I believe the British did look at nuclear propulsion for CVA01, although I don't know what type, and rejected it on grounds of cost. By the early 60s the A2W was producing 35,000hp and the A3W was producing 70,000hp.

The Global Security article on the A3W says the JFK would cost $440m with nuclear power and $280m without and with the Nimitiz with a cheaper 2 reactor setup nuclear propulsion represented half the cost of the ships whereas an oil plant is about a quarter of the cost of the ship IIUC.

I've never looked directly into the cost of nuclear propulsion, but Wow that's a lot of upfront cost!
There's apparently a law on the books that makes the USN consider nuclear power for any large ship. For the San Antonio class the analysis put the break even point at $140/barrel for oil: as long as oil stayed below $140/barrel it was cheaper to not use nuclear power.
 
. I think it was Hobbs who said any European NATO country can stand up an Armoured Brigade but only the UK can provide a carrier strike force.
True, but as Clauswitz said, “war is politics by other means”.

An Armoured Brigade, well, Corps, is a massive political statement that “we are here, and we’ll fight and die alongside you”.

A carrier group or several, entrenches the “fog in channel, continent shut off” view that the UK won’t be sharing the burden. Its not about the militart effect (a carrier force could still be fully commited and doing stuff) but the optics and the moral component (as Napoleon said, the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1) that represents- if you are an ally, you have got to be in the trenches shoulder to shoulder.

Burden sharing is vital if alliances are to hold, you couldn’t have said to the French in 14-18 “you do the western front and die in millions, we’ll have even more dreadnoughts and bottle em up” as the French would have folded. Also look at the Soviet pressure to get the west on the ground in germany - they didnt believe our North African / Italian campaigns were us being serious.

Not to mention few nato partners genuinely could raise an armd corps and every corps that NATO had was needed vs the red horde.

Going further back, what kept Portugal from falling to Napoleon? The British Army sent there, what helped clear Spain and unravel him, the Army sent there. No Army = even bigger continental system and no way to get at it even if could have more SoL.
 
BAOR was a radical change for the UK. Commiting to keep troops and aircraft in West Germany in peacetime reflected the impact of two world wars which had needed Britain to build continental armies almost from scratch and the need to keep the US doing the same.
The RN took over the nuclear deterrent in the 60s and also developed a close relationship with the US in operating SSNs against the Soviets.
Carrier airpower was desirable but not essential. RN crews disliked serving on the carriers and prefered the newer frigates. The new ships built after 1966 reflected the realities of an all volunteer navy.
A wealthier UK (compare our economy with France and W Germany in the 60s/70s) could have built CVA01 but we were pretty much bankrupt.
 
BAOR was a radical change for the UK. Commiting to keep troops and aircraft in West Germany in peacetime reflected the impact of two world wars which had needed Britain to build continental armies almost from scratch and the need to keep the US doing the same.
Yes, although it reflects that the approach of returning home after every away match over several previous centuries had kept failing to keep the peace.

The Army didnt really get bigger to do this as the list of regiments shows, it simply kept its pre-war Army list, certainly in terms of combat arms but probsbly with significant CS/CSS growth. The RAF had probably a similar if not smaller force vs pre-war?

The RN took over the nuclear deterrent in the 60s and also developed a close relationship with the US in operating SSNs against the Soviets.

Carrier airpower was desirable but not essential. RN crews disliked serving on the carriers and prefered the newer frigates.
No change there - “big ship BS” is always hated vs smaller units.

SSNs are key, they are the maritime capital ship as 82 showed and as you comment, in the SSBNs as the strategic force. Carriers are interesting now I think about it, really they are just land attack assets now. Want to control sea lanes? Use a sub. Even the WW2 Pacific carrier battles would be better fought by subs now.

Carriers could really be considered very large and long ranged bomb ketches :)

The new ships built after 1966 reflected the realities of an all volunteer navy.
A wealthier UK (compare our economy with France and W Germany in the 60s/70s) could have built CVA01 but we were pretty much bankrupt.
CVA01 was really flawed as was, should have been more a JFK, larger, not trying to fit a DLG inside it also. Or go 2nd class with smaller and less capsble jets, as ultimately we did and have.
 
