Self-defence missiles only is historically the definition of an FFG. The ones with area defence capability are mostly DDG's in sheep's clothing for navies where buying something 'larger' than a frigate might be a problem politically, eg Germany, or where there are local idiosyncracies around class naming - cf France with its talk of '1st rank frigates' and 'intermediate frigates' and where the Horizons are frigates in French use, yet DDGs in Italian use.
What ‘historical’ definition are you going off of? Once the missile age started any semblance of formal unified definitions of warship classes was out the window.

What about OHPs then? Were they DDGs in frigate clothing?

Seems like you make things up and cherry pick to suit your needs.
 
What about OHPs then? Were they DDGs in frigate clothing?
They were low-end frigates with half-competent self-defense, unlike the Knoxes, which had almost nothing (BPDMS Sea Sparrow, replaced by Phalanx).

SM-1MR was really only suited for self-defense or maybe defense of one or two escorted ships in close company. Especially when you look at the FFG weapon control system -- it had no 3D radar, so the illuminators had to do their own height finding, plus only really 1.5 channels of fire (one dedicated STIR and one less powerful channel in the CAS ball when the gun wasn't in use). It was inferior to the DDG-2s, which had 3D radar and two distinct high-power channels of fire, and utterly outclassed by the near-contemporary DDG-993, much less the DDG-47 (later CG-47).
 
That’s kinda my point…4 ships with VLS capabilities isn’t really enough.
Enough - that depends entirely on the user's requirements.
Out of curiosity, what would YOU like to use the Dutch navy for?
 
They were low-end frigates with half-competent self-defense, unlike the Knoxes, which had almost nothing (BPDMS Sea Sparrow, replaced by Phalanx).

SM-1MR was really only suited for self-defense or maybe defense of one or two escorted ships in close company. Especially when you look at the FFG weapon control system -- it had no 3D radar, so the illuminators had to do their own height finding, plus only really 1.5 channels of fire (one dedicated STIR and one less powerful channel in the CAS ball when the gun wasn't in use). It was inferior to the DDG-2s, which had 3D radar and two distinct high-power channels of fire, and utterly outclassed by the near-contemporary DDG-993, much less the DDG-47 (later CG-47).
Yeah a missile with a 92 mile range was only ‘self defense’ ok
 
Every source i can find lists it’s range as 40-92 nmi even at 40 that’s well beyond self defense range

Even the very first ever model had a 19 mile range, which is pretty well beyond self defense range

Don't trust Wiki.

Friedman's World Naval Weapons gives 35,000 yards (~17nm) for SM-1MR Blocks I-IV and 50,000 yards (~25 nm) for Block V-VI. And that's making lot of assumptions about a favorable engagement geometry, altitude, etc. Realistically, that's not the range where intercept will actually happen. Low altitude targets in particular will only be intercepted at no more than half that range.

1707333782650.png
 
Last edited:
Oh ya know…naval warfare if a war ever threatens the Dutch people…
You are most insistent on the 4 LCF ships being an insufficient number for the Dutch navy. It doesn't operate in isolation, for instance cooperation under the umbrella of NATO means operations in the North Sea are shared by Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, with regular appearances by US and Canadian ships. The participating navies have specialised to make the best use of resources.
What one navy lacks in capability, is offered by one or more of the partner navies.
So you might consider counting your beloved VLS cells in all the partners' navies. Or ASW, MCM forces, OPVs, supply ships and other auxiliaries, submarines, etc. etc.
You would note that not all tasks are performed by all partners' navies.

If you have ideas how tasks can be better assigned to the partners' navies, please share.
 

Attachments

  • 1000005164.jpg
    1000005164.jpg
    2 MB · Views: 108
Last edited:
Oh ya know…naval warfare if a war ever threatens the Dutch people…
Collective Defence, it's a thing. The Netherlands is covered twice over - by NATO under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and by the EU under Article 42(7) of the Treaty of Lisbon.
 
You are most insistent on the 4 LCF ships being an insufficient number for the Dutch navy. It doesn't operate in isolation, for instance cooperation under the umbrella of NATO means operations in the North Sea are shared by Norway, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, with regular appearances by US and Canadian ships. The participating navies have specialised to make the best use of resources.
What one navy lacks in capability, is offered by one or more of the partner navies.
So you might consider counting your beloved VLS cells in all the partners' navies. Or ASW, MCM forces, OPVs, supply ships and other auxiliaries, submarines, etc. etc.
You would note that not all tasks are performed by all partners' navies.

If you have ideas how tasks can be better assigned to the partners' navies, please share.
My primary concern is for whoever is holding those tasks to have enough ships that they can keep 3 of them at sea training and using the ship, so that in the event of "oh crap" all the crews are competent in the use of their equipment.

Sadly, even the USN isn't doing too well at this...
 
