, non-useful body on Georgia BN, for our summer patrol we got tagged to help the Lincoln carrier group work up. Part of our mission brief was to "simulate a moderately competent Han-class submarine," which Captain Tammen took to mean "let the junior officers man the scope and do the approaches."

Edit: they still didn't catch us, and we sent their group CO a letter saying "gotcha" with a couple of periscope photos to prove it.
 
Yeah, USNWC did a report on it, the reports the US intelligence community releases occasionally, etc. Tbf, as with the whole “corrupt Chinese officials put water in missiles to save money” doc, they release certain information to create a narrative, hence why I’m not entirely convinced. I’ve linked an example below:
Are there any similar articles or documents that can substantiate his claims?
As Scott Kenny said, once you hit the acoustic levels of the 688s, you're going to need good crews to keep it down, or else you die. The Chinese might be the worst crews to sail the seas. They're obnoxiously loud on a human level because they don't take their jobs seriously. The subs will be tracked less by their squeaky loud ass reactor pumps and more by the spanners and swear words dropped by their sailors.
You can literally hear Chinese submarine sailors with sonar. Not the boats. The crews themselves are undisciplined and loud.

In my view, what he said is quite an overstatement.
 
Have you watched any SINKEX like ever? US standards work against anti ship weaponry, even old Perrys consistently demonstrate an astounding degree of resilience to damage.

A SINKEX is done using a hull, one without fuel, electricity running, weapons onboard and generally speaking without an awful lot of flamable bits of hardware that are needed to actually have a ship in working order.
In these conditions every combat hull of any major NATO nation demonstrates "an astounding resilience to damage". HMS Boxer, a T22 decomissioned in 99 was merrily floating after getting hit by two Harpoons... To sunk that hull, the RN had to use a Spearfish after hitting it with an ungodly number of Harpoons, Sea Skuas and 4.5 shells. This type of resilience is the norm.
If you want to see what happens to a small combatant built for the US Navy after being hit by missiles, i present to thee the TCG Muavenet.
Two Sea Sparrows. Only one detonated, five dead chaps, 22 wounded a huge fire and a floating wreck.
Not Harpoons, not Exocet´s, not Shipwrecks. Sparrows.
Had the USS Stark faced the same sea state and multi day trip to the nearest port like HMS Sheffield got and with that initial list... it would have ended at the bottom of the sea.
 
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Depends on cost of antennas versus costs of Aegis software.




How so?

8 cells (32x) of ESSMs only leaves you with 18-24x SM2s (depends on ASROCs). I would want equal numbers of SM2s and ESSMs for a small ship. So that's ~48 cells with ASROCs.
SPY-6 is pretty cheap, the FFG-62 AN/SPY-6(v)3 is like 57-95 million for the full fit last I saw. Aegis is hard to find prices for.
I think people might see the FFG(X) more clearly if it were called DDG(Lite). It is more cost effective to build multimission ships. If the vessel is 80% as capable it can be 50% the cost.
Theres an argument (IMO) that the USN's FFGs are more appropriately hull coded as DD or DEG on balance. Like the JMSDF DDs. The wrench in this is that Zumwalt is in the DD number order, after skipping DD-998 & 999. BUT I mainly think this comes down to most people being poor students of modern naval warfare. Even specialists who focus on WW2 run into significant issues trying to extrapolate without being familiar enough with modern affairs.
 
Are there any similar articles or documents that can substantiate his claims?



In my view, what he said is quite an overstatement.

You mean besides just listening?

https://sg.news.yahoo.com/china-picks-lowest-scoring-officers-213001510.html
It's not a secret and it's something the PLAN has been trying to fix for about a decade. Their newest diesels (039C and after) and newest nukes are okay. They finally got towed arrays in their diesels and their nukes are quieter now than the incredibly loud Hans and Shangs. No word on if the crews are still bad, but that article is from last year, so probably!
 
You mean besides just listening?

https://sg.news.yahoo.com/china-picks-lowest-scoring-officers-213001510.html
It's not a secret and it's something the PLAN has been trying to fix for about a decade. Their newest diesels (039C and after) and newest nukes are okay. They finally got towed arrays in their diesels and their nukes are quieter now than the incredibly loud Hans and Shangs. No word on if the crews are still bad, but that article is from last year, so probably!

It is generally unwise to underestimate your opponent.

In any conflict with China, they would have surprises for us and us for them.
 
It is generally unwise to underestimate your opponent.