True, but as Clauswitz said, “war is politics by other means”.

An Armoured Brigade, well, Corps, is a massive political statement that “we are here, and we’ll fight and die alongside you”.

A carrier group or several, entrenches the “fog in channel, continent shut off” view that the UK won’t be sharing the burden. Its not about the militart effect (a carrier force could still be fully commited and doing stuff) but the optics and the moral component (as Napoleon said, the moral is to the physical as 3 is to 1) that represents- if you are an ally, you have got to be in the trenches shoulder to shoulder.

Burden sharing is vital if alliances are to hold, you couldn’t have said to the French in 14-18 “you do the western front and die in millions, we’ll have even more dreadnoughts and bottle em up” as the French would have folded. Also look at the Soviet pressure to get the west on the ground in germany - they didnt believe our North African / Italian campaigns were us being serious.

Not to mention few nato partners genuinely could raise an armd corps and every corps that NATO had was needed vs the red horde.

Going further back, what kept Portugal from falling to Napoleon? The British Army sent there, what helped clear Spain and unravel him, the Army sent there. No Army = even bigger continental system and no way to get at it even if could have more SoL.

BAOR had 4 divisions in the 60s, IIUC a brigade was bought back to Britain in 1970 and returned to Germany in 1973, so there is some flexibility in the size of BAOR while still meeting NATO commitments.

To retain a pair of strike carriers throughout the 70s will likely mean the RN is bigger by maybe 5000 men, this will not collapse BAOR. Rather it will mean that brigade that was withdrawn in 1970 doesn't get returned and instead the manpower allocation within the overall armed forces cieling is transferred to the RN to man the big carriers.

In any case the land battle isn't the only thing that would happen in WW3, there would be major air-sea battles in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea in an attempt to cut the US off from Europe. So it's not as if the RN would be contributing nothing to NATO by retaining attack carrier capability.
 
BAOR had 4 divisions in the 60s, IIUC a brigade was bought back to Britain in 1970 and returned to Germany in 1973, so there is some flexibility in the size of BAOR while still meeting NATO commitments.
That was all a bit of sleight of hand. I’ve a book on the BAOR orbat and its apparant the number of actual combat units barely changes. The only major changes in manpower related to the end of NS. Which makes sense as there was neither an outbreak of accomodation building nor of reducing it (bar at least one RAF base got handed over direct to NATO).
To retain a pair of strike carriers throughout the 70s will likely mean the RN is bigger by maybe 5000 men, this will not collapse BAOR. Rather it will mean that brigade that was withdrawn in 1970 doesn't get returned and instead the manpower allocation within the overall armed forces cieling is transferred to the RN to man the big carriers.
The idea cutting a bde saves carriers is way out there, it’s barely a dent in the money needed. Not to mention the RN couldnt recruit to its actual targets - let alone higher ones.

And the land forces needed every Bde they had to have a chance.
In any case the land battle isn't the only thing that would happen in WW3, there would be major air-sea battles in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea in an attempt to cut the US off from Europe. So it's not as if the RN would be contributing nothing to NATO by retaining attack carrier capability.
But thats the point, I entirely agree the RN is contributing, those are deadly battles and important. Just not politically-strategically in the ongoing battle to keep everyone in NATO. Which is the only battle that ultimately counts.

The point is we had to be on the continent in strength, because alliances depend on allies being there beside each other in the trenches. Up off Norway or out in the Atlantic is vital militarily but isnt what cements NATO in the moral component. NATO has always had vulnerabilities in this area, naturally reflecting it is so many nations and trust/lack of is never going to be magicked away. The UK in AFCENTRE is fundamental to what helps assure NATO survives and endures in a tineframe with lots of Soviet (and domestic opponents) attempts at undermining that, it does indeed drive “keeping the Americans in”.

Granted the carriers offer flexibility vs BAOR mass, but then in 91 which did we need? In the 90s Balkans? In 2003-15? Land mass ti generate a deployed force or carriers?
 
