FFG(X) - NEWS Only

[Scott Kenny]

You are greatly misrepresenting how “serious” these studies were.
CGBL and MEU were apart of the FY86 and FY88 Surface Ship Concept Formulation (CONFORM) programs. CONFORM ran from ~FY79 to ~FY91, and produced ~50 concepts in total. All work was carried out by SEA 05D1 out of NSWC Carderock.
To mention these 2 particular concepts should also require you mention the High Survivability Combatant, Aegis SL7, Dispersed Strike, CGV CTOL, High Speed Amphibious Raider, etc. You’ve never heard of any of those studies, and the fact there’s maybe one reference on the entire internet shows just how obscure and inconsequential they were.
This program is so obscure that half the design reports are missing. I know this because I currently have 4 design reports making their way through the declassification process. Do note that they were only able to locate 4/13 documents I requested, they found the CGBL design report, but the MEU report is missing.

Score!

I assume you'll post excerpts here once you get it?

 

[Deleted member 29851]

I assume you'll post excerpts here once you get it?

Unlikely, as I plan to close my account sometime within the coming days.

 

[Scott Kenny]

Unlikely, as I plan to close my account sometime within the coming days.

I'm sorry to hear that. Do you have a website?

 

[Deleted member 29851]

Do you have a website?

I don’t, but I suspect anything I get will eventually make its way back here through mutual contacts.
Additionally I was told they located the SC-21 AoAs in another declassification request, but have not heard anything since then.

 

[Kat Tsun]

I don’t, but I suspect anything I get will eventually make its way back here through mutual contacts.

Can't believe he's going to have Golly post the CGBL study on his behalf.

 

[Felocie]

they weren't blue-sky, cutting metal and putting it in the water was fully envisaged

This is categorically false. The stated aim of the projects looked at feasibility and explored future technology. Ticos were still fairly new and hence CGBL was not required to replace them. SC-21 was to explore how ship concepts would work in a 21st century warfighting environment. They were not designed explicitly for production. There were at least 50 different studies running concurrently in the same vein, FOIAs have only been able to find 4 of them.

You don't seem to understand that these are not two separate points, they are implicitly linked. An expensive, high risk design is a tough sell to government, any bad news at all risks it being cancelled. You cannot design ships and ignore the political dimensions of the build. People at the sharp end of development have been making this point about defence procurement for coming up on a century (at least)

I do understand that, it still doesn’t negate my point. You posit this is NAVSEA’s fault, it is not. You posit this is due to their stringent standards, it is not.

You cannot separate the project decisions and the presence or lack of government support, the two go hand in hand. GWOT is a fair point, but it is not the only point, budgets were already tight and falling.

And the Navy responds to demands from government, if they choose not to fund their requirements properly that isn’t Navy’s fault

I'm not disputing the need for littoral access, or that From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea increased focus on it, but the conceptualization of LCS and Streetfighter as tools for enforcing it wasn't defined by them, that came later.

You keep saying I don’t understand things and then say something like this. Doctrine and operational requirements, which drive procurement, are cratered by papers which do not directly address platforms. They address strategic circumstances and tactical needs. Procurement responds to that.

Still waiting for you to address training inadequacies.

This is the FFG(X) thread and you’ve provided one example of training inadequacy on an LHD. Beyond the fact that training standards are outside the scope of the discussion, history would indicate that training problems would be resolved after an incident and report such as that of the Bonhomme Richard. That’s part of why they write the reports in the first place. It also does nothing to undermine the high standards set by NAVSEA and the compartmentalisation that is demanded.

That there tells me that you don't understand how defence procurement works as a function of government, not independent of it.

I understand that just fine but it isn’t NAVSEA’s job to play politics in that way. They are subservient to the whims of government

The deficiency of the Battle Force is ultimately mid- and low-level escort for merchantmen and gators

That isn’t the case. Assuming war with near peer adversaries, no adversary can muster a raiding fleet a la WW2. The plan is for key SLOCs are to be diverted away from fronts and into controlled seas. To counter groups like the Houthis you need greater magazine depth than a patrol frigate can muster. This Burkes, and other LSCs

Is that why they removed the bow sonar? For ASW?

Yes, the bow sonar was assessed as unnecessary when compared to using the towed array, shipboard helicopter, and hull mounted sensors. This further helped FMM because their yard cannot build ships with bow sonars due to channel depth iirc.

Explains why it failed then.

You hit the nail on the head with:

FMM seems to have just lowballed DON on their projections, possibly deliberately, to secure a major contract.

however there is more to it. I get assessing FFG(X) options it becomes clear that FMM promised the most, and really they promised way too much. The optimal design to meet requirements in my opinion was the BIW F100 based design as it required the least internal change however F100 is CODAG, not CODLAG IEP. While FMM with a FREMM based design certainly promised to meet 100% of requirements, realistically F100 with 90% of requirements met would’ve been a far less painful and protracted design.

My favorite procurement story is the Ford's technology being spread across three ships (CVN-77 to -79) and the Congress telling the Navy to eat a sock and put everything on CVN-78. That was swell. It's not just the U.S. Navy.

Just to point out briefly, in hindsight NAVSEA has assessed that spreading technology such as this across preceding ships is less effective because teething issues often come from having the systems together. Hence it doesn’t actually aid the program in the long run. This leads to the first ships in class having problems, yet the second and third having a much easier time of it. I suspect we will see this with JFK and we are already seeing this by comparing the DDG(X) design process to the Zumwalt design process

 

[Felocie]

Can't believe he's going to have Golly post the CGBL study on his behalf.

Come back to SB and you can post them for him

 

[DWG]

You are greatly misrepresenting how “serious” these studies were.
CGBL and MEU were apart of the FY86 and FY88 Surface Ship Concept Formulation (CONFORM) programs. CONFORM ran from ~FY79 to ~FY91, and produced ~50 concepts in total. All work was carried out by SEA 05D1 out of NSWC Carderock.
To mention these 2 particular concepts should also require you mention the High Survivability Combatant, Aegis SL7, Dispersed Strike, CGV CTOL, High Speed Amphibious Raider, etc. You’ve never heard of any of those studies, and the fact there’s maybe one reference on the entire internet shows just how obscure and inconsequential they were.

Actually I have a list of the CONFORM projects, I just didn't feel it necessary to list three varieties of SES ASW frigates, etc.

 

[Felocie]

Actually I have a list of the CONFORM projects, I just didn't feel it necessary to list three varieties of SES ASW frigates, etc.

So you agree with him? And you still cited them? A so called "Senior Member" huh...

 

[DWG]

This is categorically false. The stated aim of the projects looked at feasibility and explored future technology. Ticos were still fairly new and hence CGBL was not required to replace them. SC-21 was to explore how ship concepts would work in a 21st century warfighting environment. They were not designed explicitly for production.

