FFG(X) - NEWS Only

[Desertfox]

Lets not go crazy on the scope creep.

 

[Felocie]

The USN itself doesn't disagree with this, look at the inquiry into the Bonhomme Richard loss. The entire capability of a major naval base at their hands and they couldn't stop a fire that shouldn't have resulted in the loss of the ship.

Yes so lets LOWER the standards shall we? Shit like this happens in peacetime so that it can be rectified for wartime. The answer is not lowering standards

The USN's supposed higher design standards have produced a generation of failures, it's 35 years since a new combatant class was introduced without critical problems. Standards so strict they can't be met are not fit for purpose, just as much as ones that are too slack.

List those failures which are a result of "higher design standards". You will likely say Zumwalt, which was predominantly due to the generational leap in technology leading to a complex integration process. NAVSEA declared that this remains the most effective way to push generational upgrades to the fleet. You will then try to say LCS of which standards had very little bearing.
Your argument is ridiculous, standards written in blood have proven it

 

[joshjosh]

I wonder if the Constellation concept might be flawed not because it is too capable, but because it is not capable enough. Specifically, in BMD. The Houthi are a 4th rate adversary, at best, yet they were slinging ballistic missiles. Would the Constellation (or two) even be deployed to the Red Sea to defend shipping without a Burke present to perform BMD? Which missions could a Constellation take on where the opponent might be deploying subs, cruise missiles and aircraft, but not ballistic missiles? The Constellation might have been a capable sensor-shooter-ASW as part of a SAG or CSG, but I'm doubtful it would have done many serious missions on its own in wartime.

 

[Airbus A340]

Crazier idea... Make an ASW version of the San Antonios. The well deck can be used for ASW drones, and the vehicle deck replaced with a hangar deck for more helos (6-8). Towed arrays can be deployed on the drones. Make a new quad box (Harpoon-syle) launcher for ASROC and strap a couple on the deck. Twice the cost of a Constellation but far greater ASW capability.

That's not an escort, it's a target. It needs escorts to survive.

 

[Felocie]

The quality of discourse in here is disappointing to say the least. Must I reiterate the topic is FFG(X). FFG(X) does not mean more Arleigh Burkes, nor does it mean some sort of mythical PF with the capability to destroy the Houthis singlehandedly. It seems very few people actually understand what is being discussed. That should be a prerequisite to posting

 

[Airbus A340]

I wonder if the Constellation concept might be flawed not because it is too capable, but because it is not capable enough. Specifically, in BMD. The Houthi are a 4th rate adversary, at best, yet they were slinging ballistic missiles. Would the Constellation (or two) even be deployed to the Red Sea to defend shipping without a Burke present to perform BMD? Which missions could a Constellation take on where the opponent might be deploying subs, cruise missiles and aircraft, but not ballistic missiles? The Constellation might have been a capable sensor-shooter-ASW as part of a SAG or CSG, but I'm doubtful it would have done many serious missions on its own in wartime.

This is a similar problem to the ocean escort problem after WW2. In WW2 a Loch class frigate was the most cost effective ASW escort. Faster subs means that escorts would need to be faster and more expensive. The problem was solved with SOSUS, planes, sonobuoys, helicopters, etc. Now, the minimum AAW suite is much higher than it was before antiship ballistic missiles. This is a very expensive problem to solve.

 

[Desertfox]

That's not an escort, it's a target. It needs escorts to survive.

The best escorts in WWII where the CVEs. Im merely proposing the modern version of them, one that can also carry drone DEs to augment the escorting forces.

 

[DWG]

Yes so lets LOWER the standards shall we? Shit like this happens in peacetime so that it can be rectified for wartime. The answer is not lowering standards

I'm pointing out that damage control depends on two things: the survivability of the ship, and the training of the crew. You claimed yourself that the US has both higher standards of survivability and highly trained crew. Yet the depth of navy training has been questioned for years, and you have USN inquiries into serious incidents repeatedly finding that crew training is execrable. You don't seem to be addressing this point.

Meanwhile, the RN gets better results from a more serious accident in an older ship, because they have crew training that actually lives up to the standard expected. If the survivability of the RN's ships is adequate, then are the USN's supposedly higher standards making any difference in practice, or are they just making the fleet unaffordable?

List those failures which are a result of "higher design standards". You will likely say Zumwalt, which was predominantly due to the generational leap in technology leading to a complex integration process. NAVSEA declared that this remains the most effective way to push generational upgrades to the fleet. You will then try to say LCS of which standards had very little bearing.
Your argument is ridiculous, standards written in blood have proven it

You can have numbers or bleeding edge, even the US can't afford both. The problem is whenever it tries for bleeding edge it ends uo with neither. Of the post-Burke combatant classes:

Sea Wolf - unaffordable, stopped at three.

Virginia - let's do something non-radical and affordable, doesn't seem to have had major problems, we'll give you that one. On the other hand, pay attention to the non-radical and affordable in what comes next.

Cruiser Baseline/CGBL - Not an actual ship, a model of what happens if you try to create a CG version of a Burke - 13,500t.

Mission Essential Unit/CG VSTOL - CG weapons suite + 12-20 SV-22s, 25ktons, intended to operate independently. Probably just as well it went no further with that CONOPS.