Was NATO really in danger of breaking up in the 60s and 70s? I know that Britain was at odds with the Europeans about it's EoS efforts in the 60s, Britain wanted 'credit' from them for its role in generally deterring and containing the Soviets rather than having boots in Germany. However I doubt this issue was going to break up NATO, just like removing a brigade from BAOR in 1970 didn't and downgrading NATO Strike Group 2 to ASW Group 2 in 1979 when the Ark Royal was retired didn't.

In any case NATO wouldn't know the difference. If Britain had retained her attack carrier capabilities by building CVA01/02 and refitting the Eagle for Phantoms they'd simply announce they were reducing their carrier fleet from 4.5 to 3 and they were now available for NATO. There would be no hard decisions about carriers vs BAOR when the decision was being made in the late 60s, and when the hard decisions started to arise there would be a status quo to protect and in any case the service life of the Eagle offers and opportunity to decrease the size of the RN.
 
Was NATO really in danger of breaking up in the 60s and 70s?
Always a risk on the continent (Germany which feared devastation to it as the superpowers fought using it as their playground), the US isolationism of Trump is a repeating meme and of course France had just done one whilst the smaller powers have their own issues (Med nations), not to mention ahrd leftist infiltration and politics.

CENTO failed, SEATO failed. Notably both relied upon air/naval forces and limited permament troops and a core issue was lack of trust that nations would actually rock up on the dark day.

NATO hasnt and so its easy to take that for granted or as somehow historically ordained, but I think that’s a very mistaken view of history.

I know that Britain was at odds with the Europeans about it's EoS efforts in the 60s, Britain wanted 'credit' from them for its role in generally deterring and containing the Soviets rather than having boots in Germany. However I doubt this issue was going to break up NATO, just like removing a brigade from BAOR in 1970 didn't
Except as above that Bde was smoke and mirrors.
and downgrading NATO Strike Group 2 to ASW Group 2 in 1979 when the Ark Royal was retired didn't.
Good point - it illustrates you can get away with messing around with your naval forces because they arent intrinsic to the politicial society/cultural commitment that a feck ton of troops in Germany shows, and so dont have that same impact on your alliance.
In any case NATO wouldn't know the difference. If Britain had retained her attack carrier capabilities by building CVA01/02 and refitting the Eagle for Phantoms they'd simply announce they were reducing their carrier fleet from 4.5 to 3 and they were now available for NATO. There would be no hard decisions about carriers vs BAOR when the decision was being made in the late 60s,
?? There was no money for carriers, so something else has to give if they stay. Iirc the thing being discussed is BAOR.

It wasnt carriers vs BAOR in reality, but vs the RAF. But then that did get cut anyway (loss of overseas units and transport force).
and when the hard decisions started to arise there would be a status quo to protect and in any case the service life of the Eagle offers and opportunity to decrease the size of the RN.

I note you ignore the point about which of land mass or carriers has been more useful.
 
SSNs are key, they are the maritime capital ship as 82 showed and as you comment, in the SSBNs as the strategic force. Carriers are interesting now I think about it, really they are just land attack assets now. Want to control sea lanes? Use a sub. Even the WW2 Pacific carrier battles would be better fought by subs now.
Trying to fight the WW2 Pacific carrier battles with nuclear submarines would see a lot of flailing and little of substance accomplished. For all their vital strengths the fatal weakness of nuclear submarines in sea control is their lack of information gathering capability compared to an aircraft carrier. A submarine is dependent on its sonar system to detect anything, and that sonar system has far more limited range and compared to an aircraft carrier stuffed with radar-equipped aircraft that can be further enhanced by sensor pods.

Worse, a submarine that wants to stay hidden is a submarine that can barely receive information. Yes, there are methods to transmit information to a submarine underwater, but these are sharply data-limited. Certainly nothing compared to the wealth of off-board sensors that an aircraft carrier can quietly access the data of.

And WW2 carrier battles hinged on the ability to gather information. They still do, "hit first effectively" is still a core tenet of surface warfare and reconnaissance is vital.

Now, the RN's SSNs being the more important asset than the RN's strike carriers is a more defensible argument and one I don't feel the need to argue against. But it's a separate question.
 