My primary concern is for whoever is holding those tasks to have enough ships that they can keep 3 of them at sea training and using the ship, so that in the event of "oh crap" all the crews are competent in the use of their equipment.

Sadly, even the USN isn't doing too well at this...
In most cases, no task is assigned to just one of the partner navies. If, for example, the two Dutch ASW frigates aren't available for duties, the Belgian navy has two identical ships.

I admit cross-crewing can will be problematic with different ship's systems.
 
Last edited:
Can't link it right now, but apparently there's some talk in the halls of our capital to start discussions about a procuring a third and maybe even a fourth frigate. Apart from the two being build for Belgium, that is, so five or six total.

This would however entail negotiating with Damen, because when the order was placed there wasn't really the political will for an expansion of our armed forces, and so no provisions were made for extending the contract.
 
Google Translate, lightly edited.
Defence is exploring the purchase of an additional frigate

By: Jaime Karremann - Posted: 07-02-2024 | Last modified: 07-02-2024

In June 2023, State Secretary Christophe van der Maat signed a contract for the construction of two ASW frigates for the Netherlands and two for Belgium. The Royal [Netherlands] Navy may receive more than two of these ships, according to answers from Defence to questions from this site.

In anticipation of possible further growth of the Defence budget, "various options are being explored", a Defence spokesperson said after questions from Marineschepen.nl. "Additional frigates are also included." This means that an order for an additional ship is not yet underway. "This is still an exploration and not concrete," the spokesperson emphasizes. There are numerous options being explored, but if there is financial scope for additional units, the preliminary work must have been done.

No option in contract

An order for additional ships or a 'second batch' is not uncommon. The first contract of the S-frigates, M-frigates and the LCF frigates also includes four, four and two ships respectively. With a subsequent contract, that number was doubled (the S-frigates eventually even came to ten ships). Especially for the M-frigates and the LCFs, it was already clear in advance what number the navy wanted: eight and four. Now things are slightly different because from the beginning there was talk about an order for two ASW frigates. Contrary to what Marineschepen.nl previously reported, there is no option included in the contract for more ships than the previously planned two. Defence reports this. “New contractual requirements are required” for the purchase of an additional frigate. Ordering one or more frigates is not a matter of increasing the number of ships in the shopping cart. An M-frigate consists of about 170,000 parts and the much larger ASW frigates probably consist of more parts. Some products are easy to order, but other systems are specially made for these ships. Think of the radars. The longer it has been since the contract was signed, the greater the chance that systems have become more expensive, are no longer sold or have been replaced by equipment of different dimensions or weight.

Ten years

Any decision to expand the fleet will only be visible in about ten years. If all goes well, the first ASW frigate will be put into service in 2029. The second Belgian frigate (the fourth in total) should enter service in 2032. A third Dutch frigate will therefore not be put into service until 2033 at the earliest.
If the Netherlands were to order a third frigate, the navy would have to be patient for a while. In light of the rapidly rising tensions with Russia, that is a very long time. On the other hand, this gives the Navy time to address the personnel shortage.

Belgium

In Belgium, an order for a third frigate has been discussed several times and has even been proposed by the Belgian Ministry of Defence. Ultimately, the Belgian government decided against it. From the answer of Minister of Defence Ludivine Dedonder, it can be concluded that this was partly due to the increased costs and the lack of social or industrial return in the agreements with the Netherlands. But when Houthi rebels attacked ships at the end of last year, the call for a third frigate returned to the Belgian Chamber. According to the newspaper De Morgen, a quick decision is not possible: "That is a decision for the next government, which must therefore release the necessary budget for such a possible purchase," said Dedonder. The elections in Belgium are scheduled for June 9 this year.
 
Last edited:
In most cases, no task is assigned to just one of the partner navies. If, for example, the two Dutch ASW frigates aren't available for duties, the Belgian navy has two identical ships.
And that's my concern. No one navy has enough ASW frigates (for example) to make sure that the crews are competent. The Dutch and Belgians would need at least one more ship of that class and more would be better.

The ships would also need to be identical in software/hardware, so that you can transfer personnel between ships if the ship at sea is short on manpower. This means applying whatever upgrade to each ship as they come into refit over the course of about 1.5-2 years. Ship Albert is at sea and doesn't have the refit yet. Ship Bruno is getting the refit. And Ship Charles has gotten the refit and is working up to get ready to go to sea.

You could also maybe only have two crews and three ships (one ship always in refit, one ship at sea, and one ship getting ready to go to sea), but I don't recommend that since the crews won't care enough about the ship they're assigned to.
 
And that's my concern. No one navy has enough ASW frigates (for example) to make sure that the crews are competent. The Dutch and Belgians would need at least one more ship of that class and more would be better.
And if not the Belgians, the RN, the French, the Danes, the Germans and the Norwegians, just counting NATO nations with North Sea shorelines. That's what, another 27 frigates with a primary ASW tasking? 32 if you count the GP variant Type 23s. Plus it's an enclosed sea within range of shore for ASW helos, never mind MPAs.
 