SC-21 - Let's completely revise the surface fleet (1994)

SC-21 3A5 Arsenal Ship - Let's abandon everything else in SC21 for a 30,000t monitor with 500 VLS and 50 crew. Biggest Other Transactional Authority purchase ever to avoid the adults taking a look? Abandoned as soon as CNO Boorda was buried. (1996)

Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator - Let's do Arsenal Ship as a demonstrator - Congress: let's not. (1997)

SC-21 3B1/Power Projection Ship/Littoral Combatant - initially 2xVGAS + 128 VLS, became 1x5" + 128 VLS. The whole point of the Littoral Combatant was extended duration naval operations off the Norwegian coast. Didn't it occur to anyone that maybe they should re-evaluate the entire mission given the collapse of the Soviet Union 8 years previously? Assessed unfavourably vs the Burkes and decision made to put the innards in a new hull leading to DD-21 (1997)

DD-21/21st Century Land Attack Destroyer - spawn of Littoral Combatant and the Arsenal ship. Yes, it was stuck within SC-21 and 'Forward - From The Sea', but that should have forced people to realise they needed two separate classes, one fitted for naval gunfire support, one for stealthy open ocean work, not try and squish them both in the same hull and compromise the exquisitely expensive stealth capability. Meanwhile let's take VGAS and squeeze it into a conventional turret, compromising the innovation that gives it its extreme range, while simultaneously designing it to be incompatible with existing ordnance, and only capable of using a round whose costs don't scale affordably. 256 VLS cells wanted. 2000 - this isn't risky enough, lets add IEP. *headdesk* (32 wanted, dead by 2001)

CG-21 - let's turn the Zumwalt into a Tico Replacement. (2000, dead by 2001)

Future Surface Combatant - er, SC21 sounds great, but can we actually afford it? (2001)

CG(X)/Next Generation Cruiser - BMD capable Zumwalt as a Tico replacement (18-19 wanted, dead by 2010)

SPY-6 AMDR - radar, not a ship, was planned for CG(X), but will end up in the Flight III Burkes with a 14ft array instead of the planned 22ft. Plans to put it in the Zumwalts with the 22ft array abandoned because TSCEI can't handle it.

DD(X)/Zumwalt - DD-21 modified with PVLS vs Mk-41. SPY-4 VSR removed to try and curtail cost growth, forcing SPY-3 to be modified to do Volume Search as well as Horizon Search, but it can't do both simultaneously. Lack of a fire control radar for terminal guidance forces SPY-3 to additionally work as an Interrupted Continuous Wave Illuminator, which means Zumwalt specific versions of ESSM and Standard IIIA. Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure replaces Aegis, but isn't compatible with systems that require Aegis, such as SPY-6 AMDR. DCNO " the DDG 1000 cannot perform area air defense; specifically, it cannot successfully employ the Standard Missile-2 (SM-2), SM-3 or SM-6 and is incapable of conducting Ballistic Missile Defense."

LCS - Another child of SC-21. Seriously, who thought a 50kt minesweeper was a sensible combination of capabilities? The evidence was there if it was looked for, the RN had investigated high speed frigates in the Type 19, and concluded the combination was unworkable. LCS wanted three innovations that hadn't been done before: high speed, low manning, modularity, that was too many high-risk changes for one class. And interestingly NAVSEA was perfectly willing to relax survivability standards to get there. We all know what happened there, but at least it wasn't Streetfighter.

Streetfighter - let's try to do everything we want LCS to do, but instead of a 2-3,000t hull, let's try to squeeze everything into 3-600t, with a crew of 6.

FFG(X)/Constellation - Apparently no one noticed the minor contradiction between "Let's build an in-service foreign design so we can build it quickly and cheaply" and "Let's insist every aspect of the ship matches NAVSEA standards exactly (no one mention we gave LCS a waiver and wanted one for Ford)".

Ford Class - Axing SPY-4 from the Zumwalts means Gerald R Ford will be the only ship with Dual Band Radar. Even John F Kennedy has the Enterprise Air Search Radar instead. EMALS teething issues are understandable, weapons elevator problems less so. Just don't mention that the toilet piping is too narrow It's interesting to note the USN tried to delay shock trials by six years, again demonstrating that even the Navy hierarchy sees its own construction standards as burdensome and something to be worked around.

 

[Airbus A340]

The best escorts in WWII where the CVEs. Im merely proposing the modern version of them, one that can also carry drone DEs to augment the escorting forces.

I think you are on to something. An ASW command ship that send out UUVs, USVs, UAVs and helps and can coordinate surface ships on the hunt.

 

[Ainen]

The best escorts in WWII where the CVEs. Im merely proposing the modern version of them, one that can also carry drone DEs to augment the escorting forces.

CVEs were best escort enablers, but by themselves they were escortees and couldn't escort anything - and not just that, they were juicier targets than most of their convoys.
Loss of a carrier, escort or not, was a major pushback.

I think you are on to something. An ASW command ship that send out UUVs, USVs, UAVs and helps and can coordinate surface ships on the hunt.

In principle it is. But it will be already a 3rd layer for sea control force, when USN can't get a grip on 1.

 

[Airbus A340]

Thanks to DWG for providing such great posts like the one above.

It used to be that the USN changed one thing at a time. Propulsion, hull form, or weapons/combat system. Spruance had new engines. Burke had a new hull. Ticonderoga had a new combat system. Work one one new thing at a time and make it work. Zumwalt and LCS tried to do all 3 at once. And what about foreign designs? Look at the Tacoma class PFs of WW2 and the fiasco that was. Those were extremely simple ships and the US was at the height of its productive capacity. Why would anyone think things would be better now?

 

[Scott Kenny]

IMHO, upgunned LCS would be better for frigate role. One important reason - it would NOT affect Burke's production, and LCS hulls could be produced in significant quantity.

Oh, I'm not talking about using new-build Burkes for ASW.

I'm talking about following the 2-tier building where a 20yo Burke gets sent to the shipyards to have more ASW fitted in instead of installing SPY6 etc.