Always a risk on the continent (Germany which feared devastation to it as the superpowers fought using it as their playground), the US isolationism of Trump is a repeating meme and of course France had just done one whilst the smaller powers have their own issues (Med nations), not to mention ahrd leftist infiltration and politics.

CENTO failed, SEATO failed. Notably both relied upon air/naval forces and limited permament troops and a core issue was lack of trust that nations would actually rock up on the dark day.

NATO hasnt and so its easy to take that for granted or as somehow historically ordained, but I think that’s a very mistaken view of history.


Except as above that Bde was smoke and mirrors.

Good point - it illustrates you can get away with messing around with your naval forces because they arent intrinsic to the politicial society/cultural commitment that a feck ton of troops in Germany shows, and so dont have that same impact on your alliance.

?? There was no money for carriers, so something else has to give if they stay. Iirc the thing being discussed is BAOR.

It wasnt carriers vs BAOR in reality, but vs the RAF. But then that did get cut anyway (loss of overseas units and transport force).


I note you ignore the point about which of land mass or carriers has been more useful.

NATO was vastly different in nature to SEATO and CENTO, it was formed voluntarily from self interest rather than being organised by outside powers. While it had tensions and issues it wasn't in serious jeopardy of breaking up.

There being no money for carriers is a big misnomer. There was money for the 13 million pound useless Tiger conversion, for the 32 million Ark Royal Phantomisation, for 3 Invincible class carriers and the development and production of 28+ Sea Harriers after discarding to the RAF some 40 Phantoms and 80 Buccaneers.

The RAF would be a loser with the RN carriers but they also wouldn't need to take on the naval support roles they did when the RN vacated the field.

As for Army mass, in the Cold War the British Army was about 165,000 strong, if going to 160,000 makes NATO collapse then they might as well give up and buy a white flag.

BAOR won't be disbanded for carriers, it will be reduced in numbers by 5-10% and the entire Army by 2%.

As for carriers vs Army mass, obviously carriers are more important as they take longer to build and make operational, whereas an increase in BAOR by 5-10% could be done within a couple of years with a redeployment of troops from Britain and elsewhere and a bump in recruiting (if possible).
 
Trying to fight the WW2 Pacific carrier battles with nuclear submarines would see a lot of flailing and little of substance accomplished. For all their vital strengths the fatal weakness of nuclear submarines in sea control is their lack of information gathering capability compared to an aircraft carrier. A submarine is dependent on its sonar system to detect anything, and that sonar system has far more limited range and compared to an aircraft carrier stuffed with radar-equipped aircraft that can be further enhanced by sensor pods.

Worse, a submarine that wants to stay hidden is a submarine that can barely receive information. Yes, there are methods to transmit information to a submarine underwater, but these are sharply data-limited. Certainly nothing compared to the wealth of off-board sensors that an aircraft carrier can quietly access the data of.

And WW2 carrier battles hinged on the ability to gather information. They still do, "hit first effectively" is still a core tenet of surface warfare and reconnaissance is vital.

Now, the RN's SSNs being the more important asset than the RN's strike carriers is a more defensible argument and one I don't feel the need to argue against. But it's a separate question.
Mine was a half formed thought on carriers, but the point was that to fight in the pacific of today I see the strike force as subs, not carriers tryng to sink each other.

The truly awesome US carrier force seems to be acting as a “we must use carriers to crack this nut” driver and hence the call for “super duper F14s” to try and defeat the impressively growing chinese air and naval forces in the island chain areas.

To me this is a mistake, the battle will be for control of the sea lanes, as it has always been, China’s (increasing) achillies heel is its dependence uppn import/export just as the UKs was when it was a manufacturing hub. So hit that, which doesnt require penetrating the china sea or even really the island chains (since the ship destinations are further afield). Subs as before are the killer threat, cued as ever by land, air and now space assets. Let the carriers sit back and not have to banzai run at the chinese defences which regardless of how uber the next jet is, seems certain death given the inherant mismatch between the ability to geebrate missile and air forces on land vs afloat.