SC-21 evolved to DD-21, which stood up a PEO in 1998.

I do understand that, it still doesn’t negate my point. You posit this is NAVSEA’s fault, it is not. You posit this is due to their stringent standards, it is not.

Well, you don't understand my point, because I don't think it's NAVSEA's fault. I think it's the USN's fault in repeatedly proposing high-risk, high budget projects that don't seem to recognise the budget realities they exist within. NAVSEA's standards contribute to the costs, but they aren't the sole issue.

FFG(X) was supposed to be a step away from that, by adopting a low-risk in-service design, but the USN hierarchy then allowed NAVSEA to turn it into a high-risk project. It's been clear which way FFG(X) has been going for several years, but no one stepped in to change the process that was generating greater and greater change, greater and greater risk of cancellation. That's a fundamental failure of leadership.

And the Navy responds to demands from government, if they choose not to fund their requirements properly that isn’t Navy’s fault

If the Navy keeps proposing high-risk, high budget ships that are more likely to be cancelled, then that is precisely the USN's fault.

This is the FFG(X) thread and you’ve provided one example of training inadequacy on an LHD. Beyond the fact that training standards are outside the scope of the discussion, history would indicate that training problems would be resolved after an incident and report such as that of the Bonhomme Richard.

As I pointed out at some length, the John McCain and the Fitzgerald incidents (and the Helge Ingstad) were created by training failures in basic seamanship. The McCain incident also revealed questionable damage control design. I've repeatedly seen people reporting a growing lack of depth to skills in the USN over a period of years if not decades. Training failures revealed by the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents got a string of officers all the way up to COMSEVENTHFLT canned, and yet three years later we still have basic training failures in the Bonhomme Richard, which was homeported in Japan at precisely the time of the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents and had spent it's entire career in the Pacific.

it isn’t NAVSEA’s job to play politics in that way. They are subservient to the whims of government

The entire USN is subservient to the whims of the government, but it has flexibility in how it addresses them. If it requires a new combatant class to address an assigned mission, then it behooves the design process for that class to consider not just the technical design of the class, but the available budget and the political risks that proceed from technological risks that threaten overruns in costs, time, and just plain not working. This is why we keep risk registers and update them regularly - so we can spot the emerging problems and get in front of them. But there seems to be no evidence of the USN professional leadership, from CNO on down, actually doing it.

One failed procurement is a cause for concern. Four failed projects one after the other with an insistence it's not the process that's wrong says there's something seriously wrong within the culture/competence of the USN leadership.

 

[Kat Tsun]

Come back to SB and you can post them for him

I'll just ask Char or Ian or someone for DMs when he posts them on the Discord so I can snipe the funny cruiser post.

Actually I have a list of the CONFORM projects, I just didn't feel it necessary to list three varieties of SES ASW frigates, etc.

CONFORM mega thread when.

One failed procurement is a cause for concern. Four failed projects one after the other with an insistence it's not the process that's wrong says there's something seriously wrong within the culture/competence of the USN leadership.

These are shared failures.

Ford and Zumwalt are the responsibility of the Congress due to GWOT sapping funding for the Navy's proposed technology insertion and shipbuilding plans. LCS is the responsibility of the Navy to a lesser extent and FMM to a greater extent. Connies are the responsibility of the Navy to the greater extent and FMM to the lesser extent.

This is not a Navy thing. This is an America thing. The only branch of the U.S. military that can be said to be doing "okay" is the USAF. And that's even addressing the abysmal mission capable rates of F-35A or the slow production rate of B-21 or the B-52H issues or the ICBM problem or the entire Space Force ground infrastructure being outdated.

 

[Felocie]

I'll just ask Char or Ian or someone for DMs when he posts them on the Discord so I can snipe the funny cruiser post.

Not if I get in first

CONFORM mega thread when

Coming, they’ve gotta get out of FOIA limbo. Also they keep certain docs, such as the SL-7 Algol based missile cruiser classified for some reason, no idea why

 

[DWG]

So you agree with him?

No. I was just pointing out that I was aware of the CONFORM projects

And you still cited them?

Yes, because CGBL was explicitly about providing a comparator for other cruiser design projects, while MEU was serious enough to have artwork generated. They provide context for where thinking was when SC-21 started.

A so called "Senior Member" huh...

Oh, I'm just an amateur when it comes to stuff that floats. Things that fly, however ....

 

[Scott Kenny]

As I pointed out at some length, the John McCain and the Fitzgerald incidents (and the Helge Ingstad) were created by training failures in basic seamanship. The McCain incident also revealed questionable damage control design. I've repeatedly seen people reporting a growing lack of depth to skills in the USN over a period of years if not decades. Training failures revealed by the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents got a string of officers all the way up to COMSEVENTHFLT canned, and yet three years later we still have basic training failures in the Bonhomme Richard, which was homeported in Japan at precisely the time of the McCain and Fitzgerald incidents and had spent it's entire career in the Pacific.

Point of order!

The Bon Homme Richard loss was greatly aggravated by shipyard/ships force not abiding by the lessons learned from the time a submarine burned.

 

[Felocie]

Yes, because CGBL was explicitly about providing a comparator for other cruiser design projects, while MEU was serious enough to have artwork generated. They provide context for where thinking was when SC-21 started.

Ok I wasn’t even going to bother engaging with this anymore because it’s so removed from FFG(X) it isn’t funny, but this is so egregious I can’t ignore it. MEU was the government equivalent of “make me something cool” except it had a purpose: demonstrate what technology will be available in the coming years. The artwork depicts laser weaponry with ~30 degrees arcs to port iirc and similar to starboard, a flight deck (as if the navy didn’t have any of those), and the list goes on. The artwork is not indicative of an intention to build the things, it is essentially government marketing. That does not mean the Navy intends to build the thing, they have no use for such a platform same way they had no use for the SL-7 battlecruiser or the oft feted DOD war plans for a zombie apocalypse. This still happens today, exploration of future LSC technology has been happening for the past 25 years to varying degrees even though none of them were actually laid down. We just don’t know about them because they are sensitive programs directly pertaining to DDG(X).