So the Burkes at Mid-life refit go from primarily AA focused to ASW focus, filling the high-end ASW role that the Spruance and then Zumwalts were supposed to fill.

I wonder if the Constellation concept might be flawed not because it is too capable, but because it is not capable enough. Specifically, in BMD. The Houthi are a 4th rate adversary, at best, yet they were slinging ballistic missiles. Would the Constellation (or two) even be deployed to the Red Sea to defend shipping without a Burke present to perform BMD? Which missions could a Constellation take on where the opponent might be deploying subs, cruise missiles and aircraft, but not ballistic missiles? The Constellation might have been a capable sensor-shooter-ASW as part of a SAG or CSG, but I'm doubtful it would have done many serious missions on its own in wartime.

That is my concern as well.

Cruiser Baseline/CGBL - Not an actual ship, a model of what happens if you try to create a CG version of a Burke - 13,500t.

Which tells us what we should expect for DDGX, though that is a separate thread.

DD-21/21st Century Land Attack Destroyer - spawn of Littoral Combatant and the Arsenal ship. Yes, it was stuck within SC-21 and 'Forward - From The Sea', but that should have forced people to realise they needed two separate classes, one fitted for naval gunfire support, one for stealthy open ocean work, not try and squish them both in the same hull and compromise the exquisitely expensive stealth capability. Meanwhile let's take VGAS and squeeze it into a conventional turret, compromising the innovation that gives it its extreme range, while simultaneously designing it to be incompatible with existing ordnance, and only capable of using a round whose costs don't scale affordably. 256 VLS cells wanted. 2000 - this isn't risky enough, lets add IEP. *headdesk* (32 wanted, dead by 2001)

The problem with VGAS was that at the time it was incapable of hitting targets within something like 14nmi of the ship. So a ship fitted with VGAS would have needed a second gun system.

It took until the 2010s before trajectory shaping became an option.

Ford Class - Axing SPY-4 from the Zumwalts means Gerald R Ford will be the only ship with Dual Band Radar. Even John F Kennedy has the Enterprise Air Search Radar instead. EMALS teething issues are understandable, weapons elevator problems less so. Just don't mention that the toilet piping is too narrow It's interesting to note the USN tried to delay shock trials by six years, again demonstrating that even the Navy hierarchy sees its own construction standards as burdensome and something to be worked around.

Doing all the bullshit to prepare for an INSURV absolutely is burdensome.

Georgia got dinged for the wrong ball-lock pins in one place. Nevermind that the proper ones were not in stock anywhere in the USN and the ones used were officially acceptable alternatives.

 

[Jimmo952]

FFG(X)/Constellation - Apparently no one noticed the minor contradiction between "Let's build an in-service foreign design so we can build it quickly and cheaply" and "Let's insist every aspect of the ship matches NAVSEA standards exactly (no one mention we gave LCS a waiver and wanted one for Ford)".

The entire post is great but this paragraph really sums up the absurdity of the FFGX debacle.

 

[VishnuOsiris]

SC-21 3B1/Power Projection Ship/Littoral Combatant - initially 2xVGAS + 128 VLS, became 1x5" + 128 VLS. The whole point of the Littoral Combatant was extended duration naval operations off the Norwegian coast. Didn't it occur to anyone that maybe they should re-evaluate the entire mission given the collapse of the Soviet Union 8 years previously? Assessed unfavourably vs the Burkes and decision made to put the innards in a new hull leading to DD-21 (1997)

I do recall reading the tumblehome hull was ideal for North Sea conditions. To play Devil's Advocate, perhaps there were still considerations for (90's) NATO joint operations? I also recall something about pursuing DD-21 ASW suites for the GIUK gap. I think these features would still be valuable despite the "End of History," regardless if better suited for a separate class. The latter seems unlikely given 90's budgets.

​

 

[Felocie]

Sea Wolf - unaffordable, stopped at three.

Hmm, I wonder what may have changed to make Seawolf no longer needed...

Cruiser Baseline/CGBL - Not an actual ship, a model of what happens if you try to create a CG version of a Burke - 13,500t.

Ok and? It was a study, what's your point

Mission Essential Unit/CG VSTOL - CG weapons suite + 12-20 SV-22s, 25ktons, intended to operate independently. Probably just as well it went no further with that CONOPS.

Another study, what's your point?

SC-21 - Let's completely revise the surface fleet (1994)

SC-21 3A5 Arsenal Ship - Let's abandon everything else in SC21 for a 30,000t monitor with 500 VLS and 50 crew. Biggest Other Transactional Authority purchase ever to avoid the adults taking a look? Abandoned as soon as CNO Boorda was buried. (1996)

Maritime Fire Support Demonstrator - Let's do Arsenal Ship as a demonstrator - Congress: let's not. (1997)

SC-21 3B1/Power Projection Ship/Littoral Combatant - initially 2xVGAS + 128 VLS, became 1x5" + 128 VLS. The whole point of the Littoral Combatant was extended duration naval operations off the Norwegian coast. Didn't it occur to anyone that maybe they should re-evaluate the entire mission given the collapse of the Soviet Union 8 years previously? Assessed unfavourably vs the Burkes and decision made to put the innards in a new hull leading to DD-21 (1997)

Another study, what's your point?