So I’d see subs as the key, which seems backed by Aukus and the US focus on Virginia and future SSNs. Still need carriers sure, but F35 class is fine, especially if you have something like MQ25 to push them.
NATO was vastly different in nature to SEATO and CENTO, it was formed voluntarily from self interest rather than being organised by outside powers. While it had tensions and issues it wasn't in serious jeopardy of breaking up.
I think you’ve missed a lot of NATOs history and that of western europe tbh.

What kept it from breaking was precisely the common commitment to what was AFCENT, that for the UK is BAOR/2ATAF.
There being no money for carriers is a big misnomer. There was money for the 13 million pound useless Tiger conversion, for the 32 million Ark Royal Phantomisation, for 3 Invincible class carriers and the development and production of 28+ Sea Harriers after discarding to the RAF some 40 Phantoms and 80 Buccaneers.
Clearly there wasn’t the money as we don’t have them. Your costs dont even touch the sides of a CVA force.
The RAF would be a loser with the RN carriers but they also wouldn't need to take on the naval support roles they did when the RN vacated the field.
Handful of sqns, makes no difference.
As for Army mass, in the Cold War the British Army was about 165,000 strong, if going to 160,000 makes NATO collapse then they might as well give up and buy a white flag.
Again, the RN couldn’t recruit/retain its actual numbers let alone 5k more. The idea 5k less Army buys and mans you carriers is just weird frankly.

BAOR won't be disbanded for carriers, it will be reduced in numbers by 5-10% and the entire Army by 2%.
Which wont get you carriers. The Army was getting salami sliced like that anyway and what kept stopping more was concerns over NATO commitment. If they could keep slicing BAOR they would have and just taken the saving.
As for carriers vs Army mass, obviously carriers are more important as they take longer to build and make operational, whereas an increase in BAOR by 5-10% could be done within a couple of years with a redeployment of troops from Britain and elsewhere and a bump in recruiting (if possible).
That flies in the face of the reality of what we’ve actually used. Armd mass 91, armd/mech mass for rotation and deployment 90s balkans, armd mass for 2003 and deployment rotations through to 2015. At no point would CVA carriers have added much value vs what we had to do which was troops on the ground.

Plus the idea you can build a combined arms battlewinning armoured force quickly is just silly, the Army struggles to retain it as it is. Complex fighting is something all services do, and Ajax rivals the carriers in time and cost to generate…

Ukraine also shows how hard it is to generate winning land forces quickly by expansion.

This meme some people had that “if we just shaft another part of defence we can have these glorious shiney toys”, its puerile. The carriers were built on EoS and that as realised wasn’t worth the cost hence why all the forces (RAF and Army) assigned to it disappeared. If it hadn’t been for Sandy’s having bigger issues to face they’d have gone a decade earlier.
 
SSNs are key, they are the maritime capital ship as 82 showed and as you comment, in the SSBNs as the strategic force. Carriers are interesting now I think about it, really they are just land attack assets now. Want to control sea lanes? Use a sub.
Sure, park some subs at the choke points.


Even the WW2 Pacific carrier battles would be better fought by subs now.
No.

Just no.

Subs, even modern subs, have a very small detection bubble relative to a carrier. They won't find that carrier group in the Coral Sea at 250nmi away, not with all the sensors they have onboard. Subs would require some form of off-board targeting, whether aircraft or satellites, and they'd be extremely vulnerable to detection by enemy air and satellite while getting the news.
 
The RN made a deliberate decision to focus on its main "enemy fleet in being" in 1966 which was the ever growing Soviet submarine fleet in the N Atlantic so it deployed Seaking helos, Ikara equipped Leanders and T22 frigates with Lynx.
CVA01 and its airgroup would have been of little use in this key role and of marginal value against Soviet forces defending the Kola peninsular or attacking Norway which required F14s.
 
The success of the UK is tied to not being invaded.
Not being invaded is intimately bound to the strength of naval power....perhaps now including air power.
But naval power, even to the raising of a National Debt preceeded the economic growth, security of trade yielded from naval power.