No one else will get the topic back on track so I will. Here are the facts:
1) the Constellation class program was formulated to create an ASW focused, but multi-mission capable frigate. To this end it was required to have a series of high end systems primarily so it could work with a CSG in high threat environments and independently during peacetime/LIC.
The attached image is a handy starting point for understanding desired capability.
2) Constellation was to be acquired by modifying an existing design. To this end five designs were down selected. We know the most about FMM (as it was selected) and BIW thanks to that_person (who has sadly left SPF). This was chosen to speed up and simplify the acquisition process but this has/was criticised due to exacting but logical American requirements not fitting well to foreign designs. As Kat Tsun pointed out, American naval yards operate differently to foreign naval yards. Where American naval yards mostly serve the military, foreign naval yards serve both military and civil clients leading to less stringent requirements for foreign ships. FREMM is a good example of this. As standard she features only 80% the bulkheads required for a US Navy design. Another example is the Fridtjof Nansen class which used commercial grade pumps and equipment (in part leading to the loss of the Helge Insted).
2.1) The process for initial entry development, as reported by the head of BIW’s bid, was very good. It featured excellent communication of requirements through monthly meetings and consultation. Bidders were able to craft their entry specifically to Navy requirements. It was also assumed that entries would comply with the level II survivability standards required, as outlined in OPNAV 9070. Further accepting a contract creates a legal obligation to meet these requirements or face penalties. FMM and NAVSEA must have both believed their design could meet these requirements.
2.2) FMM’s entry was the closest to what the Navy wanted, in theory. In hindsight it is fair to say they didn’t understand the scope of changes required for their design to meet OPNAV 9070 and NAVSEA failed to recognise this to their detriment. NAVSEA absolutely should’ve caught that and sought some sort of solution before selecting FMM but it is still fundamentally the responsibility of the contractor. FMM had never designed a platform above level I survivability standard which likely contributed significant to this failure. It is important to note that selection is not a choice between finished designs. With the benefit of hindsight it is fair to say that FMM was likely the wrong choice. While their design has the least compromises (particularly IEP), they required the greater number of changes. My personal opinion remains that the BIW design, while lacking optimal range and IEP, was the best choice as per that_person’s discussion with the BIW lead.
2.3) An often repeated argument is that changing NAVSEA requirements led to the FMM entry going from 85 to 10% parts commonality with the original design. This does not make sense, it is never mentioned in senate reports nor by the GAO. So what went so wrong? Well, as mentioned before, FMM obviously underestimated the changes required to bring their design to level II survivability standards. These changes ultimately reduced commonality far more than the mythical changing NAVSEA requirements. This is a common theme. FMMs LCS were always delivered late, the Freedom class was hundreds of tons overweight and littered with quality control issues.
2.4) I once again point everyone towards that_person’s post to explore alternatives to FMM’s entry:
https://www.secretprojects.co.uk/threads/ffg-x.33649/post-857076
3) Why it went wrong is fairly obvious with the benefit of hindsight. FMM didn’t understand their own entry and NAVSEA under appreciated the scope of changes required to the FREMM hull. However that does not negate the simple fact that the FFG(X) program requirements are neither superfluous or arbitrary. As demonstrated by Zumwalt when she was undergoing testing with a CSG, allowing an extra Burke to operate in the air warfare role instead of as an ASW picket is extremely beneficial to protecting the carrier asset that forms the crux of fleet striking power. this requirement is still filled, I suppose we can assume early model Burkes will be retailed once DDG(X) comes online but I digress, that is irrelevant. This role is not negated, as some have claimed, by the lack of a bow sonar. Explicitly going forward Connie would function as a node for off ship systems rather than hunting and killing submarines herself. Further, while a bow sonar is indeed nice to have, the VDS and TA are the significantly more valuable shipboard sensors and the hybrid drive makes it far quieter than the Burke. Hence it is the superior choice for ASW.
3.1) As for the aforementioned “independent operations”, Connie was not envisaged as a ship to subdue Houthi type threats alone, the size of the platform alone makes her inadequate for the task. Her magazine depth is not for fulfilling the role of a Burke (or DDG(X)) but supplementing them and filling gaps they cannot. Independent operations are not dissimilar to standard peacetime Burke duties, allowing Burkes to operate at a lower tempo. During operations similar to what was seen during Desert Shield Constellation provides a greater degree of self defence capability than LCS while providing greater flexibility than a Burke. Ultimately all three platforms, LCS for minesweeping, surface warfare and aviation support, Constellation for ASW l, surface warfare, and local air defence, and, Burke for large scale air defence, would provide a formidable force. Constellation in bridges the gap between the LCS and Burke lessening LCS reliance on the Burke air defense umbrella and allowing the area access mission.
Constellation is not a convoy escort ship in the traditional sense. The Navy explicitly states that her role as an escort is for logistics ships that are supporting combat operations in low and medium intensity conflict zones, as stated in 2017. Planning states that other ships will be diverted along less threatened SLOCs in safer waters to reduce strain on the fleet. This is aided by the the locales America is expected to fight her next major wars in and the relative forces levelled against her.
4) It is most likely Constellation was cancelled as it is viewed as an inoffensive and easy political win. There is also a not insignificant group who wish to cancel it in favour of Golden Dome and other systems that reduce Americas global presence while ideally “protecting the homeland”, as evidenced by this article: https://www.defenceconnect.com.au/n...tion-frigate-program-ahead-of-strategic-shift
This decision may not be at all rational and given all indications I find it highly unlikely that this was directed by the navy. I do not seek to debate this point, only to acknowledge it as a significant factor. This decision is a mistake. True, as I have already gone over, it was not an excellent program at the time of cancellation but it was past the worst and was finally nearing its potential. The core of the ship is such that the systems are proven and hence many likely complications have been foreseen and accounted for.
4.1) Why is it invaluable? Simple, there is no other ship to fill its place. More Burkes is an unacceptable choice, Burke is coming to a close. That is why DDG(X) is a non negotiable program. At best a Connie replacement SSC is 4-5 years of refinement and design away providing no meaningful time advantage over Connie herself. There is also no platform that can be modified within this timeframe with the growth potential of Connie. As mentioned previously the Navy needs a ship to fill Constellation’s projected spot and there’s no ship for the job but Constellation.
4.2) This opens the door to a purpose built and designed American FFG which, while I wholeheartedly endorse, doesn’t address operational requirements now or indeed within the next 10 years. Procuring Constellation first is both the logical and only practical choice.

 

[EmoBirb]

Another study, what's your point? (3x)

The (valid) point is that divesting resources, be it financial or human resources, towards several unsuccessful studies, many of which at first glance either megalomeniacal/unfeasible or of questionable usefulness compared to other option, isn't a testimony for competence or a clear vision.

Studies have to conducted by qualified personnel and need significant funding to explore the theoretical and practical feasibility of a proposed product or system. Studies aren't free, they are especially not free with regards to time. Meaning you essentially waste the time of some of your most qualified people and large monetary investments for nothing.

Having several proposals to fill various roles, all of which either still occupied by the ships that were meant to be replaced or ships that struggle to perform to the goal that was set for them is outright not a good look.

That's the point, and it's valid to include various studies that went nowhere among the list of failures. Because it presents the will and investment into something, but the failure to ultimately execute on it.

 

[Felocie]

The (valid) point is that divesting resources, be it financial or human resources, towards several unsuccessful studies, many of which at first glance either megalomeniacal/unfeasible or of questionable usefulness compared to other option, isn't a testimony for competence or a clear vision.