DD-21/21st Century Land Attack Destroyer - spawn of Littoral Combatant and the Arsenal ship. Yes, it was stuck within SC-21 and 'Forward - From The Sea', but that should have forced people to realise they needed two separate classes, one fitted for naval gunfire support, one for stealthy open ocean work, not try and squish them both in the same hull and compromise the exquisitely expensive stealth capability. Meanwhile let's take VGAS and squeeze it into a conventional turret, compromising the innovation that gives it its extreme range, while simultaneously designing it to be incompatible with existing ordnance, and only capable of using a round whose costs don't scale affordably. 256 VLS cells wanted. 2000 - this isn't risky enough, lets add IEP. *headdesk* (32 wanted, dead by 2001)

CG-21 - let's turn the Zumwalt into a Tico Replacement. (2000, dead by 2001)

Future Surface Combatant - er, SC21 sounds great, but can we actually afford it? (2001)

Mostly failed due to a small production run. NAVSEA has openly stated that the Zumwalt and Ford method of building new ships is the most effective but it requires budgetary support from government. Also IEP is the bare minimum on modern LSC due to the requirement for future electrically intensive systems. This is a moot point, the failure of these programs is mostly down to the GWOT and a lack of governmental support, not the failings of the systems themselves.

LCS - Another child of SC-21. Seriously, who thought a 50kt minesweeper was a sensible combination of capabilities? The evidence was there if it was looked for, the RN had investigated high speed frigates in the Type 19, and concluded the combination was unworkable. LCS wanted three innovations that hadn't been done before: high speed, low manning, modularity, that was too many high-risk changes for one class. And interestingly NAVSEA was perfectly willing to relax survivability standards to get there. We all know what happened there, but at least it wasn't Streetfighter.

LCS is not a product of SC-21... it's a product of FFTS. It makes perfect sense in the context of FFTS. Obviously hindsight (and arguably a lack of foresight from the USN) demonstrates that it was a bad move. 1 point.

FFG(X)/Constellation - Apparently no one noticed the minor contradiction between "Let's build an in-service foreign design so we can build it quickly and cheaply" and "Let's insist every aspect of the ship matches NAVSEA standards exactly (no one mention we gave LCS a waiver and wanted one for Ford)".

These decisions were mostly down to politics and not NAVSEA or the navy. The government would not accept a clean sheet program at the time. However to build it cheaply wasn't a goal, acquiring the design it at lower cost and quicker was. The design itself still used high quality and expensive systems. Did you read that_person's deep dive into the choices made citing genuine project leads in FFG(X)?

Ford Class - Axing SPY-4 from the Zumwalts means Gerald R Ford will be the only ship with Dual Band Radar. Even John F Kennedy has the Enterprise Air Search Radar instead. EMALS teething issues are understandable, weapons elevator problems less so. Just don't mention that the toilet piping is too narrow It's interesting to note the USN tried to delay shock trials by six years, again demonstrating that even the Navy hierarchy sees its own construction standards as burdensome and something to be worked around.

The Ford class issues have broadly been resolved as per workers at NN Shipyards, it's also the first in class. NAVSEA themselves state that building ships like this is still the best way to develop cutting edge ships despite the fact that it creates an apparently greater number of initial problems.

SPY-6 AMDR - radar, not a ship, was planned for CG(X), but will end up in the Flight III Burkes with a 14ft array instead of the planned 22ft. Plans to put it in the Zumwalts with the 22ft array abandoned because TSCEI can't handle it.

You're going to need some sources for that champion. CG(X) precedes AMDR. Zumwalt's TSCEI should also have no issues handling it and/or should quite easily be able to be modified to make it work given they are experimental platforms explicitly designed for the purpose

 

[Felocie]

It used to be that the USN changed one thing at a time. Propulsion, hull form, or weapons/combat system. Spruance had new engines. Burke had a new hull. Ticonderoga had a new combat system. Work one one new thing at a time and make it work. Zumwalt and LCS tried to do all 3 at once. And what about foreign designs? Look at the Tacoma class PFs of WW2 and the fiasco that was. Those were extremely simple ships and the US was at the height of its productive capacity. Why would anyone think things would be better now?

Yeah champion, absolutely nothing has changed since they built the Tacoma class or the Spruance class. Hell, even Burke doesn't obey your logic given they integrated new systems, a new hull, and new construction methods all at once

 

[Kat Tsun]

The entire post is great but this paragraph really sums up the absurdity of the FFGX debacle.

It's really a bit odd since they could have just taken NSC or something and given it a hull plug, honestly. It would be an actual FFG: soft squishy ship produced fairly cheaply by medium size yards for escorting merchant ships and nothing else.

I think FFG(X) was really just an attempt to try to make a ship that's a Burke but magically half the cost because they deleted SPY-1 or something. It would explain everything from the range, to the survivability standards, to the VLS fit. They'll probably do nothing except make some cool Powerpoints about robots, and end up 20-60 hulls short of requirements when the war kicks off, in however many months.

Thankfully the submarines aren't in any dire procurement situations yet but I look forward to DDG(X) being canceled in favor of Burke Flt IV.

 

[Jimmo952]

Yeah champion, absolutely nothing has changed since they built the Tacoma class or the Spruance class. Hell, even Burke doesn't obey your logic given they integrated new systems, a new hull, and new construction methods all at once

Who was responsible for the FFGX project? That person could not see the disparity between the initial intent of the project and what it became?

 

[Felocie]

Who was responsible for the FFGX project? That person could not see the disparity between the initial intent of the project and what it became?

Ok then, what was the initial intent of the program?

Then explain what it became?

 

[Felocie]

It's really a bit odd since they could have just taken NSC or something and given it a hull plug, honestly. It would be an actual FFG: soft squishy ship produced fairly cheaply by medium size yards for escorting merchant ships and nothing else.

An NSC derived patrol frigate fills a fundamentally different niche… it also would’ve still cost 2/3rds as much as a Connie (at least) for less than half the capability

I think FFG(X) was really just an attempt to try to make a ship that's a Burke but magically half the cost because they deleted SPY-1 or something. It would explain everything from the range, to the survivability standards, to the VLS fit.