And if not the Belgians, the RN, the French, the Danes, the Germans and the Norwegians, just counting NATO nations with North Sea shorelines. That's what, another 27 frigates with a primary ASW tasking? 32 if you count the GP variant Type 23s. Plus it's an enclosed sea within range of shore for ASW helos, never mind MPAs.
Right. But no 4 have the same combat systems, or aux systems. Or means of control, see the US 7th Fleet collisions.

So you can't swap bodies around to cover jobs if someone gets sick or injured.

That's what needs to happen.
 
Standardisation would be good, but national, industrial policies mess with that. You play with the hand you're dealt.
In the case of the Belgian and Dutch navies, operations are integrated to an extent only achievable because of common equipment.
Dutch and Belgian MCM ships are currently on order from a Franco-Belgian consortium, even though Dutch yards have the expertise to build those too. The French navy will use a modified version of those.
Work in progress.
 
Last edited:
Standardisation would be good, but national, industrial policies mess with that. You play with the hand you're dealt.
In the case of the Belgian and Dutch navies, operations are integrated to an extent only achievable because of common equipment.
Dutch and Belgian MCM ships are currently on order from a Franco-Belgian consortium, even though Dutch yards have the expertise to build those too. The French navy will use a modified version of those.
Work in progress.
I mean same systems just in the national fleet, not across international fleets. All Dutch ships on the same electronics build same equipment fitted. All Belgian ships on the same electronics build same equipment fitted, but not necessarily the same as what's in the Dutch ships.
 
I'm not sure I understand?

Apart from experimental equipment, or during a class-wide upgrade, Dutch navy ships from the same class are equipped with identical systems. Different ship types need (some, not all) different systems. Because of different tasks.

I expect the new ASW frigates to receive the same systems, irrespective of them being Belgian or Dutch units.
 
Right. But no 4 have the same combat systems, or aux systems.
Out of that figure of 27 ASW frigates I quoted, only five are not in a class of four or more (the three French Lafayettes* and the two Danish Absalons).

* Technically a class of six, but only three are due to get the ASW upgrade.
 
With the Absalon- and Iver Huitfeld-classes sharing many systems with other Danish ships - Stanflex!
The air-defence Iver Huitfeld also uses the same radars as the German Sachsen and the Dutch De Zeven Provinciën.
Common systems, cooperation - work in progress.
 
I'm not sure I understand?

Apart from experimental equipment, or during a class-wide upgrade, Dutch navy ships from the same class are equipped with identical systems. Different ship types need (some, not all) different systems. Because of different tasks.

I expect the new ASW frigates to receive the same systems, irrespective of them being Belgian or Dutch units.
Then the Hollanders are doing things right for once.

The USN has not been good about having all the ships of a flight all having the same configuration. (example: 7th fleet collisions. No two ships in 7th fleet were actually in the same hardware/software configurations!)
 
I'm afraid I cannot guarantee that software is byte for byte identical across the ships of a class, but hardware-wise classes are pretty uniform.
Radar systems can be tailored to specific missions, which involve changes in software.
 
The USN has not been good about having all the ships of a flight all having the same configuration. (example: 7th fleet collisions. No two ships in 7th fleet were actually in the same hardware/software configurations!)

I'm not convinced having identical configurations would have made any difference to either of the collisions. The out of control issue aboard the McCain isn't really the root problem, and the issues aboard the Fitzgerald were human factors, not technical, Both incidents had too many people on the bridge not doing their primary job - making sure they weren't on a course to hit something.
 
Can't link it right now, but apparently there's some talk in the halls of our capital to start discussions about a procuring a third and maybe even a fourth frigate. Apart from the two being build for Belgium, that is, so five or six total.

This would however entail negotiating with Damen, because when the order was placed there wasn't really the political will for an expansion of our armed forces, and so no provisions were made for extending the contract.
The numbers are publicly not known but within the MOD there is a plan for the future of the armed forces. We should not forget the to be build FUAD/AWWF's to replace the De Zeven Provinciën class air defense frigates. The new contract could also attract other potential operators like Norway or Portugal.

We can only hope that we will see 4 ASWF's within the RNLN + 2 or 3 for the Belgian Naval Component in the future, combined with 4 FUAD's. And to complete this i would love to see the 4 Holland class OPV's to be replaced by a separate class of 4 frigates instead of the LPX, similar to the Type 31E of the Royal Navy a multirole but well armed frigate.

More information about the FUAD/AWWF's has been made public by marineschepen.nl.
The long planned SM-3 capacity has been cancelled in favor of a missile system for TBMD. There are a few options for the new missile :
> SM-6
> Barak-ER
> Patriot PAC-3 (if naval variant will be produced)


The FUAD also could be more heading to a destroyer then a frigate, joined with the TRIFIC/MICAN they will be very capable AAW ships. More news to be announced soon.
 