Studies have to conducted by qualified personnel and need significant funding to explore the theoretical and practical feasibility of a proposed product or system. Studies aren't free, they are especially not free with regards to time. Meaning you essentially waste the time of some of your most qualified people and large monetary investments for nothing.

Having several proposals to fill various roles, all of which either still occupied by the ships that were meant to be replaced or ships that struggle to perform to the goal that was set for them is outright not a good look.

That's the point, and it's valid to include various studies that went nowhere among the list of failures. Because it presents the will and investment into something, but the failure to ultimately execute on it.

My my, standards really are dropping in this place. Someone doesn’t know how projects retain and cultivate talent during down periods.

Why do seemingly dead end studies get funded and why are these studies so important? Let’s use Ford as an example. I can think of at least two studies that led up to Ford, CVX and CVN-21. I can also think of minor papers, a favourite being “Developments in Carrier Design”. From this has sprouted concepts such as the low observable aircraft carrier (with catapults placed behind stealth shielding), the massive artificial island concept (a slow moving 2000 foot carrier), etc. all leading to a very conventional and seemingly unrelated design; the Gerald R Ford. They also look into the finances of different carrier types, the practicalities of deck operations, etc. Were these wasted studies? No, not really. I would wager an aircraft carrier in 100 years or less could very well utilise features previously explored in these papers. They present valuable hull studies for large ships, and most importantly they exercise those involved. The Navy is not a capitalist institution, it does not build aircraft carriers to recoup its investment, nor does it build frigates to serve as modern East Indiamen. Studies are to build institutional knowledge, explore concepts, and envision the navy of 10, 30, 50 years ahead. Other countries can’t afford this, that’s why they invariably play catchup to some extent. Above all the US Navy does this the best, even ahead of other branches, that’s why DDG(X) is finally able to implement the lessons learned from Zumwalt almost 30 years later.

 

[Kat Tsun]

DDG(X) may not ever bend metal at this rate. The USN will cry itself to sleep after ordering about 30 more Burkes in a drunken shopping spree.

 

[Cordy]

No one else will get the topic back on track so I will. Here are the facts:
1) the Constellation class program was formulated to create an ASW focused, but multi-mission capable frigate. To this end it was required to have a series of high end systems primarily so it could work with a CSG in high threat environments and independently during peacetime/LIC.

Agree

The attached image is a handy starting point for understanding desired capability.
2) Constellation was to be acquired by modifying an existing design. To this end five designs were down selected. We know the most about FMM (as it was selected) and BIW thanks to that_person (who has sadly left SPF). This was chosen to speed up and simplify the acquisition process but this has/was criticised due to exacting but logical American requirements not fitting well to foreign designs. As Kat Tsun pointed out, American naval yards operate differently to foreign naval yards. Where American naval yards mostly serve the military, foreign naval yards serve both military and civil clients leading to less stringent requirements for foreign ships. FREMM is a good example of this. As standard she features only 80% the bulkheads required for a US Navy design. Another example is the Fridtjof Nansen class which used commercial grade pumps and equipment (in part leading to the loss of the Helge Insted).

Would note FMM in their bid added 300 tons of steel to the FREMM to meet in full the USN level II survivability standards required, as outlined in OPNAV 9070 and increased the length and beam

2.1) The process for initial entry development, as reported by the head of BIW’s bid, was very good. It featured excellent communication of requirements through monthly meetings and consultation. Bidders were able to craft their entry specifically to Navy requirements. It was also assumed that entries would comply with the level II survivability standards required, as outlined in OPNAV 9070. Further accepting a contract creates a legal obligation to meet these requirements or face penalties. FMM and NAVSEA must have both believed their design could meet these requirements.

The BIW, a Navantia design which was always an outsider as you have pointed out the primary mission was ASW and it did not have a quiet HED, hybrid electric propulsion system, as did FREMM also with its FPP, propellors are a major source of noise (vortices etc) and FPP are quieter than CPP.

2.2) FMM’s entry was the closest to what the Navy wanted, in theory. In hindsight it is fair to say they didn’t understand the scope of changes required for their design to meet OPNAV 9070 and NAVSEA failed to recognise this to their detriment. NAVSEA absolutely should’ve caught that and sought some sort of solution before selecting FMM but it is still fundamentally the responsibility of the contractor. FMM had never designed a platform above level I survivability standard which likely contributed significant to this failure. It is important to note that selection is not a choice between finished designs. With the benefit of hindsight it is fair to say that FMM was likely the wrong choice. While their design has the least compromises (particularly IEP), they required the greater number of changes. My personal opinion remains that the BIW design, while lacking optimal range and IEP, was the best choice as per that_person’s discussion with the BIW lead.

FMM did not design the Freedom class it was Gibbs & Cox under sub-contract to Lockheed who were the prime contractors.
Are you saying V.Adm. Rick Hunt USN Ret. former commander of Navy surface forces who headed up the FMM bid did not understand the scope of changes required for FREMM to meet level 2 survivability standards.

2.3) An often repeated argument is that changing NAVSEA requirements led to the FMM entry going from 85 to 10% parts commonality with the original design. This does not make sense, it is never mentioned in senate reports nor by the GAO. So what went so wrong? Well, as mentioned before, FMM obviously underestimated the changes required to bring their design to level II survivability standards. These changes ultimately reduced commonality far more than the mythical changing NAVSEA requirements. This is a common theme. FMMs LCS were always delivered late, the Freedom class was hundreds of tons overweight and littered with quality control issues.

GAO “Navy decisions to substantially modify the frigate design from the parent design have caused the two to now resemble nothing more than distant cousins,” the GAO report is totally scathing in castigating NAVSEA for constantly tinkering/changing the design, reported not one of the 31 blocks that make up the build of the Constellation design was 100% complete, some as low as only 55%, so how can a yard build a ship block when the design is not finished, yet the Navy instructed FMM to start the build and two years after beginning lead ship construction this persistent lack of design stability stalled construction of the lead ship, NAVSEA come across as complete idiots, Navy had claimed design completion as high as 92% in August 2023 but were lying as in actuality in October 2024 GAO review revealed the functional design was only 70% complete as the NAVSEA used the simplistic metric for design progress by primarily tracked the number of completed design documents, not whether those designs were stable, approved, and ready for construction. Navy totally ignored the law Congress passed in 2020 which mandated the Navy have a “complete” design prior to lead ship construction, post the LCS fiasco.
In Nov. '24 relations between FMM and Navy deteriorated so much that they sued the Navy via requests for equitable adjustments, which provides a remedy payable only when unforeseen or unintended circumstances, such as government modification of the contract, cause an increase in contract performance costs. The Navy was so embarrassed it deemed the total costs of the five requests as not suitable for public release.

 

[B2Blain]

I just listened to the CAVASSHIPS podcast. They had on Thomas Modley and Rear Adm Chuck Goddard (RET). Goddard was at NAVSEA and Fincantieri.