The point of FFG(X) was clear: to build a predominantly ASW focused combatant capable of operating with a battle group. It was less expensive because it was less capable but it was not cheap as a first priority. The process through which it was delivered (modification of an in service design) was meant to both speed up acquisition and lower the cost of designing the ship, we now see that failed but the designed ship itself is still a very much needed and capable surface combatant of which essentially every design flaw has now been ironed out

 

[Jimmo952]

It's really a bit odd since they could have just taken NSC or something and given it a hull plug, honestly. It would be an actual FFG: soft squishy ship produced fairly cheaply by medium size yards for escorting merchant ships and nothing else.

I think FFG(X) was really just an attempt to try to make a ship that's a Burke but magically half the cost because they deleted SPY-1 or something. It would explain everything from the range, to the survivability standards, to the VLS fit. They'll probably do nothing except make some cool Powerpoints about robots, and end up 20-60 hulls short of requirements when the war kicks off, in however many months.

Thankfully the submarines aren't in any dire procurement situations yet but I

Ok then, what was the initial intent of the program?

Then explain what it became?

The initial intent was to take an off the shelf, successful frigate design, build it in US yards and get it out to the fleet rapidly.

When the decisions were made to modify the design to exactingly hit NAVSEA standards, the initial intent was sunk.

The last estimates I saw was that the Connie design only retains15% of the parent design, and they weren't done redesigning yet. Still aren't.

That's not politics. That's bad management.

Whomever is responsible for this should be keelhauled.

 

[Felocie]

When the decisions were made to modify the design to exactingly hit NAVSEA standards, the initial intent was sunk.

False! This was the intention from the very beginning. This was understood when each entry was was being formulated.

 

[Jimmo952]

False! This was the intention from the very beginning. This was understood when each entry was was being formulated.

Not false. Either leadership in the Navy sabotaged the program or they are incompetent.

I lean towards them being incompetent but accept sometimes two things can be true.

 

[Felocie]

Not false. Either leadership in the Navy sabotaged the program or they are incompetent.

I lean towards them being incompetent but accept sometimes two things can be true.

Actually, once again, it was the government who pushed for an off the shelf design modified to US standards. It has also yielded results, Connie is an essentially completed design with the problems ironed out that meets the standards, while failing to be as quick as was hoped it’s still a capable design that meets requirements

 

[Jimmo952]

Actually, once again, it was the government who pushed for an off the shelf design modified to US standards. It has also yielded results, Connie is an essentially completed design with the problems ironed out that meets the standards, while failing to be as quick as was hoped it’s still a capable design that meets requirements

That is a cop out. If you are saying the Navy did not like the direction set by their civilian leaders and so did not listen to them, that is insubordination and they should be shot.

If they tried to do what they were told but couldn't figure out the ships were built to completely different standards going in, then they are incompetent.

If they are that incompetent, they should not be in decision making positions anymore.

If the people project managing the program couldn't figure out this was going to be a debacle in the first year of the program, they should be scrubbing rust from hulls and not managing anything.

People need to be held accountable for programs like this.

In the civilian business world, heads would roll.

 

[Felocie]

That person could not see the disparity between the initial intent of the project and what it became?

First of all, just btw, he has direct contact with those in the industry, those who lead the BIW submission. I think he has a far greater knowledge than you. Do you have such credentials? Do you have emails demonstrating project requirements, navy goals, etc.? Given you’ve invoked nothing but your opinion I would wager not.

That is a cop out. If you are saying the Navy did not like the direction set by their civilian leaders and so did not listen to them, that is insubordination and they should be shot.

If they tried to do what they were told but couldn't figure out the ships were built to completely different standards going in, then they are incompetent.

If they are that incompetent, they should not be in decision making positions anymore.

If the people project managing the program couldn't figure out this was going to be a debacle in the first year of the program, they should be scrubbing rust from hulls and not managing anything

what are you even talking about? Insubordination? Incompetence? The program is overtime, fine, nobody objects to that. But the product, a NAVSEA standards meeting, highly capable, FFG is all but ready to go. It worked, it just took longer than we would’ve liked. You’re utterly unfit to comment if this is the standard of your understanding.

In the civilian business world, heads would roll.

”Run the government like a business” yeah that works GREAT. Even then, this isn’t how business operates. Projects don’t go wrong and “heads roll”. You’ve been watching too many movies

 

[Firefinder]

In the civilian business world, heads would roll

Eyeah heads will roll.

The heads of all the poor employees who get lay off for the F Ups of the managers who either Stay or get to Transfer to new companies with full recs to repeat their Screw Ups.

 

[Jimmo952]

First of all, just btw, he has direct contact with those in the industry, those who lead the BIW submission. I think he has a far greater knowledge than you. Do you have such credentials? Do you have emails demonstrating project requirements, navy goals, etc.? Given you’ve invoked nothing but your opinion I would wager not.

what are you even talking about? Insubordination? Incompetence? The program is overtime, fine, nobody objects to that. But the product, a NAVSEA standards meeting, highly capable, FFG is all but ready to go. It worked, it just took longer than we would’ve liked. You’re utterly unfit to comment if this is the standard of your understanding.

”Run the government like a business” yeah that works GREAT. Even then, this isn’t how business operates. Projects don’t go wrong and “heads roll”. You’ve been watching too many movies

I started as an engineer but over time worked my way into executive positions in a couple of large, multinational corporations.

I worked in successful startups and unsuccessful startups.

I have a more than fair idea of how the business world works.

I would not be so proud of working in or defending the disaster that is US naval ship building.

He or perhaps yourself, can tell me how things are done, perhaps using the right acronyms, but anyone defending the status quo is delusional or part of the problem.