The foreign policy of the UK was tied to the fact it could not afford large standing armies and large naval forces simultaneously.
So in a choice the Defence of the Realm trumps grandstanding with armies for the benefit of the egos of politicians and generals.

Since abandoning the quest to conquer France, England has used small Armies placed where it benefits us the most by naval power. There is no land bridge to Portugal.

UK has declined since it chose to try to stand up armies of continental scale and permanently cite them overseas.

It has certainly served the interests of those who want the UK diminished, contained and unable to exert much force beyond the North European Plain.

The BAOR was nothing more than a speed bump in the path of Soviet armour. It's purpose was to delay or justify the nuclear horror it's defeat would initiate. Only in the 80's with advancing technologies did it seem possible that a conventional land war might be winnable through superior attrition ratios.

UK75 is correct to argue the choice was between SSN and CV
 
The funny thing about these discussions is that the British recognized the decision to abandon conventional carriers for ASW Command Cruisers was a mistake almost immediately and spent decades trying to rectify this mistake. The first thing they did was develop the Sea Harrier from 1975, as the I class was designed without reference to the Harrier, which is why the first 2 could only have a 7 degree ski jump. Then the amount of Sea Harriers was increased from 5 to 6 then 10 were crammed in for the Falklands. Then AEW helicopters were added, then the Sea Dart was removed for magazine and deck parking space. This allowed RAF Harriers to be added to the CAG, up to 18 on occasion with 12 being more common.

18 Sea and GR7 Harriers is approaching the size of the Ark Royals final CAG, but only reached after years of remediation and expense.
 
as the I class was designed without reference to the Harrier
Nope, not true.
Naval Staff Requirement NSR 7097 for the Command Cruiser, approved in February 1970 called for an airgroup of 9x ASW helicopters and 3x Harriers (RAF GR.1s) with "reasonable provision" for a successor to Sea King and provision for future a V/STOL to be based on P.1179 (which then the cutting-edge British V/STOL design).

Weapons stowage for the airgroup was:
Helicopters: 54x A/S torpedoes, 12x WE.177A, up to 24x Mk.11 Depth Charges; 24x 5in &12x 4.5in Reconnaissance Flares
V/STOL aircraft: 40x 68mm SNEB pods, 1527x 30mm ADEN rounds, 18x 1,000lb bombs, plus provision for 12x Martel (replacing 1,000lb bombs) and 16x Sidewinder/Taildog for Harrier Successor only. [of course Harrier never carried Martel in service and WE.177A was later used on the FRS.1 Sea Harrier, in theory it might have been possible to use it on the GR1]

The implication is that initially the Command Cruisers/Invincible-class would have carried Harrier GR.1s for support and anti-ship missions and that air defence would come about when a supersonic V/STOL was developed later in the 1970s based on P.1179. This of course would coincide with the withdrawal of the last strike carrier, but it shows that even in 1970 the RN had a plan to maintain fighter air defence, they just kept their powder dry.
 
You learn something every day! I can't say I'm surprised, it struck me as odd that the ship would be designed without reference to the Harrier even though there had been trials on all sorts of ships since 1963.

The real question is why 1527 x 30mm Aden rounds? Why not 1528 or 1526 or some other oddly specific number?

My point still stands, a ship designed for 3 Harriers wound up carrying 18, a massive increase.
 
A second ship could have been in service by 1972 and a third by 1976.
With the oil crisis in 1973, devaluation of the pound in 1974, and the IMF bailout in 1976 I think any prospective third carrier would likely sail out of the yard, be put through it's acceptance trials, and then placed straight into the reserves.


I just thought about a CVA-01 with Resolution-class boomers nuclear reactors.
If the US was willing to heavily support the UK with regards to submarine reactors I think the more likely path would be to look at doing similarly for carriers.

IIRC from the last time I looked at things though the problem with nuclear propulsion is the large gaps between building, refuelling, and decommissioning. The US has a large enough number of ships that they're continuously progressing through, the UK with years-long gaps would be at risk of skills atrophy and having to re-learn things every so often.
 
Certainly with the PWR-1 it's possible more could have been built and although not ideal, they could have just been part of the existing sustainment.

It's specialist large carrier reactors that would suffer from stop go.
 