They claim the Constellation went off the rails not because of the primary operational requirements - sensors, weapons, performance but because of other requirements such as redundancy for different parts of the ship like the number of valves and cooling.

If this is so why not go back to an earlier revision and restructure the program. At some point wasn't the design good enough? Wouldn't that get more ships in the water sooner? My guess is that it is more complicated than that.

This does not bode well for DDG(X) or any other ship. The problem is with the organization. The Golden Fleet will be more of the same.

 

[Felocie]

The BIW, a Navantia design which was always an outsider as you have pointed out the primary mission was ASW and it did not have a quiet HED, hybrid electric propulsion system, as did FREMM also with its FPP, propellors are a major source of noise (vortices etc) and FPP are quieter than CPP.

I entirely agree with you however the BIW design required the least structural changes to meet American requirements (F100 is built to USN milspec standards) and structural changes (such as bringing FREMM from 85% to 100% of compartmentalisation requirements) have been one of the major issues with Constellation.

Are you saying V.Adm. Rick Hunt USN Ret. former commander of Navy surface forces who headed up the FMM bid did not understand the scope of changes required for FREMM to meet level 2 survivability standards.

Mr Hunt would without a doubt understand what was required but, given he studied bacteriology and telecommunications I doubt he understood how to get to what was required.

GAO “Navy decisions to substantially modify the frigate design from the parent design have caused the two to now resemble nothing more than distant cousins,”

Yes but why did this happen? There is no proof NAVSEA tinkered with the design and further, that just doesn’t make sense. This statement to me clearly states that it is a result of diverging American requirements from the original Italian FREMM requirements. There is also no obligation for FMM to modify their contract after it is signed as I understand it, so if Navy was demanding changes, FMM was under no obligation to make them unless they were in line with original contracted requirements.

They claim the Constellation went off the rails not because of the primary operational requirements - sensors, weapons, performance but because of other requirements such as redundancy for different parts of the ship like the number of valves and cooling.

This is know. FREMM is built to lower European survivability standards. Constellation had to be brought up to these standards which increased weight and hence created issues with stability. It also required American components to be fitted in the place of European components naturally leading to so mismatch on compartments

 

[whatismoo]

Just to point out briefly, in hindsight NAVSEA has assessed that spreading technology such as this across preceding ships is less effective because teething issues often come from having the systems together. Hence it doesn’t actually aid the program in the long run. This leads to the first ships in class having problems, yet the second and third having a much easier time of it. I suspect we will see this with JFK and we are already seeing this by comparing the DDG(X) design process to the Zumwalt design process

NHHC has a long running project on assessing first in class procurement which I have only heard discussed in person. I suspect it's relevant, fascinating, and unavailable.

I entirely agree with you however the BIW design required the least structural changes to meet American requirements (F100 is built to USN milspec standards) and structural changes (such as bringing FREMM from 85% to 100% of compartmentalisation requirements) have been one of the major issues with Constellation.

Mr Hunt would without a doubt understand what was required but, given he studied bacteriology and telecommunications I doubt he understood how to get to what was required.

Yes but why did this happen? There is no proof NAVSEA tinkered with the design and further, that just doesn’t make sense. This statement to me clearly states that it is a result of diverging American requirements from the original Italian FREMM requirements. There is also no obligation for FMM to modify their contract after it is signed as I understand it, so if Navy was demanding changes, FMM was under no obligation to make them unless they were in line with original contracted requirements.

This is know. FREMM is built to lower European survivability standards. Constellation had to be brought up to these standards which increased weight and hence created issues with stability. It also required American components to be fitted in the place of European components naturally leading to so mismatch on compartments

Really seems like a clean design from the start would have been in the water by now. Or at least on track.

 

[Felocie]

NHHC has a long running project on assessing first in class procurement which I have only heard discussed in person. I suspect it's relevant, fascinating, and unavailable.

Correct

Really seems like a clean design from the start would have been in the water by now. Or at least on track.

I disagree. Not only was a cleansheet design politically untenable at the time it likely would've taken just as long to design based on Spruance, Burke, and now DDG(X) timeframes. While Perry was an exception to the general rule, Perry is a far less complex design with a completely different philosophy behind it hence why I compare Connie to destroyer programs

 

[whatismoo]

I disagree. Not only was a cleansheet design politically untenable at the time it likely would've taken just as long to design based on Spruance, Burke, and now DDG(X) timeframes. While Perry was an exception to the general rule, Perry is a far less complex design with a completely different philosophy behind it hence why I compare Connie to destroyer programs

A fair point. At the least it seems like it would have avoided the design issues. Politically untenable yes but I suppose that is part of the issue — our requirements diverge to the point of needing a clean sheet but there's no appetite to avoid false economies.

 

[Jimmo952]

Sub Brief's take on the cancelation:

View: https://youtu.be/4APAnoptQ3c?si=etHWWyz8dneQTYmY

 

[Kat Tsun]

Really seems like a clean design from the start would have been in the water by now. Or at least on track.

Zumwalt took about 14 years.

 

[PFJN]

Sub Brief's take on the cancelation:

View: https://youtu.be/4APAnoptQ3c?si=etHWWyz8dneQTYmY

Hi.

That was an interesting video and informative video, and while I can see where the author is coming from and probably agree with alot of what he states, I do not think that I am fully onboard with all his conclusions and there may be a few small additional issues to note.

Specifically, (if I am recalling correctly);