I did learn this in my career. Holding people accountable is necessary if you want to have a high-performing organization. Accept mediocrity and lack of performance and you'll get it.

As far as the design being essentially ready, let me know when the design is actually ready. Then let me know when those frigates are in the water and in the hands of the fleet.

It's going to be awhile if it ever happens.

The fleet is shrinking and growing older. Every major naval shipbuilding program is behind schedule by years.

I would not wear being part of that as a badge of honor.

 

[Jacky]

What on earth does the National Security Cutter have to do with the Ship Characteristic Board??? Last I checked NAVSEA is the current body for warship procurement

The purpose of the Ship Characteristics Board was to coordinate the creation of 'ship characteristics' that are essential to the design of naval combatants and auxiliaries. Coordination was required because the operators and the designers of ships had different interests, perceptions, concepts, and constraints. NAVSEA is an replacement of BuShip. In the warship program after the end of the Cold War, which level was designed entirely by the NAVSEA itself?

Historically, the user would submit requirements, Buship would be responsible for the design, and SCB would be responsible for evaluating and determining the final ship design. For example, design SCB-127A/B/C was for the Kitty Hawk-class aircraft carriers, and design SCB-250 was for the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. In this process, the responsibilities of the user, the designer, and the reviewer were clearly defined and their powers were separated.

Returning to FFGX, has the Navy clearly defined the specific requirements (listing the primary and secondary performance characteristics to be met, as well as performance characteristics that can be eliminated if necessary)? All available information indicates that the Navy is constantly modifying/adding performance requirements. This implies that the project's requirements are unclear. After Fincantieri S.p.A. handed over the drawings to FREMM, G&C's design modifications progressed slowly, indicating weak design capabilities. Furthermore, domestic private contractors are unable to provide qualified design solutions. In summary, the current problem for the entire US shipbuilding industry is a lack of design capabilities coupled with an inability to achieve efficient production capacity.

If you want to know what happened, look at McNamara's military procurement reforms. A purely accounting mindset will only harm industrial projects.

 

[Jacky]

At a complete loss as to what any of this has to do with FFG(X).
BuShips and SCB (and SCIB) haven’t existed for decades.
I was clearly referring to the National Security Cutter, not the National Security Council.
Nor does your response satisfy any of the questions I posed in my previous message.
If domestic yards failed so miserably during FFG(X) conception, please, show us. I’m sure it will be enlightening. I think my previous posts effectively demonstrate just how limited American yards were with their options, and the trade offs in the design process.

Didn't you realize that the fundamental reason for FFGX's failure was the Navy's lack of clear requirements? If the Navy had clearly defined the primary and secondary performance characteristics, would the GAO still mention in its reports that the Navy was constantly revising its requirements? If SCB had continued to exist, do you think this situation would have occurred?

 

[Felocie]

I started as an engineer but over time worked my way into executive positions in a couple of large, multinational corporations.

I worked in successful startups and unsuccessful startups.

I have a more than a fair idea of how the business world works.

Funny way to say you don’t know shit about the business of US Naval shipbuilding

As far as the design being essentially ready, let me know when the design is actually ready. Then let me know when those frigates are in the water and in the hands of the fleet

The first ship is literally under construction but ok

The fleet is shrinking and growing older. Every major naval shipbuilding program is behind schedule by years.

Outright lie, DDG(X) San Antonio Flt II, the ESBs, etc. are/have done fine.

I would not wear being part of that as a badge of honor

The US still had the most lethal fighting fleet in the world but ok

He or perhaps yourself, can tell me how things are done, perhaps using the right acronyms, but anyone defending the status quo is delusional or part of the problem.

If you don’t even know the nomenclature or the program specifics then how can you judge the overall efficacy of the program? You don’t even know what the status quo is for Christ sake

 

[Felocie]

Didn't you realize that the fundamental reason for FFGX's failure was the Navy's lack of clear requirements? If the Navy had clearly defined the primary and secondary performance characteristics, would the GAO still mention in its reports that the Navy was constantly revising its requirements? If SCB had continued to exist, do you think this situation would have occurred?

This is fundamentally false. To quote the head of the BIW proposal “FFG(X) was a very well run program with excellent communication between parties”. The program had monthly meetings between navy and bidders which allowed for design requirements to be as close as possible to Navy desires. FREMM is exactly what the navy wants and needs, it took longer than was hoped but that doesn’t change the outcome

 

[Jimmo952]

Funny way to say you don’t know shit about the business of US Naval shipbuilding

The first ship is literally under construction but ok

Outright lie, DDG(X) San Antonio Flt II, the ESBs, etc. are/have done fine.

The US still had the most lethal fighting fleet in the world but ok

If you don’t even know the nomenclature or the program specifics then how can you judge the overall efficacy of the program? You don’t even know what the status quo is for Christ sake

I can judge it buy it's results.

Are you judged for following the process or for achieving results?

Are you judged by having the correct credentials or achieving results?

A General who cannot apply war-winning leadership is useless despite his credentials.

The US understood that in WW2 and replaced guys who couldn't get it done with those that could.

The modern Navy, with more Admirals than ships seems to have forgotten that lesson.

Elon Musk didn't know much about rockets or satellites before he showed NASA how to get it done.

Bill Gates was a college dropout who revolutionized the computer industry.

John Moses Browning invented many firearms formally used and still used by the US military (M2 .50cal) without any formal education.

I could go on with more examples but I expect you get the idea.

Credentials are not everything. Sometimes in fact, they get in the way of innovation and reform.

By the way, isn't it a bit early to be calling DDGX a success? All these programs look good until they don't. Keeps the money rolling in I guess.

 

[Felocie]

I can judge it buy it's results.