Not that I think CVA01 should go nuclear, but if the British nuclear industry can support 6 SSN and 4 SSBN PWR1 reactors by the early 70s why couldn't it support A3W carrier reactors? Sure the details will be different, but the basic principles and materials will be the same.
 
Not that I think CVA01 should go nuclear, but if the British nuclear industry can support 6 SSN and 4 SSBN PWR1 reactors by the early 70s why couldn't it support A3W carrier reactors? Sure the details will be different, but the basic principles and materials will be the same.
It'd require the USN to share the technical data package. And the UK to find enough uranium to fuel those, but I'm not sure how tight the UK's fissionable production was.

It took some serious arm twisting to get Rickover to release a single S5W. I can't see anyone successfully convincing Rickover to part with A3Ws.
 
There's apparently a law on the books that makes the USN consider nuclear power for any large ship. For the San Antonio class the analysis put the break even point at $140/barrel for oil: as long as oil stayed below $140/barrel it was cheaper to not use nuclear power.

You have additional information on that ?
 
And the UK to find enough uranium to fuel those, but I'm not sure how tight the UK's fissionable production was.

Interesting point. By the early-mid 60s Britain had a bunch of commercial reactors using natural uranium, apparently there was a fear that enrichment supply would outstrip demand. There was also a number of trials reactors that were connected to the grid, to see what type would be the next generation, these types used enriched uranium and it had become clear by the 70s that enrichment supply would be fine. And of course Britain was using HEU for its nuke subs and weapons.

So when the decision would have been made to go nuke with CVA01 there was a concern for the supply of enriched uranium, but that risk wasn't realised by the time the ship would have been ready for service.
 
Well, the ship works as intended after some initial problems. In the PA2 debate, they were considered for up to 60k tons /26 kts or so. They have some excess power that the propulsion system of CdG cannot use, no idea why. The screw problem alone seems too minor?
CdG has steam-operated aircraft catapults, the steam for which comes from the same steam-generating plant as that for the propulsion turbines - so having extra generating capacity IS a good thing!

Basically all carriers that were not designed for steam catapults, but which got them added later in life, had to take the catapult steam out of the propulsion allotment - meaning they had a reduced top speed while launching aircraft!

The French wisely designed their steam-generation capability for both high speed and aircraft launching at the same time.
 
There's apparently a law on the books that makes the USN consider nuclear power for any large ship.

I was under the same impression, but it turns out to apply only to Submarines, Carriers, Cruisers, & other "large surface combatants" designed to protect other ships.

So maybe "large destroyers" as well, but not amphibious warships.

US law on nuclear-powered warships.jpg


I note a distinct lack of definition for the word "large".
 
I was under the same impression, but it turns out to apply only to Submarines, Carriers, Cruisers, & other "large surface combatants" designed to protect other ships.

So maybe "large destroyers" as well, but not amphibious warships.

View attachment 729060


I note a distinct lack of definition for the word "large".
Yet there was a sufficiently detailed analysis done for the America class that they came up with the oil cost per barrel to break even...

Edit: that's also apparently the 2008 version of the law. I was still in when I read that analysis, so it was before 2006 (and I think before 2003)
 
CdG has steam-operated aircraft catapults, the steam for which comes from the same steam-generating plant as that for the propulsion turbines - so having extra generating capacity IS a good thing!

Basically all carriers that were not designed for steam catapults, but which got them added later in life, had to take the catapult steam out of the propulsion allotment - meaning they had a reduced top speed while launching aircraft!

The French wisely designed their steam-generation capability for both high speed and aircraft launching at the same time.

If I understood that correctly the two K15s could be maxed out to get a 60k ton carrier to 26kts with the necessary capacity for catapults and electricity generation as in CdG.
There was a more detailed study of a "Porte-avions nucléaire enveloppe" up to 55k tons based on two K15. http://ffaa.net/ships/aircraft-carrier/pa2/pa2_fr.htm
 
The French carrier was originally planned in the 1970s as a helicopter carrier (PH75).
 