• The FFG(X) program actually evolved from an earlier FF program that in turn evolved from the LCS program. Where as a follow-on/offshoot of the LCS program the Navy actually first started with an FF program in 2014 which were initially intended to be based on upgrades to the then building LCS platforms. (see pages 4-9 of the 2019 GAO "GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE" Report to Congress.
• As noted on page 5 of the above GAO report, this FF program was canceled in 2017 and replaced with the FFG(X) program.
• At about 2:20 in the video he talks about the four shipyards involved in the initial program, noting that FMM was the builder of the Freedom Class LCS, and that they eventually won the FFG(X) program with a design based on the FREMM class.
  • It’s probably worth clarifying here that while FMM was the builder of the LCS-1 class their FREMM based proposal submitted to the FFG(X) competition really had little to do with the LCS design.
  • In fact initially, to separate competitors for the FFG(X) program were initially being developed as part of teams that included FMM as their intended builder.
  • Initially Lockheed Martin was working with Gibbs & Cox (G&C) and FMM to developed a design that leveraged worked that they had done for the FF program and the LCS-1 design, while FMM and G&C were also part of a separate team that was developing a submittal based on the FREMM design,
  • Eventually LM decided to not submit the bid for the FFG(X) that had leveraged the LCS-1 design, resulting in only the FREMM based design being submitted for construction by FMM for the FFG(X) program.
• With respect to the number of VLS cells intended to be fitted to the FFG(X) its probably worth noting that as noted at the 2:40 and 9:00 marks in the video there was some debate whether the FFG(X) should field 32 or 48 VLS tubes in 2019 (as also discussed in this Congressional Research Services (CRS) report from 2019, it should probably also be noted that in the initial RFP released by the Navy they actually only specified 16 VLS tubes with an option for 32 tubes, but that fairly soon after the initial release of the RFP a change was made to make 32 cells the baseline (if I am understanding correctly).
• At around 4:00 in the video I think that the author misspeaks a little and states something along the lines that “The FREMM is operated by the Italian Navy which is the parent company of Finncantierri” when he actually probably meant to say that it “is operated by the Italian Navy and was built by Finncantierri in Italy, where Finncantierri is the parent company of FMM” or something along those lines.
• At around 5:20 in the video when talking about lessons learned from the DDX program the author appears to state something along the lines of “one of the lessons learned is to use a parent design, to use technology that’s already tested and no new tech installed on our ships. That will come later on in later batches and later versions. Of the ship. Let’s get the ship built first So the Navy decided to go with this parent design to modify a ship that already exists.” In general I think from the last part of that statement it is clear that the author is acknowledging that the intent is that the parent hull was always intended to be modified to some extent, but that the way he states the first part of that quote it almost looks like he is saying that nothing new will be added to the design (eventhough technically changing to US Systems would be adding “new tech” to the design). As such, I think he is trying to get the point across that the use of a parent hull will still require some mods to the parent hull design, but the way its worded in the video comes across just a little garbled,
• At around 5:35 in the video when discussing relative costs the author indicates that the FREMM was stated to have a cost of $800 thousand (though I suspect he meant $800m) cost in 2017 dollars (if I am understanding the video correctly)I think it is important to note that in addition to the factors listed about US Yards and US labor, there is also a need to consider inflation as while the FFG(X) appears to have a budgeted cost for the first of class of $1.2B (which appears to be in FY2025$ as noted in the CRS report) or $1.1B for a follow ship.
  • Using just a simple 3.5% inflation rate per year and escalating from 2017 to 2025 (8 years) would equate to a 30.6% increase in costs, which would mean that the notional costs for the Italian built FREMMs in FY2025$ may be closer to about $1.05B or so (or even more since due to COVID for at least one or two years during that period inflation was likely higher than 3.5%)
• At around 9:40 in the video the author talks about the level of commonality between the FREMM and FFG(X) having dropped to only 15% “in 2021” though in reading the CRS and GAO reports that statement appears to be from 2024 if I am understanding correctly.
• At around 10:00 in the video the author notes that (while the FREMM has a bow sonar) the FFG(X) hullform had the “bow sonar removed” suggesting that this makes the FFG(X) limited or less capable at ASW. However, here it should be noted that this decision was driven by the USN and was not specific to the FMM design. In the original FFG(X) RFP the ship was specifically intended to not fit a bow sonar (if I am understanding correctly) and the USN had decided that the use of a towed array, drones and helos would provide the ASW capability that the ship required. Although it is unclear why a bow sonar was initially not desired, it is possible that it may have had something to do with limiting the draft of the ship to allow it to also operate better in littoral water depths. And, if I am understanding correctly I think I once heard that the Navy at some point may have considered allowing the bidders to include a bow sonar if they desired (thou I may be mistaken).
• At 10:30 in the vide the author notes that in 2022 the PEO Ships of the USN authorized construction to commence without a completed design, noting that the “final” design is just over 80% complete. However, this is not uncommon for a naval ship design. Here it may be worthwhile to note a few things. Specifically;
  • A typical naval ship design will go through several spirals, with an early stage "concept design being done when developing a proposal, and a more detailed "Functional Design" being done to support submitting an actual bid to an RFP. And it is typically these "Functional Desings" that get reviewed by the government in order to decode which shipyard/industry team gets awarded a "Detailed Design and Build" contract.
  • It is during this "Detail Design and Build Phase" that the actual construction drawings are usually developed.
  • Usually prior to the Detail Design Phase the Government should have locked down there requirements for what they want as much as possible, but it is typically understood that there may still be some issues that may arise where the Government may need to make some level of modifications to their requirements, and as such an allowance is made for a Contract Mod Margin in the contract.
    • In an ideal world these potential mods should likely be limited to requirements to accommodate small changes in Government Furnished Equipment and other such things.
    • However, because some items of Government Furnished Equipment, such as specific weapons and sensor models may still be undergoing development alongside the ship design, and as such those systems may experience weight growth that the ongoing ship design will need to accommodate.
    • To try and limit these impacts a contract may stipulate that only equipment with a mature design will be incorporated, but in doing so it needs to be realized that because of ongoing issues outside the government's control it may be possible that subcomponent X of system A may no longer be in production and it may have to be replaced with subcomponent Y, which may have a different weight or heat load or some such issue and as such a change (that can hopefully be accommodated for by using the Contract Mod Margin) may be needed.
    • Finally though it should be noted that detail design work is/was always meant to be part of the DD&C contract, but that the shipyard is not supposed to be cleared to start construction until they can demonstrate that the "detail design" of the ship has reached a certain level, which I think the video identified as 80% complete, but that some level of "detail design" is expected and necessary during actual construction.
    • Specifically some level of smaller systems that will still need to be fully laid out, some interferences will undoubtedly need to be resolved, and some small issues (such as the small changes covered by Contract Mods discussed above will always need to be addressed).
    • Additionally, a yard will typically need to spread out the engineering labor hours over the entire DD&C contract so that the yard isn't faced with having to hire up a large number of engineers for the total design of the ship, then let a large number of them go once construction starts, especially if a contract if for more than 1 ship.
    • Additionally, it should also be pointed out that if a yard were to wait for 100% of detail design to be completed before construction starts this would further increase the risk that some components may become obsolescent sooner in a ship's life than desired, since some components would need to be selected potentially a year and a half before they are actually needed during construction and there is the possibility that during that time some small manufacturers may have gone out of business or that a manufacturer may have either altered or eliminated a specific piece part and replaced it with something newer.
  • As such, I do not believe that if the stated level of completion of the “final” or “detail” design of the vessel was 80% when construction was authorized to state was necessarily an issue but rather it probably was an issue with whether the “80% complete “statement was fully correct, as there appears to be some discrepancy on how the Navy came up with that number., especially based on the information provided in the video around the 13:40 mark or so.
• At around 10:50 in the video the author begins to address issues with recruiting a suitable workforce, and to me I suspect that this may actually be one of the more major issues that ultimately lead to delays and costs increases to the program. In general its not just the amount of money needed for incentives needed to attract employees, but also the fact that without sufficient employees initially available the construction schedule will begin to stretch out and other costs will begin to increase as well.
• At around 12:00 in the video the author also makes another very good point about how Congress started authorizing funds for additional ships, likely sooner than they should since the initial vessels have been delayed.
• Around 14:05 the author begins to discuss the delays to the program schedule, and here I think that I partially agree with the author but also partially disagree on some issues.
  • In general, based on the previous discussion on the actual percent of design that is complete the impression that I get, being a naval architect myself, is that the delays aren’t necessarily an issue that the “detail design” is not complete (as design work on such a ship will likely continue right up till the launching and fitting out of the vessel) but rather that the design does not appear to have been 80% complete when construction was authorized to start and that it still did not appear to be at that level in 2024.
  • To this though I also believe that supply chain issues and labor recruitment and training delays were also playing a roll, like the Navy appears to suggest in the document shown in the video at around the 14:05 mark, and as also discussed in the GAO and CRS reports.
• At around 17:00 in the video the author also makes a very good point about the difference between money being “authorized” and money being “spent” noting that the actual money sent to the shipyard so far is actual on the order of about $500M.