Which results? It's easy to ignore all the successes when it suits
America-class LHAs, San Antonio-class LPDs, LPD Flight IIs, Flight III, Ford, T-AKE, T-AO-205, LMSRs, and T-AO-205s, ESD/ESB, and T-ARS are all successful. AMDR, missile systems, NGSSR, SEWIP Blk III etc. are all doing exceptionally well.

Let me not forget as well the Seawolf program, which paved the way for the exceptional and relatively painless Virginia class.

One thing you should clearly notice is that the first in class is naturally going to have a greater degree of issues, the next ships, and their successors do not have these same problems. This has been analyzed to be the most effective way to push cutting edge technology to the fleet. This is why Zumwalt has problems, and following DDGs have a much simpler design and procurement process which leads into:

By the way, isn't it a bit early to be calling DDGX a success? All these programs look good until they don't. Keeps the money rolling in I guess.

DDG(X) is on track and thanks to Zumwalt, it is using mostly proven technology. The program is going exceptionally well, ironically due to factors that have oft been repeated in this thread as "failures"

A General who cannot apply war-winning leadership is useless despite his credentials.

The US understood that in WW2 and replaced guys who couldn't get it done with those that could.

The modern Navy, with more Admirals than ships seems to have forgotten that lesson.

That's why the US Navy is still the only truly global navy with 11 carriers?

Elon Musk didn't know much about rockets or satellites before he showed NASA how to get it done.

Oh he's a good example actually. "Lets run the government like a business", (DOGE) "and see how it goes". Remind me, how did it go?

Credentials are not everything. Sometimes in fact, they get in the way of innovation and reform.

The credentials of US procurement are massive successes marred by the uneducated parroting the same talking points on a small number of programs

 

[DWG]

The fact we did it a century ago with steam plants is practically irrelevant

You asked for examples, if ripping a battleship apart and completely replacing its engines doesn't count I'm not sure what did.

Isn’t this also years behind schedule and experiencing massive cost overruns? Probably not worth it for ships with a 25 year service life.

Absolutely vital considering they need it to operate in the Gulf. Current PIP status is three done, two in progress, one pending.

Correct, but that wasn’t the cause of cancellations either. Both Zumwalt and LCS saw reduced procurement because we didn’t want more of those vessels, we didn’t need more, and they didn’t fit DMO without politically untenable modernizations.

What shaped those decisions? Procurement plans, cost, technical capability and political support don't exist independent of each other, they're locked in a feedback loop where a problem in one area sours all the others.

But even then, I think we’re starting to see the sheer flexibility something like Zumwalt offers

The only flexibility the Zumwalts offer appears to be the large amount of empty space left after ripping out their magazines. Have they actually brought an improvement in capability in any mission over a Burke? As delivered they were a 16,000t destroyer with 16 less VLS cells than a Burke and a gun armament of 2 30mm Mk 46s.

Also regarding the idea that the USN hasn’t had a successful surface ship procurement program outside of Burke in the past 30 years,

America-class LHAs, San Antonio-class LPDs, LPD Flight IIs, Flight III, Ford, T-AKE, T-AO-205, LMSRs, and T-AO-205s, ESD/ESB, and T-ARS all say hello.

That's why I specified _combatant classes_, I specifically excluded the amphibs.

 

[Felocie]

You asked for examples, if ripping a battleship apart and completely replacing its engines doesn't count I'm not sure what did.

Oh idk, maybe replacing the powerplant of a modern LSC?

What shaped those decisions? Procurement plans, cost, technical capability and political support don't exist independent of each other, they're locked in a feedback loop where a problem in one area sours all the others.

This doesn’t mean anything

The only flexibility the Zumwalts offer appears to be the large amount of empty space left after ripping out their magazines. Have they actually brought an improvement in capability in any mission over a Burke? As delivered they were a 16,000t destroyer with 16 less VLS cells than a Burke and a gun armament of 2 30mm Mk 46s

then you evidently haven’t followed the program very closely.
Examples of flexibility include its stealth capabilities making it the only ship considered “survivable” in the Sea of Japan, its sonar suite excelling in all conditions, it’s entire conception paving the way for a much simplified DDG(X) program, the easy implementation of new weapon systems, etc.

That's why I specified _combatant classes_, I specifically excluded the amphibs

Burke Flt II and III..?

 

[DWG]

Ok and? It was a study, what's your point

Another study, what's your point?

Another study, what's your point?

You keep dismissing studies, they set the technical design goals for what comes next, and some of these 'studies' got as far as appointment of PEOs, they weren't blue-sky, cutting metal and putting it in the water was fully envisaged. CGBL was there to provide a comparison for more innovative projects, MEU was a serious look at a different model of combatant, there was full intent to proceed to a production project from SC21. If you don't understand the role of studies in shaping the systems we build and the metal we cut then you don't understand defence procurement. And the point here is that the USN kept projecting extremely expensive, extremely high risk designs and then realising they were unaffordable (and all this in a period when falling defence budgets was the norm).

Mostly failed due to a small production run. NAVSEA has openly stated that the Zumwalt and Ford method of building new ships is the most effective but it requires budgetary support from government.

You don't seem to understand that these are not two separate points, they are implicitly linked. An expensive, high risk design is a tough sell to government, any bad news at all risks it being cancelled. You cannot design ships and ignore the political dimensions of the build. People at the sharp end of development have been making this point about defence procurement for coming up on a century (at least).

Also IEP is the bare minimum on modern LSC due to the requirement for future electrically intensive systems.