Last edited:

Full marineschepen.nl article about the cancellation of SM-3 capacity

New course: no SM-3 missile for Dutch ships


The Air Defense and Command Frigates (LCFs) are equipped with Thales' new SMART-L MM/N radar, which can detect ballistic missiles in space. What is missing is a weapon to tackle these missiles. For years, people hoped behind the scenes and later worked towards the arrival of the Standard Missile 3, a missile that can destroy ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere. However, defense against ballistic missiles is undergoing significant change within the Navy and the Standard Missile 3 no longer fits in there.
The navy can now detect ballistic missiles at great distances with its frigates and pass on the information to NATO partners. That capacity is operational and will be maintained, but a change of course has been initiated towards a different form of defense. And that happened a while ago. The new ideas were even applied during the Formidable Shield 2023 exercise last May. It's no secret either. Commander of Zr.Ms. Tromp captain-lieutenant at sea Yvonne van Beusekom described this shift in focus, for example, in last year's Marine magazine 5. Yet this change is taking place completely out of sight of the general public. It wasn't long ago that the SM-3 was mentioned as a dream weapon for the Navy. This missile was also seen for some time by Belgium as an option for the new frigates. “The ambition for SM-3 has really been set at a low level,” explains Rogier Noorland of Thales. "SM-3 is for outside the atmosphere. We're going back inside the atmosphere now." Noorland is one of Thales' experts who has been working on the subject of air and missile defense for years. It is not only Noorland that is active in this field at Thales in Hengelo. The company has focused on defense against ballistic missiles since the 1990s, when it was still known as Holland Signal. This could also be read in the interview with Gerrit Dedden . Nowadays Thales, together with TNO and Defense, is working on this subject because of the SMART-L MM/N, but also in preparation for the replacement of the LCFs; the Future Air Defender (FuAD) yet to be developed and built. An early impression of the Air Defense and Command Frigate
Back to the plans from the 1990s
BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) as we knew it in the public domain until now, revolved around defending Europe, among other things, against ballistic missiles. Simply put, numerous sensors on land, in space and at sea work together to detect a possible attack in time. As soon as an attack is detected, various units at sea and on land can defend Europe with their missiles.

Crucial here is that the enemy missiles follow a ballistic trajectory; which, like a football shot high through the air, follows a predictable route towards the goal. In the case of ballistic missiles, they fly in a large arc, partly through space, towards the target.

A Dutch naval ship in the Mediterranean Sea can detect such a missile with radar and pass on information via NATO base Ramstein to, for example, an American naval ship or Aegis Ashore missile installation hundreds or thousands of kilometers away. From there, the oncoming rocket is intercepted outside the atmosphere with an SM-3.

This is how it has been practiced for years.

But instead of defending Europe or the Netherlands, for example, the focus shifts more to defending the fleet alone. From BMD to Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). New? No, that was the plan back in 1994. In the discussions surrounding the future LCFs, local defense against ballistic missiles was on the agenda, with the Standard Missile-2 Block IV as the most important weapon. However, that missile was canceled by the Americans and attention slowly shifted to SM-3 and the defense of a large area against ballistic missiles.

The attack becomes more complex
When faced with a threat from a regular ballistic missile, you can "plan in advance where to position your ship to see it clearly and take it out," says Noorland.

“What we've seen in recent years is that ballistic missiles can maneuver,” Noorland continues. These course changes of the rocket mainly occur when the rocket returns to the atmosphere.

"A small maneuver can mean that something that you would expect to end up in Luxembourg ends up in Paris. Conversely, you calculate that a rocket ends up in the south of France and then, after a short adjustment, ends up in Luxembourg. TNO calculated this on the basis from an analysis by Ralph Savelsberg of the Dutch Defense Academy." Savelsberg used a North Korean glider for his analysis.

In addition, there are fast weapons, such as hypersonic gliders and hypersonic missiles that do not enter space or only briefly enter space several times. These do not follow a ballistic trajectory and are much more difficult to intercept because the direction from which they come is unpredictable and they fly too low for SM-3.

Images of a series of weapons from different countries appear on a large screen in the Thales presentation room. The Russian Kinzhal and the Chinese DF-17 are on display, among others.

“The Kinzhal,” says Noorland: “That weapon flies faster than Mach 5 and that is why it is often classified as hypersonic weapons, but it is actually a maneuvering ballistic missile that can be mounted under a MiG. So it falls into a separate category. "

"Because that weapon can be hung under an aircraft, we are dealing with a 360-degree threat."

"The Kinzhal can go outside the atmosphere just like an Iskander, but it can also be shot depressed. That limits the range, but it remains a lot lower, within the atmosphere, and remains out of reach of the SM-3. By By staying low, it is also more difficult to detect. Although 100 kilometers is still quite high."