The Royal Navy faced having a steam boilered carrier entering service in the 70s when her escorts were moving to gas turbines
However Fearless/Intrepid also used this system in the expected lifetime of CVA01
Without nuclear power the RN has had to abandon catapults and arguably build ships inferior to De Gaulle
.
 
So in theory an AH might contain a UK developed surface ship nuclear plant and this would logically be realised during the 70's.
Which is essentially the high point of UK nuclear industry, and the period when France was sending people to learn from the UK nuclear sector.

Ironic considering the 70's oil crisis. But in real life the period of humiliation where the UK has to go cap in hand to the IMF.

But this was also the period of other nuclear powered versions of certain warships wereat least briefly examined....

Yet had this come about, it might actually be a design the UK can share with the French. Which would have considerable knock on effects.
 
CdG has steam-operated aircraft catapults, the steam for which comes from the same steam-generating plant as that for the propulsion turbines - so having extra generating capacity IS a good thing!

Basically all carriers that were not designed for steam catapults, but which got them added later in life, had to take the catapult steam out of the propulsion allotment - meaning they had a reduced top speed while launching aircraft!

The French wisely designed their steam-generation capability for both high speed and aircraft launching at the same time.

Pity the internal combustion catapult went nowhere.....
 
So in theory an AH might contain a UK developed surface ship nuclear plant and this would logically be realised during the 70's.
Which is essentially the high point of UK nuclear industry, and the period when France was sending people to learn from the UK nuclear sector.

Ironic considering the 70's oil crisis. But in real life the period of humiliation where the UK has to go cap in hand to the IMF.

But this was also the period of other nuclear powered versions of certain warships wereat least briefly examined....

Yet had this come about, it might actually be a design the UK can share with the French. Which would have considerable knock on effects.
Agreed, the best time to push for a nuclear powered UKRN carrier is the 1970s.

2x scaled up PWR1s, steam cats, etc. Then if the carrier reactors can fit into a 39ft hull, you stick them into the Vanguard class in the 1980s.
 
Nuclear power plants for carriers is good, but even the cashed up Americans took several false starts to settle on nuclear carriers. The USS America eas supposed to be a repeat of the Enterprise but this was cancelled in favour of conventional propulsion. Similarly the JFK was supposed to have 4 A3W reactors but this was changed to oil again because of the cost. It wasn't until 1968 with the Nimitz's 2 A4W reactors that nuclear carriers became the standard.

This is right in the decision window for CVA01, and if the US is not going nuclear because of the cost it would be unusual for the tightwad British to find the cash.
 
Pity the internal combustion catapult went nowhere.....
On that PMN1, it might already be known and appreciated by the forum, but I found the following in relation to the said "internal combustion catapult"


Regards
Pioneer
 
Nuclear power plants for carriers is good, but even the cashed up Americans took several false starts to settle on nuclear carriers. The USS America eas supposed to be a repeat of the Enterprise but this was cancelled in favour of conventional propulsion. Similarly the JFK was supposed to have 4 A3W reactors but this was changed to oil again because of the cost. It wasn't until 1968 with the Nimitz's 2 A4W reactors that nuclear carriers became the standard.

This is right in the decision window for CVA01, and if the US is not going nuclear because of the cost it would be unusual for the tightwad British to find the cash.
Part of the problem with Enterprise was the sheer number of reactors made for extra shielding between reactors and an immense amount of maintenance. 8x reactors, at least 8x steam generators, at least 8x reactor cooling pumps, 8x Main Engines, 8x condensate pumps... (4x shafts means 4x reduction gears, whether there's 8x main engines or 4x). Plus a lot more manning, since each reactor needs a full set of operators.

This would have been obvious to everyone.

So a nuclear CVA01 with 4x PWR1s is unlikely. But if the British could scale up that PWR1 core to double the power, a design with 2x "PWR2s" (or PWR1*, whatever you call it) would be reasonable.
 
Sure, but the JFK would have had 4 A3W reactors therefore only half that problem. My guess is that the experience of Rolling Thunder showed that the huge cost of nuclear propulsion was worth it.

I don't think the British would scale up the PWR1, I think they'd buy or build the A3W.
 

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