As such, like I said above, I think that this video is very helpful and informative though I fear there might be some misunderstandings about what is meant by having a “Detail Design complete” and that this may perhaps be obfuscating some of the issues with the program.

Some additional issues tht should probably also be considered include;

• At about 3:30 in the video above indicates that in April 2022 a Detail Design and Construction (DD&C) contract was awarded for a FREMM class Frigate, which I believe is not fully correct, as in looking through both the GAO and CRS reports noted above it is clear that the contract was actually for a FREMM-based frigate and that it was always understood that the FFG(X) would have a degree of difference from its parent design.
  • Specifically, in the CRS report it notes that the intended level of commonality with the FREMM was initially 85%.
  • Much of the differences in the level of commonality with the original FREMM design stems from the desire to fit US Weapons and sensors, as well as design to US Navy stability, safety, survivability, and habitability requirements.
  • Here it should be noted that some of the US Navy requirements are/were either new to the USN at the time or had only recently been implemented based on lessons learned from The USS Cole, the USS Tripoli, the USS McCain, the USS Fitzgerald and other assessments of evolving threats (if I am understanding correctly).
  • As such, if I am understanding correctly, the USN requirements that vessels like the legacy DDG-51 Flight IIa and the USCG NSC/WHSL, and/or even the Spanish F100 etc are not necessarily the fully the same as what were being specified for the FFG(X) and that even a design based on one of those programs would require some degree of modification to meet the FFG(X) design requirements.
• As a further issue though, ever since the end of the Cold War, threats have been changing, and the Navy has tried to adapt to meet new and evolving threats and requirements.
  • Specifically, in the late 1990s and early 2000s a need for vessels capable of addressing threats in the littorals was seen as a great need for the USN.
  • However, in the time it took to get the LCS program up and delivering ships, the outlook for potential conflict began to change such that even if the LCS program had not run into problems there was good reason to suspect that the ships being built to the LCS specs may not fully need the future needs of the USN.
  • As such, a plan was made to curtail the LCS program and replace it with an FF program. However, as outlined in the GAO and CRS reports referenced above, eventually it was decided that the FF program may not be fully capable of meeting future navy needs and as such it was evolved/replaced by the FFG(X) program.
  • And early in the FF (and perhaps FFG(X)) program the USN was still not fully sure what the best fit would be for these vessels and/or what potential weapons and sensors would be mature enough for inclusion in the design.
  • As such, during early concept level and perhaps even functional level work on the FF and FFG(X) program if I am understanding correctly, I think that there was talk of such things as using NLOS missiles, making an allowance for lasers and possibly even some sort of apparatus for flying a "kite like" object from the ship.

To me from what I have seen and read I suspect that;

• While it was hoped that using a parent design would allow for a large portion of the design of the FFG(X) to be similar to the parent hullform that changes brought on by the USN desires to fit a full four array SPY-4 radar system, a different propulsion system, a towed array sonar in lieu of a bow mounted sonar, and other USN habitability, survivability, and such design specs lead to a drastically greater amount of change required to the design.
• Some of the USN specific design standards for habitability, survivability and such probably had a greater impact to the design than initially anticipated by the shipyard and its designers.
• Issues with supply chain and labor hiring and training probably also had a relatively big impact the delays encountered in the program
• The definition of 80% completion of the Detail Design appears to have been poorly defined and that the ship probably was not yet ready to start construction when it did.
• Issues with the structure of how Congress does its business probably resulted in more money being allocated than made sense at the time.
• And finally that the overall schedule for the program probably was not realistic, as the full scope of the changes necessary to the parent design to meet the USN requirements seems to have been underestimated with significant weight growth being identified late in the design, leading to the need to try and address the impacts of this weight growth too late in the program

Although I know that I am probably overlooking a lot of issues and probably not smart enough to fully understand all the issues that lead to the problems with the program, one item that sticks out to me is that perhaps the program was too rushed and schedule driven and that perhaps more time should have been allocated for the design teams to develop their bids to make sure that the Navy requirements were fully locked down and that the full impacts or trying to modify an existing design to the Navy’s unique and specific requirements were better understood.

 

[Felocie]

Zumwalt took about 14 years.

This is a poor comparison, the GWOT needed funding! Clean sheet Connie would take less time than even a DDG based on proven technology but not by much

As such, if I am understanding correctly, the USN requirements that vessels like the legacy DDG-51 Flight IIa and the USCG NSC/WHSL, and/or even the Spanish F100 etc are not necessarily the fully the same as what were being specified for the FFG(X) and that even a design based on one of those programs would require some degree of modification to meet the FFG(X) design requirements.

Excellent post, and yes you are correct. A big problem was that, while other offers presented less changes to achieve suitable survivability standards, FREMM featured the least changes to meet capability goals. I believe that the shining capability promises outshined the practical realities of meeting the standard.

Additionally, because it is often mentioned, NSC was fundamentally never acceptable (hence why it was withdrawn and a British derived design was submitted in it’s place)

While it was hoped that using a parent design would allow for a large portion of the design of the FFG(X) to be similar to the parent hullform that changes brought on by the USN desires to fit a full four array SPY-4 radar system, a different propulsion system, a towed array sonar in lieu of a bow mounted sonar

I believe you may have confused some of the program requirements but the gist of what you’re saying is entirely correct.

making an allowance for lasers

On this point: it is clear from what has been released about DDG(X) and general discussions about the future of the US Navy that DEWs are a priority, particularly for point defence. This is why IEP is the new standard and excess generating capacity (potentially 40MW of power for DDG(X)!) is so important and this further contributes to the complexity of Constellation and future small surface combatants.

 

[Cordy]

@ PFJN, a few comments on your recent full post on the video

Sonar- My understanding Dr Regan Campbel the senior Navy civilian who headed up the FFG(X) RFQ under James Geurts who served from 2017 to 2021 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition), her directive by Geurts was to control costs and one aspect was the bidders could either fit bow sonar or a towed array.