True, but in 2000 it was a highly experimental technology, it added risk and cost to an already costly and high risk design, with all the political risk that then accrues. A less riskier approach would have been to keep IEP back for a Flight II and prototype it at full scale and at sea in the meantime. The visuals of your vital project being towed back into port because its engines failed are incredibly damaging to project survival. Doing it in the middle of the Panama Canal is worse still. Having similar problems with the second ship just cements opinions that the class is a dud. This is the ultimate consequence you invite when you choose to increase risk.

This is a moot point, the failure of these programs is mostly down to the GWOT and a lack of governmental support, not the failings of the systems themselves.

You cannot separate the project decisions and the presence or lack of government support, the two go hand in hand. GWOT is a fair point, but it is not the only point, budgets were already tight and falling.

LCS is not a product of SC-21... it's a product of FFTS. It makes perfect sense in the context of FFTS.

"In November 2001, the U.S. Navy announced its new DD(X) Future Surface Combatant Program, which encompassed the acquisition of three new classes of ship: DD(X), a destroyer for precision long-range strike; CG(X), a cruiser for missile and air defense; and a littoral combat ship that could operate in shallow-draft and coastal waters." https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/lessons-from-the-littoral-combat-ship/

FSC was the attempt to make SC-21 affordable. From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea create the need for littoral access, they don't define it, in fact Forward ... From the Sea never gets more specific about platforms than CVBGs and ARGs, while From the Sea is much the same, but does have a single reference to surface combatants.

I'm not disputing the need for littoral access, or that From the Sea and Forward ... From the Sea increased focus on it, but the conceptualization of LCS and Streetfighter as tools for enforcing it wasn't defined by them, that came later.

These decisions were mostly down to politics and not NAVSEA or the navy.

They aren't separable, they are linked together in a feedback loop. You can't understand procurement without understanding that point.

Still waiting for you to address training inadequacies.

 

[DWG]

This doesn’t mean anything

That there tells me that you don't understand how defence procurement works as a function of government, not independent of it.

 

[Deleted member 29851]

CGBL was there to provide a comparison for more innovative projects, MEU was a serious look at a different model of combatant, there was full intent to proceed to a production project from SC21.

You are greatly misrepresenting how “serious” these studies were.
CGBL and MEU were apart of the FY86 and FY88 Surface Ship Concept Formulation (CONFORM) programs. CONFORM ran from ~FY79 to ~FY91, and produced ~50 concepts in total. All work was carried out by SEA 05D1 out of NSWC Carderock.
To mention these 2 particular concepts should also require you mention the High Survivability Combatant, Aegis SL7, Dispersed Strike, CGV CTOL, High Speed Amphibious Raider, etc. You’ve never heard of any of those studies, and the fact there’s maybe one reference on the entire internet shows just how obscure and inconsequential they were.
This program is so obscure that half the design reports are missing. I know this because I currently have 4 design reports making their way through the declassification process. Do note that they were only able to locate 4/13 documents I requested, they found the CGBL design report, but the MEU report is missing.

Edit: SC-21 or the Radar/Hull Study are probably more consequential than the entirety of CONFORM

 

[Kat Tsun]

An NSC derived patrol frigate fills a fundamentally different niche… it also would’ve still cost 2/3rds as much as a Connie (at least) for less than half the capability

The deficiency of the Battle Force is ultimately mid- and low-level escort for merchantmen and gators. As long as they can hit 28 knots they can escort a battlegroup and they can even be expendable, crew and all, if you can sacrifice shock protections and construction quality. The Perries weren't exactly fast frigates.

Not everything needs to be as hard as a cruiser. Stark might've survived but it's not like the U.S. Navy would suffer a crippling loss over a single Perry either. Frigates are meant to die. The singular life goal of the ideal escort captain is to be killed in combat by a torpedo or missile hit protecting his charges. Everyone wants to be Glowworm.

The point of FFG(X) was clear: to build a predominantly ASW focused combatant capable of operating with a battle group.

Is that why they removed the bow sonar? For ASW? Anyway you can just strip Burkes from other fleets for the second Pacific War for battlegroup/CSG escort at the end of the day. It's unlikely the Russians would be in a position to laterally escalate in Europe and whatever they do muster can be checked by the EU's navies anyway.

The U.S. needs escort for merchants and amphibious landing forces, not carriers, and that's basically it.

It was less expensive because it was less capable but it was not cheap as a first priority.

Explains why it failed then.

The process through which it was delivered (modification of an in service design) was meant to both speed up acquisition and lower the cost of designing the ship, we now see that failed but the designed ship itself is still a very much needed and capable surface combatant of which essentially every design flaw has now been ironed out

The detailed design was only 70% finished when the order was canceled and likely would have undergone significant changes during the construction of Connie and Congress. At this point it's about even if finishing Constellation or starting from a new design entirely would be faster, but a fresh design at least has a chance of getting through.

More than likely it'll be another half dozen Burkes expected to do the job of 20-30 hulls while they dawdle with a robot LUSV.

True, but in 2000 it was a highly experimental technology, it added risk and cost to an already costly and high risk design, with all the political risk that then accrues. A less riskier approach would have been to keep IEP back for a Flight II and prototype it at full scale and at sea in the meantime. The visuals of your vital project being towed back into port because its engines failed are incredibly damaging to project survival. Doing it in the middle of the Panama Canal is worse still. Having similar problems with the second ship just cements opinions that the class is a dud. This is the ultimate consequence you invite when you choose to increase risk.

My favorite procurement story is the Ford's technology being spread across three ships (CVN-77 to -79) and the Congress telling the Navy to eat a sock and put everything on CVN-78. That was swell. It's not just the U.S. Navy. It's more typically Congress that does this stuff. FMM seems to have just lowballed DON on their projections, possibly deliberately, to secure a major contract. That's exactly what they did with the Freedoms.