In any conflict with China, they would have surprises for us and us for them.

Except their submarine force is a known quantity. For that matter so is 7th Fleet. They're definitely not the Soviets, that's for sure!

The most potent part of the PLA is the PLAAF followed by the PLARF. PLANSF will remain relatively easy to handle until it becomes majority 039Cs, 095s, and 096s. This will not be before at least 2032.
 
Except their submarine force is a known quantity. For that matter so is 7th Fleet. They're definitely not the Soviets, that's for sure!

The most potent part of the PLA is the PLAAF followed by the PLARF. PLANSF will remain relatively easy to handle until it becomes majority 039Cs, 095s, and 096s. This will not be before at least 2032.
Before WW2, there were those in the US Navy that believed the Japanese couldn't see, couldn't shoot and certainly couldn't fly.

It didn't turn out that way.

There are lots of examples of like this in history.

It's a bad idea to assume your opponent is incompetent.
 
Before WW2, there were those in the US Navy that believed the Japanese couldn't see, couldn't shoot and certainly couldn't fly.

It didn't turn out that way.

There are lots of examples of like this in history.

That's fantastic now what evidence did the U.S. to have back that up? Because it wasn't looking at IJA/IJN flight schools!

It's a bad idea to assume your opponent is incompetent.

If the PLANSF is competent, they aren't good at showing it, but maybe they'll suddenly find immense discipline which they've shown to be lacking in an even more pressured environment? Or, perhaps like every other military in world history, they will need to actually take the time to produce well trained and disciplined crews led by good, intelligent officers.

They're slowly solving the hull problem. They've yet to solve the crew problem. Check back in a decade if they haven't been destroyed!

The PLAAF is scary because they're roughly equivalent in flight hours to the USAF at large but have far more industrial backing. This is a recent development, since the end of the Afghanistan War, actually. The PLAN is somewhat formidable in surface units but this is heavily counter-balanced by the JMSDF and US submarine forces. The PLANSF has always been the red-headed stepchild of the PLA and never received much in the way of good budgets or allocation of resources.

They only started to fix it around 2018, with the development of the 039C and an evolved rafting scheme of the 039s, and the deployment of the 095 SSNs, which has only just begun but seems to be a submarine they might actually make in quantity. Both solve major acoustic problems that crippled the PLANSF for the past 30+ years. As far as USN sonar operators are concerned, their crews remain a major weakness to this very day, but I guess literally being able to hear them being loud isn't good enough for you lol.

It's only in the past 5 years or so that the hull issue has been slowly rectified. It'll probably be another decade before their submarine crews are halfway competent and crewed by decent tactical officers, because their crews were being masked outside of close range by the loudness of their reactor pumps and other machinery noises, so they never developed a culture of discipline in the submarine forces.

The bad officers still have to be forced out, and they still need to make the submarine forces an attractive career prospect, which they haven't yet done so. They have about 28 months to fix these problems, going by DON estimates (August 2027), which is more like a 60-120 month problem (the 095/09-Vs have been programmed since the mid-00s actually!) but the ball is really in their court here to be fair.

The PLA can literally sit on the Mainland until 2050, produce zillions of ships and subs, and come out with a fleet of eight Type 004s, a dozen Type 075s, 30-40 095s, a dozen 096s, 40-50 Type 055s, 60-70 Type 054Ds, and like 30-40 039Cs and make America really sad if they want to, but then we're not talking about weapons. We're talking about industrial outputs and of course the PRC would win a peacetime arms race since they're the world's factory.
 
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You mean besides just listening?
Listen? Were you a sonar operator before? Which force?

No word on if the crews are still bad, but that article is from last year, so probably!
The content of this article is quite similar to that USNWC article from 2023.

It is a fact that the national college entrance exam score requirements for the PLA Naval Submarine Academy are lower than those for other naval institutions, but this does not mean that submarine officers are "poorly educated" or "the least competent." These scores only reflect their standards as high school students at the time of admission, not their performance after military training as servicemen.

It is a fact that the college entrance exam score requirements for the Submarine Academy are lower than those for other naval institutions, but their educational standards are by no means low. What the USNWC article did not mention is that among all high school students taking the national college entrance exam, the average admission score for the PLA Naval Submarine Academy places them roughly within the top 6% to 12% of all takers. This is broadly comparable to the average SAT score for entrants to the U.S. Naval Academy, which is around 1310, placing them in approximately the top 9% to 13% of SAT takers (Of course, applying to universities in the U.S. also requires recommendation letters, extracurricular activities, and more…).