“The DF-17 is actually a glider and goes faster than Mach 5,” Noorland continues. "This can also be used against naval ships. Gliders can land more precisely where they need to disable something. They are also really made to make interception a lot more difficult, because they glide into the atmosphere."

"Then we have the hypersonic cruise missiles. They also go faster than Mach 5. The annoying thing is that those weapons remain even lower, are continuously propelled and can maneuver a lot."

Speed is a problem for defense, yet Noorland nuances the threat posed by hypersonic weapons: "All things that arrive at super speed are slowed down as they fly lower and come towards the ship. Due to the resistance in the atmosphere, they therefore go from the hypersonic domain."

The defense must come along
Although traditional ballistic missiles, which require the more expensive SM-3, will not simply disappear, Defense has chosen to focus on the threat within the atmosphere.

But with the SM-3 you can defend a gigantic area because this weapon disables missiles in space. Other weapons, such as SM-6 and Patriot, that operate in the atmosphere have a much shorter range.

"If you want to protect all of Europe against those threats with SM-6 and Patriot, you need an unrealistic number of weapon systems and radars," says Noorland.

That will therefore no longer be the task of the LCFs. “We are now looking at defending a task group [group of ships],” says Noorland. "That's a little easier, because then you see the threat coming your way. You still need capable interceptors."

Thales' SMART-L MM/N radar, which can detect targets 2,000 km away in space, also comes in handy, according to Noorland: "You need a long range to be able to respond in time to missiles at high speeds. although the targets fly lower. This requires links with other sensors at sea, land, in the air and in space."

New sensors?
That radar is still very popular internationally, says Noorland. "The American SPY-6 also works in that area, but it has a completely different price tag. I see that the SMART-L MM/N is still ahead of other systems. The Americans also keep saying that we are ahead in Europe Because this radar can detect ballistic targets at great distances and provide air defense. That multi-mission aspect was also decisive in the sale to Sweden."

Although sales of this new radar are now starting, Thales is looking further. The new concept also means new requirements. "Before you actually have a robust capacity to do everything from detection to elimination for the entire spectrum of threats, there are quite a few steps that need to be taken. There is now a very good capacity, but it still needs to be further developed. "

"We are looking at what we can do with the systems we currently have and whether we can develop them further. Also with a view to the Future Air Defender."

"More specifically, with SMART-L and APAR we look at whether we can make improvements in tracking or signal processing based on the threat characteristics we now see."

"When it comes to the FuAD, we look at what kind of sensor suite can be included. How big should that thing be? Which frequency bands do you need? How many systems? This is all currently in studies. We are doing this together with Defense and TNO."

It does not mean that a further development of the SMART-L, an L-band radar, will automatically come to the FuAD. "Not by definition. It is a logical thought. It would of course not be crazy to have 'long arm surveillance' if you stick to mission types such as defense against ballistic and hypersonic missiles. But that is being studied carefully. Maybe "It will all be smaller or more spread across the ship. People are also looking in that direction. But what the end result will be depends on several factors. The radars must of course fit within the ship design for reasons such as stability and the budget."

Elements of the ASWF can be taken to the FuAD, if Thales has its way. The AWWS, Above Water Warfare System , consists of more than just sensors. Consider the advanced fire control software. “From our perspective, further development of AWWS will certainly play a major role for the Future Air Defender.”

New rockets?
The new concept (which the LCFs will also have to deal with) is not just about the sensors.

Now that the SM-3 is out of the picture, that doesn't mean the frigates won't get another missile. However, there are few flavors. Noorland: "On the American side there is the SM-6 that can do something against anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. That will be a very limited capacity, especially against hypersonic missiles. But this system is also being further developed."

"The Aster 30NT, a new rocket, will have a capability in that area. And that's basically it." It remains to be seen whether an Aster missile from MBDA will soon be placed on a Dutch frigate. Noorland is reserved in his answer. “Technically it is possible,” he says. "If the governments really want it, it can be done."

The new SM-2 Block IIIC, which the Navy mentioned more than four years ago as a possible successor to the current SM-2 Block IIIA, also does not offer any additional variation in the range. According to the US Navy, this weapon is an air defense missile and is not associated with ballistic missile defense.

These options do not stop there. For example, the European study called Hypersonic Defense Interceptor Study (HYDIS) is currently underway, led by MBDA, in which Fokker, TNO and Thales are also involved. This study should lead to new missiles that can respond to hypersonic targets. That is for the long term.

Connecting factor: PLDEF
Missiles that come from different directions at enormous speeds. That requires more than just the right sensors and missiles. An important solution is PLDEF (Plot Level Data Exchange and Fusion).