The Navy claim that "final" design was just over 80% complete in 2022 when production authorized has proven to be pure Navy hogwash, as mentioned previously GAO found it only reached 70% in 2024. Also note world shipbuilding has moved on and why South East Asian shipyards who build 95% of the world's ships only commence build when design 100% and materials/components are available, a few things mentioned in article by Fred Harris President of NASSCO on his take from South Korean yards many years ago and sure their production tech has moved on since then allowing the Japanese and South Korean yards to produce navy ships at half price and time of US, e.g. Mogami class. Still don't know why Admirals were not jailed for not abiding the Congress law that passed in 2020 which mandated the Navy have a “complete” design prior to lead ship construction.


Re. FREMM habitability came with 6 and 4 room staterooms with showers and toilets, which understand Navy downgraded for Constellation, but palatial compared to Burke WWII 30 room bunkrooms, another push to the Navy into the 21st century FREMM/Constellation came with Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) a long overdue approach to maintenance and taking advantage of current AI technology sensors from the planned-maintenance system which remains basically unchanged since being introduced back in the 1970s.

 

[Jimmo952]

Here is Cdr Salamander's take:

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/...takesgiving?utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true
Reading this thread brings to mind the wise words of John F. Kennedy.

"Success has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan."

 

[whatismoo]

Here is Cdr Salamander's take:

https://cdrsalamander.substack.com/...takesgiving?utm_medium=web&triedRedirect=true
Reading this thread brings to mind the wise words of John F. Kennedy.

"Success has a thousand fathers but defeat is an orphan."

Sal is so fucking insufferable. And frankly, I think this thread has shown that there's several clear consensus picks for blame, largely falling between a choose your own adventure of CNO Richardson/OPNAV/etc, FMM, NAVSEA, and congress, depending on perspectives.

 

[Jimmo952]

Sal is so fucking insufferable. And frankly, I think this thread has shown that there's several clear consensus picks for blame, largely falling between a choose your own adventure of CNO Richardson/OPNAV/etc, FMM, NAVSEA, and congress, depending on perspectives.

Sal championed the Euro-frigate based FFGX for a long time. It is not surprising he's feeling salty.

You mentioned pretty much everyone involved.

It's a safe bet the fault was in that group somewhere.

The fact that it can't quite be pinpointed shows the process isn't right.

 

[Jimmo952]

The US is getting another chance to build a foreign design.

This time an LST from Damen.

Hopefully, we get it right this time.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-new...rps-selects-design-for-new-lsm-landing-ships/

 

[whatismoo]

Sal championed the Euro-frigate based FFGX for a long time. It is not surprising he's feeling salty.

You mentioned pretty much everyone involved.

It's a safe bet the fault was in that group somewhere.

The fact that it can't quite be pinpointed shows the process isn't right.

It can be pinpointed, it's just that there are disagreements in analysis and no definitive answers yet. We don't have complete information, so its hard to make a definitive judgement.

 

[Ainen]

(...)and sure their production tech has moved on since then allowing the Japanese and South Korean yards to produce navy ships at half price and time of US, e.g. Mogami class.(...)

Mogami is mildly speaking a lower level ship.

 

[TorpedoJ]

Speaking of Japanese ships, why were the Asahi ASW second-rank destroyers never considered for FFG-X? On the face of it they seem perfect; fully Americanised systems, and reasonable growth margin if you did want to add your own systems, like a 4x2x3 SPY-6 or CAPTAS-4.

 

[TomS]

Speaking of Japanese ships, why were the Asahi ASW second-rank destroyers never considered for FFG-X? On the face of it they seem perfect; fully Americanised systems, and reasonable growth margin if you did want to add your own systems, like a 4x2x3 SPY-6 or CAPTAS-4.

You can only consider what is actually offered. No one bid that ship, so the Navy could not consider it.

 

[isayyo2]

The year is 2045.
The third attempt at a Gerald R. Ford replacement has been cancelled due to cost overruns, the Navy has opted instead to order 22 Arleigh Burke-class guided missile helicopter destroyers.

The year is 2065.
The US Navy orders 18 more Arleigh Burke flight 5s as a stopgap after development is delayed on the new frigate.

The year is 2085.
The entire surface fleet…it's all Burkes…the only ship the US can still build.

The year is 2105.
The Secretary of the Navy performs the annual sacrifice of a multi-billion dollar project to appease the Burke gods, as is tradition.

All hail the Burke!

View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2_pcVnSwexM

 

[Felocie]

one aspect was the bidders could either fit bow sonar or a towed array.

A TA and VDS was preferred as it provides far greater capability given engagement distances for ASW.

The fact that it can't quite be pinpointed shows the process isn't right.

It can be essentially be pinpointed though. The program was flawed as it applied American standards to a foreign design. This was never going to work. When making a decision, NAVSEA went with the outwardly least compromised design when compared to program specifications. To bring FREMM to program specifications was like fitting a square peg in a round hole, you’ve gotta cut the square peg down to fit it and ultimately that process was messy and not particularly successful.

The US is getting another chance to build a foreign design.

This time an LST from Damen.

Hopefully, we get it right this time.

It is highly likely this will be a much simpler process. The Marine Corps lobby will grant waivers for survivability (it isn’t a frontline combatant anyway) and the design is proven.

Speaking of Japanese ships, why were the Asahi ASW second-rank destroyers never considered for FFG-X? On the face of it they seem perfect; fully Americanised systems, and reasonable growth margin if you did want to add your own systems, like a 4x2x3 SPY-6 or CAPTAS-4.

Survivability standards would have to be brought up, just like on FREMM. You would get the same issues.

All hail the Burke!

I’m glad to say Burke is certainly coming to an end, good ships that they are

 

[Jimmo952]

A TA and VDS was preferred as it provides far greater capability given engagement distances for ASW.

It can be essentially be pinpointed though. The program was flawed as it applied American standards to a foreign design. This was never going to work. When making a decision, NAVSEA went with the outwardly least compromised design when compared to program specifications. To bring FREMM to program specifications was like fitting a square peg in a round hole, you’ve gotta cut the square peg down to fit it and ultimately that process was messy and not particularly successful.

It is highly likely this will be a much simpler process. The Marine Corps lobby will grant waivers for survivability (it isn’t a frontline combatant anyway) and the design is proven.

Survivability standards would have to be brought up, just like on FREMM. You would get the same issues.

I’m glad to say Burke is certainly coming to an end, good ships that they are

Yes. I agree the LSM should be easier. I also agree the Marines can be expected to resist attempts to turn the ship into something more than it is.

It sounds like Damen will be doing the integration of US kit into the design.

If I am reading this correctly, Damen will do the engineering and then hand over the technical data package to the Navy which will takes bids from multiple US yards to build the thing.

Is that your take?