I’m not sure where the U.S. Naval Academy stands in your hierarchy of prestige. But in my view, scoring in the top 6% to 12% is a solid achievement. "Poorly educated," "the least competent," or "prone to shouting" —is far from the truth.

One final point. Of the ten past commanders of the PLA Navy, excluding the first three "veterans of the Red Army," three out of the remaining seven came from the submarine force, including the current commander. (Three from the submarine force, two from surface warship units, one from naval aviation, and one from naval headquarters.) This also demonstrates that officers from the submarine force are by no means "the least competent."
 
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Listen? Were you a sonar operator before?

No, it's what I've been told by sonarmen though. Hans and Shangs are extremely noisy and their crews aren't much better.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1027&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
This is a decent read on the reforms for the past decade. The main hurdle the PLANSF has is that it is only just now getting respectably quiet submarines. You can't actually train well on a submarine so loud it can be heard from the Philippine Sea by nobody in particular, whether they're trying to hear you or not, because no amount of crew discipline matters at that point. You need a quiet sub before you can really practice being quiet.

Given that Bohai has likely, at most, put three or four 095s in the water of this year I don't think the production is going super fast either. It's likely going to be a mix of 093Bs and 095s right now, with no more than a dozen to a dozen and a half combined, so still significantly outnumbered by the 774 and 688i combined force and significantly less experienced at underwater combat.

There may be some competent crews in there, but they're not likely to be many, and the hulls they have that can be properly matched with their competencies are extremely scarce outside of the 039Cs. This will be true probably for at least for the next half decade when we start seeing 039A/B going away in favor of the 039Cs, and the Hans and Shang Is and IIs begin to disappear. At that point, the PLANSF will finally have a submarine force of nuke boats comparable in decibels to the 637s and 688s, and be able to actually learn something from training.
 
That's fantastic now what evidence did the U.S. to have back that up? Because it wasn't looking at IJA/IJN flight schools!



If the PLANSF is competent, they aren't good at showing it, but maybe they'll suddenly find immense discipline which they've shown to be lacking in an even more pressured environment? Or, perhaps like every other military in world history, they will need to actually take the time to produce well trained and disciplined crews led by good, intelligent officers.

They're slowly solving the hull problem. They've yet to solve the crew problem. Check back in a decade if they haven't been destroyed!

The PLAAF is scary because they're roughly equivalent in flight hours to the USAF at large but have far more industrial backing. This is a recent development, since the end of the Afghanistan War, actually. The PLAN is somewhat formidable in surface units but this is heavily counter-balanced by the JMSDF and US submarine forces. The PLANSF has always been the red-headed stepchild of the PLA and never received much in the way of good budgets or allocation of resources.

They only started to fix it around 2018, with the development of the 039C and an evolved rafting scheme of the 039s, and the deployment of the 095 SSNs, which has only just begun but seems to be a submarine they might actually make in quantity. Both solve major acoustic problems that crippled the PLANSF for the past 30+ years. As far as USN sonar operators are concerned, their crews remain a major weakness to this very day, but I guess literally being able to hear them being loud isn't good enough for you lol.

It's only in the past 5 years or so that the hull issue has been slowly rectified. It'll probably be another decade before their submarine crews are halfway competent and crewed by decent tactical officers, because their crews were being masked outside of close range by the loudness of their reactor pumps and other machinery noises, so they never developed a culture of discipline in the submarine forces.

The bad officers still have to be forced out, and they still need to make the submarine forces an attractive career prospect, which they haven't yet done so. They have about 28 months to fix these problems, going by DON estimates (August 2027), which is more like a 60-120 month problem (the 095/09-Vs have been programmed since the mid-00s actually!) but the ball is really in their court here to be fair.

The PLA can literally sit on the Mainland until 2050, produce zillions of ships and subs, and come out with a fleet of eight Type 004s, a dozen Type 075s, 30-40 095s, a dozen 096s, 40-50 Type 055s, 60-70 Type 054Ds, and like 30-40 039Cs and make America really sad if they want to, but then we're not talking about weapons. We're talking about industrial outputs and of course the PRC would win a peacetime arms race since they're the world's factory.

That is seriously naive.

In a war of any duration, the Chinese would adapt and evolve as we would.

I want them to be as incompetent as possible but that is nothing to count on.
 

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