The idea of PLDEF is that raw information from radars is shared and merged before a track is created. Normally, a radar detects a contact and creates a track based on that information, which then appears on a screen. That track can be shared with other ships for decades, thanks to Link 11 and Link 16, for example. But what is the quality of that track? And if three radars detect an air target but do not recognize it as a contact, no one will see a track on their screen.

In Formidable Shield 2021, the Navy tested PLDEF with a French frigate and in Formidable Shield 2023, PLDEF was launched again. "Not with the French," says Noorland, "but together with the Dutch air force. We exchanged data between a system in Wier and a Dutch ship." This did not happen via a Link connection and it will probably not happen via a Link connection in the future, because this is not possible via such a connection. A separate, faster connection will be designed for which protocols are now being developed in Europe.

Noorland points to a video on the screen: "This is an example of the defense against the supersonic sea skimmer during Formidable Shield 2023. PLDEF will help enormously with this, because such a thing comes in hard and very low. Flies just below the Mach 3 at about 50 feet [over 15 meters]. The radar therefore picks it up very late and when you pick it up you first have to have a stable track, make identification, plan weapon deployment, launch a rocket and then it has to fly to the target. All the while, that rocket is coming in at Mach 3. That's really scary fast."

“But,” Noorland continues, “if you have a ship that is only slightly advanced, or an aircraft, and it tracks the target earlier with its radar and shares that raw data, you can save time. Where we are going What you want is that you can launch a rocket while the incoming target is still flying over the horizon from your perspective."

"The whole idea is that radars look at the target from multiple angles. This means that you all have a much better representation of that one contact. You can determine the position of your track much more accurately, with better accuracy and continuity. That better quality will help to disable the weapon."

"Then," says Noorland, looking back on all the new developments, "we see the really big step in the FuAD, in which all those capabilities must find a place in their new form.


One of the important milestones coming up is Formidable Shield 2025. "That will probably be in combination with At Sea Demonstration," says Noorland. “We are adding a number of new capabilities to the SMART-L MM/N. These will be tested in 2025.”

The adjustments to the radar are software adjustments. “The great thing is that so much of the intelligence in those systems is on the software side. Designed for change ,” says Noorland.

And those updates are necessary. Developments in the field of IAMD are going fast, as we also see in the Red Sea. So once again: to be continued.

 
I'm not convinced having identical configurations would have made any difference to either of the collisions. The out of control issue aboard the McCain isn't really the root problem, and the issues aboard the Fitzgerald were human factors, not technical, Both incidents had too many people on the bridge not doing their primary job - making sure they weren't on a course to hit something.
The fact that supposedly-qualified people didn't know what various switch configurations would do is what I'm getting at.

Example: I first qualified on a Trident 1 ship. I was then transferred to a Trident 2 ship. There were two things _very_ different from the ship I qualified on. One was a minor annoyance, they changed how the fire hoses were numbered from Compartment-Level-Hose to Compartment-Hose (which actually tripped me up more often because of how often we ran fire drills). The other was that Missile Compensation worked backwards, Trident 1s are lighter than their displacement so you need to push out water, while Trident 2s are heavier than their displacement so you need to bring on water (I think, it's been 20 years...).

The bridge displays and software builds were different across each of the DDGs in 7th Fleet, which greatly contributed to difficulties when they'd send a couple of people from one DDG to another to support an underway.

This is an even bigger deal across a small navy that is funding and manpower limited. Yes, I'm saying it's better to skip installing new equipment if you're not going to install it on all the ships of that class.
 
The fact that supposedly-qualified people didn't know what various switch configurations would do is what I'm getting at.
I don't disagree with you that the system design on the Burke's bridge was a mess - I'm thinking of the situation on the McCain where they were trying to slow the ship and the guy at the power controls didn't realise he only had control of one shaft and not the other, so they weren't slowing as fast as they should and were increasing the turn rate. You can do some clever things by working the props independently, but it's always going to be best to have one man doing that differential control. Splitting creates the possibility for the confusion seen on the McCain, and it echoes some of the issues we see on Airbus controls (especially, but not solely) where people don't realise they're working against each other. OTOH AFAICS that system design is common across the Burkes, putting everyone on the same software version wouldn't have changed the system level design mistakes.

But, ultimately, that was only an additional problem, the proximal cause was taking their eye off the situation offside.
 
More news for the ASWF's, the 2 dutch ASWF's will each receive 2 12 m USV's for ASW tasks.

Defense and Dutch Naval Design collaborate on unmanned vessels

usv.jpg


Technologically very advanced, sustainable, autonomous and operationally flexible. These qualifications will apply to new unmanned vessels for maritime operations in about 4 years. Defense and Dutch Naval Design are joining forces to develop this so-called unmanned surface vessel (USV). Both parties recorded this contractually the day before yesterday.

The 12 meter long innovative vessels are crucial for anti-submarine warfare. They will therefore do their work from the Anti-Submarine Warfare Frigates that will be delivered around 2030. The current frigates carry a helicopter for anti-submarine warfare. Soon, this device will no longer have to perform this task alone. The USV can do it too.

They are able to perform operations for longer periods of time. In combination with unique sonar equipment, this represents an important advance in the fight against enemy submarines.

Protecting our waters
Head of the Maritime Systems Department, Captain Olaf Binnenhei, calls the contract a milestone. “It represents significant progress for Dutch and international maritime security. By joining forces, we are taking a big step forward in protecting our waters using the latest technologies.”

Dutch Naval Design is a collaboration of maritime defense experts from industry and academia.

 
More Dutch news! The RNLN has released first impressions of the concepts for the Future Air Defender (FUAD) and LPX (ATS).
These are NOT the final designs. For the ATS there are multiple options being looked in to, one of them is a smal LHD (+/- 150 m), an other option is a standard LPD style design.

The FUAD will receive 3 types of radars:
- Long range radar air/bmd (SMART-L MM/N)
- Medium range air / fire control (SM400 block II)
- Short range air / fire control (APAR block II)

The armament will consist of:
- 127/64 LW cannon (taken from current LC-Frigates)
- 76 mm Sovraponte (CIWS)
- 2 40 mm cannons
- RAM (CIWS)
- Naval Strike Missiles
- 64 to 80 VLS cells (likely Mk41 with ESSM block II, SM-2, SM-6 & Tomahawk)
- Hardkill Anti-torpedo system
- Mk54 light weight torpedo's (tubes + NH-90)
 

Attachments

  • Concept_042024_TB2.PNG
    Concept_042024_TB2.PNG
    919.1 KB · Views: 102
  • Concept_042024_TB.png
    Concept_042024_TB.png
    149.9 KB · Views: 104
  • Concept_042024_TB3.PNG
    Concept_042024_TB3.PNG
    938.9 KB · Views: 102
  • Missiles_overzicht.png
    Missiles_overzicht.png
    1.6 MB · Views: 86
  • ATS_TB_0424.PNG
    ATS_TB_0424.PNG
    816.7 KB · Views: 82
Very surprised at the above spec as understood original thinking was to fit SM-3 to counter ballistic missiles, but has now moved on to looking for a missile system to counter hypersonic missiles, seen it said that the SM-2 does not have the performance/speed to take out ballistic missiles perhaps why Patriot 3 MSE being looked at by USN to compliment the longer range SM-6 and the exoatmospheric SM-3.
 
Very surprised at the above spec as understood original thinking was to fit SM-3 to counter ballistic missiles, but has now moved on to looking for a missile system to counter hypersonic missiles, seen it said that the SM-2 does not have the performance/speed to take out ballistic missiles perhaps why Patriot 3 MSE being looked at by USN to compliment the longer range SM-6 and the exoatmospheric SM-3.

Yes SM-3 is off the table now, the navy requirement is changed towards closer range missile defense then the SM-3 offers. The focus lays more on protecting a taskforce and/or a area instead of countering ballistic missiles in space.

The requirement for the air defense missiles is that they can be purchased from 1 supplier and within a family of missiles.
Additionally they have to be fitted in to the Mk41 VLS, this leaves 3 options on the table:
- Raytheon : ESSM, SM-family, Tomahawk
- MBDA : CAMM, VL-MICA, Aster-family, MdCN
- IAI: Barak family

For me the 3rd option is not something that will make a chance. The Barak are not ready to be fitted in Mk41 VLS, maybe with some changes they can be launched from it but not MOTS ready.

The MBDA option would be possible, but also this needs some changes to the missiles and/or launchers to be able to launch the missiles.

Raytheon is the #1 option in my opinion, not only because they can deliver all missiles required by the RNLN. But also because the RNLN has years of experience with Raytheon / US missiles and also has a maintenance license for most Raytheon missiles. The RNLN does also do the maintenance for ESSM and SM family missiles for Belgium, Denmark, Germany & Norway. Raytheon is the company for the RAM missiles with Diehl, Germany and NSM with Kongsberg, Norway.
 
More Dutch news! The RNLN has released first impressions of the concepts for the Future Air Defender (FUAD) and LPX (ATS).
These are NOT the final designs. For the ATS there are multiple options being looked in to, one of them is a smal LHD (+/- 150 m), an other option is a standard LPD style design.

The FUAD will receive 3 types of radars:
- Long range radar air/bmd (SMART-L MM/N)
- Medium range air / fire control (SM400 block II)
- Short range air / fire control (APAR block II)

The armament will consist of:
- 127/64 LW cannon (taken from current LC-Frigates)
- 76 mm Sovraponte (CIWS)
- 2 40 mm cannons
- RAM (CIWS)
- Naval Strike Missiles
- 64 to 80 VLS cells (likely Mk41 with ESSM block II, SM-2, SM-6 & Tomahawk)
- Hardkill Anti-torpedo system
- Mk54 light weight torpedo's (tubes + NH-90)
Kinda surprised those aren't tied into a CIWS FCS as well. (Caliber is a bit odd, too. Was expecting 35mm Millennium Guns, not 40mm Bofors or Bushmaster 4s)
 
Kinda surprised those aren't tied into a CIWS FCS as well. (Caliber is a bit odd, too. Was expecting 35mm Millennium Guns, not 40mm Bofors or Bushmaster 4s)
If i'm correct the 40 mm's will be connected to the CIWS FCS, a news article also reported about ( a new) 40 mm DART munition type. We know that both 76 mm and 40 mm can be controlled by the Thales Pharos FCR (30 to 76 mm guided munitions).

My first thought also went to 35 mm Milennium, in older (2019) drawings of the ASW frigates a combination of 76 mm, 2x 35 mm + 1x RAM was shown. This was later changed to Leonardo's 40 mm Marlin, likely because the French MCM's that were bought together with Belgium were to be fitted with 40 mm Bofors. This will limit the types of munition that are needed for the navy. I loved the idea of the combination for the ASW frigates's and additionally for the AAW frigates a 2nd RAM on the bow.
 
My first thought also went to 35 mm Milennium, in older (2019) drawings of the ASW frigates a combination of 76 mm, 2x 35 mm + 1x RAM was shown. This was later changed to Leonardo's 40 mm Marlin, likely because the French MCM's that were bought together with Belgium were to be fitted with 40 mm Bofors. This will limit the types of munition that are needed for the navy. I loved the idea of the combination for the ASW frigates's and additionally for the AAW frigates a 2nd RAM on the bow.
Ah, okay, makes more sense now.

Limiting the number of ammunition types in the fleet is useful, even if I'm not convinced that it's a step in the right direction. Edit: in terms of which ammunition caliber they chose.
 
Last edited:
Yes SM-3 is off the table now, the navy requirement is changed towards closer range missile defense then the SM-3 offers. The focus lays more on protecting a taskforce and/or a area instead of countering ballistic missiles in space.


- IAI: Barak family

For me the 3rd option is not something that will make a chance. The Barak are not ready to be fitted in Mk41 VLS, maybe with some changes they can be launched from it but not MOTS ready.
There’s nothing wrong with the Israeli option. EL/M-2248 MF-STAR is comparable to the current APAR as both are S-band, although the Israelis publicly claim a range of 450km as opposed to 150km. Make of that what you will. The Indians combine MF-STAR with the old LW-08 for search, and maybe Lanza, so Smart-L could integrate as well. I’d think that the home team would hold the advantage, but there again, is Thales still marketing the old S-band APAR? All I see is smaller X-band APAR Block 2?

Overall, the Israeli option has a lot going for it. There’s a nice suite of missiles all the way down to C-Dome. The Dutch are very much export oriented, so Raytheon is placed at a disadvantage by ITAR.

I would guess that the Dutch are indeed going with Raytheon, but there again, I see exclusively non-ITAR systems in the concept drawings, aside from RAM. Even there, Tamir missiles are lot cheaper and have proven effective against drone and rocket attacks while the warship is docked. It’s very embarrassing to get hit while your warship is docked at a friendly port. RAM may or may not be more effective against traditional sea skimmers but it’s awfully expensive.
 
Last edited:
There’s nothing wrong with the Israeli option. EL/M-2248 MF-STAR is comparable to the current APAR as both are S-band
APAR is I/X-Band
, although the Israelis publicly claim a range of 450km as opposed to 150km. Make of that what you will. The Indians combine MF-STAR with the old LW-08 for search, and maybe Lanza, so Smart-L could integrate as well.
It would be more an integration MF-STAR into whatever Thales CMS is.
I’d think that the home team would hold the advantage, but there again, is Thales still marketing the old S-band APAR? All I see is smaller X-band APAR Block 2?
Again which S-Band APAR?
Overall, the Israeli option has a lot going for it. There’s a nice suite of missiles all the way down to C-Dome. The Dutch are very much export oriented, so Raytheon is placed at a disadvantage by ITAR.
But for what would they buy C-Dome? Neither the navy nor the army really needs it.
I would guess that the Dutch are indeed going with Raytheon, but there again, I see exclusively non-ITAR systems in the concept drawings, aside from RAM. Even there, Tamir missiles are lot cheaper and have proven effective against drone and rocket attacks while the warship is docked. It’s very embarrassing to get hit while your warship is docked at a friendly port. RAM may or may not be more effective against traditional sea skimmers but it’s awfully expensive.
May be more expensive but highly likely more effective. Then again its 2 weapon systems who aren't even developed for the same mission.
 

Similar threads

Please donate to support the forum.

Back
Top Bottom